Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Ruling on Issues 
Contained in Thorpe v. GTE
On Referral by the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Florida
Linda Thorpe,
Representative Plaintiff,
vs.
GTE Corporation, GTE Florida Inc., AT&T Corp., 
Sprint-Florida, Inc., and MCI WorldCom Network 
Services, Inc.,
Defendants
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CG Docket No. 03-84
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Adopted:  April 9, 2008 Released:  April 11, 2008
By the Commission:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses a petition raising issues that are the subject 
of litigation in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and which is before us 
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.1 Linda Thorpe filed a petition for declaratory ruling with this 
Commission in which she asks whether she was obligated to accept long distance service on her second 
residential telephone line and pay charges associated with that service.2 Thorpe further seeks a 
declaration that the “forced coupling” of long distance with local service constitutes an unjust and 
  
1 See Petition for Declaratory Ruling on Issues Contained in “Thorpe v. GTE”, United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida, Case No. 8:00-CV-1231-T-17EAJ (filed Aug. 8, 2002) (Petition); see also id., Ex. B, 
Linda Thorpe v. GTE Corp. et al, Case No. 8:00-CV-1231-T-17EAJ, slip op. at 5-6 (M.D. Fla., Feb. 8, 2002) 
(District Court Order).
2 See Petition at 5, para. II.  Thorpe’s petition asks whether local service providers may “provide ‘local service only’ 
to their customers” or whether they must “in all events and as to all lines, couple local service with ‘long distance’ 
service provided by an interexchange carrier, even where the customer has no need for long distance service.” Id.; 
see also District Court Order at 5-6 (asking whether Thorpe was required under the national framework of the 
Communications Act to accept long distance service on her second phone line and pay the associated charges).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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unreasonable business practice in violation of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act).3  
Finally, Thorpe seeks a declaratory ruling as to whether the state law claims she asserted in her complaint 
are preempted by the Act.4  
2. In response to Thorpe’s first question, we find that she was not obligated to accept long 
distance service on her second line, but was obligated to pay certain charges associated with such service.  
The tariff that governed the relationship between Thorpe and her local telephone service provider, GTE 
Florida Incorporated (GTE Florida), offered her the option not to presubscribe to a long distance carrier.  
We also conclude that if GTE Florida did not allow Thorpe to elect not to presubscribe to a long distance 
carrier, its action would violate section 203(c) of the Act, which requires a carrier to comply with its 
tariff.  Also, if Thorpe elected not to presubscibe to a long distance carrier, she should have been able to 
avoid some charges associated with long distance service.  Under the facts alleged, there was no “forced 
coupling” of local and long distance services, and we therefore decline to rule on Thorpe’s request for 
declaratory rulings as to the lawfulness of such a practice.  Finally, Thorpe’s state law claims are 
preempted because they conflict with terms and conditions set forth in governing tariffs.  We explain our 
conclusions below.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Thorpe’s Complaint
3. Thorpe is a telephone subscriber residing in the state of Florida.5 Her complaint concerns 
charges associated with a second phone line that she had installed in her home sometime in 1997 or 1998 
and used at least until September of 1999.6 During this period, Thorpe’s local telephone company, also 
called a local exchange carrier or LEC, was GTE Florida, a subsidiary of GTE Corporation (GTE).7  
Thorpe’s first long distance company on the second line was AT&T Corp. (AT&T).8 In 1999, Thorpe 
discontinued long distance service with AT&T and selected GTE’s long distance affiliate, GTE 
Communications Corporation (GTECC), as her long distance carrier on the line.9 GTE Florida, AT&T, 
and GTECC are telecommunications carriers regulated under Title II of the Act.10
  
3 Petition at 16; see also id. at 6, para. III; 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.  
4 Petition at 5, para. I.
5 See id., Ex. A (Complaint) at 3, paras. 8-9.
6 See id. at 2-3.
7 See id.  We note that the merger between Bell Atlantic Corporation and GTE Corporation, which was completed 
on June 30, 2000, created Verizon Communications.  See Application of GTE Corporation, Transferor, and Bell 
Atlantic Corporation, Transferee, For Consent to Transfer Control of Domestic and International Sections 214 and 
310 Authorizations and Application to Transfer Control of a Submarine Cable Landing License, CC Docket No. 98-
184, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 14032 (2000).
8 Petition at 2.
9 Id. at 3; see also id., Composite Ex. E, GTE Florida Incorporated and AT&T Corp.’s Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Their Dispositive Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) (Defendants’ 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss) at 7 & n.6.  Although she did not name GTECC as a 
defendant in this proceeding or before the district court, Thorpe complains that certain charges that she was assessed 
by GTE Long Distance were unlawful.  Thorpe’s complaint appears to confuse GTE and GTECC.  Compare 
Petition at 3 with Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7 & n.6.
10 See Petition, Composite Ex. E, GTE Florida Incorporated and AT&T Corp.’s Dispositive Motion to Dismiss 
Pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) at 1-2, paras. 1, 3; Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss at 7 & n.6; see also 47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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4. In a proposed class action filed in Florida state court, Thorpe alleged that, at the time she 
requested installation of the second line, GTE Florida “without discussion or communication of any kind
. . . arbitrarily assigned AT&T” as her long distance service provider.11 Thorpe claims that she contacted 
GTE Florida again in January of 1999 and requested termination of long distance service on her second 
line.  She asserts that GTE Florida misrepresented to her that, whether or not she had any use for long 
distance service on that line, she was required to have it.12 In March of 1999, Thorpe again contacted 
GTE Florida, which apparently was the billing agent for AT&T. Thorpe told GTE Florida that, although 
she had used her second line only for local calls and thus should not have been charged anything for long 
distance services, AT&T had imposed “Carrier Line” and “Universal Connectivity” charges.13 Thorpe 
says that, for a second time, she complained that she did not want long distance service and GTE Florida 
again told her that long distance service was required on her line.  This time, however, Thorpe asserts that 
GTE Florida indicated that if she switched her long distance provider to its long distance affiliate, 
GTECC, no minimum monthly service charges would be imposed.14 Accordingly, in March of 1999, 
Thorpe switched her long distance carrier to GTECC.15 Thorpe asserts that, although it did not do so for 
several months, in September 1999 GTECC began imposing a $3.00 minimum monthly charge for long 
distance service.16 Thorpe’s complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages pursuant to 
the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act,17 restitution for void or voidable contracts,18 and 
alleged breaches of contract19 and the duty of good faith and fair dealing.20
5. Defendant GTE Florida, with the consent of the other defendants,21 removed the action to 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, arguing that the complaint involved 
services regulated by this Commission and required resolution of questions entirely federal in nature.22
B. Thorpe’s Request for Declaratory Ruling 
6. The district court determined that Thorpe’s complaint concerned a federal statute and 
  
11 Complaint at 1, 3, paras. 1, 10.
12 Id. at 3-4, para. 12.
13 Id. at 4, para. 13.  Thorpe appended to her complaint copies of her consolidated local and long distance bill dated 
January, March, and September 1999.  See id., Composite Exs. A, B, D. 
14 Id. at 4, para. 14; see also Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7 & n.6 (long 
distance provided through GTECC).
15 Complaint at 4, para. 15; id., Composite Ex. C (Letter from Rena M. Taguchi, Director, GTE Long Distance to 
Linda A. Thorpe (Mar. 31, 1999)) (confirming recent change in service).
16 Id. at 4, para. 16; see id., Composite Ex. D.  Thorpe asserts that, beginning in January 1999, after she acquired a 
computer system, she intended all usage on her second line to be local only, and thus claims that she should not have 
been billed long distance charges.  Id. at 3, 5, paras. 11-12, 18.  We note, however, that one of the bills attached to 
Thorpe’s Complaint indicates that she did make some long distance calls after January 1, 1999, on her second line.  
See id., Composite Ex. D at 3.
17 Id. at 8-11, paras. 37-54 (Counts I & II).
18 Id. at 11, paras. 55-59 (Count III).
19 Id. at 12, paras. 60-65 (Count IV).
20 Id. at 12-13, paras. 66-70 (Count VI [sic]).  
21 In addition to GTE, GTE Florida, and AT&T, Thorpe’s district court complaint named Sprint-Florida, 
Incorporated, and MCI WorldCom Network Services, Inc. as defendants.  See id. at 1.  
22 See Petition, Ex. C (Notice of Removal, Thorpe v. GTE Corp. et al., Case No. 8:00-CV-1231-T-17C at 2 (filed 
M.D. Fla. June 21, 2000)).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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should be referred to this Commission under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.23 Specifically, the court 
found that the allegations before it “center around the fact that [Thorpe] does not want long distance 
service on her second phone line, but Defendants contend [she] must accept it under the national 
framework of the [Communications Act], and pay the associated charges.”24 Accordingly, in August 
2002, Thorpe filed a petition for declaratory ruling with this Commission in which she asks whether local 
service providers may “provide ‘local service only’ to their customers,” or whether they must “in all 
events and as to all lines, couple local service with ‘long distance’ service provided by an interexchange 
carrier, even where the customer has no need for long distance service” on a line.25 In addition to that 
question, Thorpe’s petition further asks us to find that the “forced coupling” of long distance with local 
service constitutes an unjust and unreasonable business practice in violation of section 201(b) of the 
Act.26 Thorpe also seeks a declaratory ruling from this Commission as to whether her state law claims are 
preempted by the Act.  Comments were filed by numerous providers of local and long distance service, 
including the defendants in the district court proceeding, as well as the New Jersey Division of the 
Ratepayer Advocate.27 Several of the commenters, including Thorpe and Verizon, as well as the 
California Public Utilities Commission, filed replies.28  
7. Thorpe asserts that she requested installation of the second phone line sometime in 1997 
or 1998, that she asked that long distance service be removed from her account in January and March of 
1999, that she changed the long distance provider on her line in March 1999, and that GTECC began 
charging her a minimum charge for long distance on her line in September 1999.29 Accordingly, we 
consider January 1, 1997, through September 30, 1999, to be the relevant period for our analysis of 
governing law and tariff provisions.
C. Telecommunications Regulation
8. Thorpe complains that she wanted to use her second line only for local service and did 
  
