**DA 21-688**

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**Fcc Concludes Assessment of Best Practices**

**to Combat Unlawful Robocalls to Hospitals**

**CGB Docket No. 21-7**

# Introduction

1. In this Public Notice, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) concludes its assessment of how the voluntary adoption by hospitals and other stakeholders of the best practices issued by the Hospital Robocall Protection Group (HRPG) can be facilitated to protect hospitals and other institutions from unlawful robocalls. As we discuss in greater detail below, our assessment concludes that education and outreach are the best ways to facilitate voluntary adoption of the best practices, and that organizations like the American Hospital Association and other groups devoted to hospital risk management and security are in the best position to provide such outreach and training.
2. In relevant part, the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act (TRACED Act) directs the Commission to take two actions aimed at protecting hospitals from illegal robocalls.[[1]](#footnote-3) First, the TRACED Act requires the Commission to establish a federal advisory committee, the HRPG, for the purpose of issuing “best practices” regarding “[h]ow voice service providers can better combat unlawful robocalls made to hospitals, . . .[h]ow hospitals can better protect themselves from such calls, including by using unlawful robocall mitigation techniques” and “[h]ow the Federal Government and State governments can help combat such calls.”[[2]](#footnote-4) Next, the TRACED Act directs the Commission, within 180 days of the issuance of the best practices, to complete a proceeding to assess “the extent to which the voluntary adoption of [the HRPG Best Practices] can be facilitated to protect hospitals and other institutions” from unlawful robocalls.[[3]](#footnote-5) The HRPG issued its report recommending best practices (“HRPG Best Practices”) on December 14, 2020,[[4]](#footnote-6) and the Commission initiated the required assessment proceeding by Public Notice issued on January 11, 2021, in which it sought comment on the extent to which the voluntary adoption of these best practices could be facilitated.[[5]](#footnote-7)
3. After review of the HRPG Best Practices and the comments filed in this proceeding, our assessment concludes that ensuring awareness of the HRPG Best Practices among all stakeholders, particularly hospitals, and by providing effective forums to promote their adoption and implementation is the best way to facilitate the voluntary adoption of the HRPG Best Practices.[[6]](#footnote-8) In cases where stakeholders have already adopted certain best practices, as voice service providers have by implementing anti-robocall features like STIR/SHAKEN, expanding hospitals’ awareness of these features will only increase their effectiveness.[[7]](#footnote-9)
4. Hospitals and the patients they serve are the primary beneficiaries of the HRPG Best Practices, because these Best Practices comprehensively address the risks to patient care and other compliance risks that unlawful robocalls present. Hospital risk management officials, thus, have strong incentives to advance the adoption of the Best Practices as part of their efforts to prevent and mitigate these risks in their respective hospital environments. Accordingly, we believe that the best way to facilitate the voluntary adoption of the HRPG Best Practices would be for groups like the American Hospital Association,[[8]](#footnote-10) and other groups devoted to hospital risk management and security, such as the American Society for Health Care Risk Management (ASHRM)[[9]](#footnote-11) and the College of Healthcare Information Management Executives (CHIME), to harness this incentive by taking primary responsibility for developing educational materials and providing outreach to their constituencies. As we discuss below, this means not only developing educational and training materials, but also hosting a website that would aggregate into a single source all relevant HRPG Best Practices-related educational material, links to forums and workshops, and other resources.[[10]](#footnote-12)

# Background

## Unlawful Robocalls to Hospitals

1. Robocalls are the subject of the number one consumer complaint lodged with the Commission, and protecting Americans from illegal robocalls is the Commission’s top consumer protection priority.[[11]](#footnote-13) Robocalls to hospitals are significant contributors to the illegal robocall problem. Illegal robocalls that flood hospital networks are disruptive and often seek to perpetrate fraud, but they can also pose a grave challenge to public health and safety.[[12]](#footnote-14) Unlawful robocalls undermine the ability of hospitals to perform critical patient care by impairing the full operational capacity and availability of the voice services that health care professionals rely on to perform their life-saving functions.[[13]](#footnote-15) The impact that unlawful robocalls have on public health and safety to patients, hospitals, staff and our communities, and the concomitant need for prevention and remediation, has only been underscored by the overwhelming challenges hospitals and their dedicated staffs have faced over the past year with the global COVID-19 pandemic.
2. Unlawful robocalls to hospitals take myriad forms. For example, hospitals have reported receiving calls accompanied by illegal caller ID spoofing to appear as if they were originating from within the hospitals’ organizations, deceiving employees into answering calls from fraudulent scammers instead of trusted colleagues.[[14]](#footnote-16) There have also been instances of nationwide calls that spoofed hospitals’ numbers, misleading recipients into answering calls that appear to be coming from hospital personnel but were part of fraudulent schemes designed to obtain insurance or other financial information.[[15]](#footnote-17) Hospitals have also been the victims of Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS) attacks where their voice service communications are disrupted by the intentional flooding of their networks with multiple simultaneous calls, often accompanied by caller ID spoofing of the calling number to make differentiating the fraudulent calls from legitimate ones impossible. These calls are commonly made as part of an extortion attempt by the attacker who demands a ransom in exchange for stopping the attack.[[16]](#footnote-18)

## The TRACED Act and the HRPG

1. Section 14 of the TRACED Act directs the Commission to first establish a federal advisory committee, the Hospital Robocall Protection Group (HRPG), for the purpose of issuing “best practices” regarding “[h]ow voice service providers can better combat unlawful robocalls made to hospitals, . . .[h]ow hospitals can better protect themselves from such calls, including by using unlawful robocall mitigation techniques” and “[h]ow the Federal Government and State governments can help combat such calls.”[[17]](#footnote-19) The TRACED Act also directs the Commission, within 180 days of the HRPG’s issuance of the best practices, to complete a proceeding that provides the Commission’s assessment of the extent to which the voluntary adoption of the best practices can be facilitated to protect hospitals and other institutions from unlawful robocalls.[[18]](#footnote-20)
2. The Commission initiated the first action on March 25, 2020, by announcing the establishment of the HRPG and seeking nominations for membership.[[19]](#footnote-21) On July 14, 2020, the HRPG’s membership and the date of its first meeting were announced. [[20]](#footnote-22) As required by the TRACED Act, the HRPG consisted of an equal number of representatives of voice service providers that serve hospitals, companies that focus on mitigating unlawful robocalls, consumer advocacy organizations, one-way voice over internet protocol (VoIP) service providers, hospitals, and state government officials focused on combatting unlawful robocalls, as well as one FCC representative and one Federal Trade Commission representative.[[21]](#footnote-23) The HRPG held its inaugural meeting on July 27, 2020, and was organized into three working groups, one for each of the three critical areas of inquiry for which Section 14(c) of the TRACED Act required the HRPG to adopt best practices.

## HRPG Best Practices

1. On December 14, 2020, the HRPG issued recommended best practices. The HRPG Best Practices represent the unanimous view of the committee’s members on the recommended actions voice service providers, hospitals, and Federal and state government agencies can take to prevent or reduce the number of unlawful robocalls to hospitals. The HRPG Best Practices are organized around a risk mitigation framework that consists of two principal parts, each applicable to the identified stakeholder groups: (i) activities associated with prevention of unlawful robocalls and (ii) activities associated with response and mitigation after robocall events occur.[[22]](#footnote-24)
2. *Voice Service Providers*. The HRPG recommends that voice service providers can combat unlawful robocalls to hospitals through prevention techniques such as implementing the STIR/SHAKEN framework on the Internet Protocol (IP) portions of their networks; establishing appropriate procedures to ensure compliance with applicable laws; confirming voice service customer identity and vetting their customers; analyzing, identifying and monitoring network traffic; providing hospitals with education and guidance on unlawful robocalls; and offering call blocking and call labeling services.[[23]](#footnote-25)
3. The HRPG’s recommended response and mitigation techniques for voice service providers include prioritizing hospital entities in response and remediation efforts; establishing a method to ensure hospitals can expeditiously notify the provider about unlawful robocalls that interfere with patient care and hospital operations as well as outgoing phone calls being blocked, unauthenticated, or misidentified; and initiating tracebacks on behalf of hospital entities when appropriate.[[24]](#footnote-26)
4. *Hospitals*. The HRPG recommends that hospitals can better protect themselves by, among other things, engaging in education and raising awareness about robocall incidents. Such education would include staff training and preparing robocall incident response plans.[[25]](#footnote-27) It also recommends that hospitals adopt mitigation tactics and tools, including robocall blocking and labeling offerings from voice service providers; and managing telephone number resources, such as by reporting spoofing of a hospital’s numbers and isolating critical phone lines.[[26]](#footnote-28)
5. The HRPG’s recommended strategies for hospitals and health systems to respond to and mitigate unlawful robocalls include evaluating a given robocall event and capturing relevant information about the calling activity; implementing internal controls such as contacting internal technical staff to implement immediate configuration changes and safeguards within premises-based equipment after an incident; and coordinating with federal and state agencies as appropriate.[[27]](#footnote-29)
6. *Federal and State Governments*. The HRPG recommends that state and other government agencies continue to expand efforts to prevent robocalls from reaching hospitals and other institutions by creating and implementing balanced policies that facilitate industry’s ability to prevent unlawful robocalls from reaching hospitals.[[28]](#footnote-30) Such policies would include encouraging the continued development of new call blocking and labeling tools; establishing and enhancing safe harbors that incentivize increased call blocking (including within the network) and labeling of calls that appear to be unlawful based on reasonable analytics;[[29]](#footnote-31) encouraging voice service providers to cooperate with traceback requests;[[30]](#footnote-32) and encouraging voice service providers to adopt State Attorneys General Anti-Robocall Principles.[[31]](#footnote-33) Other recommendations include enforcing existing laws, rules and policies against voice service providers that allow unlawful traffic to originate on their networks, as well as voice service providers that have taken insufficient steps to mitigate the transmission of such calls. HRPG also recommends developing clear and concise hospital anti-robocall education materials.[[32]](#footnote-34)
7. Finally, the response and mitigation steps the HRPG recommends for government agencies include improving communications methods between hospitals and law enforcement agencies and establishing information-sharing methods across all relevant enforcement agencies; actively monitoring complaints from hospitals and engaging in prompt outreach to providers and agencies that can assist; and making prioritized referrals to the Industry Traceback Group and coordinating traceback response among law enforcement partners.[[33]](#footnote-35)

## Assessment Proceeding

1. This assessment proceeding commenced on January 11, 2021 with release of a Public Notice exploring the extent to which the voluntary adoption of these best practices could be facilitated to protect hospitals and other institutions from unlawful robocalls.[[34]](#footnote-36) The Public Notice sought comment on all aspects of the HRPG Best Practices, including (i) “whether the division of best practices into ‘prevention’ and ‘mitigation’ categories has any impact on the extent to which the voluntary adoption of the best practices [by stakeholders] can be facilitated;” (ii) “specific incentives that are most likely to lead to voluntary adoption;” and (iii) whether “some best practices [might] be easier to adopt than others.”[[35]](#footnote-37) Comments were filed by Lumen, NCTA, USTelecom – The Broadband Association, and Ribbon Communications, Inc.,[[36]](#footnote-38) all of which were largely supportive of the HRPG’s recommendations and consistent in their view that no additional regulatory action by the Commission was necessary for voice service providers to implement the HRPG Best Practices in relation to their hospital customers.[[37]](#footnote-39)

# DISCUSSION

1. Our assessment of the extent to which the voluntary adoption of the HRPG Best Practices can be facilitated to protect hospitals and other institutions from unlawful robocalls rests on two principal commonalities. First, many of the HRPG Best Practices reflect actions the Commission and other stakeholders have taken or continue to take, both independently and pursuant to the TRACED Act, in their respective efforts to combat unlawful robocalls. Second, successful voluntary adoption of the HRPG Best Practices will require a coordinated response by the stakeholders named by the TRACED Act, specifically voice service providers, hospitals and Federal and state agencies tasked with anti-robocall enforcement.[[38]](#footnote-40)
2. Because hospitals and the organizations that serve them have the greatest motivation to ensure that that best practices are adopted, we conclude that the most effective way to facilitate the adoption of the HRPG Best Practices would be for one or more of the hospital industry organizations devoted to hospital risk management and security to take overall ownership of that coordination, including the development of educational and outreach materials and the hosting of a website that aggregates HRPG Best Practices-related material to a single but widely available source. Other stakeholders, such as voice service providers and governmental entities, can contribute to this effort.

