1
Oral Statement
Of
The Honorable Kevin J. Martin
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Before the
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
April 15, 2008
2
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Dingell, Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Barton, 
Ranking Member Stearns, and Members of the Committee.  
Thank you for inviting me to be here with you today to discuss our reasoning and 
the results of our most recent auction.  
The 700 MHz auction achieved a number of significant milestones.  The wireless 
networks to be deployed with these licenses will be significantly faster and will extend to 
urban and rural areas alike. They will bring increased competition to a broadband sector 
currently served primarily by DSL and cable. And wireless consumers will now be able 
to use the wireless devices and applications of their choice.
There have been some significant misperceptions about our auction, and I 
appreciate the opportunity this morning to debunk what I would call the “Six Myths of 
the 700 MHZ Auction.”
Myth 1: The auction was not a success
The auction was the largest in FCC history, raising a record $19.6 billion in bids.   
Even in a difficult economic climate, revenues raised in this auction well exceeded 
congressional estimates – nearly doubling the ten billion dollars Congress had anticipated 
would be raised.  In comparison, the 2006 Advanced Wireless Service (AWS-1) Auction 
sold approximately 50 percent more spectrum, yet generated one-third less revenue.  
3
Even with the open platform requirement and aggressive build-out obligations, 
each of these blocks sold for more than AWS-1 blocks with comparable bandwidth and 
license areas.  
As this slide shows (Exhibit 1), all other 68 auctions conducted by the FCC in the 
past 15 years collectively produced a total of only $19.1 billion in actual receipts, roughly 
equivalent to the money raised in the 700 MHz auction alone.  
While clearly a success in terms of dollars, this auction also attained significant 
public interest objectives that benefit the consumer.  
With open platform requirements on one-third of the spectrum, consumers will be 
able to use the wireless device of their choice and download whatever legal software or 
applications they choose.  
A network that is more open to devices and applications will help foster 
innovation on the edge of the network, and give consumers greater freedom to use the 
wireless devices and applications of their choice.  
Ensuring that rural and underserved areas of the country benefit from the new 
services that this spectrum offers, the Commission adopted the most aggressive build-out 
requirements ever applied to wireless spectrum.  
As a result, the spectrum will quickly be put to use by all auction winners to deploy new 
technologies and offer new services in both urban and rural areas of the country.  
Finally, as I will discuss below, we created what will be new wireless broadband 
providers to compete with the incumbent telephone and cable companies in nearly every 
home in the U.S. 
4
Myth 2:  Verizon and AT&T won everything
In fact, a total of 99 bidders other than Verizon and AT&T won 754 licenses –
representing almost 70% of the licenses sold.  And a bidder other than Verizon or AT&T 
won a license in every market.
Small businesses eligible for bidding credits were very successful in the auction.  
56 (55%) of 101 total winning bidders claimed designated entity bidding credits as small 
businesses, almost all of whom are new entrants. 
As you can see in the next slide (Exhibit 2), this is very similar to past auctions.  
And in the next slide (Exhibit 3) we see that small businesses eligible for bidding 
credits won 379 (35%) of the licenses - which again is similar to past auctions.  
And finally as this map illustrates (Exhibit 4), these licenses covered a large 
portion of the country primarily in rural areas.
In fact, much of the money spent by Verizon and AT&T (approximately 70%) 
was used to obtain spectrum in only the top 15 markets. The small and rural providers 
won 500 licenses covering almost 60% of MHz/pops available outside the top 15 markets 
in the A and B blocks. 
Finally, most auction winners are new entrants.  Of the 101 winning bidders, 72 
are new entrants who won 675 licenses. 
5
Myth 3:  Small carriers were unable to win even in rural areas
Some have argued that small and rural providers were unable to win any 
spectrum, particularly in smaller communities.  This is simply not true.  
In fact, new entrants, small and rural providers did especially well in rural areas.  
As you can see in this slide (Exhibit 5), in the A and B blocks alone, small and rural 
providers won spectrum that covered almost the entire country.
Where they were unsuccessful was not in rural America or even in medium size 
markets, but in twenty large metropolitan areas, such as New York, Los Angeles, Dallas, 
Chicago and Atlanta. 
And, despite what some have argued, the percentage of spectrum available in 
smaller geographic areas was in fact comparable to what we did in AWS-1.  
As you can see in this slide (Exhibit 6), the percentage of spectrum available in 
licenses that cover the smallest areas (CMAs) was higher in the 700 MHz auction.
In the largest cities, it did not matter whether the license was a smaller CMA, a 
medium size EA or a regional REAG, the large carriers won.  Unless the Commission 
had banned the nationwide incumbents – an idea few advocated – smaller and rural 
providers would likely not have succeeded in the largest markets. 
Myth 4:  There will be no Third Pipe – the license were all won by the incumbent 
telephone or cable company
6
In much of the country, consumers have a choice of only two broadband services: 
cable or DSL.  
Although the auction did not result in a single, nationwide new entrant, in every 
market a third provider will be able to use a wireless broadband platform to compete 
against the incumbent telephone and cable companies. 
For example in Chicago, Verizon is not the incumbent DSL or cable provider, but 
won licenses in that area.  
The same can be said of Metro PCS winning licenses in Boston and AT&T 
winning licenses in New York City.  In those areas, these companies will provide a 
wireless broadband service that competes with the incumbent telephone and cable 
companies’ wireline offerings. 
In fact, as this next slide shows (Exhibit 7), a bidder other than the incumbent DSL or 
cable provider won in nearly every area in the country.  
Myth 5:  Everyone knows Verizon was going open anyway
The auction had an impact on innovation in the wireless industry even before the 
bidding began.  In less than a year, many wireless providers evolved from vocal 
opponents to vocal proponents, embracing the open platform concept.  Verizon Wireless 
has now committed to open its entire network to devices and applications for consumers.  
But when the open access issue was proposed, Verizon was adamantly opposed. 
7
For example, Verizon said to Congress in June that “what most concerns us is that 
the open access regulation … threatens to disrupt the positive consumer experience.”  
And that “An open access regime would threaten to shift the business of wireless network 
operators to primarily offering subscribers airtime.”  
In an ex parte filed in July of 07, Verizon argued that the “limits that Verizon 
Wireless places on devices and applications … are critical to maintaining the quality of 
its network and serving its customers.”
Just the next day, Verizon argued, “Imposing any such requirements. . . [would] 
limit the introduction of new and innovative wireless services.”
Finally, Verizon took the Commission to court over the open access provision, 
going so far as to seek a stay of our auction.  
If Verizon was planning to open its network regardless, why would it pay for the 
lawyers fees for the court case alone? 
Myth 6:  We could have achieved a Public Safety network another way
During a crisis public safety has to be able to communicate, regardless of where 
they are from or the uniform they wear.  
Some critics seem to suggest that if we had just auctioned the D block without 
conditions, a public safety network would have materialized on its own. Or that we 
should have ignored public safety’s conditions requiring a more robust network.
But six years after September 11, there is still no nationwide public safety 
network in place.  
8
The simple reality is that public safety does not have the funds to build a network.  
It would have been better to take the auction proceeds and provide the public 
safety community with the resources needed to build their own interoperable network.  
But we do not have the authority to directly fund such a network.  As a result, the 
Public/Private Partnership was the only means available to us to address this crucial 
issue.  
My colleagues both Republican and Democratic agreed.  The Commission 
unanimously adopted the Public Safety/Private Partnership approach for the D Block as 
an innovative means to address the critical need for nationwide public safety 
interoperability.  
The Commission will however, also need to take into account why the D block 
did not attract a successful bidder. The Commission needs to consider whether the 
demands that were placed on the prospective D block winner, such as network 
expectations and build-out requirements, were too great.
Absent funding legislation, I believe that a Public/Private Partnership remains the 
only tool at the Commission’s disposal to solve the public safety interoperability 
challenge.  However, we will look at all options and I look forward to hearing your 
views. 
9
Conclusion
This auction stands as the most successful FCC auction ever conducted, but there 
is still more to be done.  
I look forward to working with this Committee and my colleagues on these 
challenging issues in the months to come.