Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C.  20554
 
MAP Mobile Communications, Inc.,
Complainant,
v.
Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell 
Telephone Company, Incorporated, Michigan 
Bell Telephone Company, The Ohio Bell 
Telephone Company, Wisconsin Bell, Inc.,  
Pacific Bell Telephone Company, and
Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P.,                  
Defendants.
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File No. EB-05-MD-013
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Adopted:  May 13, 2009 Released:  May 13, 2009
By the Chief, Enforcement Bureau:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, we grant in part and otherwise dismiss or deny 
the claims alleged in the formal complaint1 that MAP Mobile Communications, Inc. (“MAP”) filed 
against Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated, Michigan Bell 
Telephone Company, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, and Wisconsin Bell, Inc. (collectively, the 
“Midwest ILECs”), and against Pacific Bell Telephone Company (“PacBell”) and Southwestern Bell 
Telephone, L.P. (“SWBT”) under section 208 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (“Act”).2  
In short, the Complaint alleges that Defendants violated sections 201(b), 251(b)(5), and 415 of the Act,3
and sections 20.11, 51.703, and 64.2401 of the Commission’s rules,4 by (a) unlawfully charging MAP for 
  
1 Complaint, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed July 12, 2005) (“Complaint”).
2 47 U.S.C. § 208.  MAP initially named SBC Communications, Inc. (“SBC”), Ameritech Corporation 
(“Ameritech”), and Pacific Bell Communications as defendants.  Complaint at 1.  In their Answer, Defendants 
argued that MAP incorrectly identified those entities as defendants.  Defendants’ Answer, File No. EB-05-MD-013 
(filed Aug. 11, 2005) (“Answer”) at 3, ¶ 2.  The parties subsequently stipulated that the real parties in interest are the 
Midwest ILECs, PacBell, and SWBT.  Supplemental Joint Statement of Complainant and Defendants, File No. EB-
05-MD-013 (filed Nov. 2, 2005) (“Supplemental Joint Statement”) at 10, ¶ 28.  We have modified the caption in this 
case accordingly, and hereby dismiss SBC, Ameritech, and Pacific Bell Communications as parties, without 
prejudice.
3 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 251(b)(5), and 415.
4 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.11, 51.703, and 64.2401.
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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(i) transport and termination of Defendant-originated traffic and (ii) services that MAP cancelled or never 
requested; (b) failing to pay MAP for terminating local traffic; (c) providing unclear and confusing bills; 
and (d) demanding payment of charges that were more than two years old.5 MAP bifurcated its claims for 
damages pursuant to the Commission’s rules,6 and thus this Order addresses MAP’s liability claims only.7
2. As explained below, we dismiss without prejudice those portions of the Complaint that 
relate to PacBell, because MAP’s interconnection agreement with PacBell requires MAP to resolve its 
claims against PacBell in a proceeding before the California Public Utilities Commission (“California 
PUC”).  Moreover, we grant MAP’s claims alleging that the Midwest ILECs and SWBT violated section 
201(b) of the Act and section 51.703(b) of the Commission’s rules by charging MAP for the transport and 
termination of certain intraMTA traffic that originated on their networks.  Because our ruling under 
section 201(b) of the Act and section 51.703 of the Commission rules will afford MAP all the relief to 
which it is entitled for the unlawful transport and termination charges, we find it unnecessary to address 
counts in the Complaint alleging that these charges also violated section 251(b)(5) of the Act, and we 
dismiss those counts without prejudice.  We deny MAP’s other claims.
II. BACKGROUND
3. MAP is a Commercial Mobile Radio Service (“CMRS”) carrier that provided one-way 
paging services in California and several Midwestern states from the mid-1990s until 2004.8 SWBT, 
PacBell, and the Midwest ILECs are all incumbent local exchange carriers (“incumbent LECs”) under the 
Act.9  
4. To provide its paging services, MAP interconnected its network with the public switched 
telephone network in Defendants’ service areas via interconnection facilities MAP ordered from 
Defendants.10 In 1998, MAP and PacBell entered into an interconnection agreement pursuant to section 
252(i) of the Act.11 MAP never executed an interconnection agreement with either SWBT or the Midwest 
ILECs, however.12 Instead, beginning in the mid-1990s, MAP ordered various interconnection facilities 
from SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ tariffs, and SWBT and the Midwest ILECs billed MAP for these 
  
5 See, e.g., Complaint at 8-21, ¶¶ 15, 16, 19-32, 36-44; 24-26, ¶¶ 51, 54, 56, 57; 28-31, ¶¶ 61-66, 69-71.  MAP listed 
two counts in its Complaint as Count XVIII alleging separate violations of sections 64.2401(b) and 64.2401(d) of 
the Commission’s rules.  The parties have stipulated to the dismissal of Counts I, II, III, XIV, XVIII (§ 64.2401(d)) 
and XXI of the Complaint.  See Second Supplemental Joint Status Report of Complainant and Defendants, File No. 
EB-05-MD-013 (filed Jan. 23, 2006) (“Second Supplemental Joint Status Report”) at 2-3, ¶ 2; 5, ¶ 9.  See also 
Supplemental Joint Statement at 8, ¶ 25.  Thus, we hereby dismiss those counts without prejudice.
6 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.722(d).  MAP erroneously cited to rule 1.722(h) in its Complaint.  Complaint at 7-8, ¶ 14. 
7 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.722(e).
8 See, e.g., Complaint at 1-2, ¶ 1; Joint Statement of Complainant and Defendants, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed 
Sept. 16, 2005) (“Joint Statement”) at 4, ¶ 12; MAP Mobile Communications, Inc. Responsive Brief on Selected 
Issues, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed Mar. 8, 2006) (“MAP Reply Brief”) at 21, ¶ 54, n.80 (“MAP quit providing 
paging services approximately a month after [August 21, 2004]”).
9 47 U.S.C. § 251(h).  See, e.g., Complaint at 2, ¶ 2; Answer at 3, ¶ 2.
10 See, e.g., Complaint at 2, ¶ 2, MAP Mobile Communications, Inc. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Legal Analysis, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed July 12, 2005) at 2, ¶ 2.
11 47 U.S.C. § 252(i).  See, e.g., Joint Statement at 4, ¶ 14; Complaint at 15-16, ¶ 28; Answer at 15, ¶ 28; Complaint 
Exhibit 22, Conformed Paging Interconnection Agreement between Pacific Bell and MAP Mobile Communications, 
Inc. (“Complaint Exhibit 22, Interconnection Agreement” or “Interconnection Agreement”).
12 See, e.g., Complaint at 15-16, ¶ 28; Joint Statement at 5, ¶ 18.
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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facilities in accordance with the tariffs’ terms.13
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Claims Against PacBell Are Dismissed Without Prejudice.
5. The Interconnection Agreement directs MAP and PacBell to use certain California PUC 
dispute resolution procedures to resolve any disputes arising under the Agreement.14 Defendants ask that 
we dismiss all claims relating to PacBell in deference to that provision.15 MAP responds that (1) the 
Interconnection Agreement is no longer in effect; (2) the Agreement’s dispute resolution provision is not 
mandatory; and (3) even if the dispute resolution provision does apply, the Commission should 
nevertheless adjudicate the Complaint.16
6. For the reasons below, we find that the Interconnection Agreement remains in force, that 
it requires the parties to follow the California PUC’s dispute resolution process to resolve the present 
dispute, and that MAP has provided no justification for overriding the parties’ agreement to follow that 
process.  We therefore dismiss without prejudice those portions of the Complaint that assert claims 
against PacBell.  MAP may pursue resolution of those claims by following the California dispute 
resolution procedures referenced in the parties’ Interconnection Agreement.  
1. The Interconnection Agreement Between MAP and PacBell Still Governs.
7. The initial term of the Interconnection Agreement ended on June 20, 1999.17 The 
Agreement provides that, after that date, “the Agreement shall continue in force and effect unless and 
until terminated as provided herein.”18 The relevant termination option states:
[E]ither Party may terminate this Agreement by providing written notice 
of termination to the other Party, such written notice to be provided at 
least sixty (60) days in advance of the date of termination.  Upon 
delivery of a notice of termination as set forth above, the Parties shall 
within thirty (30) days commence negotiations in good faith to reach a 
new interconnection agreement.  At least one-hundred and twenty (120) 
days prior to the expiration of this Agreement, the parties shall enter into 
negotiations to reach a new interconnection agreement.  In the event of 
  
