Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Qwest Petition for Forbearance Under
47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and 
Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to
Broadband Services
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WC Docket No. 06-125
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Adopted:  July 22, 2008 Released:  August 5, 2008
By the Commission:  Chairman Martin and Commissioner McDowell issuing separate statements; 
Commissioners Copps and Adelstein dissenting and issuing a joint statement.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Para.
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................. 1
II. BACKGROUND.................................................................................................................................... 3
A. Regulatory Requirements................................................................................................................. 3
1. Title II Requirements................................................................................................................. 3
2. Computer Inquiry Requirements ............................................................................................... 6
B. Prior Broadband Relief .................................................................................................................... 8
III. DISCUSSION....................................................................................................................................... 13
A. Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 13
B. Scope of Petition ............................................................................................................................ 14
C. Effect of the Verizon “Deemed Grant”.......................................................................................... 16
D. Application of the Statutory Forbearance Criteria......................................................................... 19
1. Dominant Carrier Regulation .................................................................................................. 20
a. Charges, Practices, Classifications, and Regulations........................................................ 20
b. Protection of Consumers................................................................................................... 46
c. Public Interest ................................................................................................................... 48
2. Computer Inquiry Requirements ............................................................................................. 54
3. General Title II Economic Regulation..................................................................................... 61
a. Regulation Applied to Common Carriers or LECs........................................................... 62
b. Regulation Applied to Incumbent LECs or BOCs............................................................ 66
4. Public Policy Regulation ......................................................................................................... 68
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES....................................................................................................................... 73
APPENDIX 
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this Order, we address a petition filed by Qwest requesting that the Commission forbear, 
pursuant to section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Communications Act or Act),1
  
1 47 U.S.C. § 160.  Congress enacted section 10 as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (1996 Act).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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from applying Title II of the Act and the Computer Inquiry rules to certain broadband services.2  
Verizon’s forbearance petition was “deemed granted” on March 19, 2006; Qwest seeks relief comparable 
to the relief granted Verizon through that deemed grant.3 Consistent with our AT&T Title II and 
Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order,4 we grant substantial forbearance relief to Qwest with regard to its 
existing packet-switched broadband telecommunications services and its existing optical transmission 
services.5 We also grant Qwest forbearance from its obligations under the Computer Inquiry rules in 
connection with these services, conditioned on its compliance with the Computer Inquiry obligations that 
apply to all non-incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC) facilities-based wireline carriers.6
2. In all other respects, Qwest’s request for forbearance is denied.  In particular, we deny 
forbearance from any statutory or regulatory requirement that applies to common carriers or LECs 
generally regardless of whether they are incumbents or competing carriers.  We also deny forbearance, 
except as stated above with regard to the Computer Inquiry rules, from any statutory or regulatory 
requirements that apply to Qwest in its capacity as an incumbent LEC or Bell Operating Company 
(BOC).  In addition, Qwest must meet its public policy obligations under Title II and the Commission’s 
implementing rules with respect to the services at issue.7 This preserves important public policies related 
  
2 Qwest Petition for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect 
to Broadband Services, WC Docket No. 06-125 (filed Sept. 12, 2007) (Qwest Petition).  The Wireline Competition 
Bureau (Bureau) invited comment on the petition.  See Pleading Cycle Established for Comments on Qwest Petition 
for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) From Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Broadband 
Services, WC Docket No. 06-125, Public Notice, 22 FCC Rcd 16858 (WCB 2007).  We note that the instant Qwest 
petition is virtually identical to a prior Qwest forbearance petition upon which comment was sought, and that Qwest 
ultimately withdrew on September 11, 2007.  See Letter from Melissa E. Newman, Vice President-Federal 
Regulatory, Qwest, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 06-125 (filed Sept. 11, 2007).  All 
comments, replies, and ex parte letters cited in this Order were filed in WC Docket No. 06-125 in response to 
Qwest’s original petition unless otherwise stated, and we incorporate the record of that proceeding into this one.
3 See Verizon Telephone Companies’ Petition for Forbearance from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with 
Respect to their Broadband Services Is Granted by Operation of Law, WC Docket No. 04-440, News Release (rel. 
Mar. 20, 2006) (March 20 News Release), review denied, Sprint Nextel Corp. v. FCC, 508 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (Sprint Nextel v. FCC); Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies For Forbearance, WC Docket No. 04-
440 (filed Dec. 20, 2004) (Verizon Petition).
4 Petition of AT&T Inc. for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with 
Respect to Its Broadband Services, Petition of BellSouth Corporation for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) 
from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Its Broadband Services, WC Docket No. 06-125, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 18705 (2007) (AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance 
Order), pets. for review pending, No. 07-1426 (and consolidated cases) (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 22, 2007); see Petition 
of AT&T Inc. for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to 
Its Broadband Services, WC Docket 06-125 (filed July 13, 2006) (AT&T Petition); Petition of BellSouth 
Corporation for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Its 
Broadband Services, WC Docket 06-125 (filed July 20, 2006) (Legacy BellSouth Petition).  
5 For ease of exposition, we refer to the services for which we grant relief as the “petitioner-specified services.”  We 
describe these services more fully in part III.D.1.a, below.  They exclude all traditional TDM-based DS1 and DS3 
services, and all services that do not provide a transmission capability of over 200 kilobits per second (kbps) in each 
direction.  See, e.g., Qwest Petition at 1.
6 Specifically, we grant, with regard to Qwest’s existing packet-switched broadband services and its existing optical 
transmission services, forbearance from the requirements contained in section 203 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 203, 
section 214 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 214 (as it relates to dominant carriers), and the following sections of the 
Commission’s rules:  47 C.F.R. §§ 61.31-.59 (general rules for dominant carriers), 47 C.F.R. § 63.71 (to the extent it 
provides discontinuance rules for domestic dominant carriers), 47 C.F.R. Part 69 (access charge and pricing 
flexibility rules), as well as Computer Inquiry requirements.
7 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 222, 225, 229, 251(a)(2), 254, 255.
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to 911, emergency preparedness, customer privacy, and universal service in connection with the 
broadband services for which we grant relief.  
II. BACKGROUND
A. Regulatory Requirements
1. Title II Requirements
3. Title II of the Act and the Commission’s implementing rules impose both economic and non-
economic regulation on common carriers.  Generally speaking, the most extensive regulations are 
imposed on dominant carriers (i.e., those with individual market power).  These carriers are subject to 
price cap or rate-of-return regulation, and must file tariffs for many of their interstate telecommunications 
services – on either seven or fifteen days’ notice – and usually with supporting data.8 In contrast, 
nondominant carriers are generally not subject to direct rate regulation and may file tariffs, on one day’s 
notice and without cost support, which are presumed lawful.9 In addition, applications to discontinue, 
reduce, or impair service are subject to a 60-day waiting period for dominant carriers, as opposed to a 31-
day period for nondominant carriers.10 Finally, dominant carriers must follow more stringent procedures 
under section 214 of the Act for certain types of transfers of control for which nondominant carriers are 
accorded presumptive streamlined treatment.11
4. The Act and our rules impose additional obligations on the BOCs, independent incumbent 
LECs, or incumbent LECs generally.  Under section 271 of the Act, BOCs were required to demonstrate 
compliance with certain market-opening requirements, including, inter alia, interconnection and 
nondiscriminatory access to network elements, directory assistance, databases and signaling before 
providing in-region, interLATA long distance service.12 The BOCs must continue to comply with such 
market-opening requirements.13 Independent incumbent LECs, moreover, are subject to certain structural 
separation requirements if they wish to provide in-region, interstate, interexchange telecommunications 
services other than through resale.14 Incumbent LECs must meet additional obligations, including the 
interconnection, collocation, and other obligations set forth in section 251(c) of the Act and the 
Commission’s implementing rules.15
5. In addition to the economic regulation described above, Title II and the Commission’s rules 
subject all common carriers to a variety of non-economic regulations designed to further important public 
  
8 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(b), 204(a)(3); 47 C.F.R. §§ 61.38, 61.41, 61.58; Implementation of Section 402(b)(1)(A) of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-187, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 2170, 2182, 2188, 
2191-92, 2202-03, paras. 19, 31, 40, 67 (1997) (Tariff Streamlining Order); see also Access Charge Reform, CC 
Docket Nos. 96-262, 94-1, 98-157, CCB/CPD File No. 98-63, Fifth Report and Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 14221, 14241, para. 40 (1999) (Pricing Flexibility Order) (allowing price cap 
LECs to file tariffs for new services on one day’s notice), aff’d, WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449 (D.C. Cir. 
2001).
9 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.773(a)(ii), 61.23(c); Tariff Filing Requirements for Nondominant Carriers, CC Docket No. 93-36,
Order, 10 FCC Rcd 13653, 13653-54, paras. 3-4 (1995).
10 47 C.F.R. § 63.71(c).
11 47 C.F.R. § 63.03(b).
12 See 47 U.S.C. § 271.
13 See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).
14 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1903.
15 47 U.S.C. § 251(c).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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policy goals and protect consumers.16 These include requirements that carriers contribute to federal 
universal service support mechanisms on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis,17 ensure access to 
telecommunications services by people with disabilities,18 meet standards regarding the privacy of their 
customers’ information,19 and facilitate the delivery of emergency services.20 All common carriers, 
moreover, are subject to a formal complaint process under which any person may complain to the 
Commission about anything the carrier may do that is contrary to the provisions of the Act.21
2. Computer Inquiry Requirements
6. Facilities-based wireline carriers are also subject to Computer Inquiry requirements.  In the 
Computer II Orders,22 the Commission, in response to the convergence and increasing interdependence of 
computer and telecommunications technologies, established a new regulatory framework that 
distinguishes between “basic services” and “enhanced services.”23 The Commission determined that 
enhanced services were not within the scope of its Title II jurisdiction but rather were within its ancillary 
jurisdiction under Title I of the Communications Act.24 To protect against anti-competitive behavior, the 
Commission, pursuant to this ancillary jurisdiction, imposed structural separation requirements on 
AT&T.25 The Commission required other facilities-based common carriers to provide the basic 
transmission services underlying their enhanced services on a nondiscriminatory basis pursuant to tariffs 
governed by Title II of the Act.26 These carriers thus must offer the underlying basic service at the same 
  
16 See infra part III.D.4.
17 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
18 47 U.S.C. § 225.
19 47 U.S.C. § 222(a)-(c), (f). 
20 47 U.S.C. § 222(d)(4), (g). 
21 47 U.S.C. § 208.
22 Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 FCC 2d 
384 (1980) (Computer II Final Decision), recon., 84 FCC 2d 50 (1980) (Computer II Reconsideration Order),
further recon., 88 FCC 2d 512 (1981) (Computer II Further Reconsideration Order), aff’d sub nom. Computer and 
Communications Industry Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (CCIA v. FCC), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 
(1983) (collectively referred to as Computer II Orders).
23 The Commission defined basic services as the offering of “a pure transmission capability over a communications 
path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied information.”  Computer II Final 
Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 415-16, para. 83, 420, para. 96.  Enhanced services, in turn, were defined as services that 
“combine[] basic service with computer processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or 
similar aspects of the subscriber’s transmitted information, or provide the subscriber additional, different, or 
restructured information, or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.” Id. at 387, para. 5.  In other
words, an “enhanced service is any offering over the telecommunications network which is more than a basic 
transmission service.”  Id. at 420, para. 97.  Although the Commission used the term “enhanced service” in its 
Computer Inquiry decisions and the Act uses the term “information service,” the Commission has determined that 
“Congress intended the categories of ‘telecommunications service’ and ‘information service’ to parallel the 
definitions of ‘basic service’ and ‘enhanced service’ developed in [the] Computer II proceeding . . . .”  National 
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 992-94 (2005) (NCTA v. Brand X); 
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd 11501, 
11511, para. 21 (1998) (Report to Congress).
24 See, e.g., Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 435, para. 132.
25 Id. at 467-68, para. 216.
26 Id. at 475, para. 231; see id. at 435, para. 132 (discussing jurisdictional basis for the Commission’s Computer II 
actions); see also CCIA v. FCC, 693 F.3d at 211-14 (affirming the Commission’s reliance on its ancillary 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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prices, terms, and conditions, to all enhanced service providers, including their own enhanced services 
operations.27  
7. In the Computer III proceedings,28 the Commission replaced this mandatory structural 
separation regime with a regime that gives a BOC the option of providing enhanced services pursuant to 
nonstructural safeguards.  In developing this regime, the Commission determined that the cost of 
decreased efficiency and innovation imposed by the structural safeguards of Computer II outweighed 
their benefits.29 The Computer III framework maintained the existing basic and enhanced services 
categories.30 It adopted comparably efficient interconnection (CEI), open network architecture (ONA), 
and other nonstructural requirements as alternatives to the Computer II structural separation requirements 
for the BOCs.31 Under Computer III, a BOC may provide enhanced services either directly or through an 
affiliate that is not a Computer II affiliate pursuant to an ONA or, alternatively, a CEI plan. 
(Continued from previous page)    
jurisdiction in imposing structural safeguards on AT&T’s provision of enhanced services); NCTA v. Brand X, 545 
U.S. at 996 (describing Computer II and stating that the Commission “remains free to impose special regulatory 
duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction”).
27 See CCIA v. FCC, 693 F.2d at 205; see also Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 474-75, para. 231.  We 
note that the Computer II “unbundling” of basic services requirement is separate and distinct from the obligation, in 
section 251(c)(3) of the Communications Act, that incumbent LECs provide access to unbundled network elements 
(UNEs).  47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
28 Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, CC Docket No. 85-229, Phase I, 104 
FCC 2d 958 (1986) (Computer III Phase I Order), recon., 2 FCC Rcd 3035 (1987) (Computer III Phase I 
Reconsideration Order), further recon., 3 FCC Rcd 1135 (1988) (Computer III Phase I Further Reconsideration 
Order), second further recon., 4 FCC Rcd 5927 (1989) (Computer III Phase I Second Further Reconsideration 
Order); Phase I Order and Phase I Recon. Order vacated sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 
1990) (California I); CC Docket No. 85-229, Phase II, 2 FCC Rcd 3072 (1987) (Computer III Phase II Order), 
recon., 3 FCC Rcd 1150 (1988) (Computer III Phase II Reconsideration Order), further recon., 4 FCC Rcd 5927 
(1989) (Phase II Further Reconsideration Order); Phase II Order vacated, California I, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 
1990); Computer III Remand Proceeding, CC Docket No. 90-368, 5 FCC Rcd 7719 (1990) (ONA Remand Order), 
recon., 7 FCC Rcd 909 (1992), pets. for review denied sub nom. California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(California II); Computer III Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating Company Safeguards and Tier 1 Local 
Exchange Company Safeguards, CC Docket No. 90-623, 6 FCC Rcd 7571 (1991) (BOC Safeguards Order), BOC
Safeguards Order vacated in part and remanded sub nom. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(California III), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995); Computer III Further Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating 
Company Provision of Enhanced Services, CC Docket No. 95-20, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd 
8360 (1995) (Computer III Further Remand Notice), Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd 6040 
(1998) (Computer III Further Remand Further Notice); Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 4289 (1999) (Computer III 
Further Remand Order), recon., 14 FCC Rcd 21628 (1999) (Computer III Further Remand Reconsideration Order); 
see also Further Comment Requested to Update and Refresh Record on Computer III Requirements, CC Docket 
Nos. 95-20, 98-10, Public Notice, 16 FCC Rcd 5363 (CCB 2001) (asking whether, under the ONA framework, 
information service providers can obtain the telecommunications inputs, including digital subscriber line (DSL) 
service, they require) (collectively referred to as Computer III).
29 See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 FCC 2d at 964, para. 3.
30 Id. at 964, para. 4.
31 Id.  An ONA plan includes a description of how a BOC unbundles its network to enable its competitors to provide 
enhanced services generally.  Id. at 1019-20, para. 113, 1064-67, paras. 214-19.  A CEI plan includes a description 
of how a BOC unbundles its network to enable its competitors to provide a particular enhanced service or set of 
enhanced services that the BOC intends to provide.  Id. at 1055-56, paras. 190-91.
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B. Prior Broadband Relief
8. In previous orders, the Commission has taken a number of important steps aimed at easing 
the regulatory requirements for broadband facilities and services.  Specifically, in the Triennial Review 
Order, the Commission determined, on a national basis, that incumbent LECs do not have to unbundle 
certain broadband elements, including fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) loops in greenfield situations, 
broadband capabilities of FTTH loops in overbuild situations, the packet-switched capabilities of hybrid 
loops, and packet switching.32 In making its determination, the Commission considered, among other 
things, the directive of section 706 of the 1996 Act that it encourage the deployment of advanced services, 
and it concluded that these facilities should not be unbundled.33 In subsequent reconsideration orders, the 
Commission extended the same unbundling relief to encompass fiber loops serving predominantly 
residential multiple dwelling units (MDUs) and fiber-to-the-curb (FTTC) loops.34 Moreover, in the 
Section 271 Broadband Forbearance Order, the Commission granted the BOCs forbearance relief from 
the requirements of section 271 specifically for the broadband elements for which it had granted 
  