## Voice Service Providers

1. As the HRPG notes, voice service providers have already taken anti-robocall actions that benefit hospitals and a number of best practices or elements of the best practices relate to measures that are (or soon will be) in place.[[39]](#footnote-41) For example, the Commission has authorized blocking of likely illegal calls as a default before they ever reach consumers;[[40]](#footnote-42) required the implementation of the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication framework in the Internet Protocol (IP) portions of their networks;[[41]](#footnote-43) instituted affirmative requirements for all voice service providers that are intended to combat unlawful robocalls;[[42]](#footnote-44) and required implementation by certain providers of robocall mitigation programs.[[43]](#footnote-45) The Commission has also established a Robocall Mitigation Database[[44]](#footnote-46) and has proposed a new online portal for provider information sharing related to robocalls.[[45]](#footnote-47) Voice service providers are participating in USTelecom’s ITG for conducting tracebacks of unlawful robocalls,[[46]](#footnote-48) and provide continued education and outreach to consumers about managing robocall risk.[[47]](#footnote-49)
2. The overarching theme of the HRPG’s remaining Best Practices for voice service providers, whether for prevention or for response and mitigation, involves dynamic interaction and collaboration between voice service providers and their hospital customers, both ahead of any robocall event and, for an event that is occurring, from as early in the cycle of that event as possible through to its end.[[48]](#footnote-50) For example, the HRPG recommends that voice service providers should prioritize hospitals in their unlawful robocall response and remediation efforts and establish a rapid notification method to ensure that hospitals can expeditiously notify the voice service provider about the receipt of unlawful robocalls. Voice service providers should also establish a similar method to ensure that hospitals can expeditiously notify the voice service provider about outgoing phone calls being blocked, unauthenticated, or misidentified, and should actively cooperate with the ITG or successor traceback consortium as mandated by the FCC and initiate traceback requests on behalf of hospital entities as appropriate.[[49]](#footnote-51) Most importantly, the HRPG recommended that voice service providers provide hospitals access to materials and opportunities for education and guidance related to preventing the receipt of and mitigating unlawful robocalls.[[50]](#footnote-52)
3. Adoption of these remaining best practices would satisfy the general best practice recommendation that voice service providers prioritize their hospital customers. Truly effective adoption of these remaining best practices, however, will require two things. The first is a uniform approach to the creation of generally applicable best practices such as a rapid notification system and educational and guidance materials. The second is development of outreach and information distribution methods to ensure that hospitals are aware of these offerings by voice service providers and know how to take advantage of them. An effective way for voice service providers to ensure adoption of a uniform approach to the best practices is to participate in industry forums hosted by their representative organizations or by other stakeholders. For example, on May 20, 2021, HRPG members John Riggi, Senior Advisor for Cybersecurity and Risk for the American Hospital Association and Rebekah Johnson, Founder & CEO of Numeracle, participated in a webinar that discussed the HRPG Best Practices and how voice providers and other stakeholders could adopt them.[[51]](#footnote-53) The Commission, individual voice service providers, or organizations such as USTelecom could host similar forums or workshops.
4. Voice service providers can then facilitate implementation and adoption of these anti-robocall services by their hospital customers by regularly educating them. By taking steps to encourage hospitals’ awareness of the features that voice service providers have developed to combat unlawful robocalls, voice service providers will have engaged in the collaboration necessary to effectuate adoption by hospitals of both the preventive and remediation anti-robocall services and features offered by voice service providers. Voice service providers can reach out to individual hospital customers through educational materials, training, webinars and forums and can provide more general outreach by linking to these materials on their websites. As discussed below, a website hosted by a hospital industry organization that aggregates HRPG Best Practices-related materials for hospitals could provide links to such materials.

## Hospitals

1. The HRPG Best Practices recommendations for hospitals similarly involve increasing stakeholder awareness through the development of educational and training materials. For example, the HRPG recommends that hospitals may prevent robocalls by training staff on how to identify incoming robocalls and how to avoid them. The HRPG Best practices also urge hospitals to learn how to collect data concerning robocall events and manage that information to minimize risk, and to develop internal governance processes to enable effective coordination and collaboration with service providers, law enforcement, and hospital industry professionals concerning robocall events.[[52]](#footnote-54) Finally, the HRPG Best Practices also focus on sharing and publicizing information to inform hospitals of the best practices and educate them on how they can be adopted and implemented.
2. As we discuss above, education and outreach are the most effective ways to facilitate the voluntary adoption of the HRPG Best Practices by hospitals. Facilitating such successful training and outreach can best be achieved if the national organizations that serve hospitals and have the greatest incentive to ensure that hospitals and their patients are protected from unlawful robocalls, such as the AHA, ASHRM and CHIME, take primary responsibility for developing and distributing educational materials and by providing training opportunities for hospitals and their staffs. Representatives from state and federal agencies (including the FCC) and voice service providers could assist hospital organizations by appearing at conferences such as the ASHRM Annual Conference in October 2021[[53]](#footnote-55) to brief hospital security administrators on issues such as the benefits of adopting the HRPG Best Practices and recent Commission actions taken to curtail illegal robocalls.
3. A particularly effective way of reaching the greatest number of hospitals would be for organization such as the AHA, ASHRM or CHIME to host a website that would aggregate the Best Practices, training materials, links to webinars, and other anti-robocall resources into a single forum. Other stakeholders, such as voice service providers, the Commission, the FTC and state government agencies could contribute to this effort by providing materials to the site’s host and by linking to the website on their own websites. The website would be a highly visible platform that hospitals could use to promote widespread adoption of the Best Practices. The website could also provide publicly available information on how voice service providers protect their hospital customers from unlawful robocalls and inform hospitals of federal and state agency actions to curtail illegal robocalls.
4. An informational anti-robocall website hosted by a major hospital industry organization could be a critical driver for assembling and disseminating the kind of information called for by the HRPG to the affected stakeholders. Hospitals and their risk managers, having access to robocall prevention (as well as response and mitigation) information would be in position to make informed choices about how to prevent robocalls from entering their environments, including through services offered by voice service providers or third parties, but also through techniques and activities they can take themselves within their facilities to prevent unlawful robocalls. Similarly, voice service providers and organization such as US Telecom, the AHA, ASHRM or CHIME can develop enterprise customer guides, comparable to Commission-developed consumer guides, to direct hospitals and their risk managers to the HRPG Best Practices as well as provide them resource information and other useful tips to enhance their risk prevention and mitigation efforts.[[54]](#footnote-56)

## Federal and State Governments

1. The HRPG Best Practices recognize that the Commission, other Federal agencies and the states already have taken many important actions to stop unlawful robocalls.[[55]](#footnote-57) In addition to its various regulatory actions, the Commission has taken aggressive enforcement action against unlawful robocallers.[[56]](#footnote-58) Other federal agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), have also taken steps to stop unlawful robocalls.[[57]](#footnote-59) States similarly have actively worked with industry on robocall mitigation, as demonstrated by the State Attorneys General-Providers Anti-Robocall Principles, which focus on bolstering technological capabilities to improve enforcement against illegal robocallers with the assistance of voice service providers.[[58]](#footnote-60) States have also been active in various enforcement actions against illegal robocallers and voice service providers.[[59]](#footnote-61)
2. The HRPG Best Practices recommend that federal and state governments continue, and even expand efforts to enforce existing laws, rules, and policies against voice service providers that allow unlawful traffic to originate on or be transmitted through their networks or calling platforms.[[60]](#footnote-62) HRPG further recommends that federal and state governments “create and implement balanced policies that facilitate industry’s ability to prevent unlawful robocalls from reaching hospitals.”[[61]](#footnote-63)
3. We agree with USTelecom that “the HRPG Best Practices for federal and state government entities highlight the existent policies and aggressive enforcement posture that are proving effective in the fight against illegal robocalls – whether to hospitals or to other end users, including consumers.”[[62]](#footnote-64) We therefore find that the kinds of policy developments called for by HRPG, including those related to the balancing of such policies toward facilitating industry’s unlawful robocall preventative capabilities, are not only capable of being facilitated, but to a great extent either are already in place or are ongoing, and we intend to regularly assess their effectiveness.[[63]](#footnote-65)
4. Equally important to enforcing current laws and promoting balanced robocall prevention policies, however, is the HRPG’s recommendation that Federal and state governments and agencies develop clear and concise robocall education materials for hospitals that explain the different types of robocalls and robocall events, how hospitals should collect robocall data in order to report any event to law enforcement or to seek a traceback, and to provide guidance to hospitals about which law enforcement agencies hospitals should contact to report unlawful robocalls.[[64]](#footnote-66)
5. As the HRPG notes, successful voluntary adoption of the best practices will require a coordinated response by stakeholders. We believe such collaboration is an evolving process that involves not only dynamic networking among stakeholders and the creation and dissemination of educational and outreach materials, but also an ongoing review of the collaboration to be sure it continues to facilitate the voluntary adoption of the HRPG Best Practices. The Commission, the FTC, state agencies and industry partners can contribute to this coordination by utilizing their collective experience in creating educational materials and conducting robocalls-related outreach.[[65]](#footnote-67)
6. There is a wealth of education and outreach material that the Commission, the FTC and state governments have produced that hospital groups such as the AHA may adapt or otherwise model for use by hospitals. For example, the Commission’s “Push to Combat Robocalls & Spoofing” website, consumer guides on its “Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts” and “Caller ID Spoofing” websites and Consumer Help Center all could be used as the basis for materials that a hospital group can adapt to help hospitals combat unlawful robocalls.[[66]](#footnote-68) The Commission could also aid by, for example, adding AHA- adapted materials, specific to hospital robocalls, to its rural tour curriculum[[67]](#footnote-69) as well as to presentations to national organizations.[[68]](#footnote-70) Finally, reference to these materials can be included on the Commission’s HRPG and fcc.gov/robocalls websites.
7. With respect to these and related educational efforts, the Commission could encourage federal and state agency stakeholders, most if not all of which already are collaboratively acting to combat unlawful robocalls across the nation,[[69]](#footnote-71) to continue those effective efforts with the needs of hospitals and associated HRPG Best Practices in mind.

# Conclusion

1. For the reasons stated above, the Commission concludes that voluntary adoption of the HRPG Best Practices to protect hospitals and other institutions from unlawful robocalls can best be facilitated through the forms of education and outreach identified in this assessment.

# Procedural Matters

1. For further information, please contact Aliza Katz, Attorney Advisor, Intergovernmental Affairs Division, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-1737 or by email at [aliza.katz@fcc.gov](mailto:aliza.katz@fcc.gov).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

**APPENDIX**

Hospital robocall protection group (hrpg)

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# Executive Summary

Hospitals receive fraudulent, disruptive and nuisance robocalls that flood their communications networks. While similar to unlawful robocalls received by consumers generally, the significant difference with hospital-related robocalls is the impact these calls can have on public health and safety to patients and the community. Hospitals can fall victim to a variety of unlawful calling schemes, ranging from telephone denial-of-service attacks to targeted social engineering to phishing and vishing schemes to more general unlawful robocall campaigns that happen to reach hospital numbers. These and other malicious calling activities can disrupt hospitals’ critical communications and render hospitals unable to place or receive telephone calls, threaten patients’ privacy, facilitate unauthorized access to prescription drugs, and divert hospital resources.

In response to the problem of unlawful robocalls, Congress passed the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act, or TRACED Act, in December 2019. The TRACED Act in turn directed the Federal Communications Commission to establish a Hospital Robocall Protection Group (HRPG), a Federal Advisory Committee that the FCC established in June 2020.

