

REDACTED VERSION

**Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of)	
)	
AT&T Services, Inc. and)	File No. CSR-8196-P
Southern New England Telephone Company)	
d/b/a AT&T Connecticut,)	
Complainants,)	
)	
v.)	
)	
Madison Square Garden, L.P. and)	
Cablevision Systems Corp.,)	
Defendants)	

ORDER

Adopted: September 22, 2011

Released: September 22, 2011

By the Chief, Media Bureau

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Heading	Paragraph #
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. BACKGROUND	2
A. Commission’s Rules Addressing Unfair Acts Involving Terrestrially Delivered, Cable-Affiliated Programming	2
B. Appeal of the <i>2010 Order</i>	5
C. AT&T’s Complaint	6
III. DISCUSSION	10
A. AT&T’s Complaint is Not Barred by the October 2007 Release	10
B. Count I – “Unfair Act” in Violation of Section 628(b) of the Act and Section 76.1001(a) of the Rules	11
1. AT&T Properly Invoked the Framework Adopted in the <i>2010 Order</i>	12
2. AT&T Has Demonstrated that Defendants Violated Section 628(b) of the Act and Section 76.1001(a) of the Rules	13
a. Both MSG LP and Cablevision Are Proper Defendants to Count I	14
(i) MSG LP	14
(ii) Cablevision	17
b. Defendants’ Withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T is an “Unfair Act”	19
(i) The D.C. Circuit’s Ruling in <i>Cablevision II</i> Affirms the Commission’s Authority to Address Whether Withholding is an “Unfair Act” on a Case-by-Case Basis	20
(ii) The Bureau Has Delegated Authority to Consider Whether Withholding is an “Unfair Act”	24
(iii) Based on Established Precedent and Guidelines, Defendants’ Withholding is an “Unfair Act”	25

REDACTED VERSION

(a) Defendants’ Procompetitive Justifications for Withholding.....	26
(b) Section 628(c)(4) Factors.....	28
(i) Development of Competition in Local and National MVPD Markets.....	29
(ii) The Effect of Withholding on Alternative Video Providers to Incumbent Cable Operators.....	31
(iii) Attraction of Investment in New Programming.....	32
(iv) The Effect on Diversity of Programming in the MVPD Market.....	35
(v) Duration of Withholding.....	37
(vi) Conclusion.....	38
(c) <i>MDU Order</i>	39
(d) Legitimate Business Justification.....	40
(e) FTC Definition.....	41
(f) Conclusion.....	42
c. Defendants’ Withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T Has the “Effect” of “Significantly Hindering” AT&T.....	43
(i) The “Significant Hindrance” Standard.....	44
(ii) The Record Supports Application of a Rebuttable Presumption of “Significant Hindrance” for HD RSNs.....	47
(iii) Defendants Have Failed to Rebut the Presumption.....	50
(a) Survey Evidence.....	52
(i) The Results of Defendants’ Surveys Contradict Their Product Differentiation Strategy.....	54
(ii) Defendants’ Survey Evidence Is Not Reliable.....	55
(b) Non-Survey Evidence.....	62
(c) Conclusion.....	69
3. Remedy.....	70
4. First Amendment.....	73
C. Count II – Unreasonable Refusal to Sell.....	77
D. Count III – Evasion.....	79
E. Count IV – Undue or Improper Influence.....	81
F. Count V – Discrimination.....	82
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES.....	83

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In this *Order*, we find that Madison Square Garden, L.P. (“MSG LP”) and Cablevision Systems Corporation (“Cablevision”) (MSG LP and Cablevision together, the “Defendants”) violated Section 628(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the “Act”) and Section 76.1001(a) of the Commission’s rules based on our findings that (i) both MSG LP and Cablevision are proper defendants; (ii) Defendants’ withholding of the high definition (“HD”) versions of the MSG and MSG+ networks from AT&T Services, Inc. and Southern New England Telephone Company d/b/a AT&T Connecticut (collectively, “AT&T”) is an “unfair act”,¹ and (iii) this “unfair act” has the “effect” of “significantly hindering” AT&T from providing a competing video service, including “satellite cable programming and satellite broadcast programming,” to subscribers and consumers in the state of

¹ Throughout this *Order*, we use the term “unfair act” as shorthand for the phrase “unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 47 U.S.C. § 548(b); see 47 C.F.R. § 76.1001(a).

REDACTED VERSION

Connecticut.² Accordingly, we grant Count I of AT&T's program access complaint and order MSG LP to enter into an agreement to license the MSG HD and MSG+ HD networks to AT&T on non-discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions within 30 days of the release of this *Order*. For the reasons discussed herein, we deny the remaining counts set forth in AT&T's complaint.

II. BACKGROUND**A. Commission's Rules Addressing Unfair Acts Involving Terrestrially Delivered, Cable-Affiliated Programming**

2. Sections 628(b), 628(c)(1), and 628(d) of the Act³ grant the Commission broad authority to prohibit "unfair acts" of cable operators, satellite cable programming vendors in which a cable operator has an attributable interest, and satellite broadcast programming vendors that have the "purpose or effect" of "hinder[ing] significantly or prevent[ing]" any multichannel video programming distributor ("MVPD") from providing "satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers."⁴ Based on this broad grant of authority, the Commission adopted rules for the processing of complaints alleging one or more of three "unfair acts" involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming: undue or improper influence, discrimination, and exclusive contracts.⁵ Among other things, these rules require a complainant to demonstrate that the "unfair act" has the "purpose or effect" of "significantly hindering or preventing" the complainant from providing satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers, as required by Section 628(b).⁶

3. The Commission has recognized that some terrestrially delivered programming may be non-replicable and sufficiently valuable to consumers that an "unfair act" regarding this programming

² 47 U.S.C. § 548(b); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1001(a). AT&T, Cablevision, and MSG LP are each a "Party" and are collectively the "Parties."

³ Section 628 was passed as part of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act"). See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).

⁴ See 47 U.S.C. § 548(b) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for a cable operator, a satellite cable programming vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable interest, or a satellite broadcast programming vendor to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices, the purpose or effect of which is to hinder significantly or to prevent any multichannel video programming distributor from providing satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers."); 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(1); 47 U.S.C. § 548(d).

⁵ See 47 C.F.R. § 76.1001; *Review of the Commission's Program Access Rules and Examination of Programming Tying Arrangements*, First Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd 746 (2010) ("2010 Order"), affirmed in part and vacated in part *Cablevision Sys. Corp. et al. v. FCC*, No. 10-1062, 2011 WL 2277217 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2011) ("Cablevision IP"). We note that the *AT&T Complaint* was filed five months prior to release of the 2010 Order. See *AT&T Services Inc. et al., Program Access and Section 628(b) Complaint*, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed Aug. 13, 2009) ("AT&T Complaint"). Many of the Parties' arguments from earlier stages of this proceeding pertain to the Commission's statutory authority to address "unfair acts" involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming pursuant to Section 628(b). See, e.g., *id.* at ¶¶ 86-88; Defendants, Answer to Program Access Complaint, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed Sept. 17, 2009), at 20-33 ("Defendants' Answer"); AT&T Services Inc. *et al.*, Reply, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed Oct. 2, 2009), at 6-13 ("AT&T Reply"). In the 2010 Order, the Commission interpreted Section 628(b) and addressed arguments regarding the scope of this provision. See 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 757-61, ¶¶ 19-24. Rather than repeating that analysis here, we incorporate by reference the Commission's interpretation of Section 628(b) from the 2010 Order.

⁶ See 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 780-82, ¶¶ 50-51.

REDACTED VERSION

presumptively – but not conclusively – has the purpose or effect set forth in Section 628(b).⁷ The Commission has found that Regional Sports Networks (“RSNs”) fall within this category.⁸ Accordingly, rather than requiring litigants and the Commission staff to undertake repetitive examinations of RSN precedent and the relevant historical evidence, the Commission allows complainants to invoke a rebuttable presumption that an “unfair act” involving a terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated RSN has the purpose or effect set forth in Section 628(b).⁹ The Commission has explained that the defendant may overcome the presumption by establishing that the “unfair act” does not have the prohibited purpose or effect.¹⁰

4. In addition, the Commission has concluded that HD programming is growing in significance to consumers¹¹ and that consumers do not consider the standard definition (“SD”) version of a particular channel to be an adequate substitute for the HD version due to the different technical characteristics and sometimes different content.¹² Accordingly, the Commission analyzes the HD version of a network separately from the SD version with similar content for purposes of determining whether an “unfair act” has the purpose or effect set forth in Section 628(b).¹³ Thus, the fact that a complainant offers the SD version of a network to subscribers will not alone be sufficient to refute the complainant’s

⁷ See *id.* at 750, ¶8 and 782-83, ¶ 52.

⁸ See *id.* at 782-83, ¶ 52. In establishing the RSN rebuttable presumption, the Commission relied on evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that RSNs typically offer non-replicable content and are considered “must have” programming by MVPDs. See *id.* at 768-69, ¶ 32 and 782-83, ¶ 52 nn.205-206. The Commission also relied on an empirical analysis performed in the 2006 *Adelphia Order* assessing the impact of the withholding of terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated RSNs on the market shares of Direct Broadcast Satellite (“DBS”) operators. See *id.* at 768-69, ¶ 32 and 782, ¶ 52 n.202 (citing *Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, Adelphia Communications Corporation, Assignors to Time Warner Cable, Inc., Assignees, et al.*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd 8203, 8271, ¶ 149 (2006) (“*Adelphia Order*”) (concluding that Comcast’s withholding of the terrestrially delivered Comcast SportsNet Philadelphia RSN from DBS operators caused the percentage of television households subscribing to DBS in Philadelphia to be 40 percent lower than what it otherwise would have been; and concluding that Cox’s withholding of the terrestrially delivered Cox-4 RSN from DBS operators in San Diego caused the percentage of television households subscribing to DBS in that city to be 33 percent lower than what it otherwise would have been); *Review of the Commission’s Program Access Rules and Examination of Programming Tying Arrangements*, MB Docket No. 07-198, Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 17791, 17818-19, ¶ 40 and 17876-82, Appendix B (addressing comments concerning the *Adelphia Order* study) (2007) (“*2007 Order*”), *aff’d sub nom. Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC*, 597 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“*Cablevision I*”). The Commission defined an RSN in the same way the Commission has defined that term in previous merger proceedings for purposes of adopting program access conditions: “any non-broadcast video programming service that (1) provides live or same-day distribution within a limited geographic region of sporting events of a sports team that is a member of Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, the National Football League, the National Hockey League, NASCAR, NCAA Division I Football, NCAA Division I Basketball, Liga de Béisbol Profesional de Puerto Rico, Baloncesto Superior Nacional de Puerto Rico, Liga Mayor de Fútbol Nacional de Puerto Rico, and the Puerto Rico Islanders of the United Soccer League’s First Division and (2) in any year, carries a minimum of either 100 hours of programming that meets the criteria of subheading 1, or 10% of the regular season games of at least one sports team that meets the criteria of subheading 1.” See *id.* at 783-84, ¶ 53.

⁹ See *id.* at 782-83, ¶ 52.

¹⁰ See *id.*; see also *id.* at 750, ¶ 8.

¹¹ See *id.* at 784-85, ¶ 54.

¹² See *id.* at 784-85, ¶¶ 54-55.

¹³ See *id.* at 784-85, ¶ 54.

REDACTED VERSION

showing that lack of access to the HD version has the purpose or effect set forth in Section 628(b).¹⁴ Similarly, in cases involving an RSN, withholding the HD feed is rebuttably presumed to cause “significant hindrance” even if an SD version of the network is made available to competitors.¹⁵

B. Appeal of the 2010 Order

5. The Defendants in this case –MSG LP and Cablevision – each appealed the *2010 Order* to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”). On June 10, 2011, the D.C. Circuit issued a decision (i) affirming the Commission’s interpretation of Section 628(b) as extending to “unfair acts” involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming;¹⁶ (ii) denying the Defendants’ facial First Amendment challenge to the Commission’s interpretation of Section 628(b);¹⁷ (iii) rejecting as unripe a First Amendment challenge to the Commission’s interpretation of Section 628(b) as applied in the New York City video market;¹⁸ (iv) upholding the Commission’s decision to establish a rebuttable presumption of “significant hindrance” for “unfair acts” involving RSNs and HD RSNs under both First Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) review;¹⁹ (v) affirming under APA review the Commission’s decision to hold a “satellite cable programming vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable interest” liable for “unfair acts” involving terrestrially delivered programming;²⁰ and (vi) affirming under APA review the Commission’s decision to hold each of the three types of entity listed in Section 628(b) liable for the “unfair acts” of a terrestrially delivered programmer that the entity wholly owns, controls, or with which it is under common control.²¹ The D.C. Circuit vacated just one part of the *2010 Order* – the Commission’s decision to treat certain acts involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming as categorically “unfair.”²² As discussed in further detail below, the D.C. Circuit’s decision on this issue does not preclude the Media Bureau (“Bureau”) from assessing on a case-by-case basis whether an act is “unfair” under Section 628(b).²³ The court’s mandate issued on July 27, 2011.²⁴

C. AT&T’s Complaint

6. Complainant AT&T is an MVPD as defined in Section 76.1000(e) of the Commission’s rules that provides video service to subscribers in Connecticut, among other areas, under the service name of AT&T U-verse TV service.²⁵ Defendant Cablevision is a cable operator as defined in Section 522(5)

¹⁴ See *id.* at 785, ¶ 55.

¹⁵ See *id.*

¹⁶ See *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *6-*12.

¹⁷ See *id.* at *13-*15.

¹⁸ See *id.* at *15.

¹⁹ See *id.* at *17-*19.

²⁰ See *id.* at *19-*20.

²¹ See *id.* at *20-*21.

²² See *id.* at *21-*24.

²³ See *infra* ¶¶ 20-24.

²⁴ See Judgment, File No. 10-1062 (D.C. Cir.).

²⁵ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 1, 12, 14, 80 and Joint Declaration of Daniel York, Christopher Lauricella, and Rob Thun (Aug. 10, 2009), at ¶ 5 (“York/Lauricella/Thun Decl.”); *Defendants’ Answer* at 83 (¶ 1), 85 (¶ 14). AT&T states that it provides service in the following communities, among others, in the state of Connecticut within the (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION

of the Act that provides video service in the state of Connecticut, among other areas.²⁶ Defendant MSG LP owns and operates two RSNs: MSG and MSG+.²⁷ MSG owns exclusive rights to produce and exhibit within a certain geographic region the games of the New York Knicks (of the National Basketball Association (“NBA”)) and New York Rangers (of the National Hockey League (“NHL”)), among others.²⁸ MSG+ owns exclusive rights to produce and exhibit within a certain geographic region the games of the New York Islanders (of the NHL) and New Jersey Devils (of the NHL), and also televises local and national college football and basketball games.²⁹ MSG LP delivers the SD versions of MSG and MSG+ to cable operators via satellite and delivers the HD versions of these networks via terrestrial facilities.³⁰ At the time the *AT&T Complaint* was filed in August 2009, MSG LP was a wholly owned subsidiary of Cablevision.³¹ In February 2010, Madison Square Garden, Inc. (“MSG Inc.”) was spun off from Cablevision, becoming a separate public company.³² Defendant MSG LP is now a wholly owned subsidiary of MSG Inc.³³ Despite this spin off, MSG LP is affiliated with Cablevision pursuant to the Commission’s attribution rules because Cablevision and MSG LP share a common controlling shareholder (the Dolan family) and thus are under common control.³⁴

7. AT&T claims that Defendants have continually refused to provide AT&T with access to the terrestrially delivered MSG HD and MSG+ HD networks in the state of Connecticut.³⁵ AT&T contends that Defendants initially indicated in 2007 that they would not license the HD versions of MSG and MSG+ to AT&T.³⁶ AT&T claims that it attempted to obtain access to the HD versions of MSG and MSG+ in 2008 and 2009 in connection with negotiations pertaining to the satellite-delivered HD versions of Defendants’ national networks, but Defendants again declined.³⁷ Defendants admit that “it is true that

(Continued from previous page) _____
New York Designated Market Area (“DMA”) (Bridgeport, Danbury, Darien, Easton, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Shelton, Stamford, Stratford, Weston, and Westport) and the Hartford/New Haven DMA (Bristol, East Haven, Hamden, Hartford, Middleton, Milford, Naugatuck, New Britain, New Haven, Orange, Wallingford, Waterbury, West Haven, and Woodbridge). See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 12; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 9; see also *Defendants’ Answer* at 15 n.41.

²⁶ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 16-17, 19, 81; *Defendants’ Answer* at 85 (¶ 16), 86 (¶ 17), 87 (¶ 81).

²⁷ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 22.

²⁸ See *id.* at ¶ 23; *Defendants’ Answer* at 86 (¶ 23).

²⁹ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 23; *Defendants’ Answer* at 86 (¶ 23).

³⁰ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 24, 44; *Defendants’ Answer* at 10-13 (¶¶ 1-5), 70-71, 86 (¶ 24) and Declaration of Steven J. Pontillo (Sept. 16, 2009), at ¶¶ 11-20 (“Pontillo Decl.”).

³¹ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 2, 21; *Defendants’ Answer* at 86 (¶ 21).

³² See *Defendants’ Answer to AT&T’s Supplement to Program Access Complaint*, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed Jan. 6, 2011), at 119-20 (“*Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement*”).

³³ See *id.* at 120.

³⁴ See Reply Brief of Defendants, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed Jan. 31, 2011), at 59 n.221 (“*Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief*”); see also Opening Brief of AT&T, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed Jan. 6, 2011), at 23 n.43 (citing Madison Square Garden, Inc., SEC Form 10-Q at 14 (Aug. 6, 2010)) and at 24 n.45 (“*AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief*”); Reply Brief of AT&T, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed Jan. 31, 2011), at 35 (“*AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief*”); *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 22 n.19.

³⁵ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 6-7, 42, 44, 50-54, 62; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶¶ 33-48.

³⁶ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 42-44; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶¶ 34-36; *Defendants’ Answer* at 13-14 (¶ 6).

³⁷ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 46-54; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶¶ 39-47; *Defendants’ Answer* at 14-15 (¶ 8).

REDACTED VERSION

AT&T cannot obtain access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD.³⁸ Despite their withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T, Defendants have licensed these networks to many of AT&T's competitors in the state of Connecticut, including Cablevision, Time Warner, Comcast, and DIRECTV.³⁹

8. On July 10, 2009, AT&T notified Defendants of its intention to file a program access complaint based on Defendants' refusal to provide AT&T with access to the HD versions of MSG and MSG+.⁴⁰ Defendants responded on July 23, 2009, stating that they had no legal obligation to provide AT&T with access to the HD versions of MSG and MSG+ and that their refusal to do so was not unreasonable, unfair, or anticompetitive.⁴¹ On August 13, 2009, AT&T filed its complaint, raising five separate counts with respect to Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T.⁴² Among other things, AT&T asks the Commission to provide a period not to exceed 30 days for Defendants to negotiate nondiscriminatory terms and conditions for AT&T's access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD.⁴³ AT&T also asks the Commission to institute a forfeiture proceeding under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) based on Defendants' alleged repeated failure to comply with the Communications Act and the Commission's rules.⁴⁴ Defendants filed an Answer to the *AT&T Complaint*, to which AT&T filed a Reply.⁴⁵ While AT&T initially elected to prosecute Count I of its complaint under Section 628(d)

³⁸ See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 94; see also *Defendants' Answer* at 13 (¶ 6), 14-15 (¶ 8), Declaration of Adam Levine (Sept. 17, 2009), at ¶ 12 (“[I]t had previously been made clear to AT&T that MSG would not provide AT&T with a license to carry MSG HD and MSG+ HD.”) (“Levine Sept. 2009 Decl.”); Defendants' Objections to AT&T's Improperly Propounded and Irrelevant Discovery Requests, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed Oct. 29, 2009), at 6 (“The parties agree that AT&T sought a license to carry MSG HD and MSG+ HD, and that it was denied such a license.”) (“*Defendants' Oct. 29th Discovery Objection*”).

³⁹ See *AT&T Complaint* at iv and ¶¶ 6, 66, 68, 76, 110; *Defendants' Answer* at 58; *AT&T Reply* at 15; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 23; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 97-98.

⁴⁰ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 53 and Exhibit 5.

⁴¹ See *id.*, Exhibit 6.

⁴² See *id.* at ¶¶ 78-111. At the request of the Parties, the Bureau adopted a Protective Order in this proceeding to govern the submission of confidential material. See *AT&T Services Inc. et al. v. Madison Square Garden, L.P. et al.*, Order, 24 FCC Rcd 11258 (MB 2009).

⁴³ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 8 and p.44.

⁴⁴ See *id.* at ¶¶ 8, 112 and p.44.

⁴⁵ See generally *Defendants' Answer*; *AT&T Reply*. The Parties have also made a number of additional filings outside of the authorized pleading cycle but prior to discovery. Defendants submitted two surveys purporting to demonstrate the importance (or lack thereof) of MSG HD and MSG+ HD to subscribers, which AT&T sought to strike as late-filed. See Defendants' Supplement to the Record, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed April 9, 2010) (“*Defendants' April 2010 Supplement*”), Exhibit A (Declaration of Leslie Shifrin (March 15, 2010) (“*Shifrin March 2010 Decl.*”), Exhibit B (“*Radius Global Market Research – Market Research Assessing Reasons for Choice of Television Provider*” (“*Defendants' Radius Survey*”)), Exhibit C (“*OTX Online Testing Exchange Assessing the Impact of Verizon Offering MSG HD/MSG+ HD on Verizon Customer Acquisition*” (“*Defendants' OTX March 2010 Survey*”)); AT&T, Motion to Strike Defendants' Supplement to the Record, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed April 16, 2010); Defendants' Opposition to AT&T's Motion to Strike Defendants' Supplement to the Record, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed April 26, 2010); AT&T, Reply in Support of Its Motion to Strike Defendants' Supplement to the Record, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed April 30, 2010). In addition, MSG LP filed a Motion to Dismiss MSG LP as a party to the proceeding, which AT&T opposed. See *Madison Square Garden, L.P., Motion to Dismiss MSG LP as a Party*, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed April 9, 2010) (“*MSG LP Motion to Dismiss*”); AT&T, Opposition to Motion to Dismiss MSG LP as a Party, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed April 16, 2010) (“*AT&T Opposition to MSG LP Motion to Dismiss*”); *Madison Square Garden, L.P., Reply to AT&T's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss MSG LP as a Party*, (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION

pursuant to the pre-2010 *Order* framework,⁴⁶ AT&T subsequently filed a supplement to its complaint on July 14, 2010 to invoke the post-2010 *Order* framework.⁴⁷

9. During the course of the proceeding, each Party submitted discovery requests as well as objections to the other Party's discovery requests.⁴⁸ On August 9, 2010, the Bureau informed the Parties

(Continued from previous page)

File No. CSR-8196-P (filed April 23, 2010) (“*MSG LP Reply to AT&T Opposition to Motion to Dismiss*”). The Parties also submitted additional substantive filings after the close of the pleading cycle but prior to discovery. See, e.g., Letter from Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (March 30, 2010) (“*AT&T March 30th Letter*”); Letter from Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (April 9, 2010) (“*Defendants’ April 9th Letter*”); Letter from Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (April 16, 2010) (“*AT&T April 16th Letter*”); Letter from Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (April 23, 2010) (“*Defendants’ April 23rd Letter*”). In the interest of acting on a complete record, we decline to strike any of these post-pleading-cycle/pre-discovery filings and consider the substantive claims made therein in reaching a decision. We have declined, however, Defendants’ request to submit supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the record supports a finding that Defendants have engaged in an “unfair act.” See Email from Christopher J. Harvie, Counsel for Defendants, to David S. Konczal, Assistant Division Chief, Policy Division, Media Bureau, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (Aug. 1, 2011). The request was made on August 1, 2011, nine months after the close of discovery in this proceeding. See *id.* The parties have had a full opportunity to brief this issue, and the record on this issue is well-developed. See Email from David S. Konczal, Assistant Division Chief, Policy Division, Media Bureau, FCC to Christopher J. Harvie, Counsel for Defendants, File No. CSR-8196-P (Aug. 3, 2011); see also *infra* ¶ 23. Moreover, the Bureau informed the parties on July 26, 2011, prior to Defendants’ request for supplemental briefing, that the Bureau intended to resolve the pending complaints in the near future, thus granting the Defendants’ request would have resulted in unnecessary delay. See Email from David S. Konczal, Assistant Division Chief, Policy Division, Media Bureau, FCC to Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, File No. CSR-8196-P (July 26, 2011).

⁴⁶ See *infra* n.69.

⁴⁷ See AT&T Services Inc. et al., Supplemental Filing Regarding the Commission’s New Program Access Rules, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed July 14, 2010) (“*AT&T Supplement*”); see also 2010 *Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 751, ¶ 10, 756-57, ¶ 17, 785, ¶ 55, 789, ¶ 64 n.237.

⁴⁸ AT&T initially filed a discovery request in October 2009. See AT&T’s First Set of Interrogatories, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed Oct. 16, 2009); AT&T’s First Request for the Production of Documents, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed Oct. 16, 2009); *Defendants’ Oct. 29th Discovery Objection*; Letter from Colin S. Stretch, Counsel for AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (Oct. 30, 2009). AT&T subsequently requested that the Commission resolve Count I of its complaint without discovery, unless the Commission did not find the record adequate to rule on its claims, in which case AT&T requested the Commission to order Defendants to provide the requested discovery. See *AT&T March 30th Letter* at 5 n.13. In response to an inquiry from the Bureau, AT&T filed a revised discovery request in April 2010. See Letter from David S. Konczal, Assistant Division Chief, Policy Division, Media Bureau, FCC to Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, and Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, File No. CSR-8196-P (April 8, 2010); Letter from Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (April 16, 2010) (attaching AT&T’s Amended First Interrogatories (April 16, 2010) and AT&T’s Amended First Request for the Production of Documents (April 16, 2010)); *Defendants’ April 23rd Letter*; AT&T’s Reply in Support of Amended Requests for Discovery, File No. CSR-8196-P (April 30, 2010). At the request of the Bureau, Defendants submitted their discovery requests in July 2010. See Letter from Nancy Murphy, Associate Bureau Chief, Media Bureau, FCC to Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, and Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, File No. CSR-8196-P (June 23, 2010); Letter from Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (July 9, 2010) (“*Defendants’ July 9th Letter*”); Defendants’ First Request for the Production of Documents, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed July 9, 2010); Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories, File No. CSR-8196-P (filed July 9, 2010); AT&T’s Objections to Defendants’ First Discovery Requests, File No. CSR-8196-P (July 19, 2010); Letter from Howard J. (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION

that discovery was necessary for the resolution of Counts I, III, and V and directed the Parties to resolve their outstanding discovery disputes.⁴⁹ On August 24, 2010, the Parties submitted a joint letter describing their agreement regarding the scope of discovery to be conducted.⁵⁰ The Bureau resolved the remaining discovery disputes and established November 1, 2010 for the end of discovery.⁵¹ The Parties agreed to file post-discovery opening briefs on January 6, 2011 and to file post-discovery reply briefs on January 31, 2011.⁵²

III. DISCUSSION**A. AT&T's Complaint is Not Barred by the October 2007 Release**

10. We find that the *AT&T Complaint* is not barred by the release that AT&T entered into with Cablevision and its wholly owned subsidiary, Rainbow Media Holdings, LLC ("Rainbow"), in October 2007.⁵³ The release resulted from a previous program access complaint filed by AT&T in June 2007 against Cablevision and Rainbow pertaining to AT&T's request to license the SD versions of MSG and MSG+.⁵⁴ In October 2007, AT&T withdrew its June 2007 complaint after Cablevision and Rainbow agreed to license the SD versions of MSG and MSG+ to AT&T.⁵⁵ The release states that AT&T and
(Continued from previous page) _____
Symons, Counsel for Defendants, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (July 26, 2010) ("*Defendants' July 26th Letter*").

⁴⁹ See Letter from David S. Konczal, Assistant Division Chief, Policy Division, Media Bureau, FCC to Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, and Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, File No. CSR-8196-P (Aug. 9, 2010) ("*Bureau Aug. 9th Letter*").

⁵⁰ See Joint Letter from Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, and Christopher J. Harvie, Counsel for Defendants, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (Aug. 14, 2010) ("*Parties' Aug. 24th Letter*"). In light of the settlement of the outstanding discovery disputes, the Parties' pending discovery objections and the Defendants' request to refer the discovery disputes to an Administrative Law Judge are moot. See *Defendants' April 23rd Letter* at 3 n.16.

⁵¹ See Letter from Nancy Murphy, Associate Chief, Media Bureau, FCC to Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, and Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, File No. CSR-8196-P (Sept. 1, 2010).