13 See, e.g., Answer at 12, ¶ 20; 13, ¶ 22; 14, ¶ 25; Answer, Exhibit 3, Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Legal Analysis (“Defendants’ Legal Analysis”) at 17-18; Defendants’ Initial Brief, File No. 
EB-05-MD-013 (filed Feb. 22, 2006) (“AT&T Initial Brief”) at 24; AT&T’s Reply Brief, File No. EB-05-MD-013 
(filed Mar. 8, 2006) (“AT&T Reply Brief”) at 33.  Although MAP never specifically alleges that it ordered its 
interconnection facilities and services from SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ tariffs, it generally acknowledges that 
these services were provided pursuant to SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ tariffs.  See, e.g., Reply at 23, ¶ 49 
(referencing SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ tariffs); MAP Mobile Communications, Inc. Initial Brief on Selected 
Issues, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed Feb. 22, 2006) (“MAP Initial Brief”) at 18-19, ¶¶ 50-53 (arguing that 
SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ tariffs do not contain certain rates); MAP Reply Brief at 17-18, ¶ 46 (referencing 
SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ tariffs).
14 See Complaint Exhibit 22, Interconnection Agreement at 28, § 28.
15 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed Aug. 11, 2005) (“Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss”) at 2-9.
16 See MAP Mobile Communications, Inc. Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, File No. EB-05-MD-013 
(filed Sept. 1, 2005) (“MAP Opposition to Motion to Dismiss) at 2-10, ¶¶ 1-20.
17 See, e.g., Joint Statement at 4, ¶ 14.
18 Complaint Exhibit 22, Interconnection Agreement at 21, § 14.1 (emphasis added).
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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such negotiations, this Agreement shall continue in effect until a new 
interconnection agreement becomes effective.19
8. On August 27, 1999, SWBT, on behalf of PacBell, sent MAP a letter stating that:
The initial term of the interconnection agreement between Map Mobile 
Communications, Inc. and Pacific Bell ended June 20, 1999.  Pursuant to 
Section 14.1 of the Agreement, Pacific Bell, by this letter, is providing 
Map Mobile Communications, Inc. written notice of termination at least 
60 days in advance of the actual date of termination.  As required by the 
Agreement, Pacific Bell is ready to begin negotiations, within 30 days of 
your receipt of this notice, for a new interconnection agreement. … The 
current agreement will remain in effect until replaced by a new 
agreement.20
9. Apparently, no negotiations for a new interconnection agreement ever took place,21
although neither party explains why.  Thus, the original Interconnection Agreement was never replaced 
by a new one.
10. The parties have opposite views of the effect of the August 27, 1999 Letter.  MAP argues 
that the August 27, 1999 Letter set the date for termination of the agreement 60 days later, i.e., October 
26, 1999.22 MAP thus contends that the Agreement terminated on October 26, 1999 and, because the 
parties never negotiated a successor agreement, their interconnection relationship was no longer governed 
by contract after that date.23 Defendants, however, characterize the August 27, 1999 Letter as indicating 
merely PacBell’s intention to terminate the original agreement upon the successful negotiation of a new 
one.24 Defendants argue that, because no successor agreement was negotiated, the Interconnection 
Agreement was never terminated and remains in effect today. 
11. We find that the record supports Defendants’ view.  MAP’s assertion that the 
Interconnection Agreement terminated 60 days after the August 27, 1999 Letter conflicts with the 
language of both the Letter and the Agreement.  According to MAP, the Interconnection Agreement does 
not require the parties to specify an actual date of termination because, “once a party to the 
[Interconnection Agreement] provides the other party with a written notice of termination, the 60-day 
termination period is activated.”25 The Agreement, however, says that written notice must be given “at 
least 60 days in advance” of termination, not that termination will automatically occur on the 60th day 
after notice is given.26 In other words, the Agreement’s 60-day notice period is a minimum, not a 
maximum.  Thus, the Agreement did not, by its own terms, terminate on October 26, 1999.  Similarly, 
consistent with the Agreement’s notice requirement, the August 27, 1999 Letter stated that PacBell was 
giving “written notice of termination at least 60 days in advance of the actual date of termination,” thus 
  
19 Complaint Exhibit 22, Interconnection Agreement at 21, § 14.1.
20 Complaint Exhibit 23, Letter dated August 27, 1999 from David Adams, Southwestern Bell Area Manager, 
Wireless Negotiations, to Gary Morrison, President, MAP Mobile Communications, Inc. (“August 27, 1999 Letter” 
or “Letter”) (emphasis added).
21 See Complaint at 15-16, ¶ 28; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3; Joint Statement at 5, ¶ 16.
22 Complaint at 15-16, ¶ 28; MAP Initial Brief at 2, ¶¶ 2-3; MAP Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 4, ¶ 6.
23 See, e.g., MAP Initial Brief at 2-3, ¶¶ 2-4; MAP Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 4, ¶ 6.
24 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3.
25 MAP Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 3-4, ¶ 6.
26 Complaint Exhibit 22, Interconnection Agreement at 21, § 14.1 (emphasis added).
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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making clear that any termination would occur not sooner than 60 days, and could occur much later than 
60 days after the Letter.27 Moreover, as permitted by the Agreement, the Letter also states that “[t]he 
current agreement will remain in effect until replaced by a new agreement.”28 Consequently, the Letter 
plainly expresses the permissible intent to terminate not in 60 days, but only after the negotiation of a new 
agreement.
12. MAP also argues that the Agreement establishes a “condition precedent” requiring the 
parties to negotiate for a new agreement in order for the original one to remain in place after the August 
27, 1999 Letter. 29 This argument rests on language in a portion of Section 14.1 of the Interconnection 
Agreement stating that “[i]n the event of such negotiations, this Agreement shall continue in effect until a 
new interconnection agreement becomes effective.”30 Because there were no negotiations, MAP reasons, 
the Agreement terminated 60 days after the August 27, 1999 Letter.31 We disagree.  MAP’s “condition 
precedent” argument presumes, erroneously, that the parties intended to terminate the old agreement in 
the event negotiations for a new agreement did not occur within 60 days.  That presumption is flatly 
contradicted by language in Section 14.1 stating without qualification that “the Agreement shall continue 
in force and effect unless and until terminated as provided herein.”32 Because the August 27, 1999 Letter 
did not terminate the Agreement, the parties’ failure to negotiate a new agreement did not end their 
contractual relationship; rather, the parties remained bound by the original Agreement. 
13. In addition, MAP’s conduct subsequent to the August 27, 1999 Letter confirms that it 
understood the Agreement to remain in effect.  Until it ceased paging operations in 2004, MAP continued 
to bill PacBell for reciprocal compensation under the terms of the Agreement, issuing numerous invoices 
with the express title:  “Billing under Paging Interconnection Agreement dated April 16, 1999.”33 In 
addition, in April 2001, a senior MAP executive sent PacBell a letter in which he affirmed that “[w]e 
currently have an interconnection agreement with Pacific Bell that covers our activities in California      
… .”34 Thus, until it filed this Complaint, MAP, too, apparently believed it still had an interconnection 
agreement with PacBell.  This evidence provides further support for our conclusion that the Agreement 
did not terminate in 1999, as MAP now contends.35 Accordingly, we hold that the Interconnection 
Agreement, including its dispute resolution provision, remained effective throughout the relevant 
  
27 Complaint Exhibit 23, August 27, 1999 Letter.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., MAP Initial Brief at 2-4, ¶¶ 4-7; MAP Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 5, ¶ 7.
30 Complaint Exhibit 22, Interconnection Agreement at 21, § 14.1.
31 MAP Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 4, ¶ 6.
32 Complaint Exhibit 22, Interconnection Agreement at 21, § 14.1.
33 Defendants’ Supplemental Response, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed Aug. 25, 2005) (“Defendants’ Supplemental 
Response”) at Exhibit G.  Exhibit G contains invoices issued as late as October 2004.  The invoices’ reference to 
“Interconnection Agreement dated April 16, 1999” apparently relates to the date on which MAP signed the 
Interconnection Agreement.  See Complaint Exhibit 22, Interconnection Agreement at 30.  
34 AT&T Initial Brief at 11 (citing April 20, 2001 Letter from David V. Sherwood, Chief Financial Officer, MAP to 
Willena Slocum, Director of Negotiation Support, SBC, included as Exhibit B to Attachment 2 of Letter from Anisa 
A. Latiff, Associate Director, Federal Regulatory, AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. EB-05-
MD-013 (filed Jan. 25, 2006)).
35 See, e.g., Julius Goldman’s Egg City v. U.S., 697 F.2d 1051, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that the “contract must 
be interpreted in accordance with the parties’ understanding as shown by their conduct before the controversy”), 
cert. denied 464 U.S. 814 (1983); Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shewry, 137 Cal.App.4th 964, 983, 41 
Cal.Rptr.3d 48, 62  (2006) (“A party’s conduct subsequent to the formation of a contract may be looked upon to 
determine the meaning of disputed contractual terms”); Oceanside 84, Ltd. v. Fidelity Federal Bank, 56 Cal.App.4th 
1441, 1449, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 487 (1997) (stating that “[t]he conduct of the parties after the execution of the contract, 
and before any controversy arose, may be considered in order to attempt to ascertain the parties’ intention”). 
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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period.36
2. The Interconnection Agreement Requires the Parties to Use the California 
PUC’s Dispute Resolution Procedures.     
14. Defendants argue that we should dismiss MAP’s claims against PacBell, because Section 
28 of the Interconnection Agreement prohibits MAP from bringing those claims to this Commission.37  
For the following reasons, we agree.
15. Section 28 of the Interconnection Agreement provides:
[I]n the event of any dispute arising under this Agreement … the Parties 
shall first meet and confer to discuss in good faith the Dispute and seek 
resolution prior to taking any action before any court or regulatory 
authority, or before making any public statement about or disclosing the 
nature of the Dispute to any third party. … Thereafter, the Parties shall
comply with the dispute resolution procedures set forth in pages 36-39 of 
[California Public Utilities] Commission Decision 95-12-056.”38  
The plain meaning of the foregoing provision is that, in the event of any dispute arising under the 
Agreement, the parties shall comply with the California PUC’s dispute resolution procedures.39  
This language makes clear that the parties chose the California procedures as their exclusive 
remedy, precluding any remedy here.  
16. MAP argues, however, that section 28 does not constitute a mandatory forum selection 
clause, but rather is “vague and permissive,” allowing but not requiring use of the California procedures.40  
According to MAP, because Section 28 refers to meeting to seek resolution prior to “taking action before 
any court or regulatory authority,” it cannot mean that the California PUC is the exclusive forum for 
resolving disputes.41 We disagree.  The reference to “any court or regulatory authority” does not conflict 
with the directive that the parties “shall comply” with California dispute resolution procedures.  For 
instance, in following the California procedures, a party could ultimately pursue action before a 
regulatory authority (a complaint before the PUC) or a court (appeal of the PUC’s ruling).42
17. We also reject MAP’s sweeping assertion, based on a single case, that “[f]ederal courts 
have held that contract language pertaining to compliance with dispute resolution procedures is 
  
