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Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, Case 1\'05. OO-14763-II, et ai.
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
Pursuant to Rule 26.1 ofthe FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE and Eleventh Circuit Rule 26.1-1, it is hereby certi.fied that the
following persons, corporations, or governmental agencies have been associated
with or have an interest in the outcome ofthis case:
Adelphia
Alabama Cable Telecommunications Association
Alabama Power Company
AT&T Cable Services
Balch & Bingham, LLP
Beggs & Lane LLP
Richard Beeland
Jane Belford
Barry Breithaupt
Jennifer M. Buettner
Ramona Byrd
Cable One
Cable Star, Inc.
C 10f6
Alabarila Power Co. v. FCC, Case Nos. 00-14763-TT et al.
Cablevision Services
Cindy Cade
John Russell Campbell
Charter Communications, LLC
Century Cullman Corporation
Gregory M. Christopher
Ford W. Clark
Cole, Raywid & Braverman
Ronnie G. Colvin
Comcast Cable
Comcast Cablevision of Panama City, Inc.
CoinLink
Geoffrey C. Cook
Coosa Cable Company
Kathleen Costello
Cox Communications Gulf Coast, L.L.C.
CVI of Alabama, Inc., d/b/a/ Time Warner Cable
Demopolis CATV Company
C 20f6
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Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, Case Nos. OO-14763-TI et at.
Peggy A. Dickinson
-
Empresa Electrica del Norte Grande, S.A. (Edelnor)
Anthony C. Epstein
Federal Communications Commission
Florida Cable Telecommunications Association
Lynne Greene Fraker
Shirley S. Fujimoto
William H. Garner
Georgia Power Company
Christine M. Gill
Paul Glist
Bruce Gluckman
Lynn Goldman
John D. Gosch
L. Keith Gregory
M.C. Grigsby
Gulf Power Company
Hidroelectrica Alicura, S.A.
C 3 of6
Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, Case Nos. OO·14763-TI et al.
Mike Hugunin
John E. Ingle
Integrated Communication Systems, Inc.
James Cable Partners, LP
Ron Johnson
William Johnson
Brian Josef
Keller and Heckman LLP
Cheryl King
Raymond A. Kowalski
Eric B. Langley
Deborah Lathen
Jane E, Mago
Keith A. McCrickard
MediaCom, LLC
MediaCom Southeast LLC
Mississippi Power Company
Mobile Energy Services Company, L.L.C.
C 4 of6
"
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Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, Case Nos. OO·14763·TT et ai.
John M. Nannes
Robert B. Nicholson
Northland Cable Properties·
James Oglethorpe
Thomas P. 0'Neil III
Scott Peden
Ralph A. Peterson
Phoenix Cable T.V.
Leonard J. Rozek
Savannah Electric and Power Company
Daniel K. Shoemaker
William Single, IV
Sky Cablevision, Ltd.
Jeffrey Smith
Jim Smith
Southern Company Capital Trust I
Southern Company Capital Trust II
Southern Electric Generating Company
C 5 of6
Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, Case Nos. OQ-14763-TT et ai.
Southern Electric International Trinidad, Inc.
Southern Investments UK P.L.C.
The Southern Company
Thomas P. Steindler
Steptoe & Johnson LLP
Joann Stone
Robert J. Wiggers
Time Warner cable
Time Warner Entertainment Advance Newhouse
Andrew W. Tunnell
Twin County Cable
Joseph Van Lerner
D.H. Ward, III
WorldCom, Inc.
C 6of6
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Respondents support the petitioners' request for oral argument.
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE
This brief is typed in 14 point CG Times.
1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION............................................. 1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES :..... 1
COUNTERSTATEMENT : 3
1. Background: The Pole Attachments Act of 1978 3
2. Mandatory Access: The 1996 Amendments
to the Act 8
3. Subsequent Judicial Proceedings 11
a. Gulf Power I 11
b. Gulf Power II 13
c. Southern Company 13
4. The Staff Decision Under Review 14
5. The Standard of Review 17
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 18
ARGUMENT 22
1. BOTH PETITIONS FOR REVIEW MUST
BE DISMISSED 22
11
II. THE POLE ATTACHMENT FEE ALLOWED
BY THE FCC IN THIS CASE SATISFIES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
OF JUST COMPENSATION AND REPRESENTS
REASONED AGENCY DECISIONMAKING 23
A. The Elements Of Mandatory Access Does
Not Change The Constitutional Sufficiency
Of The Cable Formula Rate 24
B. The FCC's Administration Of The Cable
Formula Is A Reasonable Interpretation of
Congressional Intent And Is Consistent With
Constitutional Requirements 28
1. Historical Cost of the Poles 30
2. Unusable Pole Space 34
3. Miscellaneous Accounts 37
III. THE RATE COMPLAINT PROCEEDING
WAS JURISDICTIONALLY SOUND AND
PROCEDURALLY FAIR 40
A. Separation of Powers 40
B. Jurisdiction Over The Complaint 43
C. Other Objections 44
CONCLUSION 49
111
..
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 7
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999) 9
Brotherhood ofRailway Carmen v. Pena, 64 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ........ 22
Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366 (lIth Cir.1997), cen. denied, 530
U.S. 1080 (1998) 41
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. V. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S-. 837 (1984) : 18
Consolidated Gas CO. V. City Gas Co., 912 F.2d 1262 (11 th Cir. 1990) ......... 12
Duquesne Light CO. V. Barasch, 488, U.S. 299 (1989) 40
Erie-Niagara Rail Steering Committee V. Suiface Trans. Bd., 167
F.3d 111 (2
nd
Cir. 1999) 23
FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (l987) passim
Flagship Marine Services, Inc. V. Belcher Towing Co., 23 F.3d 341
(11
th
Cir. 1994) 44
Gencom Inc. V. FCC, 832 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 47
GulfPower CO. V. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263 (11
th
Cir. 2000) .4, 13
GulfPower CO. V. United States, 187 F.3d 1324 (lIth Cir.1999) passim
GulfPower CO. V. United States, 998 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D.Fla.1998)....... 11, 43
Habersham Mills V. FERC, 976 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1992) 18
- IV -
International Telecard Ass'n v. FCC, 166 F.3d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 22
Kisser v. Cisneros, 14 F.3d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 18
Martin v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944 (11 th Cir. 1992) 43
Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. ICC, 792 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1986) ... 42 -.
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) 17,42
Monongahela Power Co. v. FCC, 655 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 7
Motor Vehicle Mfgrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983) '" 18
National Cable Television Assn. v. GulfPower Co., 121 S.Ct. 879 (2001) 13
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine, 503 U.S. 407 (1992) . 17
Public Utlities Comm'n ofCalif. v. FERC, 988 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ..... 45
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) , 42
Southern Company v. FCC, 11
th
Cir. No. 99-15160 et al. (argument
scheduled Aug. 28, 2001) 14
Texas Power & Light v. FCC, 784 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1986) 4
United States v. 0.161 Acres ofLand, 837 F.2d 1036 (11
th
Cir. 1988) 25
United States v. 320.0 Acres ofLand, 605 F.2d 762 (5
th
Cir. 1979) 25, 26
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950) 26, 41
United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949) '" 24, 31
United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 47
United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364 (11
th
Cir. 1993) 41
- v -
".
"
United States v. Steele, 147 F. 3d 1316 (11 th Cir. 1998) 41
United States v. Toronto H & B Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396 (1949) 31
Watenvay Comm. Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 851 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 22
Wisconsin Central Limited v. Public-Service Commission ofWisconsin,
95 F.3d 1359 (7th Cir. 1996) 42
Administrative Decisions
Alabama Cable Telecom. Ass'n v. Alabama Power Co., 15 FCC
Red 17346 (2000) 3, 14
Amendment ofRules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, 15 FCC
Red 6453 (2000) passim
Amendment ofRules and Policies Governing the Attachment ofCable
Television Hardware to Utility Poles, 2 FCC Red 4387 (1987),
recon. denied, 4 FCC Red 468 (1989) 7, 29, 37
Application ofSCANA Comm., Inc., 15 FCC Red 9203
(Wireless Bureau 2000) " 46
California Water & Tel. Co., 64 F.C.C.2d 753 (1977) 4
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 FCC Red 87 (1997) 33
First Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d 1585 (1978) 7
Implementation ofthe Location Competition Provisions in the Telecomm.
Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. ofMansfield, Inc. v. Virginia Electric &
Power Co., 52 Rad. Rep.2d (P&F) 1502 (1983) 38
Panhandle TV & Cable Co. v. Potomac Edison Co., 1984 FCC LEXIS 2131
(1984) 38
- VI :..
Implementation ofthe Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecomm. Act of1996, 11 FCC Red 15499 (1996) 14, 33, 34
Second Report and Order, 72 F.C.C.2d 59 (1979) 7
TCA Management Co. v. Southwestern Public Service Co., 10 FCC Red
11832 (1995) 38 ' .
Third Report and Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 187 (1980) 7
Statutes and Regulations
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) '" 18
15 U.S.C. § 79 8
15 U.S.C. § 79, et seq '" 8
15 U.S.C. § 79z-5e 10
28 U.S.C. § 2344 22
28 U.S.C. §§ 2342 22
47 U.S.C. § 154(i) '" 45
47 U.S.C. § 155(e)(7) 1, 16, 22
47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(1) 10, 25
47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4) 11
47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) 5
47 U.S.C. § 224(e) 5
47 U.S.C. § 224(d) 35
47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(1) 5, 29,38
47 U.S.C. § 224(e) 11
47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(2) , 35
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47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(3) 36
47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(4) 35
47 U.S.C. § 224(f) 11
47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1) 10
47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(2) 10, 25, 30
47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i) 34
47 U.S.C. § 253 9
47 U.S.C. § 402(a) 22
47 U.S.C. § 405(a)(1) 23
47 C.F.R. § 1.1401 et seq 7, 29
47 C.F.R. § 1. 1409(e)(1) 35
47 C.F.R. § 1. 1409(e)(2) 35,36
47 C.F.R. § 1.1411 47
Others
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science &
Transportation (1995) 9
S. Rep. No. 95-580 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 109 passim
- V111 -
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Case No. 00-14763-11, et al.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, et al.
Petitioners
v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondents
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court does not have jurisdiction because no final agency decision is
before the Court. Petitioners are seeking review of a Cable Services Bureau
decision made pursuant to delegated authority. That decision is still undergoing
review by the full Federal Communications Commission. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(7).
See pages 22-23 below and the FCC's pending motions to dismiss.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to review a decision of a bureau
of the FCC acting under delegated authority where that decision is presently
undergoing review by the full Commission and 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(7) makes
exhaustion of administrative remedies a jurisdictional prerequisite.
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2. Whether a pole attachment rate that places the utilities in at least as
good a position as if no taking had occurred and that represents what a voluntary
seller would accept from a willing buyer satisfies the Fifth Amendment
requirement for just compensation.
3. Whether the Commission's decision to base the cable rate formula
on the historical cost of the utility poles rather than the replacement cost of the
poles was a permissible choice given that this methodology provides the utilities
with a reasonable rate of return On their investment in the poles and is relatively
easy to administer.
4. Whether the cable television pole attachment rate, which provides
the utilities with just and reasonable compensation under constitutional standards
for both physical takings and ratemaking, was rendered arbitrary and capricious
by a later Congressional decision to provide the utilities with a generally higher
rental rate for telecommunications pole attachments.
5. Whether the Commission's decision to exclude from the rate base
certain cost factors that are only tangentially related to the cost of owning and
maintaining the utility poles was an abuse of the agency's broad ratemaking
discretion or otherwise denied just compensation.
6. Whether the rate complaint proceeding that afforded the parties an
opportunity to be heard on the record and is subject to judicial review was
procedurally fair.
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COUNTERSTATEMENT
On review in these consolidated cases is a decision of the FCC's Cable
Services Bureau to grant a complaint by a group of cable television systems and
their trade association (intervenors in this case) against petitioner Alabama Power
Company (APCo). The Bureau held that APCo's unilateral decision to raise its
annual pole attachment rental rate from $7.47, on which APCo and the cable
systems had agreed', to $38.81 per pole was a violation of the Pole Attachments
Act. The Bureau terminated the higher rate and ordered the parties to negotiate a
new rate using a formula derived from the Pole Attachments Act as a guide to
establishing a reasonable rate. Alabama Cable Telecom. Ass 'n v. Alabama
Power Co., 15 FCC Rcd 17346 (2000)(Tab 3 of Record Excerpts)
1. Background: The Pole Attachments Act of 1978
Since the inception of the cable television industry, cable television
companies have leased space on existing telephone or electric utility poles or in
underground utility conduits for the attachment of cable distribution facilities,
i.e., coaxial or fiber optic cable and associated equipment. The cable companies
rent a portion of the unused space on the pole or in the conduit for an annual or
other periodic fee, plus reimbursement to the utility of all of its incremental or
avoidable costs (i.e., the expenses it would not have incurred but for the cable
attachment, such as the cost of attaching the wire to the pole). Due to financial,
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environmental, and local franchise considerations, the cable operator usually has
no alternative but to use existing poles and conduits.!
By virtue of their monopoly ownership or control of the poles and
conduits, the utilities have had a superior bargaining position, and in the late
1960s the cable companies began to complain that the utilities were demanding
unreasonably high attachment rates. The FCC investigated the complaints but
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because the cable attachments did not
constitute "communication by wire or radio" within the meaning of the
Communications Act.~Congress subsequently enacted the Pole Attachments Act
of 1978 "in part to curb the extraction of monopoly profits by utilities from cable
operators in need of pole space.".J The 1978 Act did not require the utilities to
allow cable attachments, but it authorized reguiation of rates where attachments
were voluntary.
The Pole Attachments Act authorized the FCC to "regulate the rates,
terms, and conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and
conditions are just and reasonable" in any state that does not regulate the rates,
"
!
S. Rep. No. 95-580 at 12-13 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
109, 120-21. See also GulfPower Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1266 (1 ph
Cir. 2000) (hereinafter "GulfPower II''), pet. for cert. granted.
California Water & Tel. Co., 64 F.C.C.2d 753, 758 (1977).
Texas Power & Light v. FCC, 784 F.2d 1265, 1267 (5th Cir.
1986)(footnotes omitted).
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terms, and conditions of pole attachments. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1), 224(c) ..1 The
Act provides that "a rate is just and reasonable if it assures a utility the recovery
of not less than the additional cost of providing pole attachments, nor more than
an amount determined by multiplying the percentage of the total usable space, or
the percentage of the total duct or conduit capacity, which is occupied by the pole
attachment by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the
utility attributable to the entire pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way." 47 U.S.C.
§ 224(d)(1).
Thus, the Act envisions a "zone of reasonableness," the bottom end of
which is the utility'S incremental or avoidable costs, i.e., a rate that would
reimburse the utility for expenses it would not have incurred but for the cable
attachment. The upper end of the zone is the fully allocated cost of the
attachment, i. e., a proportionate share of the capital and operating costs of the
utility pole, conduit, or right-of-way.~It can be seen that any rate set above the
minimum "avoidable" or "incremental" cost makes a positive contribution to the
utility by defraying expenses that otherwise would be borne entirely by the utility
and/or its ratepayers.
Under this "reverse preemption" provision of the Act, the FCC does not
regulate pole attachments in 18 states and the District of Columbia where
public utility commissions regulate the attachments. These local
commissions have elected to base their regulations on the federal model.
See FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 253 (1987); S. Rep. No.
95-580, supra, at 19, 27.
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A principal legislative goal was that the FCC should institute "a simple and
expeditious ,.. pole attachment program which will necessitate a minimum of
staff, paperwork, and procedures consistent with fair and efficient regulation."2 
Congress stressed that the provision of space for pole attachments is not a
common carrier undertaking, so the panoply of ratemaking procedures does not
apply, Rather, the FCC was directed toadopt a "flexible program to adjudicate
complaints."1 Rather than "embark upon a large-scale ratemaking proceeding in
each case brought before it," the FCC was instructed to use "rate of return" and
"capital cost factors" already on file with other regulatory agencies. Ibid.
"There is no need for the Commission to make independent determinations as to
each element of a utility's annual pole costs .... " Ibid. Congress understood the
difficulty of assigning various utility expenses to cable-related or non-cable 
related accounts, so the Commission was urged to "make its best estimate of
some of the less identifiable actual capital costs. Special accounting measures or
studies should not be necessary.,,~
The Commission implemented the Act's rate requirements, devising a
"Cable Formula" that focuses on the upper end of the zone of reasonableness,
i.e., the fully allocated cost of a pole attachment, through a series of
.'
1
S, Rep. No. 95-580, supra, at 21.
S. Rep. No. 95-580, supra, at 22,
S, Rep, No. 95-580, supra, at 20.
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rulemakings
2
that were fine tuned in response to judicial pronouncements. 10
Employing publicly available accounting data and the last rate of return
authorized by the regulatory agency of the state in which the utility company
does business, the Cable Formula yields the maximum lawful pole attachment
fee. 11
On appeal from a decision of this Court holding that the Act effects an
unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation, the Supreme Court
declared in FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 254 (1987), that the
FCC's reduction of a utility's pole attachment fee to the maximum allowable
under the Cable Formula "does not effect a taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment. "
First Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d 1585 (1978); see also Second Report
and Order, 72 F.C.C.2d 59 (1979); Third Report and Order, 77 F.C.C.2d
187 (1980); Amendment ofRules and Policies Governing the Attachment of
Cable Television Hardware to Utility Poles, 2 FCC Rcd 4387, 4387-4407
(1987), recon. denied, 4 FCC Rcd 468 (1989).
10
11
Monongahela Power Co. v. FCC, 655 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per
curiam); see also Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (upholding challenge to aspects of the pole attachment formula).
Following Alabama Power, the Commission revised its rules in
Amendment ofRules and Policies Governing the Attachment ofCable
Television Hardware to Utility Poles, supra, 2 FCC Rcd 4387.
See generally 47 C.F.R. § 1.1401 et seq; Amendment ofRules and Policies
Governing Pole Attachments, 15 FCC Rcd 6453 (2000); Amendment of
Rules and Policies Governing the Attachment of Cable Television
Hardware to Utility Poles, supra, 2 FCC Rcd 4387.