⁵² See Email from Christopher J. Harvie, Counsel for Defendants, to David S. Konczal, Assistant Division Chief, Policy Division, Media Bureau, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (Dec. 3, 2010). The Parties agreed to a mutual exchange of opening briefs and reply briefs rather than the pleading schedule established in the *2010 Order*. See *id.*; *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 789, ¶ 64 n.237. The Commission has established an aspirational goal of resolving program access complaints within five months from the submission of a complaint for denial of programming cases, and within nine months for all other program access complaints, such as price discrimination cases. See *2007 Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 17856, ¶ 107; see also *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 747, ¶ 1 n.2. In addition to a denial of programming, the present case involves undue influence and evasion claims, thus the nine-month goal applies. While this would establish May 2010 as the goal for resolving this complaint, this proceeding was further complicated by the intervening *2010 Order* adopted in January 2010 in which the Commission interpreted Section 628(b) and its application to terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming; the Defendants' appeal of the *2010 Order* to the D.C. Circuit; AT&T's decision to supplement its complaint in July 2010; and the Parties' decision to engage in extensive discovery. See *Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992*, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 15822, 15842-43, ¶ 41 (1998) (explaining that the aspirational goals for resolving program access cases do not apply to cases involving complex discovery or extra pleadings based upon new information).

⁵³ See *Defendants' Answer*, Exhibit 4.

⁵⁴ See *AT&T Complaint*, Exhibit 4.

⁵⁵ See *id.* at ¶ 40; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 32.

REDACTED VERSION

Rainbow (defined to include Cablevision and MSG) agreed to “release one another . . . from any and all claims, actions, damages, and liabilities arising out of or related to the issues in” (i) AT&T’s June 2007 complaint and (ii) the “negotiation” of the October 2007 agreement to license the SD versions of MSG and MSG+ to AT&T “including, without limitation, the terms, conditions, and provisions contained therein or that could have been contained therein.”⁵⁶ While there is no dispute that AT&T did not raise the issue of licensing MSG HD and MSG+ HD in its June 2007 complaint,⁵⁷ Defendants claim that the negotiations leading to the October 2007 agreement included requests by AT&T to license MSG HD and MSG+ HD.⁵⁸ Accordingly, Defendants claim that the release precludes AT&T from bringing a complaint regarding access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD.⁵⁹ We disagree. While the record indicates that AT&T raised the issue of licensing MSG HD and MSG+ HD on two occasions prior to the October 2007 agreement,⁶⁰ there was no “negotiation” related to MSG HD and MSG+ HD.⁶¹ Rather, Cablevision and Rainbow flatly refused to negotiate with AT&T regarding MSG HD and MSG+ HD.⁶² Moreover, the record indicates that Cablevision and Rainbow requested that the parties handle the issue of HD rights separately from the issue of SD rights.⁶³ This is consistent with Defendants’ statement that “MSG HD and MSG+ HD are licensed separately from MSG and MSG+.”⁶⁴ In addition, AT&T notes that it

⁵⁶ See Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶ 10; see also *Defendants’ Answer* at 18.

⁵⁷ See *AT&T Reply* at 44 and Joint Reply Declaration of Rob Thun, Christopher Lauricella, and Tom Rawls (Oct. 2, 2009), at ¶ 19 (“Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl.”).

⁵⁸ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 19; Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶¶ 7-8.

⁵⁹ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 19-20; Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶ 10.

⁶⁰ First, in June 2007, AT&T indicated that it was interested in accessing MSG HD and MSG+ HD, but agreed to set that issue aside to focus on other programming negotiations. See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 42-43; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶¶ 34-35; Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl. at ¶ 21; see also *Defendants’ Answer* at 19. Second, in October 2007 during the course of settling AT&T’s June 2007 complaint, AT&T again raised the issue of licensing MSG HD and MSG+ HD. See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 44; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 36; Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl. at ¶ 22; see also *Defendants’ Answer* at 19.

⁶¹ See Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl. at ¶ 19 (“In standard English and industry practice, ‘negotiation’ involves a give and take of proposed terms and conditions of carriage. But such ‘negotiation’ never occurred with respect to HD rights: Although AT&T wanted to engage in such negotiations, Defendants outright refused to do so. It was, in short, a ‘refusal to negotiate,’ not a ‘negotiation,’ on the part of Defendants.”); see also *AT&T Reply* at 45.

⁶² In response to AT&T’s June 2007 inquiry regarding licensing MSG HD and MSG+ HD, Cablevision and Rainbow informed AT&T that “a license to distribute MSG HD and MSG+ HD would not be part of the deal under discussion.” Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶ 7; see *Defendants’ Answer* at 19; *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 42; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 34; Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl. at ¶ 21. With respect to AT&T’s October 2007 inquiry regarding licensing MSG HD and MSG+ HD, Defendants state that “this request was again denied.” Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶ 8; see *Defendants’ Answer* at 19; *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 44; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 36; *AT&T Reply* at 45; Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl. at ¶ 22.

⁶³ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 14-15 (¶ 8) (stating that Defendants rejected all attempts by AT&T to obtain a license for MSG HD and MSG+ HD “consistent with Defendants’ preference to limit the negotiations to the satellite-delivered HD programming”); see also *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 41-42; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶¶ 33-34; *AT&T Reply* at 44-45; Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl. at ¶ 20.

⁶⁴ Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶ 4; see also *Defendants’ Answer* at 78-79; Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶ 13; *AT&T Reply* at 45 n.55; *infra* ¶ 82 (noting that, in response to AT&T’s claim that Defendants have offered and sold a package of the SD and HD versions of MSG and MSG+ to other MVPDs, Defendants stated that MSG SD and MSG+ SD are licensed separately from MSG HD and MSG+ HD).

REDACTED VERSION

continued to seek access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD after the October 2007 release,⁶⁵ but the first time the Defendants claimed that the release applied to AT&T's request to license MSG HD and MSG+ HD was in their September 2009 Answer to the *AT&T Complaint*.⁶⁶ Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the *AT&T Complaint* is not barred by the October 2007 release.

B. Count I – “Unfair Act” in Violation of Section 628(b) of the Act and Section 76.1001(a) of the Rules

11. In Count I, AT&T alleges that Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T is an “unfair act” that has the “effect” and “purpose” of “significantly hindering” AT&T from providing “satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers,” as prohibited by Section 628(b) of the Act and Section 76.1001(a) of the Commission's rules.⁶⁷ As discussed in greater detail below, we determine that Defendants violated these provisions based on our findings that (i) both MSG LP and Cablevision are proper defendants; (ii) Defendants' withholding of the HD versions of the MSG and MSG+ networks from AT&T is an “unfair act”; and (iii) this “unfair act” has the “effect” of “significantly hindering” AT&T from providing a competing video service, including “satellite cable programming and satellite broadcast programming,” to subscribers and consumers in the state of Connecticut.⁶⁸ Accordingly, we grant Count I of AT&T's program access complaint and order MSG LP to enter into an agreement to license the MSG HD and MSG+ HD networks to AT&T on non-discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions within 30 days of the release of this *Order*.

1. AT&T Properly Invoked the Framework Adopted in the 2010 Order

12. We reject Defendants' claim that AT&T waived its right to prosecute its complaint pursuant to the post-*2010 Order* framework by initially requesting immediate Commission action on Count I pursuant to Section 628(d) under the pre-*2010 Order* framework.⁶⁹ Defendants allege that the Commission adopted an “either/or” approach in the *2010 Order*, such that an entity with a pending complaint could elect *either* (i) to continue to prosecute the complaint pursuant to Section 628(d) under the pre-*2010 Order* framework, *or* (ii) to prosecute the complaint under the post-*2010 Order* framework by supplementing the complaint.⁷⁰ Defendants argue that AT&T, by initially requesting immediate

⁶⁵ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 45-54; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶¶ 38-47.

⁶⁶ See *AT&T Reply* at 45; Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl. at ¶ 23. We also note that Defendants did not raise the issue of the October 2007 release in response to AT&T's July 2009 pre-filing notice. See *AT&T Complaint*, Exhibit 6.

⁶⁷ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 78-88; *AT&T Supplement* at 7-9.

⁶⁸ Because we conclude below that Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T is an “unfair act” that has the “effect” of “significantly hindering” AT&T from providing “satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers,” we find it unnecessary to also address whether Defendants' conduct has the “purpose” of “significantly hindering” AT&T. See 47 U.S.C. § 548(b) (prohibiting “unfair acts” that have the “purpose or effect” of “significantly hindering” an MVPD from providing satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1001(a) (same); see also *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 64-67, 84; *AT&T Reply* at 25-26; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 20-22, 28; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 7-8, 92-93; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 8-9; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 29-30.

⁶⁹ See *AT&T March 30th Letter* at 1 (urging the Commission to expeditiously grant the relief sought in the *AT&T Complaint* “based on the existing record and existing program access rules and procedures” and “without discovery and further briefing”).

⁷⁰ See *Defendants' April 9th Letter* at 2-3; *Defendants' April 23rd Letter* at 1-3.

REDACTED VERSION

Commission action on Count I pursuant to Section 628(d) under the pre-2010 *Order* framework, waived any benefit from the post-2010 *Order* framework.⁷¹ We reject Defendants' arguments. The Commission in the 2010 *Order* never stated or implied that an entity with a pending complaint could not initially elect to prosecute its complaint pursuant to Section 628(d) under the pre-2010 *Order* framework and then to subsequently supplement the complaint to take advantage of the post-2010 *Order* framework.⁷² Moreover, we note that the 2010 *Order* did not establish a deadline for filing a supplement to invoke the post-2010 *Order* framework.⁷³ In this case, AT&T initially elected to prosecute Count I under Section 628(d) pursuant to the pre-2010 *Order* framework.⁷⁴ Before the Commission could act on that request, AT&T requested instead to prosecute its complaint pursuant to the post-2010 *Order* framework.⁷⁵ We conclude that AT&T's election was authorized by the 2010 *Order*. We also reject Defendants' claim that procedural fairness and principles of administrative efficiency and economy require AT&T to be held to its initial decision to proceed pursuant to Section 628(d) under the pre-2010 *Order* framework.⁷⁶ We find no basis in the record for concluding that Defendants were in any way prejudiced by AT&T's actions.⁷⁷ Indeed, nothing in the 2010 *Order* or the Commission's rules would have prevented AT&T from continuing to prosecute its complaint pursuant to the pre-2010 *Order* framework, subsequently withdrawing that complaint, and then refileing its complaint under the post-2010 *Order* framework.

2. AT&T Has Demonstrated that Defendants Violated Section 628(b) of the Act and Section 76.1001(a) of the Rules

13. Section 628(b) of the Act and Section 76.1001(a) of the Commission's rules require a complainant to establish three elements in order to demonstrate a violation of these provisions: (i) the

⁷¹ See *Defendants' April 9th Letter* at 2-4; *Defendants' April 23rd Letter* at 1-2.

⁷² The Commission stated that a complainant could continue to prosecute its complaint pursuant to Section 628(d) under the pre-2010 *Order* framework and, "[i]n addition," could supplement its complaint to take advantage of the post-2010 *Order* framework. See 2010 *Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 751, ¶ 10; see also *id.* at 785, ¶ 55, 789, ¶ 64 n.237; *AT&T March 30th Letter* at 4 n.11 (stating that a complaint can be considered under both Section 628(b) and the new rules adopted in the 2010 *Order*).

⁷³ See 2010 *Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 751, ¶ 10 (permitting complainants to file a supplement after the effective date of the rules adopted in the 2010 *Order*, but not specifying a deadline for filing the supplement); see also *id.* at 785, ¶ 55 and 789, ¶ 64 n.237.

⁷⁴ See *supra* n.69.

⁷⁵ See *AT&T March 30th Letter* at 4 n.11 (stating that, after the 2010 *Order*, AT&T contacted Defendants about licensing MSG HD and MSG+ HD, but Defendants refused, and further stating that AT&T reserves the right to submit a supplement to its complaint); *AT&T Supplement* at 2-3, 7 (stating that Defendants refused to provide access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD after the effective date of the rules adopted in the 2010 *Order* and supplementing the complaint accordingly). With respect to Count I, we note that AT&T has elected to prosecute this count pursuant to only the post-2010 *Order* framework. See *Parties' Aug. 24th Letter* at 16 ("AT&T elects to proceed with respect to Count I based solely on Defendants' post-[2010 *Order*] denial of AT&T's request to license MSG HD and MSG+ HD and the post-[2010 *Order*] legal framework for resolving such disputes."). Accordingly, we need not, and do not, consider Defendants' claim that applying the Commission's interpretation of Section 628(b) in the 2010 *Order* to an act that occurred prior to the 2010 *Order* is impermissibly retroactive. See, e.g., *Defendants' April 9th Letter* at 4-7.

⁷⁶ See *Defendants' April 23rd Letter* at 1-3, 6.

⁷⁷ Similarly, we find no basis for concluding that Defendants were prejudiced by AT&T's decision to request that the Commission resolve Count I of its complaint without discovery and then to subsequently submit a revised discovery request approximately two weeks later. See *supra* nn.48, 69; *Defendants' April 23rd Letter* at 3.

REDACTED VERSION

defendant is within one of the three categories of entities covered by these provisions (*i.e.*, a cable operator, a satellite cable programming vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable interest, or a satellite broadcast programming vendor); (ii) the defendant (or a terrestrial cable programming vendor that the defendant wholly owns, controls, or with which it is under common control) has engaged in an “unfair act”; and (iii) the “purpose or effect” of the “unfair act” is to “significantly hinder or prevent” an MVPD from providing satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers.⁷⁸ For the reasons discussed below, we find that AT&T has established each element.

a. Both MSG LP and Cablevision Are Proper Defendants to Count I

(i) MSG LP

14. Section 628(b) of the Act and Section 76.1001(a) of the Commission’s rules apply to the “unfair acts” of, among other entities, a “satellite cable programming vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable interest.”⁷⁹ Defendants concede that (i) MSG LP is a “satellite cable programming vendor”⁸⁰ and (ii) a cable operator (Cablevision) has an attributable interest in MSG LP.⁸¹ While MSG LP claims that a “satellite cable programming vendor” cannot be liable under Section 628(b) of the Act and Section 76.1001(a) of the Commission’s rules when the conduct at issue involves only terrestrial programming and not satellite programming,⁸² this argument has been rejected by both the Commission⁸³ and the D.C. Circuit.⁸⁴ Accordingly, MSG LP is a proper defendant to Count I.

15. The record also establishes that MSG LP is a “terrestrial cable programming vendor” because it delivers MSG HD and MSG+ HD via terrestrial means.⁸⁵ Defendants argue, however, that the

⁷⁸ See 47 U.S.C. § 548(b); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1001(a).

⁷⁹ See 47 U.S.C. § 548(b); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1001(a); *see also* 47 U.S.C. § 548(i)(2) (the “term ‘satellite broadcast programming vendor’ means a person engaged in the production, creation, or wholesale distribution for sale of satellite cable programming, but does not include a satellite broadcast programming vendor”).

⁸⁰ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 87 (¶ 25) (“Admitting that MSG is a ‘satellite cable programming vendor’ only to the extent that it licenses certain satellite cable programming not at issue in this case.”); Pontillo Decl. at ¶ 13; *MSG LP Motion to Dismiss* at 4 (“MSG is also in the business of providing satellite-delivered services such as Fuse and the standard definition MSG and MSG Plus program services”).

⁸¹ See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 59 n.221.

⁸² See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 138 (“Where the only programming at issue is terrestrially-delivered, the entity delivering the programming is not acting as a satellite cable programming vendor for purposes of any dispute under Section 628(b), and is therefore not subject to jurisdiction under that provision in such circumstances.”); *MSG LP Motion to Dismiss* at 1-4.

⁸³ See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 779, ¶ 49 n.192 (“Nothing in the statute excludes an otherwise covered entity from the reach of Section 628(b) simply because the conduct at issue is not covered by the statutorily defined activities of a ‘cable operator’ or ‘satellite cable programming vendor.’ To the contrary, under Section 628(b), so long as the provider itself meets the statutory definition of a covered entity, it is prohibited from engaging in any unfair or deceptive acts or practices that hinder significantly or prevent any MVPD from providing satellite cable or satellite broadcast programming to consumers.”).

⁸⁴ See *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *19 (“In defining satellite cable vendors, Congress could have required that an entity would be covered ‘only ‘when’ or ‘to the extent’ that it provides the regulation-triggering services.’ . . . But as the Commission recognized in its order, Congress imposed no such limitation.”) (citations omitted).

⁸⁵ See 47 C.F.R. § 76.1000(m) (defining “terrestrial cable programming vendor”); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1000(l) (defining “terrestrial cable programming”). Defendants admit that MSG LP distributes MSG HD and MSG+ HD terrestrially; thus, MSG LP is a “terrestrial cable programming vendor.” See *MSG LP Motion to Dismiss* at 2 (“[I]n the current (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION

Commission's definition of "terrestrial cable programming vendor" excludes a "satellite cable programming vendor," such that a single entity cannot be both a "terrestrial cable programming vendor" and a "satellite cable programming vendor."⁸⁶ Defendants claim that the Commission's definition means that the only type of programmer that can qualify as a "terrestrial cable programming vendor" is one that distributes *only* terrestrial cable programming.⁸⁷ Thus, Defendants contend, because MSG LP distributes "satellite cable programming" (MSG SD, MSG+ SD, Fuse)⁸⁸ in addition to terrestrial cable programming, it cannot be a "terrestrial cable programming vendor."⁸⁹

16. We find that Defendants' interpretation of the Commission's definition contradicts established Commission precedent and would create a significant loophole that would eviscerate the protections afforded by the program access rules applicable to both satellite-delivered and terrestrially delivered programming. First, Defendants' interpretation contradicts the Commission's holding in the *2010 Order*, which has been upheld by the D.C. Circuit, that a "satellite cable programming vendor" that also distributes terrestrial cable programming can violate Section 628(b) of the Act to the extent it is providing terrestrial cable programming.⁹⁰ This holding indicates that the Commission expected entities that distribute both satellite cable programming and terrestrial cable programming to be subject to complaints under the procedures established in the *2010 Order*. Second, we note that the Commission's definition of "terrestrial cable programming vendor" mirrors Congress's definition of "satellite cable programming vendor" in the 1992 Cable Act, which excludes a "satellite broadcast programming vendor."⁹¹ Under Defendants' interpretation, a single entity cannot simultaneously be both a "satellite cable programming vendor" and a "satellite broadcast programming vendor." Thus, Defendants' view would mean that the only type of programmer that can qualify as a "satellite cable programming vendor" is one that distributes *only* satellite cable programming, to the exclusion of satellite broadcast

(Continued from previous page) _____

context MSG is acting as a terrestrial programmer"); *id.* at 3 ("The only programming at issue in AT&T's Complaint is the terrestrially-delivered MSG HD and MSG+ HD services."); *MSG LP Reply to AT&T Opposition to Motion to Dismiss* at 1 ("The programming sought by AT&T in the instant Complaint, MSG HD and MSG+ HD, is terrestrially-delivered"); *see also Defendants' Answer* at 10-13 (¶¶ 1-5), 21; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 111 ("[T]he only programming at issue is terrestrially-delivered."). Contrary to Defendants' claim, there was no "defect" in the *AT&T Supplement*. *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 110. Rather, the record clearly establishes that MSG HD and MSG+ HD are "terrestrial cable programming" and that MSG LP is a "terrestrial cable programming vendor." There was no reason for AT&T to re-establish in its *Supplement* what had already been established in the existing record.

⁸⁶ *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 9, 111-12; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 56; *see also* 47 C.F.R. § 76.1000(m) (defining "terrestrial cable programming vendor" as "a person engaged in the production, creation, or wholesale distribution for sale of terrestrial cable programming, *but does not include a satellite broadcast programming vendor or a satellite cable programming vendor*") (emphasis added).

⁸⁷ *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 112 n.435.

⁸⁸ *See Defendants' Answer* at 87 (¶ 25) ("Admitting that MSG is a 'satellite cable programming vendor' only to the extent that it licenses certain satellite cable programming not at issue in this case."); Pontillo Decl. at ¶ 13; *MSG LP Motion to Dismiss* at 4 ("MSG is also in the business of providing satellite-delivered services such as Fuse and the standard definition MSG and MSG Plus program services.").

⁸⁹ *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 110-12.

⁹⁰ *See Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *19; *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 779, ¶ 49 n.192.

⁹¹ *See* 47 U.S.C. § 548(i)(2) (defining "satellite cable programming vendor" as "a person engaged in the production, creation, or wholesale distribution for sale of satellite cable programming, *but does not include a satellite broadcast programming vendor*") (emphasis added).

REDACTED VERSION

programming. Such an interpretation would create a loophole in the rules applicable to satellite-delivered programming whereby an entity that distributes satellite cable programming could avoid liability merely by distributing some satellite broadcast programming as well. Congress, however, never stated or implied any intention to create such a loophole. The Commission in the *2010 Order* simply followed the definitional structure used by Congress in the 1992 Cable Act. We can discern no reason for Congress in the 1992 Cable Act or for the Commission in the *2010 Order* to exclude programmers from certain program access rules because they distribute more than one type of programming subject to the rules. Rather, Congress's definition of "satellite cable programming vendor" and the Commission's definition of "terrestrial cable programming vendor" reflect the definitions of the underlying programming these vendors distribute, which are defined to exclude certain other types of programming.⁹² Thus, we find no basis for interpreting the Commission's definitions to mean that a single entity cannot be both a "terrestrial cable programming vendor" and a "satellite cable programming vendor."⁹³

(ii) Cablevision

17. We also find that Cablevision is a proper defendant to Count I. In the *2010 Order*, the Commission established that an entity listed in Section 628(b) (*i.e.*, a cable operator, a satellite cable programming vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable interest, or a satellite broadcast programming vendor) can be held liable for the "unfair act" of a terrestrial cable programming vendor that it wholly owns, controls, or with which it is under common control.⁹⁴ The D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's decision on this point.⁹⁵ Here, Defendants concede that Cablevision (a "cable operator") is under common control with MSG LP because it shares a common controlling shareholder with MSG LP (the Dolan family).⁹⁶

⁹² See 47 U.S.C. § 548(i)(1) ("The term 'satellite cable programming' has the meaning provided under section 605 of this title, *except that such term does not include satellite broadcast programming.*") (emphasis added); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1000(l) (defining "terrestrial cable programming" as "video programming which is transmitted terrestrially or by any other means other than satellite and which is primarily intended for direct receipt by cable operators for their retransmission to cable subscribers, *except that such term does not include satellite broadcast programming or satellite cable programming*") (emphasis added).

⁹³ Defendants contend that it would be "untenable" for the Commission (i) in determining whether MSG LP is a proper defendant under a Section 628(b) claim, to classify MSG LP as a "satellite cable programming vendor" even when it is acting as a distributor of terrestrial cable programming because it distributes other satellite programming not at issue in the dispute; and (ii) in determining whether MSG LP is a "terrestrial cable programming vendor" for purposes of the definition of that term in Section 76.1000(m), to rule that MSG LP is not a "satellite cable programming vendor" when it acts as a distributor of terrestrial cable programming even though it also distributes satellite programming not at issue in the dispute. See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 57 n.212. There is no basis for Defendants' contention with respect to Section 76.1000(m), however, because we find that MSG LP is both a "satellite cable programming vendor" and a "terrestrial cable programming vendor" under the applicable definitions.

⁹⁴ See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 786-87, ¶ 57 ("We conclude that Section 628(b) allows complaints against the entities listed in Section 628(b) based on the unfair acts of their affiliated programmers delivering programming by terrestrial means, where the facts establish that the programmer is wholly owned by, controlled by, or under common control with one or more of these entities.").

⁹⁵ See *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *19-*21.

⁹⁶ See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 59 n.221; see also *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 35.

REDACTED VERSION

18. Accordingly, because Cablevision (a “cable operator”) is under common control with MSG LP (a “terrestrial cable programming vendor”⁹⁷ alleged to have engaged in an “unfair act” under Section 628(b)), Cablevision is a proper defendant to Count I. Defendants object, however, to the Commission’s conclusion in the *2010 Order* that a cable operator under common control with a terrestrial cable programming vendor will be “deemed responsible” for the programmer’s decision to withhold programming from a competing MVPD because the programmer’s actions are designed to benefit its affiliated cable operator.⁹⁸ The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Commission and upheld this decision.⁹⁹ In any event, the record of this proceeding supports the Commission’s conclusion on this issue. Defendants assert that MSG LP has “enter[ed] into a mutually beneficial arrangement which provides MSG value and consideration in exchange for allowing Cablevision [to] effectuate an aspect of product differentiation.”¹⁰⁰ Thus, Defendants contend, the Commission cannot presume that MSG LP’s decision to withhold programming from AT&T was designed to benefit Cablevision exclusively.¹⁰¹ While the record reflects Defendants’ position that Cablevision will benefit from this arrangement by differentiating its video service and thereby providing it with a competitive advantage over AT&T,¹⁰² Defendants provide no evidence of any “value and consideration” that MSG LP has received from this arrangement. In fact, by foregoing licensing fees and advertising revenue by withholding MSG HD and MSG+ HD from

⁹⁷ See *supra* ¶¶ 15-16.

⁹⁸ See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 138-39; see also *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 786-87, ¶ 57.

⁹⁹ See *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *20 (“But the Commission has determined, reasonably in our view, that discriminatory practices by terrestrial programmers will often be intended in part to benefit a cable operator under common ownership. . . . For example, if a cable operator has one DBS competitor and one wireline competitor but considers the latter a greater threat to its dominant position, exclusive arrangements between an affiliated terrestrial programmer and the DBS company that keep must-have programming from the wireline company will redound to the cable operator’s benefit.”) (citations omitted).

¹⁰⁰ *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 50-51; see also *id.* at 59, 60-61.

¹⁰¹ See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 139; see also *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 50 n.188 (“The arrangement enabling Cablevision to use MSG HD/MSG+ HD as a competitive differentiator offers benefits to both Cablevision and MSG, as is typical with such arrangements.”).

¹⁰² See *Defendants’ Answer* at 2-3 (“MSG HD and MSG+ HD represented a way not just for Cablevision to differentiate itself from then-existing video competitors like DBS; it also constituted an investment in the future that would differentiate Cablevision from all video programming providers – cable and satellite.”), at 5 (stating that Defendants are not prohibited from “employing a lawful pro-competitive strategy of product differentiation, simply because it may result in making AT&T’s video offering less attractive to a subset of its potential customer base”), at 14-15 (¶ 8) (“Defendants rejected . . . all . . . attempts by AT&T to obtain a license for MSG HD and MSG+ HD . . . consistent with . . . their desire to continue to utilize MSG HD and MSG+ HD as a product differentiator for Cablevision.”), at 34 (stating that Defendants opted to “use MSG HD and MSG+ HD as a means of differentiating themselves in the marketplace”), at 41 (stating that Defendants “regard MSG HD and MSG+ HD as a worthwhile way to differentiate the Cablevision video product offering from U-verse TV”); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 7 (“AT&T lacks a license to distribute MSG HD and MSG+ HD as a result of a product differentiation strategy aimed at distinguishing Cablevision’s video service offerings in Connecticut.”), at 93 (“[T]he decision not to license MSG HD and MSG+ HD to AT&T was undertaken in furtherance of a product differentiation strategy designed to distinguish Cablevision’s video offering from AT&T.”), at 97 (stating that forced sharing would require a firm to share its “competitive advantages”), at 98-99 (stating that its product differentiation strategy “may make AT&T’s video program offerings appear less attractive to some small segment of customers”); see also *Defendants’ Answer* at 10, 59; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 123; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 49.

REDACTED VERSION

AT&T,¹⁰³ MSG LP is acting counter to its economic interests in order to support Cablevision's product differentiation strategy.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, while Defendants assert that MSG LP receives "substantial promotional, marketing and other benefits" from Cablevision, they provide no support for this assertion.¹⁰⁵ Thus, Defendants have offered no facts that would undermine the Commission's conclusion in the *2010 Order*, as applied here, that MSG LP's withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T is designed to benefit Cablevision and that Cablevision (in addition to MSG LP) is therefore an appropriate defendant under Count I.¹⁰⁶

b. Defendants' Withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T Is an "Unfair Act"

19. In Count I, AT&T alleges that the Defendants have engaged in the "unfair act" of withholding MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T while at the same time licensing these networks to certain of AT&T's competitors in the state of Connecticut.¹⁰⁷ As discussed in further detail below, we

¹⁰³ Cablevision has stated in an SEC filing that MSG's programming operations "derive[] [their] revenues from affiliation fees paid by cable television operators (including our cable television systems), DBS operators and telephone companies that provide video service and from sales of advertising. Increases in [such] . . . revenues result from a combination of changes in rates and changes in the number of viewing subscribers." *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 6 n.10 (quoting Cablevision Systems Corp., Form 10-Q at 44 (July 30, 2009)); *see also AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 34, 62; *AT&T Reply* at 16, 17 n.23, 22, 26; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 24 n.44, 30; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 21-22.