23 District Court Order at 6.
24 Id. at 5-6; see also 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; Petition at 5-6.
25 Petition at 5.
26 Id. at 6, 16; see id. at 14-15.  
27 Comments of AT&T Corp. (filed June 5, 2003) (AT&T Comments); Comments of CBeyond Communications, 
LLC, Pac-West Telecomm, Inc. and US LEC Corp. (filed June 5, 2003) (CBeyond Comments); Comments of MCI 
WORLDCOM Network Services, Inc. (filed June 5, 2003) (MCI Comments); Comments of the New Jersey 
Division of the Ratepayer Advocate (filed June 5, 2003) (Ratepayer Advocate Comments); Comments of the 
Promoting Active Competition Everywhere Coalition (filed June 5, 2003)(PACE Coalition Comments); Comments 
of SBC Communications Inc. (filed June 5, 2003); Comments of Sprint Corporation (filed June 5, 2003) (Sprint 
Comments); Comments of Verizon Florida (filed June 5, 2003) (Verizon Comments); Comments of WorldNet 
Telecommunications, Inc. (filed June 5, 2003) (WorldNet Comments); see also Comment Requested on Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling Concerning the Bundling of Local Telephone Service with Long Distance Service, CG Docket 
No. 03-84, Public Notice, 18 FCC Rcd 5517; (2003) (Thorpe PN); 68 Fed. Reg. 19542-01 (Apr. 21, 2003).
28 Reply Comments of the California Public Utilities Commission and the People of the State of California on the 
Petition of Linda Thorpe for a Declaratory Ruling Concerning the Bundling of Local Telephone Service with Long 
Distance Service (filed June 19, 2003) (California PUC Reply); Reply Comments of the New Jersey Division of 
Ratepayer Advocate (filed June 20, 2003) (Ratepayer Advocate Reply); Reply Comments of Pac-West Telecomm, 
Inc. and US LEC Corp. (filed June 20, 2003) (Pac-West Reply); Reply Comments of Verizon Florida (filed June 20, 
2003); Petitioner’s Reply to Comments of AT&T Corp., CBeyond Communications, LLC, Pac-West Telecomm, 
Inc., and US LEC Corp., (filed Aug. 5, 2003) (Thorpe Reply).
29 Complaint at 3-4, paras. 9-16.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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not need or want to pay for long distance service.30 Long distance or interexchange service can be either 
intrastate or interstate.31 We understand Thorpe to complain about charges associated with interstate long 
distance service, which is within the FCC’s jurisdiction .32 Thus, the fees that we discuss here are fees 
associated with interstate service.
9. When the events described in the petition occurred (and continuing to the present day), 
“presubscription” procedures governed how telephone users in the United States select a long distance 
carrier.  These procedures were established by the FCC as one consequence of an antitrust action brought 
against AT&T by the Department of Justice.33 To resolve this lawsuit, AT&T entered into a consent 
judgment in 1982 called the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ), which required it to divest itself of its 
local affiliates, the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), and required the BOCs to provide to all 
interexchange carriers (IXCs) access to the local exchange network that was “equal in type, quality, and 
price to that provided to AT&T and its affiliates.”34 The MFJ and the equal access requirements were 
designed to serve the public interest by facilitating competition in the long distance telephone market.  
The MFJ’s “equal access” requirements included dialing parity, and subsequently were imposed on GTE 
through a separate consent decree.35 In 1985, the Commission adopted equal access requirements for all 
wireline LECs.36
10. Dialing parity is the ability of a telephone subscriber to route a call by dialing a uniform 
number of digits, regardless of which carrier’s network carries the call; in other words, the customer need 
not dial an access code of additional digits to complete the call.  Prior to equal access, only long distance 
calls carried over AT&T’s network could be connected through ten-digit dialing.37 Thus, callers seeking 
to use the long distance facilities of a competing provider had to dial a multi-digit access code to reach 
  
30 See Petition at 6.  “Local” telephone service – the kind of service that Thorpe wanted – generally refers to service 
that allows a customer, for a fixed monthly fee, to make an unlimited number of calls within the customers’ local 
service area – a geographic area defined in the LEC’s tariff that includes the customer’s local exchange and some 
local exchanges in adjoining areas.
31 It is something of a misnomer, however, to use the term “interexchange” as a synonym for “long distance” 
because local calling areas usually contain more than one exchange and thus some calls rated as local are actually 
between two local exchanges.  Since 1984, long distance calls also have been classified as either “intraLATA toll” –
between two different telephone exchanges, both located within a single local access and transport area (LATA) – or 
“interLATA toll.”  Most intraLATA long distance telephone calls are intrastate calls.  See also infra note 45.
32 Historically, state commissions have regulated local and intrastate long distance services.  The Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 enlarged the FCC’s jurisdiction over local telephone service.  See generally AT&T Corp. v. Iowa 
Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
33 In 1974, the Department of Justice filed an antitrust action against AT&T in which it asserted that AT&T 
discriminated against rivals (such as long distance companies) that needed access to the local exchange and that it 
engaged in activities designed to shut out potential competitors from the telecommunications markets.  See United 
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp 1314, 1317-18, 1328, 1340-41 (D.D.C. 1978); see also United 
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 161 n.125 (D.D.C. 1982) (MFJ), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. 
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
34 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 171-72.
35 See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 197; see also United States. v. GTE Corp., 603 F. 
Supp. 730, 744-46 (D.D.C. 1984).
36 See MTS and WATS Market Structure, CC Docket No. 78-72, Phase III, Report and Order, 100 FCC2d 860, 873-
878, paras. 43-60 (1985) (Independent Telephone Company Equal Access Order).
37 Under the North American Numbering Plan, the dialing system in place in the United States, telephone numbers 
are ten digits:  first, a three-digit area code, followed by a three-digit central office code, and concluding with a four-
digit individual number.  See generally People of the State of New York & Pub. Serv. Comm’n of the State of New 
York v. FCC, 267 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
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their chosen carrier, and then dial a multi-digit authorization code before they could dial the ten-digit 
telephone number of the person with whom they wanted to speak.38 As discussed above, dialing parity 
for long distance calls was implemented through presubscription, which is the procedure still used today.  
Once a telephone subscriber selects a long distance carrier – the customer’s Presubscribed Interexhange 
Carrier or PIC – that PIC carries all outbound “1 plus”39 long distance traffic for the subscriber until she 
decides to select a different PIC.  The LEC (in Thorpe’s case, GTE Florida), rather than the PIC, is the 
entity that actually implements the PIC choice and thus must be involved in the PIC-choice process.  
Thorpe had two PICs on her second line, first AT&T and later GTECC.  Presubscription also allows 
subscribers to place long distance calls using IXCs other than a PIC by dialing a multi-digit code plus the 
ten-digit long distance number.  In this way, customers choosing “no-PIC” still can make long distance 
“dial around” calls, albeit by dialing extra digits.  The LECs were required to incorporate presubscription 
procedures in their interstate access tariffs, and the Commission issued several orders concerning 
presubscription implementation.40
11. The MFJ sought to facilitate competition in the long distance market.  In 1996, Congress 
passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) which, among other things, sought to open the 
local telephone markets to competition.41  While the MFJ and Commission orders required dialing parity 
in the interexchange market, in 1996 Congress codified and extended this requirement in section 
251(b)(3) of the Act.42 Specifically, that section provides that all LECs have “[t]he duty to provide 
dialing parity to competing providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service.”43 In its 
1996 Local Competition Second Report and Order, the Commission determined that section 251(b)(3) 
requires LECs to provide dialing parity with respect to all telecommunications services that require 
dialing to route a call and encompasses international, interstate, intrastate, local, and toll services.44  
Implementation of section 251(b)(3), the Commission determined, required that end-user subscribers be 
  
38 Because this substantial disparity in dialing convenience had a significant adverse impact on competition, the MFJ 
mandated dialing parity.  United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.¸ 578 F. Supp. 668, 670 (D.D.C. 1983) (citing 
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 197).
39 “1 plus” refers to the ability to make a direct long distance call by dialing the number “1” plus the ten-digit long 
distance number. 
40 See United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 668; see also Investigation of Access and Divestiture 
Related Tariffs, CC Docket No. 83-1145, Phase I, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 101 FCC2d 911 (1985); 
Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, CC Docket No. 83-1145, Phase I, 101 FCC2d 935 (Com. 
Car. Bur. 1985); Independent Telephone Company Equal Access Order, 100 FCC2d 860; Investigation of Access 
and Divestiture Related Tariffs, CC Docket No. 83-1145, Phase I, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 FCC2d 
1082, 1304-05, App. D, § 13.3.3 (1984).
41 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
42 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).  Section 251(g) of the Act preserved the equal access requirements in place prior to the 
passage of the 1996 Act, including obligations imposed by the MFJ and any Commission rules.  See 47 U.S.C. § 
251(g).
43 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).
44 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-
98, et al., Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 19392, 19399-400, para. 4 
(1996) (Local Competition Second Report and Order) (subsequent history omitted).  At the time the facts of this 
case arose, the Eighth Circuit had set aside the FCC’s dialing parity rules but only to the extent that they pertained to 
intraLATA telecommunications traffic, which is not at issue here.  Ultimately the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s 
intraLATA dialing parity rules and thus the Eighth Circuit’s ruling was overturned.  See People of the State of 
California v. FCC, 124 F.3d 934, 943 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 
at 385.
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entitled to choose different presubscribed carriers for both their intraLATA and interLATA toll calls.45  
To carry out this mandate, the Commission required LECs to employ the “full 2-PIC” method, which 
allows a customer to presubscribe to one telecommunications carrier for all interLATA toll calls and to 
presubscribe to a separate telecommunications carrier (including but not limited to the customer’s LEC) 
for all intraLATA toll calls.46 The Commission decided that states were best positioned to determine how 
consumers should be educated about intraLATA presubscription and to adopt measures consistent with 
the Local Competition Second Report and Order to prevent abuse of customer notification and carrier 
selection processes.47 Some states, including Florida where Thorpe resides, already had mandated 
intraLATA toll dialing parity when the 1996 Act became law.48 According to reports of the Florida 
Public Service Commission, GTE completed its conversion to intraLATA presubscription in Florida in 
February of 1997.49  
  
