Federal Communications Commission	DA 26-769


  DA 26-769
 Released:  July 24, 2026

AUCTION OF FLEXIBLE-USE LICENSES IN THE UPPER C-BAND 
FOR NEXT-GENERATION WIRELESS SERVICES SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 27, 2027   
COMMENT SOUGHT ON COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCEDURES FOR AUCTION 115
AU DOCKET NO. 26-191
Comment Date:  August 24, 2026
Reply Comment Date:  September 8, 2026
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Heading	Paragraph #
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	LICENSES TO BE OFFERED IN AUCTION 115	3
A.	Description of Licenses	4
B.	Transition of Incumbent Operations	8
III.	IMPLEMENTATION OF PART 1 COMPETITIVE BIDDING RULES AND REQUIREMENTS	9
A.	Certification of Notice of Auction 115 Requirements and Procedures	10
B.	Bidding Credit Caps	11
C.	Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility	19
D.	Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation	23
E.	Deficiency Payments and Additional Default Payment Percentage	24
IV.	INFORMATION PROCEDURES AND PROHIBITED COMMUNICATIONS	27
A.	Information Procedures During the Auction Process	27
B.	Prohibition of Certain Communications	32
V.	PROPOSED BIDDING PROCEDURES	35
A.	Clock Phase	37
1.	Clock Auction Design	37
2.	Generic License Blocks	41
3.	Bidding Rounds	42
4.	Stopping Rule	46
5.	Activity Rule	47
6.	Acceptable Bids	54
7.	Bid Processing	75
B.	Assignment Phase	87
1.	Sequencing and Grouping of PEAs	88
2.	Acceptable Bids and Bid Processing	91
VI.	TUTORIALS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR APPLICANTS	94


VII.  PROCEDURAL MATTERS	95
A.	Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis	95
B.	Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	96
	C.   Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act	112
D.	Deadlines and Filing Procedures	113
E.	Contact Information	118
ATTACHMENT A – Auction 115 License Inventory; Proposed Bidding Units, Upfront Payments, and Minimum Opening Bid Amounts

I. INTRODUCTION  
1. By this Public Notice, the Commission announces an auction of 3,248 new flexible-use licenses in the 3.98–4.14 GHz band and seeks comment on the procedures to be used for the auction, which is designated as Auction 115.  Auction 115 responds to both the surging demand for mid-band spectrum critical for the most advanced wireless services and the congressional direction to the Commission to grant licenses for spectrum in the 3.98–4.2 GHz band (Upper C-band) through a system of competitive bidding that is completed not later than two years after July 4, 2025. Pub. L. No. 119-21, § 40002(b)(2), 139 Stat. 72 (2025) (OBBB Act) (mandating that the Commission “complet[e] a system of competitive bidding not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act for not less than 100 megahertz in the band between 3.98 gigahertz and 4.2 gigahertz.”).  The law, as passed, does not have an express “short title” but while under debate commonly was known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act.  See also 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1) (requiring the Commission to resolve any mutually exclusive applications for new spectrum licenses through a system of competitive bidding).

2. In this Public Notice, which builds upon the framework established by the Commission in the Upper C-band Report and Order, The Commission adopted the Upper C-band Report and Order, which describes in detail the rules applicable to the licenses offered in these 160 megahertz of spectrum.  See generally Upper C-band (3.98–4.2 GHz); Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz Band, GN Docket Nos. 25-59 and 18-222, Report and Order, Order of Proposed Modification, and Order on Reconsideration, FCC 26-46 (July 24, 2026) (Upper C-band Report and Order).  
 the Office of Economics and Analytics (OEA) and the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB) seek comment on the competitive bidding procedures and auction design to be used for bidding to acquire licenses in Auction 115. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(E)(i).  The Commission has delegated authority to OEA and WTB over auction design and implementation issues.  47 CFR §§ 0.21(m), 0.131(c).
  As described herein, we propose an auction with an ascending clock phase for bidding on the generic license blocks and then an assignment phase to determine frequency-specific license assignments.  Bidding for licenses in Auction 115 is tentatively scheduled to commence on April 27, 2027.
II. LICENSES TO BE OFFERED IN AUCTION 115
3. A list of markets in which licenses will be offered in Auction 115, including proposed upfront payment and minimum opening bid amounts, is available in the Attachment A file on the Auction 115 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/115.
A. Description of Licenses
4. Auction 115 will offer 3,248 new flexible-use licenses for spectrum in the 3.98–4.14 GHz portion of the Upper C-band throughout the contiguous United States subject to clearing requirements. In the Upper C-band Report and Order, the Commission consolidated the 3.98–4.14 GHz portion of the Upper C-band and the 3.7–3.98 GHz band (Lower C-band) into a single, cohesive 3.7 GHz Service.  Upper C-Band Report and Order at 10, 26, paras. 22, 52.  See also id. at Appx. A (modifying the definition and scope of “3.7 GHz Service” in sections 27.4 and 27.5 of the Commission’s rules, respectively, to incorporate the 3700–4140 MHz frequencies).   
  We will offer 160 megahertz of spectrum licensed on an unpaired basis in eight 20-megahertz blocks by partial economic area (PEA) in the contiguous states and the District of Columbia (PEAs 1–41, 43–211, 213–263, 265–297, 299–359, and 361–411). See id. at 27–28, paras. 53–54, 56.  The Commission will not issue flexible-use licenses for outside of the contiguous 48 states and the District of Columbia.  In this context, the rest of the United States includes the Honolulu, Anchorage, Kodiak, Fairbanks, Juneau, Puerto Rico, Guam-Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Gulf of America PEAs (PEAs numbers 42, 212, 264, 298, 360, and 412–416).  Id. at 12–13, 28, paras. 25, 27 n.91, 56.
  The 20 megahertz in the 4.14–4.16 GHz portion of the Upper C-band will be a guard band and not available for auction.  
5. Figure 1 shows the band plan for the 3.98–4.14 GHz band.  
Figure 1:  3.98–4.14 GHz Band Allocations in the Contiguous United States

6. All 3.98–4.14 GHz band licenses will be issued for 15-year, renewable license terms. Id. at 30, 33, paras. 62, 68.
  A licensee in the 3.98–4.14 GHz portion of the Upper C-band may provide any services permitted under terrestrial fixed or mobile allocations, as set forth in the non-Federal Government column of the Table of Frequency Allocations in section 2.106 of the Commission’s rules, as modified by the Upper C-band Report and Order.
7. Each potential bidder is solely responsible for investigating and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the potential uses of a license that it may seek in Auction 115.  In addition to the typical due diligence considerations that we encourage of bidders in all auctions, See, e.g., Auction of Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-3) Licenses; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 113; Bidding Scheduled to Begin June 2, 2026, AU Docket No. 25-117, Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd 10097, 10108–09, paras. 21–25 (OEA/WTB 2025) (Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice).
 we call particular attention in Auction 115 to the clearing process and license conditions described in the Upper C-band Report and Order. See Upper C-band Report and Order at 43–91, paras. 90–183.
  Each applicant should closely follow releases from the Commission concerning these issues and consider carefully the technical and economic implications for commercial use of the Upper C-band.  The Commission makes no representations or warranties about the use of this spectrum for particular services, or about the information in Commission databases that is furnished by outside parties.  Each applicant should be aware that a Commission spectrum license auction represents an opportunity to become a Commission licensee, subject to certain conditions and regulations.  This includes the established authority of the Commission to alter the terms of existing licenses by rulemaking, which is equally applicable to licenses awarded by auction. See, e.g., Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Celtronix Telemetry, Inc. v. FCC, 272 F.3d 585, 589 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6)(D)).
  A Commission auction does not constitute an endorsement by the Commission of any particular service, technology, or product, nor does a Commission license constitute a guarantee of business success.
B. Transition of Incumbent Operations 
8. Prior to the Commission’s adoption of the Upper C-Band Report and Order, the 4.0–4.2 GHz portion of the Upper C-band was allocated for non-Federal use on a primary basis for Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) and Fixed Service (FS) links throughout the United States, although FS operations were sunset in the contiguous United States across the entire C-band as part of the Lower C-band transition. 47 CFR § 2.106 (2025) (United States Table of Frequency Allocations, non-Federal Table for the band 3.7–4.2 GHz).  See also Upper C-band Report and Order at 5, para. 7.
  In addition, the 3.98–4.0 GHz portion of the Upper C-band in the contiguous United States was reserved as a guard band to protect operations in the Upper C-band from potential harmful interference. 47 CFR § 2.106 (2025) (United States Table of Frequency Allocations, non-Federal Table for the band 3.7–4.2 GHz).  Upper C-band Report and Order at 5, para. 8.
  In the Upper C-band Report and Order, the Commission modified the licenses and market access authorizations of incumbent FSS operators to clear the Upper C-band for new flexible-use terrestrial wireless operations in the contiguous United States. Specifically, the Commission added a primary non-Federal mobile, except aeronautical mobile, allocation to the 4.0–4.16 GHz band nationwide, removed the FSS allocation within the contiguous United States, and designated a 20-megahertz guard band at 4.14–4.16 GHz to foster coexistence with FSS operations that are repacked and remain in 4.16–4.2 GHz.  See Upper C-band Report and Order at 13, para. 27.
  For additional information about clearing and conditions on the licenses to be offered in Auction 115, including licensees’ responsibility for the costs of clearing, potential bidders should carefully review the Upper C-band Report and Order.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF PART 1 COMPETITIVE BIDDING RULES AND REQUIREMENTS
9. The Commission’s part 1 rules require each applicant seeking to participate in competitive bidding to provide certain information, including ownership details and numerous certifications, in a short-form application (FCC Form 175). Pursuant to the Commission’s competitive bidding rules, each applicant must make a series of certifications under penalty of perjury on its FCC Form 175 related to the information provided in its application and its participation in the auction, and it must confirm that it is legally, technically, financially, and otherwise qualified to hold a Commission license.  See 47 CFR § 1.2105.
  Part 1, subpart Q’s competitive bidding rules also contain a framework for the implementation of a competitive bidding design, application and certification procedures, payment procedures, reporting requirements, and the prohibition of certain communications. See generally id. §§ 1.2101–1.2114.
 
