The Honorable Mark Warner  
United States Senate  
475 Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Warner:

Thank you for your letter regarding the important issue of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, the security of the nation’s networks, and the equipment and devices that attach to the networks to deliver integrated Internet-powered services to citizens and businesses.

Cybersecurity has been a top priority for the Commission during my tenure. As you note, the rapid growth of network-connected consumer devices creates particular cybersecurity challenges. The Commission’s oversight of our country’s privately owned and managed communications networks is an important component of the larger effort to protect critical communications infrastructure and the American public from malicious cyber actors. The Commission is uniquely situated to comprehensively address this issue given its authority over the use of radio spectrum as well as the connections to and interconnections between commercial networks, which touch virtually every aspect of our economy. Other agencies have also begun looking at network-connected devices and the security implications they bring in certain industry segments.1

As your letter suggests, the Commission’s Open Internet Order’s rules enable Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to take measures to protect their networks, and those with which they interconnect, from harmful devices. These rules make clear that providers not only have the latitude to take actions to protect consumers from harm, but have the responsibility to do so. The Open Internet Order in particular emphasizes that reasonable network management incorporates practices “ensuring network security and integrity,” including by “addressing traffic harmful to the network,” such as denial of service attacks.2 The Open Internet Order thus affirms ISPs’

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ability to take measures to protect the network. This policy builds on FCC rules that have, for decades, given providers of wireline telecommunications the right to "temporarily discontinue service forthwith" in the face of imminent harm. More broadly, the recent D.C. Circuit decision upholding the Commission's authority over broadband networks empowers it to address core network issues.

In recognition of the Commission's authority over telecommunications networks, Commission staff have been actively examining cyber challenges presented by today's end-to-end Internet environment. This environment is fundamentally different, and more challenging, than the legacy telecommunications security environment that we've managed risks under for decades. The Dyn DDoS attack is illustrative of the cyber challenges that the Commission faces. During the attack, insecure devices, connected through wireless networks, shut down service to millions of customers by attacking a domain name system (DNS) server of an entity not licensed or directly regulated by the Commission. This attack highlighted that security vulnerabilities induced by or inherent in devices now can have large-scale impacts on network services connecting those devices. This is particularly so in two areas relevant to the Dyn attack: (i) the services at issue enable a broad new array of security risks to individuals and businesses that providers only have a defined and limited role in managing; and (ii) the many new entities involved in the end-to-end consumer Internet experience (especially with respect to IoT). As the end-to-end Internet user experience continues to expand and diversify, both through provider network inputs and the products and services enabled by Internet access, the Commission's ability to provide assurance to individuals and businesses against cyber risk will continue to be both taxed and constrained.

To protect consumers using telecommunications networks, the Commission must address these cyber challenges. In 2014, I initiated a new paradigm for how the FCC would address cybersecurity for our nation's communications networks and services. I stated that it begins with private sector leadership that recognizes how easily cyber threats cross corporate and national boundaries and that, because of this, the communications sector must step up its responsibility and accountability for cyber risk management. In this vein, the Commission has worked closely with its Federal Advisory Committees, as well as with our federal partners and other stakeholders, to foster standards and best practices for cyber risk management. We worked with the other regulatory agencies to create a forum whereby the agency principles meet to share best cybersecurity regulatory practices and coordinate our approaches. As a result of these collaborative efforts, a rich body of recommendations, including voluntary best practices, have been developed. Industry implementation of these practices must be part of any cybersecurity solution.

3 See 47 CFR 68.108.
4 For example, our Technological Advisory Council (TAC) has been examining how to incorporate "security by design" principles into the very fabric of emerging 5G networks, and our Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) has been working on cybersecurity in connection with a number of issues, such as improving supply chain risk management, addressing risks associated with legacy protocols such as SS7, and promoting security in networks and devices utilizing Wi-Fi technology. In addition, we have been preparing to launch voluntary, face-to-face engagements, consistent with NIST Framework and CSRIC recommendations, in which providers will collaborate with the Commission to address cyber risk issues in their networks and service environments.
I do, however, share your concern that we cannot rely solely on the market incentives of ISPs to fully address the risk of malevolent cyber activities. As private actors, ISPs operate in economic environments that pressure them to not take those steps, or to take them minimally. Given the interconnected nature of broadband networks, protective actions taken by one ISP against cyberthreats can be undermined by the failure of other ISPs to take similar actions. This weakens the incentive of all ISPs to take such protections. Cyber-accountability therefore requires a combination of market-based incentives and appropriate regulatory oversight where the market does not, or cannot, do the job effectively.

While we have had to postpone some of the next steps in this combined approach in light of the impending change in Administrations, addressing IoT threats remains a National imperative and should not be stalled by the normal transition of a new president. In recognition of the critical importance of the work that remains to protect Americans from cyber threats, I’ve attached an outline of a program that I believe would reduce the risk of cyber threats to America’s citizens and businesses. This program includes collaborative efforts with key Internet stakeholder groups; increased interagency cooperation; and consideration of regulatory solutions by the Commission to address residual risk that cannot be addressed by market forces alone due to market failure.

Thank you for your interest in this important issue. Your views are very important and will be included in the record of this proceeding. I would be happy to make appropriate FCC staff available to you and your staff for additional discussions regarding our ongoing work on these important issues. I also stand ready to collaborate on these efforts with my colleagues in a bipartisan manner during the remainder of my term.

Sincerely,

Tom Wheeler
5G/IoT CYBERSECURITY RISK REDUCTION PROGRAM PLAN

1. Federal Advisory Committee/voluntary stakeholder engagement.
   - Charge the FCC’s Federal Advisory Committees to develop cyber risk reduction standards and best practices and to promote ISP-wide adoption and implementation of those standards. In particular, convene an advisory group with broad-based cyber expertise, including industry, academia, and government agencies to provide recommendations for a device cybersecurity certification process.
   - Establish an advisory committee/working group to provide recommendations on what different members of the communications ecosystem (including 5G service providers, 5G network equipment manufacturers and suppliers, and 5G device manufacturers and suppliers) should do to prevent, reduce the risk of, or mitigate edge-based attacks that cause harm to the network.
   - Conduct voluntary and confidential, provider-specific meetings in which cyber threat and risk reduction challenges can be candidly discussed in order to foster a collaborative relationship and continued dialogue between the communications sector and the Commission.

2. Leverage interagency relationships.
   - Provide the Cybersecurity Forum for Independent and Executive Branch Regulators to coordinate regulatory approaches to address IoT residual risks across the broader regulatory environment.
   - Within the Forum, convene a task force composed of cybersecurity regulatory experts in the relevant agencies to assess the full scope of IoT cyber threats to critical infrastructure, existing regulatory authorities and mitigation recommendations within those authorities, as well as those authorities requiring statutory change.
   - Continue collaboration with our executive branch partners, state, local, Tribal, and territorial entities to identify unique state and local challenges and champion near-term activity to address those needs.

3. Regulatory/rulemaking activities.
   - Identify cybersecurity data gaps with respect to residual risk in our network outage reporting framework and develop reporting obligations to address these gaps, in order to ensure the FCC has situational awareness during and immediately after major communications disruptions, and to enable the Commission to utilize outage data to formulate standards and best practices to promote the overall reliability and resiliency of the nation’s communications networks.
   - Issue a Notice of Inquiry to develop a record and identify residual risk in the IoT commons, with the goal of determining where market failure may exist in the ISP, network element manufacturer, and device manufacturer community; identify current security best practices that could be implemented now by communications service providers—such as network filtering techniques—to address DoS attacks; and identify
methods third party solution providers and other stakeholders in the 5G ecosystem can take to mitigate DoS attacks.

- Issue an NPRM to examine regulatory measures the FCC could take to help address cyber risks that cannot be addressed through market-based measures.
  - Consider the application of existing legal authorities to protect networks from IoT device security risks. The NPRM could examine changes to the FCC's equipment certification process to protect networks from IoT device security risks. Equipment authorization is a critical element of the FCC’s regulatory structure to maintain the integrity and usability of spectrum.
  - Explore the potential of a cybersecurity certification (possibly self-certification) to create a floor and identifiable risk relevant levels above the floor for device cybersecurity and a consumer labeling requirement to address any asymmetry in the availability of information and help consumers understand and make better decisions regarding the potential cyber risks of a product or service.
  - Work with the Broadband Technical Advisory Group (BITAG) and 5G/IoT relevant stakeholder groups to build upon the evolving risk reduction initiatives, encouraging industry-initiated commitment as the preferred option and increased government engagement where that falls short.