32 Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the 
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering 
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147, Report and Order and Order on 
Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978, 17141-53, paras. 272-95, 17323, para. 
541 (2003) (Triennial Review Order), corrected by Triennial Review Order Errata, 18 FCC Rcd at 19022, para. 26, 
aff’d in part, remanded in part, vacated in part, United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 564-93 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (USTA II), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925 (2004), on remand, Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 
Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 04-313, 
CC Docket No. 01-338, Order on Remand, 20 FCC Rcd 2533, 2541, para. 12 (2004) (Triennial Review Remand 
Order), aff’d, Covad Communications Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
33 Triennial Review Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 17125-27, paras. 242-44.  Section 706 states, in pertinent part:
The Commission and each State commission with regulatory jurisdiction over 
telecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely 
basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in 
particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms) by utilizing in a manner 
consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, 
regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local 
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to 
infrastructure investment.
“Advanced telecommunications capability” is defined
without regard to any transmission media or technology, as high-speed, switched, 
broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-
quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology.
47 U.S.C. § 157 nt.
34 Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the 
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering 
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147, Order on Reconsideration, 19 
FCC Rcd 20293, 20297-20303, paras. 9-19 (2004) (Triennial Review FTTC Reconsideration Order).
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unbundling relief under section 251.35 The Commission applied its section 10 forbearance analysis in 
light of the Act’s overall goals of promoting local competition and encouraging broadband deployment.36  
9. In the Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order,37 the Commission, among other 
things, generally eliminated the Title II and Computer Inquiry requirements applicable to wireline 
broadband Internet access services offered by facilities-based providers.38 The Commission granted this 
relief for wireline broadband Internet access service and its underlying broadband transmission 
component, whether that component is provided over all copper loops, hybrid copper-fiber loops, an 
FTTC or fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) network, or any other type of wireline facilities.39 The 
Commission’s actions did not encompass other wireline broadband services, such as stand-alone 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode service (ATM), Frame Relay service, Gigabit Ethernet service, and other 
high-capacity special access services.40 The Commission stated that carriers and end users traditionally 
have used these services for basic transmission purposes and that these services, unlike broadband 
Internet access services, are telecommunications services under the statutory definitions and thus subject 
to Title II.41
10. In the Verizon Advanced Services Waiver Order,42 the Commission granted a waiver of 
specific regulatory requirements to allow Verizon to exercise pricing flexibility for certain advanced 
  
35 Petition for Forbearance of the Verizon Telephone Companies Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c); SBC 
Communications Inc.’s Petition for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c); Qwest Communications International 
Inc. Petition for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c); BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. Petition for 
Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c), WC Docket Nos. 01-338, 03-235, 03-260, 04-48, Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 21496 (2004) (Section 271 Broadband Forbearance Order), aff’d, EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, 
462 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (EarthLink v. FCC). 
36 47 U.S.C. § 157 nt.
37 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, CC Docket No. 02-33,
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 14853 (2005) (Wireline Broadband Internet 
Access Services Order), aff’d, Time Warner Telecom Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3rd Cir. 2007) (Time Warner 
Telecom v. FCC).
38 Id. at 14872-915, paras. 32-111.  The Commission found these services to be information services.  See id. at 
14909, para 102.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id.  47 U.S.C. § 153(43), (46).  We note that issues relating to this framework are pending before the 
Commission in a number of proceedings.  See, e.g., Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers; 
AT&T Corp. Petition for Rulemaking to Reform of Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier Rates for Interstate Special 
Access Services, WC Docket No. 05-25, RM-10593, Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 1994 
(2005) (Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers Notice) (examining the regulatory framework 
to apply to price cap LECs’ interstate special access services, including whether to maintain or modify the 
Commission’s pricing flexibility rules); Parties Asked to Refresh Record in the Special Access Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, WC Docket No. 05-25, RM-10593, Public Notice, 22 FCC Rcd 13352 (2007); Review of Regulatory 
Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services, CC Docket No. 01-337, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd 22745 (2001) (Incumbent LEC Broadband NPRM) (examining what regulatory 
safeguards under Title II of the Act, if any, should apply when a carrier that is dominant in the provision of 
traditional local exchange and exchange access services provides broadband services); Computer III Further 
Remand Further Notice, 13 FCC Rcd at 6046, para. 6 (inviting comment on whether the Commission should 
eliminate the ONA, CEI, and other Computer III requirements).
42 Petition for Waiver of Pricing Flexibility Rules for Fast Packet Services, Petition for Forbearance Under 47 
U.S.C. Section 160(c) from Pricing Flexibility Rules for Fast Packet Services, WC Docket No. 04-246, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 16840 (2005) (Verizon Advanced Services Waiver Order).  
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services that rely on packet technology.43 Pricing flexibility relief allows a carrier the ability to provide 
tariffed services at volume and term discounts and under contract tariffs, whereby service offerings may 
be negotiated and tailored to meet customers’ individual needs.44 The Commission subsequently granted 
AT&T and Qwest similar relief for packet-based advanced services.45
11. On December 20, 2004, Verizon filed a petition requesting that the Commission forbear from 
applying Title II of the Act and the Computer Inquiry rules to its broadband services.46 On December 19, 
2005, the Commission, pursuant to section 10(c) of the Act, extended by 90 days (until March 19, 2006) 
the date by which Verizon’s petition would be deemed granted in the absence of a Commission decision 
denying the petition for failure to meet the standards for forbearance under section 10(a) of the Act.47 By 
their recorded vote, two Commissioners voted for and two Commissioners voted against a Memorandum 
Opinion and Order granting Verizon’s petition in part.  Section 10(c) provides that a forbearance petition 
“shall be deemed granted if the Commission does not deny the petition for failure to meet the 
requirements for forbearance under subsection (a) within one year after the Commission receives it, 
unless the one-year period is extended by the Commission.”48 On March 20, 2006, the Commission 
issued a News Release announcing that the petition had been granted by operation of law.49 At that same 
time, the Chairman and other Commissioners issued statements expressing their views on the deemed 
grant of Verizon’s forbearance petition.50 On December 7, 2007, the D.C. Circuit denied petitions for 
review that attempted to challenge the deemed grant.51
  
43 Generally, price cap LECs may obtain pricing flexibility in two separate phases on a metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) basis to respond to competition in markets that are sufficiently competitive to warrant this relief.  See Pricing 
Flexibility Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 14234, 14257, paras. 24, 68.  Specifically, the Verizon Advanced Services Waiver 
Order grants Verizon phase I pricing flexibility for the advanced services at issue in MSAs where Verizon 
previously had qualified for phase I or II pricing flexibility for other special access services.  Verizon Advanced 
Services Waiver Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 16840, para. 1.  
44 Pricing Flexibility Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 14287, 14291, paras. 122, 128.  Under phase I relief, a price cap carrier 
may offer volume and term discounts and contract tariffs for certain interstate access services; however, to protect 
those customers that may lack competitive alternatives, the price cap LEC must continue to offer its generally 
available, price cap constrained (i.e., subject to part 61 and part 69) tariff rates for these services.  47 C.F.R. 
§ 69.727(a); Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers Notice, 20 FCC Rcd at 2001, para. 17.  
Under phase II relief, part 69 rate structure requirements and price cap regulation are eliminated, and tariffs may be 
filed on one day’s notice.  47 C.F.R. § 69.727(b).
45 SBC Communications Inc. Petition for Waiver of Section 61.42 of the Commission’s Rules, WC Docket No. 
03-250, Order, 22 FCC Rcd 7224 (WCB 2007) (SBC Waiver Order); Qwest Petition for Waiver of Pricing 
Flexibility Rules for Advanced Communications Networks Services, WC Docket No. 06-187, Order, 22 FCC Rcd 
7482 (WCB 2007) (Qwest Pricing Flexibility Waiver Order).
46 See Verizon Petition at 24.
47 47 U.S.C. § 160(c); Petition for Forbearance Filed by the Verizon Telephone Companies with Respect to Their 
Broadband Services, WC Docket No. 04-440, Order, 20 FCC Rcd 20037 (WCB 2005).
48 47 U.S.C. § 160(c).
49 March 20 News Release.
50 Joint Statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin and Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate, Petition of the Verizon 
Telephone Companies for Forbearance under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with 
Respect to Their Broadband Services, WC Docket No. 04-440 (rel. Mar. 20, 2006); Statement of Commissioner 
Michael J. Copps in Response to Commission Inaction on Verizon’s Forbearance Petition, Petition of the Verizon 
Telephone Companies for Forbearance under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with 
Respect to Their Broadband Services, WC Docket No. 04-440 (rel. Mar. 20, 2006); Statement of Commissioner 
Jonathan S. Adelstein in Response to Commission Inaction on Verizon’s Forbearance Petition, Petition of the 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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12. In the AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, the Commission granted in 
part AT&T’s requests for forbearance seeking relief comparable to the relief granted Verizon when its 
similar petition for forbearance was deemed granted by operation of law.52 The Commission determined 
that the statutory criteria were met and granted forbearance from dominant carrier regulation of AT&T’s 
existing packet-switched broadband telecommunications services and its existing optical transmission 
services.53 The Commission also granted AT&T relief from its obligations under the Computer Inquiry
rules in connection with these services, conditioned on its compliance with the Computer Inquiry
obligations that apply to all non-incumbent LEC, facilities-based wireline carriers.54 In all other respects 
AT&T’s requests for forbearance were denied.55
III. DISCUSSION
A. Introduction
13. Based on our analysis of marketplace conditions for the services at issue here, we grant 
Qwest forbearance from the application of our dominant carrier tariff filing, cost support, discontinuance, 
and domestic transfer of control rules, and certain Computer Inquiry requirements, with regard to (1) its 
existing non-TDM-based, packet-switched services capable of transmitting 200 kilobits per second (kbps) 
or greater in each direction; and (2) its existing non-TDM-based, optical transmission services.  These 
services include Frame Relay services, ATM services, Virtual Private Network (VPN) services, Local 
(Continued from previous page)    
Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules 
with Respect to Their Broadband Services, WC Docket No. 04-440 (rel. Mar. 20, 2006).
51 Sprint Nextel v. FCC, 508 F.3d at 1133.
52 AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18705; see Petition of the Embarq Local 
Operating Companies for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Application of Computer Inquiry Rules and 
Certain Title II Common-Carriage Requirements, Petition of the Frontier and Citizens ILECs for Forbearance 
Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Their Broadband Services, WC 
Docket No. 06-147, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 19478 (2007) (Embarq and Frontier/Citizens 
Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order) (granting in part Embarq’s and Frontier/Citizen’s requests for 
forbearance relief comparable to the relief granted Verizon through operation of law), pet. for review pending, No. 
07-1452 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 5, 2007).  We note that AT&T had withdrawn its request for forbearance from Title II 
dominant carrier regulation with respect to broadband services provided on an interstate interexchange basis that are 
subject to the relief the Commission granted in the Section 272 Sunset Order.  AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry 
Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18714, para. 15; see also Section 272(f)(1) Sunset of the BOC Separate Affiliate 
and Related Requirements et al., CC Docket No. 00-175, WC Docket Nos. 02-112, 06-120, Report and Order and 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 16440 (2007) (Section 272 Sunset Order) (allowing the BOCs to 
provide in-region, interstate, long distance services directly or through affiliates that are neither section 272 separate 
affiliates nor rule 64.1903 separate affiliates, subject to nondominant carrier regulation, as long as they comply with 
certain targeted safeguards as well as with other continuing statutory and regulatory obligations).  To the extent that 
Qwest’s forbearance petition seeks relief comparable to what was granted in the Section 272 Sunset Order, we find 
that request to be moot, consistent with our conclusions in the AT&T Section 272 Forbearance Denial Order.  
Petition of AT&T Inc. for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to Certain Dominant Carrier 
Regulations for In-Region, Interexchange Services, WC Docket No. 06-120, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 
FCC Rcd 16556 (2007) (AT&T Section 272 Forbearance Denial Order).  Similarly, for the same reasons stated in 
that order, to the extent that Qwest seeks relief from dominant carrier regulation of broadband services provided on 
an interstate interexchange basis that is different from, or in addition to, that granted in the Section 272 Sunset 
Order, we find that such additional relief would be inconsistent with the statutory forbearance criteria.  Id. at 16559, 
para. 7.  We therefore deny such relief.
53 AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18716-21, paras. 20-25.
54 Id. at paras. 54-62.
55 Id. at paras. 64-75.  
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Area Network (LAN) services, Ethernet-Based services, Video Transmission services, Optical Network 
services, and Wave-Based services.  This grant is restricted to services that Qwest currently offers and 
lists in its petition, and excludes all TDM-based DS1 and DS3 services.
B. Scope of Petition
14. We begin our analysis by identifying the specific relief Qwest requests in its petition, 
including the services, statutory provisions and Commission regulations that Qwest identifies in its 
petition.56 As stated above, Qwest seeks relief comparable to that granted Verizon when its similar 
petition for forbearance was deemed granted.57 Specifically, Qwest requests relief from Title II and 
Computer Inquiry requirements for the broadband services specified in its petition as well as for any 
additional interstate broadband services it may choose to offer in the future.58 The requested relief from 
Title II includes the ability to offer any of its specified services on a private carriage basis and free from 
the Commission’s dominant carrier requirements.59 Qwest also seeks relief from the Computer Inquiry
rules, including the requirement that it separate out and offer any underlying transmission components of 
its specified services on a common carrier basis.60 Qwest does not seek relief from the Commission’s 
universal service requirements.61
15. The services for which Qwest seeks relief fall within two categories of telecommunications 
services capable of transmitting at speeds of 200 kbps in both directions:  (1) packet-switched services, 
which route or forward packets, frames, cells, or other data units based on the identification, address, or 
other routing information contained in the packets, frames, cells, or other data units; and (2) non-TDM-
based optical networking, optical hubbing, and optical transmission services.62 Qwest lists certain 
specific interstate broadband telecommunications services that it currently offers and for which it seeks 
forbearance.63 Qwest also seeks relief from Title II and Computer Inquiry regulation for any additional 
services it chooses to offer in the future that fit within either of these two categories of services.64
  