The communications industry has taken proactive steps to stop unlawful robocalls, resulting in billions of unlawful and unwanted calls blocked each year. Hospitals too can take preventative steps to protect their infrastructure and personnel. Federal and State enforcement agencies have taken numerous actions to go after those responsible for unlawful robocalls as well. However, efforts by any single entity or group will not prevent robocalls to hospitals. Therefore, collective efforts and coordination between hospitals, government agencies, and voice service providers are critical to the success of unlawful robocall prevention and mitigation efforts. To that end, and consistent with the requirements of the TRACED Act, this report provides the best practices recommendations developed within the HRPG’s three working groups on how voice service providers, hospitals, and Federal and State government agencies can take action together to combat unlawful robocalls made to hospitals. The recommendations for each group are divided into two sections: (1) prevention and (2) response and mitigation.

***Voice service providers.*** To better combat unlawful robocalls made to hospitals, voice service providers serving hospitals should engage in the following:

Prevention

* Implement STIR/SHAKEN on the IP portions of their networks
* Have appropriate procedures in place to ensure compliance with applicable laws
* Confirm the identity of and properly vet their customers
* Analyze, identify, and monitor traffic on their network for patterns consistent with unlawful robocalls
* Offer call blocking and call labeling services
* Provide materials and opportunities for education and guidance to hospitals

Response and Mitigation

* Prioritize hospital entities as appropriate in response and remediation efforts
* Establish a method to ensure hospitals can expeditiously notify the provider about unlawful robocalls that interfere with patient care and hospital operations
* Initiate tracebacks as appropriate

***Hospitals.*** To better protect themselves from unlawful robocalls, hospitals should:

Prevention

* Engage in education and raise awareness regarding robocall incidents, including through staff training and preparing robocall incident response plans
* Explore available robocall blocking and labeling capabilities offered by voice service providers
* Manage telephone number resources, including by reporting spoofing of the hospital’s numbers and isolating critical phone lines

Response and Mitigation

* Evaluate a given robocall event and capture relevant information about the calling activity
* Contact internal engineers or technicians to implement immediate configuration changes and safeguards within premises-based equipment after an incident
* Coordinate with federal and state agencies as appropriate

***Federal and State Governments.*** Government agencies should continue to expand their efforts to prevent robocalls from reaching hospitals and other end users, and specifically should:

Prevention

* + Create and implement balanced policies that facilitate industry’s ability to prevent unlawful robocalls from reaching hospitals
  + Enforce existing laws, rules, and policies against voice service providers that originate unlawful robocalls as well as those that fail to take sufficient steps to mitigate the transmission of such calls
  + Develop clear and concise hospital education materials

Response and Mitigation

* Improve communication methods between hospitals and law enforcement agencies, and establish information sharing methods across all relevant enforcement agencies
* Actively monitor complaints from hospitals and engage in prompt outreach to providers and agencies who can assist in response
* Make prioritized referrals to the Industry Traceback Group and coordinate traceback response among law enforcement partners

# Introduction and Background

## Establishment of HRPG

In December 2019, Congress passed the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act, or TRACED Act, to further empower industry and government agencies in the fight against unlawful robocalls.[[70]](#footnote-72) In recognition of some of the unique risks posed by unlawful robocalls to hospitals, the TRACED Act directed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to establish a Hospital Robocall Protection Group (HRPG),[[71]](#footnote-73) which the agency announced in March 2020.[[72]](#footnote-74)

The HRPG’s objective is to serve as a resource to all stakeholders involved in preventing the receipt of unlawful robocalls by hospitals and patients and mitigating their effect. Included in this report is background information on the different types of unlawful robocalls that hospitals may receive and the numerous ongoing efforts by industry and government to address such calls.[[73]](#footnote-75) The best practice recommendations are arranged to cover voice service providers, hospitals, and Federal and State governments. The best practice recommendations are further separated into two broad categories (1) Prevention and (2) Response & Mitigation.

## Structure of HRPG

### 14(b) Membership Structure

As required by Section 14(b) of the TRACED Act, the HRPG consists of an equal number from the following categories:

* Voice service providers that serve hospitals.
* Companies that focus on mitigating unlawful robocalls.
* Consumer advocacy organizations.
* Providers of one-way voice over internet protocol services described in subsection (e)(3)(B)(ii) of the TRACED Act.
* Hospitals.
* State government officials focused on combating unlawful robocalls. [[74]](#footnote-76)

Section 14(b) also required the HRPG to include:

* One representative of the Federal Communications Commission.
* One representative of the Federal Trade Commission.[[75]](#footnote-77)

### Section 14(c) Best Practices

In Section 14(c) of the TRACED Act, Congress directed that the HRPG issue best practices regarding:

* How voice service providers can better combat unlawful robocalls made to hospitals.
* How hospitals can better protect themselves from such calls, including by using unlawful robocall mitigation techniques.
* How the Federal Government and State governments can help combat such calls.

The HRPG held its first meeting on July 27, 2020. Three working groups were formed to make recommendations for voice service providers, hospitals and government agencies. [[76]](#footnote-78)

## The Impact of Robocalls on Hospitals

Hospitals receive fraudulent, disruptive and nuisance robocalls flooding communication networks and annoying calls to patient rooms. While similar to unlawful robocalls received by consumers generally and other organizations, the significant difference with hospital-related robocalls is the impact these calls can have on public health and safety to patients and the community due to the possible disruption of patient care services. For example, a robocall attack disrupted all communication on a Rhode Island-based healthcare company’s five lines for 30 consecutive minutes in 2017; one hospital received more than 4,500 robocalls in just two hours in 2018; another hospital had 6,500 calls spoofed to look like internal calls tying up approximately 65 hours of response time of hospital employees over 90 days; and that same hospital also experienced about 300 robocalls spoofing numbers affiliated with the Department of Justice seeking to extract sensitive information from hospital physicians.[[77]](#footnote-79)

Hospitals and medical professionals also are subject to sophisticated phishing schemes, often for unlawful drug activities. For instance, fraudsters have contacted medical and pharmacy professionals pretending to be a state’s Board of Medicine or Board of Pharmacy, or even the FBI, to extract information or financial resources.[[78]](#footnote-80) Robocalls and other malicious calling activity can disrupt hospitals’ critical communications and render hospitals unable to place or receive telephone calls, threaten patients’ privacy, facilitate unauthorized access to prescription drugs, and divert resources that otherwise would be devoted to quality care and improving patient outcomes. Robocallers also routinely trade on hospitals’ names and reputations—and their phone numbers through unlawful spoofing—in order to scam consumers, resulting in even more calls to the hospitals from those confused consumers.

Hospitals can take many preventative steps to protect their infrastructure and personnel, working with service providers, which can be achieved through effective policies, procedures, technology, and education. Despite the preventative steps outlined in this report for hospitals, fraudulent actors will inevitably be able to circumvent these protections in some instances. It is therefore vital that hospitals have a plan to respond to an active robocall event in collaboration with their voice service providers and, in some cases, appropriate government agencies, to mitigate the impact of such calls.

There are several distinct types of unlawful calls that can impact hospitals and patients. The appropriate response to such calls will be different depending on the type of call(s) involved as discussed in the recommendations below.

Types of unlawful robocalls include:

* **Telephone denial-of-service attack (TDoS).** A TDoS attack is an intentional attack to disrupt the telephony/voice service communications of an organization by flooding the network with multiple simultaneous calls. A TDoS may involve caller ID spoofing. A TDoS attack against a hospital could be conducted for extortion or other nefarious purposes such as attempts to obtain personal identifiable information, extort money, harass, or for some other economic gain. The goal of the attacker may simply be disruption, but it is more common that it is an extortion attempt where the attacker demands a ransom to stop the attack. A TDoS attack usually involves spoofing the calling number frequently enough to make the calls difficult to differentiate from legitimate calls. The target could be patient rooms, but more often is a key phone number needed to serve the public, such as for the Emergency Room or Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The victim of TDoS is normally the hospital, but may be personnel or patients.[[79]](#footnote-81)
* **Targeted social engineering calls.** Social engineering calls, though less frequent than general unlawful or nuisance robocalls, are potentially damaging calls designed to steal information. The goal is to gather sensitive, financial, or information technology (IT) information. The goal may also be to steal some bit of information to be used in a larger data attack. For instance, social engineering calls may seek information about the hospital organization, names and phone numbers of key personnel, email addresses, and information about computer systems, among other data. These calls are very difficult to detect and usually go unreported. The victim of targeted social engineering calls is the hospital.
* **Phishing also known as vishing.**[[80]](#footnote-82)Bad actors may use social engineering techniques to try to steal information and credentials from hospital workers in order to, for example, obtain prescription drugs fraudulently. Such attacks tend to be targeted—including sophisticated attacks targeting individual staff members—and rely on caller ID spoofing to hide the caller’s identity in favor of impersonating a more trusted one. The victim of targeted phishing/vishing calls is the hospital.
* **Hospital impersonation.** Consumers regularly receive calls attempting to impersonate some individual or organization, such as the Social Security Administration (SSA), a medical equipment company, an insurance company, or another part of the hospital system. These calls attempt to steal personal information or actual funds, and include hospital-specific impersonation scams where a patient is called and tricked or coerced into giving up personal and financial information. In such a scam, a hospital telephone’s number could be spoofed. Hospital impersonation campaigns often intend to defraud current and former patients of the hospital through billing and collection schemes, requests for donations, or the request for personally identifiable information to be used in subsequent identity theft-related frauds. Although these calls do not directly target the hospital, they can lead to recipients contacting the hospital about calls the hospital never made, and expose the hospital to potential negative publicity, regulatory scrutiny and reputational harm. The victim of impersonation scams is the patient and/or hospital personnel.
* **General unlawful robocall campaigns.** General unlawful robocall campaigns rely on automatic dialing to blast mass numbers of prerecorded scam calls to as many potential victims as possible. The calls, which frequently originate from outside the United States, often seek to defraud recipients by, for example, claiming to be from a government agency or legitimate business and suggest that the recipient must take some immediate action to avoid a financial penalty or to be eligible for a benefit. In addition to being fraudulent, such calls also very often violate various criminal laws governing calling parties, such as the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and the Truth in Caller ID Act, the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), and similar state laws. While general unlawful robocalls may not specifically target hospitals, they can tie up hospital lines and resources. In addition, patients and staff at hospitals, like any other recipient of the call, can fall victim of robocall scams.
* **Nuisance and disruptive robocalls.** Some robocalls are placed to consumers who wish to receive them (medical appointment reminders, fraud alerts from banks, etc.). Many calls are also made to consumers attempting to sell some product, service, or information. With appropriate consent, as governed by relevant federal and state laws, such calls may not be unlawful, but they are very often unwanted. These calls can irritate patients and reduce hospital personnel productivity and can consume hospital voice system resources. Nuisance robocalls are starting to become more common in hospitals, as they are a lucrative target. The victim of nuisance robocalls is the patient/hospital personnel.[[81]](#footnote-83)

## Industry Efforts to Stop Unlawful Robocalls

The communications industry has taken proactive steps to stop unlawful robocalls. Voice service providers are increasingly monitoring and analyzing their traffic to look for evidence of suspicious activity that may suggest unlawful calling patterns and taking action to address unlawful traffic activity when discovered. Voice service providers and third-party analytics companies offer customers a variety of powerful options for call blocking and labeling. Most large voice service providers offer default blocking to block apparently fraudulent calls and many providers also offer additional blocking and labeling options to their subscribers.[[82]](#footnote-84) These services collectively block billions of unlawful and unwanted calls to American consumers each year.[[83]](#footnote-85)

In addition, voice service providers have been actively deploying the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication framework.[[84]](#footnote-86) By the end of 2019, AT&T, Bandwidth, Charter, Comcast, Cox, T-Mobile, and Verizon announced that they had upgraded their networks to support STIR/SHAKEN, and several others had performed necessary network upgrades and were in the process of negotiating and testing the exchange of authenticated traffic with other voice service providers.[[85]](#footnote-87) Since that time, these and other providers are even further along in their deployments.[[86]](#footnote-88)

As of November 11, 2020, the Secure Telephone Identity Policy Administrator has approved 57 service providers to start using the industry process to receive certificates and exchange STIR/SHAKEN enabled traffic.[[87]](#footnote-89)

Voice service providers, through USTelecom’s Industry Traceback Group (ITG), also conduct tracebacks of unlawful robocalls.[[88]](#footnote-90) A traceback is a process to trace a suspected unlawful robocall to its source, even if the calling number is spoofed. For tracing back a call that traverses multiple providers’ networks, the process begins with the voice service provider that terminated the suspected unlawful robocall, and then the call is systematically traced back chronologically from provider to provider. When the ITG process identifies the originator of suspicious robocalls, or a U.S. Point of Entry routinely responsible for bringing unlawful traffic into the United States, USTelecom’s ITG traceback team seeks to work with providers to mitigate the unlawful traffic, such as stopping the traffic and enhancing robocall mitigation measures going forward. When that traffic goes unmitigated, USTelecom may provide information to downstream carriers, as well as appropriate enforcement agencies, about the source of the unlawful traffic.[[89]](#footnote-91) The ITG currently conducts approximately 250 tracebacks per month, focusing on the highest volume unlawful robocall campaigns (a single traceback can be representative of millions of calls being made by a single party) and high-impact calls (i.e.calls that may not be high volume but are responsible for serious and ongoing fraud, such as an apparent TDoS attack).