45 Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19400, 19414, paras. 5, 37.  A single LATA 
encompasses more than one immediate local calling area.  Thus "intraLATA" is not synonymous with "local."  A 
call that is completed outside of the caller's immediate local calling area but within the same LATA is an intraLATA 
toll call, while a call that is completed outside of both the caller's immediate local calling area and his or her LATA 
is an interLATA toll call.
46 Id. at 19418, 19419, paras. 47, 49.  The Commission codified the intraLATA presubscription requirements in 
Section 51.209 of its rules.  Subsection (c) provides that “[a] LEC may not assign automatically a customer's 
intraLATA toll traffic to itself, to its subsidiaries or affiliates, to the customer's presubscribed interLATA or 
interstate toll carrier, or to any other carrier.”  47 C.F.R. § 51.209(c).  After implementation of intraLATA toll 
dialing parity, subscribers such as Thorpe could receive service from three different carriers – local “dial tone” 
service from a LEC, intraLATA toll from a presubscribed intraLATA toll carrier, and long distance service from an 
interLATA toll carrier – all without having to dial any access codes.  Because subscribers such as Thorpe already 
had a LEC and a PIC, the most significant subscriber impact of the 1996 Act’s dialing parity mandate was to enable 
subscribers to select a presubscribed carrier for intraLATA toll calls.
47 Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19435-36, para. 80. Reports of the Florida Public 
Service Commission issued during the period that carriers transitioned to intraLATA toll concern, inter alia, 
implementation of an intraLATA no-PIC option by GTE Florida and other large incumbent LECs, and customer 
contact protocols that these carriers should implement, which were designed to inform and educate customers about
intraLATA presubscription in a “competitively neutral” fashion.  See Generic Consideration of Incumbent Local 
Exchange (ILEC) Business Office Practices and Tariff Provisions in the Implementation of IntraLATA 
Presubscription, Docket No. 970526-TP, Notice of Proposed Agency Action, Order on Incumbent Local Exchange 
Company Business Office Practices and Tariff Provisions in the Implementation of IntraLATA Presubscription, 
Order No. PSC-97-0709-FOF-TP, 1997 WL 370746, at *2-4 (Fla. Pub. Svc. Com’n June 13, 1997), modified, Final 
Order on Incumbent Local Exchange Company Business Office Practices and Tariff Provisions in the 
Implementation of IntraLATA Presubscription, Order No. PSC-98-0710-FOF-TP, 1998 WL 391674, at *3-5, 11-12 
(Fla. Pub. Svc. Com’n May 22, 1998) (Final Order on Business Office Practices); see also Generic Consideration 
of Incumbent Local Exchange (ILEC) Business Office Practices and Tariff Provisions in the Implementation of 
IntraLATA Presubscription, Docket No. 970526-TP, Prehearing Order, Order No. PSC-98-0299-PHO-TP, 1998 WL 
242740, at *4-6, 8-9 (Fla. Pub. Svc. Com’n Feb. 18, 1998) (Prehearing Order). The Prehearing Order indicates 
that GTE Florida agreed to stipulate that it had implemented a no-PIC option for intraLATA toll.  Id. at *4, 8; see 
also Final Order on Business Office Practices, 1998 WL 391674, at *11.  For a short period, the Florida 
Commission prohibited GTE Florida from marketing its own intraLATA toll service to customers who contacted its 
offices for reasons unrelated to intraLATA service, including customers calling to set up second lines.  See Final 
Order on Business Office Practices, 1998 WL 391674, at *5.
48 Specifically, in a 1995 order, the Florida Public Service Commission ordered the four largest LECs in that state, 
including GTE Florida, to implement intraLATA toll dialing parity pursuant to the full 2-PIC method by December 
31, 1997.  IntraLATA Presubscription, Docket No. 930330-TP, Order, Order No. PSC-95-0203-FOF-TP, 1995 WL 
111239 (Fla. Pub. Svc. Com’n Feb. 13, 1995).
49 See Final Order on Business Office Practices, 1998 WL 391674, at *12.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Long Distance as a Mandatory Service Under the Act
1. Arbitrary Assignment of a PIC and the No-PIC Option
12. Against this background, we consider Thorpe’s requests for declaratory relief.  With 
respect to the question of whether Thorpe was obligated to accept long distance service on her second 
residential telephone line, we conclude that Thorpe was not required under the Act or the carrier’s 
governing tariff to accept a long distance carrier, or PIC, on her line.  As discussed above, carriers may 
offer their subscribers a no-PIC option.  Customers who select this option cannot make 1-plus long 
distance telephone calls.  These customers must dial a multi-digit access code to reach a long distance 
provider to complete a long distance call.  At the time these events occurred, GTE Florida was a dominant 
provider of interstate telecommunications access services and, as such, offered its services under a tariff, 
which it filed with this Commission pursuant to section 203 of the Act.50 GTE Florida’s interstate tariff 
offered a no-PIC option to its customers and thus, to comply with its tariff, GTE Florida should have 
granted any request Thorpe made to select that option.
13. Thorpe claims she had three separate conversations with GTE Florida that impacted her 
long distance PIC.  First, Thorpe claims that, when she signed up for a second line in 1997 or 1998, GTE 
Florida, “without discussion or communication of any kind . . . arbitrarily assigned AT&T” as her long 
distance service provider.51 Second, Thorpe claims that, when she contacted GTE Florida in January 
1999 and requested termination of long distance service on the second line, she was told “that she was 
required to have long distance service associated with the subject line, whether or not she had any use for 
it.”52 Third and finally, Thorpe says she contacted GTE Florida in March of 1999 to again complain 
about her long distance bill, and GTE Florida again told her that long distance was required and 
persuaded her to switch her PIC to GTECC.53 For purposes of our analysis, we assume the veracity of 
Thorpe’s allegations.54
14. Thorpe first asserts that GTE Florida did not discuss a long distance carrier with her but 
arbitrarily assigned her second line to AT&T.55  If true, such an action by GTE Florida would violate both 
the Act and its tariff.  Under section 251(b)(3), telephone customers have a right to choose their PIC and 
may select a PIC on a second line that is different from the PIC on their first line.56 Thus, a random 
assignment of Thorpe’s second line to AT&T – or any carrier – without her consent would violate section 
251(b)(3).  Furthermore, GTE Florida’s tariff required it to ascertain her chosen PIC.  On January 1, 1997, 
the portion of GTE Florida’s interstate exchange access tariff that governed the PIC selection process 
included the following provision regarding presubscription:
In end offices converted to Equal Access new end users, and agents of 
Public and Semipublic Pay Telephones, and multi-party end users who 
  
50 47 U.S.C. § 203.
51 Complaint at 3, para. 10.
52 Id. at 3-4, para. 12.
53 Id. at 4, para. 14.
54 GTE Florida will be entitled to present its own version of events to the district court.
55 Complaint at 3, para. 10.
56 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3); Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19400, 19414, paras. 5, 
37; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.  As discussed further below, Thorpe also was entitled to select 
no-PIC.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
9
upgrade to individual lines must presubscribe to the PIC of their choice
at the time an order is placed for service.  Upon the end user or agent’s 
selection of the PIC, at the time of placing an order, a confirmation 
notice will be sent identifying the I[nterexchange] C[arrier] selected.  
From the date of the confirmation notice, they will have 90 days to 
change their presubscription selection without a charge, on a one-time 
basis.  If a PIC is not chosen at the time the order for service is 
submitted, the end user or agent will be sent a confirmation notice which 
contains a list of ICs with FGD or BSA-D and will be informed that they 
have 90 days to contact the IC of their choice or the Telephone Company 
for the PIC arrangement.  If notice is received by the Telephone 
Company within 90 days of the in-service date for local service or 
upgrade, no charge will be billed to the end user or agent.  If notice is 
received after 90 days, the end user or agent will be billed a nonrecurring 
charge in 6.5(L).  Until the end user or agent receives service from the 
selected IC, it may access the IC of its choice by dialing the appropriate 
10XXX or 101XXXX carrier identification code.57  
Thus any failure of GTE Florida to ascertain Thorpe’s choice of PIC (including a choice of no-PIC) also 
would violate its tariff.58 Here, we can make no finding as to the lawfulness of GTE Florida’s alleged 
action because the record before this Commission does not reflect GTE Florida’s version of its 
conversation with Thorpe.
15. Thorpe also claims that she later had two conversations with GTE Florida about her long 
distance service.59 According to Thorpe, in response to her specific requests that long distance service on 
her second line be terminated, GTE Florida told her on two occasions, in January and March of 1999, 
“that she was required to have long distance service associated with the subject line, whether or not she 
had any use for it.”60 The GTE Florida tariff provision governing PIC selection quoted above permits a 
subscriber to select a no-PIC option.  Specifically, although it begins “end users . . . must presubscribe to 
the PIC of their choice at the time an order is placed for service,” it also states that customers who do not 
select a PIC “at the time the order for service is submitted,” will be mailed a list of available PICs and that 
they will be charged a fee if they first select a PIC after 90 days has passed.  It also specifies that, until a 
customer chooses a PIC, she may make long distance calls by dialing a multi-digit access code (10XXX 
or 101XXXX).  Accordingly, this tariff allows a subscriber such as Thorpe to select no-PIC as her long 
distance selection.  Thus, with respect to whether Thorpe was obligated to accept long distance service on 
her second residential telephone line, Thorpe should not have been required to accept AT&T or any other 
long distance carrier as a PIC on her line.  Moreover, if, as Thorpe claims in her petition, GTE Florida did 
  