56 See, e.g., Petition of Qwest Communications International Inc. for Forbearance from Enforcement of the 
Commission’s Dominant Carrier Rules As They Apply After Section 272 Sunsets, WC Docket No. 05-333, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 5207, 5214-15, para. 11 (2007) (Qwest Section 272 Sunset 
Forbearance Order); Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications 
Services, CC Docket No. 01-337, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 27000, 27010, para. 18 (2002) 
(SBC Advanced Services Forbearance Order).
57 Qwest Petition at 1; see supra para. 11 (describing the “deemed grant” of Verizon’s Title II and Computer Inquiry
Forbearance Petition).
58 See Qwest Petition at 1.
59 Id. at 3 (requesting relief from Title II requirements and treatment as a dominant carrier).
60 See, e.g., id. at 19-21.
61 Id. at 1 n.3.
62 See id. at 1-2.
63 Qwest lists the following services:  Frame Relay, ATM service, Metro Optical Ethernet, LAN Switching service, 
Synchronous Service Transport, Ethernet Ports over SONET on Synchronous Service Transport & Self-Healing 
Network service, GeoMax, Broadcast Digital Transport Video service, HDTV Net, Self Healing Network service, 
QWave, Private Line OC3, OC12 and OC48, and Metro Private Line.  See Qwest Petition at Attachment A.  We 
refer to these services as the petitioner-specified services.  
64 See Qwest Petition at 1 (seeking forbearance for “any broadband services Qwest does or may offer to the extent 
those services are not offered as part of an Internet access service”).  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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C. Effect of the Verizon “Deemed Grant”
16. As indicated above, Verizon’s petition for forbearance from application of Title II of the Act 
and the Computer Inquiry rules to its broadband services was “deemed granted” on March 19, 2006.65  
Qwest claims in its petition that, by virtue of the Verizon deemed grant, the Commission must grant the 
Qwest petition, which seeks the relief granted to Verizon by operation of law, “as a ministerial act.”66  
17. We reject this argument as inconsistent with section 10 of the Act, which specifies that “the 
Commission shall forbear . . . if the Commission determines” that the statutory forbearance criteria are 
met.67 Neither this provision nor any other statutory provision permits us to forbear absent a 
determination based on the relevant statutory criteria.68 Consequently, we must evaluate whether 
forbearance is consistent with the criteria of section 10 based on the record evidence here.69 For similar 
reasons, we reject Qwest’s argument that we must grant Qwest precisely the same forbearance relief as 
was granted Verizon by operation of law because we cannot treat similarly situated entities differently 
without a reasoned explanation.70 We set forth below the rationale for our decisions in this Order based 
on the facts and evidence relevant to Qwest and its identified broadband services.  We thus conclude that 
this Order satisfies our obligation to set forth a sufficient analysis and justification of the forbearance we 
do, and do not, grant.
18. We also decline in the context of this forbearance petition to explain, clarify, or otherwise 
address the forbearance that Verizon was deemed granted by operation of law, as several parties urge.71  
We find that requests seeking clarification or other determinations regarding forbearance with respect to 
Verizon’s broadband services are more appropriately addressed distinctly, based on evidence relevant to 
Verizon.72 In this proceeding, we limit our decision-making to the specific petition under consideration –
that filed by Qwest.
  
65 See supra para. 11; see also March 20 News Release.
66 Qwest Petition at 7-10.
67 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
68 See Broadview Comments at i.
69 We reject the argument that the “deemed granted” status of the Verizon Title II and Computer Inquiry
Forbearance Petition has precedential value, or binds or otherwise limits our responsibility to evaluate Qwest’s 
forbearance petition and the other petitions that are before us on their merits.  Compare, e.g., Qwest Petition at 7-10; 
Letter from Melissa Newman, Vice President, Federal Regulatory, Qwest, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, 
WC Docket No. 06-125, at 2-4 (filed Sept. 4, 2007) (Qwest Sept. 4, 2007 Ex Parte Letter) with, e.g., Alpheus 
Comments at 7; Broadview Comments at 7-10. That argument presupposes that the deemed grant of Verizon’s 
petition was the result of Commission action.  See, e.g., Qwest Sept. 4, 2007 Ex Parte Letter at 2-3 (stating that the 
deemed grant “establishes a specific Commission action . . . with direct legal consequence”).  The Commission, 
however, took no action addressing whether grant of Verizon’s petition is consistent with the statutory forbearance 
criteria.  In any event, as the Commission has held, it has the option of revisiting a forbearance ruling in light of new 
facts.  See, e.g., Qwest Section 272 Sunset Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5235, para. 55.  Therefore, even if we 
were to treat the “deemed grant” of Verizon’s forbearance petition as a Commission decision, given the extensive 
record developed in response to the petitioner’s forbearance petitions, we would find it appropriate to revisit that 
determination with respect to Qwest based on the evidence before us. 
70 Qwest Petition at 6-7; Qwest Sept. 4, 2007 Ex Parte Letter at 3.
71 See, e.g., Legacy BellSouth Petition at 3-4 (asking the Commission to resolve the uncertainty as to the scope of 
the Verizon deemed grant); Frontier Petition at 3-4 (same); Embarq Petition at 5 (claiming there uncertainty 
regarding the Verizon petition); Covad Motion, WC Docket No. 04-440.
72 We note that several competitive carriers have filed a motion asking the Commission to issue a written order 
addressing Verizon’s petition for forbearance with respect to enterprise broadband services.  See Covad Motion; 
Wireline Competition Bureau Seeks Comment on the Motion of Covad Communications, Group, NuVox 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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D. Application of the Statutory Forbearance Criteria
19. An integral part of the “pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework”73
established in the 1996 Act is the requirement, set forth in section 10 of the Communications Act, that the 
Commission forbear from applying any provision of the Act, or any of the Commission’s regulations, if 
the Commission makes certain findings with respect to such provisions or regulations.74 Specifically, the 
Commission is required to forbear from any such provision or regulation if it determines that 
(1) enforcement of the provision or regulation is not necessary to ensure the telecommunications carrier’s 
charges, practices, classifications, or regulations are just, reasonable, and not unjustly or unreasonably 
discriminatory; (2) enforcement of the provision or regulation is not necessary to protect consumers; and 
(3) forbearance is consistent with the public interest.75 In making this public interest determination, the 
Commission also must consider, pursuant to section 10(b), “whether forbearance from enforcing the 
provision or regulation will promote competitive market conditions.”76
1. Dominant Carrier Regulation
a. Charges, Practices, Classifications, and Regulations
20. Section 10(a)(1) of the Act requires that we analyze whether the application of dominant 
carrier regulation to each of the services specified by Qwest is necessary to ensure that the “charges, 
practices, classifications, or regulations . . . for[] or in connection with that  . . . telecommunications 
service are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory.”77 Our section 
10(a)(1) analysis takes into account the effect of dominant carrier regulation on Qwest’s rates and 
practices by considering the overall marketplace for the services for which relief is sought and the 
customers that use them.78 We conclude that, in light of the overall competitive alternatives available for 
(Continued from previous page)    
Communications, Inc., and XO Communications, LLC for Expedited Order on Verizon Petition for Forbearance, 
WC Docket No. 04-440, Public Notice, 22 FCC Rcd 13899 (2007); see also, e.g., Alpheus Comments at 8 (stating 
that the Commission should use this proceeding to examine the forbearance granted to Verizon and, if it is not 
rescinded, clarify its scope); Broadview Comments at 16.
73 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, S. Conf. Rep. No. 230, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 
(1996).
74 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
75 Id. 
76 47 U.S.C. § 160(b).  In its comments, the New Jersey Rate Counsel argues that exercise of the Commission’s 
forbearance authority pursuant to section 10 of the Act violates the Separation of Powers Provision and the Equal 
Protection Clause as well as the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments of the Constitution.  See New Jersey Rate Counsel 
Comments at 5-6.  As we held in the Qwest Section 272 Sunset Forbearance Order in response to the same 
argument, the New Jersey Rate Counsel makes no attempt to develop this argument, and we find the assertion 
insufficient to call into question section 10’s constitutionality.  See Qwest Section 272 Sunset Forbearance Order, 
22 FCC Rcd at 5232, para. 49 n.139 (citing Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 331 F.3d 952, 960 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Administrative Procedure Act does not require the Commission to respond to conclusory comments); MCI 
WorldCom v. FCC, 209 F.3d 70, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a party did not raise an argument with sufficient 
force to obligate the Commission to respond); Application by Verizon Maryland Inc., Verizon Washington, D.C. 
Inc., Verizon West Virginia Inc., Bell Atlantic Communications Inc. (d/b/a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long 
Distance Company (d/b/a Verizon Enterprise Solutions), Verizon Global Networks Inc., and Verizon Select Services 
Inc., for Authorization to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Maryland, Washington, D.C., and West 
Virginia, WC Docket No. 02-384, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 5212, 5282 n.469 (2003) 
(Regulatory agencies are not required to address arguments not stated with sufficient force or clarity.)). 
77 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1).
78 Section 271 Broadband Forbearance Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 21505, para. 21.
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the petitioner-specified services, as well as the way in which they are typically offered to enterprise 
customers, it is appropriate to forbear from dominant carrier regulation as it applies to these services.  In 
particular, mandating that Qwest, but not its nondominant competitors, comply with requirements that 
directly limit the ability of customers to secure the most flexible service arrangements is unnecessary to 
prevent unjust, unreasonable, or unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions for 
these services.
21. We begin our analysis by looking at the broadband services identified by Qwest and the 
customers that use them.  These types of services are high-speed, high-volume services that enterprise 
customers, including some wholesale customers, use primarily to transmit large amounts of data among 
multiple locations.  For example, Frame Relay service allows local area networks to be connected across a 
public network to carry customized data applications.79 ATM service, which was developed more 
recently than Frame Relay, has greater availability in urban areas, is currently a widely-used carrier 
backbone technology, and can guarantee different service quality levels to meet various customer needs.80  
This service offers high capacity and reliability by combining some circuit-switched functionality with 
packet-switching and is used to deliver data that requires a very low rate of transmission delays.81  
Ethernet-based services provide high-speed, dedicated pathways for large applications, including 
engineering, medical imaging, and streaming video applications, and are often used as part of local area 
networks (LANs).82  
22. Qwest’s non-TDM-based, optical services are very high speed, fiber-based transmission 
services that, collectively, reflect many of the telecommunications transmission capabilities that 
technological advances have made possible.  For example, Qwest’s GeoMax service provides a high-
speed, multi-protocol, fiber optic data transport service that enables signals of different wavelengths to be 
transmitted in the same direction over one strand of fiber.83 Qwest’s Synchronous Service Transport 
service provides customers with synchronous, optical fiber based transport at speeds as high as 9.953 
gigabits per second.84 Other services in this category also offer enterprise customers highly advanced 
transmission arrangements.  We find insufficient information to precisely define market boundaries for 
such services, and we thus focus our analysis on the services Qwest identifies in the record generally.
23. We also find it appropriate, contrary to several parties’ arguments,85 to consider marketplace 
conditions for these services broadly.86 In this regard, as we find below, competition for these enterprise 
  
