*Pages 1--17 from Microsoft Word - 12224.doc* Federal Communications Commission FCC 01- 307 Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D. C. 20554 In the Matter of: Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution: Section 628( c)( 5) of the Communications Act: Sunset of Exclusive Contract Prohibition ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CS Docket No. 01- 290 NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING Adopted: October 11, 2001 Released: October 18, 2001 Comment Date: December 3, 2001 Reply Comment Date: January 7, 2002 By the Commission: I. INTRODUCTION 1. We issue this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ Notice”) in accordance with Section 628( c)( 5) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (“ Communications Act”). 1 Section 628( c)( 2)( D) generally prohibits, in areas served by a cable operator, exclusive contracts for satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming between vertically integrated programming vendors and cable operators. 2 Under Section 628( c)( 5), the prohibition on exclusive programming contracts contained in Section 628( c)( 2)( D) will cease to be effective on October 5, 2002, unless the Commission finds that such prohibition continues to be necessary to preserve competition and diversity in the distribution of video programming. This Notice initiates a proceeding in order to make that determination. II. BACKGROUND 2. The program access provisions contained in Section 628 of the Communications Act were adopted as part of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (“ 1992 Cable Act”) which was enacted on October 5, 1992. 3 In enacting the program access provisions, 1 47 U. S. C. § 548( c)( 5). 2 47 U. S. C. § 548( c)( 2)( D). 3 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102- 385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992). 1 Federal Communications Commission FCC 01- 307 2 Congress was concerned that the majority of cable operators enjoyed a monopoly in program distribution at the local level, 4 and concluded that the use of exclusive contracts between vertically integrated programming vendors and cable operators served to inhibit the development of competition among distributors. 5 Congress concluded that vertically integrated program suppliers have the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated cable operators over other multichannel programming distributors, such as other cable systems, home satellite dish (“ HSD”) distributors, direct broadcast satellite (“ DBS”) providers, satellite master antenna television (“ SMATV”) systems, and wireless cable operators. 6 In addition, Congress found that increased horizontal concentration of cable operators, combined with extensive vertical integration, created an imbalance of power, both between cable operators and program vendors and between incumbent cable operators and their multichannel competitors. 7 Congress determined that this imbalance of power limited the development of competition and restricted consumer choice. 8 3. In Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution and Carriage, First Report and Order (“ First Report and Order”), the Commission promulgated regulations implementing the program access provisions of Section 628. 9 The purpose of Section 628 is to promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity by increasing competition and diversity in the multichannel video market, to increase the availability of satellite cable programming and satellite broadcast programming to persons in rural and other areas not currently able to receive such programming, and to spur the development of communications technologies. 10 Section 628( b) prohibits cable operators and vertically integrated programming vendors from engaging in unfair acts or practices, the purpose or effect of which is to hinder significantly or to prevent any multichannel video programming distributor (“ MVPD”) from providing satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers. 11 Section 628( b) applies only to satellite programming. Section 628( c) instructs the Commission to adopt regulations to prohibit a number of specific practices. 12 For example, Congress absolutely prohibited exclusive contracts between vertically integrated 4 1992 Cable Act, § 2( a)( 4); House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, House Rep. No. 102- 268, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (“ House Report”) at 42. 5 1992 Cable Act, § 2( a)( 5); Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, S. Rep. 102- 92, 102d Cong., 1 st Sess. (1991) (“ Senate Report”) at 25- 26. 6 Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution and Carriage, First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 3359, 3366 (1993). 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 3359 (1993), recon., 10 FCC Rcd 1902 (1994), further recon., 10 FCC Rcd 3105 (1994). In Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Petition for Rulemaking of Ameritech New Media, Inc. Regarding Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution and Carriage, 13 FCC Rcd 15822 (1998), the Commission amended the program access rules. 