### Case Study: Stopping a Hospital TDoS Attack in Real Time

In October 2020, the industry successfully worked with a hospital to stop a TDoS attack targeting the hospital, possibly for cyber extortion. On October 15, a major metropolitan hospital’s emergency department first started receiving robocalls at a high rate, which overloaded the hospital’s emergency telephone lines. After unsuccessful attempts to stop the unwanted calls on its phone system, the hospital contacted the AT&T GFMO (Global Fraud Management Organization), and the calls were stopped the next day. When the hospital started to receive the robocalls, now on an additional number, again less than a week later, it contacted AT&T right away. Aggressive industry action stopped the calls that same day.   
  
The initial calls to the emergency lines had displayed invalid numbers, spoofed numbers or no number. When those calls were answered, the caller asked for a person that was supposed to be an employee, but the name provided was not a current or past employee. The caller then demanded gift cards, before launching the attack. Because the numbers were spoofed, merely blocking the numbers in the hospital’s phone system was insufficient to halt the attack – the attacker simply changed to a new spoofed number. The AT&T team, in contrast, was able to rapidly identify the upstream carrier and get the carrier to cease sending the traffic. In addition, the ITG initiated tracebacks for both of the TDoS attacks, identifying the source of the attacks as a company in India. The Indian company has since been blocked by the providers that took its traffic, and a case referral to the FBI is underway.

In addition to these provider-driven efforts, voice service providers across the industry have been actively coordinating with government agencies at the federal and state level. Such coordination is essential for government enforcement where industry is often able to provide information essential to government efforts to crack down on unlawful callers.

## Government Regulatory and Enforcement Activity to Stop Unlawful Robocalls

Stopping unlawful robocalls is the FCC’s top consumer protection priority,[[90]](#footnote-92) and the FCC has taken a multi-pronged approach to do so. In recent years, the FCC has taken aggressive enforcement action against unlawful robocallers,[[91]](#footnote-93) authorized voice service providers to block by default unlawful and unwanted calls in several contexts,[[92]](#footnote-94) mandated implementation of the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication framework to help reduce unlawful spoofing,[[93]](#footnote-95) and designated USTelecom’s ITG as the single consortium registered to conduct private-led traceback efforts to identify the origins of suspected unlawful robocalls.[[94]](#footnote-96) Several of the FCC’s robocall-related proceedings are ongoing.

Other federal agencies also have taken important actions to stop unlawful robocalls. Earlier this year, the Department of Justice filed the first-of-their-kind enforcement actions against Voice over IP (VoIP) providers that were carrying fraudulent robocall traffic into the United States and onto the U.S. telephone network.[[95]](#footnote-97) The FTC also has targeted VoIP providers responsible for unlawful robocall traffic.[[96]](#footnote-98) The FTC, in conjunction with the FCC and with the support of the ITG, also sent letters to multiple VoIP companies this year for their involvement in fraudulent calls related to the coronavirus.[[97]](#footnote-99) Additionally, the Department of Justice investigates and prosecutes a variety of crimes which may be related either directly or indirectly to robocall schemes, including cyber- crimes.[[98]](#footnote-100)

States also have been active, both by working with industry on robocall mitigation and by bringing enforcement actions against bad actors. Fifteen voice service providers joined all fifty-one State Attorneys General (AGs) in developing and committing to eight anti-robocall principles, including implementing call authentication, analyzing and monitoring network traffic, and investigating suspicious calls and calling platforms, among others.[[99]](#footnote-101) State enforcement actions have targeted both robocallers and voice service providers that unlawfully allow unlawful robocalls to traverse their networks.[[100]](#footnote-102) The Ohio AG joined the FTC in its case against a VoIP provider routing unlawful robocalls,[[101]](#footnote-103) and eight states recently sued a robocaller out of Texas that allegedly generated over a billion robocalls to consumers across the country.[[102]](#footnote-104)

All of the actions taken above by voice service providers and government agencies to prevent unlawful robocalling will benefit hospitals. Thus, in addition to identifying recommendations unique to hospitals, particularly those things hospitals can do themselves, a key focus in these recommendations is to ensure that hospitals are aware of the relevant ongoing activities outside of their control and can take advantage of them where appropriate and in a timely fashion. It is important to recognize that while hospital coordination with government agencies and voice service providers to address robocall incidents is of critical importance, voice service providers and government agencies cannot prevent all robocalls. All stakeholders must work together in a coordinated manner, prioritizing resources consistent with the recommendations below, to effectively prevent and mitigate the impact of unlawful robocalls.

# RECOMMENDED Best Practices

Billions of robocalls are placed every month to American consumers, a substantial portion of which are unlawful.[[103]](#footnote-105) As described above, many unlawful robocalls directly target hospitals and hospital patients. Therefore, while it is inevitable that some unlawful calls will get through, it is essential that voice service providers, hospitals, and federal and state government agencies take preventative steps to reduce the number of unlawful robocalls received by hospitals.

Despite preventative efforts by all stakeholders, unlawful robocalls will get through to hospitals and patients. Therefore, it is essential that voice service providers, hospitals, and federal and state government agencies are prepared to rapidly respond to active robocall events and to consider longer-term remediation efforts post-event. Consistent with section 14(c) of the TRACED Act, below are recommended best practices to respond to and remediate unlawful robocalls to hospitals.

## How Voice Service Providers Can Better Combat Unlawful Robocalls Made to Hospitals

### Prevention

The following are prevention techniques that voice service providers can engage in to combat unlawful robocalls made to hospitals.

* **Implement STIR/SHAKEN**.  All voice service providers providing hospitals with wireline, wireless, or VoIP telephony (“Voice Services”) should implement the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework on the IP portions of their networks.[[104]](#footnote-106)
* **Engage in Compliance**.  All voice service providers providing hospitals with Voice Services should have appropriate procedures in place to ensure compliance with applicable laws.
* **Confirm Customer Identity.** All voice service providers providing hospitals with Voice Services should follow the North American Numbering Council Call Authentication Trust Anchor Working Group recommendations, titled “Best Practices for the Implementation of Call Authentication Frameworks,” with respect to the vetting of subscribers and/or customers.[[105]](#footnote-107)
* **Analyze, Identify, and Monitor Network Traffic.** All voice service providers providing hospitals with Voice Services should follow the North American Numbering Council Call Authentication Trust Anchor Working Group recommendations, titled “Best Practices for the Implementation of Call Authentication Frameworks,” with respect to analyzing voice network traffic to identify and monitor patterns consistent with unlawful robocalls.[[106]](#footnote-108)
* **Offer Call Blocking and Call Labeling Services.** All voice service providers providing hospitals with Voice Services should offer call blocking and call labeling services, to the extent such enterprise services are available and able to be implemented by hospitals, consistent with any relevant FCC guidance. Voice service providers should work with individual hospital entities to assist them with implementing call blocking and labeling services consistent with hospital individual needs.
* **Support Education and Guidance for Voice Services.** All voice service providers providing hospitals with Voice Services should provide hospitals access to materials and opportunities for education and guidance related to preventing the receipt of and mitigating unlawful robocalls.

### Response and Mitigation

The following are response and mitigation techniques that voice service providers can engage in to combat unlawful robocalls made to hospitals.

* **Prioritize Hospital Entities**. Recognizing that other entities (i.e., public safety agencies) as well as the severity of a campaign’s consumer impact (e.g., a campaign successfully scamming seniors of their life savings) may also require prioritization, all voice service providers providing hospitals with Voice Services should (1) prioritize hospitals in their response and remediation efforts relating to unlawful robocalls and (2) utilize methods that alleviate burdens, including, but not limited to, administrative and operational burdens, in response and remediation efforts, for hospitals to the extent possible.
* **Enable Immediate Inbound Issue Notification**. All voice service providers providing hospitals with Voice Services should establish a method to ensure hospitals can expeditiously notify the voice service provider about the receipt of unlawful robocalls and other communications that interfere with the delivery of patient care and/or other hospital operations.
* **Enable Immediate Outbound Issue Notification**. All voice service providers providing hospitals with Voice Services should likewise establish a method to ensure that hospitals can expeditiously notify the voice service provider about outgoing phone calls being blocked, unauthenticated, or misidentified.
* **Initiate Tracebacks**. All voice service providers providing hospitals with Voice Services should actively cooperate with USTelecom’s ITG or successor traceback consortium as mandated by the FCC and initiate traceback requests on behalf of hospital entities as appropriate.[[107]](#footnote-109)

## How Hospitals Can Better Protect Themselves From Unlawful Robocalls

### Prevention

#### Education and Awareness

Hospital staff are likely the first to become aware of fraudulent, disruptive or nuisance robocall activity within the hospital and health systems. Training staff to identify and respond to robocall activity will reduce the impact to the patients and personnel of the hospital. The following recommendations are focused on areas for hospitals to establish education and awareness of an event to prevent harm and initiate mitigation tactics.

* **Train staff.** Train staff to identify the different types of robocalls and recognize possible unlawful calls, the nature of these attacks, and how to protect against scams. At minimum, the staff should include security, compliance, and staff members who will answer phones.
* **Gather data.** Define key data for staff to gather including the date/time of the calls, number being dialed, type of calls (recording or live person), volume of calls, CallerID displayed, and the content of the message.
* **Protect data.** Remind staff of their obligation to protect personally identifiable information (PII) and Protected Health Information (PHI).
* **Be prepared to coordinate with voice service providers and law enforcement.**
  + Establish a governance process, policies and procedures on how the hospital will work with voice service providers and law enforcement agencies.
  + Establish a plan with your voice service provider for actions to take during and after an event. Discussions might include voice service providers as well as facility equipment vendors (i.e. the telephone system provider). Those involved should be aware that some robocall events are auto-programmed to dial a complete range (block) of numbers.
  + Determine internally through legal, compliance, and executive review the willingness of the hospital to report, work with and assist federal and state law enforcement agencies in the investigation and prosecution of robocall schemes, including the acceptance of potential publicity related to the matter upon investigation and prosecution.
  + Work with internal security, cybersecurity, and telecom staff to establish procedures on the identification and gathering of technical and non-technical information related to the robocalls which may be used as evidence in a subsequent criminal or civil investigation and enforcement actions.
  + Identify and establish relationships with designated points of contact with appropriate representatives of federal and state law enforcement and regulatory agencies[[108]](#footnote-110) and an understanding of how your hospital will cooperate.
  + Require staff to report internally to the appropriate function designated to collect the robocall information.
  + Have information available for patients and staff should they become a victim of a robocall scheme resulting in fraud or identity theft.[[109]](#footnote-111)
  + Consider joining threat intelligence and information sharing organizations which offer contacts, resources, and information sharing between private industry and government, such as the FBI sponsored InfraGard[[110]](#footnote-112) program, the Health-Information Sharing and Analysis Center,[[111]](#footnote-113) and the American Hospital Association.[[112]](#footnote-114)

#### Mitigation Tactics and Tools

Perimeter defense and network monitoring are critical strategies to protect hospital networks from unlawful robocalls. Not unlike security perimeter defense, tools exist to identify unlawful traffic and stop it before infiltrating the network. Even with sophisticated solutions, bad actors can still circumvent perimeter defenses. Monitoring of telephony networks will identify activity so mitigation tactics can be deployed to prevent further harm.