57 GTE Telephone Operating Companies Tariff FCC No. 1, 20th rev. p. 231.1 (eff. Mar. 29, 1996) (emphasis added) 
(attachment to Letter from Joseph Mulieri, Vice President, Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Secretary, FCC (filed Aug. 26, 2005) (Verizon August 26, 2005 Ex Parte)).  The Verizon August 26, 2005 Ex Parte 
also contains the amendments made to this language through March 31, 1999, when Thorpe switched her PIC to 
GTECC.
58 We do not construe this tariff provision to be limited to end users activating a primary line.  We note that GTE 
Florida’s tariff does not address the procedures that GTE Florida uses to educate customers about their long distance 
options or to ascertain their long distance choices.  GTE Florida was completing its implementation of intraLATA 
equal access in the same time frame and may have been subject to particular state requirements regarding educating 
Thorpe about her intraLATA choices.  See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
59 Complaint at 3-4, paras. 12, 14. 
60 Id. at 4, para. 12; see id. at para. 14.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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not allow Thorpe to make this choice in response to her specific request,61 that would be contrary to the 
provision in its tariff that allows no-PIC, and thus a violation of section 203(c) of the Act, which requires 
a carrier to comply with the terms of its tariff.62
2. Mandatory Fees for Long Distance Service
16. Thorpe’s petition also raises the issue of whether she was obligated to pay certain charges 
associated with long distance service.63 Thorpe asserts that, although she had used her second line only 
for local calls and thus should not have been charged for any long distance services, AT&T imposed a 
“Carrier Line Charge” and a “Universal Connectivity” charge.64 Thorpe also complains that, although 
GTECC did not charge a minimum fee for long distance service for several months after Thorpe selected 
it as her PIC, in September 1999 it began imposing a minimum monthly charge for long distance 
service.65 The long distance portion of what appears to be Thorpe’s consolidated local and long distance 
telephone bill for September 1999 shows that GTE Florida also charged her a “FCC Primary Carrier 
Add’l Line” charge.66 As we discuss in detail below, even if Thorpe elected no-PIC on her second line, 
she still was obligated to pay some of these charges, which were charges associated with interstate long 
distance service.
17. Interstate long distance telephone service is regulated in the federal jurisdiction by this 
Commission pursuant to the Act.67 Incumbent LECs – like GTE Florida – are dominant providers of local 
exchange service,68 which usually is an intrastate service.  Nevertheless, some of the rates these carriers 
charge are regulated in the federal jurisdiction as rates for the provision of interstate services.  That is 
because much of the telephone plant that is used to provide local telephone service is also needed to 
  
61 As noted, Thorpe claims that she specifically asked GTE Florida to terminate long distance service on her second 
line.  Although GTE Florida would still have been required to provide dial-around service and thus could not 
completely “terminate” long distance service on the second line, we believe that, as alleged, the request to terminate 
long distance service on her second line was a request for no-PIC on that line.  Further, GTE Florida’s alleged 
response – that Thorpe “was required to have long distance service associated with the subject line, whether or not 
she had any use for it” – constitutes a denial of no-PIC.
62 47 U.S.C. § 203(c); see also discussion infra para. 31.
63 See Petition at 5; see also District Court Order at 5-6 (asking whether Thorpe was required under the national 
framework of the Act to accept long distance service on her second phone line and pay the associated charges).
64 Thorpe states that, in January 1999, AT&T charged her “a minimum for long distance service.”  Petition at 2.  
Because no minimum charge appears on the copy of the bill appended to her complaint, we understand Thorpe to be 
complaining about the Carrier Line and Universal Connectivity charges.  Compare id. with Complaint at 4, para. 13, 
Composite Exs. A, B.  
65 Petition at 3.  Thorpe switched her PIC to GTECC in March.  Id.; see also Complaint, Composite Ex. C.  The 
minimum monthly charge reflected on the September 1999 bill is actually $2.86 because Thorpe placed a call to 
Alexandria, Virginia that month, which cost 14 cents.  According to the September 1999 bill, “[W]hen GTE LD 
charges are less than $3.00, the Monthly Minimum Charge will be the difference between those charges and $3.00.”  
Complaint, Composite Ex. D.  That document also reflects two 75 cent “Automatic Call Return” charges, and a late 
payment fee of 17 cents.  We do not understand Thorpe to complain about the traffic-sensitive fees for long 
distances services actually rendered to Thorpe.  These charges do, however, undercut her claim that she only used or 
intended to use her second line for local calls.  See Complaint at 3-4.
66 See Complaint, Composite Ex. D.
67 See 47 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.
68 Under existing common carrier regulation, incumbent LECs are generally treated as dominant carriers, absent a 
specific finding to the contrary for a particular market.  See Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC 
Broadband Telecommunications Services, CC Docket No. 01-337, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd 
22745, 22747, para. 5 (2001).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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originate and terminate interstate long distance calls.  The same local loop that connects a telephone 
subscriber to the local exchange also connects the subscriber to the interstate network.  IXCs such as 
AT&T use the LECs’ loop facilities in order to originate and terminate their customers’ long distance 
calls.  Thus, incumbent LECs, such as GTE Florida, traditionally have recovered a portion of the costs 
that they incur building and maintaining the local telephone plant through interstate access charges 
imposed on end users and IXCs.69 At the time the events described in the petition occurred, the 
Commission regulated the interstate access rates that these carriers charged their customers through a 
detailed rate-setting process that determined each incumbent LEC’s cost of providing service and 
established specific rates for that incumbent LEC.70 Commission rules separate the interstate portion 
from the intrastate portion of loop costs to allocate these costs between the state and federal 
jurisdictions.71 Nevertheless, this separations process –
does not affect the cost of the loop.  Local telephone plant costs are real; they are 
necessarily incurred for each subscriber by virtue of that subscriber’s interconnection into 
the local network, and they must be recovered regardless of how many or how few 
interstate calls (or local calls for that matter) a subscriber makes.72
Thus, if Thorpe avoided all charges associated with interstate long distance service, she would not be 
paying her full share for the facilities she also needed to make local calls.  This fact belies the major 
premise that underlies Thorpe’s complaint – which is that local charges fully compensate LECs for their 
costs of providing local service. 
18. The Commission historically has recognized that, consistent with principles of cost 
causation, the costs that incumbent LECs incur providing interstate access should be recovered from 
customers in the same way the costs are incurred.73 Thus, the traffic-sensitive costs of interstate access 
services, such as per-minute-of-use charges associated with individual long distance telephone calls, 
should, when possible, be recovered through per-minute rates.74 Similarly, non-traffic-sensitive costs –
  
69 See Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 148-50 (1930) (because local telephone plant is used for 
interstate calls, an appropriate percentage of local plant costs should be placed within the jurisdiction of federal, 
rather than state, regulators).  IXCs recover their costs, including the access charges they pay, from their subscribers.  
70 These rates, as well as the terms and conditions under which the LEC provides service to its customers, are 
contained in FCC tariffs.  See generally 47 U.S.C. § 203; 47 C.F.R. Part 61.
71 See 47 C.F.R. Part 36.  The Commission uses a multi-step process to identify the cost of providing access service.  
First, pursuant to the Uniform System of Accounts, contained in Part 32 of the Commission’s rules, an incumbent 
LEC must record all of its expenses, investments, and revenues.  Next, rules contained in Part 64 divide these costs 
between those associated with regulated telecommunications services and those associated with nonregulated 
activities.  Third, the separations rules, contained in Part 36, determine the fraction of the incumbent LEC’s 
regulated expenses and investment that should be allocated to the interstate jurisdiction.  After the total amount of 
interstate cost is identified, the access charge rules translate these interstate costs into charges for the specific 
interstate access services and rate elements.  Part 69 specifies in detail the rate structure for recovering these costs 
and the precise manner in which incumbent LECs may assess charges on IXCs and subscribers.
72 Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1227 (1985); see Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 558 (8th Cir. 1998) cited in AT&T Comments at 
3-4, 12; see also CBeyond Comments at 6; Verizon Comments at 8; California PUC Reply at 3; Pac-West Reply at 
2. 
73 See Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket No. 96-262, 
et al., Sixth Report and Order in CC Docket Nos. 96-262 and 94-1, Report and Order in CC Docket No. 99-249, 
Eleventh Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-45, 15 FCC Rcd 12962, 12967, para. 12 (2000) (CALLS Order), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded in part sub nom. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313 
(5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of State Util. Consumer Advocates v. FCC, 535 U.S. 986 (2002).
74 Id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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such as those associated with use of the local loop facilities – should be recovered through fixed, flat-
rated fees.75 In 1984, the Commission modified the access charge system so that a substantial portion of 
the non-traffic-sensitive costs of the portion of the local telephone plant allocated to the interstate 
jurisdiction would be recovered through a non-traffic-sensitive, flat-rated “subscriber line charge,” or 
SLC, imposed on end-user subscribers.76 Because of issues associated with universal service, however, 
the subscriber line charge did not at that time generally recover all non-traffic-sensitive interstate local 
loop costs.77
19. Achieving universal service is a principal objective of this Commission.  Under section 1 
of the Act, the Commission is responsible for “regulating interstate and foreign commerce in 
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the 
United States . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service 
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”78 Before the 1996 Act, universal service was supported 
by explicit, monetary payments to local carriers and also by a system of implicit subsidies, which 
included the structuring of long distance rates to subsidize local service.79 In the 1996 Act, Congress 
sought to remove the implicit subsidies and to establish specific mechanisms to support universal service, 
while preserving and advancing the universal service goal.80 Thus, in the 1997 Access Charge Reform 
Order, the Commission further aligned the access rate structure to reflect the manner in which costs are 
incurred.  There, the Commission observed that incumbent LECs were unable to fully recover their loop 
costs from local subscribers under the existing SLC ceiling and were recovering the remaining costs 
through usage-sensitive charges imposed on IXCs which, in turn, passed these costs along to their 
customers through toll charges.81 Accordingly, the Commission noted that low-volume toll users –
customers like Thorpe who subscribed to service on multiple lines – were not paying the full cost of their 
loops, while high-volume toll users contributed far more than the total cost of their loops.  Thus, high-
volume long distance users, who included significant numbers of low-income customers, effectively 
supported non-primary residential and multi-line business customers.82 This did not serve the 
Commission’s goal of advancing universal service and improperly shifted costs from customers who 
caused the costs – customers like Thorpe who could afford to pay for a second line – to lower income 
customers.  To correct this problem, the Commission increased the SLC ceiling for non-primary 
residential lines – such as Thorpe’s second line.  This, the Commission reasoned, would –
permit incumbent LECs to recover costs in a manner that more accurately reflects the 
  
