

**STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN BRENDAN CARR**

Re: *Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program, Second Report and Order, Order on Reconsideration, and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 24-136 (Apr. 30, 2026).*

Last month, the FCC marked one year since we established the Council on National Security. Over this year, we have made national security a top priority.

As foreign adversaries relentlessly target American communications networks, the FCC has a vital role to play in secure the nation. From Operation Clean Carts to the Covered List to undersea cable rulemakings, we are doing our part to secure American telecom infrastructure and devices and reduce our supply chain dependencies. I am especially grateful that my fellow Commissioners have provided strong leadership and ideas on the agency's national security docket.

One of the biggest national security wins from last year was our "Bad Labs" Report & Order. It was based on a simple premise: we should not have foreign adversary governments or other entities on American sanction lists testing and certifying electronic devices as safe for the U.S. market. As a result, the FCC has taken action to withdraw recognition from, or deny recognition to, twenty-three "Bad Labs" controlled by foreign adversary governments.

With foreign adversary governments excluded, the FCC now takes the next step to restore *reciprocity* to the FCC's equipment authorization program. For decades, the FCC limited testing to labs in the U.S. or in foreign countries that have Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) with the U.S., wherein each country would recognize the other's test labs. But in 2015, the FCC abandoned that principle, leading to more than 75% of testing to occur in countries that refuse any reciprocal agreement with the U.S.

Today's rules and FNRPM brings reciprocity back. We propose to cease recognizing any lab in a country without a reciprocal agreement. If a country wants the FCC to recognize its test labs, the country should sign an MRA or similar agreement with the U.S. This will not only ensure reciprocal international commercial relations, but also will ensure that the FCC has sufficient oversight, monitoring, and enforcement authority to guarantee the integrity of the equipment authorization process. It will also hopefully onshore testing capacity that has been offshored for decades.

For their work on this item, I want to thank Katherine Patsas Nevitt, Erika Heeren-Moon, Alice Jou, Andrew Hendrickson, Dusmantha Tennakoon, Thomas Rigolage, Brandon Moss, Aleks Yankelevich, Cher Li, Siobahn Philemon, Doug Klein, and Deborah Broderson.