Federal Communications Commission	DA 26-742



DA 26-742
Released:  July 17, 2026

PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU AND OFFICE OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY SEEK COMMENT ON PROHIBITING THE IMPORTATION AND MARKETING OF CERTAIN COVERED UAS AND UAS CRITICAL COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT LISTED IN SECTION 1709 OF FY2025 NDAA

PS Docket No. 26-184

Comments Due:   30 days after publication in the Federal Register 

Introduction
By this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons” (covered equipment). Pursuant to sections 2(a) and (d) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, and sections 1.50002 and 1.50003 of the Commission’s rules, the Federal Communications Commission’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) publishes a list of communications equipment and services that have been determined by one of the sources specified in that statute to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons (covered equipment).  Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-124, 133 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1609) (Secure Networks Act); 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003.  For the current version of the Covered List, see Federal Communications Commission, List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (FCC Covered List).  The process by which the Commission would exercise this authority was established in the Equipment Authorization Security Second Report and Order.  See Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program, Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 232, FCC 25-71, paras. 40-50 (2025) (EA Security 2d R&O); 47 CFR § 2.939(e).  
  Such prohibitions would apply to the advertising, distribution, and sale of such equipment. See 47 CFR § 2.803(a).  
  In particular, we propose to apply such prohibitions to certain previously-authorized foreign-produced uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components, and certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025 NDAA), added to the Covered List in December 2025. FCC Covered List; Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, Pub. L. No. 118-159, § 1709, 138 Stat. 1773, 2209-10 (2024) (Section 1709).

  This would encompass all covered equipment produced by the following entities and their affiliates, subsidiaries, and other partners:  Cogito Tech Company, Limited (Cogito); Fikaxo Technology Inc. (Fikaxo); Lyno Dynamics LLC (Lyno Dynamics); Skyhigh Tech LLC (Skyhigh Tech); Spatial Hover Inc (Spatial Hover); SZ Knowact Robot Technology Co., Ltd. (SZ Knowact); WaveGo Tech LLC (WaveGo); Xtra Technology LLC (Xtra); and Guangzhou Xaircraft Technology Co. Ltd (XAG).  These prohibitions would not apply to any importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development.  Moreover, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect continued use or operation of already-purchased covered equipment.  We seek comment on these proposals and the relevant factors, including national security and economic and supply chain considerations, that would justify prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of such previously authorized covered equipment.  
Background
In November 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) adopted rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List. See generally Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program; Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Competitive Bidding Program, Report and Order, Order, and FNPRM, 37 FCC Rcd 13493, 13509-98, paras. 32-263 (2022) (EA Security R&O and FNPRM).  The Commission explained that this proceeding builds upon the important ongoing efforts by the Commission, Congress, and the Executive Branch to take further action to protect the security of America’s critical communications networks and equipment supply chains.  Id. at 13494-95, para. 1; see also id. at 13497-505, 13507-08, paras. 5-23, 31.  
  However, the Commission did not revoke previously granted authorizations of covered equipment. Id. at 13535, para. 107.  
  In October 2025, the Commission adopted the EA Security Second R&O which, among other things, established a procedure to limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the underlying authorization. EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, paras. 40-50; 47 CFR 2.939(e), 2.803, 2.1204.   
  The Commission noted that its goal is to mitigate potential national security risks associated with covered equipment in the nation’s supply chain that was authorized prior to a Covered List addition under 47 U.S.C § 1601(b). Id. at paras. 32, 40. 
  The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to “institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List” and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the EA Security Second R&O. Id. at paras. 45, 48.  
  The Commission gave specific directives to PSHSB and OET regarding how to analyze and implement the new procedures. Id. at paras. 42-50. 
  
On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components Produced Abroad, and Equipment and Services Listed In Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to FCC Covered List, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 25-1086 (Dec. 22, 2025) (December 22 Public Notice).  As stated in the December 22 Public Notice, the definition of UAS critical components includes UAS components and any associated software.  See December 22 Public Notice, Appendix B, National Security Determination on the Threat Posed by Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components Produced in Foreign Countries, December 21, 2025 (December 2025 National Security Determination).  Section 1709 of FY2025 NDAA also defines communications or video surveillance services as including software.  See Section 1709(a)(1)(D).  
  PSHSB also added communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA to the Covered List. See December 22 Public Notice.   
  This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that such equipment and services pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons. See id.  
    
On January 7, 2026, the Commission received a subsequent National Security Determination from the Department of War (DoW) stating that certain equipment should be removed from the Covered List because it does not pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Exemption of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components from FCC Covered List, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-22 (Jan. 7, 2026) (January 7 Public Notice).  
  Accordingly, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt:  UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) Blue UAS Cleared List until January 1, 2027; and UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard (48 CFR § 25.101(a)), until January 1, 2027.  
Both National Security Determinations provided that the identified UAS and UAS critical components should be included on the Covered List, unless DoW or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given UAS or class of UAS, or a specific UAS critical component, does not pose risks to U.S. national security.  The FCC established a process for entities to request individual Conditional Approvals for their covered UAS and UAS critical components by submitting the required information, and DoW has granted several such Conditional Approvals. The UAS and UAS critical components that have been granted Conditional Approval are listed on the Commission’s Covered List webpage: https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist.  
  Additionally, on June 15, 2026, based on a National Security Determination from DoW, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt “Toy Drones” as defined in the National Security Determination and “Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components.” FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces that “Toy Drones” and “Toy Drones that Contain Foreign-Produced Components” are Removed from the FCC Covered List, WC Docket 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-588 (Jun. 15, 2026) (Toy Drones Public Notice).