¹⁰⁴ *See Defendants' Answer* at 40 (stating that exclusive distribution arrangements "'sacrifice' revenue from alternative potential distributors"), at 74 (stating that there is nothing "'undue' for a vertically-integrated cable company to forego distribution revenue that may be available from licensing its programming to an unaffiliated competitor in order for the distribution arm of the business to differentiate its product offering"), at 75 ("Firms routinely opt to forego revenue that might otherwise be gained from licensing an input to non-affiliates in order to benefit another arm of a shared enterprise."); *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 119; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 51, 59; *see also AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 62 ("Absent an interest in thwarting AT&T's competitive entry – thus benefitting Cablevision's distribution business – Madison Square Garden, as a programming vendor, would have every economic incentive to license the HD format of MSG and MSG Plus to AT&T."); *AT&T Reply* at 16, 22 ("It makes sense for Defendants to refuse to deal with AT&T *only* because they are willing to sacrifice such programming revenues to protect MVPD revenues . . .") (emphasis in original), at 26 ("[B]ecause of vertical integration, Madison Square Garden is willing to sacrifice revenues simply to benefit Cablevision's distribution business."); *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 24-25 ("If Madison Square Garden were truly an independent corporation, it would have no incentive to refuse to license MSG HD and MSG+ HD to AT&T; indeed, Madison Square Garden's failure to maximize revenue in this regard would violate the company's fiduciary duties to its shareholders. There is only one plausible explanation for Madison Square Garden's selective withholding strategy – namely, that its licensing decisions are intended to benefit Cablevision's video distribution business by denying AT&T access to critical programming."), at 30; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 21-22.

¹⁰⁵ *See Defendants' Answer* at 75.

¹⁰⁶ *See 2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 786-87, ¶ 57. As noted above, MSG LP provides both satellite-delivered programming and terrestrially delivered programming. Thus, even if Cablevision were not a proper defendant to Count I, this would not undermine our finding that MSG LP is a proper defendant nor would it prevent us from issuing a remedy. *See supra* ¶ 14.

¹⁰⁷ *See AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 6 (referring to Defendants' "outright refusal to license" the HD versions of MSG and MSG+ to AT&T); *id.* at ¶ 53 (referring to Defendants' "outright refusal to provide" AT&T with the HD versions of MSG and MSG+ on any terms); *id.* at ¶¶ 83, 84, 86; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 45; *AT&T Supplement* at 2 (referring to "Defendants' withholding of the HD feeds of MSG and MSG Plus"); *id.* at 7-9 (referring to (continued....))

REDACTED VERSION

conclude that (i) the D.C. Circuit's decision to vacate the Commission's ruling that withholding of terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming is categorically "unfair" does not prevent the Commission from addressing on a case-by-case basis whether withholding is "unfair"; (ii) Congress and the Commission have provided guidance on how to interpret the term "unfair act"; thus, the issue of whether Defendants' withholding here is an "unfair act" does not present a new or novel issue that would preclude Bureau action on delegated authority; and (iii) applying this precedent and guidance to the facts presented, AT&T has satisfied its burden of demonstrating that Defendants' withholding in this case is an "unfair act."¹⁰⁸

(i) The D.C. Circuit's Ruling in *Cablevision II* Affirms the Commission's Authority to Address Whether Withholding Is an "Unfair Act" on a Case-by-Case Basis

20. In the *2010 Order*, the Commission defined three acts involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming as categorically "unfair" under Section 628(b): exclusive contracts, discrimination, and undue or improper influence.¹⁰⁹ The Commission defined these three acts as categorically "unfair" because Congress had made a conclusive legislative judgment in Section 628(c)(2) that these same acts are categorically "unfair" with respect to satellite-delivered, cable-affiliated programming.¹¹⁰ Moreover, the Commission found that these acts involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming – like comparable acts involving satellite-delivered, cable-affiliated programming – have the potential to impede entry into the video distribution market and to hinder existing competition in the market.¹¹¹ The D.C. Circuit disagreed, holding that the Commission cannot assume that congressional judgments regarding satellite programming necessarily apply to terrestrial programming.¹¹² Moreover, the D.C. Circuit explained that the Commission in deciding to label certain conduct as "unfair" simply because it might negatively affect competition failed to consider whether that conduct is "unfair" despite it being procompetitive in some cases.¹¹³ The D.C. Circuit stated:

(Continued from previous page) _____
 Defendants' "refusal to license" the HD versions of MSG and MSG+ to AT&T); *see also AT&T Complaint* at iv and ¶¶ 6, 66, 68, 76, 110 (discussing other MVPDs that have access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD). Defendants admit that "it is true that AT&T cannot obtain access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD." *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 94.

¹⁰⁸ We note that, in addition to letters filed by the Parties, Commission staff held a joint meeting on June 27, 2011 with the Parties to discuss the impact of the D.C. Circuit's decision on the complaint. *See* Letter from Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (June 20, 2011) ("*AT&T June 20th Letter*"); Letter from Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, to William T. Lake, Chief, Media Bureau, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P et al. (June 22, 2011) ("*Defendants' June 22nd Letter*"); Letter from Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P (June 24, 2011) ("*AT&T June 24th Letter*"); Letter from Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P et al. (June 29, 2011) ("*Defendants' June 29th Letter*"); Letter from Aaron M. Panner, Counsel for AT&T, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, File No. CSR-8196-P et al. (June 29, 2011) ("*AT&T June 29th Letter*").

¹⁰⁹ *See* 47 C.F.R. § 76.1001(b).

¹¹⁰ *See 2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 778-79, ¶ 48; *see also* 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2).

¹¹¹ *See 2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 778-79, ¶ 48.

¹¹² *See Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *21 (stating that the Commission "failed to justify its assumption that just because Congress treated certain acts involving satellite programming as unfair, the same acts are necessarily unfair in the context of terrestrial programming").

¹¹³ *See id.* at *23.

REDACTED VERSION

[W]e take no position on the ultimate issue of exactly how the Commission should define the inherently ambiguous statutory term “unfair.” See *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 842–43. But if the Commission believes that conduct involving the withholding of terrestrial programming should be treated as categorically unfair, *as opposed to assessing fairness on a case-by-case basis* or perhaps adopting a public interest exception mirroring the one for satellite programming, see 47 U.S.C. § 628(c)(2)(D), (c)(4), then it must grapple with whether its definition of unfairness would apply to conduct that appears procompetitive and, if so, whether that result would comport with section 628.¹¹⁴

The D.C. Circuit proceeded to “vacate that portion of the Commission’s order treating certain acts of terrestrially delivered programming withholding as categorically unfair and remand to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”¹¹⁵

21. We find the court’s language to be clear that the Commission may address on a case-by-case basis whether conduct involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming is “unfair.”¹¹⁶ While Defendants do not dispute this point,¹¹⁷ they argue that the Commission must first conduct a notice-and-comment rulemaking before it can adopt a case-by-case approach.¹¹⁸ According to Defendants, when a court vacates an agency’s order or rule, the effect is to return to the rule that existed before the vacated rule took effect.¹¹⁹ Defendants argue that, prior to the *2010 Order*, the Commission had reached a definitive interpretation of its rules that withholding of terrestrially delivered programming can never be “unfair.”¹²⁰ Citing D.C. Circuit precedent, Defendants argue that the Commission can change this

¹¹⁴ See *id.* at *24 (emphasis added).

¹¹⁵ See *id.*

¹¹⁶ Defendants speculate that the D.C. Circuit expected that the Commission would first conduct a rulemaking on remand and then would conduct any case-by-case assessments after the remand proceeding is completed. See *Defendants’ June 22nd Letter* at 5; *Defendants’ June 29th Letter* at 5-6. We reject this view because there is no discussion in the court’s opinion as to when a remand proceeding must be conducted and whether it must precede any case-by-case assessments.

¹¹⁷ See *Defendants’ June 22nd Letter* at 5 (“the court did not rule out the assessment of ‘unfairness’ on ‘a case-by-case basis’”).

¹¹⁸ See *id.* at 2-5; *Defendants’ June 29th Letter* at 2-9.

¹¹⁹ See *Defendants’ June 22nd Letter* at 2; *Defendants’ June 29th Letter* at 2.

¹²⁰ See *Defendants’ June 22nd Letter* at 2; *Defendants’ June 29th Letter* at 3. Defendants cite the following Commission-level cases in support of their position. See *DirectTV, Inc. v. Comcast Corp.*, 13 FCC Rcd 21822, 21838, ¶ 32 (CSB 1998) (“We are not persuaded that the facts alleged are sufficient to constitute a Section 628(b) violation. . . . [W]e decline to find that, standing alone, Comcast’s decision to deliver Comcast SportsNet terrestrially and to deny that programming to DirecTV is ‘unfair.’”), *aff’d*, 15 FCC Rcd 22802, 22808 ¶ 14 (2000) (noting that the Bureau declined to find that “standing alone, [Comcast’s] decision to deliver Comcast SportsNet terrestrially and to deny that programming to [Complainants] is ‘unfair’” and stating that “[c]omplainants have submitted nothing to cause us to question the Bureau’s reasoning on this issue”); *RCN Telecom Services of New York, Inc. v. Cablevision Systems, Inc. et al.*, 14 FCC Rcd 17093, 17105-06, ¶ 25 (CSB 1999) (“We are not persuaded that the facts alleged are sufficient to establish a Section 628(b) violation. . . . [W]e decline to find that, standing alone, Defendants’ decision to deliver the overflow programming terrestrially via MetroChannels and to deny that programming to Complainants is ‘unfair’ under Section 628(b).”), *aff’d*, 16 FCC Rcd 12048, 12053, ¶ 15 (2001) (stating that “no basis exists to warrant reversal” of the Bureau’s decision).

REDACTED VERSION

substantive interpretation of its rule only after a notice-and-comment rulemaking.¹²¹ We disagree. An agency may, through adjudication, interpret an ambiguous term in its governing statute or its regulations.¹²² While Defendants rely on D.C. Circuit precedent to claim that the Commission must conduct a notice-and-comment rulemaking before the Commission can change its substantive interpretation of the term “unfair,” the pre-2010 *Order* decisions they cite do not purport to interpret the term “unfair” in any Commission “rule.” Rather, those decisions address the term “unfair” in Section 628(b) of the Act.¹²³ As the D.C. Circuit has explained, an agency does not have to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking to alter its interpretation of a statutory term.¹²⁴ Accordingly, any alleged change in the interpretation of the meaning of “unfair” is not an amendment to a “rule” requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking. In any event, prior to the 2010 *Order*, the Commission never adopted a definitive interpretation of its rules holding that conduct involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming, including withholding, is always “fair” or never “unfair.” In fact, the Commission held that “unfair acts” involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming can be cognizable under Section 628(b).¹²⁵ The pre-2010 *Order* cases cited by Defendants merely establish that withholding of terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming is not unfair “standing alone” or on a *per se* basis. The D.C. Circuit has agreed with this interpretation of the Commission’s previous decisions.¹²⁶ The Commission never stated or implied that it could not rule in an individual case that withholding of terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming is “unfair” based on the facts presented. Thus, the

¹²¹ See *Defendants’ June 22nd Letter* at 2-3; *Defendants’ June 29th Letter* at 2-3 (citing *Paralyzed Veterans v. D.C. Arena L.P.*, 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997); *Alaska Professional Hunters Ass’n, Inc. v. FAA*, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

¹²² See *BP West Coast Products, LLC v. FERC*, 374 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“When Congress authorizes an agency to adjudicate complaints arising under a statute, the agency’s interpretations of that statute announced in the adjudications are generally entitled to *Chevron* deference.”); *St. Luke’s Hosp. v. Sebelius*, 611 F.3d 900, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Within the context of an agency adjudication, the Secretary generally may lawfully interpret a regulation notwithstanding its retroactive effect.”).

¹²³ See *DIRECTV*, 15 FCC Rcd at 22084, ¶ 4 and 22807, ¶ 13; *RCN*, 16 FCC Rcd at 12049-50, ¶ 4 and 12053, ¶ 15. At the time of these pre-2010 *Order* decisions, the Commission’s rule (47 C.F.R. § 76.1001) mirrored the prohibition against “unfair acts” in Section 628(b) and did not give any additional content to the statutory term “unfair.” See *Gonzales v. Oregon*, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (stating that “the existence of a parroting regulation does not change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the statute” and holding that heightened deference not due to Attorney General’s interpretation of its regulation that merely paraphrases statutory text).

¹²⁴ See *Alaska Professional Hunters*, 177 F.3d at 1034 (“an agency has less leeway in its choice of the method of changing its interpretation of its regulations than in altering its construction of a statute”); *Paralyzed Veterans*, 117 F.3d at 586 (“The government is certainly correct in suggesting that the doctrine of deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation and *Chevron* deference are analogous. But Congress . . . has said more, specifically on the subject of regulations. Under the APA, agencies are obliged to engage in notice and comment before formulating regulations, which applies as well to ‘repeals’ or ‘amendments.’”).

¹²⁵ See 2010 *Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 759-60, ¶ 22 (“The Commission itself has specifically held that unfair acts involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming can be cognizable under Section 628(b).”). While the cases cited by the Commission pertained to moving programming from satellite to terrestrial delivery, the Commission never stated or implied that this is the only conduct that might be “unfair” under Section 628(b).

¹²⁶ See *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *12 (noting that the “Commission pointed out that it had recognized that complaints concerning terrestrial withholding might, under some circumstances, be cognizable under” Section 628(b) and stating further that the pre-2010 *Order* cases “addressed only the permissibility of an across-the-board ban on terrestrial withholding”).

REDACTED VERSION

status quo ante with respect to “unfair acts” involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming does not preclude assessing such conduct on a case-by-case basis.¹²⁷

22. Defendants also argue that a rulemaking is envisioned by Section 628(c)(1) and, in any event, is the appropriate vehicle to define whether conduct is “unfair” because this issue will impact more than the parties to this complaint.¹²⁸ We disagree. First, an agency is free to interpret statutes either through rulemaking or adjudication.¹²⁹ Second, Section 628(d) specifically authorizes case-by-case adjudication as one option at the Commission’s disposal for enforcing Section 628(b).¹³⁰ Third, as discussed below, our determination as to whether Defendants have engaged in an “unfair act” is based on applying well-known precedent and guidelines established by Congress and the Commission to the specific facts of this case.¹³¹

23. Defendants also contend that it would be unfair to the Parties if the Commission were to proceed to address whether Defendants have engaged in an “unfair act” without first allowing supplemental record development on the issue, including discovery and briefing.¹³² We find this argument unavailing. AT&T’s complaint was filed, and the pleading cycle closed, several months before the Commission had established certain acts involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming as categorically “unfair” in the *2010 Order*. As discussed below, AT&T put forth evidence in its complaint as to whether Defendants’ withholding amounted to an “unfair act,” and Defendants filed a response to those claims.¹³³ Moreover, as discussed in further detail below, we apply well-known

¹²⁷ We note that in the cases cited by Defendants, the Commission did not find any anticompetitive effect resulting from the conduct at issue, thus there was no basis to deem the conduct at issue in those cases “unfair.” See *DIRECTV*, 15 FCC Rcd at 22807, ¶ 13 (finding no basis to conclude that the conduct at issue precluded MVPDs from providing satellite cable programming); *RCN*, 16 FCC Rcd at 12053, ¶ 15 (same). Conversely, as discussed below, we find anticompetitive effects from the withholding at issue in this case. See *infra* Section III.B.2.c. We proceed to weigh these anticompetitive effects against the procompetitive benefits of Defendants’ withholding and conclude that, on balance, the conduct at issue here is “unfair.” See *infra* ¶¶ 25-42.

¹²⁸ See *Defendants’ June 22nd Letter* at 3-4; *Defendants’ June 29th Letter* at 2, 5-7.

¹²⁹ See *SEC v. Chenery Corp.*, 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).

¹³⁰ See 47 U.S.C. § 548(d).

¹³¹ See *infra* ¶¶ 25-42.

¹³² See *Defendants’ June 22nd Letter* at 6; *Defendants’ June 29th Letter* at 6-8.

¹³³ See *infra* ¶¶ 26-27. As discussed above, AT&T filed an initial request for discovery, to which Defendants objected in October 2009, several months before the Commission had established certain acts involving terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming as categorically “unfair” in the *2010 Order*. See *supra* n.48. Despite the need at the time to resolve the issue of whether Defendants’ conduct was “unfair,” Defendants took the position that discovery was “neither necessary nor proper”; that the Commission had “before it all of the relevant evidence that it needs to decide this matter”; and that, even if the Commission rejected Defendants’ legal arguments, “the only potentially material fact would be the extent to which the lack of access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD has caused competitive harm by ‘hinder[ing] significantly’ or ‘prevent[ing]’ AT&T from providing satellite cable programming.” *Defendants’ Oct. 29th Discovery Objection* at 2-3, 13. Moreover, even after release of the *2010 Order* but before the D.C. Circuit’s decision in *Cablevision II*, Defendants argued that AT&T had not alleged one of the three acts deemed categorically “unfair” in the *2010 Order* and that AT&T was thus required to establish that Defendants had engaged in an “unfair act.” See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 8, 106-07 (“[AT&T’s] Supplemental Complaint fails to allege and/or establish that it has been subject to an unfair practice cognizable under the new rules adopted by the Commission in the [2010 Order]. The [2010 Order] makes clear that, in addition to having the burden of proving competitive harm . . . , a program access complainant also has the burden of proving that the Defendant has engaged in an ‘unfair practice’ proscribed by the Commission. While Defendants (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION

precedent and guidelines to assess whether Defendants' withholding here is an "unfair act," including a test put forth by Defendants.¹³⁴ All Parties have had ample opportunity, over the course of more than two years, to address whether the conduct here is "unfair" under this precedent and guidelines.

(ii) The Bureau Has Delegated Authority to Consider Whether Withholding Is an "Unfair Act"

24. Despite Defendants' claims to the contrary, the issue of whether Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T is an "unfair act" is not a new or novel issue that would require a Commission, rather than Bureau, decision.¹³⁵ The following precedent and guidelines established by Congress and the Commission require the Bureau to weigh the anticompetitive harms of an act against the procompetitive benefits to determine whether or not, on balance, the act is "unfair." First, Congress has set forth five factors in Section 628(c)(4) of the Act to assess when considering whether an exclusive programming arrangement serves the "public interest."¹³⁶ In applying these factors, the Commission is required to weigh the harms that an exclusive arrangement may cause in the video distribution market against the benefits that may result in the video programming market.¹³⁷ While Congress established these factors for exclusive contracts involving satellite-delivered, cable-affiliated programming, we find, consistent with Commission precedent, that they are also useful in assessing the potentially anticompetitive and procompetitive aspects of withholding of terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming.¹³⁸ Second, in the *MDU Order*,¹³⁹ the Commission weighed the anticompetitive harms of

(Continued from previous page) _____
have acknowledged throughout this proceeding that AT&T has been declined a license for MSG HD and MSG+ HD in furtherance of a product differentiation strategy, that circumstance does not, in and of itself, constitute an unfair practice or relieve AT&T of its burden of proof regarding that element of its claim under the new rules."), and at 108, 134-35. Thus, even after the release of the *2010 Order* but before the D.C. Circuit's decision in *Cablevision II*, Defendants' position was that AT&T had the burden to establish an "unfair act." Defendants had every opportunity to pursue this issue during discovery and in their post-discovery briefs.

¹³⁴ See *infra* ¶¶ 25-42.

¹³⁵ See Defendants' June 22nd Letter at 4; Defendants' June 29th Letter at 9; see also 47 C.F.R. § 0.283(c).

¹³⁶ See 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(4). This provision provides that, in determining whether an exclusive contract for satellite-delivered, cable-affiliated programming in an area served by a cable operator is in the public interest, the Commission shall consider "each of the following factors with respect to the effect of such contract on the distribution of video programming in areas that are served by a cable operator: (A) the effect of such exclusive contract on the development of competition in local and national multichannel video programming distribution markets; (B) the effect of such exclusive contract on competition from multichannel video programming distribution technologies other than cable; (C) the effect of such exclusive contract on the attraction of capital investment in the production and distribution of new satellite cable programming; (D) the effect of such exclusive contract on diversity of programming in the multichannel video programming distribution market; and (E) the duration of the exclusive contract." 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(4); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.1002(c)(4).

¹³⁷ See *Time Warner Cable*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 3221, 3225, ¶ 25 (1994) ("*Court TV Exclusivity Petition*"); *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 76 ("Congress anticipated that there may be some instances in which exclusive video programming contracts are not unlawful. It therefore set forth safe harbor provisions [in Section 628(c)(4)]. In this particular regulatory context, then, Congress has already struck the balance between the procompetitive and anticompetitive benefits of exclusivity.").

¹³⁸ See *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *22, *24 (explaining that, with the factors in Section 628(c)(4), Congress "sought to balance the need for regulatory intervention in markets possessing significant barriers to competition with its recognition that vertical integration and exclusive dealing arrangements are not always pernicious and, depending on market conditions, may actually be procompetitive"); see also *id.* at *22 (noting that the framework Congress adopted for exclusive arrangements involving satellite-delivered, cable-affiliated (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION

exclusive contracts between cable operators and owners of multiple dwelling units (“MDU”) against the procompetitive benefits of these contracts before concluding that these contracts are categorically “unfair.”¹⁴⁰ Unlike the Section 628(c)(4) factors, which require the Commission to analyze the effects of an exclusive arrangement in the video distribution and video programming markets, the *MDU Order* requires a more general inquiry into the potential anticompetitive harms and procompetitive benefits of an allegedly “unfair act.”¹⁴¹ Third, the Commission’s program access rules applicable to satellite-delivered, cable-affiliated programming provide that withholding is permissible provided there is a “legitimate business justification” for the conduct.¹⁴² If a defendant can demonstrate a “legitimate business justification” for withholding content from a competitor (for example, due to a concern with the distributor’s history of defaulting on other programming contracts), then it is unlikely that the conduct can be considered “unfair” under Section 628(b).

(Continued from previous page)

programming “accords with the generally accepted view in antitrust and other areas that exclusive contracts may have both procompetitive and anticompetitive purposes and effects”) (citations omitted). For example, the Commission previously found that exclusive arrangements play an important role in the growth and viability of local cable news networks. *See New England Cable News Channel*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 3231, 3236, ¶¶ 37-39 and 3237, ¶ 43 (1994) (“*NECN Exclusivity Petition*”); *see also* S. Rep. No. 102-92 (1991), at 28, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1161 (“The Committee believes that exclusivity can be a legitimate business strategy where there is effective competition.”); *Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution and Carriage*, First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 3359, 3385, ¶ 65 (1993) (“*1993 Order*”) (“Particularly with respect to new programming, we recognize that there may well be circumstances in which exclusivity could be shown to meet the public interest test, especially when the launch of local origination programming is involved that may rely heavily on exclusivity to generate financial support due to its more limited appeal to a specific regional market.”); *see id.* at 3385, ¶ 65 n.83 (“[I]t is possible that local or regional news channels could be economically infeasible absent an exclusivity agreement.”).

¹³⁹ *See Exclusive Service Contracts for Provision of Video Services in Multiple Dwelling Units and Other Real Estate Developments*, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd 20235 (2007) (“*MDU Order*”), *aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC*, 567 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

¹⁴⁰ *See id.* at 20243, ¶ 16 and 20248-49, ¶ 26 (“We further find that although exclusivity clauses may in certain cases be beneficial, at least in the short term, to consumers, the harms of exclusivity clauses outweigh their benefits.”).

¹⁴¹ In the *MDU Order*, the Commission acknowledged the procompetitive aspects of granting cable operators exclusive access to MDUs, such as helping to obtain financing to wire an entire building, attracting investment in marginally attractive MDUs, and attracting an MVPD into a new real estate development. *See id.* at 20247-48, ¶¶ 24-25. The anticompetitive harms included denying residents a choice in MVPD service, barring new entry and competition for both video services and bundled services, and discouraging the deployment of broadband facilities. *See id.* at 20244-47, ¶¶ 17-23.

¹⁴² Withholding of satellite-delivered, cable-affiliated programming, also known as a “refusal to sell,” is a form of non-price discrimination under the program access rules. *See 1993 Order*, 8 FCC Rcd at 3364, ¶ 14 and 3412-13, ¶ 116. Such conduct is permissible if there is a legitimate business reason for the conduct. *See id.* at 3412-13, ¶ 116 (“We believe that the Commission should distinguish ‘unreasonable’ refusals to sell from certain legitimate reasons that could prevent a contract between a vendor and a particular distributor, including (i) the possibility of parties reaching an impasse on particular terms, (ii) the distributor’s history of defaulting on other programming contracts, or (iii) the vendor’s preference not to sell a program package in a particular area for reasons unrelated to an existing exclusive arrangement or a specific distributor.”); *Bell Atlantic Video Servs. Co. v. Rainbow Programming Holdings Inc. and Cablevision Sys. Corp.*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 9892, 9899, ¶ 18 (CSB 1997) (“We find that BVS has met its burden of establishing the elements of a non-price discrimination claim [and] that Defendants have not met their burden of establishing that Rainbow has legitimate business reasons for refusing to sell its programming to BVS . . .”).

REDACTED VERSION**(iii) Based on Established Precedent and Guidelines, Defendants' Withholding Is an "Unfair Act"**

25. Applying the precedent and guidelines set forth above, as well as an additional test advocated by Defendants, we find that Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T is an "unfair act." As an initial matter, we note that AT&T as the complainant has the burden to establish that Defendants' conduct is an "unfair act." Below, we begin by examining Defendants' procompetitive justifications for their withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T and then apply the precedent and guidelines set forth above.

(a) Defendants' Procompetitive Justifications for Withholding

26. AT&T has provided evidence that Defendants' decision to withhold MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T was intended to provide Cablevision with a competitive advantage over AT&T in the video distribution market. AT&T provides various statements from Cablevision executives referring to the significance of MSG HD and MSG+ HD as a competitive differentiator. For example, Cablevision's Chief Operating Officer ("COO") stated that the refusal to sell MSG HD and MSG+ HD to another wireline competitor (Verizon FiOS TV) in the New York DMA was one factor that would not only impede this wireline competitor from obtaining new subscribers, but would also cause this wireline competitor to lose subscribers it had already gained.¹⁴³ In addition, Cablevision's COO has emphasized that Cablevision's ability to provide MSG HD and MSG+ HD provides a competitive advantage over competitors.¹⁴⁴ **[REDACTED]**

.¹⁴⁵

].¹⁴⁶ In addition, AT&T provides evidence that Cablevision has emphasized in advertisements in various media both its ability to offer MSG HD and MSG+ HD and AT&T's inability

¹⁴³ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 21-22 (quoting Cablevision's COO as stating that one of the factors he believed would "slow or reverse" the defection of Cablevision customers to another wireline competitor (Verizon FiOS TV) was that Verizon FiOS TV "lacks key components," including MSG HD and MSG+ HD, which have "wide appeal for sports fan[s] in Cablevision territory") (citing Craig Moffett et al., Bernstein Research, *Cablevision (CVC): Management Commentary Supports Bullish View . . . Capital Intensity Falls, and Margins Rise*, at 4 (April 5, 2007)). Defendants do not deny that Cablevision's COO made this statement.

¹⁴⁴ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 65 (quoting Cablevision's COO in response to a question regarding how Cablevision is competing with another wireline competitor (Verizon FiOS TV) as stating that "four of the nine professional sports teams in New York. If you want to see them in HD, you have to get them from us") (citing Statement of Tom Rutledge, COO, Cablevision Systems Corp., *Cablevision Systems Corp. at Global Media and Communications Conference*, Fair Disclosure Wire at 9 (Dec. 8, 2008)); see also *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 21. Defendants do not deny that Cablevision's COO made this statement.

¹⁴⁵ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 26 and Exhibit 13 **[REDACTED]**

].

¹⁴⁶ See *id.* at 27 and Exhibit 14.

REDACTED VERSION

to offer these same networks, thus demonstrating the importance of these networks.¹⁴⁷ For example, AT&T provides numerous examples of Cablevision¹⁴⁸ advertisements stating that (i) “iO delivers all the HD games of all 9 NY areas teams. You won’t get them all with phone company TV.”;¹⁴⁹ (ii) “Do you want to see every Knicks games in HD? With iO TV you can. Verizon FiOS, DISH and AT&T you can’t.”;¹⁵⁰ and (iii) “No one has more NY sports in HD than iO TV.”¹⁵¹

27. Defendants do not dispute that their withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T is intended to provide Cablevision with a way to differentiate its service from AT&T and thereby gain a competitive advantage.¹⁵² Defendants contend, however, that product differentiation strategies are legitimate business decisions that are typically regarded as procompetitive.¹⁵³ Defendants claim two distinct consumer welfare benefits resulting from their withholding strategy: (i) more vigorous competition in the video distribution market;¹⁵⁴ and (ii) increased incentives of both Defendants and AT&T to invest in their own programming.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁷ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 65 and Exhibits 8-15; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 15; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 20-21; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 15.

