Federal Communications Commission DA 26-746 Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of Odyssey Robot LLC ) ) ) ) ) ET Docket No. 26-186 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE Adopted: July 21, 2026 Released: July 21, 2026 By the Chiefs, Office of Engineering and Technology and Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau: I. INTRODUCTION 1. By this Order, the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) and the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) direct Odyssey Robot LLC (Odyssey) to show cause why the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) should not revoke equipment authorizations held by Odyssey for FCC ID 2BSYT-FMAWZOD (Uncrewed Aircraft System or UAS) and FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD (Remote Controller) (Odyssey UAS Equipment). This Order initiates a proceeding under section 2.939(d) of the Commission’s rules 47 CFR § 2.939(d). on the grounds that Odyssey falsely stated or represented in applications and supporting application materials that the Odyssey UAS Equipment was not covered communications equipment prohibited from receiving an equipment authorization under section 2.903 of the Commission’s rules. 47 CFR § 2.903. II. BACKGROUND 2. Pursuant to sections 2(a) and (d) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 and sections 1.50002 and 1.50003 of the Commission’s rules, the FCC publishes a list (the Covered List) of communications equipment and services that have been determined by one of the sources specified in that statute to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons (covered equipment). Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-124, 133 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1609 (Secure Networks Act)); 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003. 3. On December 22, 2025, the FCC added to the Covered List uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries and equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025 NDAA) (collectively, Covered UAS and UAS Critical Components). Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components Produced Abroad, and Equipment and Services Listed In Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to FCC Covered List, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 25-1086 (Dec. 22, 2025) (UAS Public Notice). Following further specific determinations from the Department of War (DoW), that Covered List addition was updated to remove from the Covered List certain categories of UAS and UAS critical components. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Exemption of Certain Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components from FCC Covered List, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-22 (Jan. 7, 2026); FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces that “Toy Drones” and “Toy Drones that Contain Foreign-Produced Components” are Removed from the FCC Covered List, WC Docket 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-588 (June 15, 2026); Federal Communications Commission, Conditional Approvals: List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist#Conditional-Approvals (last visited July 17, 2026). 4. Commission rules prohibit all equipment identified on the Covered List from obtaining equipment authorization. 47 CFR § 2.903. The rules require that each applicant for equipment authorization pursuant to the certification process must attest in its application (in the form of a written and signed certification) that the particular equipment for which it seeks authorization is not covered equipment prohibited from authorization. 47 CFR §§ 2.903, 2.911(d)(5)(i)-(ii). Commission rules also require similar attestations for applications or requests to modify already certified equipment. 47 CFR § 2.932. Specifically, the applicant must provide a written and signed certification that, as of the date of filing the application, the equipment is not prohibited from receiving an equipment authorization pursuant to section 2.903, 47 CFR § 2.911(d)(5)(i). and a statement as to whether the applicant is identified on the Covered List as an entity producing covered communications equipment. 47 CFR § 2.911(d)(5)(ii). The Commission’s rules contain streamlined procedures for revoking authorizations of covered equipment if the applicant made any false statement or representation in its attestation(s), or supporting materials, that the equipment was not “covered” equipment. 47 CFR § 2.939(d). There is also a lengthier process to revoke on the grounds of other false statements in the application or related materials. 47 CFR § 2.939(a)(1). 5. Odyssey UAS Equipment. Odyssey Robot LLC was incorporated in the State of Delaware on January 7, 2025. Exhibit 1 – Delaware Incorporation. Odyssey registered with the State of California as a foreign corporation on December 11, 2025. Exhibit 2 – California Registration. Odyssey does not appear to maintain a corporate website. 