PUBLIC NOTICE
Federal Communications Commission
445 12th St., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554
News Media Information 202 / 418-0500
Internet: http://www.fcc.gov
TTY: 1-888-835-5322
DA 07-2222
May 25, 2007
REPORT ON RESULTS OF ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS COMPARING
PERFORMANCE PROPERTIES OF
CERTAIN SIMULTANEOUS MULTIPLE ROUND SPECTRUM LICENSE AUCTIONS
WITH PACKAGE BIDDING
By this Public Notice, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau hereby makes available a report 
on the results of new economic experiments examining the performance properties of two specific designs 
for simultaneous multiple round auctions with package bidding.  
The economic experiments were conducted as a follow-up to an earlier study that had examined 
two other Commission auction formats - the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) auction that typically 
has been used in FCC spectrum license auctions, and an auction design that allowed for package bidding.1
 
The study was conducted by Professors Jacob K. Goeree of the California Institute of 
Technology,  Charles A. Holt of the University of Virginia, and John Ledyard of the California Institute 
of Technology through Net Exchange, Inc. The report on the results of the economic experiments will be 
posted on the web at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=papers_studies.
For further information, contact:  
Dr. Martha Stancill, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, (202) 418-7015
- FCC -
  
1 See Report On Results Of Economic Experiments Examining Performance Properties Of Simultaneous Multiple 
Round Spectrum License Auctions With And Without Combinatorial Bidding, Public Notice, FCC 06-1444 (rel. 
July 14, 2006).