¹⁴⁸ Cablevision markets its video service under the “iO TV” name.

¹⁴⁹ See, e.g., *AT&T Complaint* at Exhibit 8; see also *id.* at Exhibit 10 (“iO delivers all the HD games of all 9 New York areas teams. You won’t get them all with Verizon FiOS, DISH or AT&T”).

¹⁵⁰ See, e.g., *AT&T Complaint* at Exhibit 11.

¹⁵¹ See, e.g., *AT&T Complaint* at Exhibits 9, 13-15; see also *id.* at Exhibit 12 (“Catch every HD game of all 9 NY sports teams!”); see also *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement*, Exhibit E (providing Cablevision advertisements listing “All HD games of all 9 NY sports teams” as a unique feature relative to another wireline competitor (Verizon FiOS TV)).

¹⁵² See *supra* n.102.

¹⁵³ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 36 (stating that their decision to withhold MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T “promotes consumer welfare by enhancing output and intensifying competition among both content creators and content distributors”) and Exhibit 1 (Jeremy I. Bulow and Bruce M. Owen, Analysis of Competition and Consumer Welfare Issues in AT&T’s Program Access and 628(b) Complaint Against Cablevision and Madison Square Garden, at 14-15 (stating that “the discretion to choose one’s distribution channels, up to and including the decision to use a single channel exclusively, usually is pro-competitive because it permits sellers to differentiate their products to make them more attractive to consumers”) (“*Bulow/Owen Study*”)); see also *Defendants’ Answer* at 6, 35 n.122, 40-41, 58-59, 75, 82; *Bulow/Owen Study* at 14-21; *Defendants’ April 9th Letter* at 8, 10; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 7, 93-99; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 5, 49-50.

¹⁵⁴ See *Bulow/Owen Study* at 2; see also *id.* at 2-3 (“Product differentiation is competition in ‘product space,’ and is no less important to promoting consumer welfare.”), at 16 (“exclusivity . . . permits MVPDs to compete more vigorously by differentiating their products”), at 17 (“markets with differentiated products are more likely to exhibit vigorous price competition than markets with homogeneous products”); see also *Defendants’ Answer* at 34-41; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 98-99; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 5-6, 50 n.187.

¹⁵⁵ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 57 (“[C]ompelling firms to share their legitimate competitive advantages with others undermines incentives to invest.”); *Bulow/Owen Study* at 16-17 (stating that exclusivity can “increase both the quantity and quality of video programming (and thus, presumably, the diversity of program content) by increasing incentives to invest in programming”); see *id.* at 2, 7, 15-16, 19-21; *Defendants’ April 9th Letter* at 12; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 93 n.370 (“[I]f a cable operator is unable . . . to utilize programming it develops as a product differentiator, the incentive to invest in and develop new programming diminishes, and (continued....)”).

REDACTED VERSION**(b) Section 628(c)(4) Factors**

28. In this section, we apply the five factors set forth in Section 628(c)(4) to Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T.¹⁵⁶ We conclude that the anticompetitive harms of Defendants' withholding in the video distribution market outweigh any procompetitive benefits in the video programming market.

(i) Development of Competition in Local and National MVPD Markets

29. We find that the first factor under Section 628(c)(4) – the effect of the exclusive arrangement on “the development of competition in local and national [MVPD] markets” – weighs against Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T.¹⁵⁷ In previous cases applying Section 628(c)(4), the Commission has found that an exclusive arrangement harms competition when the network withheld is “popular” and “established” and when other MVPDs have expressed an interest in carrying the network.¹⁵⁸ The record evidence here reflects that MSG HD and MSG+ HD are popular and established networks that most MVPDs in the state of Connecticut are either already carrying or have requested to carry.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the Commission has found that competition may be harmed when an exclusive arrangement denies only one competitor in the market from access to the network.¹⁶⁰ As discussed below, we conclude that the withholding at issue here “significantly hinders” at least one competitor (AT&T) from competing in the state of Connecticut which in turn harms consumers by

(Continued from previous page) _____
 program diversity will suffer.”); *see also Defendants' Answer* at 34-41; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 93-98, 126, 135; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 5.

¹⁵⁶ *See* 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(4); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1002(c)(4).

¹⁵⁷ *See* 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(4)(A); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1002(c)(4)(i).

¹⁵⁸ *See Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3227, ¶ 37 (finding that Time Warner Cable's exclusive arrangement with the “popular” Court TV network would limit the development of competition in the video distribution market in New York City); *NECN Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3235, ¶¶ 30-31 (finding that New England Cable News (“NECN”) channel's exclusive arrangement with cable operators would not have an effect on competition in local or national video distribution markets that could not be offset by public interest benefits considering that no MVPD had requested carriage of NECN); *see also NewsChannel*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd 691, 694, ¶ 21 (CSB 1994) (finding that NewsChannel's exclusive arrangement with cable operators would not have an effect on competition in the video distribution market considering that no competitor had expressed an interest in carry the channel and that NewsChannel was a new service with unknown demand that “cannot be considered popular programming”) (“*NewsChannel Exclusivity Petition*”); *Cablevision Indus. Corp.*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd 9786, 9789, ¶ 19 (CSB 1995) (finding that the Sci-Fi Channel's exclusive arrangement with cable operators would limit the development of competition in local video distribution markets considering that the Sci-Fi Channel was a “popular” and “established” service with 16.3 million subscribers nationwide) (“*Sci-Fi Exclusivity Petition*”); *Outdoor Life Network and Speedvision Network*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 12226, 12233-35, ¶¶ 14-17 (CSB 1998) (finding that the exclusive arrangements proposed by Outdoor Life Network and Speedvision Network would limit the development of competition in local and national video distribution markets considering that each network had 13.5-14.5 million subscribers nationwide and that MVPDs had expressed an interest in carrying the networks) (“*Outdoor Life/Speedvision Exclusivity Petition*”).

¹⁵⁹ *See supra* ¶ 7 (noting other MVPDs that carry MSG HD and MSG+ HD); *infra* ¶¶ 48-49, 63 (noting popularity of RSNs, including HD RSNs such as MSG HD and MSG+ HD).

¹⁶⁰ *See Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3227, ¶ 37 and 3228, ¶ 39 (finding that Time Warner Cable's exclusive arrangement with Court TV would harm competition in the New York City video distribution market, despite the fact that DBS providers could carry the network, because one SMATV operator would be denied access).

REDACTED VERSION

limiting video competition in that market.¹⁶¹ The impact on competition is particularly acute here in light of the Commission's recognition that wireline entrants such as AT&T pose a greater competitive threat than DBS to cable operators and data indicating that DBS operators do not constrain the price of cable service to the extent that wireline MVPDs do.¹⁶² Accordingly, we find that this factor weighs against Defendants' withholding.

30. To be sure, Defendants argue that their withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T will promote, rather than harm, competition by allowing Cablevision to differentiate its service from AT&T and by encouraging AT&T to develop a competitive response, which might include investing in its own programming.¹⁶³ We do not dispute that product differentiation strategies may be procompetitive in many instances,¹⁶⁴ but the key distinction here is that the product differentiation strategy involves non-replicable and popular RSN programming.¹⁶⁵ As the Commission has explained, "when programming is non-replicable and valuable to consumers, such as regional sports programming, no amount of investment can duplicate the unique attributes of such programming, and denial of access to such programming can significantly hinder an MVPD from competing in the marketplace."¹⁶⁶ In other words, given the non-replicable nature of the content on MSG HD and MSG+ HD, AT&T has no ability to formulate a viable competitive response that would allow AT&T to compete for the many subscribers

¹⁶¹ See *infra* Section III.B.2.c; see also *infra* nn.313, 324 (noting that Defendants' claim of robust competition is belied by the fact that incumbent cable market share in the New York DMA and Hartford/New Haven DMA far exceeds the national average and that Cablevision has raised its rates in excess of inflation despite the number of competitors in the market).

¹⁶² See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 765, ¶ 29; *Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Statistical Report on Average Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and Equipment*, MM Docket No. 92-266, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 24 FCC Rcd 259, 261, ¶ 3 (MB 2009); see also *Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Statistical Report on Average Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and Equipment*, MM Docket No. 92-266, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 26 FCC Rcd 1769, 1785, ¶ 34 (MB 2011). Indeed, Defendants concede that they license MSG HD and MSG+ HD to DBS operators because, unlike AT&T, DBS operators do not offer voice or broadband service. See *Defendants' Answer* at 59, 79; *Bulow/Owen Study* at 5; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 98; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 61; see also *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 6; *AT&T Reply* at 15; *AT&T March 30th Letter* at 6; *AT&T Supplement* at 5-6; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 2; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 18 n.41, 24-25.

¹⁶³ See *Bulow/Owen Study* at 2, 14-21; see also *supra* ¶ 27.

¹⁶⁴ See *2007 Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 17835, ¶ 63 ("We recognize the benefits of exclusive contracts and vertical integration . . . , such as encouraging innovation and investment in programming and allowing for 'product differentiation' among distributors.").

¹⁶⁵ Despite Defendants' claims to the contrary, the games on MSG HD and MSG+ HD are not "replicated" on the SD versions of the networks that AT&T carries. See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 16-17. As the Commission has found previously, consumers do not consider the SD version of a particular channel to be an adequate substitute for the HD version due to the different technical characteristics and sometimes different content. See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 784-85, ¶¶ 54-55.

¹⁶⁶ *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 750-51, ¶ 9; see also *id.* ("If particular programming is replicable, our policies should encourage MVPDs or others to create competing programming, rather than relying on the efforts of others, thereby encouraging investment and innovation in programming and adding to the diversity of programming in the marketplace.").

REDACTED VERSION

that highly value these networks.¹⁶⁷ Indeed, even if MSG LP's exclusive rights to the sports programming shown on MSG HD and MSG+ HD were to expire at some point in the future, two of the teams shown on MSG are owned by Cablevision, thus eliminating any potential chance AT&T might have in the future to acquire the rights to these games.¹⁶⁸

(ii) **The Effect of Withholding on Alternative Video Providers to Incumbent Cable Operators**

31. We also find that the second factor – the effect of the exclusive arrangement on “competition from [MVPD] technologies other than cable” – weighs against Defendants’ withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T.¹⁶⁹ In previous decisions, the Bureau has interpreted the term “technologies other than cable” to mean alternative video providers that compete with incumbent cable operators.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, the Commission has found that this factor weighs against a proposed exclusive arrangement even if some competitors are allowed to carry the network, as is the case with Defendants’ withholding strategy.¹⁷¹ We conclude below that the withholding of the popular and established MSG HD and MSG+ HD networks at issue here “significantly hinders” at least one competitor (AT&T) from serving as an alternative to incumbent cable operators in the state of Connecticut.¹⁷² Accordingly, consistent with Commission precedent, we find that this factor weighs against Defendants’ withholding.

¹⁶⁷ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 20 (“AT&T can develop its own news channel or children’s programming, but cannot create its own professional basketball or hockey programming.”); see also *AT&T Complaint* at ii, ¶¶ 63, 75, 77 n.54; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶¶ 10, 12, 48; *AT&T Reply* at 27; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 4, 13-14; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 3, 15-16. As the Commission has recognized previously, local and regional news channels are “readily replicable” programming. *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 750-51, ¶ 9.

¹⁶⁸ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 75 (“[N]o amount of investment by AT&T would allow AT&T to create an RSN in the HD format carrying New York City’s major professional sports teams, given Cablevision’s refusal to allow it to do so and especially given Cablevision’s ownership of the New York Knicks and New York Rangers franchises.”); *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 22 (“Defendants not only have the exclusive rights to games of the Knicks, Rangers, Islanders, and Devils, but also own the underlying Knicks and Rangers franchises. No competing provider, regardless of its size and the investment it is willing to make, can replicate that content. Due to league restrictions and exclusive contracts, AT&T cannot establish a new basketball or hockey team, nor can it independently record existing teams’ games to broadcast on its own RSN.”); *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 13-14; see also *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 23, 63; York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 48; *AT&T Reply* at 27; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 2; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 3, 15-16.

¹⁶⁹ See 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(4)(B); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1002(c)(4)(ii).

¹⁷⁰ See *Outdoor Life/Speedvision Exclusivity Petition*, 13 FCC Rcd at 12233-34, ¶¶ 14-15 (referring to telephone companies that “offer competition to incumbent cable operators”); *Sci-Fi Exclusivity Petition*, 10 FCC Rcd at 9789, ¶ 17 (stating that the first and second factors require the Commission to assess the development of competition to “incumbent cable operators”).

¹⁷¹ See *Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3228, ¶ 39 (finding that this factor weighs against the proposed exclusive arrangement despite the fact that the network was available to DBS operators); see also *Sci-Fi Exclusivity Petition*, 10 FCC Rcd at 9790, ¶ 21 (finding that this factor weighs against the proposed exclusive arrangement despite the fact that the network was available to television receive-only and DBS operators); *Outdoor Life/Speedvision Exclusivity Petition*, 13 FCC Rcd at 12235-36, ¶ 19 (finding that this factor weighs against the proposed exclusive arrangement despite the fact that the network was available to DBS operators); see also *supra* ¶ 7 (noting other MVPDs that carry MSG HD and MSG+ HD).

¹⁷² See *infra* Section III.B.2.c.

REDACTED VERSION**(iii) Attraction of Investment in New Programming**

32. We find no basis to conclude that the third factor – the effect of the exclusive arrangement on “the attraction of capital investment in the production and distribution of new . . . cable programming” – weighs in favor of Defendants’ withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T.¹⁷³ The Commission has noted that this factor recognizes that exclusive arrangements “are typically used by suppliers to create incentives for distributors to aggressively promote and sell a particular product” and “may be offered to engender distributor support for a fledgling service to help it gain a foothold in the market.”¹⁷⁴ Moreover, the Commission has explained that when “a programmer requires the ability to offer an added incentive to attract investment, carriage and support of the service, such that without the incentive the programming service could not be launched or become viable, exclusivity may be in the public interest.”¹⁷⁵ In previous cases, the Commission has found that this factor weighs in favor of an exclusive arrangement when the network is a fledgling service that needs to offer exclusivity to distributors in order to obtain carriage and attract capital investments.¹⁷⁶ The Commission has found that this factor weighs against an exclusive arrangement when the network is established and does not currently need to offer exclusivity in order to obtain carriage and attract capital investments.¹⁷⁷

33. MSG HD and MSG+ HD are established networks launched in the late 1990s with exclusive rights to televise the games of five major professional sports teams, which is some of the most valuable and popular programming available.¹⁷⁸ Defendants have not asserted, nor could they credibly claim, that MSG HD and MSG+ HD are fledgling services that MVPDs will carry and promote only if they can be guaranteed exclusivity with respect to AT&T. The importance of MSG HD and MSG+ HD to consumers means that MVPDs will carry these networks without any guarantee of exclusivity.¹⁷⁹ Indeed, in explaining why they do not offer AT&T access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD in markets not served by Cablevision, Defendants do not claim that the reason is because MVPDs in those markets have

¹⁷³ See 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(4)(C); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1002(c)(4)(iii).

¹⁷⁴ *NECN Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3236, ¶ 33.

¹⁷⁵ *Id.* at 3236, ¶ 34; see *Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3228, ¶ 39; see also *NewsChannel*, 10 FCC Rcd at 694-95, ¶ 23.

¹⁷⁶ See *NECN Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3236, ¶¶ 33-39 (finding that a fledgling, start-up, regional news channel with a limited potential subscriber base may need the ability to offer exclusivity in order to attract investment, promotion, and carriage); see also *NewsChannel*, 10 FCC Rcd at 694-95, ¶¶ 23-26 (finding that a new regional and local news channel with a limited potential subscriber base that requires distributors to install equipment in each headend to receive the programming requires the ability to offer exclusivity in order to secure carriage commitments and to ensure its financial viability).

¹⁷⁷ See *Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3228-29, ¶¶ 42-50 (finding that an established network with a growing subscriber base and nationwide appeal did not require the ability to offer exclusivity in order to gain acceptance or to attract capital investments for its production, promotion, distribution, or carriage); see also *Sci-Fi Exclusivity Petition*, 10 FCC Rcd at 9790, ¶¶ 23-26 (finding that exclusivity was not vital for the continued viability of a popular and established network); *Outdoor Life/Speedvision Exclusivity Petition*, 13 FCC Rcd at 12237-40, ¶¶ 22-25 (finding that networks did not face unique hurdles that required exclusivity).

¹⁷⁸ See *infra* ¶ 48 ([REDACTED

]); *Defendants’ Answer* at 9, 70 and Pontillo Decl. at ¶ 3 (stating that MSG HD was launched in the fall of 1998 and MSG+ HD was launched in the spring of 1999).

¹⁷⁹ See *Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3228-29, ¶ 44 (noting that the popularity of a network “creates incentives for all cable operators to market and add the service, particularly if a competitor carries it”).

REDACTED VERSION

demanded exclusivity with respect to AT&T as a condition for carriage of MSG HD and MSG+ HD. Rather, Defendants claim that doing so would complicate Cablevision's product differentiation strategy.¹⁸⁰

34. While Defendants put forth the theory that requiring MSG LP to share MSG HD and MSG+ HD with AT&T will reduce the economic incentives of Cablevision to invest in the networks,¹⁸¹ they have put forth no evidence demonstrating that this theory motivated their withholding strategy. In addition, Defendants put forth no evidence demonstrating that this withholding strategy has resulted in increased investment in the networks or that it has improved the quantity and quality of programming on the networks.¹⁸² At most, Defendants claim that MSG LP has "enter[ed] into a mutually beneficial arrangement which provides MSG value and consideration in exchange for allowing Cablevision [to] effectuate an aspect of product differentiation."¹⁸³ Defendants provide no evidence concerning the "value and consideration" that MSG LP has received from this arrangement. Nor have Defendants provided any evidence that the "value and consideration" that MSG LP receives from Cablevision exceeds the licensing fees and advertising revenues that MSG LP has foregone by withholding these networks from AT&T. There is no dispute that MSG HD and MSG+ HD are established networks with valuable and popular programming. Defendants have not alleged, let alone provided evidence, that the continued development of these networks is contingent upon further financing from Cablevision, as opposed to revenues earned from advertising and licensing fees charged to MVPDs.¹⁸⁴ Even if MSG LP were reliant on further financing from Cablevision, Defendants have not claimed that any alleged financing from Cablevision

¹⁸⁰ See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 98 n.388 (stating that licensing MSG HD and MSG+ HD to AT&T in areas not served by Cablevision would "undercut Defendants' attempt to use those services as a product differentiator because such a decision likely would dilute the efficacy of Defendants' marketing efforts, engender customer confusion, and likely lead AT&T to intensify pressure to obtain the services for its subscribers living in areas served by Cablevision"); see also *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 49 n.184.

¹⁸¹ See *Defendants' Answer* at 57; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 93 n.370, 97, 126; *Bulow/Owen Study* at 2, 15-17; see also *supra* ¶ 27.

¹⁸² See *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 22-23 ("Defendants have failed to identify any way in which their refusal to license MSG HD and MSG+ HD has resulted in greater investment in the programming carried on those channels. For example, Defendants have not asserted that the video providers to whom MSG HD and MSG+ HD are licensed pay higher fees for this programming. Such above-market fees could theoretically lead to greater investment, but Defendants have never alleged that Cablevision, DIRECTV, Comcast, Time Warner, RCN, or other providers pay above-market rates for this programming in exchange for limited distribution."); see also *id.* at 2; *AT&T June 20th Letter* at 4 ("Defendants' arguments suffer from a simple failure of proof; there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Defendants' selective withholding strategy has *actually* resulted in increased output or greater investment in the programming carried on MSG HD and MSG+ HD") (emphasis in original).

¹⁸³ *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 50-51; see also *id.* at 59, 60-61.

¹⁸⁴ See *Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3229, ¶ 49 ("[A]s Court TV grows, more of its financial needs may be met with outside revenue from licensing fees from competitors."); *NECN Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3237-38, ¶ 48 ("As consumer demand for the service develops, cable operator reliance on exclusivity as an incentive to continue to carry NECN should change. Moreover, NECN's losses in the future can eventually be lessened by the revenue and increased advertising that can be generated from increased distribution through sales to competing distributors."). Indeed, as noted above, Cablevision has stated in an SEC filing that MSG LP earns revenues from licensing fees and advertising sales. See *supra* n.103; *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 6 n.10 (quoting Cablevision Systems Corp., SEC Form 10-Q at 44 (July 30, 2009)); see also *AT&T Reply* at 17 n.23, 22, 26; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 24 n.44, 30; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 21-22.

REDACTED VERSION

would be unavailable if MSG LP licensed MSG HD and MSG+ HD to AT&T.¹⁸⁵ Similarly, Defendants assert that MSG LP receives “substantial promotional, marketing and other benefits” from Cablevision, but they provide no support for this assertion and, in any event, do not allege that Cablevision would cease such support if MSG LP licensed MSG HD and MSG+ HD to AT&T.¹⁸⁶ Accordingly, consistent with Commission precedent, we find that the third factor does not weigh in favor of Defendants’ withholding.

(iv) The Effect on Diversity of Programming in the MVPD Market

35. We find no basis to conclude that the fourth factor – the effect of the exclusive arrangement on “diversity of programming in the [MVPD] market” – weighs in favor of Defendants’ withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T.¹⁸⁷ The Commission has explained that an exclusive arrangement “may promote diversity in the programming market when used to provide incentives for cable operators to promote and carry a new and untested programming service.”¹⁸⁸ In previous cases, the Commission has found that this factor weighs in favor of exclusive arrangements for new and untested networks,¹⁸⁹ but not for established and successful networks.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁵ In applying the Section 628(c)(4) factors, the Commission has explained that it assesses whether exclusivity is currently required to attract investment and carriage, not whether exclusivity was needed when the network was first launched. *See Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3228-29, ¶ 44; *see also Defendants’ Answer* at 2, 10, 70 and Pontillo Decl. at ¶ 3 (stating that Cablevision was the only distributor willing to devote capital and channel capacity to MSG HD and MSG+ HD when these networks were launched in 1998-1999). In any event, Defendants concede that when AT&T began providing video service in Connecticut in 2006, MSG HD and MSG+ HD had already been in existence for seven years and were already carried by other MVPDs. *See Defendants’ Answer* at 7, 13 (¶ 6), 34; *see also id.* at 12 (¶ 4) (noting that MSG LP began to license MSG HD and MSG+ HD to other MVPDs in 2005) and 17-18 (¶ 11); York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 9 (stating that AT&T launched its U-verse TV service in Connecticut in 2006); *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 27 (**REDACTED**

)). Thus, when AT&T entered the market, MSG HD and MSG+ HD were already established and popular networks, thereby undermining any suggestion that the networks were fledgling services dependent upon financing from Cablevision or that Defendants were required to offer MVPDs exclusivity with respect to AT&T as an inducement to carry the networks.

¹⁸⁶ *Defendants’ Answer* at 75.

¹⁸⁷ *See* 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(4)(D); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1002(c)(4)(iv).

¹⁸⁸ *NECN Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3237, ¶ 40.

¹⁸⁹ *See id.* at 3237, ¶¶ 40-43 (finding that exclusivity will promote the financial survival of a regional news service and thereby enhance diversity of programming); *see also NewsChannel*, 10 FCC Rcd at 695, ¶¶ 27-29 (finding that exclusivity will promote the successful launch and financial survival of a new and unique regional news service and thereby enhance diversity of programming).

¹⁹⁰ *See Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3229, ¶ 51 (finding that exclusivity is not currently needed for an existing and successful service and is therefore not needed to promote diversity of programming); *see also Sci-Fi Exclusivity Petition*, 10 FCC Rcd at 9791, ¶¶ 27-29 (finding that exclusivity is not currently needed for an existing and successful service and is therefore not needed to promote diversity of programming); *Outdoor Life/Speedvision Exclusivity Petition*, 13 FCC Rcd at 12240, ¶ 26 (finding that exclusivity is not currently needed for a network with 13.5-14.5 million subscribers that various MVPDs seek to carry and is therefore not needed to promote diversity of programming).

REDACTED VERSION

36. As discussed above, MSG HD and MSG+ HD are established networks with valuable and popular programming. Defendants do not allege that the continued carriage and development of these networks is dependent on Defendants' withholding strategy. Thus, we find no basis to conclude that Defendants' withholding strategy is needed to enhance diversity of programming. Defendants theorize, however, that requiring MSG LP to share MSG HD and MSG+ HD with AT&T will reduce AT&T's incentive to invest in its own programming, thereby reducing diversity of programming.¹⁹¹ As the Commission has explained previously, however, RSN programming is non-replicable and "no amount of investment can duplicate the unique attributes of such programming."¹⁹² Accordingly, consistent with Commission precedent, we find that the fourth factor does not weigh in favor of Defendants' withholding.

(v) Duration of Withholding

37. We find that the fifth factor – the duration of the exclusive arrangement – weighs against Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T.¹⁹³ The Bureau has previously found even a three-year exclusivity period to be excessive for a network that is popular and that MVPDs seek to carry.¹⁹⁴ The withholding here is of unlimited duration given that Defendants have provided no indication that they will ever license MSG HD and MSG+ HD to AT&T on any terms.

¹⁹¹ See *Defendants' Answer* at 55-56; *Bulow/Owen Study* at 19-21; see also *AT&T Complaint*, Exhibit 6 (Letter from Howard J. Symons, Counsel for Defendants, to Christopher M. Heimann, AT&T (July 23, 2009), at 2 ("AT&T clearly has the resources to acquire, invest in, and develop its own programming.")); *Defendants' April 9th Letter* at 13; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 129.

¹⁹² *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 750-51, ¶ 9; *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 75 ("[N]o amount of investment by AT&T would allow AT&T to create an RSN in the HD format carrying New York City's major professional sports teams, given Cablevision's refusal to allow it to do so and especially given Cablevision's ownership of the New York Knicks and New York Rangers franchises."); *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 22 ("[T]his is not a context where exclusivity is likely to spur greater investment, for the simple reason that MSG HD and MSG+ HD cannot be replicated. Defendants not only have the exclusive rights to games of the Knicks, Rangers, Islanders, and Devils, but also own the underlying Knicks and Rangers franchises. No competing provider, regardless of its size and the investment it is willing to make, can replicate that content. Due to league restrictions and exclusive contracts, AT&T cannot establish a new basketball or hockey team, nor can it independently record existing teams' games to broadcast on its own RSN.") (emphasis in original); see also *AT&T Reply* at 27; *AT&T June 20th Letter* at 4 ("[T]his is not a context in which Defendants' withholding of programming will spur AT&T to develop competing programming of its own.").

¹⁹³ See 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(4)(E); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1002(c)(4)(v).

¹⁹⁴ See *Sci-Fi Exclusivity Petition*, 10 FCC Rcd at 9791, ¶ 30 n.78 (rejecting a three-year period of exclusivity given that Sci-Fi Channel was a popular service that at least one MVPD had sought to carry). The Commission has explained that in assessing the duration of an exclusive arrangement, it will "evaluate whether the proposed exclusivity has been sufficiently tailored to provide exclusivity for the minimum time period reasonably required to achieve the public interest benefits identified by the petitioner without imposing the kind of effect on the development of competition in the distribution market that Congress sought to ameliorate through the program access provisions." *Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3226, ¶ 30; see also *id.* at 3230, ¶ 54 (finding a 15-year period of exclusivity to be "excessive" and not consistent with the statute); *NECN Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3237-38, ¶¶ 44-51 (finding a seven-year period of exclusivity to be "reasonable" in light of the finding that the public interest benefits of the proposed exclusive arrangement offset any effect on competition); *Outdoor Life/Speedvision Exclusivity Petition*, 13 FCC Rcd at 12240-41, ¶ 27 (finding it unnecessary to assess whether a four-year period of exclusivity was appropriate in light of the lack of public interest benefits to offset the adverse effects on competition in the local and national video distribution markets); *NewsChannel*, 10 FCC Rcd at 695-96, ¶¶ 30-35 (finding a seven-year period of exclusivity to be "reasonable" in light of the finding that the public interest benefits of the proposed exclusive arrangement offset any effect on competition).

