**Statement of**

**commissioner brendan carr**

Re: *Process Reform for Executive Branch Review of Certain FCC Applications and Petitions Involving Foreign Ownership*, IB Docket No. 16-155.

In 2020, following a years’ long effort, we adopted significant reforms to Team Telecom’s review—that is, the process by which the Executive Branch offers its views on applications and petitions to the FCC involving foreign ownership, including its views on national security and law enforcement considerations. While this review process is vital to our national security, it had become opaque and slow moving. So I was pleased to join with my FCC colleagues in improving the Team Telecom process by promoting greater transparency and certainty. Today’s vote to adopt standardized questions will further streamline the review process, while ensuring that Team Telecom has timely access to the information it needs.

 Our decision here builds on a series of steps the FCC has taken to promote the security of our communications networks. In 2018, I asked my colleagues to broaden the scope of our supply chain proceeding to consider the removal of insecure gear. Flash forward to this week, when we announced that the reimbursement window for our rip and replace program will open at the end of next month. In 2019, I called for the FCC to conduct a top-to-bottom review of every telecom carrier with ties to communist regime in China. The FCC subsequently initiated investigations into several carriers, which led to section 214 revocation proceedings against China Unicom Americas, Pacific Networks, and ComNet. And earlier this year, I called for the Commission to look at preventing any entity on the FCC’s covered entity list from obtaining the FCC equipment authorizations necessary to operate their devices in the U.S. Acting Chair Rosenworcel has launched a proceeding that would do just that.

But our work is far from over. We need to quickly adopt final orders in our section 214 investigations. We need to close the loophole in our equipment authorization process to ensure that equipment from entities that pose a national security risk will no longer be eligible for FCC approval. And we need to continue our review of all threats to the security of our communications infrastructure—whether those threats come from carriers or service providers, hardware or software.

Finally, I would like to thank the International Bureau for their work on this item and throughout this long reform process. Their tireless efforts have paid off, and the item has my support.