75 Id.
76 See MTS and WATS Market Structure, CC Docket No. 78-72, Phase I, Third Report and Order, 93 FCC2d 241, 
243-44, paras. 3-5, modified, 97 FCC2d 682 (1983), further modified, 97 FCC2d 834, aff'd in principal part and 
remanded in part sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
77 See id.; see also Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket 
No.  96-262, et al., First Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 15982, 15992-93, para. 24 (1997) (Access Charge Reform 
Order), rev. denied sub nom. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523.
78 47 U.S.C. § 151 (emphasis added).  In the 1996 Act, Congress defined universal service as “an evolving level of 
telecommunications services . . . taking into account advances in telecommunications and information technologies 
and services."  47 U.S.C. § 254(c).  Universal service comprises, among other things, local telephone service and 
access to emergency, directory-assistance, and long distance services.  See 47 C.F.R. § 54.101(a).  
79 See Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 15994-96, paras. 28-31.
80 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5).  The 1996 Act specifies that federal support for universal service “should be explicit 
and sufficient to achieve the purposes of” section 254, which is captioned “Universal Service."  47 U.S.C. § 254(e).
81 See Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16013, para 76.
82 See id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
13
way those costs are incurred.  Because common line costs do not vary with usage, these 
costs should be recovered on a flat-rated instead of on a per-minute basis.  In addition, 
these costs should be assigned, where possible, to those customers who benefit from the 
services provided by the local loop.  Accordingly, the SLC ceilings for non-primary 
residential and multi-line business lines will be adjusted . . . .83
Adjustment of the SLC for non-primary residential lines began on January 1, 1998.84
20. Because the increased SLC still did not allow LECs to fully recover their loop costs, the 
Commission also introduced a flat-rated presubscribed interexchange carrier charge (PICC).  This charge 
was imposed by LECs (in Thorpe’s case, GTE Florida) directly on the end user’s PIC (in Thorpe’s case, 
AT&T and later GTECC) to recoup permitted common-line revenues that were not recovered through the 
SLC.85 IXCs were permitted to pass this charge through to their end-user customers. 86 Further, the 
Commission permitted incumbent LECs to collect the PICC directly from any customer who selected no-
PIC.87 This, the Commission reasoned, would eliminate customer incentive to choose dial-around 
services to avoid paying long distance rates that reflect the PICC.88
21. Separately, to further implement the 1996 Act, the Commission adopted rules requiring 
that all telecommunications carriers that provide interstate telecommunications services – including LECs 
and IXCs – contribute to universal service support programs.89 To achieve the goal of local competition 
while preserving universal service, Congress directed the FCC to replace the existing system of explicit 
and implicit subsidies with "specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State mechanisms."90 Thus, 
the 1996 Act requires that “[e]very telecommunications carrier that provides interstate 
telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the specific, 
predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve and advance universal 
service.”91 The Commission neither required carriers to recover their universal service contributions 
through a specific end-user surcharge nor prohibited them from imposing such a surcharge.  Rather, it 
“allow[ed] carriers the flexibility to decide how they should recover their contribution.”92
  
83 See id. at para. 77.  The FCC’s decision to increase the SLC cap on secondary residential lines and multi-line 
business lines was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  See Southwestern Bell Tel. 
Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d at 537-38.
84 See 47 C.F.R. § 69.152(e) (1997).
85 See Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16019, para. 91; see id. at 16022, para. 99 (allowing PICC on 
non-primary residential lines at a maximum of $1.50 per month for the first year).
86 See Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket No. 96-262, 
et al., Second Order on Reconsideration and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 16606, 16610, para. 16 
(1997) (Access Charge Reform Second Reconsideration Order).
87 See Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16019, para. 92; 47 C.F.R. § 69.153(b) (1997).
88 See Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16019, para. 92.
89 See U.S.C. § 254(d); 47 C.F.R. § 54.706.
90 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5).
91 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
92 Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 8776, 
9210, para. 853 (1997) (Universal Service Order), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and  remanded in part sub nom. Texas 
Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1210 (2000).  The 
Commission expressly prohibited IXCs from shifting more than an equitable share of the contribution to any 
customer or group of customers.  Id. at 9199, para. 829; see also Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 
CC Docket No. 96-45, et al., Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 
(continued....)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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22. With this background, we turn to the charges that Thorpe was assessed.  We consider the 
individual charges reflected in the bills she appended to her complaint.  In bills dated January and March 
1999, AT&T imposed a “Carrier Line Charge” and a “Universal Connectivity Charge.”93 Thorpe also 
complains about a minimum monthly charge that GTECC began imposing in September of that year.94  
The local portion of Thorpe’s consolidated local and long distance telephone bill for September also 
shows that GTE Florida charged an “Interstate non-primary access” charge and the long distance portion 
of that bill shows a “FCC Primary Carrier Add’l Line” fee imposed by GTECC.  As we discuss more
fully below, all of these are valid charges for long distance services provided on a non-primary residential 
line with a PIC, but only some of them would have been imposed on a customer selecting no-PIC.95
23. Long Distance Related Charges Imposed by Thorpe’s LEC: Subscriber Line Charge 
(GTE Florida).  GTE Florida’s bill for September 1999, which is appended to Thorpe’s complaint, 
reflects an “Interstate non-primary access” charge of $6.07.96 That is the SLC.  Thorpe does not complain 
about the SLC (presumably because it was imposed by her LEC, GTE Florida, rather than by an IXC and 
thus was not obviously related to long distance).  Nevertheless, this was a charge for interstate access 
service imposed on Thorpe’s second line.  During the period 1997-1999, the SLC ceiling for non-primary 
residential lines rose from $3.50 to $6.00 with an adjustment for inflation.97 GTE Florida’s tariff reflects 
a SLC charge.98 For reasons explained in detail above, imposition of this charge is consistent with 
Commission rules.  Accordingly, imposition of a SLC on Thorpe’s second line was consistent with GTE 
Florida’s tariff and otherwise lawful.  Moreover, a SLC would be imposed whether or not a customer 
elected no-PIC.  
24. Long Distance Related Charges Imposed by Thorpe’s PICs.  The remaining long 
distance charges were imposed on Thorpe’s second line by AT&T and GTECC, each of which were, at 
different times, the PIC on that line.  The Commission does not regulate the rates of non-dominant long 
distance carriers such as AT&T and GTECC, and it did not do so during the period 1997-99 when the 
facts of this matter arose.  Rather, the competitive market controls the rates of these non-dominant 
  
(...continued from previous page)
24952, 24976, para. 45 (2002), reconsideration granted in part on other grounds, Order and Second Order on 
Reconsideration, 18 FCC Rcd 4818 (2003); 47 C.F.R. § 54.712.
93 See Petition at 2.  As discussed supra note 64, we understand Thorpe to complain about these two charges.  The 
Carrier Line Charge assessed in the January 1999 bill was 85 cents and the Universal Connectivity Charge was 93 
cents.  Complaint, Composite Ex. A at 9.  It appears that, in March of 1999, AT&T began to impose these charges 
every other month, instead of every month, so in March the charges were $1.70 and $1.86, respectively.  See 
Complaint, Composite Ex. B at 5.
94 Petition at 3.  We note that the minimum monthly charge reflected on the September 1999 bill is actually $2.86 
because Thorpe placed a call to Alexandria, Virginia that month, which cost 14 cents.  According to the bill, “When 
GTE LD charges are less than $3.00, the Monthly Minimum Charge will be the difference between those charges 
and $3.00.”  See Complaint, Composite Ex. D at 3-4; see also supra note 65. 
95 We understand the action before us to challenge the assessment of the charges imposed on Thorpe’s bill in 
general, rather than the lawfulness of individual rates, and thus we do not judge the lawfulness of the amount of the 
rates charged.  The filed tariff pages, along with the Commission precedent we cite above, support the carriers’ 
assertion that the charges were lawfully assessed.
96 See Complaint, Composite Ex. D at 3.
97 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 69.203(a) (1996); 69.152(e) (1997-1999); see also CBeyond Comments at 6; California PUC 
Reply at 3-4.  As noted, supra note 71, Part 69 of the FCC’s rules specifies the precise manner in which incumbent 
LECs, such as GTE Florida, may assess interstate access charges on IXCs and subscribers.  
98 See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 1 (GTE Telephone Operating 
Companies, Tariff FCC No. 1) at 74th Revised Page 312 (eff. Apr. 1, 2000).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
15
carriers.99 Thus, IXCs were permitted to pass through to their customers the PICC charges imposed on 
them by LECs,100 and also to pass through their universal service contributions.101 During this period, 
IXC rates were contained in tariffs filed with this Commission.102 Unless specifically subject to 
investigation under sections 204 or 205 of the Act, or challenged pursuant to a complaint filed under 
section 207 or 208 of the Act and found to be unjust and unreasonable, the tariffed rates, terms, and 
conditions upon which a carrier provides service to its customers are enforceable as a matter of law.103
25. PICC (AT&T and GTECC).  AT&T’s “Carrier Line Charge” and GTECC’s “Primary 
Carrier Additional Line Charge” were rates set by these carriers to recover the PICC that GTE Florida, in 
turn, would have charged them.  According to AT&T’s interstate tariff, AT&T began imposing this 
charge in January 1998.104 GTECC’s tariff also reflects a PICC, which that company called a “Primary 
Carrier Charge” or “PCC.”105 As discussed above, imposition of these charges on Thorpe’s second line is 
consistent with Commission rules. Accordingly, imposition of a PICC on Thorpe’s second line was 
consistent with these carriers’ tariffs, and otherwise lawful.  Moreover, in the Access Charge Reform 
Second Reconsideration Order, the Commission determined that LECs could impose a PICC directly on 
no-PIC customers; GTE Florida’s tariff permits it to do so.106 Thus, whether or not Thorpe elected no-
PIC, a PICC could lawfully have been imposed on her second line.  
  