REDACTED VERSION**(vi) Conclusion**

38. The first, second, and fifth factors under Section 628(c)(4) suggest significant anticompetitive harms resulting from Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T. While the two remaining factors could potentially tip the scales in favor of a finding that Defendants' withholding is procompetitive on balance, we find no basis on this record to conclude that Defendants' withholding will promote the benefits of exclusive arrangements for the programming market (*i.e.*, attraction of capital investment or increased programming diversity). Accordingly, applying the factors set forth in Section 628(c)(4) and the Commission's interpretation of those factors, we conclude that the anticompetitive harms of Defendants' withholding are not offset by any procompetitive benefits to the programming market.

(c) MDU Order

39. In the *MDU Order*, the Commission weighed the anticompetitive harms of exclusive contracts between cable operators and MDU owners against the procompetitive benefits and concluded that, on balance, these contracts are categorically "unfair."¹⁹⁵ Applying this analysis here, we find two significant anticompetitive harms resulting from Defendants' withholding. First, as discussed below, Defendants' withholding "significantly hinders" a wireline entrant from competing in the state of Connecticut, which in turn harms consumers by limiting video competition in those markets.¹⁹⁶ Second, as the Commission has recognized previously, an act that impedes the ability of an MVPD to provide video service can also impede the ability of an MVPD to provide broadband services.¹⁹⁷ These anticompetitive harms, however, may be outweighed by the procompetitive benefits of withholding.¹⁹⁸ The only procompetitive benefit put forth by Defendants is that their withholding strategy will allow Cablevision to differentiate its service from AT&T, thereby leading to more vigorous competition in the video distribution market and increasing the incentives of both Defendants and AT&T to invest in their own programming.¹⁹⁹ While we do not preclude the possibility that the facts in an individual case may reveal that the procompetitive benefits of product differentiation outweigh the anticompetitive harms of withholding, we find no basis to reach that conclusion on the facts presented here. As discussed above, the key distinction in this case is that the content withheld from AT&T is non-replicable and popular RSN programming that "no amount of investment can duplicate."²⁰⁰ Because AT&T has no ability to formulate a viable competitive response that would allow AT&T to compete for the many subscribers that

¹⁹⁵ See *MDU Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 20243, ¶ 16 and 20248-49, ¶ 26.

¹⁹⁶ See *infra* Section III.B.2.c; see also *supra* ¶ 29.

¹⁹⁷ See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 771-72, ¶ 36 (stating that a "wireline firm's decision to deploy broadband is linked to its ability to offer video" and that an act that "imped[es] the ability of MVPDs to provide video service . . . can also impede the ability of MVPDs to provide broadband services"); *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 98 ("AT&T's inability to obtain the HD format of MSG and MSG Plus reduces expected revenues from U-verse service by making AT&T a less viable competitor in Connecticut. That, in turn, reduces incentives to extend the Project Lightspeed broadband deployment to additional customers in Connecticut."); York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 55; *AT&T Reply* at 34 n.43.

¹⁹⁸ See *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *23 (stating that "labeling conduct unfair simply because it might in some circumstances negatively affect competition in the video distribution market" fails to consider whether such conduct should be treated as unfair "despite it being procompetitive in a given instance").

¹⁹⁹ See *supra* ¶ 27. As discussed above, there is no evidence of any procompetitive benefits from Defendants' withholding strategy for the programming market. See *supra* ¶¶ 32-36.

²⁰⁰ *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 750-51, ¶ 9; see also *supra* ¶¶ 30, 36.

REDACTED VERSION

highly value these networks, we find that the anticompetitive harms of Defendants' withholding outweigh the procompetitive benefits.

(d) Legitimate Business Justification

40. The Commission's program access rules applicable to satellite-delivered, cable-affiliated programming permit withholding provided there is a "legitimate business justification" for the conduct.²⁰¹ The only justification put forth by Defendants is that their withholding strategy will allow Cablevision to differentiate its service from AT&T.²⁰² While we do not preclude the possibility that product differentiation may be a legitimate business justification for withholding terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated programming based on the facts presented in an individual case, we decline to reach that conclusion here given the non-replicable and popular nature of the content withheld from AT&T. We find that product differentiation is not a legitimate business justification here because AT&T has no ability to formulate a viable competitive response that would allow AT&T to compete for the many subscribers who, today, highly value these networks.²⁰³

(e) FTC Definition

41. Defendants have put forth their own test for assessing whether conduct is "unfair," which is based on the Federal Trade Commission's Unfairness Policy Statement.²⁰⁴ We find that Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T is "unfair" under this test as well. We thus need not decide how much weight should be given to Defendants' proposed test. The first factor requires the conduct at issue to "present an imminent, substantial, non-speculative threat of injury to consumers (as opposed to competitors)."²⁰⁵ As discussed later herein, Defendants' withholding "significantly hinders" AT&T from competing in the video distribution market in the state of Connecticut, which in turn harms consumers by limiting competition in those markets and by impeding broadband deployment.²⁰⁶ The second factor requires that the conduct at issue "must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces."²⁰⁷ As discussed above, we conclude that the anticompetitive harms of Defendants' withholding outweigh any procompetitive benefits.²⁰⁸ The third factor requires that the act impose an injury that consumers could not reasonably avoid by "survey[ing] the available alternatives, choos[ing] those that are most desirable, and avoid[ing] those that are inadequate or unsatisfactory."²⁰⁹ As the Commission has explained previously, RSNs such as MSG HD

²⁰¹ See *1993 Order*, 8 FCC Rcd at 3412-13, ¶ 116.

²⁰² See *supra* ¶ 27.

²⁰³ See *supra* ¶¶ 30, 36.

²⁰⁴ See *Defendants' June 22nd Letter* at 5 (citing *FTC Unfairness Policy Statement*, Dec. 17, 1980, reprinted in *Int'l Harvester Co.*, 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) ("The Commission shall have no authority under this section or section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.").

²⁰⁵ See *Defendants' June 22nd Letter* at 5.

²⁰⁶ See *infra* Section III.B.2.c; see also *supra* ¶¶ 29, 39.

²⁰⁷ See *Defendants' June 22nd Letter* at 5.

²⁰⁸ See *supra* ¶¶ 25-40.

²⁰⁹ See *Defendants' June 22nd Letter* at 5 (citing *FTC Unfairness Policy Statement*, Dec. 17, 1980, reprinted in *Int'l Harvester Co.*, 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984)).

REDACTED VERSION

and MSG+ HD are unique because they “purchase exclusive rights to show sporting events and sports fans believe that there is no good substitute for watching their local and/or favorite team play an important game.”²¹⁰ Moreover, the Commission has explained that RSN programming is “non-replicable and valuable to consumers” and that “no amount of investment can duplicate the unique attributes of such programming.”²¹¹ Thus, by withholding MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T, Defendants have eliminated a competitive choice for those consumers who desire MSG HD and MSG+ HD.²¹² Accordingly, even applying the test advocated by Defendants, we find Defendants’ withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T to be an “unfair act.”

(f) Conclusion

42. After applying precedent and guidelines established by Congress and the Commission, as well as an additional test advocated by Defendants, we conclude that the anticompetitive effects of Defendants’ withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T outweigh any procompetitive benefits and that Defendants’ withholding is, on balance, an “unfair act.”²¹³

c. Defendants’ Withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T Has the “Effect” of “Significantly Hindering” AT&T

43. As discussed below, we conclude that Defendants’ withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T in the state of Connecticut has the “effect” of “significantly hindering” AT&T from providing a competing video service, including “satellite cable programming and satellite broadcast programming,” to subscribers and consumers in these DMAs.²¹⁴ We begin by reviewing Commission precedent on the “significant hindrance” standard. We then assess the “effect” of the conduct at issue.

²¹⁰ See *General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors and The News Corporation Limited, Transferee*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 473, 535, ¶ 133 (2004) (“*News/Hughes Order*”).

²¹¹ *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 750-51, ¶ 9.

²¹² The fact that Defendants make the SD versions of MSG and MSG+ available to AT&T does not change our conclusion. See *supra* ¶ 4 and *infra* ¶ 49 (noting the Commission’s conclusion, as well as additional evidence supporting the conclusion, that HD programming is growing in significance to consumers and that consumers do not consider the SD version of a particular channel to be an adequate substitute for the HD version due to the different technical characteristics and sometimes different content). Moreover, the fact that Defendants make MSG HD and MSG+ HD available to DBS operators does not change our conclusion. Not all consumers can receive DBS service due to signal obstructions and difficulties with antenna siting. See *2007 Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 17879, Appendix B, ¶ 13 (noting impact of signal obstruction on DBS reception); United States Government Accountability Office, *Telecommunications: Direct Broadcast Satellite Subscribership Has Grown Rapidly, But Varies Across Different Types of Markets*, GAO-05-257 (April 2005), at 4, 13-14 (noting impact of signal obstruction on DBS reception) (available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05257.pdf>). Moreover, as discussed above, Defendants acknowledge that DBS operators do not present consumers with the same competitive choice as a wireline entrant such as AT&T because DBS operators do not offer voice or broadband service. See *supra* n.162. Moreover, the Commission has found that DBS operators do not constrain the price of cable service to the extent that wireline entrants do. See *id.*

²¹³ [REDACTED]

]

²¹⁴ As an initial matter, Defendants claim that dismissal of the *AT&T Complaint* is warranted because AT&T is not prevented or significantly hindered from providing any “satellite cable programming” or “satellite broadcast (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION**(i) The “Significant Hindrance” Standard**

44. Defendants’ claims notwithstanding, prior Commission decisions establish that the “significant hindrance” standard does not require a complainant to demonstrate that it is completely foreclosed from competing in the video distribution market or that its commercial viability is in jeopardy.²¹⁵ In 1993, in initially establishing the program access rules, the Commission stated that a complainant alleging “significant hindrance” under Section 628(b) “must show that its ability to distribute programming to customers has been hampered in some fashion” and that the Commission will focus on whether the purpose or effect of the practice is “to hinder or harm the complainant relative to its competitors.”²¹⁶ In 2007, the Commission found that MVPDs were “significantly hindered” as a result of exclusive deals between cable operators and MDU owners, despite the fact that only 30 percent of Americans lived in MDUs and the percentage of Americans living in an MDU subject to an exclusive deal is lower.²¹⁷ The Commission prohibited all such exclusive deals, regardless of the size of the MDU or the number of MDUs in a given market area.²¹⁸ In the *2010 Order*, the Commission explained that, in attempting to demonstrate “significant hindrance,” a complainant “cannot simply rely on the fact that some impairment to providing service may have occurred because of its lack of access to cable-affiliated, terrestrially delivered programming.”²¹⁹ In the same decision, the Commission found “significant (Continued from previous page) _____

programming” when the only programming being withheld is terrestrially delivered. *See Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 12-13, 26-28, 132; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 8, 10; *see also Defendants’ Answer* at 31. The Commission, and now the D.C. Circuit, have considered and rejected this argument. *See Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *10-*11 (“The problem with petitioners’ argument is that it wrongly assumes an MVPD’s lack of commercial attractiveness will never prevent or significantly hinder it from providing satellite programming.”); *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 768-69, ¶ 32, 770-71, ¶ 35, and 774-75, ¶ 39.

²¹⁵ *See Bulow/Owen Study* at 3 (“There is no evidence in the complaint that MSG’s HD program services are essential for entry (successful or otherwise) into the business. To the contrary, AT&T itself offers apparently viable retail video distribution service in the Cablevision service areas without offering MSG HD and MSG+ HD.”); *Defendants’ April 9th Letter* at 7-9 (stating that none of the evidence demonstrates that AT&T has been significantly hindered from providing a competitively viable service); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 92-93 (referring to whether Defendants could use MSG HD and MSG+ HD to hinder AT&T’s “competitive viability”), at 101 (stating that the DBS operators and telephone companies will “continue to offer video service irrespective of whether a small number of cable-owned HD regional programming services are unavailable to AT&T”), Exhibit D (Defendants, Reply to Verizon’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike, File No. CSR-8185-P (filed Sept. 24, 2009), at 3 (referring to a practice that “entirely forecloses entry into the relevant marketplace”), Exhibit N (Bruce M. Owen, Bundling Undermines the RSN Presumption, at 9 (“AT&T is apparently viable as a distributor of video services . . .”) (“*Owen Study*”)); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 6-7 (“AT&T has offered no evidence suggesting that the commercial viability of U-verse TV is significantly impaired . . .”), at 12 (“AT&T likewise has failed to present any evidence that lack of access to MSG HD/MSG+ HD renders its provision of video service in Connecticut uneconomic or commercially non-viable.”), at 14 (“The record . . . offers no basis for concluding that the commercial viability of AT&T’s video offering is impaired in any material respect . . .”); *see also AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 3 (stating that Defendants have misinterpreted the statutory standard to require a showing of total preclusion), and at 25.

²¹⁶ *1993 Order*, 8 FCC Rcd at 3374, ¶ 41; *see AT&T Reply* at 20 n.25 (“AT&T’s *absolute* level of competitive success in Connecticut says little about whether, ‘relative’ to Cablevision, AT&T has been hindered in its ability to compete effectively and fairly by the denial of a vital programming input.”) (emphasis in original).

²¹⁷ *See MDU Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 20235-36, ¶ 1, 20237, ¶ 3, 20239-41, ¶¶ 8-10, 20243-44, ¶ 16, and 20250-51, ¶ 29.

²¹⁸ *See id.* at 20251, ¶ 33 and 20253-54, ¶ 38.

²¹⁹ *See 2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 781, ¶ 51 n.200.

REDACTED VERSION

hindrance” when withholding of an RSN resulted in a 33 percent to 40 percent reduction in expected DBS market share.²²⁰ Finally, in March 2010, the Commission addressed bulk billing arrangements, which allow an MVPD to provide service to every resident of an MDU at a significant discount from the usual retail rate.²²¹ The Commission explained that these arrangements may deter a second video provider from serving a building because residents would have to pay twice, thereby increasing the second provider’s cost to consumers.²²² But, while the Commission acknowledged that these arrangements “may make entry by other MVPDs marginally less attractive,” it further found that these arrangements are not present in most MDUs²²³ and that it did not have a basis for finding that they “significantly hinder” MVPDs from providing service where the record demonstrated that “many” consumers are willing to pay twice for video service and some MVPDs have wired MDUs for service despite the presence of bulk billing arrangements.²²⁴

45. Thus, rather than requiring an MVPD to demonstrate complete foreclosure or that its commercial viability is in doubt, we believe this precedent establishes that the salient issue in assessing “significant hindrance” is whether an MVPD has been hindered relative to its competitors and whether the hindrance is substantial enough to eliminate the MVPD as a competitive choice for a meaningful number of consumers. For example, in the *MDU Order* and *2010 Order*, although the Commission found that MVPDs were “significantly hindered,” there was no indication that MVPDs were incapable of competing in the marketplace or that they were poised to exit the market without access to MDU residents or to an RSN. This precedent is consistent with Section 628(b), which prohibits “unfair acts” that have the purpose or effect “to hinder significantly *or to prevent*” an MVPD from providing programming to subscribers or consumers.²²⁵ This language indicates that Congress intended “significant hindrance” to mean something less than complete foreclosure, or prevention, from providing service. This interpretation is also supported by the D.C. Circuit’s decision upholding the *2010 Order*. In rejecting Defendants’ argument that withholding of terrestrially delivered programming does not significantly hinder an MVPD from providing “satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming,” the court explained that this argument “wrongly assumes an MVPD’s *lack of commercial attractiveness* will never prevent or significantly hinder it from providing satellite programming.”²²⁶ The court also explained that when an MVPD is denied access to “programming that customers want and that competitors are unable to duplicate—like the games of a local team selling broadcast rights to a single

²²⁰ See *id.* at 768, ¶ 32 and 782, ¶ 52 n.202. Based on this evidence, as well as the non-replicability of RSNs, the Commission established a rebuttable presumption that withholding of an RSN results in “significant hindrance.” See *supra* ¶ 3.

²²¹ See *Exclusive Service Contracts for Provision of Video Services in Multiple Dwelling Units and Other Real Estate Developments*, Second Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd 2460, 2461, ¶ 2, 2463, ¶ 10, and 2470, ¶ 26 (2010).

²²² See *id.* at 2461, ¶ 2 and 2464, ¶ 12.

²²³ See *id.* at 2464, ¶ 12.

²²⁴ See *id.* at 2470, ¶ 26 (“second MVPD providers wire MDUs for video service even in the presence of bulk billing arrangements and [] many consumers choose to subscribe to those second video services”). The Commission also found that exclusive marketing arrangements, whereby an MVPD has the exclusive right to certain means of marketing its service to residents of an MDU, do not result in “significant hindrance.” See *id.* at 2471-72, ¶ 31 and 2473, ¶ 36. The record indicated that these arrangements, which are not present in “most” MDUs, confer a slight advantage on the MVPD subject to the arrangement, but there is no indication that they “significantly hinder” competitors from providing service. See *id.* at 2473, ¶ 36.

²²⁵ 47 U.S.C. § 548(b) (emphasis added).

²²⁶ *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *10 (emphasis added).

REDACTED VERSION

sports network—competitor MVPDs will find themselves at a serious disadvantage when trying to attract customers away from the incumbent cable company.”²²⁷

46. We also reject Defendants’ claim that the Commission should be guided exclusively by antitrust precedent in applying the “significant hindrance” standard.²²⁸ Congress specifically adopted the program access regime, including Section 628(b), as a new remedy separate and apart from antitrust enforcement.²²⁹ Moreover, the Commission has previously explained that antitrust and program access laws “address similar but not identical concerns.”²³⁰

(ii) The Record Supports Application of a Rebuttable Presumption of “Significant Hindrance” for HD RSNs

47. Because MSG HD and MSG+ HD are RSNs as defined by the Commission,²³¹ Defendants’ withholding of these networks from AT&T is subject to the rebuttable presumption of “significant hindrance” established in the *2010 Order*.²³² Moreover, although Defendants license the SD versions of MSG and MSG+ to AT&T, the Commission has established that this alone is not sufficient to rebut the presumption applicable to the HD version.²³³ AT&T has put forth evidence that provides additional support for the rebuttable presumption for HD RSNs. Although this evidence is not necessary to bring the presumption into play, we nonetheless review the evidence given its presence in the record.

48. In upholding the rebuttable presumption of “significant hindrance” for RSNs, the D.C. Circuit explained that the Commission “advanced compelling reasons to believe that withholding RSN programming is, given its desirability and non-replicability, uniquely likely to significantly impact the

²²⁷ See *id.*; see also *id.* at *11 (“But given petitioners’ concession that the Commission can in principle regulate terrestrial withholding when such withholding completely prevents an MVPD from competing, thus preventing that MVPD from providing satellite programming, they have no basis for arguing that section 628 *unambiguously* precludes the Commission from regulating where it has evidence that such withholding ‘hinder[s] significantly,’ 47 U.S.C. § 548(b), an MVPD from competing with the incumbent cable operator to deliver satellite programming to customers.”) (emphasis in original).

²²⁸ See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 52-53; *Owen Study* at 3 n.5 and 9; see also *Defendants’ Answer* at 60-63; *Defendants’ April 9th Letter* at 9.

²²⁹ See S. Rep. No. 102-92 (1991), at 29, *reprinted in* 1992 U.S.C.A.N. 1133, 1162 (“The legislation provides new FCC remedies and does not amend existing antitrust laws. All antitrust and other remedies which can be pursued under current law by multichannel video programming distributors are therefore unaffected by this section.”).

²³⁰ See *1993 Order*, 8 FCC Rcd at 3404, ¶ 102 (“[W]hile antitrust precedents and other regulatory approaches address related concepts that might be particularly useful in defining the permissible factors for differentials, directly importing these concepts into the Section 628 process risks confusing the two bodies of law involved, which address similar but not identical concerns.”); see also *Court TV Exclusivity Petition*, 9 FCC Rcd at 3226-27, ¶ 35 (“[I]t would be flatly inconsistent with the Cable Act to find an exclusivity provision presumptively lawful simply because it might not rise to the level of a Sherman Act violation.”); *AT&T Reply* at 15 n.21, 18; *Defendants’ April 16th Letter* at 5; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 7-8.

²³¹ The record establishes that MSG HD and MSG+ HD satisfy the Commission’s definition of an RSN. See *supra* n.8 (defining RSN); *Defendants’ Answer* at 86 (¶ 23) (admitting that MSG has exclusive rights to the New York Knicks (NBA) and New York Rangers (NHL), among others, and that MSG+ has exclusive rights to the New York Islanders (NHL) and New Jersey Devils (NHL), among others).

²³² See *supra* ¶ 3.

²³³ See *supra* ¶ 4.

REDACTED VERSION

MVPD market.”²³⁴ AT&T has provided additional support for the Commission’s conclusion that such networks are non-replicable and critically important to consumers and competition.²³⁵ The record here

²³⁴ *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *18.

²³⁵ See *supra* n.8; 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 750, ¶ 8 and 782-83, ¶ 52. Defendants contend that the fact that certain MVPDs, including AT&T, choose not to carry certain RSNs in some markets demonstrates that RSNs are not indispensable. See *Defendants’ Answer* at 44-45; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 44; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 21. We do not find that this undermines the rebuttable presumption because the record here contains no evidence of the circumstances that led to the MVPDs’ decision to refrain from carrying an RSN. See *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 31. For example, the MVPDs’ decisions to refrain from carrying the RSNs may have been driven by the high cost of an RSN or an RSN’s demand for unreasonable terms; in such a situation, the fact of non-carriage may suggest that the RSN views itself as providing indispensable, “must have” programming. [REDACTED]

I

In addition, while Defendants state that all content is non-replicable due to copyright restrictions (see *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 17; see also *Defendants’ Answer* at 55; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 43), the Commission has previously recognized that RSNs are unique because they “typically purchase exclusive rights to show sporting events and sports fans believe that there is no good substitute for watching their local and/or favorite team play an important game.” *News/Hughes Order*, 19 FCC Rcd at 535, ¶ 133; see *York/Lauricella/Thun Decl.* at ¶ 12 (“Because the underlying rights to carry the games of these sports teams are exclusive, MSG and MSG Plus carry programming that cannot be duplicated and for which there is no substitute.”); *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 75 (“[N]o amount of investment by AT&T would allow AT&T to create an RSN in the HD format carrying New York City’s major professional sports teams, given Cablevision’s refusal to allow it to do so and especially given Cablevision’s ownership of the New York Knicks and New York Rangers franchises.”); *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 22 (“Defendants not only have the exclusive rights to games of the Knicks, Rangers, Islanders, and Devils, but also own the underlying Knicks and Rangers franchises. No competing provider, regardless of its size and the investment it is willing to make, can replicate that content. Due to league restrictions and exclusive contracts, AT&T cannot establish a new basketball or hockey team, nor can it independently record existing teams’ games to broadcast on its own RSN.”); see also *AT&T Complaint* at ii and ¶¶ 63, 77 n.54; *York/Lauricella/Thun Decl.* at ¶¶ 10, 48; *AT&T Reply* at 27; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 4, 13-14. Moreover, Defendants have previously recognized in statements to investors the significance of non-replicable content. See *AT&T Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 21 (quoting Cablevision’s COO as stating that Cablevision “currently carr[ies] more regional HD than any of our competitors” and that “we have more HD and On Demand HD that our competitors can’t replicate”) (citing *Cablevision Q3 2007 Cablevision Systems Corp. Earnings Conference Call*, Thomas StreetEvents, Final Transcript at 11 (Nov. 8, 2007)); see also *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 65.

REDACTED VERSION

contains MSG LP's statements from a previous litigation conceding that close substitutes do not exist for sports content.²³⁶ Moreover, the record contains additional evidence supporting the Commission's conclusion that RSNs are highly valued by consumers and important for competition.²³⁷ This evidence includes [REDACTED

],²³⁸ and results from a consumer survey demonstrating that a significant number of consumers in New York watch RSNs.²³⁹

49. The D.C. Circuit also upheld the rebuttable presumption of "significant hindrance" for HD RSNs,²⁴⁰ and the record here provides further support for the Commission's conclusion regarding the growing significance of HD RSNs to consumers.²⁴¹ This includes evidence showing that sales of HDTV

²³⁶ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 14 (quoting MSG LP as stating in a complaint filed with a federal district court that "[c]lose substitutes do not exist" for sports programming and that watching a particular sporting event "is not reasonably interchangeable with watching . . . other sports or other leisure activities") (quoting Complaint, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. National Hockey League, No. 07-CIV-8455 (S.D.N.Y.) (Sept. 28, 2007)). These statements pertain specifically to hockey, which accounts for four of the major professional sports teams shown on MSG HD and MSG+ HD.

²³⁷ See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 750-51, ¶¶ 8-9 and 782-83, ¶ 52.

²³⁸ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 29; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement*, Declaration of Adam Levine (Jan. 5, 2011), Attachment ([REDACTED

]) ("Levine Jan. 2011 Decl.").

²³⁹ This survey was originally submitted by Verizon in connection with its complaint against Defendants regarding the withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from Verizon in the New York DMA and the Buffalo DMA. See *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 19-20 and Exhibit 6 (Declaration of Chris Stella (Aug. 13, 2009) ("Stella Decl.") and Global Marketing Research Services Survey of Paid Television Subscribers in NY and Buffalo Designated Market Areas (Aug. 7, 2009) ("*Verizon/GMRS Survey*"). AT&T states that, given the proximity of Connecticut to New York City and the fact that part of the area AT&T serves in Connecticut is in the New York DMA (*i.e.*, Fairfield County, CT), the *Verizon/GMRS Survey* is "highly probative of the competitive significance of MSG HD and MSG+ HD in Connecticut." *Id.* at 20. The *Verizon/GMRS Survey* entailed two telephone surveys of subscribers to paid video programming services in the New York and Buffalo DMAs conducted between July 28 and August 4, 2009. See Stella Decl. at ¶ 3; *Verizon/GMRS Survey* at 4. In the New York DMA, a total of 851 interviews were conducted, and the survey data had a margin of error of +/- 3.4 percent at a confidence interval of 95 percent. See Stella Decl. at ¶ 5; *Verizon/GMRS Survey* at 4. When asked how often they watch a regional sports channel, 39 percent of respondents in the New York DMA stated at least several times per week. See *Verizon/GMRS Survey* at 2 and Question 8. In addition, when asked how important it is to watch a game of a team they closely follow, 58 percent of respondents in the New York DMA stated that it was "very important" or "somewhat important." See *id.* at Question 6. While Defendants contend that there are a number of flaws with the *Verizon/GMRS Survey*, Defendants have identified no specific issues pertaining to these two questions. See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 21-22, 64 and Exhibit D; Declaration of Professor Eric T. Bradlow (Dec. 23, 2010), at ¶¶ 10-15, 21 ("Bradlow Decl."); Declaration of Professor Carol A. Scott (Jan. 5, 2011), at ¶¶ 6(a), 8-11 ("Scott Decl."); Declaration of Professor Dilip Soman (Dec. 23, 2010), at ¶¶ 10-11, 20 ("Soman Decl."); *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 29; see also Verizon, Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike in Part Verizon's Reply, File No. CSR-8185-P (filed Sept. 14, 2009), at 12-13 (noting that, despite a typo in the survey results, all of the respondents subscribed to cable or satellite television service and all of the respondents were responsible for making decisions about which cable provider is used by the household).

²⁴⁰ See *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *19.

²⁴¹ See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 784-85, ¶¶ 54-55. Among other evidence, the Commission in the *2010 Order* noted the following: DTV sales are growing at 50 percent per year; the Consumer Electronics Association ("CEA") (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION

sets are growing, with a significant number of consumers in the New York DMA owning HDTV sets,²⁴² those consumers that have purchased HDTV sets highly value HD programming;²⁴³ HD homes are more likely to watch sports programming than non-HD homes;²⁴⁴ MVPDs have stressed the importance of

(Continued from previous page) _____

has estimated that, by 2011, the number of HDTVs sold in the United States will reach 170 million, which is roughly one set for every two Americans; more than 45 percent of American households own an HD television set, up from less than 20 percent in 2006; a 2005 CEA survey concluding that “45 percent of HDTV sports fans would consider switching to another source of HD sports if superior to their current package.” *See id.* at 784-85, ¶ 54 n.216.

