Federal Communications Commission DA 07-347
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Sprint Communications Corporation
Complaint Regarding 
Unauthorized Change of
Subscriber’s Telecommunications Carrier
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IC No. 02-S80030
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION 
Adopted: January 29, 2007 Released: January 29, 2007
By the Deputy Chief, Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau:
1. In this Order, we deny a Petition for Reconsideration filed by Sprint Communications 
Corporation (Sprint)1 asking us to reverse a finding that Sprint changed Complainant’s 
telecommunications service provider in violation of the Commission’s rules by failing to obtain proper 
authorization and verification.2 On reconsideration, we affirm that Sprint’s actions violated the 
Commission’s carrier change rules.3
I.  BACKGROUND
2. In December 1998, the Commission adopted rules prohibiting the practice of 
“slamming,” the submission or execution of an unauthorized change in a subscriber’s selection of a 
provider of telephone exchange service or telephone toll service.4  The rules were designed to take the 
profit out of slamming.5 The Commission applied the rules to all wireline carriers,6 and modified its 
existing requirements for the authorization and verification of preferred carrier changes.7
 
  
1 See Petition for Reconsideration of Sprint Communications Co. L.P. (filed May 23, 2003) (Petition) seeking 
reconsideration of Sprint Communications Corporation, 18 FCC Rcd 8275 (2003) (Division Order), issued by the 
Consumer Policy Division (Division), Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau (CGB).
2 See Division Order, 18 FCC Rcd 8275 (2003).
3 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1100 – 64.1190.  
4 See id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 258(a).  
5 See Implementation of the Subscriber Carrier Selection Changes Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996; Policies and Rules Concerning Unauthorized Changes of Consumers’ Long Distance Carriers, CC Docket 
No. 94-129, Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 1508, 1512, para. 
4 (1998) (Section 258 Order).  See also id. at 1518-19, para. 13.
6 See id. at 1560, para. 85.  CMRS providers were exempted from the verification requirements.  See Section 258 
Order at 1560-61, para. 85.
7 See Section 258 Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 1549, para. 66.
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3. The rules require that a submitting carrier receive individual subscriber consent before a 
carrier change may occur.8  Specifically, a carrier must:  (1) obtain the subscriber's written or 
electronically signed authorization; (2) obtain confirmation from the subscriber via a toll-free number 
provided exclusively for the purpose of confirming orders electronically; or (3) utilize an independent 
third party to verify the subscriber's order.9
4. The Commission also adopted liability rules for carriers that engage in slamming.10  If 
the subscriber has not already paid charges to the unauthorized carrier, the subscriber is absolved of 
liability for charges imposed by the unauthorized carrier for service provided during the first 30 days after 
the unauthorized change.11 Where the subscriber has paid charges to the unauthorized carrier, the 
unauthorized carrier must pay 150% of those charges to the authorized carrier, and the authorized carrier 
must refund or credit to the subscriber 50% of all charges paid by the subscriber to the unauthorized 
carrier.12
5. The Commission received a complaint on August 2, 2002, alleging that Complainant’s 
telecommunications service provider had been changed from its authorized carrier to Sprint without 
Complainant’s authorization.13 Pursuant to Sections 1.719 and 64.1150 of the Commission’s rules,14
CGB notified Sprint of the complaint.15  In its response, Sprint stated that it verified Complainant’s order 
using third party verification (TPV), and it provided a recording of that verification.16 In the Division 
Order, the Division determined that Complainant did not respond to the verifier’s query as to whether 
Complainant wanted to switch his service and, thus, found that Sprint failed to produce clear and 
convincing evidence that Complainant authorized a carrier change.17  Sprint seeks reconsideration of the 
Division Order.
II.  DISCUSSION
6. Based on the record before us, we affirm the Division Order and deny Sprint’s Petition.  
Commission rules state that a third party verifier must elicit from the subscriber confirmation that the 
  
