JOINT STATEMENT OF 
CHAIRMAN KEVIN J. MARTIN AND
COMMISSIONER DEBORAH TAYLOR TATE
Re:  AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of Control, WC 
Docket No. 06-74
The telecommunications market continues to be a dynamic one.  New technologies and 
services are continuing to transform every aspect of our lives.  The merged 
AT&T/BellSouth (AT&T) promises to offer consumers a wider array of IP-enabled 
services, including voice, data, wireless, and video services.  In particular, the merger 
will enable the combined company to accelerate its deployment of broadband and IPTV 
in the BellSouth region.  The merger also will enhance national security by creating a 
stronger and more efficient U.S. supplier of critical communications capabilities.  
Further, the merger will allow the combined entity to expand its global reach and be 
better positioned to provide the broad range of communications services that enterprise 
customers demand.  As a result, today the Commission finds that this merger will further 
many of its broadband, competition, and public safety priorities and finds that the merger, 
on balance, will serve the public interest.
In particular, this merger promises to result in greater competition in the broadband and 
video markets.  Broadband deployment to all Americans remains one of the highest 
objectives for us at the Commission.  This deployment is critical to our nation’s 
competitiveness in the global economy and to our national security. All consumers 
should expect to benefit from this technology.  The merging parties recognize this and 
continue to deploy high bandwidth broadband to consumers.  This merger will enable the 
combined entity to build upon the progress the companies have individually made in the 
deployment of broadband technologies in the combined territory.
The merging parties are also engaged in plans to deploy IPTV service throughout their 
territories to compete with other video providers, like cable and satellite.  By enhancing 
the ability of new entrants to provide video services, we are advancing our goal of 
universal affordable broadband access for Americans, as well as our goal of increased 
video competition.  Greater competition in the market for the delivery for multichannel 
video programming is a primary and long-standing goal of federal communications 
policy. Consumers across the country will reap the benefits of this new competition – and 
sooner as a result of this merger.  The addition of new entrants in the video marketplace 
holds prices down and improves service.  The additional competition, as well as the 
nature of IPTV, will also improve the availability and control of content that American 
consumers demand.  Moreover, the delivery of quality video services that demand a 
quality broadband infrastructure will only further encourage the deployment of 
broadband networks into yet unserved or underserved areas.  
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Although we believe that this transaction offers significant benefits to consumers, we
have reservations about some of the voluntary commitments offered by the merger 
applicants.  Like the review by the Department of Justice, nineteen states, and three 
foreign countries, the order we adopt today does not find there to be any public interest 
harms resulting from the merger.  Unlike the Department of Justice and these other 
entities, however, we nevertheless impose a number of conditions on the merging parties. 
Some of the conditions will certainly provide additional consumer benefits.  We find the 
imposition of some of the conditions, however, to be unnecessary.  And, some of the 
conditions impose burdens that have nothing to do with the transaction, are 
discriminatory, and run contrary to Commission policy and precedent.  
To be sure, we are pleased that some of these conditions should accelerate the 
deployment of broadband facilities and adoption of broadband service throughout the 22-
state region of the merged company.  For example, the applicants have committed to 
offer high-speed broadband services to all consumers in the combined territory by the end 
of 2007. They have also committed to providing new retail broadband customers a $10 a 
month broadband Internet access service throughout the combined region and they have 
committed to provide a stand-alone broadband service – one that doesn’t require the 
purchase of other bundled services – at $19.95 per month.  While we would not impose 
these requirements as regulations, we are pleased that these conditions will further 
encourage the deployment and adoption of broadband by consumers.  As such, these are 
certainly consumer-friendly concessions and are additional public benefits of the 
transaction.  
Other conditions, however, are unnecessary and may actually deter broadband 
infrastructure investment.  The conditions regarding net-neutrality have very little to do 
with the merger at hand and very well may cause greater problems than the speculative 
problems they seek to address.  These conditions are simply not warranted by current 
market conditions and may deter facilities investment.  Accordingly, it gives us pause to 
approve last-minute remedies to address the ill-defined problem net neutrality proponents 
seek to resolve. 
Importantly, however, while the Democrat Commissioners may have extracted 
concessions from AT&T, they in no way bind future Commission action.  Specifically, a 
minority of Commissioners cannot alter Commission precedent or bind future 
Commission decisions, policies, actions, or rules.   Thus, to the extent that AT&T has, as 
a business matter, determined to take certain actions, they are allowed to do so. There are 
certain conditions, however, that are not self-effectuating or cannot be accomplished by 
AT&T alone.  To the extent Commission action is required to effectuate these conditions 
as a policy going forward, we specifically do not support those aspects of the conditions 
and will oppose such policies going forward.  
For example, today’s order does not mean that the Commision has adopted an additional 
net neutrality principle.  We continue to believe such a requirement is not necessary and 
may impede infrastructure deployment.  Thus, although AT&T may make a voluntary 
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business decision, it cannot dictate or bind government policy.  Nor does this order.  
Similarly, this order does not bind the Commission to reregulate prices or reestablish 
price controls.  Specifically, with regard to special access condition #6, AT&T is required 
to file an amended tariff which reduces its wholesale special access prices for DS1, DS3, 
and Ethernet services to some but not all companies.  Unlike the commitment to offer 
broadband services to consumers for $19.95 a month, this condition provides no 
consumer benefit and is aimed at large enterprise customers and some competing carriers.  
And, AT&T will not be giving theses discounts to all customers equally.  Specifically, 
the merged entity will lower the prices for some carriers but not for others.  Carriers such 
as Verizon and Qwest do not qualify for these discounted rates unless they also lower 
their rates in their respective regions.  In effect, therefore, the Democrat Commissioners 
want to price regulate not only AT&T but also Verizon and Qwest.  Accordingly, not 
only are the conditions unnecessary as there is no finding of public interest harm, but the 
conditions attempt to impose requirements on companies that are not even parties to the 
merger.  As such, this condition imposes burdens on carriers that are not even parties to 
the transaction.  This condition surely imposes burdens that have nothing to do with the 
transaction.  
Moreover, unlike other voluntary business commitments, this condition requires future 
Commission approval.  Such approval would contravene established Commission policy 
and precedent and we would object. In short, we object to effectuating a change in 
Commission policy by a voluntary commitment by one company.  
First, the reimposition of rate regulation in the special access market is inconsistent with 
the Commission’s general policies of deregulating prices in competitive markets.  
Second, such a condition is explicitly inconsistent with Section 202(a) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, that prevents discrimination in, among other 
things, charges, practices, or services and finds it unlawful to give any undue or 
unreasonable preferences or advantages. See 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (prohibiting 
unreasonable discrimination in charges or services for like communication services 
directly or indirectly); Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 
130-31 (1990) (invalidating order allowing a carrier to charge a tariffed, regulated rate to 
certain customers and not others); MCI v. CompTel, 842 F. 2d. 1296, 1304 (1988) (stating 
that the Commission is required by statute to ensure that special access tariffs “conform 
to the dictates of section 202(a).  If certain prices are discriminatory, it is not enough to 
point to the fact that they were computed in accordance with dissimilar methodologies.  
The FCC has no choice but to see that the terms of section 202(a) are observed, even if 
that entails some modification of the methodologies used to derive the proposed 
charges.”). Carriers that are denied the discounts would be subject to a competitive 
disadvantage in the marketplace.  
As such, even when AT&T attempts to fulfill its merger commitment by filing its tariffs, 
the Commission is not bound to approve these tariffs.  Indeed, consistent with the 
Commission’s prior policies and precedent, we would oppose such discriminatory 
practices and would encourage such tariffs to be rejected.  
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Finally, in addition to the fact that this condition appears aimed to give certain competing 
carriers an advantage over others, we note that there is no requirement that the benefits of 
the discounted special access rates are passed through to customers.
AT&T’s proposed commitments turn the clock backward to rate regulations of a decade 
past. While the company has voluntarily agreed to these conditions, the Commission is 
required by law to recognize competition and will continue to use other tools and legal 
avenues to continue down the deregulatory path envisioned by Congress and adopted by 
the Commission.