²⁴² *See Verizon/GMRS Survey* at Question 3 (67 percent of subscribers in the New York DMA have an HDTV set); *see also AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 59 and Exhibit 7 (2007 CEA HD Sports Fan Study concluding that 48 percent of non-HDTV owners expect to purchase an HD display within two years) (citing Consumer Electronics Association, *Second Annual Inside the Mind of the HD Sports Fan Study* (Jan. 2007), at 3 (“2007 CEA HD Sports Fan Study”)); Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl. at ¶ 8 (2009 Forrester Research report concluding that 71 percent of households will have at least one HDTV and more than half will have two or more by 2014) (citing James L. McQuivey, Ph.D., et al., Forrester Research, *US HDTV Forecast, 2009 to 2014: Multi-HDTV Owners Become the Default Buyers* (Sept. 3, 2009)); *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 15-16 and Exhibit 4 at Slides 6, 136 (*LRG/HDTV 2009 Report* concluding that (i) as of October 2009, nearly half of all households had an HDTV set and an additional 37 percent of households were “very interested” or “somewhat interested” in purchasing HDTV in the next year; and (ii) estimating an increase in the number of HD households from 67 million in 2010 to 105 million in 2014) (citing Leichtman Research Group, *HDTV 2009: Consumer Awareness, Interest and Ownership* (4Q2009), at 6 (“LRG/HDTV 2009 Report”)); *see also Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 42 (data from Leichtman Research Group indicating that 46 percent of U.S. households have an HDTV set, an increase from 45 percent cited by the Commission in the *2010 Order*) (citing Press Release, Leichtman Research Group, *Nearly Half of U.S. Households Have an HDTV Set* (Nov. 30, 2009), available at <http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/113009release.pdf>); *id.* at 42 n.162 (2010 Nielsen data indicating that over 60 percent of homes have an HDTV set) (citing George Winslow, *Nielsen: More than 80% of Viewing Still in Standard-Def*, Broadcasting and Cable, Nov. 8, 2010, available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/459632-Nielsen_More_Than_80_of_Viewing_Still_in_Standard_Def.php (“Winslow/2010 Nielsen Article”)).

²⁴³ *See AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief*, Exhibit 4 at Slide 59 (*LRG/HDTV 2009 Report* concluding that 45 percent of respondents watch more programs in HD than programs not in HD).

²⁴⁴ *See AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 58 and *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 16 (2008 Nielsen Report stating that ratings for sporting events are 20 percent higher in HD homes compared to U.S. households as a whole) (citing Nielsen Special Report, *2008 – a Banner Year in Sports?* (2008), at 3-4, available at http://pl.nielsen.com/trends/documents/2008ABannerYear_inSports_December2008.pdf (“Nielsen 2008 Report”)); *see also AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 59, Exhibit 7, York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 16 and *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 16 (2007 CEA HD Sports Fan Study concluding that (i) 57 percent of HDTV owners can be classified as sports fans; and (ii) nearly one in three HDTV owner sports fans indicate they always or often use HD programming as the determining factor for what they watch); *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 16 n.28 (2005 CEA Study stating that (i) “[n]early 60 percent of [HDTV] owners consider themselves sports fans”; (ii) “[n]early 50 percent of HDTV owners cited HD sports programming as the primary force behind their HDTV purchase”; and (iii) “39 percent of HD sports fans are extremely disappointed when a sports event they want to watch is NOT in high-definition”) (quoting Press Release, Consumer Electronics Association, *Sports Fans Drive HD Television Sales According to a New Survey* (Jan. 17, 2006), at 1, available at http://www.ce.org/Press/CurrentNews/press_release_detail.asp?id=10928 (“2005 CEA Study”)); *id.* at 17 and Exhibit 4 at Slides 60, 85 (*LRG/HDTV 2009 Report* finding that the highest percentage of HD viewers (30 percent) listed sports as the type of channel they would add first); *id.* at 17 n.31 and Exhibit 4 at Slide 85 (*LRG/HDTV 2009 Report* finding that 40 percent of households with incomes above \$75,000 cite sports programming as their “first choice” of HD programming); *id.* at 26 and Exhibit 13 (**REDACTED**

); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 42 n.162 (citing

(continued....)

REDACTED VERSION

offering HD;²⁴⁵ and both AT&T and Cablevision advertise their HD offerings.²⁴⁶ The record also contains additional evidence supporting the Commission's conclusion that, due to technical²⁴⁷ and content²⁴⁸ differences between SD and HD, consumers do not consider the SD version of a particular channel to be an adequate substitute for the HD version.²⁴⁹ Moreover, we note that both Congress and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have recently recognized the critical nature of HD programming in today's video marketplace.²⁵⁰

(Continued from previous page) _____

Winslow/2010 Nielsen Article, which states that 2010 Nielsen data shows that sports networks lead all other types of programming in HD viewing).

²⁴⁵ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 27 and Exhibit 15 (**IREDACTED**

); *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 31 and York Decl. at ¶ 4 (explaining that AT&T carries all in-market professional sporting events today in both SD and HD, with the exception of MSG HD and MSG+ HD (the subjects of this proceeding) and two Cox RSNs (which AT&T is currently negotiating to carry)).

²⁴⁶ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 65 and Exhibits 8-15 (providing Cablevision advertisements emphasizing its ability to offer all nine New York sports teams in HD); *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 20-21; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 15; *Defendants' Answer* at 17-18 (¶ 11) and Exhibit 5 (noting AT&T's advertising and statements emphasizing its HD offerings); *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 21, 50-51, Exhibit C (providing AT&T advertisements and statements emphasizing its HD offerings) and Exhibit E (providing Cablevision advertisements emphasizing its HD offerings).

²⁴⁷ See *Defendants' Answer* at 66 (noting that HD has materially different resolution, depth, audio, and display than SD), 78.

²⁴⁸ See *id.*; Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶ 13 (noting that content may differ between the SD and HD versions of a network).

²⁴⁹ See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 784-85, ¶¶ 54-55.

²⁵⁰ In Section 207 of the Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010 ("STELA"), Congress accelerated the timetable pursuant to which satellite providers that carry local stations in HD must carry "qualified noncommercial educational television stations" in HD. See Pub. L. No. 111-175, § 207, 124 Stat. 1218 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 338 (2006)). In affirming a federal district court's decision denying a motion for a preliminary injunction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that Congress in passing Section 207 "recognized whether a program is offered in HD affects whether viewers watch it." See *DISH Network Corp. v. FCC*, 636 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011), amended by 2011 WL 3449485 (Aug. 9, 2011). The court held "it was reasonable for Congress to conclude that allowing satellite carriers to delay offering PBS in HD would lead to anticompetitive results." See *id.* The court also cited a New York Times article "stating that shortly before STELA's passage, half of the country was watching television in HD format and that 'HD may limit the number of channels that viewers turn to, because once they can watch programs in HD, they have little desire to watch anything of a lower quality.'" See *id.* (quoting Brian Stelter, *Crystal-Clear, Maybe Mesmerizing*, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2010, B4).

Defendants claim that data in the record undermine the rebuttable presumption for HD RSNs. Based on data indicating that 46 percent of U.S. households have an HDTV set (see *supra* n.242) and that 66 percent of those households owning an HDTV set subscribe to HD service, Defendants claim that only 33 percent of households (46 percent * 66 percent) are capable of viewing HD RSN programming. See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* 42 and *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 19 n.56 (2009 data from Magid Media Futures) (citing George Winslow, *Mixed Picture: HD Penetration Up, But Viewer Confusion Persists*, Multichannel News, Dec. 12, 2009, available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/439945-Mixed_Picture_HD_Penetration_Up_But_Viewer_Confusion_Persists.php?rssid=20059); see also *Defendants' Answer* at 46 (based on data indicating that 45 percent of U.S. households have an HDTV set (see *supra* n.241) and that 57 percent of HDTV owners can be classified as sports fans (see *supra* n.244), claiming that only 26 percent of households (45 percent * (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION**(iii) Defendants Have Failed to Rebut the Presumption**

50. The 2010 Order provides that a defendant to a complaint alleging an “unfair act” involving a terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated RSN will have the opportunity to rebut the presumption of significant hindrance.²⁵¹ As an initial matter, Defendants contend that the facts of the withholding at issue in the Philadelphia and San Diego cases used to support the Commission’s adoption of a rebuttable presumption for RSNs are distinct from the facts of this case.²⁵² Accordingly, Defendants argue that it would be inappropriate to apply the rebuttable presumption in this case.²⁵³ We disagree that these distinctions are meaningful. First, Defendants contend that the RSNs at issue in the previous cases had exclusive rights to the games of all of the local major professional sports teams in the market, whereas the present case involves only two of the four RSNs in the New York DMA²⁵⁴ and two of six RSNs in the Hartford/New Haven DMA.²⁵⁵ In fact, the percentage of major professional sports teams withheld in the

(Continued from previous page) _____

57 percent) are sports fans that own HDTVs). As an initial matter, evidence cited by Defendants indicates that 56 percent – not 33 percent – of U.S. households are able to view HD programming. See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement 42* (citing *Winslow/2010 Nielsen Article*, which states that 2010 Nielsen data shows that 56 percent of households are able to view HD programming). In any event, even if the 26 or 33 percent figures calculated by Defendants are accurate, we find these percentages to be significant and that they support, rather than undermine, the rebuttable presumption for HD RSNs. See *AT&T Reply* at 23. Indeed, as discussed above, the Commission found that MVPDs were “significantly hindered” as a result of exclusive deals between cable operators and MDU owners when the record reflected that 30 percent of Americans lived in MDUs and the percentage of Americans living in an MDU subject to an exclusive deal is lower. See *supra* ¶ 44.

Defendants also claim that the rebuttable presumption for HD RSNs is undermined by 2010 Nielsen data indicating that 13 percent of the viewing of cable programming networks is done in HD. See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement 42* (citing *Winslow/2010 Nielsen Article*). We disagree. Far from indicating that HD programming is not critical to many consumers, the article notes that this percentage reflects that many homes with HDTV sets and HD service also have non-HDTV sets. See *Winslow/2010 Nielsen Article*. The article further notes that Nielsen predicts an increase in HD viewing once HDTV sets spread into bedrooms where children and teens do much of their viewing. See *id.*

²⁵¹ See 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 782-83, ¶ 52.

²⁵² See *supra* n.8; *Defendants’ Answer* at 43 n.153; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 6-7, 10, 53-54, 57, 136-37; *Owen Study* at 2-9; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 54-55 n.202.

²⁵³ See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 10, 53-54, 57, 136-37; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 54-55 n.202.

²⁵⁴ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 43 n.153; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 3 n.6, 53 n.211, 54; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 54-55 n.202. In addition to MSG and MSG+, there are two additional RSNs in the New York DMA: YES Network (showing the games of the New York Yankees of MLB and the New Jersey Nets of the NBA) and SportsNet New York (showing the games of the New York Mets of MLB). See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 3 n.6, 54. AT&T has access to the SD and HD versions of YES Network and SportsNet New York. See *id.* at 3 n.7, 54.

²⁵⁵ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 43 n.153; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 3 n.6, 54; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 54-55 n.202. In addition to MSG and MSG+, there are four additional RSNs in the Hartford/New Haven DMA: YES Network; SportsNet New York; Comcast SportsNet New England (showing the games of the Boston Celtics of the NBA) and NESN (showing the games of the Boston Red Sox of MLB and the Boston Bruins of the NHL). See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 3 n.6, 54; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 4, 28. AT&T has access to the SD and HD versions of YES Network, SportsNet New York, Comcast SportsNet New England, and NESN. See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 3 n.7, 54. The record indicates that AT&T does not carry CSN New England and NESN in the New York DMA. See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 49 (citing AT&T press release indicating (continued....))

REDACTED VERSION

New York DMA and Hartford/New Haven DMA is comparable to the percentage withheld in the San Diego DMA.²⁵⁶ Second, Defendants note that the RSNs in the Philadelphia and San Diego cases show professional baseball games, which they claim involve one of the nation's two most popular sports, whereas MSG HD and MSG+ HD show professional basketball and hockey games only.²⁵⁷ The Commission, however, included professional basketball and hockey, along with professional football, baseball, and other sports, in the definition of an RSN and the accompanying rebuttable presumption.²⁵⁸

(Continued from previous page) _____

that AT&T carries NESN in the Hartford/New Haven DMA), at 53 n.211 (stating that there are two RSNs other than MSG and MSG+ in the New York DMA (YES Network and SportsNet New York)); *see also Defendants' Answer*, Exhibit 6 (providing channel listing for AT&T U-verse TV in Bridgeport, CT (Fairfield County (New York DMA)) which lists MSG, MSG+, SportsNet New York, and YES Network, but does not list Comcast SportsNet New England or NESN).

²⁵⁶ By "local major professional sports," we refer to football (NFL), baseball (MLB), basketball (NBA), and hockey (NHL) teams whose home stadiums are located in the applicable DMAs. In the New York DMA, there are nine local major professional sports teams, four of which (44 percent) are withheld from AT&T: football (New York Giants and New York Jets); baseball (New York Yankees and New York Mets); basketball (New York Knicks (withheld) and New Jersey Nets); and hockey (New York Rangers (withheld), New York Islanders (withheld), and New Jersey Devils (withheld)). In the San Diego DMA, there are two local major professional sports teams, one of which (50 percent) is withheld from competitors: football (San Diego Chargers) and baseball (San Diego Padres (withheld)).

A somewhat different analysis is required for the Hartford/New Haven DMA, which has no "local major professional sports" teams as defined above because the home stadiums of the local major professional teams are located in the adjacent New York DMA or Boston DMA. As an initial matter, the record is unclear as to whether there are communities within the Hartford/New Haven DMA where league rules would allow MVPDs to offer the games on the networks featuring New York-area teams as well as the games on the networks featuring Boston-area teams. To the extent that there are communities within the Hartford/New Haven DMA where league rules allow MVPDs to offer games on only the networks featuring New York-area teams, then the percentage of teams withheld in those communities is the same as in the New York DMA (44 percent). Assuming for the sake of argument that there are communities within the Hartford/New Haven DMA where MVPDs can offer games on the networks featuring both New York- and Boston-area teams, this results in a total of 13 major professional sports teams, four of which (31 percent) are withheld from AT&T: football (New York Giants, New York Jets, New England Patriots); baseball (New York Yankees, New York Mets, Boston Red Sox); basketball (New York Knicks (withheld), New Jersey Nets, Boston Celtics); and hockey (New York Rangers (withheld), New York Islanders (withheld), New Jersey Devils (withheld), Boston Bruins). This is similar to the percentage of major professional sports teams withheld in the San Diego DMA (33 percent) if basketball teams (Los Angeles Lakers and Los Angeles Clippers) and hockey teams (Los Angeles Kings and Anaheim Ducks) from the adjacent Los Angeles DMA are included in the analysis.

We also note that in the Philadelphia DMA, there are four local major professional sports teams, three of which were withheld from DBS operators: football (Philadelphia Eagles); baseball (Philadelphia Phillies (withheld)); basketball (Philadelphia 76ers (withheld)); and hockey (Philadelphia Flyers (withheld)). While the percentage of local major professional sports teams withheld in Philadelphia (75 percent) is greater than in either the New York DMA or the Hartford/New Haven DMA, this does not undermine the fact that the percentage of teams withheld in the New York DMA and the Hartford/New Haven DMA is similar to the San Diego DMA, where the Commission found that withholding of an RSN resulted in "significant hindrance."

²⁵⁷ *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 136. Defendants do not provide support for the assertion that baseball is "one of the nation's two most popular sports." *See id.* Even if true, Defendants do not provide evidence that this is also true in the New York DMA and the Hartford/New Haven DMA.

²⁵⁸ *See supra* n.8 (stating definition of RSN). Moreover, MSG LP has conceded in a previous litigation that close substitutes do not exist for professional hockey. *See supra* n.236.

REDACTED VERSION

Had the Commission deemed basketball or hockey as insufficiently popular or otherwise not relevant, it would not have included these sports in the definition of an RSN. Third, Defendants note that the Philadelphia and San Diego cases involved complete withholding (both SD and HD), whereas the present case involves withholding of only the HD version of the RSNs.²⁵⁹ As discussed above, however, the Commission has already determined that withholding the HD version is rebuttably presumed to cause “significant hindrance” even if an SD version of the network is made available to competitors.²⁶⁰ Fourth, Defendants note that the Philadelphia and San Diego cases assessed the impact of withholding on DBS operators only, whereas the present case involves a wireline MVPD that bundles its video service with voice, data, and wireless services, which Defendants claim decreases the competitive significance of any individual network.²⁶¹ As discussed below, however, Defendants offer no empirical support for the claim that bundling reduces the importance of RSNs to consumers when making a choice in a video provider.²⁶²

51. In any event, the *2010 Order* provides a defendant with the opportunity to bring forth evidence tending to show that distinctions such as these – or other facts – rebut the presumption that AT&T has been significantly hindered.²⁶³ Defendants have the opportunity to introduce evidence tending to show that, as they contend, these distinctions mean that AT&T’s inability to access MSG HD and MSG+ HD is “far less severe” than the withholding at issue in the Philadelphia and San Diego cases.²⁶⁴ As Defendants note, a rebuttable presumption does not shift the burden of proof to Defendants; rather, it requires Defendants to come forward with evidence that rebuts or meets the presumption.²⁶⁵ Here, Defendants have put forth two types of evidence to rebut the presumption: survey evidence and non-survey evidence. With respect to the survey evidence, we find below that the results of the surveys contradict the stated purpose of Defendants’ product differentiation strategy and, in any event, the surveys contain material flaws and deficiencies that render them insufficiently reliable to overcome the Commission’s presumption. With respect to the non-survey evidence, we find below that this evidence is also unavailing because it fails to isolate the impact of the lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD on the

²⁵⁹ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 42, 44-45; *Defendants’ April 9th Letter* at 8; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 7, 10, 53-54, 57, 136-37; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 54 n.202.

²⁶⁰ See *supra* ¶ 4.

²⁶¹ See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 71-72; *Owen Study* at 2-9; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 54 n.202.

²⁶² See *infra* ¶ 65.

²⁶³ The Commission adopted a rebuttable presumption for RSNs based on Commission precedent and the weight of empirical data demonstrating that withholding of an RSN results in significant hindrance. See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 782-83, ¶ 52. The Commission specifically declined to adopt a *per se* prohibition on withholding of RSNs because of data involving withholding of a single RSN in Charlotte which did not show a statistically significant effect on predicted market share. See *id.* at 770-71, ¶ 35 (citing *Adelphia Order*, 21 FCC Rcd at 8271, ¶ 149 and 8271-72, ¶ 151 (concluding that withholding of a terrestrially delivered RSN in Charlotte did not show a statistically significant effect on predicted market share, and noting that the RSN showed the games of the Charlotte Bobcats, a relatively new team that did not yet have a strong enough following to induce large numbers of subscribers to switch MVPDs)). Thus, despite the overwhelming evidence demonstrating the critical nature of RSNs to competition, the Commission recognized the possibility that the facts in certain cases may reveal that withholding of an RSN does not result in significant hindrance.

²⁶⁴ See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 53.

²⁶⁵ See *id.* at 14-15, 135; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 54-55; see also *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *17 (“Reviewing the Commission’s order, we think it clear that its rebuttable presumptions shift only the burden of production.”).

REDACTED VERSION

willingness of consumers to choose AT&T. Thus, we conclude that Defendants have failed to rebut the presumption that their withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T has the “effect” of “significantly hindering” AT&T.

(a) Survey Evidence

52. In the *2010 Order*, the Commission declined to adopt specific evidentiary requirements for assessing “significant hindrance,” stating instead that the evidence required will vary based on the facts and circumstances of each case.²⁶⁶ The Commission provided two illustrative examples of empirical evidence that litigants might consider providing in assessing “significant hindrance.”²⁶⁷ First, a litigant might provide an appropriately crafted regression analysis that estimates what the complainant’s market share in the MVPD market would be if it had access to the programming and how that compares to its actual market share.²⁶⁸ Second, a litigant might provide statistically reliable survey data indicating the likelihood that customers would choose not to subscribe to or switch to an MVPD that did not carry the withheld programming.²⁶⁹ The Commission explained that the reliability of the regression analysis, survey data, or other empirical data will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.²⁷⁰

53. In their effort to come forward with empirical evidence that would rebut the presumption, Defendants have elected not to rely on a regression analysis. Rather, Defendants rely on four consumer surveys purporting to demonstrate that MSG HD and MSG+ HD are not a significant factor to consumers in the state of Connecticut when choosing an MVPD. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the results of these surveys contradict the stated purpose of Defendants’ product differentiation strategy and, in any event, they suffer from significant flaws and deficiencies that render them unreliable for their intended purposes in this proceeding.²⁷¹

(i) The Results of Defendants’ Surveys Contradict Their Product Differentiation Strategy

54. As discussed above, Defendants’ stated reason for withholding MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T is to provide Cablevision with a way to differentiate its service from AT&T and thereby gain a competitive advantage.²⁷² Indeed, Defendants and their experts state that they expect at least some consumers in the state of Connecticut to refrain from choosing AT&T because it lacks MSG HD and MSG+ HD.²⁷³ Defendants’ surveys, however, purport to demonstrate that the availability of MSG HD

²⁶⁶ See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 785-86, ¶ 56.

²⁶⁷ See *id.*

²⁶⁸ See *id.*

²⁶⁹ See *id.*

²⁷⁰ See *id.*

²⁷¹ Because all four of these surveys contain significant flaws and deficiencies, and we do not know what other evidence Defendants chose not to present, we assign no significance to the fact that the four studies lead to convergent results. See Soman Decl. at ¶¶ 9, 19; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief*, Reply Declaration of Professor Dilip Soman (Jan. 24, 2011), at ¶ 3.

²⁷² See *supra* n.102 and ¶¶ 26-27.

²⁷³ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 5 (stating that withholding MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T “may result in making AT&T’s video offering less attractive to a subset of its potential customer base”); *Bulow/Owen Study* at 3 (“There is no doubt that AT&T would be better off, at least in the short run, if MSG HD and MSG+ HD were (continued....)”).

REDACTED VERSION

and MSG+ HD is not a factor for consumers in the state of Connecticut when choosing an MVPD. If consumers attach no significance to the availability of MSG HD and MSG+ HD, as Defendants' surveys purport to show, then it is hard to explain why Defendants stress the importance of that HD programming in their public statements and their advertising.²⁷⁴ Moreover, in that instance there appears to be no reason for Defendants to withhold these networks from AT&T. Instead, Defendants would benefit by licensing this content to AT&T and earning increased licensing fees and advertising revenues.²⁷⁵ Defendants do not attempt to explain the contradiction between the survey results and their real-world actions, which further supports our conclusion below that these surveys contain significant flaws and deficiencies that render them unreliable.

(ii) Defendants' Survey Evidence Is Not Reliable**(a) Defendants'/Radius Survey**

55. The *Defendants'/Radius Survey* entailed a telephone survey conducted in February/March 2010 of 503 adults who subscribe to a pay television provider or rely on over-the-air television reception; are decision-makers in their household for selecting a video provider; and live within the New York DMA where Cablevision and Verizon FiOS TV service areas overlap.²⁷⁶ The survey used

(Continued from previous page) _____
available to it at a regulated price.”); *id.* at 7 (“It is certainly true that Cablevision hopes to gain a marketing advantage amongst a group of local sports fans who will regard the availability of MSG HD and MSG+ HD as a selling point in Cablevision’s favor relative to AT&T.”); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 98-99 (stating that withholding MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T “may make AT&T’s video program offerings appear less attractive to some small segment of customers”); *see also supra* n.145 (**REDACTED**

D).

²⁷⁴ *See AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 22 (“Defendants would not emphasize this programming so heavily in their advertisements and statements to investment analysts if the programming were not extremely valuable to consumers in choosing between competing video providers.”).

²⁷⁵ Indeed, as noted above, Cablevision has stated in an SEC filing that MSG LP earns revenues from licensing fees and advertising sales. *See supra* n.103; *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 6 n.10 (quoting Cablevision Systems Corp., SEC Form 10-Q at 44 (July 30, 2009)) and at ¶ 62 (“Defendants’ own conduct – sacrificing the short-term benefits of licensing MSG and MSG Plus in the HD format to AT&T – is accordingly rational only if there is an anticompetitive effect on AT&T.”) (emphasis in original); *AT&T Reply* at 17 n.23 (“[T]here is no doubt that Cablevision/Madison Square Garden is sacrificing licensing and/or advertising or other revenues from refusing to license the HD format of MSG and MSG Plus to AT&T.”); *see also AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 34; *AT&T Reply* at 16, 22, 26; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 24 n.44, 30; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 21-22.

²⁷⁶ *See Defendants’/Radius Survey* at 1. This survey were originally submitted by Defendants in connection with a complaint filed by Verizon regarding Defendants’ withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from Verizon in the New York DMA and the Buffalo DMA. Defendants filed this survey in the AT&T proceeding initially in April 2010 and again in January 2011 as an exhibit to their post-discovery answer. *See Defendants’ April 2010 Supplement; Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 58-60, Exhibit I (attaching *Defendants’/Radius Survey*), and Declaration of Leslie Shifrin (Aug. 6, 2010), at ¶¶ 13-15 (“Shifrin Aug. 2010 Decl.”). Although the study probed adults living in the New York DMA where Cablevision and Verizon FiOS TV service areas overlap, Defendants state that it is reasonable to expect that the factors cited by household decision makers in Connecticut would not be dramatically different from the factors cited by household decision makers in the neighboring New York and New Jersey markets within the New York DMA where the study was conducted. *See Defendants’ April 2010 Supplement* at 3-4; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 58 n.231. The survey did not include residents from the Hartford/New Haven DMA.

REDACTED VERSION

open-ended, non-leading questions.²⁷⁷ Respondents could mention anything in response to the survey questions.²⁷⁸ When asked for their reasons for selecting, switching to, or staying with their current video service provider, [REDACTED

].²⁷⁹ Other factors were mentioned far more frequently: price (70 percent), general satisfaction (67 percent), and customer service/reliability (66 percent).²⁸⁰ The *Defendants' Radius Survey* concludes that MSG HD and MSG+ HD are not “top of mind” or meaningful factors and, in fact, are [REDACTED] for consumers when choosing a video provider.²⁸¹

56. We find this survey suffers from deficiencies that render it unreliable. Defendants’ own expert explains that an open-ended questioning technique has disadvantages, such as creating difficulties in properly documenting the results.²⁸² For example, to the extent that respondents stated they would not switch video providers because they were “generally satisfied,” one reason for their satisfaction with their current provider may be that they receive MSG HD and MSG+ HD. While the study indicates that exhaustive and non-directive probing was used to allow respondents to expand on their reasons for selecting, switching to, or staying with their current video service provider,²⁸³ Defendants provide only a broad outline and not the actual text of the questions and probing techniques used for the survey.²⁸⁴ This omission renders it impossible to assess whether the probing questions asked were biased or misleading and the nature and extent of the probing used to elicit responses. We also note, as Defendants’ own expert concedes, that the survey does not directly address the key issue of the impact of the lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD on the willingness of consumers to choose AT&T.²⁸⁵ While the *Defendants' Radius Survey* concludes that MSG HD and MSG+ HD are not “top of mind” considerations, this does not

²⁷⁷ See *Defendants' Radius Survey* at 2; Shifrin March 2010 Decl. at ¶ 6; Shifrin Aug. 2010 Decl. at ¶ 14; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 60.

²⁷⁸ See *Defendants' Radius Survey* at 2; Shifrin March 2010 Decl. at ¶ 6; Shifrin Aug. 2010 Decl. at ¶ 14; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 60. Defendants provided declarations from experts in survey and data analysis opining that the survey methodology was valid. See Bradlow Decl. at ¶ 18; Scott Decl. at ¶¶ 6(b), 13; Soman Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16.

²⁷⁹ [REDACTED

]. See *Defendants' Radius Survey* at 4.

²⁸⁰ See *id.*

²⁸¹ *Defendants' Radius Survey* at 4; see also *Defendants' April 2010 Supplement* at 2; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 66. Defendants provided declarations from experts in survey and data analysis opining that the results demonstrate that subscribers attach low importance to local sports in HD as a factor in their choice of video service provider. See Bradlow Decl. at ¶ 18; Scott Decl. at ¶¶ 6(b), 13; Soman Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16.

²⁸² See Scott Decl. at ¶ 13; see also *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief*, Declaration of Philip Johnson (Jan. 31, 2011), at ¶ 5 (“Johnson Reply Decl.”).

²⁸³ See Shifrin March 2010 Decl. at ¶ 6; Shifrin Aug. 2010 Decl. at ¶ 14; *Defendants' Radius Survey* at 2; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 60; Bradlow Decl. at ¶ 18; Soman Decl. at ¶ 16.

²⁸⁴ See *Defendants' Radius Survey* at 2-3 (“Other reasons – *Open/Ended (using non-directive probing)*”).

²⁸⁵ See Scott Decl. at ¶ 6(b) (“[T]his methodology does not address the question of whether or not consumers would switch subscription television providers in order to receive MSG HD or MSG+ HD”); see also *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 12 and Johnson Reply Decl. at ¶ 5.

REDACTED VERSION

necessarily mean that these networks are not significant to many consumers.²⁸⁶ It is possible, for example, that some respondents simply never thought of the possibility that they might lose MSG HD or MSG+ HD programming. That MSG HD or MSG+ HD was not one of the first things that came to the respondents' minds when attempting to recall their reasons for selecting, switching to, or staying with their current video service provider does not mean that these networks are irrelevant in their decision-making process.