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Because cable attachments produce income from an otherwise unproductive
and surplus portion of the utility's plant, cable companies had no cause to
complain about lack of access - their concern was monopoly rents - and the Act
thus did not then address a right of access. S. Rep. 95-580, supra, at 16.
Access was not an issue in 1978 for the additional reason that utility companies
competed to only a very limited extentwi~hcable companies. Restrictions in the
Public Utility Holding Company Act ("PUHCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 79, et seq.,
generally prohibited participation by the utilities in the telecommunication
industry. Thus, in 1978, the utilities had an incentive to extract monopoly rents
from cable companies but little or no incentive to refuse cable company access to
their poles, which was a potential source of revenue. The 1978 Act thus did not
require utilities to allow access, and the rate formula applied only to those
utilities that voluntarily allowed cable attachments.
2. Mandatory Access: The 1996 Amendments to the Act
When Congress began considering broad telecommunication regulatory
reforms, the electric utilities lobbied for changes in pole attachment and cable
eligibility provisions. They claimed that telecommunication was a logical
diversification choice for utilities, and they supported legislation that would allow
them to offer. telecommunication and related services. At the same time, the
cable companies and telecommunications carriers cautioned that, as electric
companies moved into the communications marketplace, the utilities must not be
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permitted to be a "bottleneck to competition" by dictating terms and conditions
for pole attachments to competing cable operators. 12
In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
56, codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., Congress accepted both arguments.
The 1996 Act authorized expanded competition intelecommunic~tionmarkets,
driven by the theory that competition would bring benefits to consumers and
diversity of communications services to communities. The Act sought "to
accelerate private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and
information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition. " 13
To achieve this goal the 1996 Act made numerous amendments to the
Communications Act designed to eliminate legal and economic barriers to entry
in local and other telecommunications markets. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 253;
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Uti!. Board, 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999). More specifically
for power companies, Congress amended the PUHCA to allow power companies
to enter telecommunications businesses from which they previously had been
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science &
Transportation (1995)(testimony of Richard H. Cutler on behalf of the
Small Cable Business Association)
See Preamble to 1996 Act.
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barred.
14
Congress recognized, however, that power companies using this.
opportunity to enter these markets would gain a new incentive to refuse to enter
voluntarily into pole attachment agreements with telecommunications competitors
r on a nondiscriminatory basis. To address this danger, Congress added a
"nondiscriminatory access" provision that requires that any utility that chooses to
use its poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way, at least in part, for wire
communications must "provide a cable television system or any
telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct,
conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by it." 47 V .S.C. § 224(f)(1).
Subsection (f)(2) authorizes a utility to deny access "on a non-discriminatory
basis where there is insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and
generally applicable engineering purposes." 47 V.S.C. § 224(f)(2). Power
companies that do not choose to use their poles for wire communications are not
obligated by the Act to provide access to communications carriers, although they
may voluntarily do so, as they could under the 1978 Act. See 47 V.S.C. §
224(a)(1).
See 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5c (as amended by § 103 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996). The Southern Company, parent company of APCo and Gulf
Power Company, now provides telecommunications service "specializing
in high-tech fiber optic networks for voice, video, and data markets." See
"Telecommunications" under "Products and Solutions" at
http://www.southernco.com.
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The 1996 amendments also expanded the FCC's Pole Attachments Act
jurisdiction to include attachments to poles and conduits by all
telecommunications carriers, as well as cable television providers, and it
established a new rate formula to govern attachments by telecommunications
earners. See 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4), (e). See also pages 35-36 below.
3. Subsequent Judicial Proceedings
a. GulfPower I
APCo and Gulf Power Company, petitioners in this case, and several other
utilities
15
brought suit against the United States and the Federal Communications
Commission seeking a declaration that the nondiscriminatory access provision of
the 1996 amendments to the Pole Attachments Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224(t), is
facially unconstitutional because it effects a taking of their property without just
compensation and without an adequate process for securing just compensation.
The district court agreed that the statute effected a taking of property, but the
court granted summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants after
concluding the amendment did not necessarily deny the utilities just
compensation. See GulfPower Co. v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 1386
(N.D.Fla.1998). The court held, moreover, that the procedure for determining
just compensation - starting with a proceeding before the FCC - did not violate
The other utilities were Georgia Power Company, Duke Power Company,
Mississippi Power Company, Ohio Edison Company, and Florida Power
Corporation.
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the Separation of Powers doctrine because the Commission's decision was subject
to judicial review. See id. at 1397-98.
The utilities appealed to this Court which upheld the district court's
conclusions. The Court agreed that while the 1996 Act authorizes a taking of the
utilities' property, the statute is not facially unconstitutional because the statute
provides an effective procedure for awarding just compensation that does not
violate the Separation of Powers doctrine. See GulfPower Co. v. United States,
187 F.3d 1324, 1328-13 (11th Cir.1999) ("GulfPower!"). The Court
explained: "Had the Act eliminated all possibility ofjudicial review and made
the FCC the final arbiter of a utility's compensation, we would be faced with a
different situation, but the Act does not do that. Instead, as we have explained,
the Act merely provides that the FCC has the first cut at fashioning the
compensation a utility receives for the taking of its property." Id. at 1337.
The utilities also argued in GulfPower !, as they do in this case, that the
Cable Formula is constitutionally inadequate because it provides the same
compensation for mandatory access as for voluntary access, citing Judge Tjoflat's
dissenting opinion in Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 912 F.2d 1262,
1314-19 (lIth Cir. 1990). The Court declined to reach that issue, holding that
"this issue is not ripe for decision [because] it would require sheer speculation
for us to conclude that the actual rates ordered by the FCC will fail to provide
.c. just compensation." GulfPower!, 187 F.3d at 1338.
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b. Gulf Power II
The utilities then sought review in this Court of an FCC decision
implementing the 1996 amendments to the Pole Attachments Act. The utilities
presented a variation of their facial attack on the constitutionality of the rate
formula, contending that the Cable Formula establishes a maximum pole
attachment rent that is below constitutional just compensation. The Court
observed that this was essentially the same argument found unripe in GulfPower
I and declared that the argument was still unripe because the utilities again failed
to demonstrate that the formula will deny just compensation in all cases. Gulf
Power II, 208 F.3d at 1272. The Court agreed with the utilities, however, that
the FCC lacks statutory authority to regulate pole attachments that are used for
cable television service commingled with Internet service or that are used for
wireless communications. Id. at 1273-78. The Supreme Court has granted
petitions for writ of certiorari filed by the FCC and the National Cable Television
Association to review those two holdings. National Cable Television Assn. v.
GulfPower Co., 121 S.Ct. 879 (2001)(mem.)
c. Southern Company
The FCC announced in a separate order a number of flexible guidelines  
"rules of general applicability" - pertaining to the terms and conditions of the
statute's nondiscriminatory access requirement, dealing with such matters as
system-wide access, access to transmission facilities, reservation and expansion
of capacity, access by third-party workers, and facility modification. The
utilities are challenging these guidelines in the pending case of Southern
.r
.'
- 14 -
Company v. FCC, Iph Cir. No. 99-15160 et al. (argument scheduled Aug. 28,
2001).16
4. The Staff Decision Under Review
For some 20 years APCo voluntarily rented excess space on its poles to
cable television companies at a negotiated rental rate based on the Cable
Formula. Specifically, just before the instant proceedings commenced APCo was
charging $7.47 per pole per year, which was slightly above the formula's
maximum rate but was acceptable to the cable companies. 17 Then, in June 2000,
APCo announced that it was unilaterally rescinding all existing agreements with
the cable companies, and it told the companies that if they wished to maintain
their existing attachments they would have to begin paying an annual rate of
$38.81 instead of $7.47. The cable companies complained to the FCC. See
Alabama Cable Telecommunications Ass'n v. Alabama Power Co., 15 FCC Rcd
17346 (CSB 2000)(Tab 3 of Record Excerpts).
The utilities did not challenge the FCC's finding that "a utility that is itself
engaged in video programming or telecommunications services has the
ability and the incentive to use its control over distribution facilities to its
own competitive advantage" or the corollary rule prohibiting a utility from
"favor[ing] itself over other parties with respect to the provision of
telecommunications or video programming services." Implementation of
the Location Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of1996, 11
FCC Rcd 15499, 16071, 16073 " 1150, 1157 (1996).
17
According to the utilities themselves, the Cable Formula produced a
maximum allowable rate of $6.30. See APCo brief at 9 n.7.
- 15 -
APCo did not attempt to justify the new rate under the Cable Formula. Id.
at , 4. Instead, it asserted that the Cable Formula had been rendered
constitutionally deficient by the mandatory access provisions of the 1996
amendments to the Pole Attachments Act. Its relationship with the cable
companies was now an involuntary one, APCo argued, which entitles it to a
much higher level of compensation than allowed under the Cable Formula. Id. at
, 5.
APCo also moved to dismiss the complaint, citing this Court's
jurisdictional pronouncements in GulfPower II, see page 13 above, because the
cable operators were allegedly using the pole attachments to provide cable
service commingled with Internet service. Therefore, APCo contended, the FCC
had no jurisdiction over the complaint. Id. at , 4.