99 See generally Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities 
Authorizations Therefor, CC Docket No. 79-252, First Report and Order, 85 FCC2d 1 (1980).  All carriers providing 
interstate service – IXCs and LECs alike – are subject to the requirement that the rates, terms, and conditions upon 
which they provide service to their customers be just, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory.  See 47 
U.S.C. §§ 201, 202.
100 See Access Charge Reform Second Reconsideration Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16610, para. 16.
101 See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 9199, para. 829.
102 Interexchange services were further deregulated in 2001 when the Commission mandatorily detariffed the 
provision of interstate long distance services.  See Common Carrier Bureau Extends Transition Period For 
Detariffing Consumer Domestic Long Distance Services, CC Docket No. 96-61, Public Notice, 16 FCC Rcd 2906 
(2001); see also Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Implementation of Section 
245(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, CC Docket No. 96-61, Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 20730, 
20732-33, para. 3 (1996), reconsideration granted in part, Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC 15014 (1997), further 
reconsideration granted, Second Order on Reconsideration and Erratum, 14 FCC Rcd 6004 (1999), rev. denied sub 
nom. MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (D.C.Cir. 2000).  Thus, IXCs currently provide service to 
customers under contracts, not tariffs.  
103  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 204-205, 207-208; Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 306 U.S. 516, 520 (1939) 
(cited in Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Services, Inc., 277 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002); ICOM Holding Inc. 
v. MCI WorldCom, 238 F.3d 219, 221 (2nd Cir. 2001); Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998)); see also discussion infra paras. 31-33.
104 See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 2 (AT&T Communications, Tariff 
FCC No. 27) at 3rd Revised Page 3-19.5 (eff. Nov. 17, 1999).  In February 2000, AT&T’s carrier line charge was 
$1.51.  Id. at 9th Revised Page 24-555 (eff. Feb. 19, 2000).  In a separate proceeding before this Commission, the 
Florida Public Service Commission represented in comments filed in November 1998 that AT&T’s PICC was 85 
cents – which is what it charged Thorpe in early 1999.  See Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, CC Docket No. 98-
170, Florida Public Service Commission Comments at Attach. A (filed Nov. 6, 1998); see also supra note 93.
105 See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 3 (GTE Communications 
Corporation, Tariff FCC No. 1) at 7th Revised page 54 (eff. July 22, 1999).  
106 See Access Charge Reform Second Reconsideration Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16610, para. 16; GTE Florida’s tariff 
reflects that it charged a PICC on end users’ presubscribed carriers and that “[e]nd user customers who do not select 
a presubscribed carrier will be billed the PICC.”  See GTE Telephone Operating Companies, Tariff FCC No. 1 at 4th
Revised Page 308.3.7.1 (eff. Apr. 29, 1998).  The PICC imposed by GTE Florida would not necessarily be the same 
amount as AT&T’s Carrier Line Charge or GTECC’s Primary Carrier Additional Line Charge.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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26. Universal Service Recovery Charge (AT&T).  AT&T imposed a “Universal Connectivity
Charge” on Thorpe.107 This charge was imposed by AT&T to recover its universal service contribution 
and is reflected in its tariff.108 The tariff states that AT&T began imposing this charge in July 1998.109 As 
discussed above, in the Universal Service Order, the Commission “allow[ed] carriers the flexibility to 
decide how they should recover their contribution.”110 Accordingly, carriers were permitted to impose a 
separate line item charge, as AT&T did, to recover their contribution.111 Thus, imposition of a universal 
service charge on Thorpe’s second line was consistent with AT&T’s tariff and otherwise lawful.
27. Minimum Service Charge (GTECC).  Thorpe complains that, in September 1999, GTECC 
began imposing a minimum service charge of $3.00 per month on her second line.112  GTECC’s tariff 
states that, “A Monthly Minimum Charge of $3 will be assessed to new and existing Customers when 
Customer’s actual monthly charges do not meet or exceed the specified amount.”113  At approximately the 
same time that GTECC began assessing this charge, other IXCs, including AT&T, MCI, and Sprint, also 
tariffed and began imposing similar monthly minimum usage charges on their customers. At that time, all 
IXCs were treated as non-dominant, which meant that they were not subject to rate regulation.114 As a 
result, as long as it was contained in their tariffs, IXCs lawfully could charge a flat monthly fee, as well 
as, or as a substitute for, per-minute interstate long distance charges. In 1999, the Commission initiated a 
proceeding concerning the impact of these minimum fees and other flat charges on consumers who make 
few or no long distance calls.115 The Low-Volume Notice of Inquiry asked whether imposition of these 
fees was a reasonable result of competitive market dynamics and the removal of implicit subsidies, or, 
instead, warranted regulatory intervention.116 That inquiry was concluded in the May 2000 CALLS Order, 
which responded to proposals of the Coalition for Affordable Local and Long Distance Service (CALLS) 
– an industry coalition that included AT&T and GTE.117 In connection with CALLS, AT&T agreed to 
eliminate monthly minimum usage charges for basic long distance service for at least three years.118 In 
the CALLS Order, the Commission declined to take further regulatory action with respect to minimum 
service fees, concluded that it had resolved the issues raised in the low-volume proceeding, and closed 
that docket.119 Thus, imposition of a monthly minimum charge by GTECC on Thorpe’s second line was 
in accordance with GTECC’s tariff and otherwise lawful.
28. In sum, all of these charges associated with long distance service were lawfully imposed 
  
107 See Complaint, Composite Ex. A at 9, Composite Ex. B at 5.
108 See AT&T Communications, Tariff FCC No. 27 at 6th Revised Page 3-19.6 (eff. Mar. 11, 2000).  
109 See id.  
110 See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 9210, para. 853.
111 Id.
112 See Petition at 3; see also Complaint, Composite Ex. D at 4.
113 See GTE Communications Corporation, Tariff FCC No. 1 at Original Page 19.1 (eff. June 28, 1999). 
114 See supra para. 24. 
115 See Low-Volume Long-Distance Users, CC Docket No. 99-249, Notice of Inquiry, 15 FCC Rcd 6298 (1999) 
(Low-Volume Notice of Inquiry).
116 See id. at 6303-04, paras. 13-17.
117 See CALLS Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 12964 n.1. 
118 See id. at 12976, para. 34.  Thus, end users who presubscribed to carriers that did not eliminate minimum fees 
could switch their PIC to an alternative carrier that did not charge these fees.  The Commission also eliminated the 
residential PICC in the CALLS Order.  Id. at 12991, para. 76.
119 See id. at 13066-67, para. 242.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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on Thorpe’s non-primary residential line.  Nevertheless, Thorpe would not have had to pay all of these 
charges if she had selected no-PIC successfully on her second line.  Specifically, if Thorpe had 
successfully selected no-PIC in January or March of 1999, as she claims she tried to, she would not have 
been assessed a universal service charge by AT&T.  She also would not have been required to pay a 
minimum monthly charge for long distance service because she would not have been presubscribed to a 
long distance carrier.120
B. Whether the “Forced Coupling” of Long Distance and Local Service is an Unjust 
and Unreasonable Practice Under the Act
29. Thorpe’s petition further seeks a declaration that the “forced coupling” of long distance 
with local service constitutes an unjust and unreasonable business practice in violation of the Act.121 The 
Commission has broad discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act and Commission rules to 
decide whether a declaratory ruling is necessary to “terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty.”122  
When, as here, a petition for declaratory ruling derives from a primary jurisidiction referral, the 
Commission also will seek to assist the referring court by resolving issues arising under the Act.  
Resolution of petitioner’s “forced coupling” question would not assist the court in resolving this matter.  
Consideration of this question would not resolve a controversy or remove any uncertainty.  As we discuss 
above, a no-PIC option was available to customers under GTE Florida’s tariff, so GTE Florida did not 
force the coupling of local and long distance service.123
C. Preemption of State Claims
30. Thorpe also seeks a declaratory ruling from this Commission that her state law claims are 
not preempted by the Act.124 We deny Thorpe’s request because these claims are preempted.  In the 
district court, Thorpe has asserted that, by charging for unnecessary and unwanted long distance service 
under a negative option or default contract, the carriers have violated the Florida Unfair and Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act;125 breached their contracts with Thorpe to provide a local telephone line for modem 
  