The following recommendations are actions hospitals and health systems can take to implement tools and technologies to assist with robocall fraud prevention.

* **Explore available robocall blocking capabilities.**  The hospital and voice service provider can review possible robocall blocking solutions within the hospital or provider’s network to stop inbound calling from specific numbers. This may include requesting a temporary block on a number used in a TDoS attack.
* **Identify fraudulent, disruptive or nuisance robocalls.** Review with your voice service provider the current services that may be available for call labeling and blocking. Identify appropriate contact information with your provider and how to respond to an event, including a description of the data hospitals should collect during an event (date/time of the calls, number being dialed, type of calls (recording or live person), volume of calls, CallerID being displayed, and the content of the message). Review third party offerings that may be available/installed in the hospital environment to assist in detecting and stopping unlawful robocall events.
* **Telephony management.** Not only do hospitals need to be aware of fraudulent, disruptive or nuisance robocall attacks against their network, the identity of a hospital can be compromised.
  + **Spoofing of Hospital number**. Until STIR/SHAKEN is fully deployed and adopted, a hospital’s number can be unlawfully spoofed. Through staff training, unlawful spoofing can be identified through random complaints reported from individuals receiving calls not originated by the hospital. When this occurs, staff should capture the dialed number, date and time of calls, and content of the robocall if available. Report the spoofing event to the voice service provider and coordinate with the provider for possible initiation of a traceback request.
  + **Segregation of numbers.** Review and identify configuration of critical and non-critical lines. Discuss with your telephone system engineer or technician possible configuration changes to isolate critical phone lines from administrative and other lines, taking into consideration hunt-groups, busy, or no-answer rollover to other lines, etc. Prevent an overload of non-critical lines from rolling-over to lines answered by key personnel.

### Response and Mitigation

The following steps are recommended for responding to fraudulent, disruptive or nuisance robocall activity within the hospital network. This covers the bare minimum strategies to be implemented.

* **Evaluate the event**. 
  + Determine the type of robocall event.[[113]](#footnote-115) If unclear, consider reporting incident to law enforcement for determination.
  + Determine if the identified event is an isolated event or a part of a campaign of robocalls.
  + Capture the following information:
    - most recent dates and times of the calls;
    - CallerID number displayed;
    - caller name displayed;
    - frequency of calls;
    - volume of calls;
    - examples of call content; and
    - toll-free telephone number or other telephone number provided for call back by the calling party.
  + Confirm the dialed number(s) the calls are routing to within the network.
  + Are one or more numbers receiving calls, possibly an entire range of numbers? If so, what are the numbers?
  + Identify the voice service provider for the numbers being dialed. 
    - The voice service provider can assist in researching/stopping the calls.
  + Retain call logs and IP logs where available.
* **Implement internal controls**. 
  + Contact the hospital’s internal telecom engineers or technicians to implement configuration changes and safeguards within the premise-based equipment
    - Block spoofed numbers where applicable.
    - Route to a single line extension to avoid disruption or limit the number of calls into a line extension to isolate critical phone lines.
    - Separate the affected phone number from other critical trunks, which may require coordination with the PBX provider/maintainer.
* **Coordinate with federal and state agencies as appropriate.**

Hospitals should be familiar with the different types of unlawful robocalls they may receive and which types of calls should be shared with government agencies, directly or via their service provider, to assist in responding to or remediating such calls (whether a real-time event or a cumulative nuisance issue). Federal and state law enforcement agencies may be able to assist hospitals when it has been determined that the robocalls the hospitals are receiving constitute a violation of federal or state law, whether the calls themselves represent a violation of the law or the calls are made in furtherance of another crime (i.e., wire fraud).

Calls designed to elicit sensitive, non-public or protected information such as personally identifiable information or protected health information may constitute multiple violations of federal and state civil and/or criminal laws. Likewise, social engineering calls designed to deceive the recipient into providing sensitive information to be used in the commission of another crime, such a healthcare fraud or various telemarketing frauds, would also warrant law enforcement notification.

For example, a caller may attempt to connect to a patient room and falsely represent themselves as a Federal Medicaid or Medicare representative who needs additional personally identifying information from them to process their insurance claim—only to use that information in a false billing scheme.

Foreign-based cyber criminal gangs have recently been known to make targeted calls to gather information or “intelligence” during the reconnaissance phase of a cyber attack.[[114]](#footnote-116) These calls may target staff of a hospital or health system and attempt to gather technical information under some pretext. For example, the caller may attempt to deceive the recipient into divulging their computer credentials either over the phone or through a follow up email designed to look like a legitimate log in screen from “tech support.”

A pattern of unlawful robocalls which interfere or attempt to interfere with patient services and/or attempt to deceive staff and patients warrant law enforcement notification, regardless of whether the calls were successful in extracting the targeted information. It is important for law enforcement to receive these reports to assist them in correlation of reports from multiple victims. This will enable the authorities to identify emerging patterns of criminal activity and may provide valuable pieces of evidence. These reports, when assembled with information from other victims, may lead to the identification, investigation, and, ultimately, prosecution of the perpetrators.

#### Reporting the Event

* **Limit engagement with caller.** Staff members should be instructed to never engage with the caller. Instruct the staff members to disconnect the call once it is detected to be a robocall scam or disruption event.
* **Contact the voice service provider.** Designated staff, such as security, should provide concise information to the voice service provider regarding the event to determine next steps in collaboration with the voice service provider.
* **Traceback.** The service provider may perform a network traceback to identify the carrier(s) routing these calls into the hospital facility and request that upstream carriers cease and desist the continued delivery of such traffic. If the criteria are met, your provider may be able to engage the ITG to conduct a traceback to identify originating source network or end user (see recommendations above on the importance of collecting specific and accurate call information that is necessary for a traceback).
* **File a complaint with law enforcement.** Report the event to applicable regulatory or government agency.
  + Complaints can be made to the FTC at the following locations:
    - DoNotCall.gov (calls that violate Do Not Call and robocall rules)
    - ReportFraud.ftc.gov (complaints involving fraud—including frauds involving phone calls)
    - IdentityTheft.gov (complaints involving identity theft—including identity theft involving phone calls)
  + Complaints can be made to the FCC by visiting consumercomplaints.fcc.gov and clicking the link to “File an Unwanted Call Complaint.” Any call that violates the robocall laws, spoofing laws, or Do Not Call rules may be reported to the FCC. The calls do not have to include telemarketing or fraud to be reported to the FCC.
  + For robocalls that appear to be connected to fraudulent schemes, identity theft or cyber attack, file a complaint with the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center ([www.IC3.gov](http://www.ic3.gov/)) and include the words unlawful robocalls, CallerID spoofing, or TDoS in the description of the event. Document the identification and any initial statements made by victim, patients and staff. Have individual victim, patient or staff member report any financial loss to their financial institution and [www.ic3.gov](http://www.ic3.gov) immediately. If the financial loss resulted through a bank wire transfer of funds, financial institutions and the FBI through [www.ic3.gov](http://www.ic3.gov) may be able to recover the funds if reported within 72 hours of the transfer being initiated. It is essential for effective financial recovery that all details of the financial transfer be reported, such as the originating and terminating financial account numbers, account names, financial institutions, amount, date, time and location of transfer, transaction and wire transfer numbers, and contact information of sending and receiving parties. Contact your voice service provider, as outlined under previous sections, indicating you have contacted federal and state law enforcement authorities and you may seek prosecution and also request they preserve all technical information.

Report robocall events to your State Attorney General, particularly those that appear to be connected to fraudulent schemes specifically targeting hospital employees or result in a hospital- or department-wide TDoS attack. You can find your State’s Attorney General by accessing the National Association of Attorneys General website at this link: <https://www.naag.org/naag/attorneys-general/whos-my-ag.php>.

#### Post Robocall Event

* **Work with law enforcement and regulatory agencies.**
  + Determine if the law enforcement agency will investigate.
  + Determine if the local Federal U.S. Attorney and/or State Attorney General’s Office will seek prosecution.
  + Continue to provide assistance and information requested by law enforcement agencies.
  + Establish and maintain regular contact with your law enforcement contacts for case updates.
  + Conduct and document internal after-action review of incident with all involved entities to identify best practices and challenges.
  + Take corrective actions as necessary.

## How the Federal and State Governments Can Help Combat Unlawful Robocalls

### Prevention

State and federal agencies should continue to expand their efforts to prevent robocalls from ever reaching hospitals and other end users (including consumers who receive fraudulent calls from entities unlawfully impersonating hospitals or other healthcare entities) by putting into practice the following recommendations.

* **Create and implement balanced policies that facilitate industry’s ability to prevent unlawful robocalls from reaching hospitals**. While many of these efforts are currently underway, they will require ongoing attention, implementation, and enforcement. These policies include:
  + Encouraging the continued development of new call blocking and labeling tools and the expanded use of existing tools;
  + Establishing and enhancing, as appropriate, safe harbors that incentivize increased call blocking (including within the network) and labeling of calls that appear to be unlawful based on reasonable analytics;[[115]](#footnote-117)
  + Establishing and enforcing industry call authentication requirements to combat unlawful spoofing and ensuring such obligations will sufficiently apply to communications made to or from hospitals, including STIR/SHAKEN for the IP portions of voice service provider networks and effective robocall mitigation programs on the non-IP portions of their networks;
  + Encouraging all voice service providers to cooperate with traceback requests in accordance with existing laws;
  + Encouraging all voice service providers to adopt State Attorneys General Anti-Robocall Principles as appropriate;[[116]](#footnote-118) and
  + Identifying, in cooperation with industry, a process for hospitals to register their own numbers in order to minimize inadvertent blocking of outbound calls from hospitals.
* **Enforce existing laws, rules, and policies against voice service providers that allow unlawful traffic to originate on their network or calling platform. Additionally, enforce existing laws, rules, and policies, as appropriate, against non-originating voice service providers that have not taken sufficient steps to mitigate the transmission of unlawful robocalls**.
  + Historically, enforcement efforts against bad actors focused on robocallers themselves, not voice service providers facilitating those calls. Increased efforts against voice service providers enabling unlawful robocallers are proving successful as part of a comprehensive strategy to reduce the overall number of unlawful calls passing through the U.S. network. These efforts likely fall into both the prevention and remediation categories, but reducing this unlawful traffic will have the effect of fewer robocalls reaching hospital telephone lines.
* **Develop clear and concise hospital education materials**.
  + In addition to regulatory and enforcement efforts to facilitate the prevention of unlawful robocalls, federal and state agencies can help hospitals be prepared in advance of robocalling events by providing education materials on robocall prevention, response, and remediation. Therefore, federal and state agencies should supplement the information in this report as needed and in conjunction with relevant stakeholders by developing materials which provide the following essential information to hospitals:
  + An explanation of the different types of robocalls and robocall events, including how staff members can recognize unlawful calls;
  + A description of the data hospitals should collect during a robocall event in order to report issues to law enforcement or to seek a traceback, such as the date and exact time of the call, the number receiving the call, the number displayed on the caller ID, whether the caller was a live person or a pre-recorded message, and the content of the message;
  + Guidance about which law enforcement agencies hospitals should contact to report unlawful robocalls, including State AG offices, the FTC, the FCC, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security, with contact information for those agencies;
  + A description of available call blocking and labeling tools and other industry tools that can be utilized by enterprise systems, including STIR/SHAKEN.
  + Where and how hospitals can register their own numbers to limit the possibility that those numbers are not inadvertently blocked or mislabeled; and
  + Where and how hospitals can get redress from incidents where their legitimate outbound calls are inadvertently blocked or mislabeled.