(b) Defendants'/OTX Surveys

57. The *Defendants'/OTX Surveys*²⁸⁷ used a test versus control methodology.²⁸⁸ The respondents were non-AT&T U-verse TV customers who are decision makers in their household for selecting a video provider and who live in areas where Cablevision and AT&T U-verse TV service areas overlap.²⁸⁹ The Control Group of 153 respondents saw an offer for AT&T U-verse TV that had no reference to MSG HD or MSG+ HD, but did state, "You've never seen the game like this – includes all 9 NY sports teams" (the "No-HD Offer").²⁹⁰ The Test Group of 150 respondents saw an offer for AT&T U-verse TV that included a reference to MSG HD and MSG+ HD and stated, "Access to a robust offering of HD channels including MSG HD and MSG Plus HD" (the "HD Offer").²⁹¹ Based on these descriptions, the respondents were asked how likely they would be to consider switching or not switching

²⁸⁶ See Johnson Reply Decl. at ¶ 5 ("[T]he Radius Survey only asked broad, open-ended questions about their reasons for selecting or switching providers, but did not ask any specific 'drill down' questions about the differences in programming among the various providers. Without such information or knowledge, it is natural for respondents to spontaneously name price and customer service as their primary reasons for selecting or switching providers.").

²⁸⁷ In April 2010, Defendants submitted a March 2010 OTX survey in this proceeding that it had previously submitted in connection with a complaint filed by Verizon regarding Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from Verizon in the New York DMA and the Buffalo DMA. See *Defendants' April 2010 Supplement* (attaching *Defendants'/OTX March 2010 Survey*). The respondents to this survey were non-Verizon FiOS TV customers who are decision makers in their household for selecting a video provider and who live in areas where Cablevision and Verizon FiOS TV service areas overlap. See *Defendants'/OTX March 2010 Survey* at 2. Although the survey probed adults living in the New York DMA where Cablevision and Verizon FiOS TV service areas overlap and presented respondents with a Verizon channel line-up, Defendants state that there is no reason to expect that the response to the OTX survey from New York DMA consumers in Connecticut would vary materially from the results documented in the survey of New York DMA consumers in New York and New Jersey. See *Defendants' April 2010 Supplement* at 4. Defendants subsequently submitted a new OTX survey in January 2011 as an exhibit to their post-discovery answer. See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 60-61, Exhibit I (attaching "OTX Online Testing Exchange Assessing the Impact of AT&T Offering MSG HD/MSG+ HD on AT&T Customer Acquisition" (*Defendants'/OTX July 2010 Survey*)), Shifrin Aug. 2010 Decl. at ¶¶ 5-11. While the March 2010 OTX survey focused on Verizon's service area and channel line-up, the July 2010 OTX survey was conducted among consumers in Connecticut markets served by both Cablevision and AT&T and presented respondents with an AT&T channel line-up. See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 59 n.232; *Defendants'/OTX July 2010 Survey* at 1. Neither survey included residents from the Hartford/New Haven DMA.

²⁸⁸ See Shifrin Aug. 2010 Decl. at ¶ 6; *Defendants'/OTX July 2010 Survey* at 1; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 61; see also Shifrin March 2010 Decl. at ¶ 3; *Defendants'/OTX March 2010 Survey* at 1.

²⁸⁹ See *Defendants'/OTX July 2010 Survey* at 2.

²⁹⁰ See *id.* at 1 and Appendix at 4; see also Shifrin Aug. 2010 Decl. at ¶ 6; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 61.

²⁹¹ See *Defendants'/OTX July 2010 Survey* at 1 and Appendix at 1; see also Shifrin Aug. 2010 Decl. at ¶ 6; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 61.

REDACTED VERSION

to AT&T.²⁹² Based on the responses, the survey concludes that the number of consumers more likely to choose AT&T U-verse TV with MSG HD and MSG+ HD over AT&T U-verse TV without MSG HD and MSG+ HD is not statistically significant.²⁹³

58. We find that the *Defendants’/OTX Surveys* are flawed because there was no meaningful difference between the offers viewed by the Control Group and the Test Group. The No-HD Offer (used for the Control Group) did not make clear that MSG HD and MSG+ HD were not offered.²⁹⁴ For example, the statement “You’ve never seen the game like this – includes all 9 NY sports teams” appeared directly before the statement “Access to a robust offering of HD channels,” which likely misled some respondents to believe that the No-HD Offer included MSG HD and MSG+ HD.²⁹⁵ We do not find that the channel line-up provided with the offer was sufficient to mitigate this flaw.²⁹⁶ We find it unlikely that respondents viewing the No-HD Offer would scour a list of hundreds of channels to determine which channels were included, especially considering that the first page of the offer specifically emphasized the amount of sports and HD channels available, thereby implying that MSG HD and MSG+ HD were included. Moreover, as AT&T’s expert notes, the survey designers could have avoided this problem by using a “filter question” to determine whether respondents were aware of the absence of MSG HD and

²⁹² See *Defendants’/OTX July 2010 Survey* at 3; see also *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 61. Defendants provided declarations from experts in survey and data analysis opining that the survey methodology was valid. See Bradlow Decl. at ¶ 19; Scott Decl. at ¶¶ 6(c), 14-16; Soman Decl. at ¶ 17.

²⁹³ See Shifrin Aug. 2010 Decl. at ¶ 5; *Defendants’/OTX July 2010 Survey* at 3; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 60-61; see also Bradlow Decl. at ¶ 19; Scott Decl. at ¶¶ 6(c), 16; Soman Decl. at ¶ 17. The *Defendants’/OTX March 2010 Survey*, which focused on Verizon’s service area and channel line-up, used the same methodology and produced similar results. The respondents to the *Defendants’/OTX March 2010 Survey* were non-Verizon FiOS TV customers who are decision makers in their household for selecting a video provider and who live in areas where Cablevision and Verizon FiOS TV service areas overlap. See *Defendants’/OTX March 2010 Survey* at 2. The Control Group of 312 respondents saw an offer for Verizon FiOS TV that had no reference to MSG HD or MSG+ HD, but did reference that Verizon FiOS TV offers “tons of sports, including all 9 NY sports teams.” See *id.* at 1 and Appendix at 3; see also Shifrin March 2010 Decl. at ¶ 9. The Test Group of 317 respondents saw an offer for Verizon FiOS TV that included a reference to MSG HD and MSG+ HD and touted the availability of “all 9 NY sports teams in HD.” See *Defendants’/OTX March 2010 Survey* at 1 and Appendix at 1; see also Shifrin March 2010 Decl. at ¶ 9. Based on these descriptions, the respondents were asked how likely they would be to consider switching or not switching to Verizon. See *Defendants’/OTX March 2010 Survey* at 2. Based on the responses, the survey concludes that the number of consumers more likely to choose Verizon FiOS TV with MSG HD and MSG+ HD over Verizon FiOS TV without MSG HD and MSG+ HD is not statistically significant. See Shifrin March 2010 Decl. at ¶ 8; *Defendants’/OTX March 2010 Survey* at 3.

²⁹⁴ See *Defendants’/OTX July 2010 Survey*, Appendix at 4; *Defendants’/OTX March 2010 Survey*, Appendix at 3; see also *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 2, 12-13 and Johnson Reply Decl. at ¶ 7 (“[B]ecause the survey stimuli were so dense, it is likely that survey participants failed to notice the presence/absence of HD programming of local sports programming in the stimuli.”).

²⁹⁵ *Defendants’/OTX July 2010 Survey*, Appendix at 4. Similarly, in the *Defendants’/OTX March 2010 Survey*, the reference to “tons of sports, including all 9 NY sports teams” appeared directly after a reference to “[m]ore than 335 all-digital channels, and over 70 in HD,” which likely misled some respondents to believe that the No-HD Offer included MSG HD and MSG+ HD. *Defendants’/OTX March 2010 Survey*, Appendix at 3; see also *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 13 and Johnson Reply Decl. at ¶ 7 (“With this juxtaposition, control survey participants who did notice these statements might have inferred HD programming of NY sports teams.”).

²⁹⁶ See *Defendants’/OTX July 2010 Survey*, Appendix at 5-6; see also *Defendants’/OTX March 2010 Survey*, Appendix at 4.

REDACTED VERSION

MSG+ HD from the No-HD Offer.²⁹⁷ The fact that the No-HD Offer mirrors AT&T's real-world advertisements, which do not emphasize its lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD, does not alter our conclusion.²⁹⁸ We would not expect AT&T to emphasize in an advertisement those networks that it cannot offer. The purpose of the study, however, was not to assess AT&T's advertisements but instead to determine specifically whether respondents were more likely to choose AT&T U-verse TV with MSG HD and MSG+ HD than without these networks.²⁹⁹ Thus, providing respondents viewing the No-HD Offer with an adequate indication that MSG HD and MSG+ HD were not available was critical to the reliability of the study.³⁰⁰ Given the misleading nature of the No HD Offer, however, it is entirely possible that some respondents assumed or concluded that MSG HD and MSG+ HD were available, thereby undermining the survey results.³⁰¹ Accordingly, we find the failure of the No-HD Offer to adequately indicate to respondents that MSG HD and MSG+ HD were not available – or at least to avoid implying that these channels were available – renders the *Defendants' OTX Surveys* unreliable.

59. We nevertheless note for future guidance that the *Defendants' OTX Surveys* present a useful survey design for attempting to address the issue of whether withholding programming results in “significant hindrance.” The surveys appropriately sought to isolate the key variable at issue in this case – the impact of the lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD on the willingness of consumers to choose AT&T. Absent the failure to adequately indicate to respondents viewing the No-HD Offer that MSG HD and MSG+ HD were not available, we would have proceeded to assess the results of the survey to determine whether Defendants had rebutted the presumption of “significant hindrance.”

(c) Defendants' Win-Back Survey

60. The *Defendants' Win-Back Survey* was an online survey conducted in November 2010 of 61 customers who accepted a Cablevision “win back” offer and switched from AT&T to Cablevision between November 2009 and October 2010.³⁰² The survey asked the following open-ended, non-leading questions, to which respondents could answer with any reasons of their choosing:³⁰³

“(1) Why did you decide to leave AT&T U-verse TV service and subscribe to iO TV? Please be as specific as possible and tell us all the reasons that may have influenced your decision to leave AT&T

²⁹⁷ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 13 and Johnson Reply Decl. at ¶ 7.

²⁹⁸ See Shifrin Aug. 2010 Decl. at ¶¶ 10-11; see also Shifrin March 2010 Decl. at ¶¶ 13-14; Bradlow Decl. at ¶ 19; Scott Decl. at ¶ 16; Soman Decl. at ¶ 17.

²⁹⁹ To the extent AT&T's advertisements (as depicted in the No-HD Offer) lead real-world consumers to believe that AT&T offers MSG HD and MSG+ HD, such advertisements may entice consumers to consider switching to AT&T, but we find it unlikely that consumers choose a video provider based solely on an advertisement. Rather, we believe it likely that most consumers compare the offerings of different video providers and ensure that the video service provider they select has the channels and features they desire before switching to that provider. See Johnson Reply Decl. at ¶ 8. Thus, in order to determine whether respondents would be more likely to choose AT&T U-verse TV if it had MSG HD and MSG+ HD than if it did not, it was critical to provide respondents viewing the No-HD Offer with an adequate indication that MSG HD and MSG+ HD were not available.

³⁰⁰ To be sure, overemphasizing the lack of a network may bias the study. The *Defendants' OTX Surveys*, however, took this to an extreme by obscuring the absence of MSG HD and MSG+ HD in the No-HD Offer and even implying that the networks were offered.

³⁰¹ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 2, 12-13 and Johnson Reply Decl. at ¶ 7.

³⁰² See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 62 n.248 and Exhibit J at 1.

³⁰³ See *id.*

REDACTED VERSION

U-verse TV service and choose iO TV service; and (2) What was the one main reason for your decision to leave AT&T U-verse TV service and choose iO TV service?"³⁰⁴

[REDACTED]

³⁰⁵

[REDACTED].³⁰⁶ Defendants contend that this demonstrates that absence of MSG HD and MSG+ HD does not significantly hinder AT&T.³⁰⁷

61. We find this survey suffers from flaws and deficiencies that render it unreliable as support for Defendants' positions. The study suffers from selection bias because the sample is made up of customers who (i) initially selected AT&T, thereby indicating that lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD was not a significant factor to them, and (ii) find price to be an important consideration, as demonstrated by their decision to accept a discounted offering to switch back to Cablevision.³⁰⁸ The sample is skewed towards individuals who would not be expected to value MSG HD and MSG+ HD highly (given their initial selection of AT&T) and who consider price a decisive factor (given their acceptance of the discounted offer). Moreover, the survey was conducted online and there is no indication of any probing performed to allow respondents to expand on their reasons for switching.³⁰⁹ Third, for the same reasons discussed above regarding the *Defendants' Radius Survey*, the *Defendants' Win-Back Survey* suffers from the following deficiencies: (i) the open-ended questioning technique creates difficulties in properly documenting the results; and (ii) the survey does not directly address the key issue of the impact of the lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD on the willingness of consumers to choose AT&T.³¹⁰ Fourth, the survey involved only 61 respondents, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].³¹¹

(b) Non-Survey Evidence

62. We also find that the non-survey evidence put forth by Defendants does not – individually or collectively – rebut the presumption of “significant hindrance.” First, Defendants provide evidence purporting to demonstrate AT&T’s general success in the state of Connecticut despite the lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD.³¹² This evidence includes the following: (i) the allegedly robust level of

³⁰⁴ *Id.*

³⁰⁵ *See id.* at 62 and Exhibit J.

³⁰⁶ *See id.*, Exhibit J.

³⁰⁷ *See id.* at 62. Defendants’ experts offered no opinions regarding the *Defendants’ Win-Back Survey*

³⁰⁸ *See AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 2, 13-14 and Johnson Reply Decl. at ¶ 9.

³⁰⁹ *See Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 62 n.248 and Exhibit J at 1.

³¹⁰ *See supra* ¶ 56.

³¹¹ Johnson Reply Decl. at ¶ 9; *see AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 2, 13.

³¹² Defendants also provide evidence regarding AT&T’s investment in its video-capable network throughout the nation, its enterprise value, its status as the ninth-largest MVPD in terms of subscribers nationwide, and AT&T’s statements regarding the overall success of AT&T U-verse TV on a nationwide basis. *See Defendants’ Post-* (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION

competition in the state of Connecticut;³¹³ (ii) statements AT&T has made regarding its success,³¹⁴ (iii) AT&T's decision to raise its rates;³¹⁵ (iv) **[REDACTED]**

316

];³¹⁷ (v) AT&T's decision to continue to invest in and expand U-verse penetration in the state of Connecticut;³¹⁸ (vi) **[REDACTED]**

];³¹⁹ and (vii) the fact

(Continued from previous page) _____

Discovery Answer to Supplement at 3, 29-35, 39, 86-87, 103-104; *see also Defendants' Answer* at 16 (¶ 10), 53. This pertains to nationwide data and not the pertinent issue of the impact of Defendants' withholding on the willingness of consumers to choose AT&T in the state of Connecticut.

³¹³ *See Defendants' Answer* at 15-16 (¶ 9), 38-39, 80, 128-29; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 48-49, 101. Defendants' claim of robust competition is belied by the fact that incumbent cable market share in the New York DMA and Hartford/New Haven DMA far exceeds the national average and that Cablevision has raised its rates in excess of inflation despite the number of competitors in the market. *See infra* n.324; *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 763, ¶ 27 n.97 (citing Nielsen data indicating that the share of MVPD subscribers held by "wired cable operators" in the New York DMA was 88.5 percent as of July 2009, while other data indicated that the market share held by cable operators nationwide was approximately 63.5 percent); *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 49 n.187 (stating that Cablevision's 2010 rate increases averaged about 3 percent); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, *Consumer Price Index – December 2010*, at 1 (stating that during 2010, the Consumer Price Index increased by 1.5 percent for all items and by 0.8 percent for all items less food and energy). Cablevision does not contend that increases in costs, such as programming costs, are primarily responsible for its rate increases. While Defendants state that the portions of Connecticut where AT&T and Cablevision compete are subject to "effective competition," the Commission has explained that the statutory "effective competition" test serves a limited and defined purpose and is not relevant in assessing "significant hindrance." *See 2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 763, ¶ 27 n.97; *see also Defendants' Answer* at 15-16 (¶ 9), 39, 80; *AT&T Reply* at 31.

³¹⁴ *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 4, 29-32 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 6-8; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 2, 9, 12-13, 33 and Highly Confidential Reply Appendix, Tabs 11-12; *see also Bradlow Decl.* at ¶ 20; *Soman Decl.* at ¶ 18.

³¹⁵ *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 49, 86 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tab 26, 59; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 12, 38 and Highly Confidential Reply Appendix, Tabs 25-26.

³¹⁶ *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 31-32, 39 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 5, 19; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 12.

³¹⁷ *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 39-40 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tab 20.

³¹⁸ *See Defendants' Answer* at 17 (¶ 11), 56, 68; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 4, 29, 33, 47-48, 104 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 25-26; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 9, 45 and Highly Confidential Reply Appendix, Tabs 19, 25, 45-46.

³¹⁹ *See Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 17, 31-32, 36-38 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 5, 7, 11-18; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 12, 33, and Highly Confidential Reply Appendix, Tabs 12, 35; *see also Bulow/Owen Study* at 9-11; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement*, Highly Confidential Appendix, Tab 17 **[REDACTED]**

(continued...)

REDACTED VERSION

that AT&T's subscriber count has increased,³²⁰ [REDACTED

³²¹
,

].³²² Defendants' evidence purporting to demonstrate AT&T's general success is contradicted by other evidence in the record indicating that [REDACTED

.³²³
,

(Continued from previous page) _____

] See *infra* n.346; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 3-4, 26-28; York Decl. at ¶¶ 6-7.

³²⁰ See *Defendants' Answer* at 6, 16; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 6, 29-30, 34-35 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tab 17; Levine Jan. 2011 Decl. at ¶ 4. We note that AT&T entered the video market in Connecticut approximately five years ago with zero video customers. See *supra* n.185. We do not find it dispositive that AT&T, as the new entrant in the video market, would experience an increase in subscribership [REDACTED

].

³²¹ See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 6, 34-35, and Exhibit G; Levine Jan. 2011 Decl. at ¶ 4.

³²² See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 35-36; Levine Jan. 2011 Decl. at ¶ 4; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 4. [REDACTED

].

³²³ See York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶ 9 (stating that AT&T launched its U-verse TV service in Connecticut in 2006); *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 27 ([REDACTED

REDACTED VERSION,324
,

J.³²⁵ In any event, we find that Defendants' evidence, standing alone, fails to rebut the presumption of "significant hindrance" because it fails to isolate how the absence of MSG HD and MSG+ HD has impacted AT&T's ability to provide a competing video service. As discussed above, the relevant inquiry in assessing "significant hindrance" is whether an MVPD has been hindered relative to its competitors and whether the hindrance is substantial enough to eliminate the MVPD as a competitive choice for a meaningful number of consumers.³²⁶ Defendants' evidence purporting to demonstrate AT&T's general success in the state of Connecticut fails to isolate the impact of the lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD on the willingness of consumers to choose AT&T.³²⁷ We note that a complainant attempting to establish that an "unfair act" has resulted in "significant hindrance" could not simply rely on evidence that its service is generally performing poorly. Rather, the complainant would need to provide evidence explaining how the "unfair act" has contributed to such performance. Likewise, in coming forward with evidence to rebut the presumption here, Defendants cannot simply rely on what they perceive to be AT&T's general success in the affected

³²⁴ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 26 ("AT&T still has a relatively small share of the video marketplace, and is dwarfed by Cablevision in the areas where the two companies compete head-to-head."); see *supra* n.323. Nielsen data indicate that, as of November 2010, the share of multichannel video subscribers held by "wired cable operators" was 87.4 percent in the New York DMA and 86.1 percent in the Hartford/New Haven DMA. See ADS and Wired-Cable Penetration by DMA: DMA Household Universe (November 2010) http://www.tvb.org/planning_buying/184839/4729/72555. [REDACTED]

] Thus, while the D.C. Circuit has stated that evidence of robust competition in a market would provide "powerful evidence that [] terrestrial programming withholding has no significant impact on the delivery of satellite programming," the record here contains no such evidence. *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *15.

³²⁵ [REDACTED]

] See *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief*, Exhibit 5; see also *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 4, 27; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 42 n.153 (citing data as of January 2010).

³²⁶ See *supra* ¶¶ 44-45.

³²⁷ See *AT&T Reply* at 25 ("[A]ny success of AT&T with respect to overall penetration in Connecticut does not remotely suggest that Cablevision's conduct has not hindered or prevented AT&T from winning or keeping subscribers. The key point is that there is a significant number of sports fans for whom RSN programming is a priority, who are a driving force behind the demand for HD content, and for whom the must-have format of must-have RSN programming is critical."); *Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl.* at ¶ 8.

REDACTED VERSION

markets without isolating the impact of the key variable here – the presence or absence of MSG HD and MSG+ HD.³²⁸

63. Second, Defendants claim that MSG HD has lower ratings than many well-known SD channels, thereby undermining the claim that lack of these networks has a significant impact on AT&T.³²⁹ Despite what they claim to be low ratings, however, Defendants continue to emphasize MSG HD and MSG+ HD in advertisements and continue to withhold this programming from AT&T.³³⁰ As with the survey results noted above, if Defendants believe that the ratings data mean that subscribers do not significantly value MSG HD and MSG+ HD, then Defendants have little to gain from advertising the availability of these networks and no reason to withhold these networks from AT&T and to forgo substantial licensing fees and advertising revenues in the process. Defendants do not attempt to explain this contradiction. Moreover, while the Commission has recognized the importance of ratings in assessing the value of programming to viewers, it has also recognized that ratings “are not a perfect

³²⁸ While Defendants have attempted to provide such evidence with their surveys, we find that evidence flawed and deficient for the reasons discussed above. See *supra* ¶¶ 52-61.

³²⁹ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 45-46; Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶ 14; *Bulow/Owen Study* at 6-7; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 40-41; Levine Jan. 2011 Decl. at ¶ 5 (stating that MSG HD and MSG+ HD have lower ratings than SD networks such as A&E, ABC, Bravo, CBS, CNN, ESPN, Food Network, Fox, Hallmark, HGTV, Lifetime, MSG, MSG+, NBC, SNY, TNT, USA, and YES); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 19-20. Defendants note that AT&T dropped three of these networks (Food Network, HGTV, and Hallmark) as a result of carriage disputes, which Defendants argue belies the characterization of the lower rated MSG HD and MSG+ HD networks as “must have.” *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 41. As an initial matter, we note that AT&T subsequently reinstated carriage of two of these networks. See *AT&T U-verse Resolves Contract Dispute with Scripps Networks*, Kansas City Business Journal, Nov. 8, 2010, available at <http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2010/11/08/att-u-verse-resolves-contract-dispute.html>. In any event, Defendants provide no evidence of the circumstances that led to these carriage disputes, which may have resulted from a disagreement among the parties as to business terms, rather than AT&T’s lack of interest in carrying these networks. **[REDACTED]**

] The key distinction, however, is that the NFL Network is a non-cable-affiliated network that has every incentive to license its programming to other MVPDs in order to maximize licensing fees and advertising revenues. See *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 17-18; York Decl. at ¶ 3. In fact, the NFL Network has sought binding arbitration in order to reach a carriage agreement with Cablevision. See *NFL Network Asks Cablevision for Binding Arbitration on Carriage Agreement*, available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-10-25/nfl-network-asks-cablevision-for-mandatory-arbitration-on-carrying-channel.html>. Thus, while Cablevision can license the NFL Network should it choose to do so, AT&T has been unable to license MSG HD and MSG+ HD under any circumstances.

³³⁰ See *supra* n.102 and ¶¶ 26-27. Defendants note that Charter, Cox, and DISH do not carry MSG HD and MSG+ HD in Connecticut and contend that this belies any suggestion that MSG HD and MSG+ HD are “must have” networks. See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 44; Levine Jan. 2011 Decl. at ¶ 7. The record here, however, contains no evidence of the circumstances that led to the MVPDs’ decisions to refrain from carrying MSG HD and MSG+ HD in Connecticut. See *supra* n.235 (noting that an MVPD’s decision to refrain from carrying an RSN may be driven by the high cost of an RSN or an RSN’s demand for unreasonable terms, and that the fact of non-carriage may suggest that the RSN views itself as providing indispensable, “must have” programming); see *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 31.

REDACTED VERSION

predictor of consumer response to the withholding of a network.³³¹ Ratings do not purport to measure the intensity of some consumers' desire to view a network.³³² While a network may have low ratings, it may also have no good substitutes, thus prompting those subscribers who value the network to refrain from subscribing to a video provider that does not carry the network. The Commission has recognized that RSNs such as MSG HD and MSG+ HD are examples of networks that have "no good substitutes," explaining that RSNs "typically purchase exclusive rights to show sporting events and sports fans believe that there is no good substitute for watching their local and/or favorite team play an important game."³³³ Thus, allegedly low ratings notwithstanding, those subscribers who value MSG HD and MSG+ HD are likely reluctant to switch to an MVPD that does not offer these networks.³³⁴ In addition, ratings for HD

³³¹ 2007 Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 17817-18, ¶ 39.

³³² See *AT&T Reply* at 21; Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl. at ¶ 12; *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 4, 30.

³³³ *News/Hughes Order*, 19 FCC Rcd at 535, ¶ 133; see also *supra* n.235. Defendants argue that the Commission in a Technical Appendix to the Comcast/NBCU merger approval decision found that there is some substitutability between RSNs and local broadcast stations. See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 18-19 (citing *Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc.*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 4238, Appendix B, 4398-99, ¶¶ 53-55 (2011) ("If [an RSN and a local broadcast station] are at least partial substitutes from the perspective of MVPDs, then the joint venture will be able to obtain a higher price for the two programming assets due to the unavailability of this substitute programming if the two sides fail to reach an agreement. . . . The results generally support the conclusion that joint ownership of these two types of programming assets in the same region allowed the joint venture to charge a higher price for the RSN relative to what would be observed if the RSN and the local broadcast affiliate were separately owned.") ("*Comcast/NBCU Order*"). Defendants claim this undercuts the Commission's previous conclusion that RSNs have no close substitutes and would require the Commission to acknowledge a greater degree of substitutability between MSG/MSG+ SD and MSG/MSG+ HD. See *id.* We disagree. The Commission's analysis of this issue in the *Comcast/NBCU Order* was limited to a study of Fox RSNs and Fox broadcast stations in selected markets. The analysis does not reach any conclusions regarding the substitutability of MSG/MSG+ for local broadcast stations in the New York DMA and Hartford/New Haven DMA. Moreover, the analysis does not assess the substitutability of HD and SD networks. Defendants have also failed to put forth any analysis of the substitutability between MSG/MSG+ and local broadcast stations in these DMAs or between MSG/MSG+ SD and MSG/MSG+ HD. We also note that Defendants have specifically acknowledged in a complaint filed with a federal district court that "[c]lose substitutes do not exist" for sports programming and that watching a particular sporting event "is not reasonably interchangeable with watching . . . other sports or other leisure activities." See *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 14 (quoting *Complaint, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. National Hockey League*, No. 07-CIV-8455 (S.D.N.Y.) (Sept. 28, 2007)).

³³⁴ [REDACTED]

| See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 80-82 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 52-56; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 35-36 and Highly Confidential Reply Appendix, Tabs 15-17. Current AT&T U-verse subscribers have chosen AT&T despite its lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD, thus indicating that the absence of these networks was not a critical factor in their choice of video provider. Thus, information pertaining to the viewing preferences of AT&T's current subscribers does not demonstrate that potential subscribers interested in MSG HD and MSG+ HD would switch to AT&T notwithstanding its lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD. See *Defendants' Answer* at 49; *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 17 (acknowledging that HD penetration rates indicate only "preferences of consumers that have already decided to become U-verse subscribers").

REDACTED VERSION

networks are currently understated because not all households have HDTVs.³³⁵ As the Commission recognized in the *2010 Order*, however, HD is growing in importance to consumers.³³⁶ While the ratings for MSG HD and MSG+ HD may appear low at present, [REDACTED

].³³⁷ In light of the growing significance of HD, we can expect ratings for the HD versions to continue to rise as more households obtain HDTV sets and subscribe to HD service offerings.³³⁹

64. Third, [REDACTED

340

341

342

].³⁴³ Defendants, however, have

³³⁵ See *supra* nn.241-42 (discussing percentage of households with HDTVs); *AT&T Reply* at 21; Thun/Lauricella/Rawls Reply Decl. at ¶ 10.