36 According to the Complaint, PacBell’s unlawful charges to MAP began in 1998 — before the October 26, 1999 
date when MAP contends the Interconnection Agreement terminated.  Complaint at 7-8, ¶ 14.  Thus, even if the 
Interconnection Agreement, which the parties entered in 1998, later terminated in October 1999, we would still find 
that, under the Agreement’s forum selection clause, MAP’s claims against PacBell should be resolved before the 
California PUC, to the extent they arose before October 1999.  See infra at Section III A (2)-(3).
37 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2-9.
38 Interconnection Agreement at 28, § 28 (emphasis added), referring to Competition for Local Exchange Service, 
Decision 95-12-056, 63 CPUC 2d 700, 1995 WL 767891 (1995).  The referenced California PUC decision 
establishes an escalating process of negotiation, mediation, decision by an Administrative Law Judge, and ultimately 
a complaint before the PUC, if necessary.
39 Complaint Exhibit 22, Interconnection Agreement at 28, ¶ 28.
40 MAP Initial Brief at 10-11, ¶¶ 28-31; MAP Reply Brief at 9-11, ¶¶ 23-27.
41 MAP Initial Brief at 10-11, ¶¶ 28-31; MAP Reply Brief at 9-11, ¶¶ 23-27.
42 See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1756 (providing that an aggrieved party may petition for court review of any 
commission order or decision).
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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permissive, and does not confer exclusive jurisdiction upon any forum.”43 The case MAP cites merely 
indicates that one must examine the specific language of a dispute resolution provision in order to 
determine whether it is mandatory or permissive.44  In this case, the Interconnection Agreement clearly 
identifies the California PUC procedures as the exclusive remedy – “in the event of any dispute … the 
Parties shall comply with the dispute resolution procedures … .”45 Consequently, the Interconnection 
Agreement requires the parties to proceed before the California PUC rather than here.46
3. The Interconnection Agreement’s Dispute Resolution Procedures Should Be 
Enforced.
18. MAP argues that the Commission should rule on its claims against PacBell, 
notwithstanding any agreement to follow California’s dispute resolution process.47 In support of this 
argument, MAP cites the Enforcement Bureau’s order in Broadview Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Tel. Cos.48  
There, the Bureau concluded, correctly, that an agency should honor dispute resolution agreements 
including valid forum-selection clauses, absent a compelling reason not to do so.49 The Bureau noted that 
such compelling circumstances may exist when (1) the complaint concerns a dispute that lies at the core 
of an agency's enforcement mission; (2) the dispute “inevitably touches commercial relationships” among 
many participants in the relevant industry; (3) the dispute involves interpretation of facially clear contract 
language (as opposed to the interpretation of ambiguous contract language or the application of contract 
language to particular facts); or (4) the alternative dispute resolution process would be a waste of time.50  
Applying these criteria, the Bureau decided to defer a decision on the Broadview complaint pending a 
commercial arbitration proceeding.51  
19. Citing the first, second, and fourth Broadview criteria, MAP argues that there are 
compelling reasons to set aside the dispute resolution terms in its Agreement with PacBell.52 For the 
following reasons, we disagree.  
20. Regarding the first Broadview criterion, resolution of MAP’s claims against PacBell does 
not lie at the core of the agency’s enforcement mission.53 MAP essentially argues that, simply because it 
alleges a violation of the Act and Commission rules, the dispute lies at the core of our mission.54 We 
disagree.  Here, MAP’s claims against PacBell can be resolved largely, if not entirely, by interpreting and 
enforcing the parties’ Agreement, a task that falls squarely within the coordinate expertise of the forum 
  
43 MAP Reply Brief at 10, ¶ 26 (citing Northern California District Counsel of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines 
Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1995)).
44 Northern California District Counsel, 69 F.3d at 1036-37.
45 Complaint Exhibit 22, Interconnection Agreement at 28, ¶ 28 (emphasis added).
46 See generally Maggio v. Windward Capital Management Co., 96 Cal. Rptr2d 168 (Cal. App. 2000) (finding that 
agreement to follow American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) procedures required the parties to proceed before 
the AAA).
47 MAP Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 7-10, ¶¶ 12-20.
48 Broadview Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Tel. Cos, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 22216 (Enf. Bur. 
2004).
49 Id. at 22222-23, ¶ 18.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 22223-26, ¶¶ 19-26.
52 MAP does not argue that the third Broadview criterion applies here. 
53 Broadview Networks v. Verizon, 19 FCC Rcd at 22222-24, ¶¶ 18-20.
54 MAP Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 8, ¶ 15.
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chosen by the parties – the California PUC.55 To the extent that federal interconnection law is implicated, 
construing such law in the context of a particular dispute also falls squarely within the California PUC’s 
expertise.56 Consequently, resolving this dispute regarding the proper interpretation of the parties’ 
Interconnection Agreement does not lie at the core of the Commission’s mission.
21. Regarding the second Broadview criterion, a decision here would not inevitably affect 
many industry participants.57 As in Broadview, this dispute between two parties about the meaning of 
their interconnection agreement will have no direct and immediate impact on third parties, beyond the 
usual precedential effect of any Commission decision.  That is not enough to override the interest in 
enforcing the parties’ choice of forum.  
22. Turning to the fourth Broadview criterion,58 we reject MAP’s assertion that it would be “a 
waste of everyone’s time and energy” to submit its claims against PacBell to the California procedures, 
because the Commission would have to decide similar issues regarding the other defendants.59 No other 
portion of this case will be resolved by reference to the terms of the parties’ Interconnection Agreement in 
California, and thus it would not be wasteful for the parties to follow the agreed-upon procedures for
enforcing that Agreement.
23. Neither are we persuaded to override the parties’ choice of forum because the California 
PUC dismissed without prejudice a complaint that PacBell filed against MAP four months after MAP 
initiated this proceeding.60 The California PUC found that PacBell’s complaint raised many of the same 
issues presented in this proceeding, and thus concluded that prosecuting simultaneous actions would be 
inefficient and would risk inconsistent results.61 The California PUC reached that conclusion, however, 
without addressing the parties’ forum selection clause.  Moreover, nothing in the California PUC’s 
decision suggests that it lacks authority to resolve the issues between the parties; in fact, the PUC noted 
that if the Commission did not resolve the issues raised in PacBell’s complaint, then PacBell could 
petition the PUC to reopen the case with no adverse consequences.62 Thus, the California PUC decision 
provides no basis to disregard the parties’ agreement to resolve disputes at the PUC.    
* * * *
24. In sum, we find that (i) MAP and PacBell agreed to follow only the California dispute 
resolution procedures cited in the Interconnection Agreement; (ii) the Agreement remains in effect; and 
(iii) no compelling reason exists to override the parties’ Agreement.  Accordingly, we dismiss without 
prejudice Counts X, XI, XII, and XXIV of the Complaint.63  
  
55 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 252.
56 Id.
57 Broadview Networks v. Verizon, 19 FCC Rcd at 22222, 22224, ¶¶ 18, 21.
58 Id. at 22222, 22225, ¶¶ 18, 23.
59 MAP Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 10, ¶ 19.
60 Pacific Bell Telephone Company v. MAP Mobile Communications, Inc., Case 05-11-016, Decision Granting 
Motion to Dismiss, 2006 WL 1059026, (Cal. P.U.C. April 13, 2006).  
61 Id.
62 Id. In addition, as previously explained, any overlap of issues in this case and in the California PUC proceeding 
may be more apparent than real, because only the California PUC proceeding involves interpretation of the 
Interconnection Agreement.
63 See Complaint at 20-21, ¶¶ 42-44; 31, ¶ 71.  MAP argues that we should dismiss the Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss because the Motion does not comply with certain procedural rules.  MAP Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 
at 2, ¶¶ 1-2.  Specifically, MAP asserts that the Motion fails to include proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
(continued …)
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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B. SWBT and the Midwest ILECs May Not Charge MAP for Facilities and Services 
Used for IntraMTA Traffic that Originated on Their Networks, but May Charge for 
Facilities and Services Used for Transiting Traffic.
25. MAP alleges that, since approximately February 1997,64 SWBT and the Midwest ILECs 
have violated sections 201(b) and 251(b)(5) of the Act,65 and section 51.703(b) of the Commission’s 
rules66 (especially as construed by TSR Wireless v. US West),67 by billing MAP for facilities and services 
related to “intraMTA” traffic originated on SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ networks.68 In response, 
SWBT and the Midwest ILECs argue that the Commission has not expressly prohibited carriers from 
charging for any costs incurred for transporting traffic to paging carriers’ networks.69 In their view, 
section 51.703(b), as interpreted by TSR Wireless v. US West, “only prohibits LECs from charging paging 
carriers for facilities used to deliver ‘LEC-originated, intraMTA traffic to the paging carrier’s point of 
interconnection’” 70 and, conversely, provides that paging carriers are “responsible for charges for 
facilities ordered from the LEC to connect points on the paging carrier’s side of the point of 
interconnection.”71 They argue that “[t]he facilities that MAP ordered to connect its network to SWBT’s 
and the Midwest ILECs’ networks lie on MAP’s side of such points of interconnection” and that these 
facilities are therefore not subject to the prohibition against origination charges.72
26. In support of their view that the interconnection facilities lie on MAP’s side of its point of 
interconnection (“POI”) with the Defendants, and thus outside the scope of the section 51.703(b) 
prohibition, SWBT and the Midwest ILECs cite section 251(c)(2) of the Act, which requires incumbent 
LECs to provide interconnection “at any technically feasible point within the [incumbent LEC’s] 
    
