

**Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of the Application of)	
)	
PAUL R. LIKINS)	FCC File No. 9600013
)	
Request for Reinstatement <i>Nunc Pro Tunc</i> and/or)	
Stay of Processing Action)	

ORDER

Adopted: March 28, 2000

Released: March 30, 2000

By the Chief, Public Safety and Private Wireless Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau:

1. *Introduction.* This Order addresses a request filed by Paul R. Likins (Likins) on October 1, 1999,¹ to reinstate *nunc pro tunc* the above-captioned application or, in the alternative, stay the dismissal² of the application. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the request.

2. *Background.* On March 29, 1995, an application filed by GHz Equipment Company (GEC) seeking authorization to operate a point-to-point microwave station on the 38.6-40.0 GHz (39 GHz) band in the Colorado Springs area was placed on public notice.³ The cut-off date for competing applications was May 28, 1995. On October 2, 1995, Likins filed an application for authorization to operate a point-to-point microwave station in the 39 GHz band in Colorado Springs, which was placed on public notice on October 18, 1995.⁴ One portion of Likins's application sought authorization to operate on facilities in the 38950-39000 MHz band, which overlapped with GEC's application. The other portion of Likins' application sought authorization to operate facilities in the 39650-39700 MHz band.

3. On December 15, 1995, the Commission suspended the processing of pending mutually exclusive 39 GHz applications and the filing of amendments thereto, pending the outcome of a rulemaking proceeding affecting this service.⁵ In a *Report and Order and Second NPRM*, released on November 3, 1997, the Commission stated that it would 1) "dismiss without prejudice all pending mutually exclusive applications, unless the mutual exclusivity was resolved by an amendment of right filed before December 15, 1995," and 2) "dismiss without prejudice all applications that had not been

¹Letter from Walter H. Sonnenfeldt, counsel for Paul R. Likins, to Mary M. Shultz, Chief, Licensing and Technical Analysis Branch, Public Safety and Private Wireless Division (filed Oct. 1, 1999) (Request).

²Letter from Mary M. Shultz, Chief, Licensing and Technical Analysis Branch, Public Safety and Private Wireless Division to Walter H. Sonnenfeldt, counsel for Paul R. Likins (August 26, 1999) (Dismissal Letter).

³FCC File No. 9502839. *Public Notice*, Report No. 1128 (rel. Mar. 29, 1992).

⁴FCC File No. 960014. *Public Notice*, Report No. 1157 (rel. Oct. 18, 1995).

⁵Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding the 37.0-38.6 GHz and 38.6-40.0 GHz Bands, *Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Order*, ET Docket No. 95-183, 11 FCC Rcd 4930, 4988-4989 ¶ 123 (1995) (*NPRM and Order*).

placed on public notice or completed the 60-day cut-off period as of November 13, 1995.”⁶ On July 29, 1999, the Commission affirmed its license processing rules in a *Memorandum Opinion and Order* and reiterated that it would “dismiss all amendments, filed on or after December 15, 1995, including those intended to resolve mutual exclusivity among pending 39 GHz applications.”⁷ The Commission further decided to dismiss as unripe “those applications for which the 30-day public notice period was not completed by the November 13, 1995 *Freeze Order*” date.⁸

4. On August 26, 1999, the Public Safety and Private Wireless Division, Licensing and Technical Analysis Branch (Branch) dismissed Likins’s application.⁹ The mutually exclusive portion of the application had been filed after the sixty-day cut-off period created by the GEC application, thus, pursuant to Section 101.45(b) of the Commission’s Rules, it was untimely.¹⁰ The remaining portion of the application was dismissed because that portion had not satisfied the thirty-day public notice requirement as of November 13, 1995.¹¹

5. *Discussion.* Likins notes that he has filed an appeal seeking judicial review of the Commission’s 39 GHz orders.¹² Likins states that one of the issues in that case is the Commission’s treatment regarding the “the rights of applicants to resolve mutual exclusivity conflicts that existed after December 15, 1995.”¹³ Likins argues that, given the pendency of an appeal raising issues determinative to the resolution of his application, the application should be reinstated or, in the alternative, the dismissal should be stayed.¹⁴ Likins contends that granting the requested relief would serve the public interest, convenience and necessity by “eliminating the need for additional duplicative litigation” and helping to “remove uncertainties as to the availability of the subject frequency assignments with respect to the contemplated competitive bidding process.”¹⁵