³³⁶ See *supra* ¶ 4.

³³⁷ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 29.

³³⁸ See *supra* n.238.

³³⁹ See *supra* ¶ 49.

³⁴⁰ See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 19-20 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 3-4; [REDACTED

]. In any event, current AT&T subscribers have chosen AT&T despite its lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD, thus indicating that the absence of these networks was not a critical factor in their choice of video provider. See *supra* n.334 (explaining that the preferences of AT&T's current subscribers do not demonstrate that potential subscribers interested in MSG HD and MSG+ HD would switch to AT&T notwithstanding its lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD); *Defendants' Answer* at 49 ("HD subscribership figures only provide a data point regarding the service level preferences of consumers that have already decided to become U-verse subscribers."); *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 17.

³⁴¹ See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 19-20 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 3, 4A.

³⁴² See *id.* at 18, 51-52.

³⁴³ See *id.* at 18 (stating that there are a "myriad of possible alternative explanations [that] remain entirely unexplored" for AT&T's HD penetration rate in Connecticut) and 51-52; *Bulow/Owen Study* at 9 (stating that "many factors may affect HD penetration rates, including, for example, pricing, characteristics of the service, marketing effort, demographics, and competitive alternatives"); see also *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 27 n.65 ("A multiple regression analysis can control for multiple potential explanatory variables in order to assess the causal relationship (or lack thereof) between those variables and the subject being tested.").

REDACTED VERSION

made no attempt to isolate the impact on AT&T's market penetration of the key factor at issue in this case – the presence or absence of MSG HD and MSG+ HD.³⁴⁴ Defendants have stated that “regression analyses represent the Commission’s preferred means of assessing the impact of the lack of access to RSN programming,” yet Defendants have made no attempt to present such an analysis here using these market penetration data and other data obtained during the course of discovery.³⁴⁵ To the extent a party relies on market share or penetration data in assessing “significant hindrance,” a regression analysis is critical to isolate the impact of the variable at issue and to provide meaning to raw market share or penetration figures.³⁴⁶ Accordingly, we find that these data standing alone do not specifically address the key issue of how the absence of MSG HD and MSG+ HD has impacted AT&T's ability to provide a competing video service.

65. Fourth, noting that AT&T bundles video with voice, data, and wireless service, Defendants argue that this increases the number of variables a consumer considers in choosing a provider and diminishes the relevance of any single variable, such as the availability of an HD RSN.³⁴⁷ We find this argument unavailing. There is no empirical data in the record to support the claim that bundling of video, voice, data, and wireless service shrinks the importance of HD RSNs to consumers in selecting a video provider. In fact, Defendants’ decision to emphasize the availability of MSG HD and MSG+ HD in its advertising indicates Defendants’ view that this programming is significant to consumers despite bundling.³⁴⁸

66. Fifth, Defendants argue that AT&T's claim that it is “significantly hindered” without MSG HD and MSG+ HD is belied by the fact that AT&T offers a large amount of sports and HD programming and has touted the availability of this programming in its advertising and other statements.³⁴⁹ The Commission has rejected this same argument previously.³⁵⁰ As Defendants have

³⁴⁴ Indeed, in response to data provided by AT&T comparing its penetration rate for HD service in Connecticut to its penetration rate for HD service in other areas that AT&T serves, Defendants stated that “[m]ere comparison of AT&T’s HD penetration rate in Connecticut with average HD penetration in other areas served by AT&T ‘does not actually test the effect of MSG HD and MSG+ HD exclusion.’” *Defendants’ Answer* at 50 (quoting *Bulow/Owen Study* at 9); *Defendants’ April 9th Letter* at 9 (“AT&T made no effort to offer a meaningful regression analysis that might demonstrate material differences in its penetration levels in Connecticut relative to other markets, taking into account other relevant factors that might explain such differences, arguably attributable to its lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD.”); *see also AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 27.

³⁴⁵ *Defendants’ April 9th Letter* at 9.

³⁴⁶ **REDACTED**

³⁴⁷ **REDACTED**] raw penetration numbers are not dispositive absent a regression analysis isolating the magnitude of the impact of the lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD. **REDACTED**

1.

³⁴⁷ *See Defendants’ Answer* at 53-54; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 67-72, 87-88 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 2, 23, 74-76; *Owen Study*; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 13-14.

³⁴⁸ *See supra* ¶ 26; *see also AT&T Reply* at 22; *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 20-22.

³⁴⁹ *See Defendants’ Answer* at 17-18 (¶ 11), 42-43, 53, and Exhibit 5 (AT&T advertisements emphasizing its HD offerings); *Defendants’ April 9th Letter* at 8; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 4-5, 21, 32-33, (continued....)

REDACTED VERSION

argued, the salient issue here is not the amount of sports or HD programming AT&T offers in general; rather, the key issue is whether AT&T has been “significantly hindered” without MSG HD or MSG+ HD.³⁵¹ The availability of other sports programming or other HD programming does not address the key issue of how the absence of MSG HD and MSG+ HD has impacted AT&T’s ability to provide a competing video service.

67. Sixth, Defendants provide evidence that **[REDACTED]**

[REDACTED]³⁵² and that AT&T does well in customer satisfaction despite its lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD.³⁵³ Both of these factors are germane to the issue of whether current AT&T subscribers are satisfied with AT&T’s service, not whether potential subscribers, whom AT&T’s business plan requires to be potentially available to be won-over,³⁵⁴ would be unwilling to switch to AT&T given its lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD. Current AT&T subscribers have chosen AT&T despite its lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD, thus indicating that the absence of these networks was not a critical factor in their choice of video provider.³⁵⁵

68. Seventh, Defendants argue that **[REDACTED]**

(Continued from previous page) _____

49-51, Exhibit C (providing AT&T’s advertising and statements emphasizing its sports and HD offerings), and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tab 10; Bradlow Decl. at ¶¶ 12-13; Soman Decl. at ¶¶ 12-13; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 20, 33 and Highly Confidential Reply Appendix, Tabs 3-6.

³⁵⁰ See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 770, ¶ 34 (“The salient point for purposes of Section 628(b) is not the total number of programming networks available or the percentage of these networks that are vertically integrated with cable operators, but rather the popularity of the particular programming that is withheld and how the inability of competitive MVPDs to access that programming in a particular local market may impact their ability to provide a commercially attractive MVPD service.”) (citing *2007 Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 12140, ¶ 38); see also *Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 – Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution: Section 628(c)(5) of the Communications Act: Sunset of Exclusive Contract Prohibition*, Report and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 12124, 12139, ¶ 33 (2002) (“*2002 Order*”) (“cable programming – be it news, drama, sports, music, or children’s programming – is not akin to so many widgets”).

³⁵¹ See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 20-21 (“The instant proceeding is not about whether HD is important to consumers or whether sports fans in general prefer HD. It is about whether the absence of MSG HD/MSG+ HD from the U-verse TV lineup significantly hinders AT&T from delivering satellite cable programming.”).

³⁵² See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 31-33, 37 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 5, 7, 9, 13-16; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 12, 33 and Highly Confidential Reply Appendix, Tab 12.

³⁵³ See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 32 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tab 5; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 33-34 and Highly Confidential Reply Appendix, Tab 13.

³⁵⁴ See *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 29 (“access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD is essential to a significant subset of consumers, and [] AT&T has no way to meet that demand”); *id.* at 30 (“Devoted sports fans with HDTVs are unlikely to switch to a competing provider that does not carry their favorite team’s games in HD.”); see also *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 61 (stating that the inability to offer MSG HD and MSG+ HD impairs AT&T’s ability to attract new subscribers).

³⁵⁵ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 49; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 17 (acknowledging that HD penetration rates indicate only “preferences of consumers that have already decided to become U-verse subscribers”).

REDACTED VERSION

AT&T has its own differentiating features, and could create additional features, that distinguish its video service from that of Cablevision.³⁵⁷ We find this unavailing. The salient issue here is the significance of one particular factor – AT&T’s inability to offer MSG HD and MSG+ HD. That there are other factors that may impact AT&T’s performance even more does not mean that access to MSG HD and MSG+ HD is unnecessary for AT&T to compete effectively. In addition, unlike these other differentiating factors, RSNs are non-replicable and have no close substitutes, thus eliminating AT&T’s ability to match its competitors’ offering of MSG HD and MSG+ HD.³⁵⁸

(c) Conclusion

69. In the *2010 Order*, the Commission established a rebuttable presumption that Defendants’ withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T has the “effect” of “significantly hindering” AT&T from providing a competing video service, including “satellite cable programming and satellite broadcast programming,” to subscribers and consumers in the state of Connecticut. AT&T has submitted evidence buttressing the application of that presumption here. Defendants were required to come forward with evidence that rebuts or meets the presumption and AT&T’s evidence. Defendants have put forth two types of evidence: survey evidence and non-survey evidence. With respect to the survey

³⁵⁶ See *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 5-6, 18-19, 51-52, 73-80, and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 2, 9, 13, 34-51 (**REDACTED**

); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 34 (same); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 83-86 and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 2, 7, 9, 11, 25-26, 35, 43, 57, 59, 60-69 (**REDACTED**

); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 36-45 and Highly Confidential Reply Appendix, Tabs 12-13, 18-42 (same); see also *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 25-26 and Exhibits 7-12 (**REDACTED**

); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 23-24 and Exhibit E (noting Cablevision’s advertisements emphasizing its unique features); *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 30, 38, 47.

³⁵⁷ See *Defendants’ Answer* at 17-18 (¶ 11), 53-56; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 25-26. Defendants note that AT&T features a “Total Home DVR” offering, offers special tie-ins with iPhone service arrangements, **REDACTED**

]. See *Defendants’ Answer* at 17-18 (¶ 11), 53-54, and Exhibit 5; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 25-26, 32, 87-91, Exhibit C (noting AT&T’s advertisements emphasizing its unique features, such as its DVR), and Highly Confidential Appendix, Tabs 2, 5, 9, 23, 26, 33, 70-78; *Defendants’ Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 13, 30-32, 34 and Highly Confidential Reply Appendix, Tabs 1, 8-9, 14.

³⁵⁸ See *supra* ¶ 30; see also *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 3 (“A competitor may cut prices, run promotions, improve customer service, or add new features to its video offering, but no amount of effort or investment will allow a competing provider to offer home-team regional sports programming that has been locked up by an incumbent cable operator.”), at 15-16 (“Cablevision could develop an improved DVR technology of its own. But no amount of investment or effort would allow AT&T to purchase or produce the home-team sports games that are shown on MSG HD and MSG+ HD.”), at 19.

REDACTED VERSION

evidence, we conclude above that the results of these surveys contradict the stated purpose of Defendants' product differentiation strategy and, in any event, the surveys themselves contain material flaws and deficiencies that render them unreliable. With respect to the non-survey evidence, we conclude that this evidence fails to isolate the impact of the lack of MSG HD and MSG+ HD on the willingness of consumers to choose AT&T. Because the evidence here fails to rebut the presumption as supplemented by AT&T's evidence, we conclude that Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T has the "effect" of "significantly hindering" AT&T.³⁵⁹

3. Remedy

70. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Defendants have violated Section 628(b) of the Act and Section 76.1001(a) of the Commission's rules based on (i) their "unfair act" of withholding MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T; and (ii) our finding that this "unfair act" has the "effect" of "significantly hindering" AT&T from providing a competing video service, including "satellite cable programming and satellite broadcast programming," to subscribers and consumers in the state of Connecticut. The Commission's rules provide for broad remedies for violation of the program access rules, including "the establishment of prices, terms, and conditions for the sale of programming to the aggrieved [MVPD]."³⁶⁰ We establish the following remedies for Defendants' violation of our rules.³⁶¹

71. First, we require MSG LP to enter into an agreement to license the MSG HD and MSG+ HD networks to AT&T on non-discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions within 30 days of the release of this *Order*. We believe that 30 days will provide a sufficient time for MSG LP and AT&T to reach an agreement on the terms of carriage while ensuring that AT&T receives prompt access to the programming. In addition, in light of Defendants' steadfast withholding of this programming from AT&T over the past several years, we are concerned that Defendants may use the negotiating process to further delay AT&T's access to this programming by insisting that AT&T accept discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions. To address this concern, we emphasize that MSG LP must offer to license MSG

³⁵⁹ We note that AT&T has submitted survey evidence in the record to demonstrate that Defendants' withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD has "significantly hindered" AT&T. *See supra* n.239 (discussing *Verizon/GMRS Survey*); *AT&T Post-Discovery Opening Brief* at 18-19 and Exhibit 5 (Leo J. Shapiro & Associates LLC, *AT&T Connecticut v. Madison Square Garden, L.P. and Cablevision Systems Corp.: A Study of Consumer Perception* (Nov. 2010)); *see also Defendants' Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 4, 22-29, Reply Declaration of Professor Eric T. Bradlow (Jan. 27, 2011), Reply Declaration of Professor Carol A. Scott (Jan. 29, 2011), Reply Declaration of Leslie Shifrin (Jan. 25, 2011), Reply Declaration of Professor Dilip Soman (Jan. 24, 2011). Other than our reliance on certain aspects of the *Verizon/GMRS Survey* to provide further support for the rebuttable presumption of "significant hindrance" for HD RSNs (*see supra* nn.239, 242), we need not consider this survey evidence here in light of Defendants' failure to rebut the presumption.

³⁶⁰ The Commission's rules also provide for damages and specify further that the remedies set forth in the rules are "in addition to and not in lieu of the sanctions available under title V or any other provision of the Communications Act." 47 C.F.R. § 76.1003(h).

³⁶¹ We decline AT&T's suggestion that we institute a forfeiture proceeding under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) based on Defendants' failure to comply with the Communications Act and the Commission's rules. *See AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 8, 112 and p.44. As an initial matter, as set forth below, we find that Defendants have not violated any of the program access prohibitions set forth in Section 628(c) of the Act and Section 76.1002 of the Commission's rules. *See infra* ¶¶ 77-82. While we find that Defendants have violated Section 628(b) of the Act and Section 76.1001(a) of the Commission's rules, we do not believe that the particular facts and circumstances set forth herein justify the initiation of a forfeiture proceeding. To the extent Defendants fail to comply with the terms of this *Order*, however, we will consider further action, which may include the initiation of a forfeiture proceeding.

REDACTED VERSION

HD and MSG+ HD to AT&T on non-discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions and, assuming AT&T's acceptance, enter into such a contract with AT&T.³⁶²

72. Second, as discussed above, Cablevision is a proper defendant to Count I because it is under common control with MSG LP and is deemed responsible (along with MSG LP) for the withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T.³⁶³ Accordingly, we require that Cablevision shall not prevent or otherwise impede MSG LP from entering into the license agreement described above and provide that Cablevision (along with MSG LP) shall be held responsible and subject to further remedies including, but not limited to, forfeitures and other penalties, if MSG LP fails to enter into such an agreement.

4. First Amendment

73. Our action here comports with the First Amendment. As an initial matter, to the extent Defendants' First Amendment claims amount to a facial challenge to the rules adopted in the *2010 Order*,³⁶⁴ the D.C. Circuit has already rejected that challenge.³⁶⁵ To the extent that Defendants are challenging our decision based on the facts of this case, we reject these claims.³⁶⁶ As the D.C. Circuit and Commission have explained previously, the program access rules are subject to intermediate scrutiny, under which government action will be upheld if it "furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."³⁶⁷ We discuss below how our action here satisfies each of these three elements.

74. First, in *Time Warner*, the court found that the governmental interest Congress intended to serve in enacting the program access provisions was "the promotion of fair competition in the video marketplace," and that this interest was substantial.³⁶⁸ Moreover, the court noted Congress's conclusion that "the benefits of these provisions – the increased speech that would result from fairer competition in the video programming marketplace – outweighed the disadvantages [resulting in] the possibility of reduced economic incentives to develop new programming."³⁶⁹ We find that this governmental interest remains substantial today. In both the *2007 Order* and *2010 Order*, the Commission noted that (i)

³⁶² If MSG LP insists on discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions, we will consider that a violation of this *Order* without requiring AT&T to demonstrate any further "significant hindrance."

³⁶³ See *supra* ¶¶ 17-18.

³⁶⁴ See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 9-10, 123-28.

³⁶⁵ See *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *13-15.

³⁶⁶ See *Defendants' Post-Discovery Answer to Supplement* at 10, 128-30.

³⁶⁷ *Time Warner Entertainment Co. L.P. v. FCC*, 93 F.3d 957, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting *Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC*, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (quoting *United States v. O'Brien*, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))); see also *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *13; *Cablevision I*, 597 F.3d at 1311; *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 775, ¶ 41; *2007 Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 17837-38, ¶ 65.

³⁶⁸ *Time Warner*, 93 F.3d at 978. Moreover, one of Congress' express findings in enacting the 1992 Cable Act was that "[t]here is a substantial governmental and First Amendment interest in promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple technology media." 1992 Cable Act, § 2(a)(6).

³⁶⁹ *Time Warner*, 93 F.3d at 979 (citing S. Rep. No. 102-92 (1991), at 26-28, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1159-61).

REDACTED VERSION

incumbent cable operators still have a dominant share of MVPD subscribers; (ii) there is evidence that cable prices have risen in excess of inflation; and (iii) incumbent cable operators still own significant programming.³⁷⁰ Based on these factors, the Commission concluded that “regulations intended to promote competition in the video distribution market in accordance with the objectives of Congress are still warranted.”³⁷¹ All of these same factors are present in this case.

75. Second, in *Time Warner*, the court held that the governmental objective served by the statutory program access provisions was unrelated to the suppression of free expression.³⁷² Similarly, our decision here to address Defendants’ withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T is not based on programming content but is instead intended to address the “significant hindrance” that results to AT&T’s ability to provide a competing video service and the harm to competition in the video distribution market. Our action here responds to concerns about competition, not content. Thus, our action is content-neutral and unrelated to the suppression of free speech.

76. Third, any alleged restriction on speech resulting from our decision here “is no greater than is essential to the furtherance” of Congress’s interest in promoting competition in the video distribution market.³⁷³ The Commission has explained previously that withholding of cable-affiliated programming from rival MVPDs “may harm the ability of MVPDs to compete with incumbent cable operators, thereby resulting in less competition in the marketplace to the detriment of consumers.”³⁷⁴ We conclude here that Defendants’ withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T has resulted in such harm.³⁷⁵ By adopting a remedy that requires Defendants to license these networks to AT&T on a non-discriminatory basis, our remedy is tailored to further the substantial governmental interest of promoting competition in the video distribution market for the benefit of consumers.

C. Count II – Unreasonable Refusal to Sell

77. In Count II, AT&T claims that because Defendants distribute the SD versions of MSG and MSG+ via satellite, the underlying programming content on those networks must be considered satellite-delivered regardless of whether a particular version of the programming content (such as the HD version) is distributed terrestrially.³⁷⁶ Thus, AT&T contends that, although Defendants distribute MSG HD and MSG+ HD via terrestrial facilities, the underlying programming content is the same as that displayed on MSG SD and MSG+ SD and therefore must be considered satellite-delivered programming to which the program access rules adopted pursuant to Section 628(c) apply.³⁷⁷ Accordingly, AT&T

³⁷⁰ See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 775-76, ¶ 42; *2007 Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 17837-38, ¶ 65; see also *Cablevision II*, 2011 WL 2277217, at *14.

³⁷¹ *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 775-76, ¶ 42; see also *2007 Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 17837-38, ¶ 65.

³⁷² See *Time Warner*, 93 F.3d at 978.

³⁷³ *Id.*

³⁷⁴ *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 762-63, ¶ 26.

³⁷⁵ See *supra* Section III.B.2.c.

³⁷⁶ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 2, 24, 93, 96; *AT&T Reply* at 32-36. AT&T brought Count II pursuant to Section 628(c) as well as Section 628(b). See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 90. We interpret AT&T’s Section 628(b) claim in Count II to be identical to Count I (*i.e.*, that Defendants have engaged in an “unfair act” of withholding MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T that has the “purpose” or the “effect” of “significantly hindering” AT&T). Because we consider this claim in addressing Count I, we will not consider it again in addressing Count II. Accordingly, we strike Count II to the extent it is redundant with Count I.

³⁷⁷ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 93, 96; *AT&T Reply* at 32-36.

REDACTED VERSION

claims that Defendants' refusal to sell MSG HD and MSG+ HD to AT&T violates the program access rules applicable to satellite-delivered programming under Section 628(c), specifically the prohibition on unreasonable non-price discrimination.³⁷⁸

78. We reject AT&T's arguments and deny Count II. Having found that the SD and HD versions of the same network have different technical characteristics and content and are not considered adequate substitutes by consumers, the Commission in the *2010 Order* concluded that it would treat the HD version of a particular network as a distinct service from the SD version of the same network.³⁷⁹ AT&T concedes that the Commission's finding on this point "was well-grounded in the record before the Commission."³⁸⁰ The record here further supports that finding, demonstrating that the SD and HD versions of MSG and MSG+ have different technical qualities as well as programming content.³⁸¹ Because the Commission has already established that the HD and SD versions of a network are distinct, we decline to conclude that distributing the SD version of a network via satellite converts a terrestrially delivered HD version of the same network into satellite-delivered programming subject to Section 628(c).

D. Count III – Evasion

79. In Count III, AT&T claims that Defendants have sought to evade the program access rules applicable to satellite-delivered programming under Section 628(c) by distributing MSG HD and MSG+ HD via terrestrial facilities.³⁸² In response, Defendants contend that they have legitimate business reasons for distributing MSG HD and MSG+ HD via terrestrial facilities.³⁸³ They explain that Cablevision had an existing fiber network that was used to distribute MSG HD when it launched in 1998 and that satellite transponder costs would have been expensive and unnecessary.³⁸⁴ Defendants state that they continue to believe that terrestrial distribution makes financial sense and note that switching now to satellite delivery would add up-front costs for additional satellite uplink equipment and recurring monthly costs for leasing transponder capacity.³⁸⁵ Moreover, they explain that the broad geographic distribution provided by satellite technology is unnecessary for regional networks such as MSG HD and MSG+ HD.³⁸⁶ Defendants also submit that terrestrial distribution has certain technical advantages over satellite distribution.³⁸⁷

80. The Bureau informed the Parties that discovery was necessary for the resolution of Count III.³⁸⁸ Despite having the opportunity to obtain relevant information through discovery, however, AT&T

³⁷⁸ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 94-95. Unlike with terrestrially delivered programming, the rules applicable to satellite-delivered programming adopted pursuant to Section 628(c) do not require a showing of "significant hindrance." See *1993 Order*, 8 FCC Rcd at 3377-78, ¶¶ 47-49.

³⁷⁹ See *2010 Order*, 25 FCC Rcd at 784-85, ¶¶ 54-55.

³⁸⁰ *AT&T Post-Discovery Reply Brief* at 30.

³⁸¹ See *Defendants' Answer* at 66-67, 78; Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶ 13.

³⁸² See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 99-102.

³⁸³ See *Defendants' Answer* at 6, 12-13 (¶¶ 3-5), 69-71; Pontillo Decl. at ¶¶ 14-20.

³⁸⁴ See *Defendants' Answer* at 70-71; Pontillo Decl. at ¶ 14.

³⁸⁵ See *Defendants' Answer* at 12 (¶ 5), 71; Pontillo Decl. at ¶ 17.

³⁸⁶ See *Defendants' Answer* at 12 (¶ 5); Pontillo Decl. at ¶ 17.

³⁸⁷ See *Defendants' Answer* at 12 (¶ 5), 71; Pontillo Decl. at ¶¶ 18-19.

³⁸⁸ See Bureau Aug. 9th Letter at 1.

REDACTED VERSION

has put forth no evidence that supports its allegations concerning Defendants' reasons for distributing MSG HD and MSG+ HD terrestrially. Based on this lack of evidence of evasion, we deny Count III.

E. Count IV – Undue or Improper Influence

81. In Count IV, AT&T claims that Cablevision is exercising undue or improper influence over MSG LP's decision to withhold MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T, in violation of Section 628(c)(2)(A) of the Act and Section 76.1002(a) of the Commission's rules.³⁸⁹ AT&T alleges only a violation of Section 628(c), which does not apply to the terrestrially delivered MSG HD and MSG+ HD.³⁹⁰ AT&T thus appears to be arguing that MSG HD and MSG+ HD should be considered satellite-delivered because the underlying programming content is delivered via satellite on MSG SD and MSG+ SD,³⁹¹ an argument we reject for the same reasons discussed above in denying Count II.³⁹² Accordingly, we deny Count IV.

F. Count V – Discrimination

82. In Count V, AT&T alleges that Defendants violated Section 628(c) by refusing to sell the satellite-delivered MSG SD and MSG+ SD to AT&T in a package along with MSG HD and MSG+ HD.³⁹³ AT&T alleges that Defendants have offered and sold a package of the SD and HD versions of MSG and MSG+ to other MVPDs.³⁹⁴ Among other arguments, Defendants assert in response that MSG SD and MSG+ SD are licensed separately from MSG HD and MSG+ HD, thus precluding a claim that the Defendants have treated AT&T differently than other MVPDs.³⁹⁵ The Bureau informed the Parties that discovery was necessary for the resolution of Count V.³⁹⁶ Despite having the opportunity to obtain relevant information through discovery, however, AT&T has put forth no evidence that would undermine Defendants' assertions that MSG SD and MSG+ SD are licensed separately from MSG HD and MSG+ HD. Based on this lack of evidence of discrimination in the sale of satellite-delivered programming, we deny Count V.

³⁸⁹ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶¶ 103-106.

³⁹⁰ See *Defendants' Answer* at 72.

³⁹¹ See *AT&T Reply* at 42-43.

³⁹² See *supra* ¶ 78.

³⁹³ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 110 (“Defendants’ refusal to license the HD format of MSG and MSG Plus to AT&T discriminatorily denies AT&T the same terms and conditions of program access that are available to Cablevision and other competitors . . .”); *AT&T Reply* at 37 (“Cablevision makes the HD format of MSG and MSG Plus available to other MVPDs. But it has refused to make this term and condition of program access available to AT&T.”); *id.* at 38 n.50 (stating that the “differential treatment underlying the discrimination count” is that “it is common practice to include HD rights in carriage agreements for the standard definition format . . . and Cablevision does provide the HD format of MSG and MSG Plus to other MVPDs (but not to AT&T)”); see also York/Lauricella/Thun Decl. at ¶¶ 33, 41-42. AT&T brought Count V pursuant to Section 628(c) as well as Section 628(b). See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 110. We interpret AT&T’s Section 628(b) claim in Count V to be identical to Count I (*i.e.*, that Defendants have engaged in an “unfair act” of withholding of MSG HD and MSG+ HD from AT&T that has the “purpose” or the “effect” of “significantly hindering” AT&T). Because we consider this claim in addressing Count I, we will not consider it again in addressing Count V. Accordingly, we strike Count V to the extent it is redundant with Count I.

³⁹⁴ See *AT&T Complaint* at ¶ 110; *AT&T Reply* at 37-38.

³⁹⁵ See *Defendants' Answer* at 78-79; Levine Sept. 2009 Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 13.

³⁹⁶ See Bureau Aug. 9th Letter at 1.

REDACTED VERSION**IV. ORDERING CLAUSES**

83. Accordingly, **IT IS ORDERED** that, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 4(j), and 628 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), and 548, and Section 76.1001 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. § 76.1001, Count I of the above-captioned complaint filed by AT&T Services, Inc. and Southern New England Telephone Company d/b/a AT&T Connecticut against Madison Square Garden, L.P. and Cablevision Systems Corporation **IS GRANTED** to the extent indicated herein.

84. **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Madison Square Garden, L.P. shall enter into an agreement to license the MSG HD and MSG+ HD networks to AT&T on non-discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions within 30 days of the release of this *Order* and in accordance with the terms of this *Order*.

85. **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Cablevision Systems Corporation shall not prevent or otherwise impede Madison Square Garden, L.P. from entering into the license agreement with AT&T as required by this *Order*.

86. **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that both Cablevision Systems Corporation and Madison Square Garden, L.P. shall be held responsible and subject to further remedies including, but not limited to, forfeitures and other penalties, if Madison Square Garden, L.P. fails to enter into the license agreement with AT&T as required by this *Order*.

87. **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Counts II, III, IV, and V of the above-captioned complaint filed by AT&T Services, Inc. and Southern New England Telephone Company d/b/a AT&T Connecticut against Madison Square Garden, L.P. and Cablevision Systems Corporation **ARE HEREBY DENIED** for the reasons discussed herein.

88. **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that, pursuant to Section 76.1003(h)(1) of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. § 76.1003(h)(1), this *Order* **SHALL BE EFFECTIVE** upon release.

89. This action is taken pursuant to authority delegated by Section 0.283 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. § 0.283.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

William T. Lake
Chief, Media Bureau