6. Odyssey received equipment certification grants for FCC ID 2BSYT-FMAWZOD (UAS) on March 24, 2026 and FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD (Remote Controller) on April 20, 2026. For both of these applications, Odyssey certified on January 12, 2026 that “the equipment for which authorization is sought is not ‘covered’ equipment prohibited from receiving an equipment authorization pursuant to section § 2.903 of the FCC rules.” Exhibit 3 – UAS Attestation; Exhibit 4 – Remote Controller Attestation. The attestations were provided in accordance with section 2.911(d)(5)(i) of the Commission’s rules. 47 CFR § 2.911(d)(5)(i). 7. On February 6, 2026, Odyssey provided a declaration in the materials supporting the application for the Remote Controller (FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD) representing that the product was developed, designed, and manufactured by Odyssey in California, and assembled by eTak Worldwide Corporation (eTak) in Texas. Exhibit 5 – Odyssey Declaration. Odyssey affirmed that the information in the declaration “is accurate and true to the best of our knowledge.” Id. The test reports submitted with Odyssey’s equipment authorizations showed testing activities for FCC ID 2BSYT-FMAWZOD (UAS) and FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD (Remote Controller) were conducted in a foreign country by TÜV Rheinland (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. Exhibit 6 – UAS Testing; Exhibit 7 – Remote Controller Testing. 8. FCC Investigation. On June 5, 2026, security researcher Konrad Iturbe published allegations that Odyssey provided materially false attestations to the FCC that the Odyssey UAS Equipment was not covered equipment. KonradIT Github.com, dji-front-companies, https://github.com/KonradIT/dji-front-companies/blob/main/odyssey-covered-list-evasion.md (last accessed July 17, 2026). On June 10, 2026, the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau (EB) sent a Letter of Inquiry (LOI) to Odyssey via certified mail, with return receipt requested. Exhibit 8 – Odyssey LOI. The LOI directed Odyssey to provide vouchers 47 CFR § 2.945(b)(1) provides that the Commission may request vouchers for equipment to be obtained from the marketplace to determine compliance. for FCC ID 2BSYT-FMAWZOD (UAS) and FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD (Remote Controller) to be obtained from the marketplace. Exhibit 8 at 2. The LOI also directed Odyssey to provide information on its business structure, operations, subsidiaries and affiliates, associations with Covered List entities, and compliance practices and procedures. Id. at 5-7. The LOI further directed Odyssey to provide certain information on FCC ID 2BSYT-FMAWZOD (UAS) and FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD (Remote Controller), to include trade names, model numbers, manufacturers, and manufacturing locations. Id. at 6-7. Finally, the LOI directed Odyssey to provide supporting documentation, along with an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury, signed and dated by an authorized officer of the company. Id. at 8. EB provided Odyssey with 14 calendar days to provide the requested equipment, information, and documentation. Id. at 2. However, Odyssey failed to respond to the LOI. 9. On June 25, 2026, EB sent a deficiency letter to Odyssey via certified mail, with return receipt requested. Exhibit 9 – Odyssey Deficiency Letter. The deficiency letter directed Odyssey to respond to the LOI within 7 calendar days. Id. at 2. However, Odyssey failed to respond to the deficiency letter. 10. On June 29, EB sent a LOI to eTak (the Texas company Odyssey identified as assembling its devices) via certified mail, with return receipt requested. Exhibit 10 – ETak LOI. The LOI directed eTak to provide information and documentation with respect to its business relationship with Odyssey, device assembly services, and payments by Odyssey for device assembly activities, to include supporting documentation. Id. at 4. EB provided eTak with 14 calendar days to provide the requested information and documentation. Id. at 2. 