1FACT SHEET: FCC MOBILE SPECTRUM HOLDINGS RULES
May 15, 2014
PRO-CONSUMER STEP TO PRESERVE AND PROMOTE COMPETITION IN THE MOBILE MARKETPLACE
Wireless providers use spectrum – the invisible infrastructure used by wireless devices such as 
smartphones and tablets—to provide communications services.
? Access to spectrum is an essential input for the provision of mobile wireless services. 
? Demand for these services has grown sharply in recent years and projections indicate continued 
growth (Source: FCC 2013 Mobile Competition Report). 
? In order for wireless providers to meet skyrocketing demand for mobile broadband, they need to 
put new spectrum to use and make more efficient use of existing spectrum holdings.
Spectrum is a finite resource integral to providing mobile broadband service.  No one or two providers 
should be able to dominate use of wireless airwaves.
? Not all spectrum is created equal: mobile providers use a mix of both low-band “coverage”
spectrum, which operates at lower frequencies, and high-band “capacity” spectrum, which operates 
at higher frequencies.
? Low-band spectrum, below 1 GHz, is relatively scarce, and has special properties that facilitate 
wireless service across long distances and through barriers, such as walls. It’s very useful for 
deploying in rural areas and providing service in urban buildings.
? High-band spectrum, like AWS-1, has more available bandwidth, meaning that it has more data 
capacity, but it doesn’t travel as well over distances or through walls.
? The two largest nationwide mobile wireless providers hold a combined share of approximately 70%
of all low-band spectrum licenses; the other two other nationwide providers hold a combined share 
of approximately 15% of all low-band spectrum licenses.
In 2012, the FCC initiated a fresh look at its mobile spectrum holding policies.
? In recent years, large and small wireless providers, as well as trade associations and public interest 
groups, requested that the FCC review its current policies regarding mobile spectrum holdings. 
? In its review, the FCC sought comment on ensuring that its policies promote competition and 
provide the clarity needed to make informed investment decisions, including participation in the 
upcoming Incentive Auction. 
For consumers, the proposed mobile spectrum holdings rules will mean more competition in more 
markets. All American consumers should enjoy the benefits that competition can bring:  more choices 
of wireless providers, lower prices, and higher quality mobile services.
? More competition means a thriving mobile marketplace, offering Americans high-quality service and 
choice no matter where they live. 
? Access to additional spectrum is necessary for smaller, regional, and rural wireless providers to be 
able to build their next-generation networks and deliver these offerings to consumers in both rural 
and urban areas. 
2Increasing competitive access to low-band spectrum will enhance wireless competition and service in 
rural areas.
? Lack of coverage and competition is a significant problem for Americans living in rural areas. 
? 92 percent of non-rural consumers, but only 37 percent of rural consumers, are covered by at least 
four 3G or 4G mobile wireless providers’ networks.
? Part of the solution requires making sure that all providers have access to much-needed low band 
spectrum.
MOBILE SPECTRUM HOLDINGS REPORT & ORDER
REASONABLE, BALANCED APPROACH
There are three interrelated parts to the Mobile Spectrum Holdings Report & Order: 
1) Transaction reviews generally;
2) Transaction reviews involving spectrum below 1 GHz; and
3) Auction-specific policies.
I. Transaction rules – General
? Under the Communications Act, when reviewing any proposed spectrum license assignment or 
transfer application, the Commission must determine whether the proposed transaction will serve 
the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
? The FCC currently uses a “spectrum screen,” among other factors, when reviewing transactions to 
determine whether they are in the public interest. 
? The current spectrum screen considers the total amount of spectrum suitable and available for 
mobile broadband held in a market by a wireless provider. 
? The screen can trigger a more detailed competitive analysis by the FCC. Currently, the trigger occurs 
when a wireless provider holds approximately 1/3 or more of the available spectrum in a given 
market.
? The Commission will continue to use this 1/3 spectrum screen threshold and will evaluate 
transactions on a case-by-case basis.  
? In light of recent and upcoming auctions and rule changes, the Commission added and subtracted
certain spectrum bands to the screen, based on whether today that spectrum is “suitable” and 
“available” for mobile broadband.  
II. Transaction rules below 1 GHz
? The Commission will continue to use a case-by-case review for transactions involving spectrum 
below 1 GHz, as described above.
? Aggregation of approximately 1/3 or more of available low-band spectrum in a market will be an 
“enhanced factor” in the Commission’s competitive analysis of a proposed transaction.   
? The importance of this uniquely valuable spectrum for promoting competition requires this
enhanced review.
3III. Auction-specific policies for AWS-3 and 600 MHz/Incentive Auction.
AWS-3 (“Capacity”) Spectrum:
? In light of the relative abundance of high-band spectrum and current holdings by multiple providers, 
there will be no auction-specific limits; all providers would be able to bid for as much as they want, 
regardless of their existing spectrum holdings.   
600 MHz/Incentive Auction (“Coverage”) Spectrum: 
EVERY PROVIDER CAN BID FOR SPECTRUM IN EVERY MARKET; NO PROVIDER WILL BE EXCLUDED
To promote effective competition in the wireless marketplace, reasonable spectrum aggregation rules 
in the upcoming Incentive Auction are tailored to promote participation by both small and large 
providers and to ensure no one or two providers can “run the table.”
? There will be a significant amount of spectrum available to all bidders in all markets.  
? To promote competition in the auction and in the marketplace, the rules establish a market-based 
reserve of up to 30 megahertz of spectrum targeted for providers that currently hold less than 1/3 
of suitable and available low-band spectrum in a license area.
? The actual amount of spectrum available only to reserve-eligible bidders will be determined when 
bidding in the auction hits a spectrum reserve trigger that fairly distributes the responsibility for 
satisfying the costs of the Incentive Auction among all bidders.  Specifically, the spectrum reserve 
trigger will occur at the point when bidding in the forward auction satisfies the final stage rule, and 
the total amount of licensed spectrum in the forward auction is finalized.  
? When the trigger is reached, the amount of reserved spectrum in each license area will be 
established based on demand in that license area by eligible bidders. 
? If demand for the reserved spectrum is less than the maximum applicable amount of reserved 
spectrum at the trigger point, the balance would be available on an unreserved basis. 
? For example, if there is 100 megahertz of spectrum available in the Incentive Auction, no more than 
30 megahertz would be reserved for eligible bidders.  But if eligible bidders demand only 20 
megahertz in a given license area when the trigger is met, then only 20 megahertz would be 
reserved, and 80 megahertz would remain unreserved. 
? Any nationwide provider that holds approximately 1/3 or more of available low-band spectrum in a 
license area would be able to bid on all unreserved spectrum in that area, but would be ineligible to 
bid on any reserved spectrum.  
? Any provider that holds less than 1/3 of available low-band spectrum in a license area would be able 
to bid on all unreserved spectrum, AND all reserved spectrum in that license area.    
? Non-nationwide providers will be able to bid on both reserved and unreserved spectrum in all 
license areas.
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