8 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1120.  See also 47 U.S.C. § 258(a).
9 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1120(c).  Section 64.1130 details the requirements for letter of agency form and content for 
written or electronically signed authorizations.  47 C.F.R. § 64.1130.
10 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1140, 64.1160-70.
11 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1140, 64.1160 (any charges imposed by the unauthorized carrier on the subscriber for 
service provided after this 30-day period shall be paid by the subscriber to the authorized carrier at the rates the 
subscriber was paying to the authorized carrier at the time of the unauthorized change).
12 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1140, 64.1170.
13 Informal Complaint No. IC 02-S80030, filed August 2, 2002.
14 47 C.F.R. § 1.719 (procedures for informal complaints filed pursuant to Section 258 of the Act); 47 C.F.R. § 
64.1150 (procedures for resolution of unauthorized changes in preferred carrier).
15 See Notice of Informal Complaint No. IC 02-S80030 to Sprint from the Deputy Chief, CGB, dated September 
13, 2002.
16 Sprint’s Response to Informal Complaint No. IC 02-S80030, received October 22, 2002.
17 See Division Order, 18 FCC Rcd 8275 (2003).
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subscriber wants to make the carrier change.18 In its Petition, Sprint states that the TPV agent identifies 
himself and says, “I would like to confirm your Sprint order for long distance on your home phone 
number….” Sprint claims it is clear the customer is being asked to confirm the switch of his long 
distance service to Sprint.19  According to Sprint, the part of the TPV the Commission found problematic 
involves the specific language used to verify the request for Sprint long distance service for 
Complainant’s telephone line.20
7. On the TPV recording, Sprint’s verifier asks the consumer, “The number you are 
authorizing Sprint to switch from your current carrier for your long distance on your home phone is
[Complainant’s phone number].  Is this correct?”  The person on the line answers, “Yea that’s the phone 
number for my house.”  Sprint argues that “Yea” evidences the consumer’s confirmation both that the 
telephone number was the consumer’s number and that the customer wanted to switch the phone number 
to Sprint.21  Sprint claims, “That’s the phone number for my house,” is additional, random information the 
consumer provides and does not relate to “Yea.”22 After reviewing the tape, we disagree with Sprint’s 
interpretation.  The statement, “Yea that’s the phone number for my house” is spoken without a pause that 
would denote two independent statements.  In fact, the evidence points to the opposite interpretation, i.e.,
the person on the recording is making one statement that confirms only that the number spoken by the 
verifier is Complainant’s and is not also a confirmation of a desire to switch telephone service providers.   
8. In addition, Sprint argues that the customer gave his consent two more times when the 
verifier asks, “Is that correct?” and “Is that a yes?”23  However, it is clear from the recording that the 
customer’s answers to the follow-up questions only confirmed the same information regarding his 
telephone number.  Sprint also argues that the conversation between the customer and the verifier, during 
which the verifier mentions Sprint’s 800 number, indicates that the consumer wanted to switch his service 
to Sprint.24  We disagree.  The person might, for example, have wanted to call the 800 number for 
additional information to help him decide whether to switch service.25  We continue to believe that Sprint 
did not provide “clear and convincing” evidence of an authorized carrier change as required by the 
Commission’s rules. Accordingly, we deny Sprint’s Petition.  
III.  ORDERING CLAUSES
9. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 258 of the Communications Act 
of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 258, and Sections 0.141, 0.361, 1.106 and 1.719 of the Commission’s 
  
18 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1120(c)(3)(iii).
19 See Petition at 2.
20 See id.  
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See Petition at 2.
24 See id. at 3.
25 After the verifier thanked the person on the recording, the latter responded, “Yeah so the phone, I can call right 
now, right?”  The verifier responded, “That I don’t know, sir.”  The person on the recording:  “Uh, you don’t 
know?”  Verifier:  No, sir, the 800 number I gave you, did you write that down?”  The person on the recording:    
“Oh, no, hold on please.  OK, it’s ah, 1-800…”  Verifier:  “Yes, 877.”  The person on the recording then repeats 
what the verifier stated regarding the 1-800 phone number.  
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rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.141, 0.361, 1.106, 1.719, the petition for reconsideration filed by Sprint on May 23, 
2003, IS DENIED.
10. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order is effective UPON RELEASE.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Catherine W. Seidel, Chief
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau