## Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554

	ORDER	
Horizon Technology Group LLC	)	EB-TCD-22-00033932
In the Matter of	)	

Adopted: October 3, 2022 Released: October 3, 2022

By the Acting Chief, Enforcement Bureau:

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. By this Order, we direct Horizon Technology Group LLC (Horizon Technology Group or Company) to demonstrate why the Enforcement Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) should not remove Horizon Technology Group from the Robocall Mitigation Database. Removal from the database would require all intermediate providers and terminating voice service providers to cease accepting the Company's traffic.¹ If that were to occur, all calls from Horizon Technology Group's customers would be blocked and therefore no traffic originated by Horizon Technology Group would reach the called party. Horizon Technology Group must provide its response to the Enforcement Bureau no later than October 18, 2022.

## II. BACKROUND

## A. Robocall Mitigation Database Requirements on Originating Providers

2. Protecting Americans from the dangers of unwanted and illegal robocalls is the Commission's top consumer protection priority.<sup>2</sup> As part of the Commission's multipronged approach to combatting illegal robocalls, the Commission has mandated adoption of the Secure Telephony Identity Revisited/Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information using toKENs (STIR/SHAKEN) caller ID authentication framework.<sup>3</sup> The Commission extended the implementation deadline for certain voice service providers on the basis of undue hardship or material reliance on a non-IP network.<sup>4</sup> Service providers that received an extension were required to implement a robocall mitigation program to prevent

<sup>2</sup> The Commission receives more complaints about unwanted and illegal calls than any other issue. FCC, *Consumer Complaint Data Center*, <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/consumer-help-center-data">https://www.fcc.gov/consumer-help-center-data</a> (last visited May 10, 2022).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Call Authentication Trust Anchor, WC Docket No. 17-97, Second Report and Order, 36 FCC Rcd 1859, 1903, para. 83 & 1904, para. 86 (2020) (Second Caller ID Authentication Order); 47 CFR § 64.6305(c).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Call Authentication Trust Anchor, Implementation of TRACED Act Section 6(a)—Knowledge of Customers by Entities with Access to Numbering Resources, WC Docket Nos. 17-97 and 20-67, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 FCC Rcd 3241 (Mar. 31, 2020) (First Caller ID Authentication Report and Order and Further Notice).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Second Caller ID Authentication Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1892-93, para. 66; Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED Act), Pub. L. No. 116-105, 133 Stat. 3274, § 4(b)(5)(A)(i) (TRACED Act). On December 9, 2021, the Commission shortened the deadline to implement STIR/SHAKEN for non-facilities-based small voice services providers and small voice service providers of any kind suspected of originating illegal robocalls. Call Authentication Trust Anchor, WC Docket No, 17-97, Fourth Report and Order, FCC 21-122 at para. 9 (2021) (Fourth Caller Authentication Order); see also TRACED Act § 4(b)(5).

unlawful robocalls from originating on their networks.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, all voice service providers—not only those granted an extension—were required to file certifications with the Commission, stating whether their traffic is authenticated with STIR/SHAKEN or subject to a robocall mitigation program.<sup>6</sup> Voice service providers whose traffic is subject to a robocall mitigation program must detail in their certifications the specific reasonable steps that they have taken to avoid originating illegal robocall traffic.<sup>7</sup> These certifications and robocall mitigation plans are publicly available in the Robocall Mitigation Database.<sup>8</sup>

3. Commission rules prohibit any intermediate provider or terminating voice service provider from accepting voice traffic directly from any voice service provider that does not appear in the Robocall Mitigation Database.<sup>9</sup> The Enforcement Bureau may take enforcement action, including removal of a certification from the Robocall Mitigation Database, against voice service providers that have deficient certifications.<sup>10</sup> A deficient certification includes one that fails to describe specific robocall mitigation steps as required by section 64.6305(b) of the Commission's rules.<sup>11</sup> Prior to removing a certification from the Robocall Mitigation Database, the Enforcement Bureau must provide notice to the originating voice service provider and allow an opportunity to cure.<sup>12</sup>

## B. Horizon Technology Group's Deficient Certification

4. Horizon Technology Group filed a Robocall Mitigation Database certification on June 29, 2021. Horizon Technology Group certified that it had not implemented the STIR/SHAKEN framework, and all calls originating on its network are subject to a robocall mitigation program. Horizon Technology Group certified that it had not implemented the STIR/SHAKEN framework, and all calls originating on its network are subject to a robocall mitigation program. Horizon The Company's certification did not include any specific reasonable steps that it was taking to avoid origination of illegal robocall traffic. Instead, it only included a screenshot of the Company's FRN number from the Commission's website. Horizon The FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau (Wireline Bureau) contacted the Company on October 10, 2021, via the e-mail listed on its certification, to inform it that its robocall mitigation program attachment contained with its certification may have been uploaded in error

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> TRACED Act § 4(b)(5)(C)(i); 47 CFR § 64.6305(a); Second Caller ID Authentication Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1897-98, para. 75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> 47 CFR § 64.6305(b); Second Caller ID Authentication Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1902, para. 82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> 47 CFR § 64.6305(b)(2)(ii); *Second Caller ID Authentication Order*, 36 FCC Rcd at 1902, para. 82 (quotations omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> FCC, Robocall Mitigation Database, FCC, <a href="https://fccprod.servicenowservices.com/rmd?id=rmd\_welcome">https://fccprod.servicenowservices.com/rmd?id=rmd\_welcome</a> (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).

<sup>9 47</sup> CFR § 64.6305(c); Second Caller ID Authentication Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1904, para. 86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Second Caller ID Authentication Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1902, 1903, paras. 81 n.322, 83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> 47 CFR § 64.6305(b)(2)(ii); see also Second Caller ID Authentication Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1900-02, paras. 77-82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Second Call Authentication Trust Anchor Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1904-05, para. 88. We may take other enforcement actions such as requiring the voice service provider to submit more specific robocall mitigation measures or imposing a forfeiture. *Id.* at 1903, para. 83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Horizon Technology Group LLC, Robocall Mitigation Database, FCC (June 29, 2021), <a href="https://fccprod.servicenowservices.com/rmd?id=rmd\_form&table=x\_g\_fmc\_rmd\_robocall\_mitigation\_database&sy\_s\_id=5f4eb1e11b8574109294113d9c4bcb06&view=sp">https://fccprod.servicenowservices.com/rmd?id=rmd\_form&table=x\_g\_fmc\_rmd\_robocall\_mitigation\_database&sy\_s\_id=5f4eb1e11b8574109294113d9c4bcb06&view=sp</a> (Robocall Mitigation Database Filing).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> *Id* 

as it did not satisfy the Commission's rules to describe robocall mitigation efforts.<sup>16</sup> The Wireline Bureau did not receive a response from Horizon Technology Group acknowledging or addressing the notice, and Horizon Technology Group did not correct its certification.

## III. DISCUSSION

- 5. Our review of the evidence finds that Horizon Technology Group apparently has filed a deficient Robocall Mitigation Database certification. The Company certified that it is subject to a robocall mitigation program,<sup>17</sup> but it failed to describe specific reasonable steps that the Company is taking to prevent the origination of illegal robocall traffic.<sup>18</sup> Instead, the Company only provided a screenshot of its FRN information from the Commission's website.<sup>19</sup> The Company's certification therefore did not describe any robocall mitigation program.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, Horizon Technology Group did not take any corrective action after the Wireline Bureau informed Horizon Technology Group of the apparent deficiencies in its certification.<sup>21</sup>
- 6. Accordingly, we direct Horizon Technology Group to explain why the Enforcement Bureau or the Commission should not remove the Company's certification from the Robocall Mitigation Database.<sup>22</sup> This Order affords Horizon Technology Group notice and an opportunity to cure any deficiencies in its robocall mitigation program filing or explain why its certification is not deficient.
- 7. Horizon Technology Group shall file its response with the Enforcement Bureau within fourteen (14) calendar days of the issue of this Order. Failure to respond or submit a response providing a reasonable basis for why Horizon Technology Group should retain its certification in the Robocall Mitigation Database will result in removal of the certification. **Removal of Horizon Technology Group's certification from the Robocall Mitigation Database will require any intermediate providers and terminating voice service providers to cease accepting traffic from the Company**. If Horizon Technology Group is removed from the Robocall Mitigation Database, Horizon Technology Group shall not refile, and the Wireline Bureau will not reinstate Horizon Technology Group to the database, until the Wireline Bureau and the Enforcement Bureau determine that Horizon Technology Group has addressed and resolved any deficiencies or shortcomings in its Robocall Mitigation Database certification

## IV. ORDERING CLAUSES

8. Accordingly, **IT IS ORDERED** that, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 227(b) 251(e), and 403 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and sections 0.111, 0.311, 1.1, 1.102(b)(1),

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> E-mail from Wireline Bureau to Horizon Technology Group LLC (Oct. 10, 2021) (Warning Notice). *See also* Exhibit A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See Robocall Mitigation Database Filing (attesting that the Company has no STIR/SHAKEN implementation and is performing robocall mitigation).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See 47 CFR § 64.6305(b); Second Caller ID Authentication Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1902, para. 82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Robocall Mitigation Database Filing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> See 47 CFR § 64.6305(b)(2)(ii) (requiring voice service providers subject to a robocall mitigation program to provide specific reasonable robocall mitigation steps).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> See Warning Notice; Wireline Bureau Referral.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See Second Caller ID Authentication Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1903, para. 83 ("Enforcement Actions may include, among others, removing a defective certification from the database after providing notice to the voice service provider and an opportunity to cure the filing . . . .").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> 47 CFR § 64.6305(c); Second Caller ID Authentication Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1904, para. 86.

64.1200, and 64.6305 of the Commission's rules,<sup>24</sup> and the *Second Caller ID Authentication Order*,<sup>25</sup> Horizon Technology Group **SHALL FILE** a written response to this Order **within fourteen (14) calendar days** from the release date of this Order.

- 9. The written response must either inform the Enforcement Bureau that Horizon Technology Group has corrected its filing in the Robocall Mitigation Database or explain why its certification should not be removed from the Robocall Mitigation Database.
- 10. The response must be mailed to the Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554, ATTN: Enforcement Bureau Telecommunications Consumers Division. The response must also be e-mailed to Kristi Thompson, Division Chief, Telecommunications Consumers Division, at <a href="mailto:kristi.thompson@fcc.gov">kristi.thompson@fcc.gov</a>, and Daniel Stepanicich, Attorney Advisor, Telecommunications Consumers Division, at <a href="mailto:daniel.stepanicich@fcc.gov">daniel.stepanicich@fcc.gov</a>.
- 11. **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that copies of this Order shall be sent by e-mail and registered mail, return receipt requested, to: Jose Gregorio, COO, Horizon Technology Group LLC, 80 NW 22nd Avenue, Miami, FL 33125; jgregorio@horizontech.us; In Corp Services Inc, 1090 Vermont Avenue NW, Suite 910, Washington, DC 20005.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Loyaan A. Egal Acting Chief Enforcement Bureau

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> 47 U.S.C. §§ 4(i), 4(j), 227(b), 251(e), 403; 47 CFR §§ 0.111, 0.311, 1.1, 1.102(b)(1), 64.1200, 64.6305.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Second Caller ID Authentication Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 1902, 1903, paras. 81 n.322, 83.

# **EXHIBIT A**