79 Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc. Application for Approval of Transfer of Control, WC Docket No. 05-
75, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18433, 18463-64, para. 57 n.160 (2005) (Verizon/MCI Order); 
see also Qwest Petition at Attach. A.
80 See Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services, CC Docket 
No. 01-337, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 27000, 27003, para. 6 n.22 (2002) (SBC Advanced 
Services Order).
81 Verizon/MCI Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18464, para. 57 n.161; see also Qwest Petition at Attach. A.
82 Verizon/MCI Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18464, para. 57 n.163; see also Qwest Petition at Attach. A.
83 Qwest Petition at Attach. A.
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Broadview Comments at 28 (claiming that the petitioner does not provide evidence for the Commission 
to determine the relevant geographic market and simply claim that there is a national market for broadband 
products); COMPTEL Comments at 11.
86 See AT&T Petition at 5 (stating that Verizon’s Petition demonstrated that “broadband competition is national in 
scope and is not limited to Verizon’s territory or the territory of any specific BOC”); Qwest Reply at 6; Verizon 
Reply at 17-18 (claiming that the Commission may consider a national broadband market based on its analysis in the
Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, the Triennial Review Order, the Section 271 Broadband 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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broadband services tends to be based on either competitive deployment of facilities or use of special 
access inputs.  We note that the relief we grant Qwest excludes TDM-based DS-1 and DS-3 special access 
services,87 and that such special access services for other incumbent LECs likewise remain rate regulated, 
regardless of the specific geographic market.88 We also continue to believe, as the Commission 
determined in the Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, that it is appropriate to view a 
broadband marketplace that is emerging and changing, such as we find true here, from the perspective of 
the larger trends that are shaping the marketplace.89 Thus, in the Wireline Broadband Internet Access 
Services Order, the Commission analyzed competitive conditions for broadband Internet access services 
without regard to specific, identified geographic markets, finding that relying on specific geographic 
markets would force the Commission to premise findings on limited and static data that failed to account 
for all of the forces that influence the future market development.90 Similarly, the Commission relied on 
such an approach in the Section 271 Broadband Forbearance Order when – after evaluating both mass 
market and enterprise broadband competitive conditions generally – it granted the BOCs forbearance 
from access obligations for broadband loops and packet switching.91 The similarities we find between the 
characteristics of the present marketplace as emerging and changing, and the markets at issue in those 
prior orders, suggest that it is appropriate for us to look more broadly at competitive trends without regard 
to specific geographic markets.92  
(Continued from previous page)    
Forbearance Order, and the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling); Erratum, Letter from Dee May, Vice President, 
Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Marlene H. Dortch, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 06-125, 06-147, 04-440, at 5-8 (filed 
Sept. 4, 2007) (Verizon Sept. 4, 2007 Ex Parte Erratum).  We note that the Commission’s forbearance analysis is 
informed by its traditional market power framework, where the Commission has noted that competitive analyses 
generally should focus on individual customer locations, but for reasons of administrative practicality may be 
aggregated and evaluated on a broader geographic basis.  See, e.g., AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation 
Application for Transfer of Control, WC Docket No. 06-74, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 5662,
5700, para. 68 (2007) (AT&T/BellSouth Order) (subsequent history omitted).  Moreover, we note that, although the 
Commission’s analysis of forbearance from dominant carrier regulation is informed by its traditional market power 
analysis, it is not bound by that framework.  As the Commission stated in the Qwest Omaha Order, while it “look[s] 
to the Commission’s previous caselaw on dominance for guidance,” the traditional market power inquiry does not 
“bind [the Commission’s] section 10 forbearance analysis.”  Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance 
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Omaha Metropolitan Statistical Area, WC Docket No. 04-223, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19415, 19423-25, paras. 14, 17, n.52 (2005) (emphasis in original) (Qwest Omaha 
Order), aff’d, Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 482 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
87 See Qwest Petition at 1.
88 Moreover, as discussed below, concerns regarding existing regulation of TDM special access inputs are better 
addressed in the pending rulemaking context.  See infra para. 37.
89 AT&T/BellSouth Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5698-99, para. 65 & n.183 (discussing the marketplace evolution for these 
types of services); Verizon Sept. 4, 2007 Ex Parte Erratum, attaching Verizon Feb. 7, 2006 Ex Parte Letter, WC 
Docket No. 04-440, at 4-6 (describing how “the technology used to provide the broadband services at issue here ‘[is] 
fundamentally changing’ in ways that are ‘breaking down the formerly rigid barriers that separate one network from 
another’”) (citations omitted); Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 14880-81, para. 
50; id. at 14901-03, paras. 91-94.
90 Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 14880-81, para. 50; id. at 14901-03, paras. 
91-94.
91 See Section 271 Broadband Forbearance Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 21496, para. 1 (granting forbearance relief for 
FTTH loops, FTTC loops, the packetized functionality of hybrid loops, and packet switching); see also EarthLink v. 
FCC, 562 F.3d at 8 (upholding the Commission’s decision in the Section 271 Broadband Forbearance Order as a 
reasonable interpretation of the forbearance statute).
92 Certain commenters seek to distinguish the manner in which the Commission conducted its analysis in the 
Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order on the basis of the evidence of the intermodal competition cited 
(continued….)
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24. Moreover, in the ACS Dominance Forbearance Order, the Commission found that many 
enterprise customers that purchase these types of services have national, multi-location operations and 
thus seek the best-priced alternatives from multiple potential providers having national market 
presences.93 Viewing the regulatory obligations from a broad perspective is consistent with the needs of 
the large and mid-sized enterprise customers that use Qwest’s broadband services to connect 
geographically-dispersed locations.94 Many of these customers, moreover, have national, multi-location 
operations and thus seek the best-priced alternatives from multiple potential providers having national 
market presences.95 Other enterprise customers have more regional or localized operations, but even 
these customers are able to solicit telecommunications services from a range of potential providers.  
Indeed, providers of these services often are able to self-deploy or obtain from competitive LECs the 
telecommunications services and facilities needed to meet potential customers’ telecommunications 
requirements.  Where self-deployment and purchasing from competitive LECs are not options, potential 
providers may obtain UNEs from the incumbent LEC to meet these customers’ needs.96
25. Viewed on this basis, and consistent with the Commission’s findings in several recent orders, 
we find that a number of entities currently provide broadband services in competition with Qwest’s 
services.97 There are a myriad of providers prepared to make competitive offers to enterprise customers 
(Continued from previous page)    
in that proceeding.  See, e.g., Broadview Comments at 25.  To the extent that competition in the emerging market for 
enterprise broadband services addressed here relies in part on third parties’ wholesale inputs, rather than 
competitors’ own facilities, we do not find that to be a distinguishing factor in terms of the Commission’s approach 
of viewing emerging and changing broadband markets from the perspective of the larger trends that are shaping the 
marketplace, although we do account for those factors in the relief ultimately granted and denied.  The Commission 
relied on the presence of intermodal competitors in the emerging wireline broadband Internet access services market 
in granting relief from the compulsion to offer as telecommunications services the telecommunications inputs 
necessary for wireline broadband Internet access service.  Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, 20 
FCC Rcd at 14895, para. 79.  Here, however, in addition to the potential for competitors to deploy their own 
facilities for the provision of the relevant enterprise broadband services, we observe that the relief we grant excludes 
TDM-based DS-1 and DS-3 special access services.  Thus, those services, in addition to section 251 UNEs, remain 
available for use as wholesale inputs for these enterprise broadband services.  
93 Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. Pursuant to Section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended 
(47 U.S.C. § 160(c)), for Forbearance from Certain Dominant Carrier Regulation of Its Interstate Access Services, 
and for Forbearance from Title II Regulation of Its Broadband Services, in the Anchorage, Alaska, Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carrier Study Area, WC Docket No. 06-109, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 16304, 
16349, para. 101 (2007) (ACS Dominance Forbearance Order), recons. pending.  Thus, based on our discretion to 
tailor our forbearance analysis, we find that an analysis of the petitioner-specified services on a national basis is the 
proper approach, and we reject arguments raised regarding the geographic market definition.  See EarthLink v. FCC, 
462 F.3d at 9.
94 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18718, para. 21; see also Time 
Warner Telecom v. FCC, 507 F.3d at 221-22 (concluding that Commission’s “broad market analysis” of the 
broadband Internet access services market “was both reasonable and consistent with the approach upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Brand X”).
95 Verizon Sept. 4, 2007 Ex Parte Erratum at 3.
96 The broadband services for which Qwest is seeking relief are purchased predominantly by enterprise customers, 
not by their competitors as wholesale inputs.  See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC 
Rcd at 18718, para. 21 n.90.  Granting the requested relief, however, will not affect these competitors’ ability to 
obtain traditional DS1 and DS3 special access services or UNEs as inputs.  Nor will it affect the competitors’ ability 
to self-deploy their own OCn facilities and services or to obtain them from non-incumbents.  Id.
97 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18718-19, para. 22; see also
Verizon/MCI Order 20 FCC Rcd at 18474-75, para. 76; Qwest Section 272 Sunset Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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demanding packet-switched data services located both within and outside any given incumbent LEC’s 
service territory.98 These competitors include the many competitive LECs, cable companies, systems 
integrators, equipment vendors, and value-added resellers providing services that compete against 
Qwest.99
26. As acknowledged in the AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, we 
recognize that the record in this proceeding does not include detailed market share information for 
particular enterprise broadband services.100 However, we note that other available data suggest that there 
are a number of competing providers for these types of services nationwide and the marketplace generally 
appears highly competitive.101 In particular, the record shows there are many significant providers of 
Frame Relay services, ATM services, and Ethernet-based services.102 Moreover, as we discuss below, we 
find that competitors either are providing, or readily could enter the market to provide, these services.  In 
light of these factors and the emerging and evolving nature of this market, and consistent with traditional 
(Continued from previous page)    
at 5244, para. 30; Verizon Sept. 4 2007 Ex Parte Erratum, attaching Verizon Feb. 7, 2006 Ex Parte Letter, WC 
Docket No. 04-440, at 7-9.
98 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18718-19, para. 22; see also
Verizon/MCI Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18473-74, para. 74; Verizon Reply at 17-18 (stating that much of the success of 
Verizon’s competitors is due to their ability to serve the national and international needs of large business 
customers, and that there are “national patterns” with respect to broadband availability and competition throughout 
Verizon’s service areas).
99 Competitors are rapidly deploying new Internet Protocol (IP)-based networks and services along with other 
technologies to satisfy customer demand.  See Telecommunications Industry Association, TIA’s 2005 
Telecommunication Market Review and Forecast, at 121 (2005) (stating that IP-VPNs have emerged as a lower-cost 
alternative to Frame Relay service).  Frame Relay growth has come to a near standstill as lower cost alternatives 
have emerged, and unified messaging, voice over IP (VoIP), multi-cast video and IP-based network security 
services, not suitable for Frame Relay applications, are increasingly in demand.  Id. at 120.  As discussed in prior 
Commission orders, there are numerous types of business models supporting competition for enterprise customers.  
Some competitive LECs market integrated voice and data services to enterprise customers, primarily through leasing 
high-capacity loops from the incumbent LECs as UNEs and then using the leased loops to provide a bundled 
offering including voice, data, and Internet access.  See, e.g., Triennial Review Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 17014, para. 
48 n.159 (observing that companies such as ITC^Deltacom, NewSouth, and Cbeyond have focused on providing 
integrated services to the business market).
100 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18719-20, para. 23.
101 See, e.g., Verizon Sept. 4, 2007 Ex Parte Erratum, attaching Verizon Feb. 7, 2006 Ex Parte Letter, WC Docket 
No. 04-440, at 7 n.13 (citing a June 2005 analyst’s estimated market shares for “primary” providers of enterprise 
data services:  AT&T 35%, MCI 28%, Sprint 12%, incumbent LEC 7%, Other 19%); id. at 7 n.14 (citing a June 
2005 analyst’s estimated market shares for “secondary” providers of enterprise data services:  Sprint 31%, AT&T 
16%, incumbent LEC 16%, MCI 6%, Qwest 6%, Other 25%); see generally id. at Attach. 2 (citing a November 
2003 analyst report estimating market shares of top providers of services to large enterprise customers:  AT&T 26%, 
MCI 14%, Sprint 8%; and forecasting anticipated market shares for subsequent years).  While these data are not 
ideal, for example because they predate the BOC/interexchange carrier mergers, and the underlying information and 
methodologies are not available, as noted above, we do not give significant weight to such static market share 
information in any event.
102 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18718-19, para. 22; see also 
Broadview Comments at 11 (stating “it is of course true that the retail market for packetized and TDM-based special 
access services is competitive”) (emphasis in original); Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. Comments at 10 
(arguing that Qwest is trying to rely on the retail competition for these services as a basis for forbearance relief); 
Sprint Nextel Comments at 13-15 (same); see also Section 271 Broadband Forbearance Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 
21505-06, para. 22 (citing competition from competitive LECs, cable companies, systems integrators, equipment 
vendors, and value-added resellers).
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market power analysis, we do not find it essential to have such detailed information and would not give 
significant weight to static market share information in any event.103 However, our findings here 
concerning the granularity of competition in specific geographic markets and the level of competition for 
enterprise broadband services do not prejudge the issue of the appropriate level of market analysis for 
services subject to the open Special Access Rulemaking proceeding, WC Docket No. 05-25.104
27. We also observe the sophistication of the enterprise customers that tend to purchase 
broadband telecommunications services.  The Commission consistently has recognized that customers 
that use specialized services, similar to the petitioner-specified services, demand the most flexible service 
offerings possible, and that service providers treat them differently from other types of customers, both in 
the way they market their products and in the prices they charge.105 These users tend to make their 
decisions about communications services by using either communications consultants or employing 
in-house communications experts.106 This shows that customers are likely to make informed choices 
based on expert advice about service offerings and prices, and thus suggests that these users also are 
likely to be aware of the choices available to them.107 The Commission has further found that the large 
revenues these customers generate, and their need for reliable service and dedicated equipment, provide a 
significant incentive to suppliers to build their own facilities where possible, and to carry the traffic of 
these customers over the suppliers’ own networks.108 These services equate to substantial 
telecommunications expenditures for large enterprise customers, which supports the notion that these 
customers will continue to deal at the most sophisticated level with the providers of these services.109  
  
103 See, e.g., Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI Communications Corporation For Transfer of Control of MCI 
Communications Corporation To WorldCom, Inc., CC Docket No. 97-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 
FCC Rcd 18025, 18036-37, paras. 17-18 (1998); see also DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, § 1.521 
(“Market concentration and market share data of necessity are based on historical evidence.  However, recent or 
ongoing changes in the market may indicate that the current market share of a particular firm either understates or 
overstates the firm’s future competitive significance.”).  We thus reject commenters’ calls to base our analysis on 
such information.  See, e.g., AdHoc Reply at 13-14.
104 Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers Notice, 20 FCC Rcd at n.43.
105 See, e.g., AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18720, para. 24; 
AT&T/BellSouth Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5699, para. 66; SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for 
Approval of Transfer of Control, WC Docket No. 05-65, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18290, 
18323, para. 60 (2005) (SBC/AT&T Order); Verizon/MCI Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18465, para. 60; Policy and Rules 
Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace; Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications 
Act of 1934, as Amended; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of Customer Premises Equipment and 
Enhanced Services Unbundling Rules in the Interexchange, Exchange Access and Local Exchange Markets, CC 
Docket Nos. 96-61, 98-183, Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 7418, 7426, para. 17 (2001) (CPE Bundling Order); 
Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Order, 11 FCC Rcd 3271, 3306, para. 65 
(1995) (AT&T Reclassification Order) (citing Competition in the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, CC Docket 
No. 90-132, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 5880, 5887, para. 39 (1991)).
106 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18718-19, para. 22; 
AT&T/BellSouth Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5708-09, paras. 81-82; SBC/AT&T Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18332-33, paras. 
74-75; see also Verizon/MCI Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18474-75, para. 76.
107 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18718-19, para. 22; 
AT&T/BellSouth Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5708-09, para. 82; SBC/AT&T Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18332-33, para. 75; 
see also Verizon/MCI Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18474-75, para. 76.
108 Triennial Review Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 17063, para. 129.
109 See Verizon Sept. 4, 2007 Ex Parte Erratum at 3; see also Legacy BellSouth Comments, WC Docket No. 04-440 
at 27 (stating that customers of these broadband transmission services “typically exert control over their buying 
practices through a variety of mechanisms to ensure quality and price” such as request for proposals and competitive 
bids).
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Smaller enterprise customers, whose telecommunications requirements do not warrant the deployment of 
new facilities, tend to purchase less sophisticated services.
28. We further find that competitors can readily respond should Qwest seek to impose unjust, 
unreasonable, or unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory rates, terms, or conditions for its enterprise 
broadband services.  Even in situations where competitors do not have the option of self-deploying their 
own facilities or purchasing inputs from carriers other than the incumbent LEC, potential providers may 
rely on special access services purchased from the incumbent LEC at rates subject to price regulation.110  
In this regard, we note that the relief we grant in this Order excludes TDM-based DS-1 and DS-3 special 
access services.111 Moreover, as we discuss in more detail below, competing carriers are able 
economically to deploy OCn-level facilities to the extent that there is demand for such services in Qwest’s 
incumbent LEC service area.  These conclusions are consistent with our analysis of retail enterprise 
services in other recent orders, where the Commission found that “so long as competitive choices remain” 
for retail enterprise services, large enterprise “customers should seek out best-priced alternatives,” 
limiting the ability of a provider “to raise and maintain prices above competitive levels.”112
29. We reject Time Warner Telecom’s assertion that TDM-based loops cannot in many instances 
be used to provide packetized broadband services to enterprise customers.113 We find that assertion to be 
inconsistent with Time Warner Telecom’s public statements that Time Warner Telecom can “cost-
effectively deliver . . . Ethernet [services] to customers anywhere,” even “where it may be uneconomical” 
to build facilities connecting Time Warner Telecom’s network to the customers’ premises.114  Indeed, we 
observe that Time Warner Telecom has been able to compete in the provision of Ethernet services by 
relying on special access TDM loops (in addition to its own facilities).115 We also are unpersuaded by 
  