(Continued from previous page)
law, as required by 47 C.F.R. § 1.727(b), and to include a table of contents and summary, as required by 47 C.F.R. § 
1.49.  As to the latter, we decline to dismiss the Motion at this stage of the proceeding for such minor 
noncompliance with the rules.  As to the former, we note that Defendants did provide, in compliance with 47 C.F.R. 
§ 1.727(c), a proposed order that incorporates its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We decline to 
dismiss the Motion simply because these proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were not also included in 
a separate document.
64 MAP does not clearly identify the exact period of time when it received bills for the allegedly unlawful charges.
65 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (requiring common carrier “charges, practices, classifications, and regulations” for and in 
connection with their communication service to be just and reasonable); 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (requiring all local 
exchange carriers “to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of 
telecommunications”).
66 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(b) (providing that a “LEC may not assess charges on any other telecommunications carrier for 
telecommunications traffic that originates on the LEC’s network”). 
67 TSR Wireless v. US West Communications, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd 11166, 11184 at ¶ 31 (2000), petition for review 
denied sub nom., Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 252 F.3d 462 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
68 See, e.g., Complaint at 8, ¶ 15; 11, ¶ 21; 18-20, ¶¶ 36-41; 21-24, ¶¶ 45-50 (Counts IV – IX); MAP Mobile 
Communications, Inc. Reply to Answer, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed Sept. 1, 2005) (“MAP Reply”) at 20, ¶ 42; 
MAP Initial Brief at 44, ¶ 44; MAP Reply Brief at 17, ¶ 45.  “IntraMTA” traffic is traffic that originates and 
terminates within the same “Major Trading Area,” as defined in 47 C.F.R. § 24.202(a).  See 47 C.F.R. § 
51.701(b)(2).
69 See, e.g., Answer at 22-24, ¶¶ 46-47; Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 8; AT&T Initial Brief at 29-32.
70 Answer at 24 ¶ 47 (emphasis in original) (quoting TSR Wireless v. US West, 11 FCC Rcd at 11176, ¶ 18); see also 
AT&T Initial Brief at 28-29.
71 AT&T Initial Brief at 29 (quoting TSR Wireless v. US West, 11 FCC Rcd at n. 70).
72 AT&T Initial Brief at 32 (emphasis in original); see also Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 10-19; AT&T Reply Brief 
at 25.
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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network[.]”73 They argue that, by requiring interconnection only “within” an incumbent LEC’s network, 
section 251(c)(2) specifies that “the point of interconnection between an ILEC network and the network 
of another carrier must be on the ILEC’s network,” which they construe to mean a point at the incumbent 
LEC’s “central or tandem offices.”74 SWBT and the Midwest ILECs thus maintain that because the POI 
was not located in one of their tandem or central offices, the facilities they used to deliver traffic to MAP 
fall outside their networks.75  
27. SWBT and the Midwest ILECs attempt to bolster this argument by citing language in the 
Commission’s Triennial Review Order indicating that the dedicated transport unbundled network element 
(“UNE”) includes only transmission facilities between incumbent LEC switches and wire centers, and 
does not include transmission facilities connecting a competing carrier’s network to an incumbent LEC’s 
network.76 According to SWBT and the Midwest ILECs, this language defined the “transmission links” 
that carriers purchase in order to connect their networks to incumbent LEC networks, i.e., entrance 
facilities, as falling outside the boundaries of an incumbent LEC’s networks.77 Thus, SWBT and the 
Midwest ILECs argue that, because the facilities MAP ordered are used to connect its network to their 
networks, these facilities lie outside SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ networks, and MAP must 
provision those facilities itself or purchase them from another source, such as from applicable tariffs.78
28. We disagree that SWBT and the Midwest ILECs may bill MAP for all of the 
interconnection facilities and services at issue in this dispute.  Section 51.703(b) of the Commission’s 
rules prohibit LECs from charging CMRS carriers for traffic originated on their networks.79 Applying 
that law (and section 332 of the Act)80 in the context of LEC-CMRS interconnection, the Commission has 
clearly held that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, LECs cannot charge one-way paging 
carriers for facilities and services used to deliver LEC-originated traffic to the paging carrier’s network, 
where the traffic originates and terminates within the same MTA.  Specifically, in TSR Wireless v. US 
West, the Commission ruled, regarding dedicated T-1 circuits connecting an incumbent LEC’s offices to a 
paging carrier’s network and provided by the incumbent LEC in the absence of an interconnection 
agreement, that to the extent that the “T-1 is situated entirely within an MTA, [the incumbent LEC] must 
provide this facility at its own expense.”81 Here, as in TSR Wireless, Defendants have provided 
  
73 See AT&T Brief at 29-30; AT&T Reply Brief at 31-32; 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2).
74 AT&T Brief at 30-31; AT&T Reply Brief at 31.
75 MAP’s POIs were located at its paging terminal.  MAP Reply Brief at 16, ¶ 42. 
76 Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 11; AT&T Initial Brief at 24, 30-31; AT&T Reply Brief at 23, 31.  See Review of 
the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Report and Order and Order on 
Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978, 17202-06 at ¶¶ 365-67 (2003) (“Triennial 
Review Order”) (subsequent history omitted). 
77 Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 12-14; AT&T Initial Brief at 29-32; AT&T Reply Brief at 31-32.  
78 Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 15; AT&T Initial Brief at 29-32; AT&T Reply Brief at 31-32.
79 See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First 
Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 16016 at ¶ 1042 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”) (subsequent history 
omitted) (stating that “[a]s of the effective date of [the Local Competition Order], a LEC must cease charging a 
CMRS provider or other carrier for terminating LEC-originated traffic and must provide that traffic to the CMRS 
provider or other carrier without charge”); 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(b) (“A LEC may not assess charges on any other 
telecommunications carrier for telecommunications traffic that originates on the LEC's network.”).  
80 47 U.S.C. § 332.
81 TSR Wireless v. US West, 15 FCC Rcd at 11189, ¶¶ 8, 40.  See id. at 11184, ¶ 31.  See also Metrocall, Inc. v. 
Concord Telephone Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 2252, 2257 (2002) (“The Commission’s 
rules state that a CMRS provider is not required to pay an interconnecting LEC for traffic that terminates on the 
CMRS provider’s network, if the traffic originated on the LEC’s network.”); Texcom, Inc. d/b/a Answer Indiana v. 
(continued …)
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
11
interconnection facilities directly connecting their offices to a paging carrier’s network in the same MTA.  
Accordingly, given that they have no interconnection agreement with MAP specifying to the contrary, 
under TSR Wireless, the default prohibition on origination charges applies to the facilities at issue.  We 
note that, most recently, the Commission reaffirmed the TSR Wireless holding in Mountain 
Communications, Inc. v. Qwest,82 which addressed Qwest’s imposition of charges for transport facilities 
interconnecting its switches to the terminal of a paging carrier.  The Commission concluded that Qwest 
violated 51.709(b) of our rules “by improperly charging Mountain for delivering one-way paging traffic 
that originated and terminated in the same Major Trading Area.”83  
29. We find unavailing Defendants’ argument that the alleged interaction of section 
51.703(b) of the Commission’s rules and section 251(c)(2) of the Act demonstrates that they may charge 
for originating traffic over interconnection facilities.84 Defendants’ position is undermined by section 
51.709(b) of the Commission’s rules, which expressly provides that “[t]he rate of a carrier providing 
transmission facilities dedicated to the transmission of traffic between two carriers’ networks shall 
recover only the costs of the proportion of that trunk capacity used by an interconnecting carrier to send 
traffic that will terminate on the providing carrier’s network.”85 Section 51.709(b) thus specifically 
prohibits an incumbent LEC from charging for the use of interconnection facilities in connection with 
incumbent LEC-originated traffic.  This prohibition in section 51.709(b) merely “applies the general 
principle of section 51.703(b) — that a LEC may not impose on a paging carrier any costs the LEC incurs 
to deliver LEC-originated, intraMTA traffic, . . . to the specific case of dedicated facilities,”86 and thus it 
is encompassed by the more general prohibition under section 51.703(b). 
30. Moreover, contrary to Defendants’ view,87 the Triennial Review Order did not modify the 
Commission’s rules with respect to a LEC’s interconnection obligations with one-way paging providers 
under sections 251(b)(5) and 332 of the Act or sections 20.11 and 51.703(b) of the Commission’s rules.88  
Rather, the portion of the Triennial Review Order cited by Defendants, which was remanded on appeal,89
involved unbundling obligations pursuant to interconnection agreements under section 251(c)(3) of the 
Act, not charges for interconnection.90 Thus, nothing in the Triennial Review Order permits SWBT and 
    
