



OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN BRENDAN CARR

Chairman Carr Announces National Security Enforcement Actions

FCC Brings Enforcement Against Drone Company Falsely Claiming to Produce in America and Targets Test Lab Discovered to Have Submitted Copied-and-Pasted Test Results

WASHINGTON, July 21, 2026—Today, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr announced two enforcement actions to further protect Americans from dangerous devices and untrustworthy labs.

First, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) began [proceedings](#) to revoke two equipment authorizations recently granted to Odyssey Robot for falsely claiming to produce its drone in the U.S. Late last year, following an Executive Branch determination that foreign-made drones pose unacceptable national security risks, the FCC added such drones to the Covered List—banning them from new authorizations. Today’s action marks the first revocation proceeding against a drone company trying to evade our rules.

Second, OET instituted [proceedings](#) to withdraw recognition from a test lab that repeatedly falsified test results in equipment authorization applications. Before any electronic device can be marketed or sold in the U.S., it must be tested at a lab recognized by the FCC. Since last year, the FCC has been expelling from its equipment authorization system “bad labs” that pose national security risks and/or are untrustworthy. Today’s proceeding against Shenzhen STS Test Services, based in Shenzhen, China, outlines how the lab relied on copied-and-pasted duplicate test results for 40 separate products, from smartphones to tablets to car diagnostic tools. This follows OET’s [instituting proceedings](#) last month against another lab SLG-CPC Test Laboratory Co., Ltd. based in Dongguan, China.

Chairman Carr issued the following statement:

“The FCC’s national security enforcement is firing on all cylinders, as today’s actions make clear. Our drone revocation proceeding sends a message that the FCC will not allow companies that produce abroad to evade the FCC’s prohibition. And our device testing withdrawal proceeding is a reminder why our ‘Bad Labs’ work is so critical. I want to thank the FCC’s Council on National Security for its excellent work on these actions, including the Public Safety and Enforcement Bureaus, alongside the Office of Engineering and Technology.”

Additional Background on Odyssey Robot:

Last December, the FCC received an Executive Branch [national security determination](#) that drones and drone components produced in foreign countries pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the U.S. or the security and safety of U.S. persons. The FCC then updated the [Covered List](#) to include foreign-produced drones—subject to some exceptions. Equipment on the FCC’s Covered List cannot be authorized for importation, marketing, or sale in the U.S., so the FCC’s action functionally banned new models of foreign-made drones from entering the U.S. market. Since then, the FCC has seen over \$4 billion dollars in investment in U.S. drone manufacturing, tens of billions of dollars in capital raised by U.S. drone companies, and thousands of manufacturing jobs created.

Earlier this year, Odyssey Robot received an equipment authorization for its drone and drone remote controller, claiming these devices were not “covered” and listing a Texas-based company as the assembler, eTak Worldwide Corp. eTak, however, is an electronics recycling company, not a drone manufacturer and has no record of any dealings with Odyssey at all. PSHSB and OET today used their authority under Commission rules to bring a streamlined revocation proceeding for equipment authorizations granted on the basis of a false statement that the equipment is not covered equipment.

Additional Background Information on Shenzhen STS Testing Services:

To import, market, or sell electronic devices in the United States, device makers generally must get their devices tested and certified in FCC-recognized test labs and telecommunications certification bodies. These entities play a vital role in ensuring that devices operate at safe power levels, on appropriate spectrum bands that do not create harmful interference and adhere to U.S. government national security rules. Through its investigation, OET discovered that 40 separate FCC IDs (see list below) had apparently relied on identical test reports prepared by Shenzhen STS Test Services, often for wholly different products, such as a PC and wireless earbuds. When confronted, Shenzhen STS Test Services conceded that it had submitted falsified reports, which it blamed on, among other factors, “engineers’ negligence...as well as the negligence of the relevant report editors/reviewers.”

Today’s action follows a series of Commission actions against “bad labs” in our equipment authorization program. Last May, the FCC adopted rules to prohibit the recognition of test labs owned by, or subject to the direction or control of, a foreign adversary country. Since these rules went into effect, the Commission has denied recognition to, or withdrawn recognition from, 23 such test labs. In April of this year, the FCC proposed to restore reciprocity to lab testing by withdrawing recognition from any test lab based in a country that lacks a reciprocal agreement with the U.S. Finally, last month, OET began proceedings against SLG-CPC, another test lab that OET discovered had submitted false, copied-and-pasted test results.

40 FCC IDs:

- (a) FCC ID 2BSW8-WAVE10 (4G smartphone), FCC ID 2A8T7ELINK (Bluetooth vehicle diagnostic tool), and FCC ID 2ANWFET9150 (automotive diagnostic system);
- (b) FCC ID 2BTXF-WT1PRO (tablet), FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR627 (wireless headset), and FCC ID 2BU9HAW101ANRISLEEP (sleep monitor);
- (c) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR640 (wireless earbuds) and FCC ID 2AXUD-G3S (mini PC);
- (d) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR621 (wireless headset), FCC ID 2ANMU-G7 (smartphone), and FCC ID 2BOHY-851P2-C (Bluetooth module);
- (e) FCC ID 2BOHY-621U1 and FCC ID 2BSW8-FORT200 (smartphone);
- (f) FCC ID 2A33N-L61A (smartphone) and FCC ID 2BOHY-851P2-M (Bluetooth module);
- (g) FCC ID 2A2P5-1-OHR554 (wireless headset) and FCC ID 2BSW8-FORT5 (smartphone);
- (h) FCC ID 2A58W-MP10 (wireless earbuds) and FCC ID 2BSW8-ZENO5 (tablet);
- (i) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR621 (wireless headset), FCC ID 2ANMU-G6 (smartphone), and FCC ID 2BTTZORATOR (visel glasses);
- (j) FCC ID 2AQRE-SR800 (smart POS terminal) and FCC ID 2BVA8-H1503BQ (LTE module);

- (k) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR804 (wireless earbuds) and FCC ID 2BSW8-ROCK5 (smartphone);
- (l) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR718 (wireless headset) and FCC ID WWE-2IHSK1016 (4-in-1 home speaker);
- (m) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR626 (wireless headset) and FCC ID 2BDS8-X7S (car media player);
- (n) FCC ID 2ATH7-U987Q (Bluetooth adapter) and FCC ID 2BUN4-ACT2631 (wireless headphones);
- (o) FCC ID 2A33N-L61B (smartphone) and FCC ID 2BSW8-MEGA5 (tablet);
- (p) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR810 (wireless neckband earphones) and FCC ID 2BU85-T20 (tablet);
- (q) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR811 (wireless neckband earphones) and FCC ID 2BU85-T90 (tablet);
- (r) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR626 (wireless headset) and FCC ID 2BSW8-ROCK3 (smartphone);
- (s) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR718 (Bluetooth headset) and FCC ID WWE-2IHSK1016 (4-in-1 home speaker); and
- (t) FCC ID 2A2P5-OHR626 (wireless headset) and FCC ID 2BDS8-X7S (car media player).

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