Federal Communications Commission FCC 18-42
STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER MIGNON L. CLYBURN
Re: Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC 
Programs, WC Docket No. 18-89
Just like transport, energy, and water, communications networks are an integral part of our daily 
lives. These networks are now – in most quarters – considered critical infrastructure, which is why 
protecting them from national security threats is such a top priority.
Communications networks not only support a wide variety of services that underpin the social 
and economic dynamics of our country, next generation networks, such as 5G and the Internet of Things, 
promise to rapidly transform industries such as healthcare, education, public safety, transportation and 
manufacturing.
While we must take the responsibility of securing this critical infrastructure seriously, we have 
the added challenge of doing so in a way that is cost effective.  Getting it wrong will not only do little to 
safeguard national security, but hamper our efforts to close the digital divide and not serve the public 
interest.  
Our dual responsibilities, enshrined in statute, are clear: to protect both the integrity of our 
nation’s communications networks and ensure that all Americans have access to communications 
services.  But we can ill-afford to slow down the progress of innovation and investment when it comes to 
these communications networks or to raise the cost of deployment or adoption of services for those who 
need connectivity the most.  
In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we seek comment on whether we should prohibit 
Universal Service Funds (USF) from being used to purchase any equipment or services by any company 
posing national security threat to the integrity of communications networks.  In being good stewards, we 
must carefully assess all costs and benefits of any proposed approach, and evaluate all viable alternatives 
to determine the best next step.  
We must minimize national security threats, while avoiding putting undue burdens on small and 
rural communications service providers, and those living in high-cost areas where connectivity is either 
lacking or needs improvement.  More pointedly, we must consider whether this proposal could ultimately 
increase equipment or service costs for consumers and providers benefiting from USF funds.
As we identify and eliminate possible security vulnerabilities, we need the participation of 
stakeholders so that we may strike the proper marketplace balance.  Quantitative and qualitative data 
would be especially helpful to demonstrate the potential impact of any proposal on national security and 
the goals of USF, to include network deployment and services offered by small and rural businesses that 
receive USF support.  
I would like to thank my colleagues for agreeing to my request to seek additional comment on 
these issues and on the costs and benefits of any proposed actions.  This Notice is a combined effort so I 
thank the team from various Bureaus for briefing me and for their dedicated work on this item.