(Continued from previous page)
Bell Atlantic Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 21493, 21496 at ¶ 8 (2001) (stating that “a LEC 
may not impose on a paging carrier any costs the LEC incurs to deliver LEC-originated, intraMTA traffic”).
82 Mountain Communications, Inc. v. Qwest Communications International, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order 
on Remand, 21 FCC Rcd 11577 (2006).  
83 Mountain Communications, Inc. v. Qwest, 21 FCC Rcd at 11580-89, ¶¶ 1, 9.  
84 See, e.g.,¶¶ 25-26 and n.69, supra.
85 47 C.F.R. § 51.709(b).
86 TSR Wireless v. US West, 15 FCC Rcd at 11181-82, ¶ 26.
87 Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 11-16; AT&T Initial Brief at 30-32; AT&T Reply Brief at 22-25.
88 Triennial Review Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 17203-04, ¶ 366.
89 See United States Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission, 359 F.3d 554, 586 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (remanding Commission’s ruling that excluded entrance facilities from the definition of dedicated transport 
after finding that the ruling was at odds with the definition of “network element” found in section 153(29) of the 
Act).  See also In the Matter of Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Order on Remand, 20 FCC Rcd 2533, 2612 
(2005) (on remand, including entrance facilities in the definition of dedicated transport).
90 More specifically, the cited portion of the Triennial Review Order dealt with defining an incumbent LEC’s 
unbundling requirements for individual network elements under section 251(c)(3) —which entails the negotiation of 
an agreement pursuant to section 252 of the Act.  MAP does not allege, however, that it interconnected with SWBT 
or the Midwest ILECs pursuant to section 251(c)(3), or ever negotiated an agreement with those Defendants 
pursuant to section 252 of the Act.  See ¶ 4, supra, and n.97, infra.  
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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the Midwest ILECs to bill MAP for all of the interconnection facilities and services at issue in this 
dispute.  
31. Nor is there any basis to conclude that the prohibitions in sections of 51.703(b) and 
51.709(b) of our rules do not apply in this case.  It is undisputed that the direct interconnection facilities at 
issue were dedicated to the direct transmission of traffic between MAP and SWBT or the Midwest ILECs, 
and were located within the MTA where the traffic at issue originated.91 Further, the parties did not have 
an interconnection agreement that required the POI to be located in a central or tandem office within 
SWBT’s or the Midwest ILECs’ networks.  Nor is there any evidence in the record establishing that the 
facilities were used solely to connect facilities within MAP’s CMRS networks by, for example, linking 
MAP’s paging terminal with its antenna.92 As applied to these facts, the Act and implementing 
Commission rules and orders prohibit SWBT and the Midwest ILECs from charging MAP for the 
interconnection facilities and services they provided to MAP, to the extent such facilities and services 
were used to deliver intraMTA traffic originated on their networks to MAP’s point of interconnection.  
Our analysis here is limited to the facts of this case, which involve direct interconnection, and we do not 
address the case of indirect interconnection and which parties pay for such facilities under that scenario.  
32. We therefore grant, to the extent indicated herein, Counts IV, VI, VII and IX of the 
Complaint.93 Because our ruling under section 201(b) of the Act and section 51.703 of the rules will 
afford MAP all the relief to which it is entitled for the unlawful transport and termination charges, we find 
it unnecessary to address Counts V and VIII in the Complaint alleging that these charges also violated 
section 251(b)(5) of the Act, and we dismiss those counts without prejudice.  
33. We hasten to add, however, that MAP is obligated to pay the tariffed charges for the 
facilities and services provided by SWBT and the Midwest ILECs to deliver “transiting traffic” to MAP, 
i.e., traffic originated by customers of carriers other than SWBT and the Midwest ILECs.  We disagree 
with MAP’s contention that it can avoid paying for transiting traffic because SWBT and the Midwest 
ILECs did not specify a transiting rate or factor in their tariffs.94 The Commission has repeatedly and 
clearly held that paging carriers are “required to pay for ‘transiting traffic.’”95 In so ruling, the 
  
91 See Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 11-16; MAP Reply at 20-22, ¶¶ 42-47; AT&T Initial Brief at 29-32; MAP 
Initial Brief at 14-17, ¶¶ 40, 45-49; AT&T Reply Brief at 31-32; MAP Reply Brief at 15-17, ¶¶ 40-42.
92 See, e.g., TSR Wireless v. US West, 15 FCC Rcd at 11177, n.70.
93 Complaint at 8-9, ¶¶ 15-18; 11-12, ¶¶ 21-22; 18-20, ¶¶ 36, 38, 39, 41; 21-24, ¶¶ 45-50 (Counts IV, VI, VII, and 
IX).  A violation of Commission rule 51.703 constitutes a violation of section 201(b) of the Act.  See Qwest 
Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission, 252 F.3d 462 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Metrocall v. Concord, 17 
FCC Rcd at 2256-57, ¶¶ 8, 10; Texcom v. Bell Atlantic, 16 FCC Rcd at 21496, ¶ 8; TSR Wireless v. US West, 15 
FCC Rcd at 11176, ¶ 18; 11184, ¶ 40.  
94 MAP Reply at 23, ¶ 49; MAP Reply Brief at 17-18, ¶ 46.  By “transiting factor,” we and the parties mean a fixed 
estimate of the percentage of the local facilities used to deliver transiting traffic to MAP.  MAP Reply Brief at 17-
18, ¶ 46; AT&T Initial Brief at 33; AT&T Reply Brief at 33.
95 TSR Wireless v. US West, 15 FCC Rcd at 11176-77, ¶ 19, n.70 (stating that “Complainants [paging carriers] are 
required to pay for ‘transiting traffic,’ that is, traffic that originates from a carrier other than the interconnecting 
LEC”).  See, e.g., Mountain Communications, Inc. v. Qwest Communications International, Inc., Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 2091, 2095 at ¶ 10 (2002) (stating that “we conclude that Qwest does not violate 
sections 51.703(b) and 51.709(b) of the Commission’s rules by assessing Mountain charges associated with 
transiting traffic”), vacated in part and remanded on other grounds, Mountain Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 355 
F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Metrocall, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order on Supplemental Complaint for Damages, 16 FCC Rcd 18123, 18126 at ¶¶ 8-9 (2001) (stating that “we 
unambiguously permitted LECs to charge paging carriers for transiting traffic”); Texcom, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 
16 FCC Rcd at 21495, ¶ 5 (stating that “a LEC may charge a paging carrier for traffic that transits the LEC’s 
network and terminates on the paging carrier’s network as long as the traffic does not originate on the LEC’s 
network”).
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
13
Commission has never suggested that this obligation to pay is contingent on proof that the carriers 
providing the interconnection facilities have provisions in their tariffs specifying either a transiting factor 
or rate to be applied against traffic carried over the facilities.96 MAP has not provided any compelling 
reason to depart from this precedent here.
34. Indeed, we note that, instead of negotiating an interconnection arrangement with SWBT 
and the Midwest ILECs specifying, inter alia, a transiting factor,97 MAP chose to order interconnection 
facilities and services from tariffs.98 The fact that SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ tariffs did not 
specify a transiting factor does not negate their right to charge MAP for facilities and services used to 
deliver transiting traffic.  Accordingly, we deny MAP’s claims to the extent they allege that SWBT and 
the Midwest ILECs acted unlawfully by charging MAP for transiting traffic.99  
C. SWBT and the Midwest ILECs Did Not Violate Section 20.11 of the Commission’s 
Rules By Failing to Pay MAP Reasonable Compensation for Which They Were 
Never Billed.
35. MAP alleges that SWBT and the Midwest ILECs violated section 20.11 of the 
Commission’s rules100 by failing to compensate MAP for terminating traffic that originated on their 
networks.101 In response, SWBT and the Midwest ILECs argue, inter alia, that MAP’s claims for 
reasonable compensation should be denied because MAP never submitted a single bill to SWBT or the 
  
96 See Metrocall, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, 16 FCC Rcd at 18126, ¶ 9 (stating that “[s]ome percentage of 
the interconnection-related charges imposed by the [defendants] constitutes [transiting] traffic, and they are entitled 
to charge for it”); id. at 18127, ¶ 14 (applying average transiting factors to calculate damages where the incumbent 
LECs’ tariffs did not designate a transiting factor or percentage for transiting traffic).
97 MAP apparently declined to negotiate such an interconnection arrangement with SWBT and the Midwest ILECs.  
See Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 17; Answer Exhibit 5, Declaration of Jack Firth at 2, ¶ 3; 4-5, ¶¶ 10-11.  MAP 
does not deny that it declined to negotiate an interconnection arrangement with SWBT and the Midwest ILECs.
98 AT&T Initial Brief at 34; AT&T Reply Brief at 25.  According to SWBT and the Midwest ILECs, a transiting 
factor usually is agreed to by the parties or established by state commission in an interconnection agreement, a 
process MAP declined here.  Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 16-17; AT&T Initial Brief at 34-35.
99 See Complaint at 8, ¶ 15; 11, ¶ 21; 18-20, ¶¶ 36-41; 21-24, ¶¶ 45-50 (Counts IV – IX).  Consequently, to the 
extent that MAP demonstrates in a supplemental damages proceeding that it actually paid the charges for which 
SWBT and the Midwest ILECs billed MAP, its recovery of damages must be reduced by an appropriate transiting 
factor. See Metrocall, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell, 16 FCC Rcd at 18126, ¶¶ 8-9.  We reject MAP’s suggestion that, 
because SWBT and the Midwest ILECs did not specifically identify transiting charges in their bills to MAP, taking 
account of such charges in a supplemental damages proceeding would amount to an endorsement of unlawful 
“backbilling.”  MAP Reply at 23, ¶ 50.  The record demonstrates that SWBT and the Midwest ILECs issued timely 
bills to MAP for the interconnection facilities and services ordered by MAP in accordance with their published 
tariffs.  AT&T Initial Brief at 34; AT&T Reply Brief at 25.  Consequently, requiring that any damages recovery be 
reduced to reflect transiting traffic would involve no delay in the issuance of bills containing the transiting charges 
at issue, and thus no “backbilling.”
100 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b) (stating that “[l]ocal exchange carriers and commercial mobile radio service providers shall 
comply with principles of mutual compensation”).  The rule further requires that LECs and CMRS carriers pay 
reasonable compensation to each other for the termination of traffic that originates on their networks.  47 C.F.R. §§ 
20.11(b)(1) and (2).  
101 Complaint at 8, ¶ 15; 12-13, ¶ 23; 26-27, ¶¶ 56-60 (Counts XV and XVI).  For purposes of this Order only, we 
assume, without deciding, that a violation of rule 20.11 would constitute a violation of the Act cognizable under 
section 208 of the Act.  See North County Communications Corp. v. MetroPCS California, LLC, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, DA 09-719, 2009 WL 818927 (Enf. Bur. rel. Mar. 30, 2009) at ¶ 8, n.30.  See generally Global 
Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1513 (2007); Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001).
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
14
Midwest ILECs for such charges.102 As discussed below, we agree with SWBT and the Midwest ILECs. 
36. Even assuming that MAP had a right under section 20.11 to impose compensation 
charges on SWBT and the Midwest ILECs in the absence of any agreement between the parties, MAP 
cannot complain about their failure to pay such charges, when the undisputed record shows that MAP 
never issued a single bill for the charges.103 Contrary to MAP’s suggestion, the right to reasonable 
compensation under rule 20.11 is not entirely self-effectuating.104  
37. We reject MAP’s suggestion that the Commission’s decision in AirTouch Cellular v. 
Pacific Bell supports MAP’s right to receive reasonable compensation.105 In Airtouch Cellular v. Pacific 
Bell, the Commission held that Pacific Bell should have paid mutual compensation to a CMRS carrier 
pursuant to rule 20.11, even though the ILEC’s interconnection agreement with the CMRS carrier was 
silent regarding mutual compensation.106 The Commission did not indicate that the non-contractual right 
to compensation recognized in Airtouch extends beyond the circumstances presented in that case, where 
the parties had entered into a one-way compensation agreement that contained no waiver of the right to 
mutual compensation.107 Even assuming that section 20.11 provides a broader non-contractual right to 
compensation, however, the Airtouch decision nowhere states that carriers must pay for reasonable 
compensation in the absence of receiving bills.  Similarly, MAP’s reliance upon general language in the 
Commission’s T-Mobile Declaratory Ruling that rule 20.11 establishes default rights to LEC-CMRS 
compensation is also unavailing.108 The T-Mobile Declaratory Ruling primarily addressed the issue of 
  