A. Certification of Notice of Auction 115 Requirements and Procedures
10. In addition to certifications already required under section 1.2105, we propose to require any applicant seeking to participate in Auction 115 to certify in its short-form application, under penalty of perjury, that it has read the public notice(s) adopting procedures for Auction 115, as appropriate, and that it has familiarized itself both with the auction procedures and with the requirements for obtaining a license and operating facilities in the 3.98–4.14 GHz portion of the Upper C-band.  We believe that this certification would help ensure that the applicant has reviewed the procedures for participation in the auction process and has investigated and evaluated those technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on its potential use of any license won at auction.  Consequently, we believe this requirement will promote an applicant’s successful participation in the auction and reduce its risk of defaulting on its auction obligations.  As with other required certifications, an auction applicant’s failure to make the required certifications in its short-form application by the applicable filing deadline would render its application unacceptable for filing, and its application would be dismissed with prejudice. See id. § 1.2105(b)(1).
  We seek comment on this proposal.  We also seek comment on whether there are additional steps the Commission should take with respect to the filing of short-form applications to further ensure auction integrity.
B. Bidding Credit Caps
11. In general, the Commission’s bidding credit program promotes small business and rural service provider participation in auctions and in the provision of spectrum-based services. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D); see also id. § 309(j)(3)(A)–(B).
  Consistent with the framework established by the Commission in the Updating Part 1 Report and Order, See generally Updating Part 1 Competitive Bidding Rules et al., WT Docket No. 14-170 et al., Report and Order; Order on Reconsideration of the First Report and Order; Third Order on Reconsideration of the Second Report and Order; Third Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 7493, 7539–48, paras. 109–30 (2015) (modified by Erratum, 30 FCC Rcd 8518 (2015)) (Updating Part 1 Report and Order).
 we seek comment on establishing a reasonable monetary limit or cap on the total dollar amount of the discount from bidding credits that an eligible small business or rural service provider may be awarded for Auction 115.    
12. Eligibility for the small business bidding credit, as well as the size of the bidding credit, is determined according to a tiered schedule of small business size definitions that are based on an applicant’s average attributable annual gross revenues for the relevant preceding period. See 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(2); see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7523–25, 7530–31, paras. 72–74, 88 (increasing the gross revenue thresholds that define the eligibility tiers for the small business bidding credit and adopting a rural service provider bidding credit).  
  In the Upper C-band Report and Order, the Commission determined that eligibility for the small business bidding credit in the auction of licenses in the Upper C-band would be defined using the two higher gross revenue thresholds of $55 million and $20 million that are in the standardized schedule of small business sizes in part 1, subpart Q of the Commission’s rules. Upper C-band Report and Order at 17–18, para. 34; see also 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(2)(i).  The Commission defines the small business size standards on a service-by-service basis, after evaluating the associated characteristics and capital requirements of each service.  47 CFR § 1.2110(c)(1); see also id. § 1.2110(b)(1)(i); Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7529, para. 85.
  Specifically, the Commission determined that an entity with average annual gross revenues for the preceding five years not exceeding $55 million would be designated as a “small business” eligible for a 15% bidding credit, and that an entity with average annual gross revenues for the preceding five years not exceeding $20 million would be designated as a “very small business” eligible for a 25% bidding credit. See Upper C-band Report and Order at 17–18, paras. 34, 36.  Because the 3.7 GHz Service now encompasses both the Upper and Lower Cbands, section 27.1402 of the Commission’s rules concerning small business and rural service provider bidding credits in the 3.7 GHz Service applies to all licenses in the 3.98–4.14 GHz band.  See 47 CFR § 27.1402. 
  The Commission further determined that it would offer a 15% rural service provider bidding credit to any eligible rural service provider, as defined in section 1.2110(f)(4)(i) of the Commission’s rules, that is not also claiming a small business bidding credit. Upper C-band Report and Order at 19–20, para. 40 & n.132.  Under section 1.2110(f)(4)(i) of the Commission’s rules, entities providing commercial communications services to an attributable customer base of fewer than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable subscribers in primarily rural areas will be eligible for the 15% rural service provider bidding credit.  See 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(4)(i).  The Commission defined “rural area” as a county with a population density of 100 persons or fewer per square mile.  Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7536–37, para. 104 & n.340.  The Commission determines eligibility for the rural service provider bidding credit on a service-by-service basis.  See 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(1); see also Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7529, para. 85.

13. To protect the integrity of the bidding credit program and to mitigate the incentives for abuse, the Commission, in the Updating Part 1 Report and Order, established a process to implement a reasonable cap on the total bidding credit amount that an eligible small business or rural service provider may be awarded in any auction where such credits are available. Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7541, para. 114.
  This process is based on an evaluation of the expected capital requirements presented by the particular service and inventory of licenses being auctioned. Id. 
  The Commission determined that bidding credit caps would be implemented on an auction-by-auction basis, but resolved that, for any particular auction, the total amount of the bidding credit cap for small businesses would not be less than $25 million, and the bidding credit cap for rural service providers would not be less than $10 million. Id.; see also 47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(2)(ii), (4)(ii).
  For all auctions conducted in the last decade for licenses likely to be used for 5G services, the Commission adopted a $25 million cap on the total bidding credit amount that may be awarded to an eligible small business in each auction and a $10 million cap on rural service provider bidding credits in each auction. This includes Auctions 101, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108, 110, and 113.  See Auctions of Upper Microwave Flexible Use Licenses for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auctions 101 (28 GHz) and 102 (24 GHz); Bidding in Auction 101 Scheduled to Begin November 14, 2018, AU Docket. No. 18-85, Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd 7575, 7609–10, para. 93 (2018) (Auctions 101 and 102 Procedures Public Notice); Incentive Auction of Upper Microwave Flexible Use Service Licenses in the Upper 37 GHz, 39 GHz, and 47 GHz Bands for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 103; Bidding in Auction 103 Scheduled to Begin December 10, 2019, AU Docket No. 19-59, GN Docket No. 14-177, Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd 5532, 5558–59, para. 79 (2019) (Auction 103 Procedures Public Notice); Auction of Priority Access Licenses for the 3550–3650 MHz Band; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 105; Bidding in Auction 105 Scheduled to Begin June 25, 2020, AU Docket No. 19-244, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 2140, 2165, para. 77 (2020) (Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice); Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the 3.7–3.98 GHz Band for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 107; Bidding in Auction 107 Scheduled to Begin December 8, 2020, AU Docket No. 20-25, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 8404, 8428–29, para. 76 (2020) (Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice); Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the 3.45–3.55 GHz Band for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 110; AU Docket No. 21-62, Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd 9272, 9297, para. 78 (OEA/WTB 2021) (Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice); Auction of Flexible-Use Licenses in the 2.5 GHz Band for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 108; AU Docket No. 20-429, Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd 4370, 4402, para. 94 (2022) (Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice); Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 10165–66, para. 219.
  
14. We propose to adopt the same bidding credit caps for Auction 115.  Auction data suggest that a $25 million cap on small business bidding credits will allow the substantial majority of eligible small businesses in the auction to take advantage of the bidding credit program. No bidder seeking a small business bidding credit exceeded the $25 million cap in Auctions 101, 102, 103, 105, 108, or 113.  Only one bidder in Auction 107 and three bidders in Auction 110 seeking a small business bidding credit exceeded the $25 million cap in their respective auctions.  See generally Winning Bidders Announced for Auction of 28 GHz Upper Microwave Flexible Use Service Licenses (Auction 101), AU Docket No. 18-85, Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd 4279, 4283–85, Attach. A (OEA/WTB 2019) (Auction 101 Closing Public Notice); Auction of 24 GHz Upper Microwave Flexible Use Service Licenses Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 102, AU Docket No. 18-85, Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd 4294, 4306–08, Attach. A (OEA/WTB 2019) (Auction 102 Closing Public Notice); Incentive Auction of Upper Microwave Flexible Use Service Licenses in the Upper 37 GHz, 39 GHz, and 47 GHz Bands for Next-Generation Wireless Services Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 103, AU Docket No. 19-59, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 2015, 2032–34, Attach. B (OEA/WTB 2020) (Auction 103 Closing Public Notice); Auction of Priority Access Licenses in the 3550–3650 MHz Band Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 105, AU Docket No. 19-244, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 9287, 9299–317, Attach. A (OEA/WTB 2020) (Auction 105 Closing Public Notice); Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the 3.7–3.98 GHz Band Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 107, AU Docket No. 20-25, Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd 4318, 4329–32, Attach. A (OEA/WTB 2021) (Auction 107 Closing Public Notice); Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the 3.45–3.55 GHz Band Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 110, AU Docket No. 21-62, Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd 308, 320–22, Attach. A (OEA/WTB 2022) (Auction 110 Closing Public Notice); Auction of Flexible-Use Licenses in the 2.5 GHz Band Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 108, AU Docket No. 20-429, Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd 10117, 10128–33, Attach. A (OEA/WTB 2022) (Auction 108 Closing Public Notice); Auction of Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-3) Licenses Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 113, AU Docket No. 25-117, Public Notice, DA 26-633, Attach. A (OEA/WTB June 26, 2026) (Auction 113 Closing Public Notice).  
  We therefore believe that our proposed cap will not conflict with the statutory goals of providing meaningful opportunities for bona fide small businesses to compete in auctions and in the provision of spectrum-based services, See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D); see also id. § 309(j)(3)(A)–(B).
 while preventing unjust enrichment and ensuring efficient and intensive use of spectrum. See id. § 309(j)(3)(C)–(D).

15. Similarly, we propose to adopt a $10 million cap on the total bidding credit amounts that may be awarded to an eligible rural service provider in Auction 115. An entity is not eligible for a rural service provider bidding credit if it has already claimed a small business bidding credit.  47 CFR § 1.2110(f)(4)(i).
  Based on our experience with other auctions for spectrum licenses, we anticipate that a $10 million cap on rural service provider bidding credits will allow any rural service provider to participate fully and fairly in Auction 115.  The capped rural service provider bidding credit will be “significant enough to assist eligible entities to have the opportunity to compete at auction, but reasonable enough to ensure that ineligible entities are not encouraged to undercut our rules,” and thereby serve the “dual statutory goals of benefitting [designated entities] and at the same time preventing unjust enrichment.” Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7544, para. 121.  No rural service provider has exceeded the $10 million cap in any auction for wireless spectrum licenses since the Commission adopted the bidding credit.  See generally Incentive Auction Closing and Channel Reassignment Public Notice; the Broadcast Television Incentive Auction Closes; Reverse Auction and Forward Auction Results Announced; Final Television Band Channel Assignments Announced; Post-Auction Deadlines Announced, AU Docket No. 14-252 et al., Public Notice, 32 FCC Rcd 2786, Appx. B (WTB/MB 2017); Auction 101 Closing Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 4283–85, Attach. A; Auction 102 Closing Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 4306–08, Attach. A; Auction 103 Closing Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2032–34, Attach. B; Auction 105 Closing Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 9299–317, Attach. A; Auction 107 Closing Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 4329–32, Attach. A; Auction 110 Closing Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 320–22, Attach. A; Auction 108 Closing Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 10128–33, Attach. A; Auction 113 Closing Public Notice at Attach. A.
  
16. In addition, to create parity in Auction 115 among eligible small businesses and rural service providers competing against each other in smaller markets, we propose a $10 million cap on the overall amount of bidding credits that any winning designated entity bidder may apply to licenses won in markets with a population of 500,000 or less (small market bidding credit cap).  This proposal is consistent with the approach adopted by the Commission for the forward portion of the Broadcast Incentive Auction (Auction 1002) and in every auction for wireless spectrum licenses since. See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7546–47, paras. 127–28; Auctions 101 and 102 Procedures Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 7609–10, para. 93; Auction 103 Procedures Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 5558–59, para. 79; Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2165, para. 77; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8428–29, para. 76; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9297, para. 78; Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4402, para. 94; Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 10165–66, para. 219.  
  
17. We seek comment on these proposed caps.  Specifically, do the expected capital requirements associated with operating in the Upper C-band, the potential number and value of Upper Cband licenses, past auction data, or any other considerations justify a higher or lower cap for either type of bidding credit in this auction?  Commenters are encouraged to identify circumstances and characteristics of Auction 115 and/or the spectrum licenses to be made available in the auction that should guide us in establishing bidding credit caps, and to provide specific, data-driven arguments in support of their proposals. 
18. We remind applicants applying for designated entity bidding credits that they should take due account of the requirements of the Commission’s rules and implementing orders regarding de jure and de facto control of such applicants. See, e.g., 47 CFR §§ 1.2110, 1.2112.  
  These rules include a prohibition, which applies to all applicants regardless of whether they are seeking bidding credits, starting at the short-form application filing deadline, against changes in ownership of the applicant that would constitute an assignment or transfer of control. Id. § 1.2105(b)(2).  Under section 1.2107(c), the winning bidder must be the entity that files the post-auction long-form application.  Id. § 1.2107(c).  Pursuant to 47 CFR § 1.929(a)(2), any substantial change in ownership or control is classified as a major amendment.  Id. § 1.929(a)(2); see also id. § 1.927(a)–(b), (h). 
  Applicants should not expect to receive an opportunity to revise their ownership structure after the filing of their short- and long-form applications, including making revisions to their agreements or other arrangements with interest holders, lenders, or others in order to address potential concerns relating to compliance with the designated entity bidding credit requirements.  This policy will help to ensure compliance with the Commission’s rules applicable to the award of bidding credits prior to the start of bidding in this auction, which will involve competing bids from those who do and do not seek bidding credits, and thus preserves the integrity of the auction process. In furtherance of this policy, applicants will not be permitted to change their bidding credit type selection (i.e., from small business to rural service provider, or vice versa) after the short-form application deadline.  See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7538, para. 108 (“[A]n applicant must choose between one bidding credit and the other.”).
  We also believe that this will meet the Commission’s objectives in awarding licenses through the competitive bidding process. The Commission’s objectives when awarding licenses through competitive bidding include, among other things, “the development and rapid deployment of new technologies, products, and services for the benefit of the public . . . without administrative or judicial delays” and “promoting economic opportunity and competition and ensuring that new and innovative technologies are readily accessible to the American people by avoiding excessive concentration of licenses and by disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including small businesses.”  47 U.S.C. § 309(j).
  
C. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
19. In keeping with the Commission’s usual practice in spectrum auctions, we propose that each applicant be required to submit an upfront payment as a prerequisite to becoming qualified to bid. See 47 CFR § 1.2106.  
  An upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by an applicant that would establish its eligibility to bid on licenses, as proposed below.  Upfront payments protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments owed at the close of bidding. See Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 2348, 2377–79, paras. 169–76 (1994) (Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order); see also 47 CFR § 1.2106(e) (upfront payments applied to any bid default payments prior to other post-auction payments); 47 CFR § 1.2106(a) (“Any auction applicant that, pursuant to § 1.2105(a)(2)(xii), certifies that it is a former defaulter must submit an upfront payment equal to 50 percent more than the amount that otherwise would be required.”).  
  With these considerations in mind, we propose upfront payments for a generic 20-megahertz block in a PEA based on $0.015 per MHz-pop for PEAs 1–50, $0.003 per MHz-pop for PEAs 51–100, and $0.0015 per MHz-pop for all other PEAs, subject to a minimum of $500 per block. The results of these calculations will be rounded using the Commission’s standard rounding procedures for auctions:  results above $10,000 are rounded to the nearest $1,000; results below $10,000 but above $1,000 are rounded to the nearest $100; and results below $1,000 are rounded to the nearest $10.
  The proposed upfront payments equal approximately half the proposed minimum opening bids, which are established as described in Section V.A.6.a. (Minimum Opening Bids), below.  
20. We seek comment on these upfront payment amounts, which are specified in the Attachment A file on the Auction 115 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/115.  If commenters believe that these upfront payment amounts are not reasonable amounts, they should explain their reasoning and suggest an alternative approach.  
21. We further propose that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder determine the bidder’s initial bidding eligibility in bidding units. The upfront payment does not limit the dollar amounts of the bids that a bidder may submit.
  Bidder eligibility and bidding activity are measured in bidding units.  We propose to assign each generic spectrum block in a given PEA a specific number of bidding units, equal to one bidding unit per $10 of the upfront payment listed in the Attachment A file.  Thus, a bidder’s initial bidding eligibility in bidding units would be equal to a bidding unit for each $10 of the bidder’s upfront payment.  The number of bidding units for one block in a given PEA is fixed and does not change during the auction as prices change.  The number of bidding units per 20-megahertz block in each PEA is specified in Attachment A.   
22. An applicant that plans to bid on multiple generic blocks simultaneously, whether within the same PEA or in different PEAs, would need to select the appropriate PEA(s) in its FCC Form 175 and submit an upfront payment that provides sufficient initial eligibility to cover the bidding units associated with those blocks. Upfront payment amounts are not attributed to specific PEAs or blocks therein.   
  A bidder cannot increase its eligibility during the auction; it can only maintain or decrease its eligibility.  Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount, and hence its initial bidding eligibility, an applicant in Auction 115 must determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish to bid in any single round and submit an upfront payment amount covering that total number of bidding units.  We seek comment on these proposals.
D. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
23. For Auction 115, we propose that at any time before or during the bidding process, OEA, in conjunction with WTB, may delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in the event of a natural disaster, technical obstacle, network interruption, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an auction security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. See 47 CFR § 1.2104(i).
  In such case, OEA would notify participants by public notice and/or through the announcement function in the FCC auction bidding system (referred to as the “bidding system” throughout this Public Notice).  If the bidding is delayed or suspended, OEA, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the auction starting from the beginning of the current round or from some previous round, or it may cancel the auction in its entirety.  OEA and WTB would exercise this authority to delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 115 solely at their discretion.  We seek comment on this proposal.
E. Deficiency Payments and Additional Default Payment Percentage
24. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the close of an auction (i.e., if it fails to remit the required down payment by the specified deadline, fails to submit a timely long-form application, fails to make full and timely final payment, or is otherwise disqualified) would be liable for a default payment under section 1.2104(g)(2) of the Commission’s rules. Id. § 1.2104(g)(2).
  This payment consists of a deficiency payment, equal to the difference between the amount of the bidder’s winning bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time a license covering the same spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal to a percentage of the defaulter’s bid or of the subsequent winning bid, whichever is less. Because final auction payments are calculated on an aggregate basis, taking into account both assignment phase winning bids and any capped bidding credit discounts, the bidding system will calculate individual per-license prices in case they are needed for post-auction administrative purposes, including for calculating default payments.  The bidding system will apportion to individual licenses any assignment phase payments and any capped bidding credit discounts, since in both cases, a single amount may apply to multiple licenses.  This per-license price will be used as the amount of a bidder’s winning bid for a particular license when calculating a default payment with respect to that license.  For additional details, see the Auction 115 Assignment Phase Technical Guide released concurrently with this Public Notice.
 
25. The Commission’s rules provide that, in advance of each auction, it will establish a percentage between 3% and 20% of the applicable winning bid to be assessed as an additional default payment. Id. § 1.2104(g)(2)(ii).
  As the Commission has indicated, the level of this additional payment in each auction will be based on the nature of the service and the licenses being offered. Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act and Modernization of the Commission’s Competitive Bidding Rules and Procedures, WT Docket No. 05-211, Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd 891, 903–04, para. 31 (2006) (CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order).
 
26. As noted in the CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, defaults weaken the integrity of the auction process and may impede the deployment of service to the public, and an additional default payment of up to 20% will be more effective in deterring defaults than the 3% used in some earlier auctions. Id. at 902–03, para. 29.
  In most recent auctions of spectrum suitable for 5G and other advanced wireless services, an additional default payment of 15% was adopted, except in Auctions 105 and 113 which had a 20% additional default payment due to specific circumstances for those auctions. See Auctions 101 and 102 Procedures Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 7660, para. 295; Auction 103 Procedures Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 5601, para. 248; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8470, para. 237; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9343, para. 264; Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4445, para. 249; Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2204, para. 228, citing Auction 105 Comment Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 9235, para. 85 (adopting the proposed 20% additional default payment percentage in recognition that Auction 105 involved an unusually large number of licenses, and so a higher additional default payment percentage than had been used in other recent auctions was necessary to ensure that entities only bid on those licenses that they reasonably expected to use); Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 10172, para. 243 (concluding that as the AWS-3 spectrum covered by licenses offered in Auction 113 had been in the Commission’s inventory for a full decade after comparable licenses were first offered in Auction 97, a higher additional default payment would be more appropriate to deter defaults in Auction 113 in order to reduce the risk of further licensing delays).       
  For Auction 115, we do not believe any such special circumstances exist, and therefore, propose to establish an additional default payment of 15%.  We seek comment on this proposal.
IV. INFORMATION PROCEDURES AND PROHIBITED COMMUNICATIONS
A. Information Procedures During the Auction Process
27. As an additional safeguard to prevent the communication of information about applicants’ bids and bidding strategies and to discourage anti-competitive strategic behavior, we propose to limit information available in Auction 115 so that bidders placing particular bids will not be identified until after the bidding has closed. The Commission has instituted limited information procedures for all recent spectrum license auctions.  See Auctions 101 and 102 Procedures Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 7596, para. 50; Auction 103 Procedures Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 5546, para. 35; Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2153, para. 36; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8417, para. 35; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9286, para. 37; Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4391, para. 53; Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 10142, para. 130; see also 47 CFR § 1.2104(h).  
  While we generally make available to the public information provided in each applicant’s short-form application following the initial review by Commission staff, we propose to not make public until after bidding has closed:  (1) the PEAs that an applicant has selected for bidding in its short-form application, (2) the amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant, (3) an applicant’s bidding eligibility, and (4) any other bidding-related information that might reveal the identity of a bidder.
28. As in past Commission auctions, we would not make public during a bidding round any real-time information on bidding activity.  We propose that the bidding system would publicly disclose, after each round of Auction 115, for each PEA:  the aggregate demand; the posted price of the last completed round; The posted price of the last completed round is, generally:  the start-of-round price of the last completed round if supply exceeds demand; the clock price of the last completed round if demand exceeds supply; or the price at which a reduction caused demand to equal supply.  For more details, see the Auction 115 Clock Phase Technical Guide released concurrently with this Public Notice.
 and the clock price for the next round.  The identities of bidders demanding blocks in a PEA would not be disclosed until after bidding is closed and Auction 115 concludes.
29. Both during and after a round, each bidder would have access to additional information related to its own bidding activity and bid eligibility through the bidding system.  Specifically, after the bids of a round have been processed, the bidding system would inform each bidder of the number of blocks it holds in processed demand in every PEA and its eligibility for the next round. 
30. After the close of bidding, bidders’ PEA selections, upfront payment amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and other bidding-related information would be made publicly available.  Proxy instructions would not be publicly released either during or after the auction.  
31. We seek comment on the above details of our proposal for implementing limited information procedures (also referred to as anonymous bidding) in Auction 115.  Commenters opposing the use of anonymous bidding in Auction 115 should explain their reasoning and propose alternative information procedures.
B. Prohibition of Certain Communications
32. Section 1.2105(c)(1) of the Commission’s rules provides that, subject to specified exceptions, “[a]fter the short-form application filing deadline, all applicants are prohibited from cooperating or collaborating with respect to, communicating with or disclosing, to each other or any nationwide provider [of communications services] that is not an applicant, or, if the applicant is a nationwide provider, any non-nationwide provider that is not an applicant, in any manner the substance of their own, or each other’s, or any other applicants’ bids or bidding strategies (including post-auction market structure), or discussing or negotiating settlement agreements, until after the down payment deadline[.]” 47 CFR § 1.2105(c)(1).  Section 1.2105(c)(5)(i) includes in the definition of “applicant” all officers and directors of the entity submitting a short-form application to participate in the auction, all controlling interests of that entity, as well as all holders of partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest amounting to 10% or more of the entity, or outstanding stock, or outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form application.  Id. § 1.2105(c)(5)(i).

33. The operation of the rule prohibiting certain communications requires that the identification of each “nationwide provider” for purposes of section 1.2105(c)(1) in connection with each auction. See Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7571, para. 182 n.596.
  Because the applicable service rules for the 3.98–4.14 GHz band will allow a licensee to provide flexible terrestrial wireless services, See note 12, above.  
 the Commission’s identification of three nationwide providers in its most recent Communications Marketplace Report suggests that we should also identify those same entities as nationwide providers for purposes of 3.98–4.14 GHz band licenses and Auction 115. See Communications Marketplace Report, GN Docket No. 24-119, 2024 Communications Marketplace Report, 39 FCC Rcd 14116, 14160, para. 56 (2024).  Identifying “nationwide providers” in this manner for the purpose of implementing the Commission’s competitive bidding rules is consistent with the approach used in several recent spectrum license auctions.  See, e.g., Application Procedures for Broadcast Incentive Auction Scheduled to Begin on March 29, 2016; Technical Formulas for Competitive Bidding, AU Docket No. 14-252, GN Docket No. 12-268, and WT Docket No. 12-269, Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd 11034, 11070, para. 111 & n.193 (WTB 2015) (Auction 1000 Application Procedures Public Notice); Auctions 101 and 102 Comment Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 4112, para. 26; Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2604, para. 9; Auction 110 Comment Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 6109, para. 21; Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 1490, para. 23; see also Auction 108 Comment Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 652, para. 17 & n.44.   
  Accordingly, consistent with the procedures adopted for prior auctions of flexible-use licenses for advanced wireless services, we propose to identify AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon as “nationwide providers” for the purpose of implementing our competitive bidding rules in Auction 115, including section 1.2105(c), the rule prohibiting certain communications. See Auction 1000 Application Procedures Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 11070, para. 111; Auctions 101 and 102 Procedures Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 7593–94, para. 44; Auction 103 Procedures Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 5542, 5547, paras. 27, 43; Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2150, 2155, paras. 28, 44; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8413, 8418, paras. 27 & n.51, 43; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9282–83, 9287, paras. 29, 45; Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4387, 4393, paras. 45, 61; Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 10126, 10145, paras. 88, 139. 
  We seek comment on this proposal.  Commenters that disagree with this proposed designation of nationwide providers are encouraged to articulate alternative methodologies by which we should identify nationwide providers for purposes of the prohibited communications rule.
34. Pursuant to the requirements of the OBBB Act and our strategic objective to lead in next-generation wireless technologies, the Commission is likely to conduct multiple spectrum auctions over the next few years in addition to the Auction 115. Pub. L. No. 119-21, § 40002(b)(2).
  This could lead to successive or overlapping prohibited communications periods.  As the Commission has previously explained, the rule prohibiting certain communications is “limited in scope and only prohibit[s] disclosure of information that affects, or has the potential to affect, bids and bidding strategies.” Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, GN Docket No. 12-268, Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd 6567, 6771, para. 492 (2014).
  Because “business discussions and negotiations that are unrelated to bids and bidding strategies or to post-auction market structure are not prohibited by the rule,” we do not believe that the rule impedes normal business operations. Id. at 6768, para. 486.
  Moreover, it is not unusual for the Commission to hold multiple auctions in quick succession—from late 2018 to early 2021, the Commission conducted six auctions, with four taking place within a single twelve-month span. See FCC, Auction 101: Spectrum Frontiers – 28 GHz, https://www.fcc.gov/auction/101 (last visited July 22, 2026) (Auction 101 short-form application deadline was September 18, 2018, and bidding took place from November 14, 2018 to January 24, 2019); FCC, Auction 102: Spectrum Frontiers – 24 GHz, https://www.fcc.gov/auction/102 (last visited July 22, 2026) (Auction 102 short-form application deadline was September 18, 2018, and bidding took place from March 14, 2019 to May 28, 2019); FCC, Auction 103: Spectrum Frontiers – Upper 37 GHz, 39 GHz, and 47 GHz, https://www.fcc.gov/auction/103 (last visited July 22, 2026) (Auction 103 short-form application deadline was September 9, 2019, and bidding took place from December 10, 2019 to March 5, 2020); FCC, Auction 105: 3.5 GHz Band, https://www.fcc.gov/auction/105 (last visited July 22, 2026) (Auction 105 short-form application deadline was May 7, 2020, and bidding took place from July 23, 2020 to August 25, 2020); FCC, Auction 904: Rural Digital Opportunity Fund, https://www.fcc.gov/auction/904 (last visited July 22, 2026) (Auction 904 short-form application deadline was July 15, 2020, and bidding took place from October 29, 2020 to November 25, 2020); FCC, Auction 107: 3.7 GHz Service, https://www.fcc.gov/auction/107 (last visited July 22, 2026) (Auction 107 short-form application deadline was September 22, 2020, and bidding took place from December 8, 2020 to February 17, 2021).  Note that in Auctions 101 and 102, which involved related inventories of Upper Microwave Flexible Use Service spectrum licenses, the Commission elected to “apply the Commission’s rule prohibiting certain communications across both auctions, using the Auction 102 down payment deadline to determine when the prohibition ends for applicants in either auction,” resulting in the period ending four months after the end of Auction 101 bidding without the prohibition’s length causing any particular adverse consequences.  Auctions 101 and 102 Procedures Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 7598, para. 58.
  Nevertheless, we seek comment on whether previous successive or overlapping prohibited communications periods have, in practice, had a negative effect on business operations or auction participation.
V. PROPOSED BIDDING PROCEDURES
35. We propose to conduct Auction 115 using an ascending clock auction format.  Under the proposed auction format, bidding would take place in two phases.  The first phase of the auction—the clock phase—would consist of successive clock bidding rounds in which qualified bidders indicate their demands for generic license blocks (referred to as “generic blocks” throughout this Public Notice) in specific PEAs, followed by a second phase—the assignment phase—with bidding for frequency-specific license assignments.  We seek comment below on bidding procedures for Auction 115.
36. We are releasing two technical guides concurrently with this Public Notice—the Auction 115 Clock Phase Technical Guide and the Auction 115 Assignment Phase Technical Guide. Both technical guides will be available in the Education section on the Auction 115 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/115.
  The technical guides supplement the information in this Public Notice and provide the mathematical details and algorithms of the proposed auction format.
A. Clock Phase 
1. Clock Auction Design
37. Under the proposed clock format, the clock phase of Auction 115 would consist of multiple, sequential bidding rounds, with bidding being conducted simultaneously for all available spectrum blocks in all PEAs in the auction.  During each round, bidders would indicate their demands for generic blocks in specific PEAs, and round results would be released after each round.  In the first bidding round of Auction 115, a bidder would indicate for each product—the generic blocks in a PEA—the quantity of generic blocks it demands at the product’s opening per-block clock price.  During each subsequent bidding round, the bidding system would announce a per-block start-of-round price and clock price for each product, and qualified bidders would indicate, for each product for which they wish to bid, the number of blocks they request at the prices associated with the current round.  Bidding rounds would be open for predetermined periods of time, announced well in advance of the start of each round.  Bidders would be subject to activity and eligibility rules that govern the pace of the auction.  
38. Under our proposal, for each product, the clock price for a generic block would increase from round to round if bidders’ total demand for blocks in that product exceeds the supply of blocks available.  The bidding rounds would continue until, for all products, the total number of blocks that bidders demand does not exceed the supply of available blocks.  Once bidding rounds stop, the bidders with processed demand for a product at the product’s final price would become winning bidders.  Bidding in the clock phase would determine a uniform price for all the generic blocks in a product.
39. Following the clock phase, the assignment phase would offer clock phase winners the opportunity to bid an additional amount for licenses with specific frequencies.  All winning bidders, regardless of whether they bid in the assignment phase, would be assigned licenses for contiguous blocks in a PEA.
40. We seek comment on specific procedures to implement this ascending clock auction and on alternative procedures for conducting, in a timely manner, an auction of licenses in the 3.98–4.14 GHz band.
2. Generic License Blocks
41. The Commission determined in the Upper C-band Report and Order that 160 megahertz of the reconfigured Upper C-band from 3.98–4.14 GHz will be available to auction, and licensed in eight uniform 20-megahertz blocks in each PEA within the contiguous United States. Upper C-band Report and Order at 14, 27–28, paras. 29, 53, 56.
  In PEAs 1–41 and 43–76, the incumbent FSS operations have a Transition Deadline of December 30, 2030. Id. at 55, para. 111 & n.400.
  In PEAs 77–211, 213–263, 265–297, 299–359, and 361–411, the incumbent FSS operations have a Transition Deadline of June 30, 2031. Id. at 55, para. 111 & n.403.
  Consequently, in each of these PEAs, all eight 20-megahertz blocks are the same and would be considered as generic blocks in the same category.
3. Bidding Rounds
42. We propose that, as with any Commission spectrum license auction, the initial bidding schedule for Auction 115 would be announced in a public notice to be released at least one week before the start of bidding, and OEA would retain the discretion to adjust the bidding schedule to maintain an auction pace that reasonably balances bidders’ need to study round results and adjust their bidding strategies with the need to conduct the clock auction at an efficient speed.  Any adjustments to the bidding schedule could include changes in the amount of time for bidding rounds, the amount of time between rounds, and/or the number of rounds per day, and would depend upon bidding activity and other factors.  We seek comment on this proposal.  Commenters should address the role of the bidding schedule in managing the pace of the auction and should specifically discuss the tradeoffs in managing the auction pace by changes to the bidding schedule, the activity requirement percentage, or the clock price increment percentage, or by using other means.
43. We propose to conduct Auction 115 over the Internet.  Under the ascending clock format, a bidder would submit its bids either by using the bidding system’s upload function, which allows bid files in a comma-separated values (CSV) text format to be uploaded, or through the user interface in the bidding system.  The bidding system would allow a bidder to submit bids only for PEAs that the bidder selected on its FCC Form 175 and for which the bidder has sufficient bidding eligibility. See Section III.C. (Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility), above.
  
44. During each open bidding round, a bidder would be able to modify any existing bids placed in the round through the user interface or by uploading a new bid file, which would replace all bids previously submitted in the round.
45. As in other Commission auctions, we propose to facilitate auction participation by providing qualified bidders with a toll-free telephone number for an auction bidder line prior to the start of bidding.  Under this proposal, bidders, in addition to submitting bids through the bidding system, would have the option of placing bids by telephone through this dedicated auction bidder line.  We seek comment on this proposal.
4. Stopping Rule
46. As in previous FCC clock auctions, we propose to use a simultaneous stopping rule for Auction 115, under which all products would remain available for bidding until the bidding stops simultaneously on every product. The Commission has discretion to establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in order to complete the auction within a reasonable time.  47 CFR § 1.2104(e).  
  Specifically, bidding would close for all products after the first round in which no product has any excess demand. Excess demand is calculated as the difference between the number of blocks of aggregate demand and supply.  
  Consequently, under this approach, it is not possible to determine in advance the duration of Auction 115.  We seek comment on this proposal.  
5. Activity Rule
47. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of time, we propose an activity rule that would require bidders to bid actively throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction before participating.  This is an approach that is routinely used in multiple-round auctions. See, e.g., Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 10153–54, paras. 172–75; Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4433–34, paras. 196–98; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9328, paras. 191–93; Auctions 101 and 102 Procedures Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 7634–35, para. 181.
  In the proposed ascending clock auction, a bidder’s activity in a round for purposes of the activity rule would be the sum of the bidding units associated with the bidder’s processed demands as applied by the bidding system during bid processing after the round has closed. During a round, the bidding system will inform a bidder of the bidding units associated with its submitted bids (submitted activity).  After bids for a round are processed, the bidding system will inform a bidder of its processed activity associated with its processed demands. 
  A bidder would be required to be active on a specific percentage (the activity requirement percentage) of its current bidding eligibility during each round of the auction.  Failure to maintain the requisite activity level would result in a reduction in the bidder’s eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder’s ability to place bids in subsequent rounds of the auction.
48. Under this auction format, a bidder would be required to maintain a fixed, high level of activity in each round of Auction 115 in order to maintain bidding eligibility.  Specifically, in each round of Auction 115, a bidder would be required to be active on between 90% and 100% of its current bidding eligibility to maintain its bidding eligibility, with the specific percentage within this range to be set for each round.  We propose to set the activity requirement percentage for Auction 115 initially at 95%.  Thus, the activity rule would be satisfied when a bidder has processed demand on blocks with bidding units that total at least 95% of its current eligibility in the round.  If the activity rule is met, then the bidder’s eligibility would not change for the next round.  If the activity rule is not met in a round, the bidder’s eligibility would be reduced such that the activity rule is satisfied.  Bidding activity would be based on the bids that are submitted and applied by the bidding system.  That is, if a bidder bids to reduce its demand for a product, but the bidding system cannot apply the request because demand would fall below the available supply, then the bidder’s activity would reflect its unreduced demand. Under the ascending clock auction format, the bidding system will not allow a bidder to reduce the quantity of blocks it demands in an individual PEA if, after the reduction, aggregate demand would be less than the available supply of blocks in the PEA.  See Section V.A.7.a. (No Excess Supply Rule for Bids to Reduce Demand), below.
  We seek comment on this proposal.
49. Pursuant to this proposal, OEA would retain the discretion to change the activity requirement percentage during the auction to help manage the pace of bidding to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of time.  The bidding system would announce any such changes in advance of the round in which they would take effect, giving bidders adequate notice to adjust their bidding strategies.  
50. Under these proposed activity rule procedures, a bidder would be allowed to submit bids with bidding units totaling up to the bidder’s eligibility for the round.
51. We also seek comment on potentially including contingent bidding procedures by which, after Round 1, In Round 1, a bidder would be allowed to submit bids with bidding units totaling up to the bidder’s initial bidding eligibility.
 a bidder may submit bids with associated activity totaling up to a contingent bidding limit greater than or equal to the bidder’s current bidding eligibility for the round. The Commission has previously referred to the contingent bidding limit as the activity upper limit, and similarly, to the contingent bidding percentage as the activity limit percentage.  See, e.g., Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2194–95, paras. 182–84; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8455–56, paras. 172–76.  We modified those terms before Auction 110 to remind bidders that bids submitted using the contingent bidding limit will be applied only under certain circumstances.  Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9329, para. 195 n.354.
  If adopted, a bidder’s use of the contingent bidding limit would be optional.  If we adopt the contingent bidding procedures, a bidder’s contingent bidding limit would be calculated as its current eligibility times a contingent bidding percentage equal to or greater than 100%.
52. Allowing a bidder to submit bids with associated bidding activity greater than its current bidding eligibility would potentially help a bidder, in some circumstances, avoid having its eligibility reduced as a result of submitted bids that could not be applied during bid processing. A bidder’s eligibility could be unexpectedly reduced as a result of a bid not being applied when, for example, a bidder bids to reduce its demand in PEA X by two blocks (with 10 bidding units each) and bids to increase its demand by one block (with 20 bidding units) in PEA Y.  If the bidder’s demand can only be reduced by one block in PEA X (because there is only one block of excess demand), and if the bidder does not have 20 bidding units of eligibility available, then the increase in PEA Y cannot be applied, and absent other bidding activity the bidder’s eligibility would be reduced.  For further details on bid processing, see Sections V.A.7.a. (No Excess Supply Rule for Bids to Reduce Demand) and V.A.7.d. (Processed Demand).
  However, even under these additional procedures, the bidder’s activity as applied by the bidding system during bid processing would not exceed the bidder’s current bidding eligibility.  That is, if a bidder were allowed to submit bids with associated bidding units exceeding 100% of its current bidding eligibility, its processed activity would never exceed the bidder’s current bidding eligibility. See Section V.A.7.d. (Processed Demand), below.
   
53. Contingent bidding procedures were used in four recent FCC clock auctions (Auctions 105, 107, 108, and 110), See Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2194–95, paras. 182–84; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8455–56, paras. 172–76; Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4434–35, paras. 199–201; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9328–29, paras. 194–97.   
 but we tentatively conclude that including the contingent bidding limit in Auction 115 would add unnecessary complexity The bidding system would post a bidder’s contingent bidding limit in addition to the bidder’s current eligibility and required bidding activity.  Effective use of the contingent bidding limit would necessarily involve submitting additional bids such that the total submitted activity exceeds current eligibility.  Because not all of these bids could be applied by the bidding system, effective use of the contingent bidding limit could also involve selecting particular price points for bids to change demand so that the bids (which are processed in order of ascending price point) are processed in a particular order and applied during bid processing as available eligibility permits.
 and the potential for misuse with little to no benefit for most Auction 115 bidders. We note that parties commenting on auction procedures for Auction 113 objected to allowing contingent bidding in that auction, arguing that it would introduce complexity and uncertainty without adding any appreciable benefits to bidders or the Commission, also noting that contingent bidding was scarcely utilized by bidders in auctions where it was allowed.  See Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 10154–55, para. 177 (finding that, in addition to introducing complexity, a contingent bidding limit was unnecessary for Auction 113 because there was a lower likelihood that bidders would see submitted bids go unapplied during bid processing due to the limited auction inventory). 
  We seek comment on this tentative conclusion.  If we do adopt contingent bidding procedures, we propose to set the initial contingent bidding percentage at 120%, which would apply starting in Round 2, subject to change in subsequent rounds within a range of 100% to 140%.   
6. Acceptable Bids
a. Minimum Opening Bids
54. As part of the pre-bidding process for each auction, section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, mandates that we prescribe methods for establishing a reasonable reserve price or reasonable minimum bid amounts for licenses subject to auction unless such bid amounts are not in the public interest. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(F); 47 CFR § 1.2104(c)–(d).  A reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which a license will not be sold in a given auction.  An opening bid, on the other hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction below which no bids are accepted.  It is generally used to accelerate the competitive bidding process.  It is also possible for a reserve price and an opening bid to be the same amount.
 
55. We propose to establish minimum opening bids for Auction 115.  Minimum opening bids would serve as the initial clock prices in the proposed clock auction format.  In Round 1 of the proposed clock auction, a bidder would indicate, for each product, how many generic blocks it demands at the product’s minimum opening bid.  The bidding system will not accept bids lower than these amounts.  Based on our experience in past auctions, setting appropriate minimum opening bids is an effective tool to prevent an excessive number of bidding rounds at very low prices. See, e.g., Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 10157, para. 185.
  Our experience also suggests appropriate minimum opening bids have less bearing on final prices than they do on the number of rounds required to reach the final prices. See id. at 10158, para. 188.
    
56. We do not propose to establish an aggregate reserve price in Auction 115.  At this time, we are not aware of any circumstances that would warrant establishing an aggregate reserve price in the public interest for the auction of spectrum licenses in the 3.98–4.14 GHz band.  Therefore, we propose only the per-product minimum opening bids discussed here.  We seek comment on this issue.
57. For Auction 115, we propose to calculate minimum opening bid amounts for each 20-megahertz block on a PEA basis using a formula based on bandwidth, PEA population, and PEA population tiers, which is similar to our approach in many previous auctions for spectrum licenses. We note that minimum opening bid amounts in Commission auctions are not meant to predict the value of the spectrum.  See, e.g., Auction 103 Procedures Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 5591, para. 197.
  We would calculate minimum opening bid amounts for each 20-megahertz block based on $0.03 per MHz-pop for PEAs 1–50; $0.006 per MHz-pop for PEAs 51–100; and $0.003 per MHz-pop for all other PEAs.  For all blocks in all PEAs, minimum opening bids would be subject to a minimum of $1,000 per 20-megahertz block. The results of these calculations will be rounded using the Commission’s standard rounding procedures for auctions:  results above $10,000 are rounded to the nearest $1,000; results below $10,000 but above $1,000 are rounded to the nearest $100; and results below $1,000 are rounded to the nearest $10.
  We seek comment on these amounts, which are specified in the Attachment A file on the Auction 115 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/115.  If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts would result in many unsold licenses, an excessive number of rounds at very low prices, or otherwise are not reasonable, they should explain why and propose alternative amounts.  
58. In establishing minimum opening bid amounts, we particularly seek comment on factors that reasonably could have an impact on bidders’ valuation of the spectrum, including the type of service offered, measures of market size, population covered by a provider’s network plan, prices of comparable spectrum, and any other relevant factors.  Commenters should support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested amounts or formulas for opening prices.  Further, if commenters believe that the minimum opening bids are too high, they should address appropriate measures to manage the pace of the auction so that there would not be an excessive number of bidding rounds at very low prices.  
b. Clock Price Increments
59. Under our proposed clock phase procedures for Auction 115, after bidding in the first round and before each subsequent round, the bidding system would announce, for each product, the start-of-round price A product’s start-of-round price is equal to the product’s posted price in the previous round.  
 and the clock price for the upcoming round—that is, the lowest per block price and the highest per block price at which bidders can specify the number of blocks they demand during the round.  After Round 1, the bidding system can accept bids for a round at prices that are between the start-of-round price and the round’s clock price, as described further in Sections V.A.6.c. (Bid Types) and V.A.6.d. (Intra-Round Bids).  
60. A product’s start-of-round price would depend upon aggregate demand for the product in the previous round.  If aggregate demand for blocks in a product exceeded the supply of blocks in the previous round, then the start-of-round price for the upcoming round would be equal to the clock price of the previous round.  If aggregate demand for a product equaled supply at a price in the previous round, then the start-of-round price for the upcoming round would be equal to the price at which demand equaled supply.  If aggregate demand for a product was less than supply in the previous round, then the start-of-round price for the upcoming round would be equal to the start-of-round price of the previous round.  
61. A product’s clock price for a round would be set by adding a percentage increment to the start-of-round price. For example, if the start-of-round price for a block in a given product is $10,000, and the percentage increment is 10%, then the clock price for the round will be $11,000.  The result of the clock price calculation will be rounded up to the nearest $1,000 for results above $10,000; rounded up to the nearest $100 for results below $10,000 but above $1,000; and rounded up to the nearest $10 for results below $1,000. 
  As in most previous FCC clock auctions, we propose that OEA would set the initial increment percentage at 10%, and potentially would adjust the increment percentage within a range of 5% to 30% inclusive as rounds continue.  OEA would retain the discretion to cap the increment if the total dollar amount of the increment (the difference between the clock price and the start-of-round price) would exceed a certain amount.  We propose to set this cap on the increment at $50 million initially.  The proposed 5% to 30% increment range and cap would allow us to set a percentage that manages the auction pace and take into account bidders’ needs to evaluate round results and their bidding strategies.  We seek comment on this proposal. 
c. Bid Types
62. Under the clock auction format proposed for Auction 115, a bidder would be able to make only “simple” bids since there is only one category of generic blocks in each PEA.  A bid for a product specifies a quantity of a product at a price associated with the round.  A bidder that is willing to maintain its previous round’s processed demand for a product at the new clock price would bid for that quantity at the current clock price, indicating that it is willing to pay up to the clock price, if necessary, for the specified quantity.  Such a bid to maintain demand must be at the current round’s clock price.  A bidder with processed demand for a product that wishes to reduce its demand for that product would place a bid that specifies a lower quantity at a price associated with the round at which it wishes to reduce its demand.  A bidder that wishes to increase its demand for a product would place a bid that specifies a quantity and a price associated with the round, which indicates that the bidder is willing to pay up to the clock price, if necessary, for the specified quantity. A bid to increase demand indicates that the bidder is willing to buy up to the specified quantity at any price up to the clock price (regardless of the price specified in the bid).  As described in Section V.A.7.d. (Processed Demand) and in the Auction 115 Clock Phase Technical Guide, bid prices are used to determine the order in which bids are processed.
 
63. Bids to maintain demand would always be applied by the bidding system during bid processing.  Bids to increase or decrease demand would be treated as requests that are not necessarily applied during bid processing. See Section V.A.7. (Bid Processing), below, for details on bid processing.
  We seek comment on this proposal.
d. Intra-Round Bids
64. We propose that in this clock auction, in a round after the first round, a bidder would be permitted to make intra-round bids by indicating a price between the start-of-round price and the clock price at which its demand for blocks changes. For more details on intra-round bids, see the Auction 115 Clock Phase Technical Guide.
  In placing an intra-round bid for a product, a bidder would indicate a specific price and the changed quantity of blocks it demands if the price for blocks should increase beyond that price.  For example, if a bidder has processed demand of three blocks at the start-of-round price of $200, but wishes to hold only two blocks if the price increases by more than $10, the bidder will indicate a bid quantity of two at a price of $210 ($200+$10).  Similarly, if the bidder wishes to reduce its demand to zero if the price increases above $200, the bidder will indicate a bid quantity of zero at the start-of-round price of $200.
65. Intra-round bid amounts would be limited to multiples of $10 for prices below $10,000; to multiples of $100 for prices between $10,000 and $100,000, inclusive; and to multiples of $1,000 for prices above $100,000.  Limiting intra-round bid amounts to certain multiples may deter some types of anticompetitive bidding behavior.  Using intra-round bidding allows the bidding system to use relatively large clock price increments because bidders would be permitted to submit bids at prices lower than the clock prices. Intra-round bids would be optional; a bidder may choose to express its demands only at the start-of-round price or the clock price.  
  This may reduce the number of rounds in the auction without increasing the risk that a large clock price increment for a product would prevent the auction from accurately determining the market clearing price of the product, at which demand for blocks equals the supply.  We seek comment on this proposal.
e. Proxy Bids
66. Under the clock format, we propose to allow bidders to submit proxy instructions to the bidding system that, in subsequent rounds, instruct the bidding system to automatically submit proxy bids based on the proxy instructions. Proxy bids were first introduced into FCC clock auctions in Auction 108.  See Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd at 4428–29, 4438–39, paras. 176 n.366, 213–17.
  With proxy bidding, a bidder could submit a proxy instruction to the bidding system to reduce its demand for a product at a price higher than the current round’s clock price—i.e., at a price in a future round.  Proxy instructions to increase a bidder’s demand for a product at a given price would not be permitted. 
67. Under these proposed procedures, if a proxy instruction has been submitted, the bidding system would automatically submit a proxy bid to maintain the bidder’s demand for the product in every subsequent round as long as the clock price for the round is less than the proxy instruction price.  In the first round in which the clock price is greater than or equal to the proxy instruction price, the bidding system would submit a proxy bid on behalf of the bidder to reduce the bidder’s demand for that product to the quantity specified in the proxy instruction at the price specified in the proxy instruction.  For example, if a bidder has a processed demand of three blocks for a product with a start-of-round price of $900 and a clock price of $1,000, and the bidder is willing to purchase three blocks of the product for a price up to  $1,800 per block but is not willing to purchase any blocks when the price per block exceeds $1,800, the bidder could submit a proxy instruction to reduce its demand for the product to zero blocks at $1,800.  In that case, the bidding system would submit proxy bids to maintain the bidder’s demand for three blocks of the product in each subsequent round as long as the clock price is less than $1,800.  Proxy bids would be processed by the bidding system in the same way as bids submitted by the bidder in the round. 
68. A bidder may submit more than one proxy instruction for a given product as long as one of those proxy instructions is for a quantity of zero blocks.  For example, if a bidder has a processed demand of four blocks for a product with a start-of-round price of $900 and a clock price of $1,000, and the bidder is willing to purchase four blocks of the product for a price up to $3,000 per block and two blocks of the product for a price of up to $4,000 per block, the bidder could submit a proxy instruction to reduce its demand for the product to two blocks at $3,000 and another proxy instruction to further reduce its demand to zero blocks at $4,000.  
69. In the case of a product for which the bidder either submitted a bid to reduce demand to zero or a proxy instruction, for any bid to reduce demand for the product that is not applied in full during bid processing, the bidding system will automatically generate a proxy instruction at the bid price and, in the following rounds, submit proxy bids on behalf of the bidder according to that proxy instruction.  For example, suppose that the start-of-round price for a product is $10,000, the clock price is $12,000, and a bidder with processed demand of two for the product submits a bid to reduce its demand to zero at price $11,500.  If the bid is not applied during bid processing (e.g., because there was no excess demand and no other bids for the product in the round), in the following round the bidding system would submit a proxy bid on behalf of the bidder to reduce its demand for the product to zero at price $11,500.  The purpose of this system-created proxy instruction is to preserve in the bidding system the bidder’s interest in reducing its demand for the product to zero at a price of $11,500, which may help avoid having blocks of the product sold later in the auction to another bidder at a price less than the $11,500 that the initial bidder was willing to pay.
70. In any round, a bidder can remove or modify any existing proxy instructions or proxy bids for the round by resubmitting its bids (through the user interface or file upload), including the modifications, which would replace any bids and proxy instructions previously submitted.  The bidding system would take the last bid submission as that bidder’s bids and proxy instructions. 
71. As is the case for intra-round bid amounts, proxy instruction prices would be limited to multiples of $10 for prices below $10,000; to multiples of $100 for prices between $10,000 and $100,000, inclusive; and to multiples of $1,000 for prices above $100,000.  Proxy instructions would not be publicly released either during or after the auction.  
72. We seek comment on the proposed procedures for proxy bids.
f. Missing Bids  
73. Under the proposed clock auction format, for every product for which a bidder has processed demand at the end of a round, a bidder would be required to submit a bid in the next round or have a proxy instruction in place, even if its demands at the new round’s prices are unchanged.  If a bidder does not submit bids in the current round for all of the products for which it had processed demand in the previous round and does not have proxy instructions in place, the bidding system would consider those products to have missing bids.  
74. Missing bids would be treated by the bidding system as requests to reduce the bidder’s demand to zero at the start-of-round prices for the products with missing bids.  If these requests are applied, even if applied partially, See Section V.A.7.c. (Partial Application of Bids), below.
 then a bidder’s activity, and its bidding eligibility for the next round, may be reduced.  A bidder can avoid having missing bids by either indicating its demand in every round or by entering appropriate proxy instructions.  We seek comment on this proposal.  
7. Bid Processing
75. We propose that after each bidding round under the proposed clock auction format, bids would be processed according to the bid processing procedures described below to determine the processed demand of each bidder for each product and the posted price for each product.  The posted price would serve as the start-of-round price for the next round.  We seek comment on the full bid processing procedures for Auction 115 proposed in detail below.  
a. No Excess Supply Rule for Bids to Reduce Demand 
76. Bidding would be subject to a “no excess supply” rule, wherein the bidding system would not allow a bidder to reduce the quantity of blocks it demands for a product if the reduction would cause aggregate demand to fall below, or be less than, the supply of blocks in the product, which would create excess supply.  Therefore, if a bidder has processed demand for a product in the previous round, and submits a bid to reduce the number of blocks if the price should increase above the price in its bid, the bidding system would treat the bid as a request to reduce demand that would be applied only if applying the bid would not result in, or further increase, excess supply. Note, however, if a bid to reduce demand is not applied, the bidder will not be asked to pay more for the block than the highest price it agreed to pay.  See Section V.A.7.e. (Price Determination), below.
  
b. Eligibility Rule for Bids to Increase Demand
77. The bidding system would not allow a bidder in Auction 115 to increase the quantity of blocks it demands for a product if the total number of bidding units associated with the bidder’s demand would exceed the bidder’s bidding eligibility for the round.  Therefore, if a bidder submits a bid to increase the number of blocks for which it has processed demand as of the previous round, the bidding system would treat the bid as a request to increase demand that would be applied only if that would not cause the bidder’s processed activity to exceed its eligibility.
c. Partial Application of Bids
78. A bid that involves a reduction from the bidder’s previous demands could be applied partially—that is, reduced by fewer blocks than requested in the bid—if excess demand is insufficient to support the entire reduction.  Accordingly, the bidding system would apply a bidder’s request to reduce demand as much as possible consistent with the no excess supply rule.  A bid to increase a bidder’s demand could be applied partially if the total number of bidding units associated with the bidder’s demand exceeds the bidder’s bidding eligibility for the round.  Therefore, the bidding system would accommodate a bidder’s request to increase demand as much as possible as long as the bidder’s activity does not exceed its eligibility.
d. Processed Demand
79. After a round ends, the bidding system would first consider and apply all bids to maintain processed demand at the clock price.  Bids to maintain a bidder’s processed demand at the clock price would always be applied.  Then the bidding system would process bids to change demand in order of price point, and by pseudo-random number in the case of tied price points, where the price point represents the percentage of the bidding interval for the round.  For example, if the start-of-round price is $1,200 and the clock price is $1,300, a bid at $1,230 is at the 30% price point (30% of the $100 bidding interval for the round).
80. To process bids to change demand, the bidding system would consider bids at the lowest price point across all products, then look at bids at the next price point across all products, and continue in ascending order up to bids to change demand at the clock price.  To determine whether a bidder’s request to reduce demand for a product can be applied, the bidding system would determine whether there is excess demand for that product at that point in the processing.  To determine whether a request to increase demand can be applied, the bidding system would evaluate the activity associated with the bidder’s processed demands at that point in the bid processing.  If a bid for a product can be applied fully or partially at that point in the processing, the bidding system would recalculate the number of blocks that the bidder holds in processed demand, the aggregate demand for the product, and the bidder’s processed activity.
81. If a bid to change demand could not be applied in full at the price point indicated in the bid, e.g., because demand would fall below supply or because the bidder’s processed activity would exceed its eligibility, the unfulfilled bid, or portion thereof, would be held in a queue and reconsidered, again in price point order, if later in the processing (after other bids are processed) there should be excess demand for that product or if the bidder’s processed activity is sufficiently reduced below its eligibility.  This process of reconsidering unfulfilled bids held in the queue in ascending order of original price point repeats iteratively, with the reconsidered bids being applied (fully, partially, or not at all) and then products’ aggregate demand and bidders’ processed demand and activity being recalculated.  The bid processing ends when no further bids remaining in the queue can be applied.  The bidding system would not carry over unfulfilled bid requests to the next round, except for generating proxy instructions as described above. See para. 69, above, and the Auction 115 Clock Phase Technical Guide.
  The bidding system would advise bidders of the status of their bids when round results are released.
e. Price Determination
82. During bid processing, the bidding system also would determine, based on aggregate demand, the posted per-block price for each product for the round, which would serve as the start-of-round price for the next round.  The start-of-round price for a block in a product would increase across rounds if there is excess demand for blocks in the product.  
83. Specifically, if, at the end of a round, the aggregate demand for blocks in a product exceeds the supply of blocks, the posted price for the round would equal the clock price.  If a reduction in demand was applied during the round that caused demand for the product to equal supply, the posted price would be the price at which the reduction was applied.  If aggregate demand is less than or equal to supply and no bid to reduce demand was applied for the product, then the posted price would equal the start-of-round price for the round.  The range of acceptable bid amounts for the next round would be set by adding the percentage increment to the posted price.
84. Under these procedures, when a bid to reduce demand cannot be fully applied, the bidder would not face a price that is higher than its bid price.  Specifically, if a bid to reduce demand cannot be fully applied, it must be the case that there is no excess demand for the product at the bid price and, therefore, the posted price would not be higher than that price.  
85. After each round of bid processing, each bidder would be informed of its processed demands, its processed activity, and the aggregate demand for each product.  If the stopping rule has not been met, the bidding system would announce clock prices to determine the range of acceptable bids for the next round.
f. Winning Bids in the Clock Phase
86. A bidder with processed demand for a product at the time the stopping rule is met would become the winning bidder of licenses corresponding to that number of blocks and would be assigned specific frequencies in the assignment phase.  The final clock phase price for a generic block in a product would be the posted price of the final round. Additional discussion of bid processing appears in the Auction 115 Clock Phase Technical Guide.

B. Assignment Phase
87. Following the conclusion of the clock phase, we propose to conduct an assignment phase that determines specific frequency assignments for the generic blocks won in the clock phase.  The assignment phase would proceed in a series of single-round sealed-bid bidding rounds, where clock phase winning bidders may submit bids to indicate their preferences for specific frequency licenses corresponding to the generic blocks they won in the clock phase.  A clock phase bidder that won multiple blocks in a PEA would be assigned contiguous blocks in that PEA regardless of whether it participates in the assignment phase.  Therefore, in the assignment phase, winning bidders in the clock phase bid for the specific frequencies they might prefer for the contiguous blocks that they will be assigned.
1. Sequencing and Grouping of PEAs
88. We propose to sequence assignment rounds to make it easier for bidders to incorporate frequency assignments from previously assigned areas into their bid preferences for other areas, recognizing that bidders winning multiple blocks of licenses generally will prefer contiguous blocks across adjacent PEAs.  To that end, we propose to conduct rounds for the largest markets first to enable bidders to establish a “footprint” from which to work.  Specifically, we propose that the assignment phase begin with a separate assignment round for each of the top 20 PEAs, and to sequentially order these twenty assignment rounds by descending order of PEA population. In Auctions 103, 107, and 110, to reduce the duration of the assignment phase without adversely affecting bidders, we conducted sequential rounds for the top 20 PEAs and included PEAs 21–40 in the simultaneous REAG assignment rounds.  See Auction 103 Procedures Public Notice, 34 FCC Rcd at 5596–97, paras. 221–24; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8463–64, paras. 206–09; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9336–37, paras. 232–37.  Compare Broadcast Incentive Auction Scheduled to Begin on March 29, 2016; Procedures for Competitive Bidding in Auction 1000, Including Initial Clearing Target Determination, Qualifying to Bid, and Bidding in Auctions 1001 (Reverse) and 1002 (Forward), AU Docket No. 14-252, GN Docket No. 12-268, WT Docket No. 12-269, and MB Docket No. 15-146, Public Notice, 30 FCC Rcd 8975, 9087–88, paras. 242–43 & n.702 (conducted sequential rounds for the top 40 PEAs and allowed those PEAs to be grouped together, when feasible); Auctions 101 and 102 Procedures Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 7656, paras. 270–73 (conducted sequential rounds for the top 40 PEAs).     
  
89. Once the top 20 PEAs have been assigned, we propose to conduct, for each of the six Regional Economic Area Groupings (REAGs), The six REAGs are:  Northeast, Southeast, Great Lakes, Mississippi Valley, Central, and West.
 a series of assignment rounds for the remaining PEAs within each region.  We propose to conduct the bidding for the six REAGs in parallel in order to reduce the total amount of time required to complete the assignment phase.  To help maximize contiguity across PEAs, we further propose that, where feasible, multiple PEAs will be grouped together if they: Such a group of PEAs is referred to as an “assignment phase market” in the Auction 115 Assignment Phase Technical Guide.
  (1) are located in the same REAG; (2) are outside the top20 PEAs; and (3) include the same bidders winning the same number of blocks.  In addition, all PEAs in the group must either be uniformly subject to, or not subject to, the small market bidding credit cap.  We would sequence the assignment rounds within a REAG in descending order of population for a PEA group or individual PEA.  
90. We seek comment on these proposals.  
2. Acceptable Bids and Bid Processing
91. Under our proposal, in each assignment round, a bidder will be asked to assign a price to one or more possible frequency assignments for which it wishes to express a preference, consistent with the generic blocks it won in the clock phase.  The price will represent a maximum payment that the bidder is willing to pay, in addition to the clock phase price for the generic blocks, for the frequency-specific license or licenses in its bid.
92. We propose to use an optimization approach to determine the winning frequency assignment for each PEA or PEA group.  We propose that the bidding system will select the assignment that maximizes the sum of bid amounts among all assignments that satisfy the contiguity requirements, that is, where every winning bidder is assigned contiguous spectrum in the PEA or PEA group. Furthermore, if multiple blocks in a PEA remain unsold, the unsold licenses will be contiguous.  
  We propose that the additional price a bidder will pay for a specific frequency assignment (above the clock phase price) will be calculated consistent with a generalized “second price” approach—that is, the winner will pay a price that would be just sufficient to result in the bidder receiving that same winning frequency assignment while ensuring that no group of bidders is willing to pay more for an alternative assignment that satisfies the contiguity requirements. The Auction 115 Assignment Phase Technical Guide provides mathematical details of this proposal.
  This price will be less than or equal to the price the bidder indicated it was willing to pay for the assignment.  We propose to determine prices in this way because it simplifies bidders’ bidding strategies, incentivizing them to bid their full value for the assignment, knowing that if the assignment is selected, they will pay no more than would be necessary to ensure that the outcome is competitive. We propose to determine prices using the Vickrey-nearest approach, which is described in the Auction 115 Assignment Phase Technical Guide.  

93. We seek comment on these proposed procedures.
VI. TUTORIALS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR APPLICANTS
94. We intend to provide additional information on the bidding system and to offer demonstrations and other educational opportunities for applicants in Auction 115 to familiarize themselves with the FCC auction application system and the bidding system.  For example, we intend to release online tutorials that will help applicants understand the procedures to be followed in the filing of their auction short-form applications (FCC Form 175) and on the bidding procedures for Auction 115, as well as technical guides that supplement the information in this Public Notice and provide the mathematical details and algorithms of the procedures described herein. See para. 36, above.  Additionally, we will make available an FCC Auctions Hotline to provide access to Commission staff for information about the auction process and procedures, and an FCC Auctions Technical Support Hotline to provide technical assistance to applicants, including small business entities, on issues such as access to or navigation within the short-form application and use of the bidding system.

VII. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis 
95. This document seeks comment on proposed requirements that may result in new or modified information collection requirements.  The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the information collection requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–21.
  In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Id. § 3506(c)(4).
 we seek specific comment on how we might further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
B. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
96. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996). 
 the Commission prepared Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analyses (IRFAs) in connection with the Upper C-band NPRM, Upper C-band (3.98–4.2 GHz), GN Docket No. 25-59, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 40 FCC Rcd 9462, 9512–23, Appx. (2025) (Upper C-band NPRM).
 and other Commission notices of proposed rulemaking pursuant to which Auction 115 will be conducted. See Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act and Modernization of the Commission’s Competitive Bidding Rules and Procedures, WT Docket No. 05-211, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 20 FCC Rcd 11268, 11301–07, Appx. B (2005); Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission’s Rules – Competitive Bidding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97-82, Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 12 FCC Rcd 5686, 5749–53, Appx. C (1997) (Part 1 Order Notice); Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act – Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 8 FCC Rcd 7635, 7666, Appx. (1993) (Competitive Bidding Notice).
  Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses (FRFAs) likewise were prepared in the Upper C-band Report and Order Upper C-band Report and Order at 119–34, Appx. B.
 and other Commission rulemaking orders pursuant to which Auction 115 will be conducted. CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd at 927–34, Appx. C; Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission’s Rules—Competitive Bidding Procedures, et al., WT Docket No. 97-82 and ET Docket No. 94-32, Third Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 13 FCC Rcd 374, 492–503, Appx. B (1997) (Part 1 Third Report and Order); Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2400, paras. 299–302.
  OEA and WTB have prepared this IRFA of the procedures proposed in this Public Notice, assessing the possible significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.  The Commission requests written public comments on this IRFA.  Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments specified on the first page of this Public Notice.  The Commission will send a copy of this Public Notice, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for the Small Business Administration (SBA) Office of Advocacy. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a).
  In addition, this Public Notice (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register. Id.
  
1. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Procedures  
97. If adopted, the proposed procedures for conducting Auction 115 as described in this Public Notice would constitute the more specific implementation of the competitive bidding rules contemplated by parts 1 and 27 of the Commission’s rules, which were adopted by the Commission in multiple notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings, See the decisions cited in notes 102–05, above, for a list of the relevant decisions that adopted the competitive bidding rules.
 including the delegation of authority to establish additional procedures to be adopted prior to a spectrum license auction.  This Public Notice seeks comment on proposed procedures, terms, and conditions governing Auction 115, including the minimum opening bid amounts for the generic blocks in a PEA, and is fully consistent with the underlying rulemaking orders, including the Upper C-band Report and Order and other relevant competitive bidding orders.  
98. The Commission is offering licenses in Auction 115 pursuant to its statutory mandate to grant spectrum licenses in the Upper C-band through a system of competitive bidding, and to complete competitive bidding for such licenses within two years. Pub. L. No. 119-21, § 40002(b)(2).
  Auction 115 will offer 160 megahertz of spectrum in the 3.98–4.14 GHz portion of the Upper C-band licensed on an unpaired basis in eight 20-megahertz blocks by PEA in the contiguous states and the District of Columbia (PEAs 1–41, 43–211, 213–263, 265–297, 299–359, and 361–411). Upper C-band Report and Order at 27–28, paras. 53–54, 56.
  
99. This Public Notice also provides notice to Auction 115 applicants, some of which are small entities, of proposed auction procedures and provides adequate time for applicants to comment on proposed procedures. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(E)(i) (requiring the Commission to seek comment on proposed auction procedures). 
  To promote the efficient and fair administration of the competitive bidding process for all Auction 115 participants, this Public Notice seeks comment on the following proposed procedures: 
· A requirement that any applicant seeking to participate in Auction 115 certify in its short-form application, under penalty of perjury, that it has read the public notice adopting procedures for Auction 115 that will be released in advance of the short-form application deadline, and that it has familiarized itself with those procedures and the requirements for obtaining a license and operating facilities in the 3.98–4.14 GHz portion of the Upper C-band;
· Establishment of bidding credit caps for eligible small businesses and rural service providers in Auction 115;
· A specific upfront payment amount for a generic block of each product available in Auction 115;
· Establishment of a bidder’s initial bidding eligibility in bidding units based on that bidder’s upfront payment through assignment of a specific number of bidding units for each generic block;
· The ability of OEA, in conjunction with WTB, to exercise its discretion to delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 115 for any reason that affects the ability of the competitive bidding process to be conducted fairly and efficiently; 
· Establishment of an additional default payment of 15% under section 1.2104(g)(2) of the rules in the event that a winning bidder defaults or is disqualified after the auction;
· Use of anonymous bidding/limited information procedures under which the Commission will not make public until after the bidding has closed:  (1) PEAs that an applicant selects for bidding in its short-form application (FCC Form 175); (2) the amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant for Auction 115; (3) any applicant’s bidding eligibility; and (4) any other bidding-related information that might reveal the identity of the bidder placing a bid;
· Designation of AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon as nationwide providers for the purpose of implementing the Commission’s competitive bidding rules in Auction 115;
· Use of a clock auction format for Auction 115, under which each qualified bidder will indicate in successive clock bidding rounds its demands for generic blocks in specific geographic areas at the prices associated with the rounds;
· Retention by OEA of discretion to adjust the bidding schedule in order to manage the pace of Auction 115;
· Use of a simultaneous stopping rule for Auction 115, under which all blocks in all PEAs would remain available for bidding until the bidding stops in every PEA;
· Use of an activity rule that would require bidders to be active on between 90% and 100% of their bidding eligibility in all clock rounds, with the initial activity requirement percentage set at 95% and with OEA retaining discretion to change the activity requirement percentage during the auction;
· A specific minimum opening bid amount for a generic block of each product available in Auction 115;
· Establishment of acceptable bid amounts, including clock price increments and intra-round prices;   
· Permitting each bidder to place bids that indicate its desired quantity of blocks for a product at the prices associated with the round;
· Permitting a bidder to submit a proxy instruction to request a reduction in its demand for a product at a price higher than the current round’s clock price for Auction 115;
· A requirement that bidders indicate their demands in every round or submit appropriate proxy instructions, even if their demands at the new round’s prices are unchanged from the previous round, and the treatment of bids to reduce demand as a request to reduce demand for the product;  
· A methodology for processing bids and requests to reduce and increase demand; and
· Establishment of an assignment phase that will determine which frequency-specific licenses will be won by the winning bidders of generic blocks during the clock phase.
2. Legal Basis
100. The Commission’s statutory obligations to small businesses participating in a spectrum license auction under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, are found in sections 309(j)(3)(B) and 309(j)(4)(D). 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(j)(3)(B), 309(j)(4)(D).
  The statutory basis for the Commission’s competitive bidding rules is found in various provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, including 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 301, 303(e), 303(f), 303(r), 304, 307, and 309(j).  The Commission has established a framework of competitive bidding rules pursuant to which it has conducted auctions since the inception of the auctions program in 1994 and would conduct Auction 115. See generally 47 CFR §§ 1.2101–1.2114.  In promulgating those rules, the Commission conducted numerous RFA analyses to consider the possible impact of those rules on small entities that might seek to participate in Commission auctions.  See, e.g., Competitive Bidding Notice, 8 FCC Rcd at 7666, Appx.; Part 1 Order Notice, 12 FCC Rcd at 5749–53, Appx. C; Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7613–28, Appx. B.  In addition, a FRFA was included in the concurrent rulemaking order that adopts rule provisions relevant to this Public Notice.  See Upper C-band Report and Order at 119–34, Appx. B.
  The Commission has directed that OEA and WTB, under delegated authority, seek comment on a variety of auction-specific procedures prior to the start of bidding in each auction. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(E)(i), (j)(4)(F); 47 CFR § 1.2104(c)–(g), (i); Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 447–49, paras. 123–25.  See also generally Part 1 Order Notice, 12 FCC Rcd at 5697–98, para. 16.
   
3. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Proposed Rules Will Apply  
101. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be affected by the proposed rules and policies, if adopted. 5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(3).
  The RFA generally defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” “small organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.” Id. § 601(6).
  In addition, the term “small business” has the same meaning as the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act. Id. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of “small business concern” in the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632).  Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies “unless an agency, after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity for public comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of the agency and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.”
  A “small business concern” is one which:  (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA. 15 U.S.C. § 632.
  The SBA establishes small business size standards that agencies are required to use when promulgating regulations relating to small businesses; agencies may establish alternative size standards for use in such programs, but must consult and obtain approval from SBA before doing so. 13 CFR § 121.903.

102. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that are not easily categorized at present.  We therefore describe three broad groups of small entities that could be directly affected by our actions. 5 U.S.C. § 601(3)–(6).
  In general, a small business is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees. See SBA, Office of Advocacy, Frequently Asked Questions About Small Business (July 23, 2024), https://advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Frequently-Asked-Questions-About-Small-Business_2024-508.pdf.
  These types of small businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 34.75 million businesses. Id.
  Next, “small organizations” are not-for-profit enterprises that are independently owned and operated and not dominant in their field. 5 U.S.C. § 601(4).
  While we do not have data regarding the number of non-profits that meet that criteria, over 99% of nonprofits have fewer than 500 employees. See SBA, Office of Advocacy, Small Business Facts, Spotlight on Nonprofits (July 2019), https://advocacy.sba.gov/2019/07/25/small-business-facts-spotlight-on-nonprofits/.  
  Finally, “small governmental jurisdictions” are defined as cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special districts with populations of less than fifty thousand. 5 U.S.C. § 601(5).
  Based on the 2022 U.S. Census of Governments data, we estimate that at least 48,724 out of 90,835 local government jurisdictions have a population of less than 50,000. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Census of Governments –Organization, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2022/econ/gus/2022-governments.html, tables 1–11.  
  
103. The proposed procedures in this Public Notice will apply to small entities in the industries identified in the chart below by their six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) NAICS is the standard used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy.  See www.census.gov/NAICS for further details regarding the NAICS codes identified in this chart.
 codes and corresponding SBA size standard. The size standards in this chart are set forth in 13 CFR 121.201, by six-digit NAICS code.
  Based on currently available U.S. Census data regarding the estimated number of small firms in the identified industries, we conclude that the proposed procedures could impact a substantial number of small entities.  Where available, we also provide additional information regarding the number of potentially affected entities in the industries identified below.
Table 1.  2022 U.S. Census Bureau Data by NAICS Code
Regulated Industry (Footnotes specify potentially affected entities within a regulated industry where applicable)
NAICS Code

SBA Size Standard

Total Firms U.S. Census Bureau, “Selected Sectors: Employment Size of Firms for the U.S.: 2022.” Economic Census, ECN Core Statistics Economic Census: Establishment and Firm Size Statistics for the U.S., Table EC2200SIZEEMPFIRM, 2025, “Selected Sectors: Sales, Value of Shipments, or Revenue Size of Firms for the U.S.: 2022.” Economic Census, ECN Core Statistics Economic Census: Establishment and Firm Size Statistics for the U.S., Table EC2200SIZEREVFIRM, 2025.

Total Small Firms Id. 

% Small Firms
Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) Affected Entities in this industry include Wireless Broadband Internet Access Service Providers, Wireless Carriers and Service Providers, Wireless Communications Services, and Wireless Telephony.  
 
517112
1,500 employees
1,184
1,081
91.30%
Satellite Telecommunications Affected Entities in this industry include Fixed Satellite Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) Systems and Mobile Satellite Earth Stations. 

517410
$44 million
332
195
58.73%

Table 2.  Telecommunications Service Provider Data
2025 Universal Service Monitoring Report Telecommunications Service Provider Data Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Universal Service Monitoring Report at 25, Table 1.12 (2025), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-418505A1.pdf.

(Data as of December 2024)
SBA Size Standard
(1500 Employees)

Affected Entity
Total # FCC Form 499A Filers
Small Firms
% Small Entities
Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) Affected Entities in this industry include all reporting wireless carriers and service providers.
 
608
522
85.86
Wireless Telephony Affected Entities in this industry include Cellular/PCS/SMR - Specialized Mobile Radio Licensees and SMR (Dispatch).

336
262
77.98

4. Description of Economic Impact and Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements for Small Entities  
104. The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact of its proposed rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance requirements, including an estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a), (b)(4).

105. In this Public Notice, OEA and WTB do not propose any new reporting, recordkeeping, or other compliance requirements for small entities or other auction applicants.  Moreover, the auction application process is designed to minimize reporting and compliance requirements for applicants, some of which are small entities.  In the first part of the Commission’s two-phased auction application process, parties desiring to participate in an auction file streamlined, short-form applications in which they certify their qualifications under penalty of perjury. Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2376–77, paras. 163–66.
  A party’s eligibility to participate in bidding is based on an applicant’s short-form application and certifications, as well as its upfront payment.  In the second phase of the auction process, there are additional compliance requirements for winning bidders.  Thus, a small business that fails to become a winning bidder does not need to file a long-form application and provide the additional showings and more detailed demonstrations required of a winning bidder.  This approach will particularly benefit small entities that seek to participate in the auction because it avoids imposing on an auction applicant/bidder that does not ultimately become a winning bidder the burden of submitting this additional information.
106. At this time, we do not expect the processes and procedures proposed in this Public Notice will require small entities to hire attorneys, engineers, consultants, or other professionals to participate in Auction 115 and comply with the procedures we ultimately adopt because of the information, resources, and guidance we make available to potential and actual auction participants at no cost.  For example, we intend to release an online tutorial that will help applicants understand the procedures for filing the short-form application (FCC Form 175).  We also intend to make information on the bidding system available and offer demonstrations and other educational opportunities for applicants in Auction 115 to familiarize themselves with the FCC auction application system and the bidding system.  By providing these resources, as well as the resources discussed below, we expect small entities that use the available resources to experience lower participation and compliance costs.  Nevertheless, while we cannot quantify the cost of compliance with the rules and proposed procedures, we do not believe that the costs of compliance will unduly burden small entities that choose to participate in the auction because the proposals for Auction 115 are similar in many respects to the procedures in recent auctions conducted by the Commission. See generally, e.g., Auction 105 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 2146–205, paras. 14–231; Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd at 8409–71, paras. 13–240; Auction 110 Procedures Public Notice, 36 FCC Rcd at 9279–9344, paras. 15–267; Auction 108 Procedures Public Notice, 37 FCC Rcd 4381–446, paras. 24–252; Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, 40 FCC Rcd at 10108–73, paras. 21–246.
  
5. Discussion of Significant Alternatives Considered That Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities  
107. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of any significant alternatives to the proposed rules that would accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes, and minimize any significant economic impact on small entities. 5 U.S.C. § 603(c).
  The discussion is required to include alternatives such as:  “(1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small entities.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 603(c)(1)–(4).
 
108.  In this Public Notice, OEA and WTB set forth proposals to facilitate participation in Auction 115 that result in both operational and administrative cost savings for small entities and other auction participants.  For example, given the numerous resources that will be made available from the Commission at no cost to potential applicants and bidders, the processes and procedures proposed in this Public Notice should result in minimal economic impact on small entities.  Prior to the start of bidding, the Commission will hold a mock auction to allow qualified bidders the opportunity to familiarize themselves with both the bidding processes and systems that will be used in Auction 115.  During the auction, participants will be able to access and participate in bidding via the Internet using a web-based system, or telephonically, providing two cost-effective methods of participation and avoiding the cost of travel for in-person participation.  Further, small entities as well as other auction participants will be able to avail themselves of a telephone hotline for assistance with auction processes and procedures, as well as a telephone technical support hotline to assist with issues such as access to or navigation within the short-form application and use of the FCC’s auction system.  All auction participants, including small business entities, will also have access to various other sources of information and databases through the Commission that will aid in both their understanding of and participation in the process.  These mechanisms are made available to facilitate participation by all qualified bidders and may result in significant cost savings for small business entities that utilize these mechanisms.  Alternatively, we will continue to consider additional ways to assist small entities, many of which have limited resources, in their efforts to participate more efficiently in Auction 115 and seek comment on such proposals.  These steps, coupled with the advanced description of the bidding procedures, should ensure that the auction will be administered efficiently and fairly, thus providing certainty for small entities.
109. Lastly, in this Public Notice, we seek to promote opportunities and reduce economic barriers to entry for small entities wishing to grow their businesses through the auction process.  In keeping with these objectives, for Auction 115, we propose a $25 million cap on the total amount of bidding credits that may be awarded to an eligible small business and a $10 million cap on the total amount of bidding credits that may be awarded to a rural service provider.  In addition, we propose a $10 million cap on the overall amount of bidding credits that any winning small business bidder may apply to winning licenses in markets with a population of 500,000 or less.  Based on the technical characteristics of the Upper C-band licenses and our analysis of past auction data, we anticipate that our proposed caps will allow the majority of small businesses in each auction to take full advantage of the bidding credit program, thereby lowering the relative costs of participation for small businesses.  We seek comment on, and will consider alternatives to, the proposed cap levels in an effort to maximize small entity participation in the auction process, while minimizing potential abuse of the bidding credit program, thereby protecting its integrity.
110. To assist with the Commission’s evaluation of the economic impact on small entities that may result from the actions and alternatives that have been discussed in this proceeding, this Public Notice seeks alternative proposals, and requests information on the potential costs of such alternatives to small entities.  The Commission expects to consider more fully the economic impact on small entities following its review of comments filed in response to this Public Notice, including costs and benefits information.  The Commission’s evaluation of the comments filed in this proceeding will shape the final conclusions it reaches, the final alternatives it considers, and the actions it ultimately takes in this proceeding to minimize any significant economic impact on small entities resulting from the final procedures that are ultimately adopted.
6. Federal Rules that May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict with the Proposed Rules.  
111. None.
C. Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act 
112. Consistent with the Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act, Public Law 118‐9, a summary of this document will be available on https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings.
D. Deadlines and Filing Procedures  
113. Interested parties may file comments or reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document in AU Docket No. 26-191.  Comments may be filed using the Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS) or by filing paper copies. See Federal Communications Commission, Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 Fed. Reg. 24121 (May 1,1998).
  We strongly encourage interested parties to file comments electronically.  
· Electronic Filers:  Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS at https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs.  
· Paper Filers:  Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing.  
114. Filings in response to this Public Notice can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service.  All filings must be addressed to the Commission’s Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
·	Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission’s Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC’s mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.  All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners.  Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building.
·	Courier mail (any not sent by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
·	Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Express, and Priority mail must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
115. Email:  We also request that a copy of all comments and reply comments be submitted electronically to the following address: auction115@fcc.gov.
116. People with Disabilities:  To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer and Government Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530.
117. The proceeding this Public Notice initiates shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the Commission’s ex parte rules. 47 CFR §§ 1.1200(a), 1.1206.
  Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentations or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine Period applies).  Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentations must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation.  If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter’s written comments, memoranda, or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum.  Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte presentations are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b).  In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf).  Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission’s ex parte rules.
E. Contact Information  
118. For further information concerning this proceeding, contact the offices listed below: 
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau 

3.98–4.14 GHz legal questions:	Andrew McArdell at (202) 418-1576

3.98–4.14 GHz technical questions:	Janet Young at (202) 418-0837


Auctions Division, Office of Economics and Analytics

Auction legal questions:	Kathryn Hinton or Yasiman Montgomery at (202) 418-0660 

General auction questions:	Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2868

Office of Communications Business Opportunities  

For questions concerning small business inquiries:	(202) 418-0990


– FCC –
ATTACHMENT A
Auction 115 License Inventory
Proposed Bidding Units, Upfront Payments and Minimum Opening Bid Amounts

This page was intentionally inserted as a placeholder for Attachment A, which is available as a separate file.  This Attachment will also be made available at www.fcc.gov/auction/115.
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