



PUBLIC NOTICE

Federal Communications Commission
45 L Street NE
Washington, DC 20554

News Media Information 202-418-0500
Internet: www.fcc.gov

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FOLLOWING NEW NATIONAL SECURITY DETERMINATION, FCC ANNOUNCES MODIFICATION OF POWER INVERTERS ENTRY ON THE COVERED LIST

WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, EA Docket No. 21-233

The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC or Commission) Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) maintains a list of equipment and services (Covered List) that have been determined to "pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons."¹ Pursuant to Section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Secure Networks Act)² and Sections 1.50002(a) and 1.50003 of the Commission's rules,³ PSHSB announces that the Department of War (DoW) has made the following determinations: First, DoW has determined that certain foreign-produced power inverters that are eligible for certain clean energy tax credits do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of U.S. persons. Second, DoW has determined that the definition of "power inverters" should be revised to accurately reflect the specific power inverters that the Executive Branch interagency body and the DoW previously determined to pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the security and safety of U.S. persons.⁴ The Commission has also updated its FAQ page accordingly.⁵

Addition of Foreign-Produced Inverters to Covered List

On July 28, 2026, PSHSB added power inverters produced in a foreign country to the Covered List.⁶ This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that

¹ Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-124, 133 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1609) (Secure Networks Act); 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003. For the current version of the Covered List, see Federal Communications Commission (FCC), *List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act*, <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist> (last updated Aug. 20, 2026).

² 47 U.S.C. § 1601.

³ 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003; see also *Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC Programs*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Second Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 14284 (2020) (*Supply Chain Second Report and Order*).

⁴ See Appendix B.

⁵ *FAQs on Recent Updates to FCC Covered List Regarding Foreign-Produced Advanced Robotic Devices and Power Inverters* (last updated Aug. 20, 2026), <https://www.fcc.gov/covered-list-faqs-robots-inverters>.

⁶ See FCC, *FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Foreign-Produced Power Inverters and Advanced Robotic Devices to FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, EA Docket No. 21-233, Public Notice, DA 26-786 (PSHSB July 28, 2026) (*July 2026 Power Inverters PN*).

power inverters produced in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons (First Power Inverter National Security Determination). In the Public Notice, we stated, “If we receive a further specific determination from DoW or DHS that a given power inverter . . . , or class of such devices, does not pose unacceptable risks, we will further update the Covered List.”⁷

Second Power Inverter National Security Determination

On August 19, 2026, the Commission received another National Security Determination from DoW that contains additional determinations in follow-up to the First Power Inverter National Security Determination.⁸

Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit. The Second Power Inverter National Security Determination has determined that “certain foreign-produced power inverters that are eligible for certain clean energy tax credits do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.”⁹ Among other things, the Second Power Inverter National Security Determination states:

“The One Big Beautiful Bill Act . . . modified and established certain conditions on access to the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit for domestic production of certain energy-related components (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45X)(section 45X).¹⁰ Specifically, section 45x(c)(1)(C) prevents any ‘eligible component’ (including certain power inverters) from including any property which includes any material assistance from a prohibited foreign entity (as defined in section 7701(a)(52)).¹¹ The United States Congress and President Trump, as part of the Trump Administration’s efforts to reshore and secure critical supply chains, through The One Big Beautiful Bill Act clearly determined that foreign-produced power inverters that comply with section 45X should be eligible for a tax credit for domestic production. Therefore, President Trump and the United States Congress determined that such power inverters should be considered domestically-produced.”¹²

As a result, DoW has “determine[d] that foreign-produced power inverters that are eligible for the section 45X tax credit do not pose the unacceptable security risks identified in the First Power Inverter National Security Determination and should be removed from the FCC’s Covered List as not ‘foreign-produced.’”¹³

⁷ *July 2026 Power Inverters PN*, at 3.

⁸ The second Power Inverters National Security Determination is attached as Appendix B to this Public Notice (*Second Power Inverter National Security Determination*).

⁹ *Second Power Inverter National Security Determination* at 1.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 1 (citing The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Pub. L. No. 119-21, 70514, 139 Stat. 72 (2025) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45X).

¹¹ *Second Power Inverter National Security Determination* at 1-2 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 45X(d)(4)(A)).

¹² *Second Power Inverter National Security Determination* at 2.

¹³ *Id.* at 2.

Type of Power Inverters Covered. In this Second Power Inverter National Security Determination, DoW has also determined that “pursuant to the First Power Inverter National Security Determination and the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1601(c)(4), that the definition of ‘power inverters’ should be revised to accurately reflect which foreign-produced power inverters the Executive Branch interagency body and the DoW have determined to pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.”¹⁴ The DoW notes that “[t]he First Power Inverter National Security Determination concerned foreign-produced power inverters that ‘[c]ontain[ed] components that enable remote communication, control, sensing, data collection, or monitoring through WiFi, cellular, Bluetooth, or other similar connection.’”¹⁵ DoW states that “the interagency body, including DoW, interpret the term ‘similar connection’ to include components with wired connectivity and understand the First Power Inverter National Security Determination to have included power inverters designed, equipped, or configured to contain these connected components.”¹⁶ DoW states that, “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, DoW determines that power inverters that contain, or are designed, equipped, or configured to accept, a component that enables remote communication, control, sensing, data-collection, or monitoring through Ethernet or other similar connections pose the same unacceptable risks described in the First Power Inverter National Security Determination as power inverters with wireless connectivity.”¹⁷ The DoW states that “[t]hese unacceptable risks include: (i) facilitating a supply chain vulnerability that could disrupt U.S. economic security, including sectors critical to national security, and (ii) creating a cybersecurity risk that threatens the security of critical infrastructure and the safety of U.S. persons.”¹⁸

Additionally, in the Second Power Inverter National Security Determination, DoW also has determined that certain classes of power inverters do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons and should be removed from the FCC’s Covered List.¹⁹ DoW states that “[t]hese classes of power inverters are those that are not electronic devices that ‘change[] dc power to ac power, to include bidirectional devices, that is intended for use in parallel with an electric utility to supply common loads and sometimes deliver power to the utility, i.e. a utility-interactive inverter as that term is defined in UL 1741 [Underwriter Laboratories Standard UL 1741, Inverters, Converters, Controllers and Interconnection System Equipment for Use with Distributed Energy Resources] sections 2.1.23, 2.1.52.’”²⁰ DoW has determined that “power inverters described in the First Power Inverter National Security Determination, but which do not meet the definition set forth in UL 1741, do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States person.”²¹ DoW additionally states that “[p]ower inverters that are incapable of connection to the utility grid (i.e., non-utility-interactive inverters) generally do not pose risk to the public utility grid” and that “[t]he risk of such power inverter systems is thus limited to local impacts which can generally be managed on a local system level and do not threaten the interconnected power system.”²²

The DoW concludes that, in light of the above determinations, that:

¹⁴ *Id.* at 1.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ *Id.* at 2 (citing First Power Inverter National Security Determination).

¹⁸ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁹ *Id.* at 3.

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.*

“the FCC should include on its Covered List only foreign-produced power inverters that are defined to be an electronic device that:

- (a) Changes dc power to ac power, to include bidirectional devices, that is intended for use in parallel with an electric utility to supply common loads and sometimes deliver power to the utility, *i.e.*, a utility-interactive inverter as that term is defined in UL 1741 sections 2.1.23, 2.1.52 and
- (b) Contains, or is designed, equipped, or configured to accept, a component that enables remote communication, control, sensing, data-collection, or monitoring through Ethernet, Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, or other similar connections, whether wired or wireless.”²³

As a result of all these determinations, DoW states that “the FCC should update the Covered List as it relates to foreign-produced power inverters and amend the definition of power inverter.”²⁴

The Covered List

We find that the Second Power Inverter National Security Determination constitutes a specific determination of an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security or safety of United States persons pursuant to section 2 of the Secure Networks Act and the First Power Inverter National Security Determination.²⁵ First, we find that the Second Power Inverter National Security Determination constitutes a specific determination that certain foreign-produced power inverters pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security or safety of United States persons pursuant to section 2 of the Secure Networks Act, *i.e.* those that “[c]ontain[], or [are] designed, equipped, or configured to accept, a component that enables remote communication, control, sensing, data-collection, or monitoring through Ethernet, Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, or other similar connections, whether wired or wireless.”²⁶ Second, we find that this constitutes a specific determination that power inverters that are eligible for the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit in 26 U.S.C. § 45X for domestic production do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security or safety of United States persons, as they should not be considered “foreign-produced.”²⁷ Therefore, we update the Covered List as follows:

“Foreign-produced power inverters, except power inverters which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS.”