120 She would, however, have had to pay a subscriber line charge and a PICC to GTE Florida whether or not she had 
no-PIC on her second line.  See supra paras. 19-20, 23, 25.
121 Petition at 6, 16.  
122 5 U.S.C. § 554(e); 47 C.F.R. § 1.2; see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), (j); Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 
594, 602 (D.C.Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973); cf. AT&T Comments at 4 (“the Commission need not, and 
therefore should not, render advisory opinions” on whether federal law requires or allows LECs to bundle local and 
long distance services); see also id. at 11, 13-14.  
123 See supra para. 15.  As discussed above, if GTE Florida did not honor its tariff and allow Thorpe to select no-
PIC, that would be contrary to its tariff and thus violate section 203(c) of the Act.  47 U.S.C. § 203(c).  Because 
GTE Florida did tariff a no-PIC option, we need not and do not reach the question whether it would be unjust and 
unreasonable for a LEC to deny its customers such an option.  See Ratepayer Advocate Comments at 2; Ratepayer 
Advocate Reply at 2.  Were that issue before us, we likely would find such a practice unreasonable.  See 47 U.S.C. § 
251(b)(3); Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19436, para. 81 (finding that “consistent 
with current practices in the interLATA toll market,” new customers of a telephone exchange provider who do not 
affirmatively select a toll service provider “should dial a carrier access code to route their intraLATA toll or 
intrastate toll calls to the carrier of their choice until they make a permanent, affirmative selection”).  Thorpe also 
asks the Commission to declare that LECs may provide “local only service” to their customers.  See Petition at 5; 
Thorpe Reply at 9.  For the reasons cited above, we also decline to address this issue.  Insofar as GTE Florida’s tariff 
offered Thorpe no-PIC, it did offer a local-only option.  As discussed, however, not all charges associated with long 
distance service can be avoided through the choice of no-PIC.
124 Petition at 5, 6-11.
125 Complaint at 9-11, paras. 46-54 (citing Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq.) (Count II).
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service;126 and breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing.127 She also asserts a claim for 
restitution, arguing that the carriers failed to form a valid contract to provide her with long distance 
service.128 For each of these claims, Thorpe seeks monetary relief.129 Thorpe also seeks to enjoin the 
carriers from charging for unnecessary and unwanted long distance service, pursuant to the Florida Unfair 
and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.130  
31. As commenters in this proceeding point out, all of Thorpe’s claims concern charges for 
interstate long distance service provided under a filed tariff.131 Thorpe argues that she never signed up for 
long distance service or consented to being charged for it.132 She does, however, acknowledge that she 
ordered a second telephone line from her LEC, GTE Florida.133 The tariff that GTE Florida filed with this 
Commission specified the terms and conditions under which it provided long distance interstate access 
service to its customers, including Thorpe.134 Similarly, AT&T and GTECC tariffs explained the terms 
and conditions under which these carriers provided long distance service to their customers.135 Each of 
these tariffs were filed pursuant to section 203(a) of the Act, which requires every common carrier to file 
with the Commission “schedules,” i.e., tariffs, “showing all charges” and “showing the classifications, 
practices, and regulations affecting such charges.”136 The “filed tariff doctrine,” which is also called the 
“filed rate doctrine,” requires carriers, as well as their customers, to abide by the terms of the tariff and 
precludes them from acting outside it.137 Under this doctrine, “‘[t]he rights as defined by the tariff cannot 
be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.’”138 Thus, each carrier’s tariff alone defines 
the terms and conditions under which it offered and provided long distance service to Thorpe.139 Thorpe 
cannot prevail based upon an argument that a carrier owes her a duty inconsistent with the terms of the 
carrier’s filed tariff because carriers may not “‘extend to any person any privileges or facilities in 
[interstate] communication, or employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices affecting 
such charges’ except those set forth in the tariff.”140 We consider Thorpe’s claims in the context of the 
  
126 Id. at 12, paras. 60-65 (Count IV). 
127 Id. at 12-13, paras. 66-70 (Count VI [sic]).
128 Id. at 11-12, paras. 55-59 (Count III).
129 See id. at 9, 11, 12, 13, paras. 47, 56, 61, 67. 
130 Id. at 8-9, paras. 37-45 (Count I).
131 See AT&T Comments at 3, 6, 9-11; MCI Comments at 4-6; PACE Coalition Comments at 2-3; Ratepayer 
Advocate Comments at 2-3; Sprint Comments at 3-6; Verizon Comments at 4-6; WorldNet Comments at 2-3.
132 See Petition at 2, 4.
133 Id. at 2 (“Sometime in 1997 or 1998, at the request of Plaintiff, GTE installed an extra phone line in her home.”).
134 See supra paras. 12, 14-15; see also GTE Telephone Operating Companies Tariff FCC No. 1 (attachment to 
Verizon August 26, 2005 Ex Parte).
135 See supra para. 24; see also AT&T Communications, Tariff FCC No. 27; GTE Communications Corporation, 
Tariff FCC No. 1.
136 47 U.S. C. § 203(a).
137 See AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, 524 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1998).
138 Id. at 227 (quoting Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922)); see AT&T Comments 
at 5.  
139 Further, the tariff controls the rights and responsibilities of the customer and the carrier as a matter of law.  See 
supra note 103 and accompanying text.
140 See AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, 524 U.S. at 223-24 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(c)) (explanation and 
emphasis added). 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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carriers’ tariffs.141
32. Thorpe asserts that, “[t]he actions of Defendants in charging for . . . unnecessary and 
unwanted long distance service pursuant to ‘negative option’ or ‘default’ contracts constitute[ ] an unfair 
method of competition, an unconscionable act or practice, and/or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in 
the conduct of any trade or commerce in violation of” the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act.142 She further argues that by “creating purported ‘negative option’ or ‘default’ contracts for . . .  
unnecessary and unwanted long distance service,” the carriers breached their duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.143 Similarly, in her claim for restitution, Thorpe asserts that, in charging for “unnecessary and 
unwanted long distance service,” the carriers “treated silence and inaction as ‘acceptance’” and thus that 
any contract for long distance service is “void ab initio or voidable.”144 Finally, in her breach of contract 
claim, Thorpe asserts that the parties entered into “contracts or at least ‘quasi contracts’ with Defendants 
for a local modem phone line,” which the defendants breached “by charging and collecting for their 
unnecessary and unwanted long distance service.”145 All of these claims are preempted.  All five counts 
of Thorpe’s complaint turn upon her assertion that, in connection with the provision of her second line, 
GTE Florida, AT&T, and GTECC owed her a duty not to provide or charge for long distance service.  But 
the provision of long distance and the charges about which Thorpe complains are “subjects that are 
specifically addressed by the filed tariff[s].”146 GTE Florida’s tariff provided that Thorpe was required 
either to choose a long distance carrier or to select the no-PIC option.  AT&T and GTECC’s tariffs 
specified the rates, terms, and conditions under which these carriers actually provided long distance 
service.  Thorpe cannot make a claim that is inconsistent with these carriers’ tariff provisions, but if any 
carrier did not comply with its tariff, Thorpe has a claim under section 203(c).147 Either way, Thorpe’s 
claims about whether and how long distance service was provided on her second line rise or fall based 
upon the carriers’ compliance with their tariffs.  Accordingly, Thorpe’s state law claims based upon 
duties not specified in the tariffs are preempted.
  
141 Thorpe relies upon cases involving wireless carriers in support of her argument that her state claims are not 
preempted.  E.g., Petition for Declaratory Ruling on Issues Contained in Count I of White v. GTE, WT Docket No. 
00-164, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 11558 (2001), cited in Petition at 6; Sommerman v. Dallas 
SMSA Limited Partnership, No. 3:96-CV-1129-J, slip op. (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 1996), cited in Petition at 7.  Wireless 
services are not provided pursuant to filed tariffs.  See 47 C.F.R. § 20.15 (c); see also Wireless Consumers Alliance 
Petition for a Declaratory Ruling Concerning Whether the Provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
Amended, or the Jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission Thereunder, Serve to Preempt State 
Courts from Awarding Monetary Relief Against Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) Providers (a) for 
Violating State Consumer Protection Laws Prohibiting False Advertising and Other Fraudulent Business Practices, 
and/or (b) in the Context of Contractual Disputes and Tort Actions Adjudicated Under State Contract and Tort 
Laws, WT Docket No. 99-263, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 17021, 17029-31, paras. 15-18 
(2000).  Accordingly, the wireless cases cited by Thorpe are not controlling precedent for her case, which concerns 
tariffed services.  Interstate wireline long distance services were detariffed in 2001 and, accordingly, these services 
are now also no longer subject to the filed tariff doctrine.  See supra note 102.  Because Thorpe’s claims arose 
before 2001, her long distance service was provided pursuant to rates, terms, and conditions contained in filed tariffs 
and her claims are governed by the filed tariff doctrine.
142 Complaint at 8-9, 10, paras. 43, 52 (citing Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq.) (Counts I and II).
143 Id. at 13, para. 69 (Count V).
144 See id. at 11, paras. 57–58 (Count III).
145 See id. at 12, paras. 62–63 (Count IV).
146 AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, 524 U.S. at 225 (emphasis in original); see also GTE Telephone Operating 
Companies, Tariff FCC No. 1; AT&T Communications, Tariff FCC No. 27; GTE Communications Corporation, 
Tariff FCC No. 1.
147 See 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) (“[n]o carrier shall . . . employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices 
affecting [the] charges [specified in its tariff], except as specified” in the tariff).  
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33. We note also that Thorpe’s complaint before the court seeks damages for claims that are 
not based on the reasonableness of the rates charged.  Courts have held that actions seeking damages 
violate the filed tariff doctrine by infringing upon the principle of nondiscrimination, which prevents 
carriers from engaging in price discrimination among ratepayers. 148 That is, because the rate set forth in a 
filed tariff is the legal rate, the only rate the carrier may lawfully charge all ratepayers is that tariffed 
rate.149 Each of Counts II through V of Thorpe’s complaint is an “action for damages which exceed 
$15,000.00,” based on claims other than the reasonableness of the rates charged.150 A court-imposed 
damage award on these bases would modify the tariffed rate and, in so doing, contravene the 
nondiscrimination principle.151 Thus, Thorpe’s claims in this regard are preempted.  
34. Although Thorpe argues that her claims are preserved by section 414, the Act’s savings 
clause,152 that section preserves only those rights that are not inconsistent with the filed tariff doctrine.  “A 
claim for services that constitute unlawful preferences or that directly conflict with the tariff . . . cannot be 
‘saved’ under § 414.”153 That is because “‘[t]h[e saving] clause . . . cannot in reason be construed as 
continuing in [customers] a common law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely 
inconsistent with the provisions of the act.  In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself.’”154 In 
this case, the gravamen of each of Thorpe’s five counts is that she was “charg[ed] for . . . unnecessary and 
unwanted long distance service.”155 But the carriers’ tariffs, filed pursuant to the provisions of the Act, 
govern how the carriers provide and charge for long distance service.  Thus Thorpe’s claims, each of 
which challenges the legality of these practices, are preempted.156
  