102 Answer at 11, ¶ 15; 13, ¶ 23; Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 21, 27-28; AT&T Initial Brief at 37, 45-47; AT&T 
Reply Brief at 35-36.  SWBT and the Midwest ILECs also argue that we should deny MAP’s claims under section 
20.11 of the Commission’s rules because (i) MAP failed to negotiate an agreement with them regarding the payment 
of reasonable compensation, see Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 21-27; AT&T Initial Brief at 36-41; Defendants’ 
Reply Brief at 35; and (ii) under the “collection action” doctrine, MAP’s allegations fail to state a claim under 
section 208 of the Act.  See AT&T Initial Brief at 47-50; AT&T Reply Brief at 34-35.  Because we rule in 
Defendants’ favor on other grounds, we need not address these two arguments.  
103 Answer at 30, ¶ 60; Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 27-28.  See MAP Reply at 7, ¶ 16.    
104 MAP Reply at 7-8, ¶ 16; MAP Mobile Communications, Inc.’s Objections and Answers to Defendants’ 
Interrogatories, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed Sept. 1, 2005) at 3; MAP Initial Brief at 21, ¶ 62; MAP Reply Brief 
at 19-20, ¶¶ 50-52.  We decline to address in this complaint proceeding whether MAP could, in the future, issue bills 
to SWBT and the Midwest ILECs for the compensation at issue in this case without being subject to a defense that it 
was unlawfully “backbilling” SWBT and the Midwest ILECs.  See MAP Reply Brief at 21, ¶ 54, n.81.  See 
generally American Network, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Backbilling of Access Charges, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd 550, 552 at ¶ 19 (Com. Carr. Bur. 1989), petition for recon. denied, 4 
FCC Rcd 8797 (1989) (stating that “[a] delay of much less than 24 months between the rendering of service and the 
receipt of an initial bill for such service may be an unjust and unreasonable practice for purposes of Section 201(b) 
of the Act”); People’s Network Incorporated v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 21081, 21088 at ¶ 15 (Com. Carr. Bur. 1997) (stating that “[w]e have little 
difficulty in determining that, under the facts of this case, billing delays of 15 or 20 months qualify as an 
unreasonable practice within the meaning of Section 201(b)”).
105 MAP Reply at 6-7, ¶¶ 13-15 (citing Airtouch Cellular v. Pacific Bell, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC 
Rcd 13502 (2001)).  
106 Airtouch Cellular v. Pacific Bell, 16 FCC Rcd at 13508, ¶ 16.  
107 See id.  Cf. 47 C.F.R. § 51.717(b) (providing that a CMRS provider seeking to renegotiate a non-reciprocal 
compensation arrangement with an incumbent LEC established prior to August 8, 1996 “shall be entitled to assess 
upon the incumbent LEC the same rates for the transport and termination of telecommunications traffic that the 
incumbent LEC assesses upon the CMRS provider pursuant to the pre-existing arrangement” until a new reciprocal 
compensation agreement is established).
108 See MAP Reply at 6-7, ¶¶ 13-15; MAP Initial Brief at 20-21, ¶ 59; MAP Reply Brief at 19-20, ¶ 50 (citing In the 
Matter of Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, T-Mobile Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
(continued …)
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
15
LECs imposing termination charges on CMRS carriers via state tariffs in the absence of an 
interconnection arrangement.109 It says nothing about an obligation to pay such charges in the absence of 
receiving bills.  
38. Consequently, we deny MAP’s claims under rule 20.11 (Counts XV and XVI) for 
compensation not reflected in any bills to SWBT or the Midwest ILECs.
D. The Midwest ILECs Have Not Improperly Billed MAP for Special Access.
39. According to MAP, the Midwest ILECs have violated section 201(b) of the Act by 
“impos[ing] charges for special access” that “MAP has never requested nor authorized.”110 The Midwest 
ILECs deny that they billed MAP for special access on the account in question.111 They maintain that the 
outstanding balance in dispute is for services to “rearrange certain of the trunks” MAP had previously 
ordered.112 As discussed below, we deny MAP’s claim because MAP has failed to offer sufficient 
evidence to meet its burden of proof.113
40. The record supports the Midwest ILECs’ contention that they never billed MAP for 
special access on the account at issue.114 The Midwest ILECs produced copies of MAP’s Access Service 
Requests (“ASRs”),115 which demonstrate that the underlying services were for rearrangement of certain 
circuits ordered by a MAP employee via his direct input into the Midwest ILECs’ electronic ordering 
systems.116 MAP has not offered any specific evidence to refute that its employee ordered such 
    
(Continued from previous page)
Regarding Incumbent LEC Wireless Termination Tariffs, Declaratory Ruling and Report and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 
4855, 4857 at ¶ 4 (2005) (“T-Mobile Declaratory Ruling”)).  
109 T-Mobile Declaratory Ruling, 20 FCC Rcd at 4855, ¶ 1.  The T-Mobile Declaratory Ruling amended section 
20.11 of the Commission’s rules prospectively to make clear the Commission’s preference for contractual 
arrangements for non-access CMRS traffic by permitting incumbent LECs to request interconnection from a CMRS 
provider and invoke the negotiation and arbitration procedures set forth in section 252 of the Act.  Pursuant to the T-
Mobile Declaratory Ruling, an interim compensation rate takes effect upon receipt of a request for interconnection 
pursuant to section 252.  T-Mobile Declaratory Ruling, 20 FCC Rcd at 4863, ¶ 5; 4864, ¶¶ 15-16.
110 Complaint at 12, ¶ 23; 24-25, ¶¶ 51-53 (Count XIII); MAP Reply at 24-26, ¶¶ 53-58.
111 Answer at 13, ¶ 23; 25-26, ¶¶ 51-53; Answer Exhibit 8, Declaration of Michelle L. Johnson (“Johnson 
Declaration”) at 2, ¶ 5; Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 19-20.
112 Answer at 13, ¶ 23; 26, ¶ 53; Answer Exhibit 8, Johnson Declaration at 2-3, ¶¶ 6-7; Defendants’ Legal Analysis 
at 19.
113 See, e.g., High-Tech Furnace Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 224 F.3d 781, 787 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that “[w]ell
established FCC precedent imposes the burden of proof on the complainant in section 208 proceedings”); American 
Message Centers v FCC, 50 F.3d 35, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that in a section 208 proceeding “[t]he rules place 
the burden of pleading and documenting a violation of the Act on [the complainant].  They do not require [the 
carrier] to prove that it has not violated the Act.”).
114 See, e.g., Answer at 13, ¶ 23; 25-26, ¶¶ 51-53; Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 19-20.
115 An ASR is a document generated by MAP’s direct input into the Midwest ILECs’ electronic ordering systems.  
Defendants’ Objections and Responses to MAP’s Interrogatories, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed Sept. 9, 2005) at 3 
(“Defendants’ Discovery Responses”).
116 Specifically, the Midwest ILECs produced ASRs demonstrating that there were four separate service requests 
placed by MAP employee Matthew Bocialetti to move circuits in Detroit.  See Answer, Exhibit 8, Declaration of 
Michelle L. Johnson at 2-3, ¶¶ 5-9; Defendants’ Discovery Responses at 2-3 and n.3; Defendants’ Discovery 
Responses, Exhibits 1 and 2.
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
16
services.117 Rather, it relies upon a single email message from a Midwest ILEC employee that was sent 
over one year after the services were invoiced, which generally describes the disputed charges as “special 
access service usage BAN.”118 We find that this single email message is insufficient to overcome the 
considerable contrary evidence provided by the Midwest ILECs.  Consequently, MAP has not met its 
burden of demonstrating that the Midwest ILECs billed it for special access services that it had not 
ordered.  We therefore deny Count XIII of MAP’s Complaint.     
E. SWBT’s and Midwest ILECs’ Invoices Are Not Unclear or Ambiguous.
41. MAP alleges that SWBT and the Midwest ILECs have violated section 201(b) of the Act 
and section 64.2401(b) of the Commission’s rules by issuing confusing and ambiguous invoices to MAP 
“consist[ing] of codes which do not clearly describe the services” for which MAP has been charged.119 In 
support of its claim, MAP identifies one string of codes each from one set of SWBT’s and the Midwest 
ILEC’s invoices as examples of the allegedly unclear codes.120 Although MAP is correct that a violation 
of section 64.2401(b) of the Commission’s rules constitutes an unjust and unreasonable practice under 
section 201(b),121 we deny this claim for the reasons below, because MAP fails to present evidence 
sufficient to sustain its burden of proof.122
42. SWBT and the Midwest ILECs have offered proof that the invoices they issued to MAP 
  
