Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
December 18, 2014
DA 14-1867
In Reply Refer to:
1800B3-HOD
Released:  December 18, 2014
John F. Banzhaf III
104 N. Jackson Street
Arlington, VA 22201
Andrew G. McBride
Wiley Rein LLP
1776 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
In re: Red Zebra Broadcasting Licensee, LLC
WWXX(FM), Buckland, Virginia
Facility ID No. 16819
File No. BRH-20110601ACB
Informal Objections
Dear Sirs:
We have before us the application (“Application”) of Red Zebra Broadcasting Licensee, LLC
(“Red Zebra”) for renewal of its license for WWXX(FM), Buckland, Virginia (“Station”).  We also have 
before us pleadings (“Objections”) filed by John F. Banzhaf III (“Banzhaf”), Louis Ramon Grimaldi
(“Grimaldi”), Jay Winter Nightwolf (“Nightwolf”), and Verona Iriarte (“Iriarte”).
1
  These pleadings 
purport to be petitions to deny the Application.  As discussed below, we dismiss the pleadings as petitions 
to deny, deny them when considered as informal objections, and grant the Application.
Background. Red Zebra timely filed the Application on June 1, 2011.  On September 2, 2014, 
Banzhaf filed his pleading.  Banzhaf urges us to deny the Application because Red Zebra permits the 
Station’s broadcast of the word “Redskins” to identify the professional football team named the 
Washington Redskins.  In addition, Banzhaf questions whether Daniel Snyder (“Snyder”), the managing 
member of Red Zebra’s parent company and the majority owner of the Washington Redskins, possesses 
the character qualifications required of a Commission licensee.  Grimaldi, Nightwolf and Iriarte filed their 
pleadings on October 13, 2014.  These pleadings adopt and incorporate by reference the Banzhaf 
pleading.  They do not contain any additional arguments, assertions or allegations of fact.
2
  Red Zebra 
filed a response to all of the pleadings (“Red Zebra Response”) on October 17, 2014.  
                                                          
1
Banzhaf filed his pleading (“Banzhaf Objection”) on September 2, 2014.  The others submitted their pleadings on 
October 13, 2014.  
2
It is for this reason that we discuss only arguments, assertions or allegations made by Banzhaf herein.
2Discussion.  Procedural Issues.  Petitions to deny a renewal application must be filed by the first 
day of the last full calendar month of the expiring license term.
3
  The deadline for filing petitions to deny 
the Application was September 1, 2011. Banzhaf, Grimaldi, Nightwolf, and Iriarte each filed their 
pleadings more than 3 years after this deadline.  For this reason, the pleadings are procedurally defective.  
Accordingly, we dismiss all of the pleadings as petitions to deny.  We will, however, consider them as 
informal objections under Section 73.3587 of the Commission’s rules (“Rules”).
4
  
Substantive Issues. Under longstanding Commission precedent, informal objections to license 
renewal applications must provide properly supported allegations of fact that, if true, would establish that 
grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent with Section 309(k) of the Act, which governs 
our evaluation of an application for license renewal.
5
  Section 309(k)(1) provides that we are to grant a
renewal application if, upon consideration of the application and pleadings, we find that (1) the station has 
served the public interest, convenience, and necessity; (2) there have been no serious violations of the 
Act or the Rules; and (3) there have been no other violations that, taken together, constitute a pattern of 
abuse.
6
  If such a finding cannot be made on the basis of the application and pleadings and grant with 
conditions is not appropriate under the circumstances, Section 309(k) provides that the license renewal 
application is to be designated for a hearing.
Programming Complaints.  Banzhaf objects to the Station’s use of the word “Redskins” – which 
he characterizes as “a derogatory racial and ethnic slur” – during its coverage of the professional football 
team named the Washington Redskins.
7
  He contends that this conduct demonstrates that the Station has 
not served the public interest, convenience and necessity and/or has violated the law or the Rules, and 
therefore that the Commission should deny the Application.  We address and reject each of these 
arguments in turn below.  
Obscenity.   Section 1464 of Title 18 of the United States Code – which the Commission enforces 
– prohibits the broadcast of "obscene” language.
8
  Banzhaf alleges that the term “Redskins” is akin to 
obscenity.
9
  The Supreme Court of the United States has held that to be obscene, material must, among 
other things, depict or describe sexual conduct.
10
  Banzhaf does not allege that the term “Redskins” 
                                                          