110 See, e.g., Sprint Nextel Comments at 6 (stating that special access inputs are “critical” inputs to the broadband 
services provided by incumbent LEC competitors); Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. Comments at 12-16 
(arguing that many competitors rely on special access facilities to serve broadband services to enterprise customers); 
Broadview Comments at 25-26 (arguing that competitors are dependent on the incumbent LECs’ special access 
services); Mobile Satellite Ventures Subsidiary Reply at 2 (stating that it relied on special access inputs from the 
incumbent LECs to provide mobile satellite services).  While we note that Qwest has phase II pricing flexibility in 
certain markets where the Commission has determined the competitive triggers have been met, this does not alter 
our ultimate conclusions for the reasons described above.  See infra para. 44.
111 Qwest excludes traditional TDM-based DS1 and DS3 services from its broadband requests.  See supra n.5.
112 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18720-21, para. 25; 
AT&T/BellSouth Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5608-09, para. 82; SBC/AT&T Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18332-33, para. 75; 
Verizon/MCI Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18474-75, para. 76; Qwest Section 272 Sunset Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd 
at 5231, para. 46.
113 Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. Comments at 16-20.
114 Time Warner Telecom and Overture Networks Provide Ethernet Anywhere, Time Warner Telecom Press Release 
(June 6, 2006), available at:  http://www.twtelecom.com/Documents/Announcements/News/2006/Overture.pdf.
115 Specifically, Time Warner Telecom cites two declarations filed in the AT&T/BellSouth merger proceedings.  See 
Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. Comments at 15-20 (citing Letter from Thomas Jones, Counsel for Time 
Warner Telecom, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 06-74, Attach. Reply Decl. of Graham 
Taylor (Taylor WC Docket No. 06-74 Reply Decl.); Joint Opposition of AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp. to Petitions 
to Deny and Reply to Comments, WC Docket No. 06-74, Attach. Reply Decl. of Parley C. Casto (Casto WC Docket 
No. 06-74 Reply Decl.)).  These declarations indicate that Time Warner Telecom, among others, can use TDM 
special access services to offer retail Ethernet services.  See Taylor WC Docket No. 06-74 Reply Decl. at para. 9 
(“To the extent that TWTC has been able to deploy Ethernet services at retail in AT&T’s region, it has done so 
using 1) its on-net facilities; 2) TDM loops purchased from AT&T; and 3) an extremely limited number of 
competitive facilities.”) cited in Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. Comments; Casto WC Docket No. 06-74 
Reply Decl. at para. 10 (“Numerous Ethernet providers, including TWTC, AT&T, and others, offer retail Ethernet 
services” by using “basic DS1 or DS3 special access circuits.”).
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Time Warner Telecom’s concern that reliance on TDM special access inputs gives rise to service or 
performance problems that hinder competition.116 We agree that this argument is undercut by the fact that 
providers have been successfully competing for Ethernet services customers by relying on TDM inputs.117  
We also reject Time Warner Telecom’s argument that the fixed and variable mileage rates charged by the 
BOCs make it uneconomical for competing carriers to rely on TDM inputs, and that forbearance should 
be denied because the BOCs therefore have monopoly power over such inputs.118 Rather, consistent with 
the AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, we believe that the increased mileage costs 
for providing longer connections has not prevented Time Warner Telecom from using Ethernet over TDM 
arrangements; and further, that Time Warner Telecom could minimize those charges by interconnecting at 
additional points.119 In addition, we observe that all ways of obtaining transmission capacity have trade-
offs, including purchasing transmission services at wholesale and self-provisioning network transmission 
facilities, and we anticipate that competitors will explore various options in seeking to provide enterprise 
broadband services.  For example, obtaining wholesale TDM special access circuits and providing the 
Ethernet electronics can enable providers to exercise greater control over the traffic carried on those 
circuits.120 Further, any transmission services typically are offered in fixed capacity increments, which 
may not be the precise capacities particular customers prefer.121  
30. In addition, to the extent that commenters argue for changes in the existing regulation of 
special access services other than those for which we grant relief, as in prior proceedings, we find that 
such concerns are more appropriately addressed on an industry-wide basis in pending rulemaking 
proceedings.122 As the Commission has held, “[t]o the extent that certain incumbent LECs have the 
incentive and ability under our existing rules to discriminate against competitors” using special access 
inputs, “such a concern is more appropriately addressed in our existing rulemaking proceedings on special 
access performance metrics and special access pricing.”123 By addressing such issues in the context of a 
  
116 See, e.g., Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. Comments at 18.
117 See, e.g., Casto WC Docket No. 06-74 Reply Decl. at para. 22.
118 Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. Comments at 18-19.
119 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18721-22, para. 26.
120 See Casto WC Docket No. 06-74 Reply Decl. at para. 22.
121 For example, Time Warner Telecom notes that it would need to obtain two DS3s to provide a 50 Mbps Ethernet 
loop because DS3s provide approximately 45 Mbps of bandwidth.  Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. 
Comments at 17.  However, Ethernet supports data transfer rates in specific increments of 10 Mbps, 100 Mbps, and 
1 Gbps.  See NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY at 363-64.  Thus, depending upon the capacity of service desired by 
a particular customer, it could well be necessary to purchase excess capacity of a wholesale Ethernet service, as 
well.
122 We note that our finding is consistent with AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  In that decision, 
the court found that the Commission could not deny a petitioner’s forbearance request simply because of the 
availability of a separate, inferior avenue of regulatory relief.  Id. at 737-38.  By contrast, here we grant in part 
Qwest’s forbearance request with regard to certain specific services and we do not defer consideration of requested 
forbearance relief to any other proceeding.  Deferring to other pending proceedings proposals by commenters for 
increased regulation of other services does not in any way undermine the grant of requested relief.
123 AT&T/BellSouth Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5695-96, para. 60; SBC/AT&T Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18320, para. 55; 
Verizon/MCI Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18462, para. 55; Application of AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. and Cingular 
Wireless Corporation For Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, File Nos. 0001656065, et 
al., WT Docket No. 04-70; Applications of Subsidiaries of T-Mobile USA, Inc. and Subsidiaries of Cingular 
Wireless Corporation for Consent to Assignment and Long-Term De Facto Lease of Licenses, File Nos. 
0001771442, et al., WT Docket No. 04-254; Applications of Triton PCS License Company, LLC, AT&T Wireless 
PCS, LLC, and Lafayette Communications Company, LLC For Consent to Assignment of Licenses, File Nos. 
0001808915, et al., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 21522, 21592, para. 193 (2004).
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rulemaking, we will be able to develop a comprehensive approach based on a full record that applies to all 
similarly situated incumbent LECs.  For the same reasons, to the extent that commenters desire expanded 
access to section 251 UNEs under the Commission’s generally applicable unbundling rules, we find it 
more appropriate to consider such concerns in the context of an industry-wide proceeding applicable to all 
similarly situated carriers, rather than in the context of a forbearance proceeding.124
31. Because our grant of forbearance excludes traditional TDM-based DS1 and DS3 special 
access services, we reject certain commenters’ concerns regarding the potential impact of forbearance on 
rural access to the Internet backbone.125 The record makes clear that rural carriers are largely using 
TDM-based DS1 and DS3 special access services to access the Internet backbone today,126 and the 
forbearance relief granted in this Order does not affect those services.  Accordingly, rural incumbent 
LECs will continue to have access to the Internet backbone using those regulated special access services.  
While the rural carriers’ concerns regarding access to the Internet backbone using packetized services 
appear largely speculative based on the record here, as in the AT&T/BellSouth Order, we commit to 
monitor the competitive concerns of rural carriers with respect to access to the Internet backbone.127 We 
find on this record, however, that the limited forbearance relief we grant in this order will not adversely 
affect rural incumbent LECs’ ability to access the Internet backbone.
32. We are convinced that customers would benefit from the ability of all competitors to respond 
to competing market-based price offerings that take the form of promotions and multi-tiered service 
packages.  As we held in the AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, we find tariffing 
and cost support requirements limit Qwest’s ability to negotiate service arrangements tailored to specific 
customer needs and to respond to new service offers from unregulated competitors because it must 
currently provide advance notice of any tariff price changes.128 We also find that the ability to negotiate 
in an unencumbered fashion is not only essential to enable competition in the broadband market but to 
encourage investment in, and development of, new broadband services and that these requirements 
impose significant unnecessary transactions costs on Qwest’s broadband business.129  
33. In light of these findings, we conclude that dominant carrier tariffing and pricing regulation 
of Frame Relay services, ATM Services, LAN services, Ethernet-Based services, Video Transmission 
services, Optical Network services, and Wave-Based services, as offered by Qwest today, is not necessary 
to ensure that Qwest’s rates and practices for those services are just, reasonable, and not unjustly or 
unreasonably discriminatory.  The competitive conditions persuade us that the contribution of tariffing 
requirements, and the accompanying cost support and other requirements, to ensuring just, reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory charges and practices for these services is negligible.  The Commission has 
recognized that tariffs originally were required to protect consumers from unjust, unreasonable, and 
  
124 See, e.g., Broadview Reply at 7-8; see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.401-1.407 (providing for petitions for rulemaking).
125 See NTCA Comments at 2 (arguing that forbearance will saddle rural areas with obsolete TDM connections for 
Internet backbone); OPASTCO Comments at 3, 6 (claiming that rural incumbent LECs need access to the Internet 
backbone based on reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates and terms in order to provide their customers with 
high-quality, affordable advanced services); NTCA Reply at 3 (arguing that if forbearance is granted, the BOCs 
could refuse to provide their transport services to the Internet backbone to rural incumbent LECs, unless these 
incumbent LECs agree to purchase both this transport and Internet backbone capacity from the BOC).
126 NTCA Comments at 2 (stating many rural incumbent LECs connect to the Internet using TDM circuits).
127 Id.  We note that the Commission has the option of revisiting this forbearance ruling should circumstances 
warrant.  See, e.g., Qwest Section 272 Sunset Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5235, para. 55.
128 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18723, para. 29.
129 See id.
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discriminatory rates in a virtually monopolistic market, and that they become unnecessary in a 
marketplace where the provider faces significant competitive pressure.130  
34. For the same reasons, we find that continuing to subject Qwest to dominant carrier regulation 
in regard to its existing non-TDM-based packet-switched broadband services therefore is no longer 
appropriate in light of the market conditions.  Such regulation is not necessary to ensure that Qwest’s 
charges, practices, or regulations in connection with these services are just, reasonable, and not unjustly 
or unreasonably discriminatory, so long as Qwest is subject to the same treatment as the nondominant 
competitors that provide these services.131
35. We also find that Qwest faces sufficient competition in its provision of the specified optical 
transmission services because competing carriers are able to economically deploy OCn-level facilities to 
compete with Qwest’s offerings.  Specifically, we find, consistent with the Commission’s findings in the 
Triennial Review and the Triennial Review Remand Orders, that there is substantial deployment of 
competitive fiber loops at OCn capacity and that competitive carriers are often able to economically 
deploy these facilities to large enterprise customers.132 We further find, consistent with this precedent, 
that OCn-level facilities produce revenue levels that can justify the high cost of loop construction.133 Our 
precedent also makes clear that large enterprise customers purchasing services over such facilities 
typically enter into long-term contracts that enable competing providers to recover their construction costs 
over lengthy periods.134 Evidence in the record here likewise is consistent with those conclusions.135  
Thus, we find it no longer appropriate to subject Qwest to dominant carrier regulation for these non-
TDM-based, optical services.136
36. Given the costs associated with dominant carrier regulation, we find that customers would 
benefit by our granting Qwest relief from that regulation as it applies to the packet-switched and optical 
transmission services for which it seeks forbearance.  In particular, the Commission has long recognized 
that tariff regulation may create market inefficiencies, inhibit carriers from responding quickly to rivals’ 
  
130 See ACS Dominance Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 16350, para. 103; see also Policies and Rules 
Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, CC Docket No. 96-61, Second Report and Order, 11 FCC 
Rcd 20730, 20738-68, paras. 14-66 (1996) (Interexchange Forbearance Order).
131 See Qwest Omaha Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 19434-35, paras. 39, 42.  As discussed in part III.D.3 & III.D.4, below, 
we agree with the argument of Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. that Qwest should remain subject to 
nondominant carrier regulation in its provision of these services.  See Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. 
Comments at 26-28.
132 Triennial Review Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 17169, 17221, paras. 315, 389 (finding that requesting carriers are not 
impaired without OCn or SONET interface transport); Triennial Review Remand Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 2634, para. 
183; AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18724-25, para 32; EarthLink 
Comments at 20 (arguing that the BOCs control almost all the essential inputs in their regions).  We note that our 
reliance on the Triennial Review Order and the Triennial Review Remand Order is for purposes of the findings of 
fact made therein and not on the impairment analysis per se.  See Sprint Comments at 18 (arguing that any reliance 
in this proceeding on the Triennial Review Order would be misplaced as the analysis conducted in that order was 
driven by section 251(c), as opposed to the section 10 forbearance analysis of the current proceeding); see also
Broadview Reply at 10 n.30.
133 Triennial Review Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 17169, para. 316.
134 AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18724-25, para 32; Triennial Review 
Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 17169, para. 316.
135 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18724-25, para. 32.
136 Qwest has not asked for, nor are we granting, forbearance for the traditional TDM-based DS1 and DS3 special 
access services that the Commission has previously found that competitors rely on to serve enterprise customers.  
See Qwest Petition at 1-2.  
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new offerings, and impose other unnecessary costs.137 We find that applying dominant carrier regulation 
to the petitioner-specified broadband services would have each of these effects.  Specifically, tariffing 
these services reduces Qwest’s ability to respond in a timely manner to its customers’ demands for 
innovative service arrangements tailored to each customer’s individualized needs.138 In addition, by 
mandating that Qwest provide advance notice of changes in its prices, terms, and conditions of service for 
these services, tariffing allows its competitors to counter innovative product and service offerings even 
before they are made available to the public.  In contrast, detariffing of these services will facilitate 
innovative integrated service offerings designed to meet changing market conditions and will increase 
customers’ ability to obtain service arrangements that are specifically tailored to their individualized 
needs.139 Moreover, relief from advance notice requirements and cost-based pricing requirements will 
enable Qwest to respond quickly and creatively to competing service offers.140 We find that tariff 
regulation simply is not necessary to ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions for the petitioner-
specified broadband services are just and reasonable and not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory.  
The better policy for consumers is to allow Qwest to respond to technological and market developments 
without the Commission reviewing in advance the rates, and terms, and conditions under which it offers 
these services.141
37. We disagree with the parties that argue Qwest already has sufficient relief, through our 
pricing flexibility regime, to meet its customers’ needs and compete effectively.142  Although Qwest has 
obtained pricing flexibility relief for certain interstate access services,143 that relief is both limited in 
scope and limited to certain geographic areas.144 As the Commission has stated before in reducing 
regulatory requirements where competition is present, there comes a point at which constraints become 
counter-productive, especially in terms of carriers’ ability to respond to customer needs.145 This is 
particularly true for the broadband services for which Qwest seeks relief because, unlike many of its 
competitors, Qwest is limited in its ability to negotiate arrangements with customers that operate on a 
nationwide basis.  Even when price cap carriers are permitted to tailor services to their customers through 
individually negotiated contracts under the Pricing Flexibility Order, our rules still require these contract-
based tariffs to be filed with specified information that is available publicly to any party, including 
competitors.146
  