On March 27, 2026, PSHSB and OET released a Public Notice (March 27 Public Notice) seeking comment on a proposal to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of equipment that had been placed on the Covered List in 2024 or earlier but was originally authorized prior to the adoption of the Commission’s 2022 equipment authorization and national security rules. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Seek Comment on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier, PS Docket No. 26-72, DA 26-294 (PSHSB/OET Mar. 27, 2026), 91 FR 17275 (Apr. 6, 2026) (March 27 Public Notice).
  The March 27 Public Notice explained that those additions to the Covered List were made pursuant to a specific national security determination made by Congress, which the Commission found constituted a “specific determination that such equipment poses an ‘unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.’” See March 27 Public Notice.
  PSHSB and OET sought comment on whether maintaining such authorizations would undermine the Commission’s national security framework and whether prohibiting continued importation and marketing would better serve the public interest. March 27 Public Notice at 3-5.

On June 26, 2026, after review of the record, PSHSB and OET issued a second Public Notice (June 26 Public Notice) summarizing the comments received, evaluating the technical, economic, and national security considerations raised by commenters, and assessing the public interest implications of the proposed prohibition. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Prohibit the Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier, PS Docket No. 26-72, Public Notice, DA 26-635 (Jun. 26, 2026) (June 26 Public Notice).
  The June 26 Public Notice concluded that continued importation and marketing of equipment authorized before the adoption of the Commission’s 2022 rules posed unacceptable risks to national security when imported or marketed in the United States. June 26 Public Notice at 3.
  The Commission therefore determined that adoption of the prohibition was warranted and announced that the prohibition would become effective 10 days after publication in the Federal Register. The June 26 Public Notice was published in the Federal Register on July 6, 2026.  See Federal Communications Commission, Prohibiting Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier, 91 Fed. Reg. 41023 (July 6, 2026). 
  The June 26 Public Notice emphasized that expedited action was necessary because a delayed but impending prohibition could incentivize importers and markets to accelerate shipments of covered equipment into the U.S market, which is a result that is directly contrary to the purpose of the Notice. June 26 Public Notice at 8.
  Following the release of the June 26 Public Notice, the Commission updated its website to reflect the newly adopted prohibitions. https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist. 
  These prohibitions went into effect on July 16, 2026.
On March 30, 2026, the Enforcement Bureau (EB) opened an investigation and issued a Letter of Inquiry (LOI) to Xtra, Letter of Inquiry from Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Xtra Technology LLC, c/o Fiona Miller, U.S. Agent for Service of Process (on file in EB-SED-26-00040495).
 based on publicly available information that Xtra was producing hardware copies of certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, and that code from the equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA was copied and pasted into Xtra devices. The Verge, Xtra: the company that lets DJI sneak its popular cameras into the US (Oct. 9, 2025), https://www.theverge.com/report/795016/xtra-muse-dji-osmo-pocket-3-us-customs-tariffs. 
  On May 8, 2026, EB opened an investigation and issued LOIs to Cogito, Fikaxo, Lyno Dynamics, Skyhigh Tech, Spatial Hover, SZ Knowact, and WaveGo, On May 8, 2026, the Enforcement Bureau issued Letters of Inquiry to:  Letter of Inquiry from Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Cogito Tech Company Limited, c/o Alan Graham, Vishtec LLC, U.S. Agent for Service of Process (May 8, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040760); Letter of Inquiry from Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Fikaxo Technology Inc., c/o Xiaoya Ren, U.S. Agent for Service of Process (May 8, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040743); Letter of Inquiry from Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Lyno Dynamics LLC, c/o Bryan Menendez, U.S. Agent for Service of Process (May 8, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040751); Letter from Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Skyhigh Tech, LLC, c/o Christina Xu, U.S. Agent for Service of Process (May 8, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040755); Letter of Inquiry from Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Spatial Hover Inc, c/o Ricky Yu, U.S. Agent for Service of Process (May 8, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040749); Letter of Inquiry from Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to SZ Knowact Robot Technology Co., Ltd, c/o David Wu, U.S. Agent for Service of Process (May 8, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040751); and Letter of Inquiry from Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to WaveGo Tech LLC, c/o Luna Zeng, U.S. Agent for Service of Process (May 8, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040753).  
 based on publicly available information that such companies produce UAS and UAS critical components that contain hardware copies of communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. See DroneXL, DJI Shell Game Exposed: Security Bot Catches DJI’s Fikaxo Proxy Before Congressional Deadline (Sept. 26, 2025), https://dronexl.co/2025/09/26/dji-shell-game-exposed-fikaxo-proxy/ (last visited Jul. 13, 2026);
see also DroneXL, Spatial Hover Emerges as Newest DJI Shell Company After Fikaxo Drone Mysteriously
Migrates Between Websites, (Oct. 3, 2025), https://dronexl.co/2025/10/03/spatial-hover-dji-shell-company-after-fikaxo-drone/ (last visited Jul. 13, 2026).
  All of these companies failed to respond to EB’s March and May 2026 LOIs as directed in violation of Commission rules.  On July 10, 2026, OET temporarily deferred the grantee codes of these companies based on publicly available information that these companies are producing covered equipment, which is prohibited from receiving equipment authorization, and for the failure to respond to the LOIs. See Letter from Clifford Jones, Associate Chief and Chief of the Laboratory Division, FCC Office of Engineering and Technology, to Cogito Tech Company Limited, c/o Rober Lyu (Jul. 10, 2026); Letter from Clifford Jones, Associate Chief and Chief of the Laboratory Division, FCC Office of Engineering and Technology, to Fikaxo Technology Inc., c/o Xiaoya Ren (Jul. 10, 2026); Letter from Clifford Jones, Associate Chief and Chief of the Laboratory Division, FCC Office of Engineering and Technology, to Lyno Dynamics LLC, c/o Bryan Menendez (Jul. 10, 2026); Letter from Clifford Jones, Associate Chief and Chief of the Laboratory Division, FCC Office of Engineering and Technology, to Skyhigh Tech LLC, c/o Christina Xu (Jul. 10, 2026); Letter from Clifford Jones, Associate Chief and Chief of the Laboratory Division, FCC Office of Engineering and Technology, to Spatial Hover Inc., c/o Ricky Yu (Jul. 10, 2026); Letter from Clifford Jones, Associate Chief and Chief of the Laboratory Division, FCC Office of Engineering and Technology, to SZ Knowact Robot Technology Co., Ltd, c/o Sita Luo (Jul. 10, 2026); Letter from Clifford Jones, Associate Chief and Chief of the Laboratory Division, FCC Office of Engineering and Technology, to WaveGo Tech LLC, c/o Luna Zeng (Jul. 10, 2026); Letter from Clifford Jones, Associate Chief and Chief of the Laboratory Division, FCC Office of Engineering and Technology, to Xtra Technology LLC, c/o Foina Miller (Jul. 10, 2026). 
  
On April 9, 2026, EB issued an LOI to XAG, a company that produces UAS and UAS critical components in a foreign country, See e.g., Response to Letter of Inquiry from Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, counsel for XAG, to Spectrum Enforcement Division, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, at 6, Response to Question 6.d (May 26, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040569) (XAG Response to LOI) (identifying the location of XAG’s manufacturing facilities as located at Room 501, Building 2, No. 127, Hongmei Section, Wangsha Road, Hongmei Town, Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, P.R.C.).  
 based on XAG’s failure to provide updated U.S. agent for service of process information pursuant to Section 2.929(c) of the Commission’s rules and granted XAG’s request for extension of time to respond to the LOI to May 26, 2026. Letter of Inquiry from Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Guangzhou Xaircraft Technology Co. Ltd, c/o Pegasus Spray Inc, U.S. Agent for Service of Process, Arthur Chen (Apr. 9, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040569).
  On May 21, 2026, XAG requested another 60-day extension of time concerning responses to two questions on the grounds that the information may be subject to export controls by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and XAG needed time to seek an official determination from the PRC Ministry of Commerce regarding whether XAG was permitted to respond to FCC inquiries under PRC law. Email from Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Puttman LLP, counsel for XAG, to, Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau (May 21, 2026, 15:38 EDT).  Needless to say, there is no exception to the requirement to respond to EB LOIs on the grounds that a foreign government might prohibit the response.  See 47 U.S.C. § 403 (Section 403 grants the Commission both the authority to institute inquiries and “the power to make and enforce any order or orders” relating to its inquiries into compliance with the Communications Act; 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (authorizing the Commission to “issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”); 47 U.S.C. § 154(j) (stating that “[t]he Commission may conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice.”); 47 CFR § 0.111(a)(17) (granting the Bureau the authority to “[i]dentify and analyze complaint information, conduct investigations, conduct external audits and collect information, including pursuant to sections 218, 220, 308(b), 403 and 409(e) through (k) of the Communications Act, in connection with complaints, on its own initiative or upon request of another Bureau or Office”).  Furthermore, section 416(c) of the Act provides, “[i]t shall be the duty of every person . . . to observe and comply with such orders so long as the same shall remain in effect.” 47 U.S.C. § 416(c).    
  On July 16, 2026, OET temporarily deferred XAG’s grantee code based on XAG’s failure to provide updated U.S. agent for service of process information pursuant to Section 2.929(c) of the Commission’s rules. Letter from Clifford Jones, Associate Chief and Chief of the Laboratory Division, FCC Office of Engineering and Technology, to Guangzhou Xaircraft Technology Co. Ltd, Junjie Zhu (Jul. 16, 2026); 47 CFR § 2.929.
  
Today, we initiate another proceeding to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2025.  
Discussion
The Commission has legal authority to review an existing authorization for covered equipment, and to revoke such authorization pursuant to current rules. EA Security R&O and FNPRM, 37 FCC Rcd at 13537, para. 114. 
  Under section 2.939(a), the Commission may “revoke . . . any equipment authorization” for various reasons, including “conditions coming to the attention of the Commission which would warrant it in refusing to grant an original application.” 47 CFR § 2.939(a).
  Likewise, under section 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET “may place limitations on an existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit continued importation or marketing” of such equipment. 47 CFR § 2.939(e).  “OET and PSHSB will issue a public notice announcing the intent to limit the scope of equipment authorizations to prohibit the further importation or marketing of specified devices identified by class, type, or other description sufficient to identify the devices.”  47 CFR § 2.939(e)(1).  “The public notice will include an assessment of the impact of the proposed prohibition with consideration of public interest factors, including: the unacceptable risks the equipment was found to pose, the economic and supply chain impacts, and any other criteria as specified by the Commission. The public notice should give particular weight to the specific determination(s), and any accompanying rules or analyses, through which the relevant equipment was added to the Covered List.  47 CFR § 2.939(e)(2). 