148 See Hill v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 364 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Marcus v AT&T, 
138 F.3d 46, 58, 59 (2d Cir. 1998)).  Section 202(a) of the Act expressly prohibits carriers from unjustly or 
unreasonably discriminating among customers in furnishing service or giving any undue preference or advantage to 
a particular customer with respect to payment of tariffed charges.  Section 201(b) of the Act directs that "[a]ll 
charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with [interstate] communication service, 
shall be just and reasonable," and declares "unlawful" any unjust or unreasonable charge, practice, classification or 
regulation.
149 See AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, 524 U.S. at 222.
150 See Complaint at 9, para. 47 (Count II); see also id. at 11, para. 56 (Count III); id. at 12, para. 61 (Count IV); id at 
13, para. 67 (Count V).
151 Although Thorpe argues that she can circumvent discrimination by seeking to certify a nationwide class, see 
Thorpe Reply at 5, the Supreme Court has rejected that view.  Marcus v. AT&T, 138 F.3d at 61 (citing Square D Co. 
v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 423 (1986)).
152 Petition at 7, 9; Thorpe Reply at 6-7.
153 AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. at 227, cited in AT&T Comments at 11 n.7.
154 AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. at 227-28 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil 
Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907) (alteration in original)).
155 Complaint at 8-9, para. 43 (Count I), 10, para. 52 (Count II); see also id. at 11, para. 57 (Count III), 12, para. 63 
(Count IV), 13, para. 69 (Count V).
156 Even if we consider Thorpe’s state claims to turn upon her allegation that the carriers failed to disclose their 
practice of charging customers for long distance service, rather than upon their practice of charging for the service, 
see Long Distance Telecommunications Litigation, 831 F.2d 627, 633-34 (6th Cir. 1987) (state actions for fraud and 
deceit, based upon carriers’ failure to notify customers of the practice of charging for uncompleted calls, were 
preserved where practice in question was “a failure to inform customers of a practice, not an attack on the practice 
itself”), cited in Petition at 8, her claims are deficient because they are inconsistent with the terms of the filed tariffs, 
which specify that customers could choose a long distance carrier or select no-PIC and the applicable charges under 
either option.  Hill v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 364 F.3d at 1316-17 (permitting recovery on claims that 
carrier had disclosure obligations beyond those made in its filed tariffs would violate the filed tariff doctrine).  
Moreover, under the filed tariff doctrine, customers are charged with knowledge of the terms and conditions of the 
(continued....)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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35. We note that Thorpe has named AT&T – the original PIC on her second line – as a 
defendant in the district court proceeding.  Thorpe did not name GTECC, the second PIC on her line, as a 
party to this proceeding but it appears to be similarly situated to AT&T.157 There is no record evidence in 
this matter that either of these carriers acted unlawfully.  Thorpe does not claim that she had any direct 
contact with AT&T or GTECC.  Moreover, she does not refute AT&T’s assertion that it began providing 
long distance service to Thorpe only after GTE Florida informed it that it had been chosen as Thorpe’s 
PIC.158 Under existing industry practice, the LEC, not the IXC, actually implements the PIC installation 
or change.159 Accordingly, there is neither allegation nor evidence that AT&T participated in its alleged 
arbitrary assignment as the PIC on Thorpe’s second line.160 Nor is there evidence that either AT&T or 
GTECC participated in the denial of no-PIC to Thorpe.161 As discussed above, the charges imposed by 
AT&T and GTECC appear to be consistent with these carriers’ tariffs, and thus are binding under the 
filed tariff doctrine.162
IV. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
36. On June 17, 2003, Thorpe filed a motion requesting an extension of time for replying to 
the comments of AT&T and three competitive LECs:  CBeyond Communications, LLC; Pac-West 
Telecomm, Inc.; and US LEC Corp.163 Thorpe’s reason for requesting the extension was that these 
comments should have been filed on May 11, 2003, but were filed “on or about” June 5 and 6, 2003, 
  
(...continued from previous page)
tariff.  Marcus v. AT&T, 138 F.3d at 63 (citing Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 653 (1913)).  Thus, in 
this case, Thorpe is charged with knowledge of these options and of the charges that corresponded to each. This 
undermines any claims based upon an argument that GTE Florida failed to disclose that long distance charges would 
apply to Thorpe’s second line – including Thorpe’s claims that she was subject to a negative option or default 
contract.  See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 306 n.14 (1976) (“if respondent’s . . . practices were 
detailed in its tariff and therefore available to the public, a court presented with a claim of misrepresentation based 
on failure to disclose . . . could, applying settled principles of tort law, determine that the tariff provided sufficient 
notice to the party who brought the suit”); Marcus v. AT&T, 138 F.3d at 63 (“Because the appellants are held to 
know the filed rate and thus AT&T’s practice of rounding up, it would be unreasonable for them to rely on any price 
quotes to the contrary.”); cf. Halprin, Temple, Goodman & Sugrue v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., File No. E-
98-40, 13 FCC Rcd 22568, 22579, para. 23 (1998) (constructive notice established as a matter of law by the filed 
tariff doctrine cannot be used to prove that the charges and practices contained in the tariff are themselves lawful).
157 See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7 n.6 (“GTECC is a federally 
regulated IXC that is a separate entity from GTE Florida.”); Verizon Comments at 2 n.2.
158 See AT&T Comments at 2, 5-6 (citing Complaint); Thorpe Reply at 3-4.
159 See Presubscribed Interexchange Carrier Charges, CC Docket No. 02-53, CCB/CPD File No. 01-12, RM-
10131, Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 5568, 5575, para. 15 (2002) ("Under current network 
configurations, a PIC change must be completed by an end user's LEC.").
160 See Implementation of the Subscriber Carrier Selection Changes Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Policies and Rules Concerning Unauthorized Changes of Consumers' Long Distance Carriers, CC Docket 
No. 94-129, Third Order on Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 
5099, 5131-32, paras. 86-87 (2003) (IXCs are not required to reverify that the LEC accurately assigns the 
customer’s PIC), cited in AT&T Comments at 2, 7.
161 According to Thorpe’s allegations, she chose GTECC as her second PIC after GTE Florida allegedly told her that 
she was required to have a long distance carrier.  Petition at 2-3.  Assuming that GTECC acted pursuant to lawful 
amendments to its tariff, see 47 U.S.C. § 203, it was entitled to change the terms of its long distance offering to 
Thorpe and begin charging a monthly minimum fee.
162 See supra paras. 24-27; AT&T Comments at 9-11.
163 Motion for Extension of Time to File a Reply to Comments Untimely Filed (filed June 17, 2003).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-113 
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when counsel for Thorpe was on a three-week vacation.164 Thorpe’s assertion that AT&T and the 
competitive LECs should have filed their comments on May 11, 2003, is incorrect.  The Public Notice 
requesting comment on Thorpe’s petition stated that comments were due 45 days after publication of the 
Notice in the Federal Register, which occurred on April 21, 2003.165 Thus comments on the petition were 
due June 5, 2003, which is when AT&T and the three competitive LECs (as well as other commenters) 
filed comments.  While Thorpe’s motion requested an extension of time until July 30, 2003, she 
eventually filed her reply on August 5, 2003.166 Despite Thorpe’s confusion regarding the comment filing 
deadline and the lateness of her reply, we grant the motion for extension of time and consider her reply.
37. Paperwork Reduction Act.  This document does not contain new or modified information 
collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13.  In 
addition, therefore, it does not contain any new or modified “information collection burdens for small 
business concerns with fewer than 25 employees,” pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act 
of 2002, Public Law 107-198.167  
38. Congressional Review Act.  The Commission will not send a copy of this Order pursuant to 
the Congressional Review Act because it establishes only rules of particular applicability.168
39. Materials in Accessible Formats. To request materials in accessible formats (such as Braille, 
large print, electronic files, or audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice) or (202) 418-0432 (TTY).  This Report and 
Order can also be downloaded in Word and Portable Document Formats (PDF) at 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb.dro.
V. ORDERING CLAUSES
40. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 201, 202, 203, 251 
and 254 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), (j), 201, 202, 203, 
251, 254, and section 1.2 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2, the Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
on Issues Contained in GTE v. Thorpe is DENIED, as discussed herein.
41. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 4(i) and 4(j) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i) and (j), and section 1.46 of the 
Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. § 1.46, the Motion for Extension of Time to File a Reply is GRANTED.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
  
164 Id. at 2, paras. 3-7.
165 See Thorpe PN, 18 FCC Rcd 5517; 68 Fed. Reg. 19542-01.
166 See Thorpe Reply.
167 See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(4).
168 See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).