10 47 U. S. C. § 548( a). 11 47 U. S. C. § 548( b). 12 47 U. S. C. § 548( c). 2 Federal Communications Commission FCC 01- 307 3 programming vendors and cable operators in areas unserved by cable, 13 and generally prohibited exclusive contracts within areas served by cable. 14 The prohibition with regard to served areas, Section 628( c)( 2)( D), states that: with respect to distribution to persons in areas served by a cable operator, [the Commission shall] prohibit exclusive contracts for satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming between a cable operator and a satellite cable programming vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable interest or a satellite broadcast programming vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable interest, unless the Commission determines . . . that such contract is in the public interest. 15 4. Congress recognized, however, in areas served by cable, that some exclusive contracts between vertically integrated programming vendors and cable operators may serve the public interest by providing countervailing benefits to the programming market or to the development of competition among distributors. 16 In determining whether an exclusive contract is in the public interest, Congress instructed the Commission to consider each of the following factors: (i) The effect of such exclusive contract on the development of competition in the local and national multichannel video programming distribution markets; (ii) The effect of such exclusive contract on competition from multichannel video programming distribution technologies other than cable; (iii) The effect of such exclusive contract on the attraction of capital investment in the production and distribution of new satellite cable programming; (iv) The effect of such exclusive contract on diversity of programming in the multichannel video programming distribution market; and (v) The duration of the exclusive contract. 17 Any party seeking to enforce or enter into an exclusive contract in an area served by a cable operator must submit a petition for exclusivity to the Commission for approval. 18 13 47 U. S. C. § 548( c)( 2)( C). 14 47 U. S. C. § 548( c)( 2)( D). 15 47 U. S. C. § 548( c)( 2)( D); 47 C. F. R. § 76. 1002( c)( 2). 16 47 U. S. C. § 548( c)( 2)( 4). 17 47 U. S. C. § 548( c)( 4); 47 C. F. R. § 76.1002( c)( 4); see e. g., New England Cable News, 9 FCC Rcd 3231 (1994) (finding public interest factors favored limited 7 year period of exclusivity for startup regional news programmer); Time Warner Cable, 9 FCC Rcd 3221 (1994) (finding public interest factors did not favor requested 15 year exclusivity request related to established national programmer, Court TV). 18 See 47 C. F. R. § 76. 1002( c)( 5). 3 Federal Communications Commission FCC 01- 307 4 5. The prohibition contained in Section 628( c)( 2)( D) sunsets on October 5, 2002 unless the Commission determines that the prohibition continues to be necessary. Section 628( c)( 5) of the Communications Act provides that: The prohibition required by paragraph (2)( D) shall cease to be effective 10 years after the date of enactment of this section, unless the Commission finds, in a proceeding conducted during the last year of such 10- year period, that such prohibition continues to be necessary to preserve and protect competition and diversity in the distribution of video programming. 19 The restrictions on exclusive contracts for this ten- year period were intended to foster development of emerging competitors to cable, allowing a transition to a competitive market for the distribution of programming. 20 III. DISCUSSION AND NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 6. There are a variety of possible exclusive dealing arrangements. This proceeding is concerned with the type of arrangement in which a seller provides access to a good or service to one buyer or a group of buyers to the exclusion of other interested buyers. 21 By its nature, exclusivity forecloses other buyers from obtaining the relevant good or service for the term of the agreement. 22 Such exclusive dealing arrangements may serve legitimate business interests or they may be used to foreclose competitive entry or to stifle competitive development. Exclusive agreements may have an anti-competitive impact when competitors are foreclosed from such a large percentage of the market that they cannot compete effectively. 23 In the multichannel video programming marketplace, the anti- competitive potential of exclusive arrangements may be compounded to the extent that vertical integration exists between cable operators and programming producers. 24 7. Congress intended the program access rules to address a competitive imbalance involving access to programming between incumbent cable operators and new entrants. Congress enacted the prohibition on exclusivity in Section 628( c)( 2)( D) as one measure to address this imbalance. In so doing, however, Congress envisioned a time in which that remedial measure would be unnecessary. Thus, in Section 628( c)( 5), Congress directed the Commission to reexamine the need for Section 628( c)( 2)( D) after ten years. To this end, we seek comment on the following issues. 19 47 U. S. C. § 548( c)( 5); see also 47 C. F. R. § 76. 1002( c)( 6). The prohibition on exclusive contracts shall cease to be effective on October 5, 2002 unless the Commission determines otherwise. 20 See First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd at 3376, 3378; see also Time Warner Cable, 9 FCC Rcd at 3225 and New England Cable News at 3234. 21 ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments (3d. ed. 1993) at 196. 22 Id. 23 See, e. g., U. S. Healthcare v. Healthsource, 986 F. 2d at 589, 595 (1 st Cir. 1993). There is an extensive line of case law and economic analysis concerning the permissibility of exclusive dealing arrangements in the motion picture entertainment field. See, e. g., U. S. v. Paramount, 334 U. S. 131 (1948); U. S. v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres v. U. S., 334 U. S. 110 (1948). 24 See First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd at 3366. 4 Federal Communications Commission FCC 01- 307 5 8. We seek comment on whether Section 628( c)( 2)( D) of the Communications Act should be retained or whether the provision should cease to be effective pursuant to the sunset provision contained in Section 628( c)( 5). 25 We ask whether the prohibition against exclusive contracts has been effective during the period of its existence as a deterrent to anticompetitive behavior and whether it has a continuing role in preventing such behavior. Although Congress and the Commission have recognized the benefits of exclusivity in certain circumstances, the 1992 Cable Act placed a higher value on new competitive entry than on the continuation of exclusive distribution practices that may impede that entry. 26 In this regard, we note that in 1992, cable operators served 95.5% of all MVPD subscribers. 27 Currently, cable operators serve 80% of MVPD subscribers. 28 We ask what effect Section 628( c)( 2)( D) has had on the development of competition generally in local and national markets and on competition from alternate technologies. We seek comment on the general state of competition among MVPD operators and, in particular, on the extent to which DBS operators impose effective competition on cable operators and the extent to which the exclusivity provision impacts this. We also seek comment on whether distortions in the marketplace may have developed because of the exclusivity prohibition. In this regard, we seek comment on whether more affiliations between cable operators and programmers would have developed in the absence of the exclusivity prohibition, or whether the prohibition had any other negative impact on the development of new cable programming networks. We seek comment on any other specific developments that have occurred over the last decade in the marketplace for multichannel video programming that might render the assumptions underlying Section 628( c)( 2)( D) no longer valid. In the alternative, we seek comment on developments over the last decade that impart continuing relevance to the prohibition on exclusivity. We request that commenters provide specific information on all programming services (both vertically integrated and non- vertically integrated, both satellite and terrestrially delivered) which are currently sold on an exclusive basis, as well as the number of subscribers subject to those exclusive arrangements. 9. The nearly ten- year period during which Section 628( c)( 2)( D) has been in effect has been a period of consolidation and clustering in the cable industry. We seek comment on what impact exclusivity has had on trends within the industry. We seek comment on the degree, if any, that clustering and the continuing consolidation within the communications industry should inform our decision with regard to the sunset of the exclusivity prohibition. In this regard, we note that the Commission recently has initiated a proceeding to resolve the remand of our horizontal ownership rules by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 29 That proceeding will directly address the effect 25 We also note that in the Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Notice of Inquiry, CS Docket No. 01- 129, FCC 01- 191 (rel. June 25, 2001), the Commission sought comment on the sunset of Section 628( c)( 2)( D). We received comments on this issue from Carolina Broadband, Comcast Corporation, DirecTV, Inc., EchoStar Satellite Corporation, the National Cable & Telecommunications Association (“ NCTA”), the National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative (“ NRTC”), RCN Corporation, the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association (“ SBCA”), and the Wireless Communications Association International (“ WCA”). To the extent they address the subject matter of our inquiry herein, we incorporate these comments into the record of this proceeding. 26 See First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd at 3384. 27 See Implementation of Section 19 of the 1992 Cable Act (Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Seventh Annual Report, 16 FCC Rcd 6005 at Appendix C, Table C-1 (2001). 28 Id. 29 See Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Implementation of Cable Act Reform Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: The Commission’s Cable (continued.…) 5 Federal Communications Commission FCC 01- 307 6 of consolidation and vertical integration on the market for video programming production and packaging. We seek comment on the impact, if any, that this pending proceeding should have on our decision regarding the possible sunset of Section 628( c)( 2)( D). 10. We also seek comment on the potential beneficial effects of exclusivity in the multichannel video programming marketplace. We seek comment on whether and how exclusivity has been significant in the development, promotion and launch of new programming services. We note that DIRECTV’s exclusive arrangement with the National Football League to make available to subscribers a substantial package of NFL games each Sunday has been credited with attracting significant numbers of subscribers to DIRECTV’s service. We ask how important exclusivity has been to the launch of local origination programming that may have a more limited geographic appeal. We seek comment on whether exclusivity has acted as an investment incentive, such that without the incentive the programming service would not be launched or become viable. We also ask whether a continued prohibition on exclusivity will chill future investments in new programming. In addition, we seek comment on whether the existing public interest waiver provision set forth in Section 628( c)( 4) would sufficiently protect instances of beneficial exclusivity should the Commission retain the prohibition on exclusivity. 11. We seek comment on what impact the prohibition on exclusivity has had on diversity in programming. We ask if the prohibition on exclusivity has helped to increase diversity by providing additional news, public affairs, informational and children’s programming. In the alternative, we seek comment on whether the restriction in Section 628( c)( 2)( D) has impeded programming diversity. We generally seek comment on how diversity of programming will be affected if the prohibition on exclusivity sunsets. 12. The program access requirements of Section 628 have at their heart the objective of making available programming to the existing or potential competitors of traditional cable systems so that the public may benefit from the development of competitive programming distributors. 30 In this regard, we note that Section 628( c)( 5) permits the sunset only of the exclusivity prohibition of Section 628( c)( 2)( D) while preserving the overall structure of program access and Section 628. We ask how the remaining program access provisions will function should the exclusivity prohibition sunset and we seek comment on whether the statute will continue to serve the purpose for which it was intended. 13. Section 628( c)( 2)( C) of the Communications Act prohibits all “practices, understandings, arrangements and activities, including exclusive contracts” that prevent an MVPD from obtaining vertically integrated programming “for distribution to persons in areas not served by a cable operator as of the date of enactment” of the 1992 Cable Act (October 5, 1992). 31 Section 628( c)( 2)( C) is not subject to potential sunset. By contrast, the prohibition on exclusive arrangements of Section 628( c)( 2)( D) applies to “areas served by a cable operator” and is subject to the sunset provision of Section 628( c)( 5). 32 We seek comment on the relationship between Section 628( c)( 2)( D) and Section 628( c)( 2)( C). What impact, if any, would the sunset of Section 628( c)( 2)( D) have on the prohibition set forth in Section (… continued from previous page) Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits and Attribution Rules, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 01-263 (rel. Sept. 21, 2001); Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 240 F. 3d 1126 (D. C. Cir. 2001). 30 First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd at 3365. 31 47 U. S. C. § 548( c)( 2)( C); see 47 C. F. R. § 76.1002( c)( 1) (emphasis added). 32 47 U. S. C. § 548( c)( 2)( D); see 47 C. F. R. § 76. 1002( c)( 2). 6 Federal Communications Commission FCC 01- 307 7 628( c)( 2)( C)? Specifically, if the prohibition in Section 628( c)( 2)( D) were to sunset, would the prohibition in Section 628( c)( 2)( C) continue to bar exclusive agreements in areas that were not served by a cable operator before October 5, 1992, but in which cable service has commenced in the intervening period? Would such areas be regarded as “areas served by a cable operator” under Section 628( c)( 2)( D), or would such areas continue to be regarded as unserved under Section 628( c)( 2)( C)? We also seek comment as to how many areas are actually affected by the prohibition contained in Section 628( c)( 2)( C). We also ask what impact has the prohibition contained in Section 628( c)( 2)( C) had on increasing the availability of satellite cable programming and satellite broadcast programming to persons in rural areas? 33 14. We also seek comment on whether the Commission should consider an approach that narrows the scope of, rather than completely eliminates, the exclusivity restriction. The Commission has recognized that certain programming services may be more essential than others to the viability and success of competing program distributors. 34 Given the proliferation of new programming and competing programming services, we seek comment on the extent to which this assumption still holds true. To the extent the assumption remains valid, we seek comment on whether, and in what manner, the prohibition on exclusivity could be limited to cover only essential programming services. To what extent would tailoring the rules based on the success or popularity of particular services raise First Amendment concerns? We also seek comment on any other potential alternative approaches. For example, should the limitation of exclusivity be tied to the specific geographic or competitive circumstances of the area in question? Should the exclusivity restriction continue to be applied when the programming service in question is vertically integrated with cable television systems in some locations but is not vertically integrated with those in the area where exclusivity might be sought? Should the restriction continue in areas in which the level of MVPD competition reaches a certain level? In the latter example, we seek comment on whether the prohibition should be lifted as to all MVPD competitors or solely for MVPDs of sufficient competitive presence. We seek comment on the statutory basis for any of these approaches and what standards and analysis the Commission could use to define and implement any such approach. 15. If Section 628( c)( 2)( D) is retained, we seek comment on future procedures necessarily related to the retention of Section 628( c)( 2)( D). We seek comment on whether the provision should be retained in perpetuity or for a fixed period of years. If retained for a fixed period of years, what is the appropriate period? We note that on January 1, 2006, the existing prohibition on exclusive retransmission consent agreements between television broadcast stations and MVPDs expires. 35 We seek comment on whether the provision, if retained pursuant to this proceeding, should automatically sunset at the end of that further period, or whether the Commission should undertake the same analysis required by Section 628( c)( 5) to determine at that time the continuing value of and need for Section 628( c)( 2)( D). We also seek comment on whether Section 628( c)( 2)( D) should be eliminated depending on certain triggering events, such as a significant change in market conditions. Finally, we seek comment on any other issues appropriate to our inquiry in accordance with Section 628( c)( 5). 33 See 47 U. S. C. § 548( a). 34 Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission’s Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television Service, 5 FCC Rcd 4962, 5027 (1990). 35 47 U. S. C. § 325( b)( 3)( C)( 2). 7 Federal Communications Commission FCC 01- 307 8 IV. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS A. INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT STATEMENT 16. The initial regulatory flexibility analysis is attached to this Notice as Appendix A. B. INITIAL PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT OF 1995 ANALYSIS 17. This NPRM contains either a proposed or modified information collection. As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, we invite the general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to take this opportunity to comment on the information collections contained in this NPRM, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104- 13. Public and agency comments are due at the same time as other comments on this NPRM; OMB comments are due 60 days from date of publication of this NPRM in the Federal Register. Comments should address: (a) whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on the respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology. C. PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS 18. Comments and Reply Comments. Pursuant to applicable procedures set forth in Sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 36 interested parties may file comments on or before December 3, 2001 and reply comments on or before January 7, 2002. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS) or by filing paper copies. 37 Comments filed through the ECFS can be sent as an electronic file via the Internet to . Generally, only one copy of an electronic submission must be filed. If multiple docket or rulemaking numbers appear in the caption of this proceeding, however, commenters must transmit one electronic copy of the comments to each docket or rulemaking number referenced in the caption. In completing the transmittal screen, commenters should include their full name, Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket or rulemaking number. Parties may also submit an electronic comment by Internet e- mail. To get filing instructions for e- mail comments, commenters should send an e- mail to ecfs@ fcc. gov, and should include the following words in the body of the message, "get form