Scope.  Pursuant to section 2.939(e), we propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized covered equipment referenced above.  We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment.  Specifically, we propose to apply prohibitions to the following covered equipment:

(1) foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components and white-labeled devices listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA produced by the following entities:
o Cogito, including FCC IDs 2BCHV-TQFDUB2, 2BCHV-GL3323, 2BCHV-TQFDUB1; 
o Fikaxo, including FCC IDs 2BRQB-FKABZF and 2BRQB-YZABFI; 
o Lyno Dynamics, including FCC IDs 2BQ98-LD2202508, 2BQ98-LD220RC, and 2BQ98-LD220RD; 
o Skyhigh Tech, including FCC IDs 2BLZI-T60X2411 and 2BLZI-YKBP22411; 
o Spatial Hover, including FCC IDs 2BQAI-S3T and 2BQAI-NRC01; 
o SZ Knowact, including FCC IDs 2BMUV-ARDCF25 and 2BMUV-AUDAFV25; and
o WaveGo LLC, including FCC IDs 2BPFE-DD001 and 2BPFE-RC001;
(2) communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 produced by Xtra, to include FCC IDs 2BQH2-XCAMA01, 2BQH2-XCAMB01, 2BQH2-XCAMC01, 2BQH2-XCAMD01, and 2BQH2-XCAME01; and 
(3) foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components produced by XAG, to include UAS and UAS critical components with FCC IDs beginning with the 2A46G grantee code. 