137 See, e.g., AT&T Reclassification Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 3288, para. 27.
138 AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18725, para. 33; Qwest Petition at 13; 
see also Interexchange Forbearance Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 20760-61, para. 53.
139 AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18725, para. 33.
140 Id.; Qwest Petition at 13.
141 See SBC Advanced Services Forbearance Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 27012-13, para. 22.
142 Alpheus Comments at 12-13; Broadview Reply at 12.
143 Most carriers did not include packet-switched services in price caps, and thus these services could not qualify for 
pricing flexibility.  The Commission subsequently found that these procedural circumstances should not act to 
preclude Qwest from obtaining pricing flexibility for these services. See Qwest Pricing Flexibility Waiver Order, 22 
FCC Rcd at 7485, para. 6 n.22.  
144 See generally Pricing Flexibility Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14221.  Pricing flexibility permits the LEC to enter into 
more individualized relationships with its customers.  Price cap LECs may obtain pricing flexibility in two separate 
phases, each on an MSA basis. 
145 See, e.g., id. at 14232-33, para. 17. 
146 47 C.F.R. § 61.55 (requirements for contract-based tariffs).
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38. We find that eliminating these requirements would make Qwest a more effective competitor 
for these services, which in turn we anticipate will increase even further the amount of competition in the 
marketplace,147 thus helping ensure that the rates and practices for these services overall are just, 
reasonable, and not unjustly discriminatory.  Forbearing from dominant carrier regulation of the 
petitioner-specified services will permit customers to take advantage of a more market-based environment 
for these highly specialized services and allow Qwest the flexibility necessary to respond to dynamic 
price and service changes often associated with the competitive bidding process.  In such a deregulated 
environment, the Commission’s enforcement authority, along with market forces, will serve to safeguard 
the rights of consumers.  Qwest will continue to be subject to sections 201 and 202 of the Act in its 
provision of its specified broadband services, which, among other things, mandate that Qwest provide 
interstate telecommunications services upon reasonable request and prohibit Qwest from acting in an 
unjust or unreasonable manner or otherwise favoring particular entities in the provision of “like” services 
provided to other entities.148
39. By virtue of the relief granted, Qwest may detariff the specified broadband services, but the 
section 201 and 202 standards and the formal complaint process in section 208 of the Act and sections 
1.720 through 1.735 of the Commission’s rules will continue to apply to those service offerings.  We 
expect that any complaint pertaining to services covered by this Order will be resolved within five 
months, as prescribed by section 208(b)(1) of the Act.149
40. We also find that continued application of our dominant carrier discontinuance rules to the 
petitioner-specified broadband services is not necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, or 
regulations in connection with these services are just, reasonable, and not unjustly or unreasonably 
discriminatory, so long as Qwest is subject to the same treatment as nondominant carriers in relation to 
these services.150 We conclude that subjecting Qwest to a 60-day automatic grant period for 
discontinuance of the existing specified broadband services, and a 30-day comment period for notice to 
affected customers, is not necessary under section 10(a)(1), where nondominant carriers providing those 
same services are subject to a 31-day automatic grant period and a 15-day comment period.  However, to 
maintain sufficient customer protection and ensure the justness and reasonableness of Qwest’s practices 
in connection with these services, we predicate this finding upon Qwest’s compliance with the 
discontinuance rules that apply to nondominant carriers in the event it seeks to discontinue, reduce, or 
impair any of the non-TDM-based, packet-switched broadband services and non-TDM-based, optical 
transmission services for which we grant relief.151 Similarly, we forbear from applying our domestic 
streamlined transfer of control rules to Qwest as a dominant carrier of these services, conditioned upon 
treatment of Qwest as a nondominant carrier for these services.152
41. Consistent with our recent AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order,153 we 
reject the New Jersey Rate Counsel’s argument that the Commission should impose the requirements of 
section 64.1903 of the Commission’s rules on Qwest in the event we grant Qwest forbearance relief in 
  
147 See supra paras. 32-36.
148 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-02.
149 Section 208(b)(1) states:  “Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Commission shall, with respect to any 
investigation under this section of the lawfulness of a charge, classification, regulation, or practice, issue an order 
concluding such investigation within 5 months after the date on which the complaint was filed.”  47 U.S.C. 
§ 208(b)(1).
150 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.03(b)(2), 63.71(a)(5), (b)(4), (c).
151 47 C.F.R. § 63.71; see Qwest Omaha Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 19435-36, para. 43.
152 47 C.F.R. § 63.03; see Qwest Omaha Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 19435-36, para. 43.
153 AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18727, para. 38.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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this proceeding.154 That rule imposes structural separation requirements on independent incumbent LECs 
in their provision of interstate, interexchange services.155 In the Section 272 Sunset Order, we rejected a 
similar argument from the New Jersey Rate Counsel in connection with our determination that the BOCs 
should not be subject to the section 64.1903 requirements in their provision of in-region, long distance 
services.156 We found that, as applied to those services, the section 64.1903 requirement would impose 
costs that would make the BOCs less effective marketplace competitors, and instead we adopted targeted 
safeguards to address potential competitive concerns.157 Consistent with that order, we find here that, as 
applied to Qwest’s existing specified-broadband services, the section 64.1903 requirements would impose 
significant costs.  Indeed, they would require Qwest to restructure its in-region, broadband 
telecommunications operations at great expense and in a less efficient manner.158 We find that these costs 
far exceed any potential benefits and therefore decline to impose the section 63.1903 requirements on 
Qwest in its provision of its existing specified broadband services.  
42. Further, while we do grant forbearance from dominant carrier regulation for the petitioner-
specified services, we do not grant forbearance from Title II as a whole, but instead ensure that Qwest is 
subject to the same regulatory obligations applicable to nondominant carriers.159 As the Commission 
concluded in the Qwest Section 272 Sunset Forbearance and the ACS Dominance Forbearance Orders, 
“dominant carrier regulation is not the most effective and cost-efficient way to address exclusionary 
market power concerns resulting from [an incumbent LEC’s] control of any bottleneck access facilities 
that [the incumbent LEC’s] competitors must access in order to provide competing services.”160 We find 
that, to the extent dominant carrier regulation of the petitioner-specified broadband services addresses any 
exclusionary market power Qwest may have in relation to those services, the burdens imposed by that 
regulation exceed its benefits.161
  
154 New Jersey Rate Counsel Comments at 8 (arguing that application of these requirements is necessary to deter the 
BOCs and independent incumbent LECs from engaging in discriminatory behavior).
155 Under section 64.1903 of our rules, an independent incumbent LEC that provides in-region, interstate, 
interexchange telecommunications services or in-region, international services is required to provide such services 
through a separate affiliate and such affiliate must maintain separate books of account from the independent 
incumbent LEC and purchase services from the independent incumbent LEC pursuant to the incumbent LEC’s 
tariffs.  47 C.F.R. § 64.1903(a).  Section 64.1903 of the Commission’s rules also forbids incumbent LECs’ affiliates 
from jointly owning transmission or switching facilities with the independent incumbent LEC.  47 C.F.R. 
§ 64.1903(a).
156 Section 272 Sunset Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 16482, para. 85.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 16482-83, paras. 85-86 (discussing the costs and burdens of section 63.1903 structural separation 
requirements).
159 See infra parts III.D.3 & III.D.4.  This should address commenters’ concern regarding general Title II regulations 
including, for example, universal service, interconnection, customer proprietary network information (CPNI), and 
disability access.  See Sprint Nextel Comments at 17; COMPTEL Comments at 18; Broadview Comments at 5, 
26-28; Letter from Daniel L. Brenner, National Cable & Telecommunications Association, to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 04-440, 06-109, 06-125, 06-147 (filed Aug. 6, 2007); Letter from Mary C. Albert, 
COMPTEL, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 04-440, 06-109, 06-125, 06-147 (filed Aug. 
13, 2007); Letter from William H. Weber, Vice President and Corporate Counsel, Cbeyond, Inc., to Marlene H. 
Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 04-440, 06-109, 06-125, 06-147 (filed Aug. 13, 2007).
160 ACS Dominance Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 16354, para. 111; Qwest Section 272 Sunset Forbearance 
Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5233, para. 52.
161 ACS Dominance Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 16354, para. 111; Qwest Section 272 Sunset Forbearance 
Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 5233, para. 52.
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43. Our forbearance grant is restricted to broadband services that Qwest currently offers and lists 
in its petition.  We believe that limiting our forbearance grant to the identified services that are currently 
offered is consistent with our analysis under the forbearance framework.  We do not know the precise 
nature of future services, including how, and to what customers, they would be offered, information that 
we would need to evaluate whether they are sufficiently similar to the services for which we grant
forbearance here.162 Similarly, we do not know the competitive conditions associated with such potential 
services.  We thus are unable to conclude on the record here that the section 10 criteria are met for such 
services.  We therefore cannot find that dominant carrier regulation will not be necessary to ensure that 
the charges, practices, classifications, and regulations in connection with those as yet unoffered services 
will be just, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory within the meaning of section 10(a)(1).163
44. Similarly, we decline to extend the forbearance relief granted in this order to carriers other 
than Qwest.164 For similar reasons to those noted above, we find it appropriate to limit forbearance to 
Qwest.  Just as we do not know the precise nature of, and competitive conditions associated with, other 
possible services that Qwest might some day offer, the record before us does not provide sufficient 
information regarding the nature of, and competitive conditions associated with, particular enterprise 
broadband services currently offered by other incumbent LECs.  We find that the better course is to limit 
this forbearance grant to Qwest, without prejudice to the ability of other carriers to file their own 
forbearance petitions showing that granting them relief from dominant carrier regulation for specific 
broadband telecommunications services would meet the statutory forbearance criteria, or to seek such 
relief in the rulemaking context or through petitions to be declared nondominant.165 We also agree with 
NTCA that certain carriers may not want to offer their broadband telecommunications free of dominant 
carrier regulation and therefore should not be forced to relinquish any obligations and benefits of such 
regulation by a broad forbearance grant by the Commission.166 Accordingly, the forbearance relief 
granted in this Order is limited to Qwest and the services it specified. 
45. To ensure that customers will have the benefit of a single regime for Qwest’s packet-switched 
and optical transmission broadband offerings, we condition the forbearance relief granted to Qwest on its 
not filing or maintaining any interstate tariffs for its specified broadband services.  Thus, to the extent 
Qwest wishes to take advantage of the relief granted in this Order for any particular service specified in 
its petition, it must follow our rules for nondominant interexchange carriers in connection with that 
service.  Consistent with the Commission’s analysis in the Interexchange Forbearance Order, we find 
that precluding Qwest from tariffing its packet-switched broadband services and its optical transmission 
services while taking advantage of that relief is necessary to protect consumers and the public interest 
because, in such circumstances, it will limit Qwest’s ability to invoke the filed rate doctrine in contractual 
disputes with its customers.167 Precluding such tariffs also will restrict Qwest’s ability to assert “deemed 
  
162 Cf. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (directing the Commission to forbear with respect to a particular service or class of 
services).
163 Qwest Omaha Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 19438, para. 50 (denying Qwest’s petition with respect to the enterprise 
market because Qwest had failed to provide sufficient data for its service territory for the entire MSA to allow the 
Commission to make a forbearance determination).
164 See Cincinnati Bell Comments at 2 (supporting forbearance relief for all incumbent LECs); Hawaiian Telcom 
Reply at 1-2 (same).
165 We note that GCI argues that the Commission lacks the authority to grant forbearance relief to any carriers other 
than those that file petitions for forbearance.  GCI Reply at 3.  Because we decline to extend our forbearance grant to 
carriers other than Qwest, we need not address this argument.
166 NTCA Reply at 5.
167 See Interexchange Forbearance Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 20760, para. 52 (finding that “not permitting 
nondominant interexchange carriers to file tariffs with respect to interstate, domestic, interexchange services will 
enhance competition among providers of such services, promote competitive market conditions, and achieve other 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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lawful” status for tariff filings that are not accompanied by cost support.168 We distinguish this from the 
broadband relief granted to ACS in the ACS Dominance Forbearance Order, in which the Commission 
conditioned its forbearance relief on, among other things, ACS’s continuing to file tariffs for switched 
access, special access, and end-user services.169  In that instance, the Commission found that filing of 
tariffs was appropriate for the Commission to monitor ACS’s compliance with the other conditions the 
Commission adopted in that order, including conditions arising from ACS’s status as a rate-of-return 
carrier.170 In addition, there was consensus in the record that continued tariffing was appropriate given 
the unique circumstances in the Anchorage study area.  Here, we are addressing Qwest, which, unlike 
ACS, is not subject to rate-of-return regulation in the provision of any interstate access services, nor is it 
subject to many of the conditions adopted in the ACS Dominance Forbearance Order.  Further, both 
commenters and Qwest here suggest that a mandatory detariffing regime would be more appropriate.171  
Accordingly, we find that these consumer protection and public interest benefits provide independent 
reasons for conditioning Qwest’s ability to take advantage of the relief granted here on mandatory 
detariffing of the broadband transmission services for which we grant relief.  
b. Protection of Consumers
46. Section 10(a)(2) of the Act requires us to determine whether dominant carrier regulation of 
Qwest’s-specified services is necessary to protect consumers.172 For reasons similar to those that 
persuade us that these regulations are not necessary within the meaning of section 10(a)(1), we also 
determine that their application to Qwest’s existing specified services is not necessary for the protection 
of consumers.  As we found above, Qwest faces sufficient pressure from actual and potential competition 
to protect consumers, which gives Qwest incentive to offer innovative services.  In light of these 
conclusions, we find that the combination of dominant carrier tariffing requirements and the 
accompanying cost support can hinder, instead of protect, consumers’ ability to secure better service 
offerings.  Finally, as we explain below,173 we are not forbearing from any public policy obligations 
applicable to these services, including those related to 911, emergency preparedness, customer privacy, or 
universal service, and consumers therefore do not lose protections in these important areas.
(Continued from previous page)    
objectives that are in the public interest, including eliminating the possible invocation of the filed rate doctrine by 
nondominant interexchange carriers, and establishing market conditions that more closely resemble an unregulated 
environment”).  We note that certain exceptions to the Commission’s mandatory detariffing rules exist.  Pursuant to 
the “filed-rate” doctrine, where a filed tariff rate, term, or condition differs from a rate, term, or condition set in a 
non-tariffed carrier-customer contract, the carrier is required to assess the tariff rate, term, or condition.  See Armour 
Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908); American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. FCC, 643 F.2d 818 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980); see also Aero Trucking, Inc. v. Regal Tube Co., 594 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1979); Farley Terminal Co., Inc. 
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 522 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975).  Consequently, if a 
carrier unilaterally changes a rate by filing a tariff revision, the newly filed rate becomes the applicable rate unless 
the revised rate is found to be unjust, unreasonable, or unlawful under the Act.  See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b); Maislin 
Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
168 See 47 U.S.C. § 204(a)(3).  
169 ACS Dominance Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 16332, para. 61, 16344-45, para. 89.
170 Id. at 16307, para. 4, 16344-45, para. 89.
171 See Alpheus Comments at 22 (arguing that permissive detariffing would allow the BOCs to tariff “purported 
private carriage services so they may invoke the filed rate doctrine against their retail and CLEC wholesale 
broadband customers”); see also Qwest Petition at 5-6 (citing Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, 
Interexchange Marketplace, Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, CC 
Docket No. 96-61, Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 20730, 20732-33, para. 3 (1996) (Detariffing Order)).
172 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(2).
173 See infra part III.D.4.
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47. Conversely, we find that restricting our forbearance grant to Qwest’s existing services as 
specified in its petition, and subsequent filings, is necessary to protect customers under section 10(a)(2).  
Qwest has not provided sufficient information regarding any broadband services, other than those 
specifically identified in its petition, to allow us to reach a forbearance determination under section 
10(a).174 We cannot make a finding on the record before us that Qwest will face sufficient competitive 
pressure with regard to services it does not currently offer,175 or that dominant carrier regulation of these 
as yet unoffered services otherwise will not be necessary to protect consumers.  In addition, as explained 
above,176 carriers that have not filed similar forbearance petitions are free to do so, as well as to seek relief 
from regulatory obligations through rulemaking proceedings or petitions to be declared nondominant.
c. Public Interest
48. Section 10(a)(3) of the Act requires us to determine whether forbearance from dominant 
carrier regulation for Qwest’s non-TDM-based, packet-switched broadband services and its non-TDM-
based, optical transmission services is consistent with the public interest.177 In making this determination, 
section 10(b) of the Act directs us to consider whether forbearance from enforcing the provisions at issue 
will promote competitive market conditions, including the extent to which forbearance will enhance 
competition among providers of telecommunications services.  If we determine that forbearance will 
promote competition among providers of telecommunications services, that determination may be a basis 
for finding that forbearance is in the public interest.178  
49. We agree with Qwest that a deregulatory approach for its provision of non-TDM-based, 
packet-switched broadband services and non-TDM-based, optical transmission services will serve the 
public interest by eliminating the market distortions that asymmetrical regulation of these services 
causes.179 In particular, the record in this proceeding shows that dominant carrier regulation impedes 
Qwest’s efforts to compete effectively with nondominant providers of these services.180 The record also 
makes clear that such regulation keeps Qwest from responding efficiently and in a timely manner to 
market-based pricing promotions, including volume and term discounts, or special arrangements offered 
by competitors.181 In particular, Qwest has shown that dominant carrier regulation of its specified 
services makes it unnecessarily difficult to negotiate nationwide arrangements tailored to the needs of 
  