### Response and Mitigation

While the immediate effort to stop a robocall event in its tracks is often between a hospital, its provider, and other industry members, law enforcement should take the following steps to ensure that its response to these events is effective and timely.

* Establish improved communication methods between hospitals and law enforcement agencies so that hospitals know where and how to report ongoing or recent robocall events.
* Actively monitor complaints received from hospitals and engage in prompt outreach to relevant voice service providers and other law enforcement agencies that may be able to assist in the response.
* Make prioritized referrals to the ITG for hospital robocall events as appropriate and coordinate the traceback response among relevant law enforcement partners.
* Despite all efforts to prevent and respond to robocall events that disrupt hospital operations, unlawful and fraudulent calls will inevitably get through. State and federal law enforcement agencies, often with the help of the ITG and individual voice service providers, are continually seeking to track down the bad actors and bring them to justice. To that end, we make the following recommendations.
  + Increase and continue collaboration between industry and law enforcement, as well as the ITG, to share information about targeted hospital robocall events.
  + Establish appropriate methods for sharing information about hospital robocall events across all relevant enforcement agencies. Agencies may need to enter into memoranda of understanding or common interest agreements in order to share information on existing investigations and may need to identify an internal point of contact for hospital robocall investigations.
  + Utilize all tools at agencies’ disposal to investigate unlawful robocalls to hospitals, including regular searches of complaint databases for hospital complaints, communication with the ITG about hospital-related tracebacks, and, where necessary and appropriate, the issuance of investigative subpoenas to targets and affiliated parties.
  + Ensure sufficient coordination among enforcement agencies to aggressively pursue civil or criminal enforcement actions against robocallers that send unlawful calls impacting hospitals and against voice service providers that assist and facilitate such activities.
  + Communicate and coordinate with foreign governments where possible to address unlawful robocall traffic originating internationally and pursue criminal enforcement actions against foreign individuals, call centers, and any other entities responsible for making unlawful robocalls into the United States.
  + Collect data on hospital robocall events and actions taken in response, then analyze the data and adapt enforcement approaches to increase efficacy of future response and remediation efforts.

# CONCLUSION

Combating unlawful robocalls is an enormous effort. Although this report is not an exhaustive list of actions and recommendations, it has been written with the input of knowledgeable and experienced subject matter experts with the charge of providing guidance and best practices. The reader should understand that the severity of these calls is wide ranging, from nuisance to privacy evasion to life-threatening. Eliminating them may be an impossibility, however significantly reducing them to acceptable risk levels can be attained and will require the cooperation of federal and state governments, law enforcement, the telecom industry, voice service providers and voice service provider customers.

##### APPENDIX A – HRPG Membership

**Chair:**

* Dave Summitt, Chief Information Security Officer, Moffitt Cancer Center

**Vice Chair:**

* Patrick Halley, Senior Vice President, Policy & Advocacy, US Telecom – The Broadband Association

**Voice Service Providers that Serve Hospitals:**

* John Cunningham, Director of Fraud Management, CenturyLink
* Joseph DeLotto, VP of Voice and Unified Communications Products, Charter Communications (*Chair Working Group 1: Addressing recommendations on how providers can better combat unlawful robocalls made to hospitals*)
* Linda Vandeloop, Assistant Vice President, Federal Regulatory, AT&T

**Companies that Focus on Mitigating Unlawful Robocalls:**

* Mark Collier, Chief Technology Officer, SecureLogix
* Aaron Foss, Founder and CEO, Nomorobo
* Patrick Halley, Senior Vice President, Policy & Advocacy, US Telecom – The Broadband Association

**Consumer Advocacy Organizations:**

* John Breyault, Vice President, Public Policy, Telecommunications and Fraud, National Consumers League
* Dawit Kahsai, Senior Legislative Representative, AARP (formerly the “American Association of Retired Persons”)
* Irene Leech, Vice-President, Consumer Federation of America

**Providers of one-way voice over internet protocol services:**

* Gunnar Halley, Assistant General Counsel CELA-Privacy & Regulatory Affairs, Microsoft Corporation
* Rebekah Johnson, Founder & CEO, Numeracle
* Chris Shipley, Attorney & Policy Advisor, INCOMPAS

**Hospitals:**

* Richard Lovich, Managing Partner, Stephenson, Acquisto & Colman, and National Counsel to the American Association of Healthcare Administrative Management (AAHAM)
* John Riggi, Senior Advisor for Cybersecurity and Risk, American Hospital Association (*Chair Working Group 2: Addressing recommendations on how hospitals can protect themselves from unlawful robocalls*)
* Dave Summitt, Chief Information Security Officer, Moffitt Cancer Center & Research Institute

**State Government Officials Focused on Combating Unlawful Robocalls:**

* Creecy Johnson, Special Deputy Attorney General, North Carolina Attorney General’s Office (*Chair Working Group 3: Addressing recommendations on how the Federal Government and State governments can help combat unlawful robocalls*)
* David McCoy, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Arkansas Attorney General
* Wisam Naoum, Assistant Attorney General, Michigan Department of Attorney General

**FCC Representative:**

* Commissioner Brendan Carr

**FTC Representative:**

* Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips

Donna Cyrus, Designated Federal Officer

Aliza Katz, Deputy Designated Federal Officer

## APPENDIX B – Additional Resources

#### Resources Available from State Attorneys General’s Offices

Many state AGs have made combating unlawful robocalls a top priority for their offices’ consumer protection enforcement actions. These offices often have one or more attorneys and investigators that regularly investigate and litigate persons and companies that commit robocall violations. Plus, these offices may be a more immediately accessible resource than other government agencies. Contact information for every State Attorney General may be found at:

<https://www.naag.org/naag/attorneys-general/whos-my-ag.php>

#### Resources Available from the FCC and FTC

FTC

Suggestions for Blocking & Reporting Robocalls

<https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/how-stop-unwanted-calls>

<https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-block-unwanted-calls>

Complaint Reporting Website

[https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov](https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/)

FCC

Suggestions for Blocking & Reporting Robocalls

<https://www.fcc.gov/call-blocking>

<https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts>

Complaint Reporting Website

[https://consumercomplaints.fcc.gov](https://consumercomplaints.fcc.gov/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=39744)

#### Resources Available from the Industry Traceback Group

Industry Traceback Group Policies and Procedures

<https://www.ustelecom.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/USTelecom_ITG-Policies-and-Procedures_Jan-2020.pdf>

Guidance to law enforcement agencies for submitting traceback requests

<https://www.ustelecom.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Guidelines-for-Law-Enforcement-Submissions-of-Traceback-Requests.pdf>

1. Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 116-105 (2019) (TRACED Act); §§ 14(a) and (c). Robocalls are calls made with an autodialer or contain a message made with a prerecorded or artificial voice. *See* FCC, *Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts* (March 17, 2021)<https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts>. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
2. TRACED Act §§ 14(a) and (c). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
3. TRACED Act § 14(d). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
4. The Report containing the Best Practices is attached as the Appendix to this Public Notice (HRPG Best Practices). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
5. *FCC Seeks Comment on How to Facilitate Voluntary Adoption of the Hospital Robocall Protection Group’s Best Practices to Combat Unlawful Robocalls to Hospitals*, CG Docket No. 21-7, Public Notice, DA 21-39 (CGB Jan. 11, 2021) (Assessment Proceeding PN). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
6. Section 14(d) of the TRACED Act directs the Commission, after issuance of the HRPG’s Best Practices, to “conclude a proceeding to assess the extent to which the voluntary adoption of such best practices can be facilitated to protect hospitals and other institutions.” Section 14, therefore, does not authorize the Commission to compel adoption of any of the HRPG’s Best Practices. Accordingly, the Commission’s assessment will focus solely on how voluntary adoption can be facilitated among the identified stakeholders. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
7. The STIR/SHAKEN framework is a set of technical standards and protocols that allow for the authentication and verification of caller ID information for calls carried over Internet Protocol (IP) networks. *See* Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order, FCC 20-136 at 4, para 6. (Oct. 1, 2020) (*Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order*)**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
8. John Riggi, Senior Advisor for Cybersecurity and Risk for the AHA, served on the HRPG and was the Chair of Working Group 2, the group that addressed how hospitals can protect themselves from unlawful robocalls. HRPG Report, Appendix A. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
9. As ASHRM’s website states, this 6,000+ member organization of hospital and healthcare risk managers’ mission is “to provide health care risk managers with the resources, knowledge and support to strategically and broadly manage risk, reduce uncertainty, add value, and advance health and safety.” *See* <https://www.ashrm.org/about-1>. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
10. Because the majority of the HRPG Best Practices also apply to “other institutions” and not just hospitals, our assessment that education and outreach, including a centralized website, will facilitate the voluntary adoption of the HRPG’s Best Practices, applies not only for the protection of hospitals but also *other institutions* in accordance with Section 14(d). *See*, *e.g.*, HRPG Best Practices at 17 (“. . . recommendations are actions hospitals and health systems can take to implement tools and technologies to assist with robocall fraud prevention); Lumen at 2-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
11. FCC, *Consumer Complaint Data Center*, <https://www.fcc.gov/consumer-help-center-data> (last visited April 14, 2021); FCC, *Consumer Complaints Data—Unwanted Calls*, (April 14,2021) <https://opendata.fcc.gov/Consumer/Consumer-Complaints-Data-Unwanted-Calls/vakf-fz8e>; FCC, *The FCC’s Push to Combat Robocalls & Spoofing*, <https://www.fcc.gov/spoofed-robocalls> (last visited Dec. 14, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
12. *See Legislating to Stop the Onslaught of Annoying Robocalls: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce,* 116th Cong. 12 (2019), <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-116hhrg39858/pdf/CHRG-116hhrg39858.pdf> (statement of Dave Summitt, Chief Information Security Officer, H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center & Research Institute) (Summitt Statement). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
13. HRPG Best Practices at 2, 5-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
14. *See* Summitt Statement; HRPG Best Practices at 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
15. HRPG Best Practices at 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
16. HRPG Best Practices at 6, 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
17. TRACED Act §§ 14(a), (c). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
18. TRACED Act § 14(d). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
19. *FCC Announces the Establishment of the Hospital Robocall Protection Group and Seeks Nominations for Membership,* DA 20-333, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 2895 (CGB 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
20. *FCC Announces the Membership and First Meeting of the Hospital Robocall Protection Group,* DA 20-734, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 6997 (2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
21. *See* TRACED Act § 14(b). *See* Appendix for a list of HRPG members. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
22. HRPG Best Practices at 13-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
23. HRPG Best Practices at 2-24. The HRPG Best Practices also recommend that voice service providers providing hospitals with voice services should follow the North American Numbering Council (NANC) Call Authentication Trust Anchor Working Group recommendations, titled “Best Practices for the Implementation of Call Authentication Frameworks,” with respect to the vetting of subscribers and/or customers and with respect to analyzing voice network traffic to identify and monitor patterns consistent with unlawful robocalls.<https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-367133A1.pdf>. On December 22, 2020, the Wireline Competition Bureau issued a set of voluntary best practices related to call authentication, relying upon these NANC recommendations. *See Wireline Competition Bureau Issues Caller ID Authentication Best Practices,* WC Docket Nos. 17-97 and 20-324, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 14726 (2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
24. HRPG Best Practices at 14-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
25. HRPG Best Practices at 15-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
26. HRPG Best Practices. at 15-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
27. HRPG Best Practices at 19-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
28. HRPG Best Practices at 22-24 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
29. HRPG Best Practices at 22-24. *See Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls,* Third Report and Order, Order on Reconsideration, and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 FCC Rcd 7614 (2020) (*Third Report and Order*) (The *Third Report and Order* established two safe harbors from liability for voice service providers working to block illegal or unwanted robocalls – the first based on reasonable analytics designed to identify unwanted calls with the second enabling voice service providers to block traffic from bad-actor upstream voice service providers that allow calls to traverse their networks. The order also established redress and other requirements for providers that engage in call blocking). In the *Call Blocking Fourth Report and Order*, the Commission required voice service providers to meet certain affirmative obligations and to better police their networks against illegal calls. *See Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls,* CG Docket 17-59, Fourth Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 15221, 15227-234, paras. 14-38 (2020) (*Fourth Report and Order).* Among other things, the *Fourth Report and Order* expanded the existing call blocking safe harbor to cover network-based blocking of certain calls that are highly likely to be illegal. *Id.* at 15234-38, paras. 39-47. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
30. HRPG Best Practices at 23. In July 2020, the Enforcement Bureau named US Telecom’s Industry Traceback Group (ITG) as the registered consortium (Traceback Consortium) to conduct private-led traceback efforts. *See Implementing Section 13(d) of the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act (TRACED Act)*, EB Docket No., 20-22, Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 7886 (2020). The Commission also requires all voice service providers to respond to traceback requests from the ITG as well as from the Commission and civil and criminal law enforcement. *See* 47 CFR § 64.1200(n)(1); *Fourth Report and Order*, 35 FCC Rcd at 15227-15229, paras. 15-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
31. HRPG Best Practices at 23. On August 22, 2019, all 50 State Attorneys General plus the District of Columbia as well as 12 major voice service providers, announced a set of Anti-Robocall Principles they agreed to implement or continue to implement for combating illegal and unwanted robocalls. <https://www.ustelecom.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/State-AGs-Providers-AntiRobocall-Principles-With-Signatories.pdf>(last visited Apr. 14, 2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
32. HRPG Best Practices at 22-24. The *Fourth Report and Order* adopted affirmative obligations related to the HRPG’s recommendations, including responding to traceback requests from the Commission, civil and criminal law enforcement and the designated Traceback Consortium; taking steps to mitigate illegal traffic when the voice service provider receives written notice from the Commission of such traffic; and implementing affirmative effective measures to prevent new and renewing customers from using its network to originate illegal calls. *Fourth Report and Order*, 35 FCC Rcd at 15227-234, paras. 24-38. The second of these three affirmative obligations has not yet taken effect, but the other two are currently in effect. *See* 47 CFR § 64.1200(n). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
33. HRPG Best Practices at 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
34. *Assessment Proceeding PN*, 36 FCC Rcd 155. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
35. *Id*. at 1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
36. *See* Comments of Lumen (Lumen Comments); Comments of NCTA – The Internet & Television Association (NCTA Comments); Comments of USTelecom – the Broadband Association (USTelecom Comments); and Ribbon Communications Reply [sic] Comments (Ribbon Comments). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
37. *See* USTelecom Comments at 2 (“Because voice service providers already have implemented, or are in the process of implementing, the HRPG Best Practices that pertain to them, no additional Commission action is necessary to encourage further implementation specifically for such providers’ hospital customers.”). Ribbon Technologies claims that in situations where a hospital’s voice service provider has not yet implemented STIR/SHAKEN, there may be third party options available for hospitals whereby they can subscribe to STIR/SHAKEN as a service through a cloud-based third-party provider that can work with the underlying voice service provider. *See* Ribbon Comments at 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
38. HRPG Best Practices at 2. *See* US Telecom at 1; Lumen at 3-4 (collective efforts and coordination among voice service providers, hospitals and government agencies optimize robocall risk prevention and mitigation for hospitals and health systems). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
39. HRPG Best Practices at 2, 8, 12-13 (describing key focus of HRPG Best Practices “is to ensure that hospitals are aware of the relevant ongoing activities”). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
40. The Commission has authorized voice service providers to block certain calls as a default before they ever reach consumers, so long as consumers are given the opportunity to opt out. *See* *Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls*, CG Docket No. 17-59, WC Docket No. 17-97, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd 9706 (2017) (*2017* *Call Blocking Report and Order*); *Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls*, CG Docket No. 17-59, WC Docket No. 17-97, Declaratory Ruling and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 34 FCC Rcd at 4886-88, paras. 33-34 (2019) (*2019* *Call Blocking Declaratory Ruling*); *Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls*, CG Docket No. 17-59, WC Docket No. 17-97, Second Report and Order, 33 FCC Rcd 12024 (2018) (*Robocall Second Report and Order*). *See also* 47 CFR §§ 64.1200(k)(1)-(4), (11) (Commission’s call blocking rules). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
41. *See* 47 CFR § 64.6301(a). In accordance with section 4 of the TRACED Act, in March 2020, the Commission required voice service providers to implement the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication technology in the IP portions of their phone networks by June 30, 2021. *See* TRACED Act §§ 4(b)(1)(A)-(B); *Call Authentication Trust Anchor, Implementation of TRACED Act Section 6(a)—Knowledge of Customers by Entities with Access to Numbering Resources*, WC Docket Nos. 17-97 and 20-67, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 FCC Rcd 3241, 3252 paras. 24-25 (2020) (*First Caller ID Authentication Report and Order and Further Notice*). In September 2020, the Commission established extension and exemption mechanisms for various categories of providers and made clear the obligations on voice service providers to protect the non-IP parts of their networks, including by developing non-IP caller ID authentication solutions. *See* Second Report and Order, FCC 20-136 at 9, para. 16. (Oct. 1, 2020) (*Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order***)**. On May 20, 2020, the Commission proposed to shorten the deadline from two years to one for a subset of small voice service providers that appear to be originating a large quantity of illegal robocalls. *See* *Call Authentication Trust Anchor*, WC Docket No, 17-97, Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (May 21, 2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
42. 47 CFR § 64.1200(n); *Fourth Report and Order*, 35 FCC Rcd at 15227-15223, paras 14-36 (e.g., responding to official traceback requests, mitigating illegal traffic when voice service providers receive written notice from the Commission and implementation of customer-focused practices to prevent new and renewing customers from originating illegal calls). The second of these three affirmative obligations has not yet taken effect. *See Fourth Report and Order*, 35 FCC Rcd at 15251, para. 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
43. 47 CFR § 64.6305(a); *Second STIR/SHAKEN Order* at 39-49, paras 74-96 (requiring voice service providers granted extensions of STIR/SHAKEN mandate to implement robocall mitigation programs to combat origination of illegal robocalls on their networks). The Commission also required all voice service providers to file certifications with the Commission regarding their efforts to stem the origination of illegal robocalls on their networks, either with STIR/SHAKEN or robocall mitigation programs. *Id.* at 44-45, para. 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
44. *See Wireline Competition Bureau Announces Opening of Robocall Mitigation Database and Provides Filing Instructions and Deadlines,* WC Docket No. 17-97, Public Notice at 1-3 (2021) (establishing June 30, 2021 as deadline by which voice service providers must file in the Robocall Mitigation Database). [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
45. *Implementing Section 10(a) of the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act (TRACED Act*), EB Docket No. 20-374, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 FCC Rcd 14263 (2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
46. HRPG Best Practices at 9; USTelecom Comments at 2-3. The Commission also has required that all voice service providers participate in traceback as part of their robocall mitigation programs. 47 CFR § 64.1200(n)(1); *Second STIR/SHAKEN Order* at 43, para. 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
47. *See* FCC, Consumer Guides, *Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts*, <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts> (last updated Oct. 13, 2020); FCC, Consumer Guides, *Caller ID Spoofing*, <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/spoofing-and-caller-id> (last updated Sept. 23, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
48. *See* HRPG Best Practices at 13-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
49. HRPG Best Practices Report at 14-15. Ribbon, addressing the hospital prioritization recommendation, “applaud[ed] . . . the HRPG for identifying the need for prioritizing hospital entities,” which it believes will particularly aid necessary response and remediation efforts. Ribbon Comments at 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
50. HRPG Best Practices at 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
51. A recording of the webinar can be found [here](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4Rhgp2mwus&t=181s). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
52. HRPG Best Practices at 16-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
53. The ASHRM Annual Conference is scheduled as a virtual conference and an in-person event at the Henry B. Gonzalez Convention Center in San Antonio, TX from October 10-13, 2021. <https://www.ashrm.org/ashrm-2021-annual-conference>. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
54. *See*, *e.g*., *Call Blocking Tools and Resources*, Consumer Guide, at <https://www.fcc.gov/call-blocking>. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
55. HRPG Best Practices at 10-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
56. *See, e.g.*, *John C. Spiller; Jakob A. Mears; Rising Eagle Capital Group LLC, et. al.,* Forfeiture Order, FCC 21-35, 2021 WL 1056077 (Mar. 18, 2021), <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-21-35A1.pdf> (assessing the largest forfeiture in FCC history, $225,000,000); *Scott Rhodes*, Forfeiture Order, 36 FCC Rcd 705 (2021), <https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-fines-robocaller-scott-rhodes-nearly-10m-illegal-spoofing> (adopting forfeiture of $9,918,000 for illegally using caller ID spoofing in thousands of calls)**;** *Kenneth Moser dba Marketing Support Systems*, Forfeiture Order, 35 FCC Rcd 13415 (2020) (forfeiture of $9,997,750 for calls made spoofing the telephone number of another telemarketing company), <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-20-163A1.pdf>; *Scott Rhodes a.k.a. Scott David Rhodes, Scott D. Rhodes, Scott Platek, Scott P. Platek*, Forfeiture Order, FCC 21-16 (rel. Jan. 14, 2021) (forfeiture of $9,918,000 for spoofed robocalls in six campaigns with hate speech and racist, anti-Semitic, or anti-immigrant language), <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-21-16A1.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
57. HRPG Best Practices at 11 (describing Department of Justice and FTC respective enforcement actions against Voice over IP (VoIP) providers for assisting and facilitating unlawful robocalls). The FCC and FTC have also recently collaborated to stop COVID-19 related scam calls. Press Release, FCC, FTC Demand Robocall-Enabling Service Providers Cut Off COVID-19 Related International Scammers (May 20, 2020), <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-364482A1.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
58. *See* HRPG Best Practices at 12. *See also* Letter from National Association of Attorneys General to Jonathan Spalter, President & CEO US Telecomm (May 4, 2020) <https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/pr/2020/pr20-17-letter.pdf>. Actions by Federal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), State governments and the communications industry to combat unlawful robocall are catalogued in a report by the U.S. Department of Justice. *Report Detailing Government Efforts to Combat Robocalls Released to Congress*, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/report-detailing-government-efforts-combat-robocalls-released-congress> (last visited April 26, 2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
59. HRPG Best Practices at 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
60. HRPG Best Practices at 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
61. *Id*. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
62. USTelecom Comments at 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
63. For example, on March 17, 2021, Acting Chairwoman Rosenworcel announced the delivery of letters to the FTC, DOJ and NAAG seeking to renew partnerships and associated coordination to combat robocalls. *Acting Chairwoman Rosenworcel kicks off Anti-robocall Agenda*, News Release (March 17, 2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
64. HRPG Best Practices Report at 23-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
65. *See e.g.,* <https://www.fcc.gov/robocalls> (last visited May 21, 2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
66. *See*, *e.g*.,FCC, *The FCC’s Push to Combat Robocalls & Spoofing*, <https://www.fcc.gov/spoofed-robocalls> (last visited May 6, 2020); *Call Blocking Tools and Resources*, Consumer Guide, at <https://www.fcc.gov/call-blocking>; FCC, *Scam Glossary* (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.fcc.gov/scam-glossary. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
67. *See* FCC, *Rural Tour Highlights – Arizona and New Mexico*, (Feb. 11, 2020),<https://www.fcc.gov/rural-tour-dispatches>. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
68. *See* FCC, *FCC & AARP to Educate Older Americans About Phone Scams*, <https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2018/09/fcc-aarp-educate-older-americans-about-phone-scams> (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
69. There is frequent coordination among federal and state stakeholders, for example, by monthly calls the Enforcement Bureau of the Commission conducts with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) and other federal law enforcement agencies regarding robocall enforcement and investigations. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
70. Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act, Pub. L. 116-105, 133 Stat. 3274 (2019) (TRACED Act). [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
71. TRACED Act § 14(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
72. *FCC Announces the Establishment of the Hospital Robocall Protection Group and Seeks Nominations for Membership*, DA 20-333, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 2895 (CGB 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
73. A “robocall” generally refers to “calls made with an autodialer or that contain a message made with a prerecorded or artificial voice.” FCC, Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts, <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts> (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). This report addresses such autodialed robocalls, but also discusses other types of unlawful and harassing calls made to hospitals by individuals, such as phishing calls targeting an individual hospital employee. For purposes of this report, the term “robocall” refers broadly to any unlawful calls placed to hospitals or patients. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
74. TRACED Act § 14(b). [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
75. *Id.* A full list of HRPG members is available in Appendix A. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
76. TRACED Act § 14(c). [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
77. *See* Nick Wingfield, *Swindlers Use Telephones, With Internet’s Tactics*, N.Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2014), <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/technology/swindlers-use-telephones-with-internets-tactics.html>*;* FCC, *Caller ID Spoofing*, (last updated Sept. 23, 2020), <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/spoofing-and-caller-id>; *Legislating to Stop the Onslaught of Annoying Robocalls: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce*, 116th Cong. 12 (2019) (statement of Dave Summitt, Chief Information Security Officer, H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center & Research Institute). [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
78. Off. of the Private Sector, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Criminals Pose as Law Enforcement and Medical Boards as Part of Mass Marketing Fraud Schemes to Target Medical Providers for Financial Gain*, Liaison Information Report, LIR 201013-007 (Oct. 13, 2020), <https://providers.beaumont.org/docs/default-source/pdfs-for-bpp-bulletin/lir_criminals_posing_law_enforcement_medical_boards.pdf?sfvrsn=441f5eec_2> . [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
79. Several years ago, the “payday loan scam” was common against hospitals. The scam involved a threat against a hospital staff member, accusing the person of owing debt on a loan, with the place of business being flooded with calls until they pay. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
80. Brian Krebs, *FBI, CISA Echo Warnings on “Vishing” Threat* (Aug. 21, 2020), <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/08/fbi-cisa-echo-warnings-on-vishing-threat/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
81. If enough nuisance or other calls are received, even if the intention is not to disrupt the hospital, a TDoS event can occur. For example, if the same number or a small group of numbers is called continuously, and that number is important for patient or a hospital function, legitimate use of that number or numbers may not be possible. Because inadvertent TDoS is not intentional, the attack is usually not long lasting or persistent. The victim of inadvertent TDoS is the hospital. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
82. FCC, Call Blocking Tools Now Substantially Available to Consumers: Report on Call Blocking at12, para. 25 (2020), <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-365152A1.pdf>. Third-party analytics companies and device manufacturers also offer additional services. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
83. *Id.* at 25,para. 57. Voice service providers and analytics companies provide contact information for parties to report to them incorrectly identified calls. *See Id.* at 29, para*.* 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
84. The STIR/SHAKEN framework includes several different standards and protocols. STIR stands for Secure Telephony Identity Revisited and SHAKEN stands for the Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information using toKENs. *See Call Authentication Trust Anchor*, WC Docket No. 17-97, Second Report and Order, FCC 20-136 at 4-5, para. 7 (Oct. 1, 2020) (*STIR/SHAKEN Second Report and Order*). STIR/SHAKEN digitally validates the handoff of phone calls passing through a complex web of networks, allowing the phone company of the consumer receiving the call to verify that a call is in fact from the number displayed on Caller ID. *Id.* at 3, para. 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
85. *Call Authentication Trust Anchor, Implementation of TRACED Act Section 6(a)-Knowledge of Customers by Entities with Access to Numbering Resources,* WC Docket Nos. 17-97 and 20-67, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 FCC Rcd 3241, 3249, para. 18 (2020) (*Call Authentication* *Trust Anchor*). [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
86. *See STIR/Shaken Second Report and Order* at 8, para. 15*.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
87. *See* iconnecitve,<https://authenticate.iconectiv.com/authorized-service-providers-authenticate> (last visited Nov. 11, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
88. USTelecom, *The USTelecom Industry Traceback Group (ITG)*, <https://www.ustelecom.org/the-ustelecom-industry-traceback-group-itg> (last visited Nov. 11, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
89. *See generally* USTelecom, *USTelecom’s Industry Traceback Group*, Policies and Procedures (2020), <https://www.ustelecom.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/USTelecom_ITG-Policies-and-Procedures_Jan-2020.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
90. FCC, *Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts* (last updated Nov. 18, 2020), <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts>. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
91. *See, e.g.,* *Adrian Abramovich* Marketing Strategy Leaders, Inc., and Marketing Leaders, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 33 FCC Rcd 4663 (2018); *John C. Spiller; Jakob A. Mears, Rising Eagle Capital Group LLC; JSquared Telecom LLC; Only Web Leads LLC; Rising Phoenix Group: Rising Phenix Holdings: RPG Leads; and Rising Eagle Capital Group - Cayman*, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 35 FCC Rcd 5948 (2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
92. *Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls*, CG Docket No. 17-59, WC Docket No. 17-97, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd 9706 (2017) (*2017 Call Blocking Report and Order*); *Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls*; *Call Authentication Trust Anchor*, CG Docket No. 17-59, WC Docket No. 17-97, Declaratory Ruling and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 34 FCC Rcd 4876, 4886-88, paras. 33-34 (2019) (*2019 Call Blocking Declaratory Ruling*). [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
93. *Call Authentication Trust Anchor*, 35 FCC Rcd 3241 (2020); *STIR/SHAKEN Second Report and Order*, FCC 20-136 (Oct. 1, 2020) [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
94. *Implementing Section 13(d) of the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act (TRACED Act)*, EB Docket No. 20-22, Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 7886 (2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
95. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, The Department of Justice Files Actions to Stop Telecom Carriers Who Facilitated Hundreds of Millions of Fraudulent Robocalls to American Consumers (Jan. 28, 2020), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-actions-stop-telecom-carriers-who-facilitated-hundreds-millions>. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
96. *See, e.g.,* Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Globex Telecom and Associates Will Pay $2.1 Million, Settling FTC’s First Consumer Protection Case Against a VoIP Service Provider (Sept. 22, 2020), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/09/globex-telecom-associates-will-pay-21-million-settling-ftcs-first>; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Warns 19 VoIP Service Provider That ‘Assisting and Facilitating’ Unlawful Telemarketing or Robocalling Is Against the Law ( Jan. 30, 2020), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/01/ftc-warns-19-voip-service-providers-assisting-facilitating>; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Takes Action against Second VoIP Service Provider for Facilitating Illegal Telemarketing Robocalls (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-takes-action-against-second-voip-service-provider. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
97. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Warns Nine VoIP Service Providers and Other Companies against ‘Assisting and Facilitating’ Unlawful Coronavirus-related Telemarketing Calls (Mar. 27, 2020), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/03/ftc-warns-nine-voip-service-providers-other-companies-against>; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and FCC Send Joint Letters to Additional VoIP Providers Warning against ‘Routing and Transmitting’ Unlawful Coronavirus-related Robocalls (May 20, 2020), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/05/ftc-fcc-send-joint-letters-additional-voip-providers-warning>. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
98. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Five Defendants Arrested and Indicted for India-Based Telemarketing And Email Marketing Scheme Victimizing Seniors Throughout The United States (Dec. 18, 2019), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-nv/pr/five-defendants-arrested-and-indicted-india-based-telemarketing-and-email-marketing>. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
99. *See State Attorney Generals-Providers Anti-Robocall Principles*, <https://www.ustelecom.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/State-AGs-Providers-AntiRobocall-Principles-With-Signatories.pdf> (last visited Nov. 11, 2020) (*Anti-Robocall Principles)*. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
100. *See, e.g.,* Press Release, Michigan Dept. of Att’y Gen., *AG Nessel Announces Significant Settlement with Telecom Carrier Focused on Innovative Robocall Mitigation Measures* (Sept. 11, 2020), <https://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-359-92297_99936-539389--,00.html>; Press Release, Michigan Dept. of Att’y Gen., *AG Nessel Announces Settlement Eliminating Telecom Carrier Responsible for Unlawful Robocalls* (Aug. 7, 2020) <https://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-359--536108--s,00.html>; Press Release, Ohio Att’y Gen., *Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost Announces Settlement in Groundbreaking Lawsuit Against Unlawful Robocall Service* (Sept. 29, 2020), <https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/September-2020-(1)/Ohio-Attorney-General-Dave-Yost-Announces-Settleme>; *States of Arkansas, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas v. Rising Eagle Capital Group LLC et al.*, No. 4:20-cv-02021 (Tex. S.D. June 9, 2020) (complaint). [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
101. *FTC v. Educare Ctr. Servs., Inc.*, No. EP-19-CV-196-KC, 2019 WL 5415836 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2019); Press Release, Ohio Att’y Gen., *Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost Announces Settlement in Groundbreaking Lawsuit Against Unlawful Robocall Service* (Sept. 29, 2020), <https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/September-2020-(1)/Ohio-Attorney-General-Dave-Yost-Announces-Settleme>. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
102. *Texas et al. v. Rising Eagle Capital Group LLC*, No. 4:20-cv-02021 (S.D. Tex. 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
103. *See* Nathan Bomey, Robocall *“Crackdown”: FTC Blocks More Than a Billion Unlawful Calls, but the Problem Festers*, USA Today (Jun. 25, 2019 12:38 PM EDT), <https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/06/25/ftc-robocall-crackdown/1548714001/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
104. *See Anti-Robocall Principles, supra* note 30,Principle #2. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
105. NANC Call Authentication Trust Anchor Working Group, *Best Practices for the Implementation of Call Authentication Networks* at 6-10, <https://www.fcc.gov/document/best-practices-implementation-call-authentication-framework> (last visited Nov. 11, 2020); *see also Anti-Robocall Principles, supra* note 30,Principles #5 and #6. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
106. NANC Call Authentication Trust Anchor Working Group, *Best Practices for the Implementation of Call Authentication Networks* at 17, <https://www.fcc.gov/document/best-practices-implementation-call-authentication-framework> (last visited Nov. 11, 2020); *see also Anti-Robocall Principles, supra* note 30,Principles #3 and #4. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
107. *Anti-Robocall Principles, supra* note 30,Principle #7. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
108. FBI, DHS-ICE-HIS, United States Secret Service, FTC, FCC, State Attorney General’s Office, State Consumer Affairs Office. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
109. *See, e.g.*, Federal Trade Commission, *IdentityTheft.gov,* <http://www.identifytheft.gov> (last visited Dec. 11, 2020;Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Internet Crime Complaint Center IC3*, https://[ic3.gov](http://ic3.gov); FCC, *Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts,* <https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts> (last visited Nov. 11, 2020); Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Scams and Safety, Telemarketing Fraud*, <https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-scams-and-crimes/telemarketing-fraud> (last visited Nov. 11, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
110. *See* *InfraGard*, https: [www.InfraGard.org](http://www.InfraGard.org) (last visited Nov. 11, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
111. *See* *H-ISAC: Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center*, [www.h-isac.org](http://www.h-isac.org/) (last visited Nov. 11, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
112. *See* American Hospital Association, *Cybersecurity*, [www.aha.org/cybersecurity](http://www.aha.org/cybersecurity) (last visited Nov. 11, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
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116. *See Anti-Robocall Principles,* <https://www.ustelecom.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/State-AGs-Providers-AntiRobocall-Principles-With-Signatories.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)