We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment.  As stated above, public reporting indicates that equipment listed in categories (1) and (2) are exact hardware copies of certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. See supra n.25 and n.27; see also the following web searches – Cogito: See Haye Kostello, Specta Air Drone Teardown Reveals Strong Similarities to DJI Air 3 (Mar. 27, 2024), https://dronexl.co/2024/03/27/cogito-specta-air-drone-teardown/ (reporting that the Specta Air has “striking similarities” to a section 1709 company’s equipment, in both external appearance and internal components); Haye Kostello, Specta Air as Alternative to DJI Air 3 (Apr. 2, 2024), https://dronexl.co/2024/04/02/specta-air-drone-alternative-dji-air-3/ (describing use of a section 1709 company’s proprietary OcuSync wireless system and cross‑compatibility of hardware accessories);  Konrad Iturbe, DJI Front Companies, GitHub, https://github.com/KonradIT/dji-front-companies (noting that Cogito devices incorporate a section 1709 company’s standard wireless chipset).  Public reporting links Fikaxo to a broader network of a section 1709 company’s‑affiliated proxy or shell entities.  See Haye Kostello, VooMax Breeze Is A Fikaxo Rebrand of a DJI Drone—And Fikaxo Doesn’t Even List It (Apr. 24, 2026), https://dronexl.co/2026/04/24/voomax-breeze-fikaxo-rebrand-dji-drone/ (detailing additional rebranding activity linking Fikaxo products to a section 1709 company’s hardware); Haye Kostello, DJI Shell Game Exposed: Security Bot Catches DJI’s Fikaxo Proxy Before Congressional Deadline (Sept. 26, 2025), https://dronexl.co/2025/09/26/dji-shell-game-exposed-fikaxo-proxy/ (mapping Fikaxo’s technical and corporate connections to a section 1709 company).  Video and user analyses on social media also identify direct physical similarities between Lyno Dynamics’ LD220 series controllers and a section 1709 company’s remote controllers. See Max Drone Service, Facebook Video, https://www.facebook.com/maxdroneservice/videos/a-closer-look-at-the-lyno-dynamics-ld220-rc-compared-to-the-dji-t100-rc/715345081568421/ (providing side‑by‑side comparison of the Lyno Dynamics LD220 RC and a section 1709 company’s equipment, including identical button layout, housing geometry, and antenna placement); see also Drone Enthusiast Group, Facebook Post, https://www.facebook.com/groups/3080483255595962/posts/4276127689364840/ (users documenting hardware similarities and noting cross‑compatibility observations between Lyno Dynamics components and a section 1709 company’s designs).  Community reports similarly suggest that Skyhigh Tech’s Talos T60X agricultural drone may incorporate a section 1709 company’s hardware.  See Reddit, https://www.reddit.com/r/drones/comments/1l9clc5/spray_drones/ (user discussion comparing the Talos T60X to the section 1709 company’s device, with one commenter stating: “yes it's DJI parts, but Talos and the OEM company (I'm pretty confident it's a company called Sky High) are doing the software and maintenance of everything”).  Public reporting suggests that Spatial Hover and Fikaxo function as proxy companies marketing rebranded versions of the a section 1709 company’s device with identical specifications.  See Haye Kesteloo, Spatial Hover Emerges as Newest DJI Shell Company After Fikaxo Drone Mysteriously Migrates Between Websites (Oct. 3, 2025), https://dronexl.co/2025/10/03/spatial-hover-dji-shell-company-after-fikaxo-drone/.  SZ Knowact’s Skyrover X1 drone appears to be a re-labeled section 1709 company’s device.  See SKYROVER X1: https://www.skyroverdrone.com/products/skyrover-x1 (last visited Jul. 16, 2026) and compare with a section 1709 company’s equipment: https://www.dji.com/mini-4-pro, SKYROVER X1 Combo: https://www.skyroverdrone.com/products/skyrover-x1?variant=51866969047343 (last visited Jul. 16, 2026), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZE2HZv8EHXc&list=PLl4WE3f-MRmwTSgpnHMicsAKDDB-USNNy&index=5; see also https://www.reddit.com/r/dji/comments/1n22sm2/skyrover_x1/ (screenshots of packaging on EBATS showing FCC IDs and SZ Knowact contact address); FCC filings likewise reveal that the SZ Knowact’s Skyrover X1 shares similar RF design elements with a section 1709 company’s device.  See FCC ID 2BMUV‑AUDAFV25 (Skyrover X1), External Photos, Test Setup Photos, Antenna Information, https://apps.fcc.gov/eas/GetApplicationAttachment.html?id=8251242; FCC ID SS3‑MT4MFVD23 (Section 1709 device), External Photos, Antenna Gain info, https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=oFZBdGx%2FqUWaMHfnt%2FJgPA%3D%3D&fcc_id=SS3-MT4MFVD23; Skyrover X1 Review, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZE2HZv8EHXc (showing how the Skyrover drone resembles a section 1709 company’s device).  Additional commentary identifies SZ Knowact’s SkyroverX1 as a section 1709 compnay’s drone sold through proxy entities.  See Reddit, https://www.reddit.com/r/videography/comments/1r09z21/dji_is_rebranding_got_the_scoop_from_a_friend_who/ (alleging a section 1709 company’s rebranding activity through third‑party distributors); Is DJI Dodging U.S. Tariffs with the Xtra Brand?, RedShark News (Oct. 10. 2025), https://www.redsharknews.com/is-dji-dodging-us-tariffs-with-the-xtra-brand (examining evidence that a section 1709 company’s may be distributing rebranded or whitelabeled drone models under the “Xtra” name to mitigate tariff exposure, noting hardware and specification overlap between Xtrabranded aircraft and a section 1709 company’s platforms). 
  Even if the equipment is not an exact hardware copy, equipment that relies on substantial design, manufacture, assembly, or development by entities listed in section 1709 could still be considered “produced by” such entities. EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 53.