117 Although MAP’s Reply includes a declaration by one of its officers who generally attests that “MAP did not 
request nor authorize such rearrangement,” (MAP Reply, Exhibit 3, Declaration of Grant Sibley), we find that this 
general, unsubstantiated statement from someone other than Matthew Bocialetti, the MAP employee who ordered 
the services, does not outweigh the specific documentation produced by the Midwest ILECs that demonstrates 
otherwise.
118 Complaint at 24, ¶ 51; Complaint Exhibit 15.  MAP did not produce a copy of the actual invoice containing the 
disputed charges.
119 Complaint at 10-11, ¶ 20; 13-14, ¶ 25; and 28-29, ¶¶ 61-67 (Counts XVII, XVIII, XIX and XX); MAP Reply at 
11-12, ¶¶ 23-24.  Section 64.2401(b) of the Commission’s rules states that the description of charges on telephone 
bills “must be sufficiently clear in presentation and specific enough in content so that customers can accurately 
assess that the services for which they are billed correspond to those that they have requested and received, and that 
the costs assessed for those services conform to their understanding of the price charged.”  47 C.F.R. § 64.2401(b).
120 Complaint at 10-11, ¶ 20; 13-14, ¶ 25; Complaint, Exhibits 6, 14.  MAP does not specify the time period during 
which it received the invoices with the allegedly confusing codes, and it appears from other exhibits attached to its 
Complaint that the format of the invoices changed during the parties’ relationship to include additional descriptive 
information.  Compare Complaint Exhibits 6 and 14 with Complaint Exhibits 18 & 19.
121 The Commission previously found that a carrier’s billing and collection is an integral part of a carrier’s provision 
of communications services subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction under Title II of the Communications Act.  See 
Local Exchange Carrier Validation and Billing Information for Joint Use Calling Cards, Report and Order and 
Request for Supplemental Comments, 7 FCC Rcd 3528, 3530-3533 (1992), clarified on reconsideration, 12 FCC 
Rcd 1632, 1643-1645 (1997); Public Service Commission of Maryland, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC 
Rcd 4000, 4004-4006 (1989), aff’d, Public Service Commission of Maryland v F.C.C., 909 F.2d 1510 (D.C. Cir. 
1990); Detariffing of Billing and Collection Services, Report and Order, 102 F.C.C. 2nd 1150, 1169-71(1986).  
Specifically, a carrier’s practices regarding “the manner in which charges and providers are identified on the 
telephone bill [are] essential to consumers’ understanding of the services that have been rendered, the charges 
imposed for those services, and the entities that have provided such services.”  In the Matter of Truth-in-Billing and 
Billing Format, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 7492, 7503 at ¶ 20 
(1999).  Consequently, “[a] carrier’s provision of misleading or deceptive billing information is an unjust and 
unreasonable practice in violation of section 201(b) of the Act.”  Id. at 7506, ¶ 24. Indeed, the Commission’s truth-
in-billing requirements for common carriers, including section 64.2401 of the Commission’s rules, were established 
“to define more specifically what would constitute a violation of section 201 with respect to billing practices.”  Id. at 
7506-07, ¶¶ 24-25.
122 See n.113, supra.
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comply with industry billing standards and practices, and contain all of the information necessary to 
determine the services being billed, the billing period, the specific locations, and the applicable price, 
including the usage rate where applicable.123 Specifically, they presented evidence that the invoices were 
issued via their Carrier Access Billing Systems (“CABS”),124 and that the format of their CABS invoices, 
and the codes used on the invoices, conform to industry standards published by the Ordering and Billing 
Forum of the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (“ATIS”) and Telcordia.125 SWBT and 
the Midwest ILECs specifically demonstrated that the information in the invoices identified by MAP 
consists of various “Field Identifiers” and “Universal Service Ordering Codes” used throughout the 
industry.126 They also provided evidence that the codes contained in the invoices, as well as other 
pertinent information, are identified and discussed in detail in various documents that they provide online 
to MAP and all of their access services customers.127 These documents include, inter alia, SWBT’s and
the Midwest ILECs’ Carrier Coding Guides, which provide the method by which a customer who orders 
services from their access tariffs will technically convey the customer’s requirements to SWBT and the 
Midwest ILECs.128 SWBT and the Midwest ILECs also presented evidence that they billed for the 
tariffed services as ordered by MAP, and that the charges specified on their invoices correspond to the 
  
123 Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 29; Answer, Exhibit 6, Declaration of Mark Goodwin (“Answer, Goodwin 
Declaration”) at 1-3, ¶¶ 3, 4, 6; Defendants’ Supplemental Response at 3-5.
124 The Carrier Access Billing System allows carriers in a competitive environment to bill each other for traffic 
passed between them.  See Newton’s Telecom Dictionary, 22nd Edition (2006) at 189.  See also In the Matter of 
Joint Application of SBC Communications Inc., Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell Telephone Company 
Incorporated, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, Wisconsin Bell, Inc., and Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Communications Services, Inc. for Authorization to Provide In-Region InterLATA Services in Illinois, Indiana, 
Ohio, and Wisconsin, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 21543, 21614 at ¶ 117 (2003) (stating that 
CABS “generates bills for competitive LECs that purchase UNE and interconnection products”); In the Matter of 
Application of Verizon Virginia Inc., Verizon Long Distance Virginia Inc., Verizon Enterprise Solutions Virginia 
Inc., Verizon Global Networks Inc. and Verizon Select Services of Virginia Inc., for Authorization to Provide In-
Region InterLATA Services in Virginia, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 21880, 21900 at ¶ 39 (2002) 
(stating that “Verizon uses CABS to provide billing for interoffice transport facilities, collocation, access services, 
carrier settlement, and other UNE products”); In the Matter of Joint Application of BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth 
Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth Long Distance, Inc. for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in 
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC 
Rcd 17595, 17691 at n.653 (2002) (stating that “CABS is used by BellSouth to bill for most UNE and 
interconnection services”).
125 Answer, Goodwin Declaration at 2, ¶ 4; Defendants’ Supplemental Response at 3-5.  ATIS develops and
promotes technical and operational standards for communications and related information technologies.  See, e.g., In 
the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing Minimum Customer Account Record Exchange Obligations on 
All Local and Interexchange Carriers, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 
4560, 4463 at ¶ 5 (2005).  Telcordia, formerly BellCore, is a provider of telecommunications network software and 
services for Internet protocol, wireline, wireless, and cable.  See, e.g., In the Matter of Implementation of Section 
273 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 18896, 18897-98 at ¶ 4 and n.13 (2003).  According to SWBT and the Midwest
ILECs, these standards and guidelines have been used for a number of years without any serious complaints by 
carrier customers.  Answer, Goodwin Declaration at 2-3, ¶ 6.
126 Defendant Supplemental Response, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed Aug. 25, 2005) at 3-5.  Defendants also 
provided a detailed explanation of the codes on one of the invoices that MAP identified, specifying the trunks, 
locations, type, circuit starting and end points, customer location, and directionality of the circuits.  Id.
127 SWBT and the Midwest ILECs provided the links to these websites in their submissions.  Defendants’ 
Supplemental Response at 3.
128 Defendant Supplemental Response, File No. EB-05-MD-013 (filed Aug. 25, 2005) at 3.  SWBT and the Midwest 
ILECs provided evidence that the codes identified in Defendants’ Carrier Coding Guidelines are generally based on 
Telcordia Common Language® codes, which are available online from Telcordia’s website.
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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charges specified in the relevant tariff provisions from which MAP ordered the facilities and services.129  
43. MAP has not refuted any of the foregoing evidence.  Rather, MAP apparently contends 
that the SWBT and the Midwest ILEC invoices violate section 64.2401(b) of the Commission’s rules 
solely because the codes used in the invoices, standing alone, do not provide a sufficient description of the 
services for which MAP was charged.130  
44. We find this argument unpersuasive in view of MAP’s status as a sophisticated carrier 
with knowledge of industry standards and practices.131 For example, the record shows that MAP’s 
employees were familiar with SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ tariffs and their online ordering 
systems.132 In addition, MAP’s employees placed orders for various tariffed services and facilities via 
SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ online systems, which appear to utilize many of the codes shown on 
the disputed invoices.133 SWBT and the Midwest ILECs demonstrated that the codes in question identify 
the specific facilities or services ordered by MAP, their location(s), the billing period, and their rates, all 
of which correspond to the online orders placed by MAP.134 All of this information appears necessary to 
establish an audit trail by which MAP can verify that the services it placed online with SWBT and the 
Midwest ILECs were billed in accordance with the rates specified in the tariffs from which MAP placed 
its orders.
45. Moreover, although the record indicates that MAP disputed certain charges at various 
times over the course of the parties’ approximately nine-year relationship,135 it contains no evidence that 
MAP ever told SWBT or the Midwest ILECs during this time that it found the codes on the bills to be 
  