²³ *Id.* at 3.

²⁴ *Id.* at 1.

²⁵ 47 U.S.C. § 1601(c); *First Power Inverter National Security Determination* at 2 (reaching a specific determination pursuant to section 2 of the Secure Networks Act about foreign-produced power inverters, “unless the Department of War or Department of Homeland Security makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given power inverter or class of power inverters do not pose such risks.”)

²⁶ *Second Power Inverter National Security Determination* at 2-3. We read the Second Power Inverter National Security Determination to both clarify the scope of the First Power Inverter National Security Determination and to constitute a new such specific determination pursuant to DoW’s authority to make specific determinations under the Secure Networks Act as an “appropriate national security agency.” *See* 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601(c)(4), 1608(2).

²⁷ *Second Power Inverter National Security Determination* at 1-2; *First Power Inverter Determination* at 2.

In making this update to the Covered List, we incorporate the definitions of “power inverters” and “foreign-produced power inverters” as stated in the Second Power Inverter National Security Determination.²⁸ Specifically, we adopt the following definitions:

- Power inverters: The term “power inverters” shall mean—
 - (a) Changes dc power to ac power, to include bidirectional devices, that is intended for use in parallel with an electric utility to supply common loads and sometimes deliver power to the utility, *i.e.*, a utility-interactive inverter as that term is defined in UL 1741 sections 2.1.23, 2.1.52; and
 - (b) Contains, or is designed, equipped, or configured to accept, a component that enables remote communication, control, sensing, data-collection, or monitoring through Ethernet, Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, or other similar connections, whether wired or wireless.
- Foreign-produced power inverters: The term “foreign-produced power inverters” shall mean power inverters as defined above that are not either—
 - (a) Eligible for the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit in 26 U.S. Code § 45X for domestic production or
 - (b) A domestic end product as defined in 48 CFR § 25.101(a) because they are manufactured in the United States and the cost of domestic components exceeds 65% of the total component cost for items delivered in calendar years 2024 through 2028 or 75% for items delivered starting in calendar year 2029.

Conditional Approvals

We reiterate that the Executive Branch interagency body has established a process in which entities producing power inverters in a foreign country can request an evaluation as to whether their devices do not pose unacceptable risks to national security and receive Conditional Approvals that would exempt the devices from the Covered List. DoW or DHS may evaluate such submissions for power inverters. Entities seeking Conditional Approvals for power inverters must provide the information requested in the [Power Inverters Guidance Document](#).

If we receive a further specific determination from DoW or DHS that a given power inverter, or class of such devices, does not pose unacceptable risks, we will further update the Covered List and release a subsequent Public Notice.

PSHSB takes this action under its authority and obligation to publish and maintain the Covered List. Sections 1.50002(a) and 1.50003 of the Commission’s rules require PSHSB to publish the Covered List on the Commission's website, to maintain and update the Covered List, and to monitor the status of

²⁸ *Second Power Inverter National Security Determination* at 4.

determinations.²⁹

Equipment Authorization Impacts of the Covered List. Under the Commission's existing rules in section 2.903(a), once added to the Covered List, "covered" equipment is prohibited from receiving equipment authorizations.³⁰ Moreover, pursuant to section 2.911 of the Commission's rules, all applications seeking equipment authorization from the Commission must certify that the equipment is not prohibited from receiving an equipment authorization by virtue of being "covered equipment."³¹ By so certifying, the applicant would be certifying that the equipment does not qualify as equipment listed in this Public Notice as "covered." We clarify that these updates will not implicate various rules and programs applicable to entities "identified" on the Covered List, because this newly-covered equipment is identified by place of production, not by entity.³²

On July 28, 2026, the Office of Engineering and Technology issued a Public Notice waiving the applicability of the prohibitions against Class I and Class II permissive changes under 47 CFR §§ 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b) to software and firmware updates that mitigate harm to U.S. consumers for "covered" power inverters and advanced robotic devices that received FCC authorization prior to the addition of those devices to the Covered List.³³ We clarify that July 28 waiver of the FCC's permissive changes rules apply to "power inverters" and "foreign-produced power inverters" under the revised definitions in the Second Power Inverter National Security Determination.

The updated Covered List is attached as Appendix A to this Public Notice and is published on the Bureau's website at <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist>.³⁴ The Second Power Inverters National Security Determination is attached as Appendix B.

We note the continued availability of FCC staff guidance pursuant to sections 0.191 and 0.31(i) of the Commission's rules. Commission staff will provide guidance to TCBs, test labs, and equipment authorization applicants on the impact of these updates.

For further information, please contact Matthew Chai, Attorney Advisor, Operations and Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau at 202-418-1112 or Matthew.Chai@fcc.gov.

²⁹ 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003. *See Supply Chain Second Report and Order*, 35 FCC Rcd at 14317, 14319, 14325, paras. 72, 77, 92.

³⁰ 47 CFR § 2.903(a).

³¹ 47 CFR § 2.911(d)(5)(i).

³² *See* 47 CFR §§ 2.903, 2.906, 2.907, 2.911, 2.929, 2.932, 2.938, 2.1033, 2.1043.

³³ *See* FCC, *Office of Engineering and Technology Announces Waiver of Prohibitions on Certain Class I and Class II Permissive Changes to Covered Foreign-Produced Advance Robotic Devices and Covered Foreign-Produced Power Inverters*, ET Docket No. 21-232, Public Notice, DA 26-789 (OET July 28, 2026).

³⁴ The FCC website also contains a list of certain affiliates and subsidiaries of entities identified on the Covered List. The list of affiliates and subsidiaries does not constitute a comprehensive list of all entities that the Commission may find, upon further examination, to qualify as relevant subsidiaries or affiliates of entities on the Covered List. Those entities, whether or not they currently provide covered communications equipment or services, are subject to the Commission's prohibitions, such as the prohibition against obtaining authorizations for covered equipment. *See Reminder: Communications Equipment And Services On The Covered List Pose An Unacceptable Risk To National Security*, National Security Advisory No. 2025-01, DA 25-927, note 3 (PSHSB Oct. 14, 2025).

APPENDIX A

COVERED LIST (Updated August 20, 2026)*†±

Covered Equipment or Services*	Date of Inclusion on Covered List
Telecommunications equipment produced or provided by Huawei Technologies Company , including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Telecommunications equipment produced or provided by ZTE Corporation , including telecommunications or video surveillance services provided or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by Hytera Communications Corporation , to the extent it is used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company , to the extent it is used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by Dahua Technology Company , to the extent it is used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Information security products, solutions, and services supplied, directly or indirectly, by AO Kaspersky Lab or any of its predecessors, successors, parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates.	March 25, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by China Mobile International USA Inc. subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	March 25, 2022
Telecommunications services provided by China Telecom (Americas) Corp. subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	March 25, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by Pacific Networks Corp. and its wholly-owned subsidiary ComNet (USA) LLC subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	September 20, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	September 20, 2022
Cybersecurity and anti-virus software produced or provided by Kaspersky Lab, Inc. or any of its successors and assignees.	July 23, 2024
Uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country ^{††} —except: (a) UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA's) Blue UAS Cleared List, until January 1, 2028, [#] (b) UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR 25.101(a) , until January 1, 2028; (c) devices which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS ; and	December 22, 2025 Updated: January 7, 2026 Updated: March 18, 2026

(d) foreign-produced “Toy Drones,” as defined in the National Security Determination , and “Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components.”	Updated: June 15, 2026
All communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in Section 1709(a)(1) of the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 118-159).	Updated: July 21, 2026
Routers [^] produced in a foreign country, except routers which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS .	March 23, 2026
International telecommunications services provided by Digitalssystem Technology Inc. , subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	July 7, 2026
Foreign-produced power inverters , [£] except power inverters which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS .	July 28, 2026
Foreign-produced advanced robotic devices , ^³ except advanced robotic devices which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW .	Updated: August 20, 2026
	July 28, 2026

*The inclusion of producers or providers of equipment or services named on this list should be read to include the subsidiaries and affiliates of such entities.

†Where equipment or services on the list are identified by category, such category should be construed to include only equipment or services capable of the functions outlined in sections 2(b)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b)(2)(A)-(C).

±The scope of the Covered List is affected by the [Conditional Approvals](#) that we have received.

††For purposes of inclusion of UAS and UAS critical components, we incorporate the definitions included in the associated [National Security Determination](#).

#The “Blue UAS list” referred to in the [National Security Determination](#) is the combination of the “Blue UAS Cleared List” at <https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/Cleared-List/> and the list of compliant UAS components and software at <https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/Framework/>. We use the term “Blue UAS Cleared List” to refer to both lists.

^For purposes of inclusion of routers, we incorporate the definitions included in the associated [National Security Determination](#).

³For purposes of inclusion of advanced robotic devices, we incorporate the definitions included in the associated [National Security Determination](#).

£For purposes of inclusion of power inverters, we incorporate the definitions included in the associated [National Security Determination](#).

APPENDIX B



INDUSTRIAL BASE POLICY

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
3011 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

SUBJECT: National Security Determination on the Threat Posed by Foreign-Produced Power Inverters

Last month, an Executive Branch interagency body, which included appropriate national security expertise, transmitted a National Security Determination regarding the threat posed by certain power inverters (First Power Inverter National Security Determination) to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).¹ Specifically, the interagency body determined that foreign-produced power inverters pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons and should be included on the FCC's Covered List, unless the Department of War (DoW) or the Department of Homeland Security makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given power inverter or class thereof does not pose such risks.²

This memorandum constitutes a specific determination by DoW, pursuant to the First Power Inverter National Security Determination, that certain foreign-produced power inverters that are eligible for certain clean energy tax credits do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons. DoW has also determined, pursuant to the First Power Inverter National Security Determination and the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1601(c)(4), that the definition of "power inverters" should be revised to accurately reflect which foreign-produced power inverters the Executive Branch interagency body and the DoW have determined pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.

As a result of these specific determinations, the FCC should update the Covered List as it relates to foreign-produced power inverters and amend the definition of power inverter.

Advanced Manufacturing Production Tax Credit

On Friday, July 4, 2025, President Trump signed The One Big Beautiful Bill Act into law, which, among other things, modified and established certain conditions on access to the Advanced Manufacturing Production Tax Credit for domestic production of certain energy-related components (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45X)(section 45X).³ Specifically, section 45x(c)(1)(C) prevents any "eligible component" (including certain power inverters) from

¹Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Foreign-Produced Power Inverters and Advanced Robotic Devices to FCC Covered List, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice DA 26-786, Appx. B (July 28, 2026) ("First Power Inverter National Security Determination").

²Id. at 2.

³The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Pub. L. No. 119-21, § 70514, 139 Stat. 72 (2025) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45X).

including any property which includes any material assistance from a prohibited foreign entity (as defined in section 7701(a)(52)). . . .”⁴

The United States Congress and President Trump, as part of the Trump Administration’s efforts to reshore and secure critical supply chains, through The One Big Beautiful Bill Act clearly determined that foreign-produced power inverters that comply with section 45X should be eligible for a tax credit for domestic production. Therefore, President Trump and the United States Congress determined that such power inverters should be considered domestically produced. For these reasons, DoW assesses that foreign-produced power inverters that are eligible for the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit in 26 U.S.C. § 45X for domestic production are not properly considered “foreign produced” and do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.

DoW therefore determines that foreign-produced power inverters that are eligible for the section 45X tax credit do not pose the unacceptable national security risks identified in the First Power Inverter National Security Determination and should be removed from the FCC’s Covered List as not “foreign-produced.”

Types of Power Inverters

A. Wired Power Inverters

The First Power Inverter National Security Determination concerned foreign-produced power inverters that “[c]ontain[ed] components that enable remote communication, control, sensing, data collection, or monitoring through Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, or other similar connection”.⁵ The interagency body, including DoW, interpret the term “similar connection” to include components with wired connectivity and understand the First Power Inverter National Security Determination to have included power inverters designed, equipped, or configured to contain these connected components.

For the avoidance of doubt, DoW determines that power inverters that contain, or are designed, equipped, or configured to accept, a component that enables remote communication, control, sensing, data-collection, or monitoring through Ethernet or other similar connections pose the same unacceptable national security risks described in the First Power Inverter National Security Determination as power inverters with wireless connectivity.⁶ These unacceptable risks include (i) facilitating a supply chain vulnerability that could disrupt U.S. economic security, including sectors critical to national security, and (ii) creating a cybersecurity risk that threatens the security of critical infrastructure and the safety of U.S. persons.⁷

B. Power Inverters Meeting the Definition of Underwriters Laboratory Standard UL 1741

⁴ 47 U.S.C. § 45X(d)(4)(A).

⁵ *Id.* at 4.

⁶ First Power Inverter National Security Determination.

⁷ *Id.* at 2.

DoW further determines that certain classes of power inverters do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons and should be removed from the FCC's Covered List.⁸ These classes of power inverters are those that are not electronic devices that "changes dc power to ac power, to include bidirectional devices, that is intended for use in parallel with an electric utility to supply common loads and sometimes deliver power to the utility, i.e. a utility-interactive inverter as that term is defined in UL 1741 [Underwriter Laboratories Standard UL 1741, Inverters, Converters, Controllers and Interconnection System Equipment for Use with Distributed Energy Resources] sections 2.1.23, 2.1.52."⁹

DoW determines that power inverters described in the First Power Inverter National Security Determination, but which do not meet the definition set forth in UL 1741, do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States person. Power inverters that are incapable of connection to the utility grid (i.e., non-utility-interactive inverters) generally do not pose risk to the public utility grid. The risk of such power inverter systems is thus limited to local impacts which can generally be managed on a local system level and do not threaten the interconnected power system.

The FCC should include on its Covered List only foreign-produced power inverters that are defined to be an electronic device that:

- (a) Changes dc power to ac power, to include bidirectional devices, that are intended for use in parallel with an electric utility to supply common loads and sometimes deliver power to the utility, *i.e.*, a utility-interactive inverter as that term is defined in UL 1741 sections 2.1.23, 2.1.52 and
- (b) Contains, or is designed, equipped, or configured to accept, a component that enables remote communication, control, sensing, data-collection, or monitoring through Ethernet, Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, or other similar connections, whether wired or wireless.



HON Michael P. Cadenazzi

Attachment:
Annex A – Definitions

⁸ *Id.* at 2.

⁹ National Electrical Code (NFPA 70), Article 100 (Definition of Inverter, Power).

Annex A – Definitions

Definitions:

For purposes of this determination:

FCC: The term “FCC” means the Federal Communications Commission.

Covered List: The term “Covered List” shall mean the list of covered communications equipment or services published on the FCC’s website pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 1601(a).

For purposes of the listing of “foreign-produced power inverters” on the FCC’s Covered List:

Power inverters: The term “power inverters” shall mean—

- (a) Changes dc power to ac power, to include bidirectional devices, that is intended for use in parallel with an electric utility to supply common loads and sometimes deliver power to the utility, *i.e.*, a utility-interactive inverter as that term is defined in UL 1741 sections 2.1.23, 2.1.52; and
- (b) Contains, or is designed, equipped, or configured to accept, a component that enables remote communication, control, sensing, data-collection, or monitoring through Ethernet, Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, or other similar connections, whether wired or wireless.

Foreign-produced power inverters: The term “foreign-produced power inverters” shall mean power inverters as defined above that are not either—

- (a) Eligible for the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit in 26 U.S. Code § 45X for domestic production or
- (b) A domestic end product as defined in 48 CFR § 25.101(a) because they are manufactured in the United States and the cost of domestic components exceeds 65% of the total component cost for items delivered in calendar years 2024 through 2028 or 75% for items delivered starting in calendar year 2029.