174 Qwest Omaha Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 19438, para. 50 (denying Qwest’s petition with respect to the enterprise 
market because Qwest had failed to provide sufficient data for its service territory for the entire MSA to allow the 
Commission to make a forbearance determination).
175 See supra para. 42.
176 See supra para. 43.
177 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(3).
178 47 U.S.C. § 160(b).
179 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18730-31, para. 46; see also, e.g., 
Qwest Petition at 18-19.
180 See Qwest Petition at 13.  In addition, as the Commission observed in the AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry 
Forbearance Order, “[w]e seek to avoid persistent regulatory disparities between similarly situated competitors, and 
seek to minimize the time in which they are treated differently.”  AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance 
Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18732, para. 50.
181 See, e.g., Qwest Petition at 13-14.  While we note that Qwest has phase II pricing flexibility in certain markets 
where the Commission has determined the competitive triggers have been met, this does not alter our ultimate
conclusions for the reasons described above.  See supra para. 36.
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large enterprise customers with geographically dispersed locations, because its tariff filings necessarily 
provide competitors with notice of its pricing strategies and competitive innovations.182
50. Forbearance from the application of dominant carrier regulation to Qwest’s non-TDM-based, 
packet-switched broadband services and non-TDM-based, optical transmission services also will promote 
the public interest by furthering the deployment of advanced services.183 Indeed, forbearance in this case 
is entirely consistent with section 706 of the 1996 Act and Congress’s express goals of “promot[ing] 
competition and reduc[ing] regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for 
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new 
telecommunications technologies.”184 Forbearance also is consistent with section 7(a) of the Act, which 
establishes a national policy of “encourag[ing] the provision of new technologies and services to the 
public.”185 In addition, for the reasons described above, we conclude that granting Qwest this relief will 
help promote competitive market conditions and enhance competition among providers of 
telecommunications services as contemplated by section 10(b).  By allowing Qwest to compete more 
effectively in the provision of the broadband transmission services that it currently offers, forbearance 
from dominant carrier regulation of these services will enhance competition among providers in a manner 
consistent with the public interest.186
51. Our finding that public interest benefits will accrue from allowing Qwest to provide non-
TDM-based, packet-switched broadband services and non-TDM-based, optical transmission services 
subject to the same regulations as its nondominant competitors also is consistent with the Commission’s 
Fourth Report to Congress on the availability of advanced telecommunications capability under section 
706 of the 1996 Act.  In that report, the Commission determined that a diverse range of broadband 
technologies and facilities-based platforms that promote both price and quality-of-service competition 
will be available to consumers, and that the prospects of such competition “lend credence to calls for 
restrained regulation of advanced telecommunications technologies and advanced telecommunications 
providers.”187  
  
182 See AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 18730-31, para. 46; see also, e.g., 
Qwest Reply at 16-17.
183 47 U.S.C. § 157 nt; see Qwest Petition at 10.  The Commission has concluded that section 706 is not an 
independent grant of forbearance authority.  Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98-147, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd 24012, 24044-48, paras. 69-77 (1998), recon. denied, 15 FCC Rcd 17044 (2000); see also 
ACS Dominance Forbearance Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 16356, para. 118 n.318.
184 1996 Act Preamble, 110 Stat. at 56; 47 U.S.C. § 157 nt.  In section 706 of the 1996 Act, Congress directed the 
Commission to encourage, without regard to transmission media or technology, the deployment of advanced 
telecommunications capability to all Americans on a reasonable and timely basis through, among other things, 
removing barriers to infrastructure investment.  47 U.S.C. § 157 nt.
185 47 U.S.C. § 157(a).
186 We recognize, of course, that theoretically forbearance from dominant carrier regulation for broadband 
telecommunications services other than those Qwest currently offers or for incumbent LECs other than Qwest also 
may advance purposes behind sections 7(a) and 706.  In the event that Qwest or other carriers request additional 
relief from dominant carrier regulation, we will evaluate on the record developed with regard to those requests 
whether grant of those requests would advance these purposes.  However, for the reasons set forth in this Order, we 
cannot conclude on the record before us that additional forbearance here would meet the statutory forbearance 
criteria.
187 Availability of Advanced Telecommunications Capability in the United States, GN Docket No. 04-54, Fourth 
Report to Congress, 19 FCC Rcd 20540 (2004).
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52. We disagree with the commenters that urge that forbearing from the application of dominant 
carrier regulation to Qwest’s existing, non-TDM-based, packet-switched broadband services and existing, 
non-TDM-based, optical transmission services would be inconsistent with the public interest.188  
Forbearing from application of dominant carrier regulation will increase competition by freeing Qwest 
from unnecessary regulation and will serve the public interest by promoting regulatory parity among 
providers of these services.  In addition, the directives of section 706 of the 1996 Act require that we 
ensure that our broadband policies promote infrastructure investment, consistent with our other statutory 
obligations under the Act.  As we found in the Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, 
regulation that constrains incentives to invest in and deploy the infrastructure needed to deliver broadband 
services is not in the public interest.189 By regulating Qwest on the same terms as its nondominant 
competitors, we will encourage all potential investors in broadband network platforms, and not just a 
particular group of investors, to be able to make market-based, rather than regulatory-driven, investment 
and deployment decisions.  This is particularly true for new technologies and services that provide voice, 
video, Internet access, and other broadband applications.  
53. Consistent with our determinations under sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(2),190 we find that 
extending our forbearance from dominant carrier regulation to services that Qwest does not currently 
offer would be contrary to the public interest.  Specifically, because the record before us is insufficient to 
support a finding that Qwest will lack market power with regard to these as yet unoffered services, we 
cannot conclude that forbearance in this instance would be consistent with the public interest.  We also 
believe that the public interest would be better served by our allowing carriers that are not before us to file 
their own forbearance petitions seeking relief from dominant carrier regulation for specific broadband 
telecommunications services or seek regulatory relief through rulemaking proceedings or petitions to be 
declared nondominant, rather than extending our forbearance action to such carriers.
2. Computer Inquiry Requirements
54. As part of its request, Qwest seeks forbearance from application of the Computer Inquiry 
requirements to its specified broadband services.191 Consistent with the treatment of wireline broadband 
Internet access service in the Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, we forbear from 
application of our BOC-specific Computer Inquiry rules to the extent that Qwest offers information 
services in conjunction with its existing non-TDM-based, packet-switched broadband services or its 
existing non-TDM-based, optical transmission services.192
55. The reasons that persuaded the Commission in the Wireline Broadband Internet Access 
Services Order to eliminate the Computer Inquiry rules as they applied to wireline broadband Internet 
access service also persuade us to forbear from application of the BOC-specific Computer Inquiry rules to 
any information services Qwest may offer in conjunction with one or more of its existing specified 
broadband services.  Specifically, the enterprise customers that seek to obtain such information services 
demand the most flexible service offerings possible.193 To compete effectively in providing these 
  
188 See, e.g., Broadview Comments at 34-35; EarthLink Comments at 20-21, COMPTEL Comments at 19-21; Sprint 
Nextel Comments at 16-19.
189 Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 14878, para. 45.
190 See supra parts III.D.1.a & III.D.1.b.
191 As discussed below, we grant forbearance from certain Computer Inquiry requirements that would apply to the 
enterprise broadband service solely by virtue of their use as the transmission component of an information service.  
192 See Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 14863-64, para. 14 (citing NCTA v. 
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1000).
193 See Qwest Petition at 12 (arguing that Title II requirements limit its ability to respond to competition in a market 
where “a customer is seriously considering a number of different providers”).
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customized service packages, Qwest necessarily will need to adapt how it integrates each of its specified 
services into service packages that meet potential customers’ individualized needs.  Like its enterprise 
services competitors, Qwest also will have to offer its customers innovative service arrangements that 
make full use of its networks’ telecommunications and information services capabilities.194
56. We conclude that requiring Qwest to unbundle and offer separately the non-TDM-based, 
packet-switched broadband services and non-TDM-based, optical transmission services underlying these 
information services – or otherwise comply with the BOC-specific Computer Inquiry requirements by 
virtue of the use of these telecommunications services – is unnecessary to ensure that the charges or 
practices associated with them are just, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory.  On the contrary, 
as discussed in part III.D.1, above, competitive constraints on the Qwest’s non-TDM-based, packet-
switched broadband services and non-TDM-based, optical transmission services will check Qwest’s 
ability to impose such charges and practices on potential customers.  Indeed, like other enterprise services 
providers, Qwest will have every business incentive to offer the transmission component of these services 
under just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates, terms, and conditions in order to spread network costs 
over as much traffic and as many customers as possible.195
57. This need to attract as many enterprise and carrier customers as possible also makes clear that 
application of the Computer Inquiry rules to Qwest’s information services, to the extent that Qwest 
includes one or more of its existing specified services, is not necessary to protect consumers.  Rather, 
Qwest’s need to respond to changing customer demands with innovative offerings should ensure adequate 
consumer protection.  In particular, we find that application of the Computer Inquiry rules to these 
information services constrains Qwest’s ability to respond to technological advances and customer needs 
in an efficient, effective, or timely manner.196 Eliminating this constraint should benefit potential 
enterprise customers by giving them increased opportunities to obtain integrated service packages that 
meet their needs.
58. We conclude that forbearance from applying many of the BOC-specific Computer Inquiry
rules to Qwest’s information services, to the extent that it includes one or more of the specified non-
TDM-based, packet-switched broadband services and non-TDM-based, optical transmission services, will 
serve the public interest.  Specifically, application of the Computer II structural separation or, 
alternatively, the Computer III CEI and ONA requirements unnecessarily constrains how Qwest may 
offer its broadband transmission services to its enterprise customers.  Removing these unnecessary 
constraints will promote competitive market conditions by increasing the competitive pressure on all 
enterprise services providers.  Forbearance in these circumstances also will increase Qwest’s incentives to 
invest in advanced network technologies that will enable it to provide enterprise customers with 
increasingly innovative services.  
59. This forbearance determination does not extend, however, to the BOC-specific Computer 
Inquiry requirements to the extent they impose the same transmission access or nondiscrimination 
requirements that apply to all non-BOC, facilities-based wireline carriers in their provision of enhanced 
services.197 We find that relief from these requirements would be contrary to the public interest as it 
would confer a regulatory advantage on Qwest, vis-a-vis its facilities-based, wireline competitors offering 
information services.  We therefore condition our forbearance from the BOC-specific Computer Inquiry
requirements on compliance by Qwest with the non-BOC transmission access and nondiscrimination 
  
194 See Qwest Petition at 18.
195 See Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 14892-93, paras 75-76, 14902, para. 92.
196 Id. at 14887-92, paras. 65-73, 14902, para. 92.
197 Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 474-75, para. 231; see infra paras. 69-72.
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requirements in connection with its provision of information services in conjunction with its existing 
specified broadband services.
60. Our forbearance from the Computer Inquiry requirements also does not extend to Qwest’s 
information services to the extent it incorporates telecommunications components other than its existing 
specified broadband services.  As with our analysis of dominant carrier regulation of its broadband 
services,198 we find that restricting our forbearance from Computer Inquiry obligations to services that 
incorporate these existing broadband telecommunications services is appropriate because we cannot 
conclude, on the record before us, that Qwest will lack market power with regard to any as yet unoffered 
broadband telecommunications services.  We also cannot find, on this record, that additional forbearance 
from the Computer Inquiry rules would meet the statutory forbearance criteria.
3. General Title II Economic Regulation
61. As part of its request, Qwest seeks forbearance from any economic regulation that would 
apply to it, under Title II and the Commission’s implementing rules, in connection with its existing and 
future broadband services.199 We first address this regulation as it applies to common carriers or LECs.  
We then turn to this regulation as it applies to incumbent LECs or BOCs.
a. Regulation Applied to Common Carriers or LECs
62. Title II and the Commission’s implementing rules impose economic regulation on common 
carriers or LECs generally regardless of whether they are incumbents or competing carriers.  This 
regulation, though much less burdensome than the regulation imposed on dominant carriers, has been 
thought to provide important protections against unjust, unreasonable, and unjustly or unreasonably 
discriminatory treatment of consumers.200 For example, section 201 of the Act mandates that all carriers 
engaged in the provision of interstate or foreign communications service provide such service upon 
reasonable request, and that all charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for such service be just 
and reasonable.201 Section 202 of the Act makes it unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust 
or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services, or 
to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person or class of persons.202  
All telecommunications carriers are obligated under section 251(a)(1) of the Act to “interconnect directly 
or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers.”203 Section 251(b), 
moreover, imposes a number of duties on LECs, including the duty not to impose unreasonable or 
  
