DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER NATHAN SIMINGTON


I have no choice but to dissent from this order. It will have the Commission run a permanent inquisition against the broadband industry, creating a climate of fear and uncertainty when we should instead be encouraging greater investment and innovation. Under the digital equity rules we are adopting today, every business practice or decision, by any company remotely connected to the provision of broadband, is prohibited unless any disparate impact is unavoidable due to “technical or economic infeasibility.” This is an impossible standard to meet, and the only way for a company to even attempt to comply is to practice racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination in every business decision.

Surely, Congress would not have authorized, in a less than one page section of a thousand-page bill, the most open-ended liability regime that the FCC has ever seen—indeed, one broader than any civil rights law Congress has ever passed. And in fact, it did not. Nowhere does Section 60506 authorize the Commission to issue fines, forfeitures, or injunctions. My colleagues’ primary argument to the contrary is that by ordering the FCC to adopt rules “preventing digital discrimination,” Section 60506 allows the FCC to use its Titles IV and V enforcement powers toward that end. But the enforcement provisions in Titles IV and V of the Communications Act could not be clearer: they only apply to rules deriving from that Act, not from totally separate laws like Section 60506. When Congress has wished to give the FCC new authority, enforceable through those provisions, it has done so by explicitly amending the Communications Act, which it took care to avoid here. This refusal by Congress to grant new powers is consistent with the facial interpretation of Section 60506: that it directs the FCC to use its existing authority, such as by modifying Universal Service Fund programs, to achieve the goals of the statute.

Aware of these difficulties with their primary argument, my colleagues turn to the ancillary authority provision in Section 4(i) of the Communications Act. Reliance on ancillary authority is usually a sign that the Commission is overreaching, and so it is here. Invoking it here raises troubling questions about the Commission’s deference to Congress. If Section 4(i) on its own authorizes fines, forfeitures, and other remedies for any rule adopted by the Commission, then ninety years of precedent and understanding of Titles IV and V of the Communications Act are wrong. By the logic of this rule, the grants of enforcement powers under those titles are actually limitations on those powers, which would otherwise be unlimited under Section 4(i).

This cannot possibly be correct. The provisions of Titles IV and V are written as grants of authority, not limitations on Section 4(i), and the Commission has always interpreted them this way. A fallback to Section 4(i) would also require us to believe that by mere silence on the question of enforcement in Section 60506, Congress intended to give us enforcement powers greater than those we have in any other area we regulate. Section 4(i) has none of the limitations on fines, for example, that Title V does. In short, this order suggests that the Commission’s powers are greatest when Congress is silent.

I cannot agree with this. The obvious meaning of Section 60506, in line with decades of Commission precedent, is that Congress intended for the FCC to adopt rules directing our own conduct and using our previously existing authority to address disparities in connectivity.

I am further concerned that the disparate impact standard adopted by this order, which makes “technical or economic infeasibility” the only defense, is impossible to comply with. Like any business, ISPs and their partners have to decide how to invest limited capital in a way that maximizes their returns. When choosing between investing the same amount into serving an area where they stand to make more
money or an area where they stand to make less money, they should choose to deploy to the area where they will make the most profit. When the FCC believes that the public interest will be served by build-outs to less profitable areas, we sweeten the pot by offering subsidies through our high-cost USF programs. Under established disparate impact law, this profit maximization—the pursuit of a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest”—insulates broadband providers, like any other businesses, from liability. But, breaking with established law, this order explicitly rejects the idea that profit maximization should be a defense to disparate impact liability.

Instead of protecting the pursuit of “legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests”, this rule only allows a defense of “technical or economic infeasibility.” How much profitability, then, is a company supposed to sacrifice in pursuit of digital equity goals? The rule provides neither guidance nor safe harbors. After all, every dollar of profit is a dollar that feasibly could have been invested in serving other areas. And why stop at profits? Companies routinely make losses for decades in pursuit of longer-term goals, so why not in service of digital equity? In a competitive market for investment dollars, projects under the shadow of these digital equity rules will be disfavored. Therefore, the liability regime under this rule, both as to standards and penalties, cannot help but have a chilling effect out of all proportion to its stated benefits. No amount of diligence in complying with this order can prevent the FCC from reasonably arguing that a company violated it anyway, that it could have made less money in better pursuit of digital equity. No business decision can be known to be defensible or safe to make. When everyone is guilty, and enforcement is discretionary, the only real rule is to stay on the good side of the prosecutor, in this case, whoever controls the FCC. It is no exaggeration to say that this order establishes an inquisition against the broadband industry. The Commission will sit not merely as judge, jury, and executioner, but also police and legislature.

Beyond being indeterminate and impossible to reliably comply with, a disparate impact standard limited only by technical or economic feasibility is an unconstitutional requirement for companies to engage in racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination. Rather than looking only to their own self-interest when planning investments, companies will have to consider the racial, ethnic, and religious effects of their decisions. They will have to disregard their own profitability in pursuit of FCC-desired racial, ethnic, and religious outcomes. When a company makes business decisions on the basis of race, that is called racial discrimination, and that is exactly what we are requiring here.

The Supreme Court anticipated exactly this difficulty in Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015), when it upheld a disparate impact liability regime only because it had safeguards that included a defense for decisions motivated by “legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests,” such that disparate impact liability would only attach to “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.” It said:

Difficult questions might arise if disparate-impact liability … caused race to be used and considered in a pervasive and explicit manner … Courts should avoid interpreting disparate-impact liability to be so expansive as to inject racial considerations into every housing decision … Were standards for proceeding with disparate-impact suits not to incorporate at least the safeguards discussed here, then disparate-impact liability might displace valid governmental and private priorities, rather than solely removing artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers. And that, in turn, would set our Nation back in its quest to reduce the salience of race in our social and economic system.

Id. at 544 (cleaned up). Today, the Commission ignores this warning and creates a regime that requires the pervasive and explicit consideration of race, ethnicity, and religion for every business decision, however grand or picayune. More recent caselaw should give the Commission further pause, especially the Supreme Court’s rejection of affirmative consideration of race even for remedial purposes. Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, 600 U.S. 181 (2023). This Order is on the wrong side of the Constitution.
My colleagues have also failed to justify the necessity of this expansive regulatory scheme. Not even the majority interprets the statute to require such a draconian liability regime, so one would expect them to justify taking such a maximalist position by showing the existence of pervasive discrimination and inequality in access to broadband. But they have made no such showing. The order does not even deny that whatever disparities do exist are best attributed to the difficulty and unprofitability of serving certain geographic areas, which are best addressed by reductions in cost or the provision of subsidies, not by a punitive civil rights regime. Even if all other legal difficulties were overcome, the complete lack of factual justification makes this order arbitrary and capricious, and invalid under the Administrative Procedures Act.