 Additionally, as reflected in the materials submitted as part of the application for certification, three companies—Lyno Dynamics, Spatial Hover, and Skyhigh Tech—submitted equipment certification applications that still display branding of or reference companies listed in section 1709. See FCC ID 2BQ98‑LD220RC, OET Exhibits, https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=UzufucGHcPzWeWQnCkfxOQ%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BQ98-LD220RC (showing section 1709 company branding in Lyno Dynamics’s FCC equipment authorization materials for its remote controller, labeled “05_YKBP2 WIFI ANT”; to view, select the link and open the exhibit titled “05_YKBP2 WIFI ANT”); FCC ID 2BQAI‑NRC01, OET Exhibits, https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=WDJaaUC3r0cPfT13iFOmoQ%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BQAI-NRC01 (showing an antenna specification referencing a company named in section 1709 in Spatial Hover’s FCC equipment authorization materials; to view, select the link and open the exhibit titled “Antenna Spec”); FCC ID 2BLZI‑T60X2411, OET Exhibits, https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=ERV0JteG2MqC%2Fpyq4oaAbg%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BLZI-T60X2411 (Skyhigh’s FCC equipment authorization materials also display branding of a company listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA on WiFi antenna diagrams in the exhibit titled “YKBP2 WIFI ANT0 LEFT”; to view, select the link and open the antenna report labeled “YKBP2 WIFI ANT0 LEFT”).
  Even if not produced by an entity named in section 1709, the equipment listed in categories (1) and (2) might still be produced by a “partner,” or entity “to which [a] named entity has a technology sharing or licensing agreement,” given the closeness of the designs. See Section 1709(a)(1)(C)(i), (iii).  
  Moreover, publicly available equipment authorization records indicate that several of the UAS and UAS critical components in category (1) are in any event produced abroad, rendering them covered equipment even apart from the section 1709 connection. A review of the FCC equipment authorization filings for each entity shows that the FCC ID labels and accompanying OET exhibit reports identify foreign‑produced antennas, components, or devices.  For each FCC ID, the country‑of‑origin statement is available by navigating to the FCC ID link and selecting the “ID Label” exhibit.  For Cogito: See FCC ID 2BCHV‑GL3323, ID Label (SPECTA GL33 antenna labeled “Made in China”) https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=kz1wZPveYmuMrmUc3sebAQ%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BCHV-GL3323; FCC ID 2BCHV‑TQFDUB2, ID Label (SPECTA UAV antenna labeled “Made in Malaysia”) https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=Mi8uivrB55e9bI8QD7Oa5Q%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BCHV-TQFDUB2; FCC ID 2BCHV‑TQFDUB1, ID Label (SPECTA WA1616 Foot SDR antenna labeled “Made in Malaysia”), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=kt36fRe3oEp5BI0YUOygJA%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BCHV-TQFDUB1.  Fikaxo: See FCC ID 2BRQB‑YZABFI, ID Label (remote control antennas labeled “Made in China”), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=e6382NaiAG82%2FN6RRQPQZw%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BRQB-YZABFI; FCC ID 2BRQB‑FKABZFI, ID Label (unmanned aircraft antennas labeled “Made in China”), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=C0Paw5ut8j9Ey26aXRQRFA%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BRQB-FKABZFI.  Lyno Dynamics: See FCC ID 2BQ98‑LD2202508, ID Label (antenna manufactured by INPAQ Technology (Suzhou) Co., Ltd., labeled “Made in China”), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=J7tesTh%2FwdFYimWTS9lhmQ%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BQ98-LD2202508; FCC ID 2BQ98‑LD220RC, ID Label (antenna manufactured by INPAQ Technology (Suzhou) Co., Ltd., labeled “Made in China”),  https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=UzufucGHcPzWeWQnCkfxOQ%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BQ98-LD220RC.  For Skyhigh Tech: see FCC ID 2BLZI‑T60X2411, ID Label (Talos T60X drone labeled “Made in China”), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=ERV0JteG2MqC%2Fpyq4oaAbg%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BLZI-T60X2411; see also FCC ID 2BLZI‑T60X2411, Test Report (Chinese test laboratory).  For Spatial Hover Inc.:  see FCC ID 2BQAI‑S3T, ID Label (UAV SDR LF ANT1 antenna labeled “Made in Malaysia”), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=qSIjw6B%2FKhDGMi47pir10g%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BQAI-S3T; FCC ID 2BQAI‑NRC01, ID Label (N Series RC antenna labeled “Made in China”) and FCC ID 2BQAI‑NRC01, Test Report (Chinese test laboratory), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=WDJaaUC3r0cPfT13iFOmoQ%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BQAI-NRC01.  For SZ Knowact: see FCC ID 2BMUV‑ARDCF25, ID Label (remote controller labeled “Made in PRC”) https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=VxTMRO8s14sRfppb%2B1DLoQ%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BMUV-ARDCF25; FCC ID 2BMUV‑AUDAFV25, ID Label (antenna manufactured by Shenzhen ZTX Communication Technology Co., Ltd., labeled “Made in Malaysia”), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=cGAEAMb%2FRBZmYsZrapDaOg%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BMUV-AUDAFV25. Manufacturer and applicant filings list only Shenzhen, China addresses.  For WaveGo:  see FCC ID 2BFPE‑RC001, ID Label/location info (showing remote controller label as “Made in China”), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=9XhLwbSM9JGGb4vVhvNnDQ%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BPFE-RC001; FCC ID 2BPFE‑DD001, Aircraft label and location (showing “Made in Malaysia”) https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/ViewExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&application_id=Aj3fge%2F4XYGATl0GkawlXQ%3D%3D&fcc_id=2BPFE-DD001; see also FCC ID 2BFPE‑RC001, SAR Test Report (testing performed by SGS‑CTSC, a test laboratory located in China). 
  Equipment listed in category 3 is equipment produced in a foreign country.  For example, XAG identified in its response to EB’s April 9, 2026 LOI that its manufacturing facilities are located in a foreign country. For example, filings indicate that XAG’s P150 Max drone and related accessories are manufactured by Dongguan Xaircraft UAS Technology Co., Ltd., located at Room 501, Building 2, No. 127, Hongmei Section, Wangsha Road, Hongmei Town, Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, P.R.C.  See e.g., XAG Response to LOI, at 6, Response to Question 6.d.  
  