129 Answer at 31, ¶ 62; Answer, Goodwin Declaration at 1-3, ¶¶ 3, 5, 6.  SWBT and the Midwest ILECs also moved 
to dismiss MAP’s ambiguous billing claims because MAP’s Complaint failed to allege any injury with respect to 
these claims.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 13-14.  Although MAP bifurcated its liability and damages claims 
pursuant to section 1.722(d) of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. § 1.722(d), we agree with SWBT and the 
Midwest ILECs that MAP failed to allege any injury or ask for any relief in its Complaint with respect to its 
ambiguous billing claims.  See Complaint at 33-34.  In any event, because we deny MAP’s ambiguous billing claims 
on other grounds, SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ Motion to Dismiss these claims is denied as moot.  See 
generally Amendment of Rules Governing Procedures to be Followed When Formal Complaints are Filed Against 
Common Carriers, Order on Reconsideration, 16 FCC Rcd 5681, 5696 at ¶ 34 (2001) (finding the practice of filing 
motions to dismiss as separate pleadings is usually unnecessary).
130 MAP also argues that SWBT and the Midwest ILECs have not identified the specific ATIS and Telcordia 
standards and practices they followed when issuing their invoices.  MAP Reply at 10, ¶ 21.  However, contrary to 
MAP’s contention, SWBT and the Midwest ILECs have identified the standards as those published by the Ordering 
and Billing Forum of ATIS and Telcordia.  Defendants’ Supplemental Response at 3.
131 The record reflects that, since at least February 1997, MAP has provided service in the PacBell, Ameritech, and 
SWBT service territories, including operations in California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  See, e.g., Complaint at 8, ¶ 15; 11, ¶ 21; Complaint Exhibit 12 at 
1; Complaint, Exhibit 20.  The record further reflects that MAP’s personnel had access to and were knowledgeable 
about industry-wide resources, such as online electronic carrier ordering systems and Defendants’ tariffs. See
Defendants’ Discovery Responses at 3.  
132 See Defendants’ Discovery Responses at 3 and Exhibits 1 and 2.
133 Id.
134 Indeed, MAP’s invoices to Defendants include codes similar in format to the codes found on Defendants’ 
invoices to MAP.  See, e.g., Defendants’ Supplemental Response, Exhibit G.
135 See, e.g., Complaint Exhibit 13, Letter dated February 13, 1998 from David V. Sherwood, MAP Chief Financial 
Officer, to John Earle, Ameritech, requesting credit for charges associated with certain interconnection facilities 
(“Complaint Exhibit 13, MAP Mobile February 13, 1998 Letter”).
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confusing or ambiguous.136 In fact, the record concerning MAP’s continuing efforts to address and 
resolve its interconnection-related billing disputes with SWBT and the Midwest ILECs suggests that 
MAP understood the codes on the invoices which enabled it to identify specific charges it was 
disputing.137  
46. Based on this record, we find that MAP has failed to meet its burden of proving that 
SWBT’s and the Midwest ILECs’ invoices were unclear, confusing, or ambiguous in violation of section 
201(b) of the Act or section 64.2401(b) of the Commission’s rules.  Accordingly, we deny Counts XVII, 
XVIII, XIX, and XX of the Complaint.138
F. MAP Does Not Have A Cause of Action Under Section 415 of the Act.
47. MAP alleges that Defendants violated section 415(a) of the Act139 by invoicing MAP for 
services provided more than two years prior to the filing of MAP’s Complaint.140 We reject MAP’s 
contention.  As SWBT and the Midwest ILECs point out, section 415(a) is a defense to claims asserted 
against a party; it does not provide the basis for an affirmative claim for relief.141 Section 415 serves as a 
procedural and substantive bar to the consideration of complaints against common carriers,142 thereby 
“protect[ing] a potential defendant against stale and vexatious claims."143 Section 415(a) establishes a 
time limit within which a carrier may initiate legal action to recover charges owed; it “does not address 
what is an acceptable amount of time between a carrier’s provision of service and the rendering of its 
bill.”144 MAP’s section 415 claims are thus not supported by either the statutory language or the purpose 
of the statutory provision.  We therefore deny Counts XXII and XXIII of MAP’s Complaint.145
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES
48. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), and 208 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), and 208, and sections 1.720-
1.736 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.720-1.736, and the authority delegated in sections 0.111 
and 0.311 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.111 and 0.311, that SBC Communications, Inc.,
Ameritech Corporation, Pacific Bell Communications, and Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. are hereby 
  
136 In addition, MAP’s responses to Defendants’ discovery on this very claim did not provide any specific supporting 
information.  See MAP Mobile Communications, Inc.’s Response to Defendants’ Interrogatories, File No. EB-05-
MD-013 at 3 (filed Oct. 19, 2005).
137 See, e.g., Complaint at 8-9, ¶¶ 15-18 and 11-12, ¶¶ 21-22; Complaint Exhibit 13, MAP Mobile February 13, 1998 
Letter.
138 See Complaint at 28-29, ¶¶ 61-65 (Counts XVII, XVIII, XIX, and XX).
139 Section 415(a) states that “[a]ll actions at law by carriers for the recovery of their lawful charges … shall be 
begun within two years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after.”  47 U.S.C. § 415(a).
140 Complaint at 30-32, ¶¶ 69-70, 72 (Counts XXII and XXIII); 10, ¶ 19; 13, ¶ 24; 16, ¶ 29.
141 Answer at 33-35, ¶¶ 69-72; Defendants’ Legal Analysis at 30-31.
142 See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 
FCC Rcd 13243, 13252 at ¶ 15 (Com. Carr. Bur. 1997).
143 Bunker Ramo Corp. v. The Western Union Telegraph Co., New York, N.T., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 31 
FCC 2d 449, 453-54 (Rev. Bd. 1971).  See, e.g., Business Choice Network v AT&T, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 7 FCC Rcd 7702, 7703 at n.7 (Com. Carr. Bur. 1992) (“That section limits the time when carriers may begin 
“actions at law,” i.e., sue in an appropriate court, to recover their lawful charges.”).
144 American Network, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Backbilling of Access Charges, Order on 
Reconsideration, 4 FCC Rcd 8797, 8798 at ¶ 10 (1989).
145 See Complaint at 30-32, ¶¶ 69-72 (Counts XXII and XXIII).
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DISMISSED as parties, without prejudice.
49. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), and 208 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), and 208, and sections 1.720-
1.736 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.720-1.736, and the authority delegated in sections 0.111 
and 0.311 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.111 and 0.311, that Illinois Bell Telephone 
Company, Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated, Michigan Bell Telephone Company, The 
Ohio Bell Telephone Company, Wisconsin Bell, Inc., Pacific Bell Telephone Company, and 
Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. are hereby added as parties in this proceeding.
50. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 201, 208, 251, 252, and 332 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), 201, 208, 251, 252, and 
332, and sections 1.720-1.736 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.720-1.736, and the authority 
delegated in sections 0.111 and 0.311 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.111 and 0.311, that 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART to the extent set forth 
herein, and those portions of the Complaint asserting claims against Pacific Bell Telephone Company, 
including specifically Counts X, XI, XII, and XXIV, are DISMISSED without prejudice.
51. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 201, 208, 251, 252, and 332 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), 201, 208, 251, 252, and 
332, and sections 1.720-1.736 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.720-1.736, and the authority 
delegated in sections 0.111 and 0.311 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.111 and 0.311, that 
Counts I, II, III, V, VIII, XIV, XVIII (§ 64.2401(d)) and XXI of the Complaint alleged by MAP Mobile 
Communications, Inc. against Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell Telephone Company, 
Incorporated, Michigan Bell Telephone Company, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, Wisconsin Bell, 
Inc., Pacific Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. are DISMISSED without 
prejudice.
52. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 201, 208, 251, 252, and 332, 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), 201, 208, 251, 252, and 
332, and sections 1.720-1.736, 20.11, 51.703(b), and 64.2401 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 
1.720-1.736, 20.11, 51.703 and 64.2401, and the authority delegated in sections 0.111 and 0.311 of the 
Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.111 and 0.311, that Counts IV, VI, VII, and IX of the Complaint 
alleged by MAP Mobile Communications, Inc. against Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell 
Telephone Company, Incorporated, Michigan Bell Telephone Company, The Ohio Bell Telephone 
Company, Wisconsin Bell, Inc., and Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. are GRANTED IN PART AND 
DENIED IN PART, to the extent indicated herein.
Federal Communications Commission DA 09-1065 
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53. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 201, 208, 251, 252, and 332, 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), 201, 208, 251, 252, and 
332, and sections 1.720-1.736, 20.11, 51.703(b), and 64.2401 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 
1.720-1.736, 20.11, 51.703 and 64.2401, and the authority delegated in sections 0.111 and 0.311 of the 
Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.111 and 0.311, that Counts XIII, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII (§ 
64.2401(b)), XIX, XX, XXII, and XXIII of the Complaint alleged by MAP Mobile Communications, Inc. 
against Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated, Michigan Bell 
Telephone Company, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, Wisconsin Bell, Inc., and Southwestern Bell 
Telephone, L.P. are DENIED.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Kris Anne Monteith
Chief, Enforcement Bureau