



PUBLIC NOTICE

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**PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU AND OFFICE OF ENGINEERING
AND TECHNOLOGY SEEK COMMENT ON PROHIBITING THE IMPORTATION AND
MARKETING OF CERTAIN COVERED UAS AND UAS CRITICAL COMPONENTS AND
EQUIPMENT LISTED IN SECTION 1709 OF FY2025 NDAA**

PS Docket No. 26-184

Comments Due: 30 days after publication in the *Federal Register*

Introduction

By this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons” (covered equipment).¹ Such prohibitions would apply to the advertising, distribution, and sale of such equipment.² In particular, we propose to apply such prohibitions to certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025 NDAA), added to the Covered List in December 2025.³ This would encompass all covered equipment produced by Anzu Robotics, LLC (“Anzu”) and their affiliates, subsidiaries, and other partners. These prohibitions would not apply to any importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development. Moreover, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect continued use or operation of already-purchased covered

¹ Pursuant to sections 2(a) and (d) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, and sections 1.50002 and 1.50003 of the Commission’s rules, the Federal Communications Commission’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) publishes a list of communications equipment and services that have been determined by one of the sources specified in that statute to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons (covered equipment). Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-124, 133 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1609) (Secure Networks Act); 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003. For the current version of the Covered List, see Federal Communications Commission, *List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act*, <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist> (FCC Covered List). The process by which the Commission would exercise this authority was established in the *Equipment Authorization Security Second Report and Order*. See *Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program*, Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 232, 40 FCC Rcd 8430, 8451-55, paras. 40-50 (2025) (*EA Security Second R&O*); 47 CFR § 2.939(e).

² See 47 CFR § 2.803(a).

³ FCC Covered List; Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, Pub. L. No. 118-159, § 1709, 138 Stat. 1773, 2209-10 (2024) (Section 1709).

equipment. We seek comment on these proposals and the relevant factors, including national security, economic, and supply chain considerations, that would justify prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of such previously authorized covered equipment.

Background

In November 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) adopted rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List.⁴ However, the Commission did not revoke previously granted authorizations of covered equipment.⁵ In October 2025, the Commission adopted the *EA Security Second R&O*, which among other things established a procedure to limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the underlying authorization.⁶ The Commission noted that its goal was to mitigate potential national security risks associated with covered equipment in the nation's supply chain that was authorized prior to a Covered List addition under 47 U.S.C § 1601(b).⁷ The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to "institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List" and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the *EA Security Second R&O*.⁸ The Commission also gave specific directives to PSHSB and OET regarding how to analyze and implement the procedures established in the *EA Security Second R&O*.⁹

On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List.¹⁰ PSHSB also added communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA to the Covered List.¹¹ This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that such equipment and services pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.¹²

⁴ See generally *Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program; Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Competitive Bidding Program*, Report and Order, Order, and FNPRM, 37 FCC Rcd 13493, 13509-98, paras. 32-263 (2022) (*EA Security R&O and FNPRM*). The Commission explained that this proceeding builds upon the important ongoing efforts by the Commission, Congress, and the Executive Branch to take further action to protect the security of America's critical communications networks and equipment supply chains. *Id.* at 13494-95, para. 1; see also *id.* at 13497-505, 13507-08, paras. 5-23, 31.

⁵ *Id.* at 13535, para. 107.

⁶ *EA Security Second R&O*, 40 FCC Rcd at 8451-55, paras. 40-50; 47 CFR §§ 2.939(e), 2.803, 2.1204.

⁷ *EA Security Second R&O*, 40 FCC Rcd at 8447, 8451-52, paras. 32, 40.

⁸ *Id.* at 8453-54, 8455, paras. 45, 48.

⁹ *Id.* at 8452-55, paras. 42-50.

¹⁰ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components Produced Abroad, and Equipment and Services Listed In Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 25-1086 (Dec. 22, 2025) (*December 22 Public Notice*). As stated in the *December 22 Public Notice*, the definition of UAS critical components includes UAS components and any associated software. See *December 22 Public Notice*, Appendix B, National Security Determination on the Threat Posed by Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components Produced in Foreign Countries, December 21, 2025 (*December 2025 National Security Determination*). Section 1709 of FY2025 NDAA also defines communications or video surveillance services as including software. See Section 1709(a)(1)(D).

¹¹ See *December 22 Public Notice*.

¹² See *id.*

On January 7, 2026, the Commission received a subsequent National Security Determination from the Department of War (DoW) stating that certain equipment should be removed from the Covered List because it does not pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.¹³ Accordingly, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt: [UAS](#) and [UAS critical components](#) included on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) Blue UAS Cleared List until January 1, 2027; and UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "[domestic end products](#)" under the Buy American Standard (48 CFR § 25.101(a)), until January 1, 2027.

Both National Security Determinations provided that the identified UAS and UAS critical components should be included on the Covered List, unless DoW or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given UAS or class of UAS, or a specific UAS critical component, does not pose risks to U.S. national security. The FCC established a process for entities to request individual Conditional Approvals for their covered UAS and UAS critical components by submitting [the required information](#), and DoW has granted several such Conditional Approvals.¹⁴ Additionally, on June 15, 2026, based on a National Security Determination from DoW, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt "Toy Drones" as defined in the National Security Determination as well as "Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components."¹⁵ Furthermore, on July 21, 2026, we updated the Covered List to reflect a DoW determination that: (1) extended to January 1, 2028, the exemption of UAS and UAS critical components included on DoW's Blue UAS Cleared List or that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard, and (2) clarified that Conditional Approvals for foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components will not terminate on December 31, 2026, so long as the applicant complies with its approved onshoring plan and updated vetting of the products.¹⁶

On March 27, 2026, PSHSB and OET released a Public Notice seeking comment on a proposal to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of equipment that had been placed on the Covered List in 2024 or earlier but was originally authorized prior to the adoption of the Commission's 2022 equipment authorization and national security rules.¹⁷ The *March 27 Public Notice* explained that those additions to the Covered List were made pursuant to a specific national security determination made by Congress, which the Commission found constituted a "specific determination that such equipment poses an 'unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.'"¹⁸ PSHSB and OET sought comment on whether maintaining such authorizations would

¹³ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Exemption of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components from FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-22 (Jan. 7, 2026).

¹⁴ The UAS and UAS critical components that have been granted Conditional Approval are listed on the Commission's Covered List webpage: <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist>.

¹⁵ *FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces that "Toy Drones" and "Toy Drones that Contain Foreign-Produced Components" are Removed from the FCC Covered List*, WC Docket 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-588 (Jun. 15, 2026) (*Toy Drones Public Notice*).

¹⁶ *FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Extension of Conditional Approvals and Exemption of Certain Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components from FCC Covered List*, WC Docket 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-761 (Jul. 21, 2026) (*UAS Extension Public Notice*). Also, pursuant to DoW's determination, a Conditional Approval will terminate—and the device will be restored to the Covered List—if the applicant fails to adhere to the onshoring plan or if the U.S. Government discovers any false statements or misrepresentations in the application. See *UAS Extension Public Notice* at 2.

¹⁷ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Seek Comment on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier*, PS Docket No. 26-72, DA 26-294 (PSHSB/OET Mar. 27, 2026), 91 FR 17275 (Apr. 6, 2026) (*March 27 Public Notice*).

¹⁸ See *March 27 Public Notice*.

undermine the Commission's national security framework and whether prohibiting continued importation and marketing would better serve the public interest.¹⁹

On June 26, 2026, after review of the record, PSHSB and OET issued a second Public Notice summarizing the comments received, evaluating the technical, economic, and national security considerations raised by commenters, and assessing the public interest implications of the proposed prohibition.²⁰ The *June 26 Public Notice* concluded that equipment authorized before the adoption of the Commission's 2022 rules posed unacceptable risks to national security when imported or marketed in the United States.²¹ The Commission therefore determined that adoption of the prohibition was warranted and announced that the prohibition would become effective 10 days after publication in the Federal Register.²² The *June 26 Public Notice* emphasized that expedited action was necessary because a delayed but impending prohibition could incentivize importers and distributors to accelerate shipments of covered equipment into the U.S market, which is a result that is directly contrary to the purpose of the Notice.²³ Following the release of the *June 26 Public Notice*, the Commission updated its website to reflect the newly adopted prohibitions.²⁴ These prohibitions went into effect on July 16, 2026.

On July 17, 2026, PSHSB and OET released a Public Notice seeking comment on a proposal to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components, and certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, added to the Covered List in December 2025.²⁵ This encompassed all covered equipment produced by the following entities and their affiliates, subsidiaries, and other partners: Cogito Tech Company, Limited; Fikaxo Technology Inc.; Lyno Dynamics LLC; Skyhigh Tech LLC; Spatial Hover Inc; SZ Knowact Robot Technology Co., Ltd.; WaveGo Tech LLC; Xtra Technology LLC; and Guangzhou Xaircraft Technology Co. Ltd.²⁶

On May 8, 2026, the Enforcement Bureau (EB) opened an investigation and issued a Letter of Inquiry (LOI) to Anzu,²⁷ a U.S.-based UAS company, based on publicly available information that Anzu was producing certain devices listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA.²⁸ On July 9, 2026, Anzu

¹⁹ *Id.* at 3-5.

²⁰ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Prohibit the Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier*, PS Docket No. 26-72, Public Notice, DA 26-635 (Jun. 26, 2026) (*June 26 Public Notice*).

²¹ *Id.* at 3.

²² The *June 26 Public Notice* was published in the Federal Register on July 6, 2026. See Federal Communications Commission, Prohibiting Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier, 91 Fed. Reg. 41023 (July 6, 2026).

²³ *June 26 Public Notice* at 8.

²⁴ <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist>.

²⁵ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Seek Comment on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Certain Covered UAS and UAS Critical Components and Equipment Listed in Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA*, PS Docket No. 26-184, DA 26-742 (PSHSB/OET July 17, 2026), 91 FR 48108 (July 30, 2026) (*July 17 Public Notice*).

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ See Letter from Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Mark DuRei, Agent for Service of Process, Anzu Robotics LLC (May 8, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040758).

²⁸ The Washington Free Beacon, *This Chinese Drone Company Found a Workaround to Congress's Ban on Doing Business in the US—Before the Ban Is Even Passed*, (Dec. 7, 2024), <https://freebeacon.com/national-security/this-chinese-drone-company-found-a-workaround-to-congresss-ban-on-doing-business-in-the-us-before-the-ban-is-even-passed/>.

responded to the LOI in a confidential filing.²⁹ Public sources suggest that Anzu devices are produced by an entity with a technology sharing or licensing agreement with an entity named in section 1709 and thus are considered covered equipment.³⁰ Anzu's UAS and UAS controllers would also be covered equipment because they are produced in Malaysia, a foreign country.³¹ On August 3, 2026, OET temporarily deferred the grantee codes of these companies based on publicly available information that this company is producing covered equipment, which is prohibited from receiving equipment authorization.³²

Today, we initiate another proceeding to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2025.

Discussion

The Commission has legal authority to review an existing authorization for covered equipment, and to revoke such authorization pursuant to current rules.³³ Under section 2.939(a), the Commission may “revoke . . . any equipment authorization” for various reasons, including “conditions coming to the attention of the Commission which would warrant it in refusing to grant an original application.”³⁴ Likewise, under section 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET “may place limitations on an existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit continued importation or marketing” of such equipment.³⁵

Scope. Pursuant to section 2.939(e), we propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized covered equipment referenced above. We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment. Specifically, we propose to apply such prohibitions to communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA produced by Anzu, to include FCC IDS 2BBYS-RAPTOR and 2BBYS-RRC01. We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment. As stated above, public reporting indicates that this equipment is listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, because it is produced by an entity with a technology licensing or sharing agreement with an entity named in section 1709 and because the equipment is produced in a foreign country.³⁶

²⁹ See Letter from Nicholas M. DePalma, Venable LLP, to Spectrum Enforcement Division, FCC Enforcement Bureau (July 9, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040758).

³⁰ *Id.*; China Select Committee, *Letter to Commerce Department and Anzu Robotics Exposing PRC Drone Company Masquerading as U.S. Firm*, (Aug. 27, 2024), <https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/letters/letter-commerce-department-and-anzu-robotics-exposing-prc-drone-company-masquerading>; see also Just Auto, *BYD acquires stake in DJI's automotive subsidiary*, (Dec. 16, 2024), <https://www.just-auto.com/news/byd-acquires-stake-in-djis-subsidiary/>; FY2025 NDAA § 1709(a)(1)(C)(iii).

³¹ *FAQs*, Anzu Robotics, <https://www.anzurobotics.com/faq/> (last visited July 31, 2026) (“Nearly all of the components and final assembly of our drones is done in Malaysia.”).

³² See Letter from Clifford Jones, Associate Chief and Chief of the Laboratory Division, FCC Office of Engineering and Technology, to Anzu Robotics LLC, c/o Randall Warnas (Aug. 3, 2026) (on file in EB-SED-26-00040758).

³³ *EA Security R&O and FNPRM*, 37 FCC Rcd at 13537, para. 114.

³⁴ 47 CFR § 2.939(a).

³⁵ 47 CFR § 2.939(e). “OET and PSHSB will issue a public notice announcing the intent to limit the scope of equipment authorizations to prohibit the further importation or marketing of specified devices identified by class, type, or other description sufficient to identify the devices.” 47 CFR § 2.939(e)(1). “The public notice will include an assessment of the impact of the proposed prohibition with consideration of public interest factors, including: the unacceptable risks the equipment was found to pose, the economic and supply chain impacts, and any other criteria as specified by the Commission. The public notice should give particular weight to the specific determination(s), and any accompanying rules or analyses, through which the relevant equipment was added to the Covered List. 47 CFR § 2.939(e)(2).

³⁶ See *supra* n.2724.

This proposed prohibition on importation and marketing would not apply to any other already-authorized covered equipment, including UAS or UAS critical components or other communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. Furthermore, this prohibition would not apply to importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development. Finally, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect the continued use or operation of already-purchased UAS or UAS critical components that were -foreign-produced or communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA.

We seek comment on our tentative conclusions that the above-referenced equipment is covered equipment. We invite commenters to provide specific evidence in response to our tentative conclusions. Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized “covered” equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment serves the public interest.

National security impacts. We start with national security concerns, because, as the Commission noted in the *EA Security Second R&O*, “[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”³⁷ In the *EA Security Second R&O*, the Commission stated that older models of covered equipment, which are still widely sold in the U.S., pose an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed in the United States, “not only when such equipment is new to the market.”³⁸ The Commission agreed with commenters who pointed out that certain previously authorized devices that are now considered covered equipment “likely remain[] marketable in the United States” and “may present continuing national security threats.”³⁹

An Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise, including appropriate national security agencies, one of whom was the DoW,⁴⁰ specifically determined that UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries and communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA “pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons.”⁴¹ This determination of “unacceptable risks” was based on an assessment of “threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential threats to the homeland.”⁴² We believe this determination included all already-authorized covered equipment described in this Public Notice, which are communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA.⁴³ We tentatively accept this determination and “give [it] particular weight,” as the Commission directed.⁴⁴

Therefore, based on the *EA Security Second R&O* and the December 21, 2025, National Security Determination, we tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section

³⁷ *EA Security Second R&O*, 40 FCC Rcd at 8453-54, para. 45 (quoting *Haig v. Agee*, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).

³⁸ *Id.* at 8451-52, para. 40.

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ See Opposition of Department of War to Petition for Reconsideration, ET Docket Nos. 26-22 and 26-23 (filed Apr. 6, 2026).

⁴¹ *December 2025 National Security Determination* at 2, 4.

⁴² *Id.* at 2.

⁴³ See *supra*, at 2-3.

⁴⁴ *EA Security Second R&O*, 40 FCC Rcd at 8453-54, para. 45.

1709 of the FY2025 NDAA as described above is necessary to protect national security by mitigating risks to the U.S. communications sector.

Economic and supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the potential economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of the above-referenced already-authorized covered equipment. How would this proposed action affect the financial interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in the communications sector? As the Commission noted in the *EA Security Second R&O*, it may consider “countervailing economic concerns when implementing the prohibitions for already-authorized devices.”⁴⁵ What are the economic or supply chain considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide data that we should consider in our analysis.

We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have substantial economic and supply chain impacts, especially given that the devices subject to our proposed limitation appear to comprise a very small share of the market. Anzu does not appear in major industry market analyses or rankings.⁴⁶ Do commenters agree that economic and supply chain impacts are relatively minor? Could other equipment fill any gaps that may be created by this proposed prohibition? Has the Conditional Approval process provided an adequate source for trusted equipment now or in the future? Would this proposal be cost-effective for the public in terms of obtaining trusted equipment? Would providers’ compliance costs decrease as they replace covered equipment with trusted equipment? We strongly encourage commenters to supply data and other specific evidence of economic costs to this prohibition.

On the other hand, we seek comment on any economic benefits that might arise as a result of these prohibitions. We note that after the initial update to the Covered List, billions of dollars have already been raised by domestic UAS producers, creating thousands of U.S. manufacturing jobs.⁴⁷ Additionally, billions more have been committed for domestic production of UAS and UAS critical

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 8454-55, para. 46.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Hendrik Boedecker, *Drone Market Shares 2023–2025* (Aug 3, 2023), <https://droneii.com/commercial-drone-market-2023> (finding that the small UAS market is highly concentrated, with a small number of manufacturers accounting for the vast majority of sales).

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Kristen Korosec, Zipline Charts Drone Delivery Expansion with \$600M in New Funding (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://techcrunch.com/2026/01/21/zipline-charts-drone-delivery-expansion-with-600m-in-new-funding/>; BRINC Announces New Seattle Factory and Launch of Next Generation 911 Response Drone, (Mar. 24, 2026), <https://brincdrones.com/news/brinc-announces-new-seattle-factory-and-launch-of-next-generation-911-response-drone/>; Zacc Dukowitz, Flytrex to Open U.S. Factory (May 27, 2026), <https://uavcoach.com/flytrex-us-factory/>; DMR Technologies to Launch Full Scale U.S. Drone Manufacturing Facility in Lafayette (Oct. 2, 2025), <https://www.opportunitylouisiana.gov/news/dmr-technologies-to-launch-full-scale-u-s-drone-manufacturing-facility-in-lafayette>; Mike Stone, High Speed Combat Drone Production Starts at New U.S. Anduril Plant in Days, *Defense News* (Mar. 19, 2026), <https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2026/03/19/high-speed-combat-drone-production-starts-at-new-us-anduril-plant-in-days/>; Unusual Machines Expands Orlando Manufacturing Footprint to Support Battery Operations (Jun. 25, 2026), <https://www.morningstar.com/news/accesswire/1182163msn/unusual-machines-expands-orlando-manufacturing-footprint-to-support-battery-operations>; Colin Demarest, Swarm Aero Raises Series A, Plans Drone Factory (Mar. 11, 2026), <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/11/swarm-aero-series-a-drone-factory>; Ryan Finnerty, Tekever Expands into Americas with First U.S. Office (May 19, 2026), <https://www.flightglobal.com/archive/2026/05/tekever-expands-into-americas-with-first-us-office/>; Echodyne Expands Public Safety Radar Applications Through Partnership with Axon, Echodyne (May 27, 2026), <https://www.echodyne.com/newsroom/echodyne-expands-public-safety-radar-applications-through-partnership-with-axon>; Pragyan Kalita and Pritam Biswas, Zipline Soars to \$7.6 Billion Valuation as U.S. Drone Delivery Bets Grow (Jan. 20, 2026), <https://www.reuters.com/business/zipline-soars-76-billion-valuation-us-drone-delivery-bets-2026-01-20/>; Adam Bry, Skydio Series F (Apr. 23, 2026), <https://www.skydio.com/blog/skydio-series-f>; Ishveena Singh, Flytrex Drone Delivery Texas Factory, DroneDJ (May 21, 2026), <https://dronedj.com/2026/05/21/flytrex-drone-delivery-texas-factory/>; Kurt Schlosser, Drone Home: BRINC Moving to Massive New HQ and Factory in Seattle Amid Rapid Growth, *GeekWire* (Mar. 24, 2026), <https://www.geekwire.com/2026/drone-home-brinc-moving-to-massive-new-hq-and-factory-in-seattle-amid-startups-rapid-growth/>.

components, which are expected to generate additional jobs.⁴⁸ These investments include capital from domestic investors as well as foreign investors supporting U.S. manufacturing.⁴⁹ We tentatively conclude that if the proposed prohibitions of the previously authorized covered equipment subject to this Public Notice generated economic harm by noticeably reducing supply, such prohibition would spur investments in domestic production that would generate a countervailing positive economic impact. Do commenters agree? We seek comment on the economic effects of the likely investment in U.S. production that this proposed prohibition would yield.

Public interest analysis. We tentatively conclude that prohibiting the importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment subject to this Public Notice is consistent with the public interest because it protects American communications networks from devices specifically determined by an Executive Branch interagency body to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.”⁵⁰ We also tentatively conclude that there are no public interest factors that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed ban on import and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment. We seek comment on this public interest analysis. Do commenters agree that the national security benefits outweigh any negative economic or supply chain factors? Are there any other public interest considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide any information that would assist the Commission in its balancing of the need to address the national security risks posed by the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment in communications networks with the impact of the proposed prohibitions on government partners, consumers, industry, and the public at large.

Implementation

Existing authorizations. We clarify that, if this prohibition is adopted, the continued use or operation of the previously-authorized foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components, as well as the communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, that are the subject of this Public Notice and are already in the hands of users would remain authorized. This is consistent with the approach that the Commission adopted in the *EA Security Second R&O*.⁵¹ The limitation on existing authorizations would not result in the revocation of an existing authorization of

⁴⁸ See, e.g., *Skydio Commits \$3.5 Billion to Expand U.S. Manufacturing and Secure American Drone Leadership*, Skydio (Apr. 24, 2026), <https://www.skydio.com/blog/skydio-commits-usd3-5-billion-to-expand-u-s-manufacturing-and-secure-american-drone-leadership>; *Project Millennium* (Feb. 19, 2026), <https://www.neros.tech/articles/project-millennium>; *AV Partners with City of Albuquerque and State of New Mexico in Defense Manufacturing Expansion*, AeroVironment (Mar. 3, 2026), <https://www.avinc.com/2026/03/03/av-partners-with-city-of-albuquerque-and-state-of-new-mexico-in-defense-manufacturing-expansion/>; Adam Doe, *Denton City Council Seals \$870K Incentive Deal for Drone Factory in 4-3 Vote*, Community Impact (Apr. 22, 2026), <https://communityimpact.com/dallas-fort-worth/denton/business/2026/04/22/denton-city-council-seals-870k-incentive-deal-for-drone-factory-in-4-3-vote/>; *Quantum Cyber Signs LOI to Acquire U.S. Manufacturing Facility to Support Mass-Scale Autonomous Drone Production*, GlobeNewswire (June 8, 2026), <https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/06/08/3307956/0/en/quantum-cyber-signs-loi-to-acquire-an-estimated-43-000-square-foot-u-s-based-manufacturing-facility-to-support-mass-scale-autonomous-drone-production.html>.

⁴⁹ See, e.g., *Red Cat Holdings Completes Upsized Public Equity Offering*, Globe and Mail (May 19, 2026), <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/stocks/RCAT/pressreleases/2027276/red-cat-holdings-completes-up-sized-public-equity-offering/>; Erin O’Brien, *Exclusive: ORQA Launches Independent U.S. Company*, Tectonic Defense (May 5, 2026), <https://www.tectonicdefense.com/exclusive-orqa-launches-independent-us-company/>; *PDW Raises Over \$110M in Series B Financing to Expand Product Offerings, Strengthen Engineering Capabilities, and Scale Production of Modular Military Drones*, PR Newswire (Mar. 25, 2026), <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pdw-raises-over-110m-in-series-b-financing-to-expand-product-offerings-strengthen-engineering-capabilities-and-scale-production-of-modular-military-drones-302724165.html>.

⁵⁰ 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b); see also *EA Security R&O and FNPRM*, 37 FCC Rcd at 13511-13513, paras. 40-43.

⁵¹ See *EA Security Second R&O*, 40 FCC Rcd at 8455, para. 50.

covered equipment and, therefore, would not affect the continued use or operation of devices that consumers already possess.

Implementation timeline. We propose that Anzu must cease all importation and marketing activities within 30 days after publication in the Federal Register. We believe that this timeline is reasonable and strikes the appropriate balance between addressing the national security concerns and minimizing any potential adverse economic or supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the proposed timeline and invite input from responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and other interested entities. Specifically, we request that commenters address implementation considerations including the quantity of devices that have already been imported into the U.S. and are available for or being held for marketing or sale, new or recently updated device models that are en route to the U.S. or pending shipment, and devices that are subject to executed distribution, marketing, or sales agreements, but have not yet entered the supply chain.

Procedural Matters

Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR §§ 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS).

- *Electronic Filers:* Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: <https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs>.
- *Paper Filers:* Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing.
 - Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. **All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.**
 - Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building.
 - Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
 - Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
- *People with Disabilities:* To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.

The proceeding this Public Notice initiates shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose" proceeding in accordance with the Commission's *ex parte* rules.⁵² Persons making *ex parte* presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral *ex parte* presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the *ex parte*

⁵² 47 CFR §§ 1.1200 *et seq.*

presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during *ex parte* meetings are deemed to be written *ex parte* presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written *ex parte* presentations and memoranda summarizing oral *ex parte* presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's *ex parte* rules.

For further information, please contact Matthew Chai, Attorney Advisor, Operations and Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1112 or Matthew.chai@fcc.gov.