3
47 C.F.R. § 73.3516(e).
4
47 C.F.R. § 73.3587.  
5
47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1).  See, e.g., Applications of Cumulus Licensing, Corp. (Assignor) and Clear Channel 
Broadcasting Licenses, Inc. (Assignee), Order, 16 FCC Rcd 1052, 1054 n.5 (2001) (stating that the Commission 
follows the same two-step analysis in assessing the merits of a petition to deny or informal objection and noting that 
the first step of the analysis is to determine whether “the pleading makes specific allegations of fact which, if true, 
would demonstrate that grant of the applicant would be prima facie inconsistent with the public interest”); Area 
Christian Television, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 RR 2d 862, 864 (1989) (informal objection must 
contain adequate and specific factual allegations sufficient to warrant the relief requested).
6
47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(1). 
7
Banzhaf Objection at 1.  
8
18 U.S.C. § 1464.  See also 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D).
9
Banzhaf Objection at 5-6.  
10
To be obscene, material must satisfy the three-part test set out in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).  The 
test requires that (1) an average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the material, 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) the material depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
3depicts or describes sexual conduct in any way.  Accordingly, we reject his argument that the term 
“Redskins” is akin to obscenity. 
Profanity.
11
  The Commission defined profanity in 2006 as “language so grossly offensive to 
members of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.”
12
  Due to “the sensitive First 
Amendment implications in this area,” the Commission limited its regulation of profane language to “the 
universe of words that are sexual or excretory in nature or are derived from such terms.”
13
  However, even 
that limited definition was invalidated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
14
  Banzhaf argues 
that the word “Redskins” constitutes profanity.
15
  He does not allege, however, that the word is sexual or 
excretory in nature or derived from terms that are.  Instead, he asserts that the word “Redskins” is racially 
derogatory.   While the Commission has “recognize[d] that additional words, such as language conveying 
racial or religious epithets, are considered offensive by most Americans,” it made clear its intent “to avoid
extending the bounds of profanity to reach such language given constitutional considerations.”
16
  
Accordingly, we reject the argument that the word “Redskins” falls within the Commission’s definition of 
profanity.
Public Interest, Convenience and Necessity.  Banzhaf states that “repeated and unnecessary 
exposure” to the word “Redskins” causes “psychological harm, not only to Indian and non-Indian 
children, but also to Indian adults.”
17
  He asserts that, for these reasons, it is contrary to the mandate that 
broadcasters operate in the public interest, convenience and necessity for the Station to broadcast the 
word in its coverage of Washington’s professional football team.  Thus, Banzhaf urges us to find that the 
Station failed to serve the public interest, convenience and necessity, and deny the Application.
We reject Banzhaf’s position in light of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Section 326 of the Act.
18
  The First Amendment and Section 326 prohibit the Commission from 
censoring program material or interfering with broadcasters’ free speech rights.  In view of this, the 
Commission has stated that it will not take “adverse action on a license renewal application based only 
upon the subjective determination of a listener or group of listeners as to what constitutes appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
conduct specifically defined by applicable law; and (3) the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.   
11
Section 1464 of Title 18 of the United States Code – which, as noted above, the Commission enforces – also 
prohibits the broadcast of “profane” language.  18 U.S.C. § 1464.
12
Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, Notices of 
Apparent Liability and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd 2664, 2669 ¶ 17 (2006) (“2006 Indecency 
Order”), partially vacated and revised, 21 FCC Rcd 13299 n.121 (2006), rev’d, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 461-462 (2d. Cir. 2007), rev’d and remanded, 552 U.S. 502 (2009).
13
See id.  
14
See id.  The Commission did not further defend its finding that the vulgar language at issue in Fox was profane.  
See Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 327 n.7 (2d Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2307 
(2012).
15
Banzhaf Objection at 6-11.  
16
2006 Indecency Order, 21 FCC Rcd at 2669 ¶ 18.
17
Banzhaf Objection at 2.
18
U.S. CONST. amend. I; 47 U.S.C. § 326.
4programming.”
19
  It has recognized that:  “Licensees have broad discretion – based on their right to free 
speech – to choose, in good faith, the programming they believe serves the needs and interests of their 
communities.  This holds true even if the material broadcast is insulting to a particular minority or ethnic 
group in a station’s community.”
20
  Indeed, the Commission has held that “if there is to be free speech, it 
must be free for speech that we abhor and hate as well as for speech that we find tolerable and 
congenial.”
21
Banzhaf cites a number of Commission decisions that he asserts demonstrate the Commission has 
utilized the public interest standard to regulate content.  These cases, however, do not support denial of 
the Station’s license renewal in this case based on the fact that the Station broadcast the name “Redskins.”  
For instance, Banzhaf cites FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (“Fox”),
22
and suggests that, therein, the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that the Commission could rely on its public interest 
authority to expand the definition of “indecency” to include language that neither depicted nor described 
sexual or excretory organs or functions.
23
  In fact, the court simply observed that its opinion left “the 
Commission free to modify its current indecency policy in light of its determination of the public interest 
and applicable legal requirements” and left “the courts free to review the current policy or any modified 
policy in light of its content and application.”
24
  Moreover, we note that, contrary to Banzhaf’s assertion, 
in the underlying decision, the Commission did not expand the definition of “indecency.”
25
  The name 
“Washington Redskins” does not fall within that definition.  
Banzhaf likewise mischaracterizes Yale Broadcasting Company v. FCC,
26
arguing that therein the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Commission’s use of the public 
interest standard to regulate the broadcast of songs that might promote or glorify the use of illegal drugs.  
In fact, as the court noted, the Commission merely reminded broadcasters that they must make 
“reasonable efforts” to determine the meaning of a song’s lyrics prior to broadcasting the song.
27
  
                                                          
19
See Citadel Broadcasting Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Apparent Liability, 22 FCC Rcd 
7083, 7101 ¶ 41 (2007), citing WGBH Educational Foundation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 69 FCC 2d 1250, 
1251 ¶ 4 (1978).
20
Multicultural Radio Broadcasting Licensee, LLC, Letter, 22 FCC Rcd 21429, 21434 (MB 2007), citing License 
Renewal Applications of Certain Commercial Radio Stations Serving Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order 8 FCC Rcd 6400, 6401 ¶ 7 (1993), and Zapis Communications Corp., Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 3888, 3889 ¶ 7 (MB 1992).
21
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Memorandum Opinion, 4 FCC 2d 190, 192 (1966), aff'd, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 6 FCC 2d 385 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F. 2d 
169 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
22
132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
23
Banzhaf Objection at 3.
24
Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2320.
25
Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 4978 ¶ 8 (2004).  Rather, the Commission determined that any use of the 
word at issue or a variation of that word, “in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation.”  Id.
26
478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Yale Broadcasting”).
27
Yale Broadcasting, 478 F.2d at 598 (“It is beyond dispute that the Commission requires stations to broadcast in 
the public interest. In order for a broadcaster to determine whether it is acting in the public interest, knowledge of its 
own programming is required.”).
5Moreover, the Commission specifically clarified that it was not banning the broadcast of “drug-oriented” 
songs.
28
  
Banzhaf also cites Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC (“UCC”),
29
and Stone v. FCC (“Stone”).
30
  He argues that these cases confirm the Commission’s authority to deny 
renewal of a station’s license based on the content it broadcast during its license term.  But the 
circumstances of those cases are very different from those presented here.  UCC involved allegations that 
a station had violated the Commission’s now defunct fairness doctrine and otherwise failed to air 
programming that served the needs of its community.  Nothing in that case suggests that the Commission 
could deny renewal of a broadcast license because particular words or programming broadcast by the 
licensee offended some viewers.
31
Stone noted that “such generalized criticisms [of a station’s 
programming] run the risk of turning the FCC into a censorship board, a goal clearly not in the public 
interest.”
32
  
Banzhaf has not demonstrated that the Commission has ever denied renewal of a broadcast 
license based on the broadcast of programming or individual words that do not violate the Act or the 
Commission’s rules.  Given the First Amendment and Section 326 of the Act, and the Commission’s 
repeated statements that its “role in overseeing program content is very limited,”
33
we decline to do so 
here.
Hate Speech.  Banzhaf asserts that the term “Redskins” constitutes hate speech and incites 
violence against Indians.
34
  There are no provisions in the Act or the Commission’s rules banning hate 
speech.  We have recognized that, under the principles enunciated in Brandenburg v. Ohio 
(“Brandenburg”), the Commission can take enforcement action based on broadcast speech that “is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”
35
  
We will not do so, however, unless a local court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the speech 
                                                          