6. To receive a stay of an administrative action, a party must show that: 1) it will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted, 2) it is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal, 3) the grant

⁶See Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Regarding the 37.0-38.6 GHz and 38.6-40.0 GHz Bands, *Report and Order and Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, ET Docket No. 95-183, 12 FCC Rcd 18600, 18605 ¶ 3 (1997) (*Report and Order and Second NPRM*).

⁷Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Regarding the 37.0-38.6 GHz and 38.6-40.0 GHz Bands, *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, ET Docket No. 95-183, 14 FCC Rcd 12428, 12440-12448 ¶ 37 (1999) (*July 29 MO&O*).

⁸*Id.* at 12450-12452 ¶ 44.

⁹Dismissal Letter at 1.

¹⁰47 C.F.R. § 101.45(b).

¹¹Dismissal Letter at 1.

¹²See *Bachow Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, Case No. 99-1346 (consolidating Case Nos. 99-1361 and 99-1362) (D.C. Cir. 1999).

¹³Request at 2.

¹⁴*Id.*

¹⁵*Id.*

of a stay will not harm other interested parties, and 4) the grant would serve the public interest.¹⁶ As the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) explained in a recent *Order* denying a motion for stay of dismissals in the 39 GHz band, a vague assertion of irreparable harm is insufficient to justify injunctive relief, as it fails to demonstrate an injury that is “certain and great. . . not theoretical.”¹⁷ We are not persuaded that the types of injuries Likins mentions are sufficient to warrant a stay. Anticipated economic loss “does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.”¹⁸ Likewise, Likins has not demonstrated that the purported harm is irreparable. In this connection, we note that if he were to prevail in his judicial appeal of the Commission’s order regarding the dismissal of the subject application, we anticipate that such relief would address the ultimate disposition of the application.¹⁹ Therefore, we find that Likins has not shown any injury warranting a stay.²⁰

7. In addition, we find Likins’ alternate request that we reinstate his applications until his judicial appeal is resolved effectively to be a restatement of his request for a stay, so we deny that request, as well. Moreover, reinstating Likins’ applications would frustrate the goals underlying this proceeding and “could lead to results inconsistent with our intent . . . to update the regulatory structure of the 39 GHz band in light of contemporary market conditions.”²¹ Further, we believe that the Bureau addressed this matter in its November 23, 1999, decision.

8. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Sections 154(i) and 405 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 405, and Sections 1.41 and 1.106 of the Commission’s Rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.41, 1.106, the Request for Reinstatement *Nunc Pro Tunc* and/or Stay of Processing Action for File Number 9600013 filed on October 1, 1999, by Paul R. Likins IS DENIED.

¹⁶See *Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. FPC*, 259 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (*Virginia Petroleum*), as revised by *Washington Metropolitan Area Transit System v. Holiday Tours, Inc.*, 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

¹⁷Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Regarding the 37.0–38.6 GHz and 38.6–40.0 GHz Bands, *Order*, ET Docket No. 95-183, RM-8553, DA 99-2632, ¶ 2 (WTB rel. Nov. 23, 1999) (citation omitted).

¹⁸*Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC*, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (*Wisconsin Gas*); see also *Virginia Petroleum*, 259 F.2d at 925 (“mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough”).

¹⁹See 47 U.S.C. § 402(h).

²⁰Where, as here, petitioner fails to show that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, we need not consider the other requirements for a stay. *Wisconsin Gas*, 758 F.2d at 674.

²¹*July 29 MO&O*, 14 FCC Rcd at 12437-38; *Report and Order and Second NPRM*, 12 FCC Rcd at 2917 ¶ 15; *NPRM and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 4988-89 ¶¶ 121-124.

9. This action is taken under delegated authority pursuant to Sections 0.131 and 0.331 of the Commission's Rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.131, 0.331.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

D'wana R. Terry
Chief, Public Safety and Private Wireless Division
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau