Federal Communications Commission FCC 07-149
JOINT STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL J. COPPS AND
COMMISSIONER JONATHAN S. ADELSTEIN,
CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART
Re: Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. Pursuant to Section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
Amended, for Forbearance from Certain Dominant Carrier Regulation of Its Interstate Access Services, 
and for Forbearance from Title II Regulation of Its Broadband Services, in the Anchorage, Alaska, 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier Study Area, WC Docket No. 06-109.
In today’s decision, the Commission addresses a wide-ranging forbearance petition concerning 
the appropriate regulation of the incumbent local exchange carrier in the unique circumstances of 
Anchorage, Alaska.  Anchorage is a relatively small market, geographically removed from the lower 48 
states. Moreover, a competitive facilities-based carrier has extensively built out its network and has taken 
significant market share for certain services from the incumbent provider. Because we find that this Order 
is inconsistent in its consideration of these factors, we concur in part and dissent in part.
We support this Order’s decision to grant conditional relief in Anchorage for certain services 
where there is clear evidence of a vigorous rivalry between the incumbent cable and wireline provider; 
where there are few, if any, other competitors seeking to enter the market; and where the principal 
competitors previously reached a long-term commercial agreement that may in fact foster competition in 
the mass market.  However, we continue to have concerns with a general approach that suggests that 
consumers should be satisfied with only two providers.  The goal of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
is to establish a competitive and de-regulatory telecommunications environment. While today’s order 
reduces regulation by eliminating some incumbent obligations and demonstrates that the Commission can 
respond to a dynamic marketplace, the Commission relies on the intermodal efforts of a single alternative 
provider to conclude that sufficient competition exists.  While we concur in the forbearance of certain 
regulations based on the aforementioned factors that affect the unique Anchorage market, we believe the 
statute contemplates more than just competition between a wireline and cable provider.
Moreover, the Commission is forced to craft a novel litany of conditions in order to grant 
forbearance in this case.  While we appreciate the efforts of the parties and the Bureau to limit potential 
adverse effects of this decision on universal service, access charges, consumer prices, and for cost 
allocation purposes, here we create an almost entirely new regulatory structure out of whole cloth.  It will 
be important for the Commission to monitor the effects of these safeguards, and we encourage the 
Commission to diligently verify whether its predictions about their sufficiency are accurate.
For business customers, this Order is a particularly mixed bag.  We support the decision to deny 
relief from the Commission’s existing pricing rules for “traditional TDM-based” special access services, 
for which relief the Order finds a lack of evidence about market shares and the development of 
competitive forces.  Yet, in an inexplicable turn, the Commission forbears from the pricing rules for other 
special access services, referred to in this Order as enterprise broadband services.  While we appreciate 
the Commission’s effort not to rely explicitly on generalized marketplace conditions for these services or 
to characterize explicitly the marketplace as nationwide, in doing so it is left with an Order that it is 
devoid of virtually any analysis.  The Order readily admits “that the record in this proceeding does not 
include detailed market information for particular enterprise broadband services in the Anchorage MSA.”  
Much of the data pointed to for support is in fact for services offered by providers everywhere but 
Anchorage.  In addition, the Commission finds that “potential” competition is sufficient to forbear from 
regulation.  In places where substantial competition does not demonstrably exist, it seems that forbearance 
actually can make the problem worse as “potential” competitors will have even less ability to successfully 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 07-149
compete.  These kinds of decisions are too important to be made without the in-depth market analysis that 
might support them.  Recent Congressional hearings have demonstrated to us a growing impatience with 
policymaking via analysis-poor forbearance decisions.  The Commission needs to mend its ways.
While we certainly appreciate the Order’s decision to retain key interconnection, universal 
service, privacy, disabilities access, and other Congressionally-mandated provisions -- forbearance from 
which would have been devastating for consumers and competition -- we cannot support this Order’s 
decision to forbear from rules that provide critical pricing protection.  We hope that the grant of 
forbearance here, without analysis of specific market forces and conditions, is not an ominous sign for 
customers in other regions of the country, many who have fewer options than those available in 
Anchorage.