11. On July 13, 2026, eTak responded to the LOI. Exhibit 11 – ETak Response to LOI. eTak denied any business or financial relationship with Odyssey, and eTak denied that it had performed any device assembly activities for Odyssey. As eTak wrote: Based on eTak’s investigation to date, eTak has no affiliation, business relationship, contractual relationship, agency relationship, ownership interest, or other connection with Odyssey Robot LLC. . . . During the Inquiry Period, eTak performed general device refurbishing & recycling services at its Grand Prairie, Texas facility. eTak has not performed any assembly, and/or other services for Odyssey Robot LLC. Following a reasonable investigation of its records, eTak has identified no information indicating that any devices processed by eTak were owned by, supplied by, manufactured for, or contracted through Odyssey Robot LLC. Id. at 2. III. DISCUSSION 12. OET and PSHSB have tentatively determined that the Odyssey UAS Equipment may be covered communications equipment. OET and PSHSB have tentatively determined that the applications and supporting application materials for the Odyssey UAS Equipment may contain false statements or representations that the equipment was not covered equipment and was not produced in a foreign country. 13. Equipment authorizations subject to this proposed revocation action. OET and PSHSB tentatively determine that FCC ID 2BSYT-FMAWZOD (UAS) and FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD (Remote Controller) are covered equipment that was improperly authorized. OET and PSHSB tentatively determine that such equipment are Covered UAS and UAS Critical Components because they were produced in a foreign country and do not fall within any of the categories of UAS or UAS critical components removed from the Covered List by subsequent DoW determinations. Odyssey’s apparently false statement regarding its U.S.-based assembler that Odyssey used to substantiate the fact that its devices were not “covered,” the lack of any record of Odyssey’s domestic production, the fact that testing occurred in a foreign country, and Odyssey’s failure to respond to any Commission inquires on the matter all support this tentative conclusion. 14. Initiation of revocation proceeding. According to our tentative determinations that the Odyssey UAS Equipment is covered equipment and the applications and supporting materials for the equipment authorizations contained false statements or representations that the equipment is not prohibited from receiving an equipment authorization pursuant to section 2.903, we initiate a proceeding under section 2.939(d) to reach a final determination whether to revoke the equipment authorizations for FCC ID 2BSYT-FMAWZOD (UAS) and FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD (Remote Controller). 47 CFR § 2.939(d). This proceeding affords Odyssey notice and an opportunity to file a written response to explain why the Commission should not revoke such equipment authorizations. 15. Odyssey must file a response with OET and PSHSB within ten (10) calendar days of release of this Order to Show Cause demonstrating why the Commission should not revoke the equipment authorizations for FCC ID 2BSYT-FMAWZOD (UAS) and FCC ID 2BSYT-YMAWZOD (Remote Controller. Odyssey may seek confidential treatment of its filings pursuant to section 0.459 of the Commission’s rules. 47 CFR § 0.459. Failure to timely respond or submit a response providing a reasonable basis for why the Commission should not revoke its equipment authorizations may result in revocation of the equipment authorizations obtained by Odyssey through the Commission. Odyssey’s response must include a written detailed factual statement explaining why the equipment authorizations should not be revoked, supported by appropriate documentation and declarations pursuant to section 1.16 of the Commission’s rules. 47 CFR § 1.16. The written statement must include the FCC file numbers referenced in the caption and be sent to Andrew Hendrickson, Chief, Office of Engineering and Technology, Federal Communications Commission, 45 L Street N.E., Washington, D.C. 20554 and Zenji Nakazawa, Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, 45 L Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20554. The written statement must also be e-mailed to at OdysseyRobotproceeding@fcc.gov. The written statement must also be filed in the docket referenced in the caption of this document. Any request that material submitted not be made public may be submitted pursuant to 47 CFR § 0.459. IV. ORDERING CLAUSES 16. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to section 302 of the Act and section 2.939(d) of the Commission’s rules, 47 U.S.C. § 302a; 47 CFR 2.939(d). Odyssey MUST FILE a written response to this Order within ten (10) calendar days from the release date of this Order. 17. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of the Order shall be sent by email to contact@flyondrone.com on the release date of this Order and also that a copy shall be sent by first class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested, to Randolph Howard Eason, Odyssey Robot LLC, 21 Miller Alley, Suite 210, Pasadena, California 91103. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Andrew C. Hendrickson Chief Office of Engineering and Technology Zenji Nakazawa Chief Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau