Federal Communications Commission	DA 26-758



DA 26-758
Released:  July 21, 2026

FCC SEEKS COMMENT ON PROHIBITING THE IMPORTATION AND MARKETING OF CERTAIN FOREIGN-PRODUCED MILITARY-GRADE UNCREWED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) AND UAS CRITICAL COMPONENTS FOR NON-U.S. GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE WITH SWARMING CAPABILITIES

PS Docket No. 26-189

Comments Due:   30 days after publication in the Federal Register

Introduction
By this Public Notice, the FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons” (covered equipment). Pursuant to sections 2(a) and (d) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, and sections 1.50002 and 1.50003 of the Commission’s rules, the Federal Communications Commission’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) publishes a list of communications equipment and services that have been determined by one of the sources specified in that statute to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons (covered equipment).  Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-124, 133 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1609) (Secure Networks Act); 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003.  For the current version of the Covered List, see Federal Communications Commission, List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (last updated January 7, 2026) (FCC Covered List).  The process by which the Commission would exercise this authority was established in the Equipment Authorization Security Second Report and Order (EA Security 2d R&O).  Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program, Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 232, FCC 25-71, paras. 40-50 (2025) (EA Security 2d R&O); 47 CFR § 2.939(e).  
  In particular, we propose to apply such prohibitions to foreign-produced uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components that are both on the Covered List The FCC’s Covered list currently includes:  Uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country†† —except: (a) UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA’s) Blue UAS Cleared List, until January 1, 2027,# (b) UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR § 25.101(a), until January 1, 2027; (c) devices which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS; and
(d) foreign-produced “Toy Drones,” as defined in the National Security Determination, and “Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components.”
 and are “military-grade” as defined below. See infra at 4-6.


These prohibitions would not apply to any UAS or UAS critical components produced domestically.  Additionally, these prohibitions would not apply to any importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development.  Moreover, these prohibitions would not apply to any non-military-grade UAS or UAS critical components.  Finally, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect continued use or operation of already-purchased UAS or UAS critical components.  We seek comment on these proposals and the relevant factors, including national security, economic, and supply chain considerations, that would justify prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of such previously authorized covered equipment.
Background
In November 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) adopted rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List. See generally Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program; Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Competitive Bidding Program, Report and Order, Order, and FNPRM, 37 FCC Rcd 13493, 13509-98, paras. 32-263 (2022) (EA Security R&O and FNPRM).  The Commission explained that this proceeding builds upon the important ongoing efforts by the Commission, Congress, and the Executive Branch to take further action to protect the security of America’s critical communications networks and equipment supply chains.  Id. at 13494-95, para. 1; see also id. at 13497-505, 13507-08, paras. 5-23, 31.  
  However, the Commission did not revoke previously granted authorizations of covered equipment. Id. at 13535, para. 107.  
  In October 2025, the Commission adopted the EA Security Second R&O which, among other things, established a procedure to limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the underlying authorization. EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, paras. 40-50; 47 CFR §§ 2.939(e), 2.803, 2.1204.   
  The Commission noted that its goal is to mitigate potential national security risks associated with covered equipment in the nation’s supply chain that was authorized prior to a Covered List addition under 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b). Id. at paras. 32, 40. 

The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to “institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List,” and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the EA Security Second R&O. Id. at paras. 45, 48.  
  The Commission gave specific directives to PSHSB and OET regarding how to analyze and implement the new procedures. Id. at paras. 42-50. 

 On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components Produced Abroad, and Equipment and Services Listed In Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to FCC Covered List, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 25-1086 (Dec. 22, 2025) (December 22 Public Notice).  
  This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that UAS produced in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons. See December 22 Public Notice.  Separately, the National Security Determination found similar “unacceptable risks” were posed by “all communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in Section 1709(a)(1) of the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act.”  Id. at 2.

The National Security Determination provided that the identified UAS and UAS critical components should be included on the Covered List, unless DoW or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given UAS or class of UAS, or a specific UAS critical component, does not pose risks to U.S. national security.  The FCC established a process for entities to request individual Conditional Approvals for their covered UAS and UAS critical components by submitting the required information, and DoW has granted several such Conditional Approvals. The UAS and UAS critical components that have been granted Conditional Approval are listed on the Commission’s Covered List webpage: https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist.  

On January 7, 2026, the Commission received a subsequent National Security Determination from the Department of War (DoW) stating that certain equipment should be removed from the Covered List because it does not pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Exemption of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components from FCC Covered List, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-22 (Jan. 7, 2026) (January 7 Public Notice).  
  Accordingly, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt:  UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) Blue UAS Cleared List until January 1, 2027; and UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard (48 CFR § 25.101(a)), until January 1, 2027.  Additionally, on June 15, 2026, based on a National Security Determination from DoW, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt “Toy Drones” as defined in the National Security Determination and “Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components.” FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces that “Toy Drones” and “Toy Drones that Contain Foreign-Produced Components” are Removed from the FCC Covered List, WC Docket 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-588 (Jun. 15, 2026) (Toy Drones Public Notice).
 
On March 27, 2026, PSHSB and OET released a Public Notice (March 27 Public Notice) seeking comment on a proposal to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of equipment that had been placed on the Covered List in 2024 or earlier but was originally authorized prior to the adoption of the Commissions 2022 equipment authorization and national security rules. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Seek Comment on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier, PS Docket No. 26-72, Public Notice, DA 26-294 (PSHSB/OET Mar. 27, 2026), 91 Fed. Reg. 17275 (Apr. 6, 2026) (March 27 Public Notice).
  The March 27 Public Notice explained that those additions to the Covered List were made pursuant to a specific national security determination made by Congress, which the Commission found constituted a “specific determination that such equipment poses an ‘unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.’” See March 27 Public Notice.
  PSHSB and OET sought comment on whether maintaining such authorizations would undermine the Commission’s national security framework and whether prohibiting continued importation and marketing would better serve the public interest. March 27 Public Notice at 3-5.

On June 26, 2026, after review of the record, PSHSB and OET issued a second Public Notice (June 26 Public Notice) summarizing the comments received, evaluating the technical, economic, and national security considerations raised by commenters, and assessing the public interest implications of the proposed prohibition. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Prohibit the Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier, PS Docket No. 26-72, Public Notice, DA 26-635 (Jun. 26, 2026) (June 26 Public Notice).
  The June 26 Public Notice concluded that continued importation and marketing of equipment authorized before the adoption of the Commission’s 2022 rules posed unacceptable risks to national security when imported or marketed in the United States. June 26 Public Notice at 3.

The Commission therefore decided that adoption of the prohibition was warranted and announced that the prohibition would become effective 10 days after publication in the Federal Register.  The June 26 Public Notice emphasized that expedited action was necessary because a delayed, but impending prohibition, could incentivize importers and markets to accelerate shipments of covered equipment into the U.S market, which is a result that is directly contrary to the purpose of the Notice. June 26 Public Notice at 8.
  Following the release of the June 26 Public Notice, the Commission updated its website to reflect the newly adopted prohibitions. See https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist.
  The Order took effect on July 16, 2026, 10 days after Federal Register publication. See Federal Communications Commission, Prohibiting Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier, 91 Fed. Reg. 41023 (July 6, 2026).

On July 17, 2026, PSHSB and OET initiated a proceeding to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components, and certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Seek Comment on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Certain Covered UAS and UAS Critical Components and Equipment Listed in Section 1709 of FY2025 NDAA, PS Docket No. 26-184, Public Notice, DA 26-742 (Jul. 17, 2026).

Today, we initiate another proceeding to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment:  foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components on the FCC’s Covered List that qualify as “military-grade” as defined below.
Discussion
The Commission has legal authority to review an existing authorization for covered equipment, and to revoke such authorization pursuant to current rules. EA Security R&O and FNPRM, 37 FCC Rcd at 13537, para. 114. 
  Under section 2.939(a), the FCC may “revoke . . . any equipment authorization” for various reasons, including “conditions coming to the attention of the Commission which would warrant it in refusing to grant an original application.” 47 CFR § 2.939(a).
  Likewise, under section 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET “may place limitations on an existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit continued importation or marketing” of such equipment. 47 CFR § 2.939(e).  “OET and PSHSB will issue a public notice announcing the intent to limit the scope of equipment authorizations to prohibit the further importation or marketing of specified devices identified by class, type, or other description sufficient to identify the devices.”  47 CFR § 2.939(e)(1).  “The public notice will include an assessment of the impact of the proposed prohibition with consideration of public interest factors, including: the unacceptable risks the equipment was found to pose, the economic and supply chain impacts, and any other criteria as specified by the Commission. The public notice should give particular weight to the specific determination(s), and any accompanying rules or analyses, through which the relevant equipment was added to the Covered List.  47 CFR § 2.939(e)(2). 

Scope.  Pursuant to section 2.939(e), we propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of any previously-authorized military-grade UAS or UAS critical component that is listed on the Covered List.  We propose to limit the proposed prohibitions to military-grade UAS or UAS critical components, which we define on the basis of other agencies’ regulations governing certain high-risk UAS, and following discussions with our partners in other national security agencies.  Specifically, we consider military-grade UAS and UAS critical components to be any of the following:
(1) UAS that weigh 55 pounds or more on takeoff, i.e. UAS that are not “small unmanned aircraft” pursuant to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules. See 14 CFR § 107.3.  FAA rules governing the operation of such UAS are contained at 14 CFR Part 107.  
  
o These UAS are considered “larger platforms” that offer greater payload capacity, endurance, and range, which make them suitable for military operations requiring heavy sensors, communications equipment, or specialized weapons systems (i.e., deep-strike operations, persistent wide-area surveillance, electronic warfare, and cargo resupply).  
o Their increased power and stability also allow them to operate effectively in more demanding environments, making them highly effective for various missions.
o UAS that weigh over 55 pounds or more operating individually or in a swarm have the capability to carry out a significant attack on the U.S. homeland.
(2) UAS capable of dispensing “economic poison” under FAA rules. See 14 CFR § 137.3.  The FAA defines an “economic poison” as any substance intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating pests (insects, rodents, nematodes, fungi, weeds), viruses, or intended for use as a plant defoliant, or drying agent.  

o These UAS can be used to deliver hazardous substances in ways that bypass traditional defense and detection systems.  Their ability to fly autonomously, reach remote areas, and carry dangerous materials make them ideal for military operations.
o Aerosol dispensing platforms operating independently or in a swarm can carry out mass chemical or biological attacks against U.S. persons and our food supply.
(3) UAS that contain or integrate sensors capable of thermal imaging (i.e. the capability to capture and translate the difference in temperature between objects, as well as an object's heat signature and residual heat signature). See “Thermal Imagers,” Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (last updated April 10, 2025), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/thermal-imagers (last accessed June 26, 2026).  
  
o UAS that feature these sensors are ideal for military use because their ability to operate effectively in low visibility environments enhances night operations, covert surveillance, and targeting capabilities. 
o These capabilities allow forces to bypass camouflage, navigate in total darkness, and identify concealed heat signatures that are entirely invisible to standard optical sensors and the human eye.  
o These capabilities also make it more difficult to protect critical infrastructure, maintain operational security, and prevent intelligence collection in sensitive areas.
(4) UAS that contain or integrate sensors capable of Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), a “remote sensing technology that measures distance by illuminating a target with a laser and analyzing the reflected light.” “Guidelines for the Use of Terrestrial LiDAR Scanners in Criminal Justice Applications,” Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs at 3 (March 2022), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/304452.pdf (last accessed June 26, 2026).  
  
o These UAS offer military utility by providing enhanced capability to conduct detailed threedimensional terrain mapping, penetrate dense foliage to reveal hidden structures, assist in autonomous navigation in GPS-denied environments, and conduct covert reconnaissance under a range of environmental conditions.
(5) UAS docking stations, defined as multipurpose systems that enable UAS to land safely, take off, recharge and/or replace batteries, and transfer data and payload. Carlo Giorgio Grlj, Nino Krznar, and Marko Pranjic, “A Decade of UAV Docking Stations: A Brief Overview of Mobile and Fixed Landing Platforms,” Dones, at 2 (Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.mdpi.com/2504-446X/6/1/17 (las accessed June 26, 2026).  A docking station is a “UAS” and “UAS critical components” under the definitions in the National Security Determination, because it is an “uncrewed aircraft station” and/or a “ground control station.”  See December 22 Public Notice at 8, 9.
  
o UAS docking stations are infrastructure that enable persistent, 24/7 autonomous operations allowing faster, more continuous intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other mission workflows.  
o Additionally, by serving as coordinated launch, recovery, and servicing nodes, docking stations facilitate the capability for large-scale drone swarms to support military operations.
(6) UAS “specially designed to incorporate a defense article.” See 22 CFR § 121.1, Category VIII(a)(5).  “Defense article” is defined at 22 CFR § 120.31.
  
o These UAS are ideal for military use because they can enable combat commanders to conduct unparalleled precision strikes, kinetic effect delivery, and electronic warfare capabilities at a significantly lower cost and risk to human life than manned aircraft.
o They also extend range, persistence, or precision beyond traditional platforms.
(7) Swarming UAS, defined as:
· Ground control stations purpose-built for, or UAS integrated with flight control or vehicle management systems specially designed for, managing drone swarms, consisting of UAS that operate autonomously (without human intervention) to coordinate with each other, avoid collisions, maintain formations, and dynamically respond to changes in operational or threat environments, or if weaponized, synchronize targeting activities across multiple drones See 22 CFR § 121.1, Category VIII(h)(12).   Such systems are “UAS critical components,” because they are “flight controllers,” “UAS controllers,” “communications systems,” and or “navigation systems.”  See December 22 Public Notice at 9.
; or
· UAS purpose-built to perform flights in coordinated and synchronized formations, including applications such as multi-UAS light shows, where numerous illuminated UAS work together to create synchronized aerial displays. 
o This capability enables large numbers of UAS to coordinate autonomously, making them harder to detect, track, and counter.  
o Swarm-enabled UAS can overwhelm defenses, provide persistent surveillance, and create complex operational challenges that strain traditional air defense systems, which pose significant risks to public safety and national security. 
This prohibition on importation and marketing would not apply to any non-military-grade UAS or UAS critical components, nor would it apply to any domestically produced UAS or UAS critical components or to any other already-authorized covered equipment.  It would also only apply to covered UAS and UAS critical components and would therefore not apply to any UAS or UAS critical components that are exempt from the Covered List—including UAS and UAS critical components identified on the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA’s) Blue UAS Cleared List; UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR § 25.101(a); and UAS and UAS critical components granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS.  Any UAS or UAS critical component subsequently removed from the Covered List, such as through Conditional Approval, would also be exempt from this prohibition.  Furthermore, this prohibition would not apply to importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development.  Finally, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect the continued use or operation of already-purchased UAS or UAS critical components.
We seek comment on this list of prohibitions.  Does this list adequately capture military-grade UAS and UAS critical components?  Are there UAS and UAS critical components that are listed above, but are not military-grade?  Are there UAS and UAS critical components that are not listed above that are military-grade?
Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized covered equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment serves the public interest.
National security impacts.  We start with national security concerns, because, as the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O, “[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 45 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)). 
  In the EA Security Second R&O, the Commission stated that older models of covered equipment, which are still widely sold in the U.S., pose an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed in the United States, “not only when such equipment is new to the market.” EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 40. 
  The Commission agreed with commenters who pointed out that certain previously authorized devices that are now considered covered equipment “likely remain[] marketable in the United States” and “may present continuing national security threats.” Id. 
  The Commission also directed PSHSB and OET to “give particular weight to the fact that the relevant equipment was determined to pose ‘an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons.’” EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 45.  PSHSB’s and OET’s adjudication with respect to the 2024-or-earlier relied primarily on national security considerations arising from the relevant specific determinations.  See December 22 Public Notice; see also January 7 Public Notice.

Subject to exceptions, See January 7 Public Notice at 2; Toy Drones Public Notice at 3.
 an Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise, including appropriate national security agencies, one of whom was the DoW, See Opposition of Department of War to Petition for Reconsideration, ET Docket Nos. 26-22 and 26-23 (filed Apr. 6, 2026). 
 specifically determined that UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries “pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons.” UAS/UAS Critical Component National Security Determination at 2, 4. 
  This determination of “unacceptable risks” was based on an assessment of “threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential threats to the homeland.” UAS/UAS Critical Component National Security Determination at 2.
  We tentatively accept this determination and “give [it] particular weight,” as the Commission directed. EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 45.
  This determination, which covered foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components generally, necessarily includes already-authorized foreign-produced military-grade UAS and UAS critical components.
Therefore, based on the EA Security Second R&O and the UAS and UAS critical component National Security Determination, we tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered military-grade UAS and UAS critical components as described above is necessary to protect national security by mitigating risks to the U.S. communications sector.
We also believe that military-grade foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components might pose even particularly acute national security or related risks, given their military-grade capabilities.  We invite comment on whether military-grade UAS and UAS critical components, as described above, pose particularly acute national security risks of the sort described in the National Security Determination.
Economic and supply chain impacts.  We seek comment on the potential economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of already-authorized covered military-grade UAS and UAS critical components.  How would this proposed action affect the financial interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in the communications sector?  As the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O, it may consider “countervailing economic concerns when implementing the prohibitions for already-authorized devices.” EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 46. 
  What are the economic or supply chain considerations that weigh either in favor or against taking this proposed action?  We invite commenters to provide data that we should consider in our analysis.
We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have substantial economic and supply chain impacts.  Outside of importation, marketing, and sales to the U.S. government, which are excluded from the scope of this proposed action, military-grade UAS and UAS critical components represent a minority of the remaining UAS and UAS critical component market. See U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), https://www.trade.gov/unmanned-aircraft-systems (June 30, 2026).
  Recreational consumers comprise the majority of individual drone operators and are unlikely to fly military-grade UAS. Id.
  While foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components dominate the recreational market, domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components in the higher-end, military-grade subsectors is more prevalent. Id. 
  Moreover, several of the categories of UAS and UAS critical components are subject to U.S. export controls or other regulatory restrictions and likely comprise a small market within the United States.
Do commenters agree that economic and supply chain impacts are relatively minor and contained?  Are there domestically-produced alternatives for military-grade UAS and UAS critical components?  Would this proposal be cost-effective for the public in terms of obtaining trusted equipment?  Would providers’ compliance costs decrease as they replace covered equipment with trusted equipment?  We strongly encourage commenters to supply data and other specific evidence of economic costs to this prohibition.
On the other hand, we seek comment on any economic benefits that might arise as a result of these prohibitions.  We note that after the initial update to the Covered List, billions of dollars have already been raised by domestic UAS producers, creating thousands of U.S. manufacturing jobs. See, e.g., Zipline Charts Drone Delivery Expansion with $600M in New Funding, TechCrunch (Jan. 21, 2026), https://techcrunch.com/2026/01/21/zipline-charts-drone-delivery-expansion-with-600m-in-new-funding/; BRINC Announces New Seattle Factory and Launch of NextGeneration 911 Response Drone, BRINC, https://brincdrones.com/news/brinc-announces-new-seattle-factory-and-launch-of-next-generation-911-response-drone/; Flytrex to Open U.S. Factory, UAV Coach, https://uavcoach.com/flytrex-us-factory/; DMR Technologies to Launch FullScale U.S. Drone Manufacturing Facility in Lafayette, Opportunity Louisiana, https://www.opportunitylouisiana.gov/news/dmr-technologies-to-launch-full-scale-u-s-drone-manufacturing-facility-in-lafayette; HighSpeed Combat Drone Production Starts at New U.S. Anduril Plant in Days, Defense News (Mar. 19, 2026), https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2026/03/19/high-speed-combat-drone-production-starts-at-new-us-anduril-plant-in-days/; Unusual Machines Expands Orlando Manufacturing Footprint to Support Battery Operations, Morningstar, https://www.morningstar.com/news/accesswire/1182163msn/unusual-machines-expands-orlando-manufacturing-footprint-to-support-battery-operations; Swarm Aero Raises Series A, Plans Drone Factory, Axios (Mar. 11, 2026), https://www.axios.com/2026/03/11/swarm-aero-seriesa-drone-factory; Tekever Expands into Americas with First U.S. Office, FlightGlobal (May 2026), https://www.flightglobal.com/archive/2026/05/tekever-expands-into-americas-with-first-us-office/; Echodyne Expands Public Safety Radar Applications Through Partnership with Axon, Echodyne, https://www.echodyne.com/newsroom/echodyne-expands-public-safety-radar-applications-through-partnership-with-axon; (echodyne.com in Bing) Zipline Soars to $7.6 Billion Valuation as U.S. Drone Delivery Bets Grow, Reuters (Jan. 20, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/zipline-soars-76-billion-valuation-us-drone-delivery-bets-2026-01-20/; Skydio Series F, Skydio, https://www.skydio.com/blog/skydio-series-f; Flytrex Drone Delivery Texas Factory, DroneDJ (May 21, 2026), https://dronedj.com/2026/05/21/flytrex-drone-delivery-texas-factory/; Drone Home: BRINC Moving to Massive New HQ and Factory in Seattle Amid Rapid Growth, GeekWire (Mar. 24, 2026), https://www.geekwire.com/2026/drone-home-brinc-moving-to-massive-new-hq-and-factory-in-seattle-amid-startups-rapid-growth/.
 Additionally, billions more have been committed for domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components, which are expected to generate additional jobs. See, e.g., Skydio Commits $3.5 Billion to Expand U.S. Manufacturing and Secure American Drone Leadership, Skydio (Apr. 24, 2026), https://www.skydio.com/blog/skydio-commits-usd3-5-billion-to-expand-u-s-manufacturing-and-secure-american-drone-leadership; Project Millennium, Neros (Feb. 19, 2026). https://www.neros.tech/articles/project-millennium; AV Partners with City of Albuquerque and State of New Mexico in Defense Manufacturing Expansion, AeroVironment (Mar. 3, 2026), https://www.avinc.com/2026/03/03/av-partners-with-city-of-albuquerque-and-state-of-new-mexico-in-defense-manufacturing-expansion/; Denton City Council Seals $870K Incentive Deal for Drone Factory in 4–3 Vote, Community Impact (Apr. 22, 2026), https://communityimpact.com/dallas-fort-worth/denton/business/2026/04/22/denton-city-council-seals-870k-incentive-deal-for-drone-factory-in-4-3-vote/; Quantum Cyber Signs LOI to Acquire U.S. Manufacturing Facility to Support MassScale Autonomous Drone Production, GlobeNewswire (June 8, 2026), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/06/08/3307956/0/en/quantum-cyber-signs-loi-to-acquire-an-estimated-43-000-square-foot-u-s-based-manufacturing-facility-to-support-mass-scale-autonomous-drone-production.html.
  These investments include capital from domestic investors as well as foreign investors supporting U.S. manufacturing. See, e.g., Red Cat Holdings Completes Upsized Public Equity Offering, Globe and Mail, (May 19, 2026), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/stocks/RCAT/pressreleases/2027276/red-cat-holdings-completes-upsized-public-equity-offering/; Exclusive: ORQA Launches Independent U.S. Company, Tectonic Defense, (May 5, 2026), https://www.tectonicdefense.com/exclusive-orqa-launches-independent-us-company/; PDW Raises Over $110M in Series B Financing to Expand Product Offerings, Strengthen Engineering Capabilities, and Scale Production of Modular Military Drones, PR Newswire, (May 25, 2026), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pdw-raises-over-110m-in-series-b-financing-to-expand-product-offerings-strengthen-engineering-capabilities-and-scale-production-of-modular-military-drones-302724165.html.
  We tentatively conclude that the proposed prohibitions of military-grade UAS and UAS critical components would similarly generate substantial investment in domestic production, given the loss of foreign-produced supply.  Do commenters agree?  We seek comment on the economic effects of the likely investment in U.S. production that this proposed prohibition would yield.
Public interest analysis.  We tentatively conclude that prohibiting the importation and marketing of previously authorized covered military-grade foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components is consistent with the public interest, because it protects American communications networks from devices specifically determined by an Executive Branch interagency body to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.” 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b); see also EA Security R&O and FNPRM, 37 FCC Rcd at 13511-13513, paras. 40-43. 

We also tentatively conclude that there are no public interest factors that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed ban on import and marketing of this previously authorized equipment.  After all, as the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O, “[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” EA Security 2d R&O, FCC 25-71, para. 45 (quoting Haig, 453 U.S. at 307). 
  We seek comment on this public interest analysis.  Do commenters agree that the national security benefits outweigh any negative economic or supply chain factors?  Are there any other public interest considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action?
We invite commenters to provide any information that would assist the Commission in its balancing of the need to address the national security risks posed by the continued importation and marketing of previously-authorized covered equipment that are military-grade UAS and UAS critical components in communications networks with the impact of the proposed prohibitions on government partners, consumers, industry, and the public at large.
Implementation
Existing authorizations.  We clarify that, if this prohibition is adopted, the continued use or operation of previously-authorized military-grade UAS and UAS critical components that are already in the hands of users would remain authorized.  This is consistent with the approach that the Commission adopted in the EA Security Second R&O.  The limitation on existing authorizations would not result in the revocation of an existing authorization of covered equipment and, therefore, would not affect the continued use or operation of devices that consumers already possess.
Implementation timeline.  We propose that all parties must cease all importation and marketing activities regarding such previously-authorized military-grade UAS and UAS critical components 180 days after publication in the Federal Register.  We believe that this timeline is reasonable and strikes the appropriate balance between addressing the national security concerns and minimizing any potential adverse economic or supply chain impacts.  Although the Commission’s prohibition with respect to covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier took effect within 10 days of publication in the Federal Register, given the expected large scope of equipment at issue in this proposed prohibition, as well as the shorter time that such foreign produced military-grade UAS and UAS critical components have been listed on the Covered List, we believe that a more extended time period to permit an orderly transition is appropriate.
We seek comment on the proposed timeline and invite input from responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and other interested entities.  Specifically, we request that commenters address implementation considerations including the quantity of devices that have already been imported into the U.S. and are available for or being held for marketing or sale, new or recently updated device models that are en route to the U.S. or pending shipment, and devices that are subject to executed distribution, marketing, or sales agreements, but have not yet entered the supply chain.
Procedural Matters
Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR §§ 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document.  Comments may be filed using the Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS).  
· Electronic Filers:  Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS:  https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs.  
· Paper Filers:  Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing.  
· Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service.  All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
· Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission’s Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC’s mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.  All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners.  Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building.  
· Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
· Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
· People with Disabilities:  To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530. 
The proceeding this Public Notice initiates shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the Commission’s ex parte rules. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200 et seq.
  Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies).  Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation.
If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter’s written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum.
Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b).  In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf).  Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission’s ex parte rules.
For further information, contact Chris Smeenk, Attorney Advisor, Operations and Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1630 or Chris.Smeenk@fcc.gov.
2