The FCC's Cable Services Bureau, under delegated authority, was charged
with the responsibility of administering the Cable Formula. Acting on the
complaint, the Bureau disallowed the higher rate proffered by APCo, and it
ordered APCo to continue to make access to its poles available at the previously
negotiated rate of $7.47 pending further negotiations. Id. at" 7, 13-17. The
Bureau also denied APCo's motion to dismiss because the Court's mandate in
GulfPower II had not been issued pending the filing of petitions for writ of
certiorari. Until the mandate issues, the Bureau said, the pole attachment rules
- 16 -
were still in effect and the Commission's jurisdiction over the complaint was
intact. Id. at~4.
18
On September 11, 2000, APCo filed an application for review of the staff
decision by the full Commission, which is pending. A few days later, APCo and
Gulf Power Company, which was not a party to the Alabama complaint
proceeding, filed the instant petitions for review. The two utilities also asked this
Court to stay the Bureau's order pending judicial review.
By separate motions dated October 18, 2000, the FCC moved to dismiss
both petitions for review. The Commission noted that the petitions seek review
of a staff decision issued pursuant to delegated authority whereas judicial review
may be sought only of final agency action. 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(7). The
Commission noted also that Gulf Power, which was not even a party to these
proceedings and was not cognizably aggrieved, does not have standing to file.
The Court denied the utilities' motions for stay but it declined to rule on
the Commission's motions to dismiss. By order dated January 3, 2001, the Court
said that the motions to dismiss "are carried with the case. "
18 As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has granted the petitions for writ
of certiorari. The mandate in GulfPower II therefore remains stayed
pending final disposition by the Supreme Court. Rule 41(d)(I), Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
- 17 -
5. The Standard of Review
The Constitution does not dictate a single approach to determining just
compensation, so in deciding whether the statutory rate provides just
compensation within the meaning of the Constitution in this case, the Court
should apply a deferential standard that gives weight to the legislative judgment
as to what constitutes a just and reasonable rate. This deferential standard
applies when an agency interprets the terms on which Congress authorized a
taking. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine, 503 U.S. 407,
421-22 (1992). Such deference is consistent with the role of the courts as the
"ultimate" arbiter of the constitutional requirement. See Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893); GulfPower I, 187
F.3d at 1333. However, even if the Court accepts APCo's argument that the
Court should apply a de novo standard of review in deciding whether the
statutory rate provides just compensation (APCo brief at 21 n.15), the result is
the same because the statutory formula satisfies any constitutionally applicable
standard.
To the extent that APCo argues that the Court should review de novo the
FCC's interpretation of the Act, it is incorrect. The FCC's interpretation of the
Act is reviewed under a deferential standard where, as here, the language of the
statute does not speak to the precise methodology that should be employed to
implement the Congressional intent. Where the meaning of statutory language is
not clear, the Court defers to the agency that administers the statute if the
agency's interpretation is reasonable." Habersham Mills v. FERC, 976 F.2d
- 18 -
1381, 1383 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
The Bureau's adjudication of the complaint may be set aside only if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Under this "highly deferential" standard, the
Court presumes the validity of agency action and may reverse only if the
agency's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or if the agency has
made a clear error in judgment. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfgrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 44 (1983); Kisser v. Cisneros, 14
F .3d 615, 618 (D .C. Cir. 1994).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both petitions for review must be dismissed. APCo seeks review of an
order of the FCC's Cable Services Bureau taken under delegated authority, but
under the Communications Act and Hobbs Act a petition for review may only be
filed within a 60-day period that starts with the date the full Commission issues
an order reviewing the staff decision. No such decision by the Commission has
not yet been issued, so APCo's petition for review is incurably premature. For
the same reason the petition of Gulf Power must also be dismissed, but in
addition, the Communications Act and Hobbs Act permit petitions for review of
an agency decision only by parties to the agency proceeding unless the nonparty
first files a petition for reconsideration at the agency. Gulf Power did not file
such a petition, but instead it sought direct review of the Bureau decision.
- 19 -
As to the merits, the electric utilities in this case treat the mandatory access
provision of the Pole Attachments Act as a windfall that supposedly gives them
the constitutional right to quintuple the rent they charge for pole attachments.
They are not so entitled. The constitutional requirement ofjust compensation
ensures that property owners are placed in as good a position after a taking as
they were before the taking. Here, the attachers pay all the up-front costs of the
mandatory attachment, so the annual rent calculated by the FCC's formula
represents pure profit to the utilities. This was true when the pole attachments
were voluntary and it is still true while the attachments are mandatory. The
utilities are at least in as good a position economically now as they were before
the attachments became mandatory.
For more than 20 years the utilities voluntarily rented space on their poles
at a regulated rate that was held to be constitutionally sufficient by the Supreme
Court in Florida Power. If the pole attachments were not mandatory, the utilities
would still be able to rent space on their poles, but only at the regulated rate.
Therefore, the loss to the utilities occasioned by mandatory access is not their
right to a "market rate," as they claim, but is instead the right to lease space at
the regulated rate. This is the same rate they are receiving anyway under the
statutory scheme that was upheld in Florida Power.
Because the regulated rate satisfies the constitutional standard for just
compensation, the utilities are not constitutionally entitled to a modification of the
formula that would result in a higher rent. Nor is the Commission's
methodology arbitrary and capricious:
- 20-
1. The use of historical cost of the poles results in "just and reasonable"
compensation to the utilities and is more consistent with the language and
purpose of the Pole Attachments Act, which envisioned a simple and expeditious
calculation of rates. The use of forward-looking costs would entail the sort of
large-scale ratemaking proceeding that Congress directed the FCC to avoid.
2. The utilities claim that the rate paid by cable television attachers avoids
payment of the attachers' "fair share" of the unusable part of the utility pole.
The claim is based on a mischaracterization of the formula. The cable operators
in fact pay a share of the cost of the entire pole in direct proportion to the amount
of usable space occupied by the attachment. The fact that some
telecommunications attachments command a higher rate under the statutory
formula than the rate paid for cable television attachments is not of constitutional
significance and represents a permissible legislative judgment.
3. The FCC allows the utilities to put into the rate base only those
accounts that have a sufficient nexus to the cost of owning and maintaining the
utility poles. The Commission understands that some accounts it disallows
contain costs that have some relationship to the cost of pole attachments, just as it
knows that certain other accounts that overstate the expenses attributable to the
poles are allowed. It all washes out. Greater precision could be accomplished
only with a full-scale ratemaking proceeding.
Under this Court's prior precedent rule, a panel of this Court may not
overrule the holding of an earlier panel in GulfPower I that the Constitution
allows the FCC to make the initial determination ofjust compensation so long as
- 21 -
that determination is subject to judicial review. In any event, the holding in Gulf
Power I was a correct application of controlling Supreme Court precedent.
The FCC's jurisdiction over the complaint in this case was not affected by
this Court's decision in GulfPower II. The mandate in that case was stayed at
the time, and it continues to be stayed pending the disposition of writs of
certiorari. The holding in GulfPower IIis binding within this Circuit
notwithstanding the stay, but the parties to that case are not bound to act in
accordance with that holding so long as the stay of mandate is in effect.
The utilities' miscellaneous procedural arguments are without merit:
1. Their claim that they may be deprived of retroactive compensation if
they prevail in this case is devoid of analysis and ignores the authority of the
Court to require an agency to correct any errors it may find.
2. The complaint proceeding afforded the utilities the right to a hearing,
but they failed to identify any substantial and material questions of fact that
would warrant a hearing.
3. The Bureau's focused analysis of the record and explanation of its
decision was commensurate with the delegated responsibility to administer the
Cable Formula. The Bureau was not required to use the complaint proceeding as
an opportunity to reexamine settled Commission policy.
- 22 -
ARGUMENT
I. BOTH PETITIONS FOR REVIEW MUST BE DISMISSED.
We will not burden the Court with a recapitulation of the arguments made
in the motions to dismiss where we argued that judicial review may be sought
only of final agency action. Rather, because we anticipate that the Commission
will issue a final and reviewable decision on APCo's application for review in the
near future, we take this opportunity to note that a Commission decision will not
make moot the pending motions to dismiss. Both petitions for review of the
Bureau decision must still be dismissed.
The statutory time frame within which petitions for review may be filed is
a window that opens when the agency issues a final decision and closes on the
statutory deadline, here 60 days from the date of issuance. 47 U.S.C. § 402(a);
28 U.S.C. §§ 2342, 2344. The window will not open in this case until the
Commission issues its decision on review of the Bureau order. 47 U. S. C. §
155(c)(7). Petitions for review filed before the window opens, as in this case,
are incurably premature and must be dismissed, just as petitions filed after the
window closes are untimely and must be dismissed. 19
International Telecard Ass 'n v. FCC, 166 F.3d 387, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
Brotherhood ofRailway Carmen v. Pena, 64 F.3d 702,703 (D.C. Cir.
1995); Waterway Comm. Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 851 F.2d 401,405-06
(D.C. Cir. 1988)(discussing effect of similar language in 28 U.S.C. 2344
and 47 U.S.C. § 402(a).
- 23 -
The petition for review filed by Gulf Power is doubly defective. Petitions
for review may be filed only by parties to an agency proceeding unless the non 
party first files a petition for reconsideration with the agency. 20 Gulf Power did
not file such a petition, but instead, as mentioned, sought direct review of the
decision of the FCC's Cable Services Bureau. Gulf Power's petition must be
dismissed for this additional reason.
II. THE POLE ATTACHMENT FEE ALLOWED BY THE FCC IN
THIS CASE SATISFIES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF JUST COMPENSATION AND
REPRESENTS REASONED AGENCY DECISIONMAKING.
This Court declined in GulfPower I and GulfPower II, in the absence of a
concrete rate complaint to determine whether the Cable Formula produces a pole
attachment rate that satisfies the Fifth Amendment requirement ofjust
compensation. If and when the Court's jurisdiction is properly invoked in this
controversy, that is, when the FCC has issued a final and reviewable decision,
the Court will have before it an appropriate case in which to make that
determination, and it should rule that an annual rate of $7.47, the maximum
allowable by the order in this case, affords the utility all the compensation to
which it is constitutionally entitled. As we explain below, the $7.47 rate
See 28 U.S.C. § 2344; 47 U.S.C. § 405(a)(l); Erie-Niagara Rail Steering
Committee v. Suiface Trans. Bd., 167 F.3d 111 (2nd Cir. 1999) and cases
collected id. at 112.
.0
.'
'.
- 24 -
provides just compensation under any accepted rational measure, and the decision
to adhere to that measure represents reasoned agency decisionmaking.
A. The Element Of Mandatory Access Does Not Change The
Constitutional Sufficiency Of The Cable Formula Rate.
The utilities assert that, although $7.47 may satisfy the constitutional
requirements for traditional ratemaking, ordinary ratemaking principles govern
voluntary ventures only. They claim that the mandatory access provision added
to the Pole Attachments Act in 1996 requires a "paradigm shift" from ordinary
ratemaking principles to "a more rigorous standard for just compensation ...."
APCo brief at 13, 21; see American Electric Power Service Corp. ("AEP") brief
at 12-14. They calculate their entitlement to at least $38.81 per pole per year. A
few observations are sufficient to demonstrate the emptiness of the utilities'
theory.
First and preliminarily, the Supreme Court has held that the Takings
Clause does not prevent Congress, through just and reasonable rate regulation,
from preventing exploitation of monopoly power. When no fair market exists, as
in this case, sellers may not engage in profiteering under cover of the
Constitution and extract whatever they can get. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S.
325 (1949). Accordingly, the law of this Circuit is that a "bottleneck" seller
- 25 -
such as APCo is not entitled to the "hold-up" value of its property. 21 United
States v. 320.0 Acres ofLand, 605 F.2d 762, 782 (5
th
Cir. 1979). 22
Next and more specifically, as explained in the counterstatement, the cable
attachments occupy surplus capacity on the utility poles, space that would
otherwise generate no income at all. The utilities' core business or income
producing ability is not affected in any way by the mandatory access
requirement.23 Indeed, because the attachers separately pay up front all the
make-ready costs of the attachments, the annual pole rents represent pure profit
The utility intervenors argue that poles are "almost never bottleneck
facilities" despite the congressional judgment to the contrary. AEP brief at
18 n.9. See legislative history at page 10 above. That argument is
inconsistent with the utilities' admission that no market value can be
determined here. APCo brief at 29; AEP brief at 18. If the utilities can
demonstrate to Congress that the Pole Attachments Act has outlived its
usefulness, they may seek a political remedy; in the meantime, the Court
must defer to the legislative judgment, necessarily reaffirmed in the 1996
amendments to the Pole Attachments Act, that zoning, environmental, and
other considerations make the construction of multiple networks of poles
and ducts impractical at best.
See United States v. 0.161 Acres ofLand, 837 F.2d 1036,1039 n.1 (11
th
Cir. 1988)(recognizing as precedent decisions of the Fifth Circuit issued
before 1981.
The mandatory access provision applies only to excess capacity not needed
for electric service, and a utility may deny access where there is
insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability, and generally
acceptable engineering purposes. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(2). Access need not
be afforded at all if the utility does not use its poles for telecommunications
services. 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(l).
- 26 -
to the utilities that can be used to defray expenses that would otherwise be borne
entirely by the utility and its ratepayers. Thus, in a real economic sense, even at
the regulated rate, the utilities are in at least as good a position as if no
attachments had occurred.
Moreover, if Congress had not imposed a mandatory access requirement,
the utilities could lease surplus space voluntarily - but only at the same regulated
rate, a rate the Supreme Court upheld· as constitutional in FCC v. Florida Power
Corp., supra, 480 U.S. at 253-54. Because the pole owner would charge the
statutory rate if it voluntarily leased surplus capacity, the Constitution does not
give it the right to charge a higher rate for the same space when it is the subject
of mandatory access. The Supreme Court and this Court have squarely held that
the maximum price set by statute for a voluntary sale of property establishes its
value for just compensation purposes. United States v. Commodities Trading
Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 125-28 (1950); United States v. 320.0 Acres ofLand,
supra, 605 F.2d at 818 & n.128.
Put differently, under the utilities' own view, one generally acceptable
measure ofjust compensation is "what a willing buyer would pay to a willing
seller." APCo brief at 29; AEP brief at 14.
24
Here, that price has already been
The Supreme Court "has never attempted to prescribe a rigid rule for
determining what is 'just compensation' under all circumstances and in all
cases." United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123
(1950).
- 27 -
established to be the regulated rate. As described above at page 14', for nearly
two decades before the 1996 amendments made the attachments mandatory, the
utilities were quite willing to lease excess capacity to the cable systems at the
regulated rate calculated under the same methodology that applies today. 25 The
,-
transition from voluntary attachment to mandatory attachment has not changed
the intrinsic value of the space rented to the cable systems or in any way
increased the magnitude of the utilities' "loss," if the conversion of empty pole
space from fallow to income-producing, or limiting utilities to a reasonable rate,
can be called a loss.
In this case, then, there is no difference of constitutional significance
between the regulated pole attachment rate approved by the Supreme Court in
Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 254, and the "just compensation" rate triggered by
the mandatory access provision. Because the same Cable Formula applies to
both mandatory and voluntary access, the rent calculated under this formula puts
the utilities in the same position they would occupy if their decision to lease
surplus capacity were still voluntary, as it was before the 1996 amendments.
The utilities may not have liked the regulated rate, and may therefore
object to the characterization of themselves as a "willing seller," but the
fact remains that they voluntarily accepted the regulated rate from the cable
companies in this case for some 20 years.
- 28 -
B. The FCC's Administration Of The Cable Formula Is A
Reasonable Interpretation of Congressional Intent And Is
Consistent With Constitutional Requirements.
Congress directed the FCC to institute an expeditious program for
determining just and reasonable pole attachment rates, employing a minimum of
staff, paperwork, and procedures consistent with fair and efficient regulation.
Rather than "embark upon a large-scale ratemaking proceeding in each case
brought before it," the Commission was instructed to use rate of return and
capital cost factors already on file with other regulatory agencies. 26 Congress
understood that there may be some difficulty in determining whether a particular
capital or expense item incurred by the utility is attributable to the ownership and
maintenance of the utility poles. "For example, maintenance expenses of utility
pole crews may be difficult to assign where the same crew performs functions
other than maintaining utility poles. Likewise, general office salaries and
expenses may not be susceptible to clear attribution to pole maintenance
categories. "27 Nevertheless, Congress said, special accounting measures or
studies should not be necessary because the majority of cost and expense items
attributable to utility pole plant were already established and the information was
Sen. Rep. No. 95-580, supra, at 21.
Sen. Rep. No. 95-580, supra, at 20.
- 29 -
already a matter of public record. Congress told the FCC to "make its best
estimate" of some of the less readily identifiable costs. 28
The formula the Commission devised calculates the maximum pole
attachment rate by focusing on the upper end of the permissible statutory range of
rates, the fully allocated cost of the pole attachment, which is defined as "the
percentage of the total usable space ... which is occupied by the pole attachment
by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility
attributable to the entire pole ...." 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(I). The "actual capital
costs" are the depreciated cost of the poles. The"operating expenses" consist of
the utility's administrative, maintenance and depreciation expenses, a return on
investment, and taxes. As directed by Congress, the Commission relies on
investment and expense data the utilities maintain in their accounting records and
report publicly on an annual basis. The formula also relies on rebuttable
presumptions regarding pole height, usable space available, the amount of usable
space occupied, and the identification of pertinent cost accounts.
29
The utilities say that the regulated rate is constitutionally deficient, or is at
least arbitrary and capricious, because the Commission uses historical cost in
Sen. Rep. No. 95-580, supra, at 19-21.
See generally Amendment ofRules and Policies Governing Pole
Attachments, supra, 15 FCC Rcd 6453; Amendment ofRules and Policies
Governing the Attachment ofCable Television Hardware to Utility Poles,
supra, 2 FCC Rcd 4387; 47 C.F.R. § 1.1401 et seq.
- 30 -
calculating the cost of the pole rather than replacement cost, and because the rate
allegedly fails to consider the cost of the unusable part of the pole and certain
allegedly pertinent operating expenses. See APCo brief at 23-37; AEP brief at 9 
11, 14-23. We established in the preceding section that the utilities are not
constitutionally entitled to more than the regulated rate for voluntary attachments,
so they cannot be constitutionally entitled to cost factors and computations that
would raise the regulated rate for mandatory attachments beyond that which is
just and reasonable. If the utilities are to succeed in their challenge to the
absence of certain cost factors, they must demonstrate that the absence represents
arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking or violates a constitutional imperative.
They have not done so.
1. Historical Cost ofthe Poles. The utilities fault the Commission for
using the actual historical cost of the poles in calculating the fully allocated cost
of the attachment to that pole. They insist that the Commission should instead
ascertain and plug in to the formula the replacement cost of the pole. APCo brief
at 30-33; AEP brief at 14-17, 19-22.
Preliminary, we note that the utilities rely entirely on cases and treatises
that discuss government condemnation in which property is confiscated and
disposed of and must eventually be replaced by the property owner. A pole
attachment does not displace the utility from its own use of the pole. See 47
U.S.C. § 224(t)(2). Because the utility's interest in the property is not destroyed
and need not be replaced, requiring the use of replacement cost as a measure of
compensation is not required, as cases have held where, as here, no one would
- 31 -
think of replacing the property taken. See United States v. Toronto H & B Nav.
Co., 338 U.S. 396,403 (1949).
The issue, however, is not whether the use of replacement costs may ever
be constitutionally required, or whether historical costs may in some
circumstances be inappropriate. None of the cases cited by APCo or AEP holds
that a methodology based on replacement costs is the only constitutionally
acceptable methodology. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has made clear
that the Taking Clause does not incorporate a one-size-fits-all approach and that
different methods may be appropriate in different circumstances. United States
v. Cors, supra, 337 U.S. at 332 ("The Court in its construction of the
constitutional provision has been careful not to reduce the concept of 'just
compensation' to a formula. ").
The question, rather, is whether it is constitutionally permissible for
Congress and the FCC to use historical costs in the circumstances presented here.
Even if the Court reviews this issue de novo, it is permissible to use this
methodology because, as we have shown, historical costs have consistently been
used to determine the maximum rate for voluntary access; the Supreme Court in
Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 254, has rejected a constitutional challenge to the use
of historical costs in the context of pole attachment rates; and a formula using
historical costs puts utilities in as good a position as they would be in if utilities
voluntarily leased access, and in a better position than if there were no pole
attachments at all.
- 32 -
The FCC's decision to use historical costs is more consistent with the
language and purpose of the Pole Attachments Act than an interpretation using
forward-looking costs. First, § 224(d)(l) requires the Commission to use "actual
capital costs" in calculating the utility's costs, and this language clearly indicates
that Congress expected the Commission to use costs as recorded in books of
account and not an estimate of capital costs for a replacement network of poles.
Second, Congress instructed the FCC to develop a regulatory framework
that may be applied "simply and expeditiously" with "a minimum of staff,
paperwork and procedures consistent with fair and efficient regulation. ,,30
Switching to a methodology based on forward-looking economic costs would
cause significant disruption and impose significant costs on attachers and the
FCC. Such a change would require the Commission to develop a new formula
that would likely involve complicated pricing investigations, precisely the sort of
formal ratemaking proceedings that Congress directed the FCC to avoid. The
continued use of historical cost and readily available data, in contrast, is
conducive to success in private negotiation, which has long been a cornerstone of
the FCC's pole attachment regulatory program and which has deflected countless
disputes that would otherwise have to be settled by the FCC. 31
S. Rep. No. 95-580, supra, at 21.
See Amendment ofRules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, supra,
15 FCC Rcd at 6460-61.
- 33 -
APCo correctly notes that the FCC uses a "forward-looking" cost
methodology in its interconnection pricing rules for incumbent local exchange
carriers ("ILECs"). APCo brief at 33 n.20. 32 However, the Commission has a
rational basis for choosing different pricing methodologies in different contexts.
In the Universal Service Order and Local Competition Order, 33 the Commission
explained that, in connection with universal service requirements and
interconnection agreements, ratemaking on the basis of forward-looking
economic cost would best effectuate the pertinent objectives of the 1996 Act.
Those objectives were to stimulate competition in local telecommunications
markets, to ensure the efficient use of existing network facilities, and to
encourage new entrants to make economically rational decisions about whether or
how to enter a given local market. A forward-looking methodology was
particularly important in that context because the agency had determined that a
firm considers forward-looking costs, not historical costs, in making decisions
APCo fails to distinguish reproduction costs from forward-looking costs,
which are not necessarily the same. Reproduction costs are incurred when
property is replaced with identical property, whereas the version of
forward-looking costs adopted in the interconnection context represents the
most efficient property that will perform the same function.
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 FCC Rcd 87 (1997)
(sub. history omitted); Implementation ofthe Local Competition Provisions
in the Telecommunications Act of1996, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 (1997) (sub.
history omitted).
- 34 -
about entry, expansion, and price. 34 In addition, Congress had expressed no
preference for historical costs in that context, and indeed had directed the
Commission to determine costs "without reference to a rate-of-return or other
rate-based proceeding." See 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(l)(A)(i). In fact, use of
historical costs in this context would be extremely complicated.
By contrast, the predominant legislative goal for the Pole Attachments Act
was to establish a relatively simple mechanism whereby unfair pole attachment
rates and practices could be reviewed and sanctioned. That goal has been well
served for nearly 25 years under a regime that evaluates rates on the basis of
historical costs, consistent with Congress' expectations.
2. Unusable Pole Space. The utilities claim that the Cable Formula
does not require attachers to pay their fair share of unusable pole space and argue
that cable operators should be required to pay the same rate as
telecommunications attachers in order to provide just compensation to the utility.
APCo brief at 23-28. It is difficult to comprehend how a failure to compensate
the utilities for the unused and unusable portion of their poles amounts to a loss
of constitutional dimensions.
In any event, the utilities mischaracterize the formula. While under certain
circumstances the statutory formula for telecommunications attachments will
Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15813, 15817, 15846, " 620,
630,679.
- 35 -
produce a higher rate than the formula for cable television attachments, both
rates are based on a calculation of the costs associated with the entire pole. The
statute and the implementing regulations make this plain.
The rate for cable television attachments is prescribed in 47 U.S. C. §
224(d), which states: "[A] rate is just and reasonable if it assures a utility the
recovery of not less than the additional costs of providing pole attachments, nor
more than an amount determined by multiplying the percentage of usable space
'" which is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum of the operating expenses
and actual capital costs of the utility attributable to the entire pole ...."
(emphasis added) Section 1. 1409(e)(l) of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. §
1.1409(e)(l), expresses the rate mathematically:
Maximum Space Occupied by Attachment Net Cost of Carrying Charge
Rate = Total Usable Space X Bare Pole X. Rate
In other words, the cable operators pays a share of the cost of the entire
pole in direct proportion to the amount of usable space occupied by the cable
attachment.
The structure of the telecommunications rate, which is being phased in
over a five year period commencing February 2001, 47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(4), 47
C.F.R. § 1.1409(e)(2), is more complicated. That rate, too, calculates the costs
associated with the entire pole, but the rate varies with the number of attachers.
47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(2) first specifies a calculation of the costs of a portion of the
unusable part of the pole: "A utility shall apportion the cost of providing space
on a pole ... other than the usable space among entities so that such
- 36 -
apportionment equals two-thirds of the costs of providing space other than the
usable space that would be allocated to such entity under an equal apportionment
of such costs among all attaching entities." 47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(3) then specifies
the calculation of the cost of a portion of the usable part of the pole, which is
different from the usable space costs calculated under the 224(d) formula, that
must be added to the unusable space costs: "A utility shall apportion the cost of
providing usable space among all entities according to the percentage of usable
space required for each entity." The telecommunications rate equals the usable
space costs plus the unusable space costs. 47 C.F.R. § 1.1409(e)(2). The
mathematical expression of the telecommunications rate is:
Maximum
Rate =
Usable Space~Unusable Space Net Cost
=O=cc=u=p=ie=d~_+-,----=3~-.!.x:------!.#~o=f-,-A=tt=a=ch~e~rs::.--x of x
Pole Height Bare Pole
Carrying
Charge
Rate
The legislative history does not explain why Congress chose a different
rate formula for telecommunications attachments when it amended the Pole
Attachments Act in 1996, but it can be inferred that Congress expected the
number of attachers to increase over the years, which would reduce the rates paid
by each user. Indeed, with several attachers, the telecommunications rate for
each individual attacher can actually be less than the cable rate (although the total
payments from all telecommunications attachers will always exceed the payment
from a cable company).
In any event, the utilities are correct that a telecommunications attacher
may pay more than a single cable television attacher. APCo brief at 23. But
they are wrong in claiming that the cable attachers are not paying a share of the
- 37 -
cost of the entire pole, as the 224(d) formula clearly shows. Their complaint that
the disparity in the two rates is "unfair" and "indefensible" (APCo brief at 23,
24) is merely their quarrel with Congress's legislative judgment. Given, as
explained above, that the Section 224(d) cable television rate provides
constitutional just compensation, the FCC's decision to enforce that rate, which
implements the statutory directive, was not arbitrary or capricious.
3. Miscellaneous Accounts. The FCC publishes a schedule of FERC
accounts that are related to the cost of owning and maintaining the utility poles
and are therefore incorporated in the rate base of the Cable Formula. 35 The
utilities point to nine FERC cost accounts associated with their operating
expenses and capital costs that they say should be included in the rate base.
These accounts include the cost of grounds and arrestors, the cost of clearing
rights of way, and the cost of certain transportation and storage equipment.
APCo brief at 34-35
The utilities have been making this argument for years in various contexts,
and the Commission has consistently held that the proffered accounts do not
contain any significant costs that should be allocated to the ownership or
maintenance of the poles. Under the Pole Attachments Act, only the costs or
expenses that have a sufficient nexus to the operating expenses and capital costs
See Amendment ofRules and Policies Governing the Attachment ofCable
Television Hardware to Utility Poles, supra, 2 FCC Rcd at 4404.
- 38 -
of the utility attributable to the pole must be included in the formula. 47 U.S.C.
§ 224(d)(l). Here, each account proffered by the utilities contains costs that are
more directly related to the utility's core business function of energy distribution,
and so the Commission has declared that it would not be reasonable or just to
include these accounts in the calculation of the pole attachment rate. 36
The Commission just recently reevaluated its formula methodology and
reaffirmed this conclusion. The Commission acknowledged that some of the
costs within the proffered accounts may have some relationship to pole
attachments, but the agency determined that "any increased accuracy that would
be derived from including some minute percentage of pole-related expenses that
may be recorded in miscellaneous accounts is outweighed by the complexity of
arriving at an appropriate and equitable percentage of the expenses. ,,37 The
Commission noted that the inclusion of the proffered accounts "would have the
significant disadvantage of requiring the allocation of portions of FERC accounts
See id., 2 FCC Rcd at 4389-93; TCA Management Co. v. Southwestern
Public Service Co., 10 FCC Rcd 11832 (1995); Panhandle TV & Cable
Co. v. Potomac Edison Co., 1984 FCC LEXIS 2131 (1984); Multi 
Channel TV Cable Co. ofMansfield, Inc. v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co., 52 Rad. Rep.2d (P&F) 1502 (1983).
Amendment ofRules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, supra, 15
FCC Rcd at 6475.
- 39 -
into rate-based calculations turning virtually every rate dispute into a full-blown,
discovery-laden case. "38
Contrary to the utilities' assertions, the Cable Formula does incorporate all
capital and operating expenses reasonably and readily attributable to pole plant.
However, the Cable Formula does not purport to be a precise ratemaking tool, in
keeping with the Congressional directive.that the Commission should not become
mired in special accounting studies and other ratemaking minutia. Rather, the
Commission was told to use public information readily available and to "make its
best estimate" of some of the less readily identifiable costs. 39 As a result, the
formula quite possibly does omit some costs that might be included in a formal
ratemaking proceeding. But the formula also allows certain accounts that
overstate the expenses attributable to poles. As the Commission recently
explained: "The potential for inclusion of unrelated expenses in certain accounts
must be balanced with the inability to recover other minor expenses that may
have a legitimate nexus to pole attachments that are included in unrelated
accounts. Our policy has been that not every detail of pole attachment cost must
be accounted for, nor every detail of non-pole attachment cost eliminated from
Id. at 6476 (footnote omitted)
Sen. Rep. No. 95-580, supra, at 19-21.
- 40 -
every account used. "40 For example, administrative accounts include expenses
such as research and development for highly complex technological and business
planning projects which would far exceed the administrative oversight for poles.
The Commission includes those accounts, however, because the bulk of the
expenses in the accounts are relevant to plant investment.
It is not necessary to categorize precisely all miscellaneous expenses in the
accounts used in the formula because it all balances out, and neither the
Constitution nor the public interest nor elemental fairness requires anything more
than that. As the Supreme Court said in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488,
U.S. 299, 314 (1989), "Inconsistencies in one aspect of the methodology have no
constitutional effect on the utility's property if they are compensated by
countervailing factors in some other respect."
III. THE RATE COMPLAINT PROCEEDING WAS
JURISDICTIONALLY SOUND AND PROCEDURALLY FAIR.
A. Separation ofPowers. The utility intervenors, but not APCo, ask
the Court to "reconsider and reverse" the holding in GulfPower I, 187 F. 3d at
1333-34, that the Constitution allows an administrative agency to make the initial
determination ofjust compensation, so long as that determination is subject to
judicial review. AEP brief at 23. The utilities should have sought rehearing en
banc or certiorari in GulfPower I, because under this Court's prior precedent
Amendment ofRules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, supra, 15
FCC Rcd at 6463-64.
- 41 -
rule, a panel cannot overrule a prior panel's holding even if convinced it is
wrong. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (1 ph Cir.
1998)(en bane); Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386 (1Ith Cir.1997) (liThe
law of this circuit is I emphatic I that only the Supreme Court or this court sitting
en bane can judicially overrule a prior panel decision. "), cert. denied, 530 U.S.
1080 (1998); accord United States V. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11 th Cir.
1993).
At any rate, GulfPower I was correct in holding that the 1996 Pole
Attachments Act provides a constitutionally sound process for obtaining
compensation that includes adequate judicial participation, and the utilities
identify no new developments that justify revisiting this holding. The issue
resolved in GulfPower I is not whether the courts are the ultimate arbiters of
constitutional requirements, for clearly they are. See Commodities Trading
Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 n.3 (1950). Rather, the question is whether it is
unconstitutional for Congress or an agency to play any role at all in the process.
With respect to compensation for pole attachments, Congress has provided an
ample role for the courts. If pole owners believe that the FCC has established an
inadequate rate because it either interpreted or applied the formula incorrectly,
they may seek judicial review of the FCC's decision. 47 U. S. C. § 402(a). In
fact, the utilities here argue that the statutory formula is unconstitutional and that
the Court can provide complete relief - notwithstanding the FCC's role in the
process. See APCo brief at 46 (summarizing relief requested).
- 42 -
The case on which the utilities primarily rely in making this argument is
consistent with GulfPower I and other recent cases. See AEP brief at 23-24,
discussing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
This Court in GulfPower I addressed Monongahela and held that "the fact that
our constitutional scheme dictates that the judicial branch is entrusted with the
ultimate responsibility for ensuring that just compensation is awarded does not
mean the other branches of government must be excluded from the process of
determining the proper level ofjust compensation." 187 F.3d at 1333; see
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 151 n.39 (1974), where
the Court said that Monongahela "did no more than restate the general principle
that the courts, not the legislature, are ultimately entrusted with assuring
compliance with constitutional commands" concerning just compensation for
physical takings" (emphasis added). 41
The Seventh and Second Circuits also have held correctly that
Monongahela does not bar an administrative agency from setting the
amount of compensation in the first instance because the requirement of a
judicial determination "is satisfied by the availability ofjudicial review."
See Wisconsin Central Limited v. Public Service Commission ofWisconsin,
95 F.3d 1359, 1369 (7th Cir. 1996); Metropolitan Transportation
Authority v. ICC, 792 F.2d 287,296 (2d Cir. 1986), rejecting the claim
that a statute was unconstitutional "because an administrative agency rather
than a court determines the compensation and because the statute ties the
agency's hands in determination of that amount."
- 43 -
B. Jurisdiction Over The Complaint. In GulfPower II this Court held
that the FCC has no statutory authority to regulate the rates for cable television
pole attachments that are used to provide Internet service. 208 F.3d at 1276 
1278. On motion by the FCC and its supporting intervenors, the Court's
mandate was stayed pending writ of certiorari. See Order, dated October 12,
2000. The petitions for writs of certiorari were subsequently granted sub nom.
National Cable Television Ass'n v. GulfPower Co., Case No. 00-832.
Notwithstanding the stay of mandate, APCo contends, as it did in its
unsuccessful motion for stay in this Court, that the FCC was required to dismiss
the complaint in this case because the issue presented was the rate to be charged
for attachments by cable companies that were allegedly providing commingled
cable and Internet service. APCo brief at 40-41.
APCo misapprehends the significance of the mandate. The stay of
mandate "in no way affects the duty of this panel and the courts in this circuit to
apply now the precedent established by [the case] as binding authority," Martin
v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944,945 n.1 (11
th
Cir. 1992), but the value of the case is
for "the courts in this circuit." Ibid.. Such precedential value is irrelevant to
whether the FCC was obliged to follow the decision in GulfPower II
notwithstanding the stay of mandate.
The advisory committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure has
explained that a judgment or order of a court of appeals "is not final until
issuance of the mandate; at that time the parties' obligations become fixed. "
Advisory Committee Notes, 1998 Amendments, Rule 41, Subdivision (c).
- 44-
Similarly, this Court has observed the importance of the mandate when it said:
"Until the mandate issues, an appellate judgment is not final; the decision
reached in the opinion may be revised by the panel, or reconsidered by the en
banc court, or certiorari may be granted by the Supreme Court." Flagship
Marine Services, Inc. v. Belcher Towing Co., 23 F.3d 341, 342 (lr
h
Cir. 1994).
In other words, the holding in GulfPower II, and the precedential value
within the Eleventh Circuit, is extant. The mandate, and the parties' obligation
to comply with the holding, are not. The jurisdiction of the FCC is not affected
by the GulfPower II decisiop so long as the mandate is stayed. Any other
interpretation would render the stay of mandate meaningless.
C. Other Objections. The utilities assert that the Commission's pole
attachment complaint proceeding is defective because "if and when" they are
ultimately successful in their claim that they are entitled to more than the
statutory rate, "there may not be any process that will compensate APCo
retroactively" because the FCC "apparently lacks the statutory authority to order
a cable company to retroactively pay a charge higher than the statutory
maximum." APCo brief at 38 (emphasis added). This same argument was part
of the utilities' facial attack on the statute in GulfPower I. The argument was
rejected there because it was entirely hypothetical. GulfPower I, 187 F.3d at
1136 & n.9.
The utilities have done nothing to transform their hypothetical argument.
They make no attempt to show why, or under what circumstances specific to this
case, the Commission's administrative procedures cannot provide the
- 45 -
compensation to which they are entitled.
42
They still rely on conclusory
assertions that make impossible any meaningful reply. We do note, however,
that the utilities ask the Court in the Conclusion to their brief to order the cable
companies to pay just compensation retroactively to the date of the alleged
taking, APCo brief at 46, which would seem to belie their fear that the system
will leave them without adequate redress.
In that regard,. we note also that pole attachment ratemaking is not a
tariffed activity, so an order of retroactive compensation would not seem to run
afoul of the general proscription against retroactive ratemaking. 43 Rather, the
attachment rates are set by private contract based on the federal model. Ifthe
rates were found to be constitutionally inadequate, it would appear that the
general remedial power of the courts could ensure that just compensation is
awarded from the date of the taking.
In lieu of meaningful analysis on this issue, the utilities resurrect the
canard they uttered in their unsuccessful motion for stay that the question of
retroactive compensation would be moot if the FCC had not played "fast and
loose" with its commitments to this Court. APCo brief at 38-39 & n.24. APCo
The FCC has broad authority to take such actions "as may be necessary in
the execution of its functions." 47 U.S.C. § 154(i). One such function is
to carry out any mandate (absent a stay of mandate) issued by a court
reviewing the agency's decisions.
See, e.g., Public Utilities Comm'n ofCalif. v. FERC, 988 F.2d 154,160
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
.-
- 46 -
continues to claim that the FCC assured the Court in the GulfPower I
proceeding that it would stay any order pending judicial review which had the
effect of lowering the compensation demanded by a utility for providing
mandatory access, and that the FCC has dishonored that promise in this case. As
we assured the Court in our opposition to motion for stay, 44 the FCC never made
any such promise. On the contrary, the FCC, through the Department of Justice,
stated that "the FCC has the power to stay its rate order pending review by the
court of appeal." Letter from Alisa Klein to Thomas K. Kahn, Clerk of the
Court, dated Feb. 26, 1999, at page 2 (Attachment C to APCo Motion for Stay).
The Government did not state or imply that a stay would be granted as a matter
of course. Indeed, the FCC, like this Court, has explicit standards for the
exercise of its stay power. See, e.g., Application ofSCANA Comm., Inc., 15
FCC Rcd 9203, 9204~4 (Wireless Bureau 2000). An order granting a stay
would never be automatic, either by the FCC or by this Court, as APCo should
know.
45
Next, the utilities claim that the complaint process violates their due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment because "pole complaints normally are
See "Opposition to Motion for Stay Pending Review," filed by the FCC on
November 3, 2000, at pages 8-9.
By Order dated January 3, 2000, this Court denied APCo's motion for stay
pending review. The FCC cannot be faulted for declining to issue a stay
where this Court itself found no basis for doing so.
- 47 -
to be adjudicated on the basis of the pleadings, without the opportunity for a
hearing." AEP brief at 27. The argument is puzzling inasmuch as the utilities
cite in support of the argument Section 1.1411 of the Commission's rules, 47
C.F.R. § 1.1411, which states quite clearly: "The Commission may decide each
complaint upon the filings and information before it ... or may, in its discretion,
order evidentiary procedures upon any issues it finds to have been raised by the
filings." Ifthe utilities are claiming that they were denied a right to a hearing in
this case, they must identify some substantial and material question of fact that
warrants a hearing, but they have not done so. Indeed, no one disputed the
material facts in this case; rather, the dispute centered on the methodology that
should be employed for calculating just compensation - a legal issue that does not
warrant an evidentiary hearing. 46
Finally, the utilities allege "that the FCC did not even consider the
evidence submitted by the parties," nor did it "provide a reasoned explanation for
its decision." APCo brief at 43, 44. The utilities' real complaint is that the
The Commission's discretion and expertise in deciding whether to hold an
evidentiary hearing are "paramount," and the court's role in reviewing that
decision is a limited one. United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 90-91 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)(en bane); see, e.g., Gencom Inc. v. FCC, 832F~2d171, 181
(D.C. Cir. 1987). To the extent the utilities claim that a hearing before the
FCC would be constitutionally inadequate because they are entitled "to a
full trial on the merits in an independent forum," AEP brief at 28 n.11,
this Court in GulfPower I has already rejected that claim. 187 F.3d at
1333-34. See also page 41 above.
- 48 -
Cable Services Bureau did not use this complaint proceeding as a vehicle for
reexamining the Cable Formula and overturning the FCC's recently released pole
attachments rulemaking. 47
The Bureau acknowledged that it was declining to address the specific
issues relating to the application of the formula because "[a]ll of these arguments
have been addressed and rejected in prior Commission Orders," and because
"under any scenario proposed by [APCo], [the cable companies'] agreed rate of
$7.47 exceeds the fully allocated costs." Bureau Order at' 5 & n.17. Indeed,
the utilities concede that APCo is entitled to only $6.30 under the Cable
Formula. APCo brief at 9 n. 7.
The utilities' "evidence" constituted an attack on the Cable Formula itself,
which was not within the purview of the Cable Services Bureau to entertain. The
limited scope of the Bureau's review of the evidence and the focused explanation
for its decision were entirely commensurate with its delegated responsibility to
administer the Cable Formula as adopted by Congress and administered by the
Commission. A more elaborate review of the case should and must await a
Commission decision on APCo's pending application for review. 48
See Amendment ofRules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, supra,
15 FCC Rcd 6453 (2000).
In any event, the Bureau did not prescribe a new rate, but merely directed
the parties to negotiate further. Bureau Order at , 17. Any more detailed
review of the evidence can await an actual prescription.
- 49 -
CONCLUSION
The captioned petitions for review should be dismissed. Ifthe Court
chooses to reach the merits of this case, the decision of the FCC's Cable Services
Bureau should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN M. NANNES
Acting Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT B. NICHOLSON
ROBERT J. WIGGERS
Attorneys
United States Department
of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
May 4,2001
JANEE. MAGO
Acting General Counsel
JOHN E. INGLE
Deputy Associate General Counsel
j
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! . ..........._------
GREGORY M. HRISTOPHER
Counsel
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
(202) 418-1753
Certificate of Compliance
Pursuant to Rule 37(a) of the FederalRules of Appellate Procedure, I
hereby certify that the foregoing brief contains 11,895 words.
I 'j /1/ . // .
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Gregoiy/M. Christopher '.)
00-14763-i
_ IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Alabama Power Company, et aI., Petitioners,
v.
Federal Communications Commission and USA, Respondents.
Certificate OfService
I, Sharon D. Freeman, hereby certify that the foregoing printed "Brief For Respondents" was served this 4th
day of May, 2001, by mailing true copies thereof, postage prepaid, to the following persons at the addresses
listed below:
J. Russell Campbell
Andrew Tunnell
Balch & Bingham LLP
1710 Sixth Avenue, North
Birmingham AL 35203
Counsel For: Alabama Power Company & Gulf Power
Company
Anthony C. Epstein
Steptoe & Johnson LLP
1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington DC 20036
Counsel For: MCI WORLDCOM Inc.
Raymond A. Kowalski
Keller and Heckman LLP
1001 G Street, N.W.
Suite 500 West
Washington DC 20001
Counsel For: Alabama Power Company & Gulf Power
Company
Thomas P. Steindler
McDermott, Will & Emery
600 13th Street, N.W.
Washington DC 20005-3096
Counsel For: American Electric Power Service Corp.,
et al.
Charles A. Zdebski
Troutman Sanders LLP
401 9th Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington DC 20004-2134
Counsel For: Atlantic City Electric Company, et al.
Report No. 12
Geoffrey C. Cook
Cole, Raywid & Braverman, L.L.P.
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, N,W.
Suite 200
Washington DC 20006
Counserfor: Alabama Cable Tel. Assn., et al.
Michael A. Gross
Florida Cable Telecommunications Assoc., Inc.
246 E. 6th Avenue
Tallahassee,FL FL 32303
Counsel For: Florida Cable Telecommunications
Assoc., Inc.
Ralph A. Peterson
Beggs & Lane .
3 West Garden Street, 7th Floor
P.O. Box 12950
Pennsacola FL 32576-2950
.~.
Counsel For: Gulf Power Company
Robert J. Wiggers
U.S. Dept. of Justice
Antitrust Div., Appellate Section, Rm. 10535
Patrick Henry Bldg., 601 D St., N.W.
Washington DC 20530
Counsel For: USA
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