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NEWS

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This is an unofficial announcement of Commission action. Release of the full text of a Commission order constitutes MCI v. FCC. 515 F 2d 385 (D.C. Circ 1974).

Report No. IN 97-36

INTERNATIONAL ACTION

COMMISSION LIBERALIZES FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN THE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET (IB Docket Nos. 97-142 and 95-22)

The Commission today adopted an *Order* that will significantly increase competition in the U.S. telecommunications market by facilitating entry by foreign service providers and investors. This action will yield substantial benefits to U.S. consumers by reducing prices, providing greater service options, and spurring technological

The Commission's action underscores the U.S. leadership position in opening the global telecommunications market to competition. On February 15, 1997, the United States and 68 other countries reached a market-opening agreement that will fundamentally change the structure of the global telecommunications market. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Basic Telecom Agreement is guided by a worldwide commitment to opening markets, promoting competition, and preventing anticompetitive conduct -- principles that are also at the heart of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Under the terms of the Agreement, scheduled to take effect January 1, 1998, the world's major trading nations made binding commitments to open their telecommunications markets. In fact, the 69 nations that made commitments account for more than 90 percent of global telecommunications service revenues. Most of these countries will replace traditional regimes of restrictive policies with procompetitive and deregulatory policies. As a result, U.S. companies will be able to enter previously closed foreign markets and develop competing networks for local, long distance, and international

This *Order*, along with a companion *Order* governing access to non-U.S. licensed satellite systems, is necessary to open the U.S. market to increased competition. In light of the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement and the market-opening commitments of other WTO Members, and the Commission's improved competition policy governing U.S. international services, the Commission determined that it could replace its previous policy governing foreign entry with an open entry policy for carriers from WTO Members. With these *Orders*, the Commission has taken important steps to carry out the letter and spirit of the market-opening commitments made by the United States. As a result, more foreign carriers will soon begin to enter and compete in the U.S. market. U.S. carriers will likewise be able to enter and compete in previously closed foreign markets. In this context, the Commission emphasized that the United States will carefully review the market-opening steps taken by the res

Open Entry Policies

In 1995, the Commission adopted the effective competitive opportunities (ECO) test to govern for U.S. telecommunications market. The ECO test allowed foreign applicants to enter the U.S. markets offered effective competitive opportunities for U.S. companies.

Today's *Order* replaces the ECO test with an open entry standard for applicants from WTO Member countries. Applicants will no longer be required to demonstrate that their markets offer effective competitive opportunities in order to: (1) obtain Section 214 authority to provide international facilities-based, resold switched services; (2) receive authorization to exceed the 25 percent indirect foreign ownership benchmark in Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act for wireless licenses; or (3) receive special access licenses. The Commission also removed the equivalency test, a standard similar to the ECO test, for applicants seeking to provide switched services over private lines between the United States and WTO Member countries. Under the ECO test, the *Order* presumes that entry is procompetitive and therefore adopts streamlined procedures for most applications. The Commission recognized, however, that in some cases safeguards may not be sufficient to constrain the potential for anticompetitive harm. In such instances, the Commission reserved the right to impose additional conditions to an authorization and, in the exceptional case in which an application poses a significant threat to competition that cannot be addressed by safeguards, it reserved the right to deny the authorization.

With regard to carriers from non-WTO Members, the Commission found that circumstances have changed sufficiently in these countries to allow the Commission to remove the ECO and equivalency tests for those applicants.

Regulatory Safeguards

The Commission also revised the competitive safeguards that apply to the provision of international telecommunications services in the U.S. market. The *Order* adopts more narrowly tailored safeguards to preserve the Commission's ability to monitor and detect anticompetitive behavior in the U.S. market and to eliminate some existing rules that could hamper competition.

The Commission narrowed the existing "No Special Concessions" rule so that it only prohibits U.S. carriers from entering into exclusive arrangements with foreign carriers that have sufficient market power to adversely affect competition in the U.S. market. To provide more certainty in the market as U.S. carriers negotiate deals with their foreign counterparts, the *Order* adopts a rebuttable presumption that carriers with less than 50 percent market share in the foreign market lack such market power. U.S. carriers, therefore, may enter into exclusive deals with foreign carriers involving, for example, operating agreements and interconnection arrangements. Parties may challenge the Commission that a carrier with more than 50 percent market share on the foreign end of a route has sufficient market power to harm competition and consumers in the U.S. market, and therefore may engage in exclusive deals.

The *Order* also protects the confidentiality of U.S. carriers and consumers by prohibiting carriers from disclosing confidential carrier or U.S. customer information from a foreign carrier without appropriate U.S. carrier or customer approval.

In the August 1997 *Benchmarks Order*, the Commission conditioned foreign-affiliated carrier authorization on the carrier's agreement to provide information to the Commission regarding its competitive

provide facilities-based switched or private line services to an affiliated market on compliance with settlement rates adopted in that order. In this *Order*, the Commission declined to apply a similar order to affiliated carriers providing resold switched services to affiliated markets because the potential for harm is less in the switched resale context than for facilities-based service. In order to facilitate de facto anticompetitive conduct, however, the Commission required carriers providing switched resale services, which they have an affiliate with market power to file quarterly traffic and revenue reports.

The Commission also revised the competitive safeguards that apply to U.S. carriers classified as dominant carrier affiliation with a foreign carrier that has market power on the foreign end of an international route. The Commission adopted a single-tier dominant carrier regulatory approach and relies in large part on reporting requirements and restrictions on carriers' provision of service, to prevent affiliated carriers from causing harm to consumers in the U.S. market. In particular, the *Order* replaces the fourteen-day advance notice tariff filing requirement with a one-day advance notice requirement and accords these tariff filings a presumptive priority. It also removes the prior approval requirement for circuit additions or discontinuances on the dominant carrier. To monitor and detect anticompetitive behavior, the *Order* requires quarterly reports on traffic and revenue, provisioning and maintenance, and circuit status for the dominant route. The *Order* also requires a structural separation between U.S. carriers and their foreign affiliates. As with its No Special Conditions Order, the Commission adopted a rebuttable presumption that a foreign carrier with less than 50 percent market share in a foreign market lacks market power and, therefore, its U.S. affiliate should be presumptively treated as a dominant carrier. The Commission emphasized that, in the event of anticompetitive conduct, it may issue fines, require conditions on a grant of authority, and, if necessary, revoke an authorization.

Finally, the Commission adopted a presumption in favor of alternative settlement arrangements on the part of Members. This presumption may be rebutted with a showing that there are not multiple international competitors operating in the foreign market. Action by the Commission November 25, 1997, Report and Order on Reconsideration, (FCC 97-398). Chairman Kennard, Commissioners Ness, Furchtgott-Rothenberg, and Tristani with Chairman Kennard issuing a separate statement.

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