For reasons discussed below, this prohibition on importation and marketing would not apply to any other already-authorized covered equipment, including UAS or UAS critical components or other communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA.  It would also only apply to covered UAS and UAS critical components and would therefore not apply to any UAS or UAS critical components that are exempt from the Covered List—including UAS and UAS critical components identified on the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA’s) Blue UAS Cleared List; UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR § 25.101(a); and UAS and UAS critical components granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS.  Furthermore, this prohibition would not apply to importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development.  Finally, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect the continued use or operation of already-purchased UAS or UAS critical components that were foreign produced or communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA.
We seek comment on our tentative conclusions that the above-referenced equipment is covered equipment.  We invite commenters to provide specific evidence in response to our tentative conclusions.  Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized “covered” equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment serves the public interest.
National security impacts.  We start with national security concerns, because, as the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O, “[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 45 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)). 
  In the EA Security Second R&O, the Commission stated that older models of covered equipment, which are still widely sold in the U.S., pose an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed in the United States, “not only when such equipment is new to the market.” EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 40. 
  The Commission agreed with commenters who pointed out that certain previously authorized devices that are now considered covered equipment “likely remain[] marketable in the United States” and “may present continuing national security threats.” Id. 
  
Subject to exceptions, January 7 Public Notice at 2; Toy Drones Public Notice at 3.
 an Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise, including appropriate national security agencies, one of whom was the DoW, See Opposition of Department of War to Petition for Reconsideration, ET Docket Nos. 26-22 and 26-23 (filed Apr. 6, 2026). 
 specifically determined that UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries and communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA “pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons.” December 2025 National Security Determination at 2, 4. 
  This determination of “unacceptable risks” was based on an assessment of “threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential threats to the homeland.” December 2025 National Security Determination at 2.
  We believe this determination included all already-authorized covered equipment described in this Public Notice, which are UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries and/or communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. See supra, at 2-3. 
  We tentatively accept this determination and “give [it] particular weight,” as the Commission directed. EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 45.
  
Therefore, based on the EA Security Second R&O and the December 21, 2025, National Security Determination, we tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered UAS and UAS critical components and communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA as described above is necessary to protect national security by mitigating risks to the U.S. communications sector.
Economic and supply chain impacts.  We seek comment on the potential economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of the above-referenced already-authorized covered equipment.  How would this proposed action affect the financial interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in the communications sector?  As the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O, it may consider “countervailing economic concerns when implementing the prohibitions for already-authorized devices.”EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 46. 
  What are the economic or supply chain considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action?  We invite commenters to provide data that we should consider in our analysis.  
We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have substantial economic and supply chain impacts, especially given that the devices subject to our proposed limitation comprise a very small share of the market.  None of the companies whose equipment is identified in this Public Notice—Cogito; Fikaxo; Lyno Dynamics; Skyhigh Tech; Spatial Hover; SZ Knowact; WaveGo; XAG; or Xtra—appear in major industry market analyses or rankings. See, e.g., Hendrik Boedecker, Drone Market Shares 2023–2025 (Aug 3, 2023), https://droneii.com/commercial-drone-market-2023 (finding that the small UAS market is highly concentrated, with a small number of manufacturers accounting for the vast majority of sales).
  Do commenters agree that economic and supply chain impacts are relatively minor?  Could other equipment fill any gaps created by this proposed prohibition?  Has the Conditional Approval process provided an adequate source for trusted equipment now or in the future?  Would this proposal be cost-effective for the public in terms of obtaining trusted equipment?  Would providers’ compliance costs decrease as they replace covered equipment with trusted equipment?  We strongly encourage commenters to supply data and other specific evidence of economic costs to this prohibition.
On the other hand, we seek comment on any economic benefits that might arise as a result of these prohibitions.  We note that after the initial update to the Covered List, billions of dollars have already been raised by domestic UAS producers, creating thousands of U.S. manufacturing jobs. See, e.g., Kristen Korosec, Zipline Charts Drone Delivery Expansion with $600M in New Funding (Jan. 21, 2026), https://techcrunch.com/2026/01/21/zipline-charts-drone-delivery-expansion-with-600m-in-new-funding/; BRINC Announces New Seattle Factory and Launch of Next Generation 911 Response Drone, (Mar. 24, 2026), https://brincdrones.com/news/brinc-announces-new-seattle-factory-and-launch-of-next-generation-911-response-drone/; Zacc Dukowitz, Flytrex to Open U.S. Factory (May 27, 2026), https://uavcoach.com/flytrex-us-factory/; DMR Technologies to Launch Full Scale U.S. Drone Manufacturing Facility in Lafayette (Oct. 2, 2025), https://www.opportunitylouisiana.gov/news/dmr-technologies-to-launch-full-scale-u-s-drone-manufacturing-facility-in-lafayette; Mike Stone, High Speed Combat Drone Production Starts at New U.S. Anduril Plant in Days, Defense News (Mar. 19, 2026), https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2026/03/19/high-speed-combat-drone-production-starts-at-new-us-anduril-plant-in-days/; Unusual Machines Expands Orlando Manufacturing Footprint to Support Battery Operations (Jun. 25, 2026), https://www.morningstar.com/news/accesswire/1182163msn/unusual-machines-expands-orlando-manufacturing-footprint-to-support-battery-operations; Colin Demarest, Swarm Aero Raises Series A, Plans Drone Factory (Mar. 11, 2026), https://www.axios.com/2026/03/11/swarm-aero-seriesa-drone-factory; Ryan Finnerty, Tekever Expands into Americas with First U.S. Office (May 19, 2026), https://www.flightglobal.com/archive/2026/05/tekever-expands-into-americas-with-first-us-office/; Echodyne Expands Public Safety Radar Applications Through Partnership with Axon, Echodyne (May 27, 2026), https://www.echodyne.com/newsroom/echodyne-expands-public-safety-radar-applications-through-partnership-with-axon; Pragyan Kalita and Pritam Biswas, Zipline Soars to $7.6 Billion Valuation as U.S. Drone Delivery Bets Grow (Jan. 20, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/zipline-soars-76-billion-valuation-us-drone-delivery-bets-2026-01-20/; Adam Bry, Skydio Series F (Apr. 23, 2026), https://www.skydio.com/blog/skydio-series-f; Ishveena Singh, Flytrex Drone Delivery Texas Factory, DroneDJ (May 21, 2026), https://dronedj.com/2026/05/21/flytrex-drone-delivery-texas-factory/; Kurt Schlosser, Drone Home: BRINC Moving to Massive New HQ and Factory in Seattle Amid Rapid Growth, GeekWire (Mar. 24, 2026), https://www.geekwire.com/2026/drone-home-brinc-moving-to-massive-new-hq-and-factory-in-seattle-amid-startups-rapid-growth/.
  Additionally, billions more have been committed for domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components, which are expected to generate additional jobs. See, e.g., Skydio Commits $3.5 Billion to Expand U.S. Manufacturing and Secure American Drone Leadership, Skydio (Apr. 24, 2026), https://www.skydio.com/blog/skydio-commits-usd3-5-billion-to-expand-u-s-manufacturing-and-secure-american-drone-leadership; Project Millennium (Feb. 19, 2026). https://www.neros.tech/articles/project-millennium; AV Partners with City of Albuquerque and State of New Mexico in Defense Manufacturing Expansion, AeroVironment (Mar. 3, 2026), https://www.avinc.com/2026/03/03/av-partners-with-city-of-albuquerque-and-state-of-new-mexico-in-defense-manufacturing-expansion/; Adam Doe, Denton City Council Seals $870K Incentive Deal for Drone Factory in 4–3 Vote, Community Impact (Apr. 22, 2026), https://communityimpact.com/dallas-fort-worth/denton/business/2026/04/22/denton-city-council-seals-870k-incentive-deal-for-drone-factory-in-4-3-vote/; Quantum Cyber Signs LOI to Acquire U.S. Manufacturing Facility to Support MassScale Autonomous Drone Production, GlobeNewswire (June 8, 2026), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/06/08/3307956/0/en/quantum-cyber-signs-loi-to-acquire-an-estimated-43-000-square-foot-u-s-based-manufacturing-facility-to-support-mass-scale-autonomous-drone-production.html.
  These investments include capital from domestic investors as well as foreign investors supporting U.S. manufacturing. See supra notes 53 and 54; see, e.g., Red Cat Holdings Completes Upsized Public Equity Offering, Globe and Mail (May 19, 2026), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/stocks/RCAT/pressreleases/2027276/red-cat-holdings-completes-upsized-public-equity-offering/; Erin O’Brien, Exclusive: ORQA Launches Independent U.S. Company, Tectonic Defense (May 5, 2026), https://www.tectonicdefense.com/exclusive-orqa-launches-independent-us-company/; PDW Raises Over $110M in Series B Financing to Expand Product Offerings, Strengthen Engineering Capabilities, and Scale Production of Modular Military Drones, PR Newswire (Mar. 25, 2026), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pdw-raises-over-110m-in-series-b-financing-to-expand-product-offerings-strengthen-engineering-capabilities-and-scale-production-of-modular-military-drones-302724165.html.
  We tentatively conclude that if the proposed prohibitions of the previously authorized covered equipment subject to this Public Notice generated economic harm by noticeably reducing supply, such prohibition would spur investments in domestic production that would generate a countervailing positive economic impact.  Do commenters agree?  We seek comment on the economic effects of the likely investment in U.S. production that this proposed prohibition would yield.
	Public interest analysis.  We tentatively conclude that prohibiting the importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment subject to this Public Notice is consistent with the public interest, because it protects American communications networks from devices specifically determined by an Executive Branch interagency body to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.” 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b); see also EA Security R&O and FNPRM, 37 FCC Rcd at 13511-13513, paras. 40-43. 
  We also tentatively conclude that there are no public interest factors that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed ban on import and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment.  We seek comment on this public interest analysis.  Do commenters agree that the national security benefits outweigh any negative economic or supply chain factors?  Are there any other public interest considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action?  We invite commenters to provide any information that would assist the Commission in its balancing of the need to address the national security risks posed by the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment in communications networks with the impact of the proposed prohibitions on government partners, consumers, industry, and the public at large.
Implementation	
Existing authorizations.  We clarify that, if this prohibition is adopted, the continued use or operation of previously-authorized UAS and UAS critical components that are foreign-produced and communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA that are the subject of this Public Notice that are already in the hands of users would remain authorized.  This is consistent with the approach that the Commission adopted in the EA Security Second R&O. See EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 50.
  The limitation on existing authorizations would not result in the revocation of an existing authorization of covered equipment and, therefore, would not affect the continued use or operation of devices that consumers already possess.  
Implementation timeline.  We propose that all parties must cease all importation and marketing activities within 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.  We believe that this timeline is reasonable and strikes the appropriate balance between addressing the national security concerns and minimizing any potential adverse economic or supply chain impacts.  We seek comment on the proposed timeline and invite input from responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and other interested entities.  Specifically, we request that commenters address implementation considerations including the quantity of devices that have already been imported into the U.S. and are available for or being held for marketing or sale, new or recently updated device models that are en route to the U.S. or pending shipment, and devices that are subject to executed distribution, marketing, or sales agreements, but have not yet entered the supply chain.  

Procedural Matters

Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR §§ 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document.  Comments may be filed using the Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS).  

· Electronic Filers:  Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS:  https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs.  

· Paper Filers:  Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing.  
· Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service.  All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
· Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission’s Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC’s mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.  All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners.  Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building.  
· Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
· Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.

· People with Disabilities:  To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530. 

The proceeding this Public Notice initiates shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the Commission’s ex parte rules. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200 et seq.

  Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies).  Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation.  If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter’s written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum.  Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b).  In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf).  Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission’s ex parte rules.

For further information, please contact Matthew Chai, Attorney Advisor, Operations and Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1112 or Matthew.chai@fcc.gov. 


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