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 SEPARATE  STATEMENT  OF  COMMISSIONER  KATHLEEN  Q.  ABERNATHY 
 Re:  Application  of  EchoStar  Communications  Corporation  (a  Nevada  Corporation),  General  Motors  Corporation,  and  Hughes  Electronics  Corporation 
 (Delaware  Corporations)  (Transferors)  and  EchoStar  Communications  Corporation  (a  Delaware  Corporation)  (Transferee),  CS  Docket  No.  01-  348 
 (adopted  October  9,  2002). 
 I  am  unable  to  find,  based  on  the  record  before  me,  that  the  proposed  transaction  serves  the  public  interest,  convenience,  and  necessity  and  I  therefore 
 support  designating  this  application  for  hearing.  I  start  with  the  premise  that  a  proposed  merger  generally  creates  efficiencies  for  the  combined  entity  and  those 
 efficiencies  may  ultimately  benefit  consumers.  But  the  inquiry  cannot  end  there.  We  must  determine  what  effect  the  merger  will  have  on  the  state  of  competition  in 
 the  relevant  market  and  whether  the  efficiencies  created  by  the  merger  will  be  passed  on  as  benefits  to  consumers  in  the  form  of  better  services  and  lower  prices. 
 The  Commission  must  then  balance  the  potential  benefits  against  the  potential  harms  of  the  merger.  The  Commission’s  review  goes  beyond  traditional  antitrust 
 considerations  to  encompass  a  broader  public  interest  analysis. 
 The  record  developed  thus  far  demonstrates  that  this  proposed  merger  will  likely  harm  consumers  by  eliminating  a  viable  competitor  in  every  market, 
 driving  up  prices,  and  decreasing  innovation  and  quality  of  service.  The  Applicants  have  not  demonstrated  any  merger-  specific  public  interest  benefits  that 
 outweigh  these  harms.  More  specifically,  the  proposed  merger  will  substantially  increase  the  level  of  concentration  in  an  already  highly  concentrated  market.  It 
 would  at  best  be  a  merger  to  duopoly  in  markets  where  cable  is  available,  and  at  worst  a  merger  to  monopoly  in  markets  where  there  are  no  other  competitive 
 multichannel  video  programming  providers.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  Applicants’  commitment  to  a  national  pricing  plan,  coupled  with  competition 
 from  cable  in  certain  areas,  will  provide  a  sufficient  competitive  check  on  the  merged  entity.  Furthermore,  the  high  level  of  concentration  resulting  from  the 
 merger  will  likely  reduce,  rather  than  increase,  the  Applicants’  incentives  to  carry  through  on  many  of  the  conceivable  merger  benefits,  such  as  expanding  local-into- 
 local  programming  into  all  markets. 
 I  have  no  doubt  that  business  combinations  in  the  multichannel  video  market  may  be  pro-  consumer,  and  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  equate  bigness  with 
 badness.  But  our  task  is  to  review  only  the  application  in  front  of  us  and  to  weigh  the  potential  benefits  against  the  threats  to  competition.  On  this  record,  I  am 
 forced  to  conclude  that  the  public  interest  would  not  be  served  by  granting  the  application. 
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