



OFFICE OF
THE CHAIRMAN

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

January 15, 2021

The Honorable Amy Klobuchar
United States Senate
425 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Klobuchar:

Thank you for your letter regarding the Commission's recent decision regarding the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication implementation. I appreciate your support of the Commission's efforts to combat illegal robocalls, particularly those that target seniors. As you know, the Commission has taken a multi-pronged approach to this issue—by taking swift and tough enforcement actions, collaborating with industry, partnering with state governments and other federal agencies, and educating consumers. I believe that these efforts have made an impact. Robocall complaints numbers are down and, according to industry sources, the total number of robocalls declined by 33% from the first to second quarter of this year.


Of course, our efforts also include the implementation of the TRACED Act. We swiftly acted to adopt STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication obligations in March, requiring that voice service providers implement it in their IP portions of their networks by June 30, 2021. The Commission took additional steps in September to require voice service providers to either upgrade their non-IP networks to IP and then implement STIR/SHAKEN by the June 30, 2021 deadline or develop a non-IP caller ID authentication solution. In this same decision, we obligated intermediate providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN in the IP portions of their networks by June 30, 2021 to ensure that a call will benefit from caller ID authentication regardless of how it travels through the network. For those portions of networks where STIR/SHAKEN cannot be or is not yet enabled, we required voice service providers to implement a robocall mitigation program to ensure they are not the source of illegally spoofed robocalls. We also acknowledged the progress many companies have made in deploying STIR/SHAKEN, and established a process to exempt these providers from the deadline. As required by the TRACED Act, we also prohibited voice service providers from imposing additional line item charges on consumer or small business subscribers for caller ID authentication. Finally, we granted an extension, as required by the TRACED Act, to providers that would face undue hardship in making necessary network upgrades to meet the June 30, 2021 deadline.

The Commission declined to extend robocall mitigation programs to intermediate providers because the TRACED Act only directed the Commission to require such programs for voice service—i.e., originating and terminating—providers subject to an extension and was silent with regards to intermediate providers. In making this determination, the Commission found it appropriate to defer to Congress's recent, specific guidance on this subject. As you note, the

Commission prohibited intermediate providers from accepting traffic directly from an originating voice service provider that has not certified to implementing either STIR/SHAKEN or a robocall mitigation program. The Commission determined that this approach was the best way to give intermediate providers responsibility within the greater robocall mitigation scheme.

Additionally, the Commission took the appropriate action with regard to robocall mitigation programs by requiring all voice service providers to certify to the Commission regarding their efforts to stem origination of robocalls, as well as by requiring that all mitigation programs must include a commitment to cooperate with the industry traceback consortium. At this point, there does not appear to be a need to extend the mitigation program to other providers not subject to an extension or to dictate specific requirements beyond those noted above, though it would be possible for the Commission to revisit this issue in the future.

Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai



FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE CHAIRMAN

January 15, 2021

Honorable Richard J. Durbin
United States Senate
711 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Durbin:

Thank you for your letter regarding the Commission's recent decision regarding the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication implementation. I appreciate your support of the Commission's efforts to combat illegal robocalls, particularly those that target seniors. As you know, the Commission has taken a multi-pronged approach to this issue—by taking swift and tough enforcement actions, collaborating with industry, partnering with state governments and other federal agencies, and educating consumers. I believe that these efforts have made an impact. Robocall complaints numbers are down and, according to industry sources, the total number of robocalls declined by 33% from the first to second quarter of this year.


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OFFICE OF
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January 15, 2021

The Honorable Bob Casey
United States Senate
393 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Casey:

Thank you for your letter regarding the Commission's recent decision regarding the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication implementation. I appreciate your support of the Commission's efforts to combat illegal robocalls, particularly those that target seniors. As you know, the Commission has taken a multi-pronged approach to this issue—by taking swift and tough enforcement actions, collaborating with industry, partnering with state governments and other federal agencies, and educating consumers. I believe that these efforts have made an impact. Robocall complaints numbers are down and, according to industry sources, the total number of robocalls declined by 33% from the first to second quarter of this year.


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