28
Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 31 FCC 2d 
377, 378-79 ¶¶ 4-6 (1971).
29
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).  
30
466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
31
Banzhaf also cites a subsequent decision related to this case.  Office of Communication of the United Church of 
Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).  That decision too addressed the station’s compliance with the 
fairness doctrine and, like the first court decision, did not address the Commission’s authority to withhold renewal 
based on the airing of offensive content.  
32
Stone, 466 F.2d at 328-29.
33
See, e.g., AMFM Radio Licenses, L.L.C., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 19 FCC Rcd 10751, 10752 ¶ 
4 (2004); Clear Channel Broadcasting Licenses, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 19 FCC Rcd 1768, 
1777 ¶ 16 (2004); Saga Communications of New England, LLC, Letter, 23 FCC Rcd 11008, 11010 (2008); Infinity 
Media Corp., Letter, 23 FCC Rcd 1820, 1821 (2008); The Greenwich Broadcasting Corp., Letter, 23 FCC Rcd 
1692, 1693 (2008).
34
Banzhaf Objection at 12-13.   
35
See Citicasters Licenses, L.P., Memorandum Opinion and order and Notice of Apparent Liability, 22 FCC Rcd 
19324, 19331-32 ¶ 20 (MB 2007), citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
6at issue meets the Brandenburg test.
36
  Here, Banzhaf has not proffered any evidence that a court has 
found broadcasting the word “Redskins” to meet the Brandenburg test.
Character Qualifications.  In evaluating an applicant’s character qualifications, the Commission 
considers misconduct which violates the Act or a Commission rule or policy.
37
  The Commission also 
takes into account certain adjudicated non-Commission misconduct.  The Commission generally 
considers only three types of non-Commission misconduct:  felony convictions; fraudulent 
misrepresentations to governmental units; and violations of antitrust or other laws protecting 
competition.
38
  
Banzhaf alleges that Snyder – and thus Red Zebra – lacks the character qualifications required of 
a Commission licensee.  To support his claim, Banzhaf cites the Station’s broadcast of the word
“Redskins,” which he characterizes as a “racist and derogatory term.”
39
However, as discussed above, the 
broadcast of this word does not violate the Act or any Commission rule or policy.  Further, Banzhaf has 
not offered any evidence of adjudications that the Station’s broadcast of the word “Redskins” violates any 
other laws.  Banzhaf also points to a newspaper article that accused Snyder of various transgressions.
40
  
Banzhaf does not proffer any evidence regarding these alleged non-FCC transgressions.  In any event, 
Red Zebra rebutted Banzhaf’s claims.
41
  Accordingly, we find that Banzhaf has not established a prima 
facie case that Red Zebra lacks the character qualifications to be a Commission licensee.
Conclusion.  We have evaluated the Application pursuant to Section 309(k) of the Act, and we 
find that the Station has served the public interest, convenience, and necessity during the most recent 
license term.  Moreover, we find that there have been no serious violations of the Act or the Rules 
involving the Station or any other violations that, taken together, would constitute a pattern of abuse. In 
light of the foregoing, we will grant the Application and renew the Station’s license. 
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the petitions to deny filed by John F. Banzhaf III, Louis 
Ramon Grimaldi, Jay Winter Nightwolf, and Verona Iriarte ARE DISMISSED and, when considered as 
                                                          
36
See Spanish Radio Network, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd 9954, 9959 ¶¶ 21-22 (1995) (noting 
that “any determination that particular speech poses a ‘clear and present danger of serious substantive evil’ 
presupposes a familiarity with the circumstances, issues, and concerns of the community where such speech was 
heard, a familiarity which the Commission, in most cases, does not have and cannot practically obtain” and 
explaining that “[l]ocal authorities responsible for keeping the peace and enforcing the law are better positioned to 
know and assess the specific and unique circumstances in the ... community and, thus, to determine whether the 
Brandenburg test has been met”)
37
See Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, Report, Order, and Policy Statement, 102 
FCC 2d 1179, 1190-91 ¶ 23 (1986) (“Character Policy Statement”), modified, Policy Statement and Order, 5 FCC 
Rcd 3252 (1990), recon. granted in part, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 3448 (1991), modified in 
part, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 6564 (1992).  
38
Id.  
39
Banzhaf Objection at 16.  Banzhaf also claims that Snyder, who is also the majority owner of the Washington 
Redskins, forces other broadcasters to use the term. Id. at 17.  This claim is unsubstantiated.  Accordingly, we do not 
consider it further.  
40
Id. at 17.
41
Red Zebra presented evidence that the publisher of the news article had disavowed the allegations made therein.  
Red Zebra Response at 22.
7informal objections, ARE DENIED.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 309(k) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the license renewal application of Red Zebra Broadcasting 
Licensee, LLC for Station WWXX(FM), Buckland, Virginia (File No. BRH-20110601ACB) IS
GRANTED.
Sincerely,
Peter H. Doyle
Chief, Audio Division
Media Bureau