198 See id.
199  See, e.g., Qwest Petition at 3 (requesting relief from Title II requirements and treatment as a dominant carrier).  
In this part and in part III.D.4, infra, we use the terms “economic regulation” and “public policy regulation” as 
convenient shorthands to ensure that we address the full breadth of Qwest’s forbearance request. In using these 
terms, we recognize that they have no well-established, specific meanings. Cf. AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (AT&T v. FCC) (directing that the Commission reconcile its holding that a request for forbearance 
from “only ‘common carrier’ and ‘economic’ regulation under Title II” was insufficiently specific to identify the 
regulations from which forbearance was sought with the Commission’s use of these terms in other proceedings).
Our use of these terms here does not in any way prejudge our actions on remand of AT&T v. FCC.
200 See Personal Communications Industry Association’s Broadband Personal Communications Services Alliance’s 
Petition for Forbearance for Broadband Personal Communications Services, WT Docket No. 98-100, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd 16857, 16865-72, paras. 15-31 
(1998) (PCIA Forbearance Order) (denying PCIA’s request for forbearance from sections 201 and 202 of the Act 
and noting that these provisions “codify[] the bedrock consumer protection obligations of a common carrier. . . .”); 
Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. Comments at 26.
201 47 U.S.C. § 201.
202 47 U.S.C. § 202.
203 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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discriminatory conditions or limitations on resale of their telecommunications services,204 the duty to 
implement number portability,205 and the duty to provide competing telecommunications service 
providers with access to the LECs’ poles, ducts, and conduits under just and reasonable rates, terms, and 
conditions.206
63. With respect to nondominant carriers, the Commission has relaxed tariffing, transfer of 
control, and discontinuance regulation for carriers that lack market power, although, as discussed above, 
these carriers are still subject to limited regulation in these areas.207 In particular, section 214 of the Act 
requires common carriers to obtain Commission authorization before constructing, acquiring, operating or 
engaging in transmission over lines of communication, or discontinuing, reducing or impairing 
telecommunications service to a community.208 The Commission’s discontinuance rules for nondominant 
carriers require such carriers to file applications with the Commission and provide notice to the affected 
customers.209 These applications are automatically granted on the 31st day unless the Commission notifies 
the applicant otherwise.210 Moreover, to the extent they are permitted to file interstate tariffs, 
nondominant carriers must comply with the streamlined tariffing and notice requirements of part 61, 
subpart C of the Commission’s rules.211
64. We conclude that the record does not demonstrate that forbearance from these, and other, 
economic regulations that apply generally to nondominant telecommunications carriers and to LECs 
would meet the statutory forbearance criteria.  Indeed, Qwest asks us to go beyond the relief the 
Commission has granted any competitive LEC or nondominant interexchange carrier and allow it to offer 
certain broadband telecommunications services free of Title II regulation, thus creating a disparity in 
regulatory treatment between Qwest and its competitors.212 We find, based on the record before us, that 
granting Qwest such preferential treatment would be inconsistent with the market-opening policies and 
consumer protection goals that led Congress and the Commission to impose these economic regulations 
  
204 E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1).
205 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2).
206 E.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 224, 251(b)(4).
207 See supra para. 3.
208 47 U.S.C. § 214; see, e.g., Verizon Telephone Companies Section 63.71 Application to Discontinue Expanded 
Interconnection Service Through Physical Collocation, WC Docket No. 02-237, Order, 18 FCC Rcd 22737, 22742, 
para. 8 (2003) (applying five factors to determine whether “reasonable substitutes are available” to consumers).  In 
1999, the Commission granted all carriers blanket authority under section 214 to provide domestic interstate services 
and to construct, acquire, or operate any domestic transmission line.  See Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Petition for Forbearance of the Independent Telephone & 
Telecommunications Alliance, Report and Order in CC Docket No. 97-11, Second Memorandum Opinion and Order 
in AAD File No. 98-43, 14 FCC Rcd 11364, 11372, para. 12 (1999); 47 C.F.R. § 63.01(a).  We also note that, in 
certain instances, the Commission has granted conditional blanket discontinuance authority to carriers under section 
214.  See Wireline Broadband Access Services Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 14907-08, paras. 100-01.
209 47 C.F.R. § 63.71(c).
210 Id.
211 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 61.18 et seq.
212 We note that this request appears inconsistent with Qwest’s request for regulatory parity among broadband 
competitors.  Qwest Petition at 14 (suggesting that the Commission should subject Qwest and its competitors to the 
same Title II regulatory requirements); see also Applications for License and Authority to Operate in the 2155-2175 
MHz Band, WT Docket No. 07-16; Petitions for Forbearance under 47 U.S.C. § 160, WT Docket No. 07-30, Order, 
22 FCC Rcd 16563, 16568, para. 9 (2007) (denying a forbearance request because the petitioners failed to 
demonstrate that a forbearance action was in the public interest).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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on carriers that lack individual market power.213 For example, the protections provided by sections 201 
and 202(a), coupled with our ability to enforce those provisions in a complaint proceeding pursuant to 
section 208, provide essential safeguards that ensure that relieving Qwest of tariffing obligations in 
relation to its specified broadband services will not result in unjust, unreasonable, or unreasonably 
discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions in connection with those services.214 Accordingly, we cannot 
find that enforcement of these statutory and regulatory requirements is not necessary to ensure that the 
“charges, practices, classifications, or regulations . . . for[] or in connection with [Qwest’s specified 
broadband services] are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory” within 
the meaning of section 10(a)(1).215  
65. Qwest also has not shown how enforcement of these economic regulation requirements in 
connection with its specified broadband services is not necessary for the protection of consumers within 
the meaning of section 10(a)(2) or how forbearance is consistent with the public interest within the 
meaning of section 10(a)(3).216 On the contrary, disparate treatment of carriers providing the same or 
similar services is not in the public interest as it creates distortions in the marketplace that may harm 
consumers.217 Moreover, nondominant carrier regulation provides significant consumer benefits without 
the costs of dominant carrier regulation.  In particular, many of the obligations that Title II imposes on 
carriers or LECs generally, including interconnection obligations under section 251(a)(1) and pole 
attachment obligations under sections 224 and 251(b)(4), foster the open and interconnected nature of our 
communications system, and thus promote competitive market conditions within the meaning of section 
10(b).  Allowing Qwest, but not its competitors, to avoid these obligations would undermine, rather than 
promote, competition among telecommunications services providers within the meaning of that provision.  
Moreover, in originally subjecting nondominant carriers to streamlined discontinuance, transfer of 
control, and tariffing requirements, the Commission necessarily determined that these requirements were 
needed to protect the public interest and competitive markets in situations where a carrier lacks market 
power.218 Granting Qwest, but not its competitors, forbearance from these and the other obligations that 
apply generally to common carriers, LECs, or nondominant carriers would result in disparate regulatory 
treatment for the same or similar services, create market distortions, and fail to protect consumers within 
the meaning of section 10(a)(2).219 Accordingly, we deny Qwest’s forbearance request to the extent it 
seeks forbearance from Title II economic obligations, including those discussed above, that apply 
generally to telecommunications carriers or LECs. 
b. Regulation Applied to Incumbent LECs or BOCs 
66. Title II and the Commission’s implementing rules also impose regulation specifically on 
incumbent LECs, or BOCs, and independent incumbent LECs.  For example, section 251(c) of the Act 
  
213 Cf. Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. Comments at 26 (contending that Qwest has provided no basis for 
relief from Title II regulation that applies to both dominant and nondominant carriers).
214 See, e.g., SBC Advanced Services Forbearance Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 27010, 27012, paras. 18, 21 (citing 47 
U.S.C. §§ 201-02, 208); PCIA Forbearance Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 16865-72, paras. 15-31; see also COMPTEL 
Comments at 18 (arguing that forbearance from sections 201 and 202 would significantly undermine competition); 
Sprint Nextel Reply at 8 (maintaining that forbearance from sections 201 and 202 would effectively gut the core of 
the Communications Act); Time Warner Telecom, Cbeyond et al. Comments at 26-27.
215 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1).
216 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(2), (a)(3).
217 Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 14865, para. 17 (creating a regulatory and 
analytical framework that is consistent across different platforms that supports competing services).
218 See, e.g., Detariffing Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 20776-77, paras. 84-85.
219 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(2).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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imposes interconnection, unbundling, and resale obligations on Qwest as an incumbent LEC.220 In 
addition, the BOCs, under section 271 of the Act, were required to demonstrate compliance with certain 
market-opening requirements before providing in-region, interLATA long distance service and must 
continue to comply with such market-opening requirements.221
67. We conclude that the record before us does not show that forbearance from these and other 
economic regulations that apply generally to incumbent LECs or BOCs would meet the statutory 
forbearance criteria.  Indeed the record contains no specific information regarding whether application of 
these regulatory requirements is not necessary to ensure that the “charges, practices, classifications, or 
regulations . . . for[] or in connection with [Qwest’s specified broadband services] are just and reasonable 
and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory” within the meaning of section 10(a)(1).222 Nor does 
the record suggest how continued enforcement of these requirements in connection with Qwest’s 
specified broadband services is not necessary for the protection of consumers or inconsistent with the 
public interest.  We therefore deny Qwest’s forbearance request to the extent it seeks forbearance from 
Title II economic obligations, including those discussed above, that apply generally to incumbent LECs 
or BOCs.   
4. Public Policy Regulation
68. As part of its request, Qwest seeks forbearance from any public policy regulation that would 
apply to it, under Title II and the Commission’s implementing rules, in connection with its existing and 
future broadband services offerings.223 We now turn to these requests.
69. Title II and the Commission’s implementing rules set forth numerous public policy 
requirements that apply generally to all carriers, regardless of whether they are incumbents or competing 
carriers.  These requirements advance critically important national objectives, such as ensuring the 
sufficiency of universal service support mechanisms, promoting access to telecommunications services by 
individuals with disabilities, protecting customer privacy, and increasing the effectiveness of emergency 
services, among other objectives.  For example, section 254(b) of the Act states that “[t]here should be 
specific, predictable, and sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal 
service.”224 Section 254(d) of the Act states that “[e]very telecommunications carrier that provides 
interstate telecommunications services shall contribute” to universal service.225 These universal service 
provisions ensure that all Americans, including consumers living in high-cost areas, low-income 
consumers, eligible schools and libraries, and rural health care providers, have access to affordable 
telecommunications services.226
  
220 See COMPTEL Comments, Attach. at 17 (arguing that the section 251 requirements are necessary to ensure that 
“wholesale charges, practices, classifications and regulations for broadband services are just reasonable and not 
unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory”); Sprint Nextel Reply at 10 (arguing that “forbearance also could lift the 
symmetrical interconnection obligations of sections 251 and 252”).
221 See 47 U.S.C. § 271.
222 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1).
223 Qwest Reply at 2-3 (stating that “it is seeking forbearance from all of Title II regulation, except [u]niversal 
[s]ervice requirements”).
224 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5).  The Commission has emphasized that maintaining the long-term viability of universal 
service programs is a fundamental goal that must continue to be met in an evolving telecommunications marketplace 
in which customers are migrating to broadband service platforms.  Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 
CC Docket No. 96-45, Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 24952, 
24954-56, paras. 1-5 (2002) (Universal Service Contribution Methodology NPRM).
225 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
226 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 254.
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70. Similarly, Congress enacted section 225 of the Act to require each common carrier offering 
voice telephone service to also provide telecommunications relay service (TRS) so that individuals with 
disabilities will have equal access to the carrier’s telecommunications network.227 Moreover, section 255 
sets forth disability access network requirements, and 251(a)(2) prohibits telecommunications carriers 
from installing any “network features, functions, or capabilities” that do not comply with the disability 
access requirements in section 255.228 With regard to customer privacy, certain provisions in section 222 
of the Act restrict telecommunications carriers’ use and disclosure of CPNI.229 In these provisions, 
Congress recognized that telecommunications carriers are in a unique position to collect sensitive 
personal information and that consumers maintain an important privacy interest in protecting this 
information from disclosure and dissemination.230 Other section 222 provisions increase the effectiveness 
of emergency services by facilitating the provision of vital caller location and subscriber identification 
information to emergency service providers.231 We note that Qwest’s obligations under the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) are governed by the CALEA statute,232
and Qwest remains obligated to comply with those statutory requirements.
71. We find that Qwest has not shown that forbearance from these and the other public policy 
requirements in Title II and the Commission’s implementing rules meets the statutory forbearance 
criteria.233 Indeed, with regard to universal service, Qwest disavows any intent to seek relief from 
universal service contribution obligations.234 We believe that by excluding this relief from its forbearance 
request, Qwest recognized that the public interest requires it to maintain its universal service support 
obligations.  Nevertheless, we include those obligations in our forbearance analysis to ensure that there is 
no ambiguity with regard to Qwest’s continuing duty to include revenues from each of its specified 
broadband services in its federal universal service support calculations.
72. In particular, we conclude on the record before us that forbearing from the public policy 
requirements in Title II and the Commission’s implementing rules would be inconsistent with the critical 
national goals that led to the adoption of these requirements.  We therefore cannot find that enforcement 
of those requirements is unnecessary to ensure that the “charges, practices, classifications, or 
  
227 47 U.S.C § 225.  TRS enables an individual with a hearing or speech disability to communicate by telephone or 
other device with a hearing individual.  This is accomplished through TRS facilities that are staffed by specially 
trained communications assistants (CAs) using special technology.  The CA relays conversations between persons 
using various types of assistive communication devices and persons who do not require such assistive devices.  See 
generally Telecommunications Relay Services and Speech-to-Speech Services for Individuals with Hearing and 
Speech Disabilities, CC Docket No. 98-67, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC 
Rcd 5140, 5141, para. 2 (2000) (Improved TRS Order & FNPRM).
228 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(a)(2), 255.
229 47 U.S.C. § 222(a)-(c), (f).  CPNI is defined to include “(A) information that relates to the quantity, technical 
configuration, type, destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any 
customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue 
of the carrier-customer relationship; and (B) information contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange 
service or telephone toll service received by a customer of a carrier.”  47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(1).
230 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 222.
231 47 U.S.C. § 222(d)(4), (g).
232 47 U.S.C. § 229; see also Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 
4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
233 See, e.g., AdHoc Reply at i-ii (pointing out that Qwest fails to address or justify forbearance from Title II 
provisions that serve public policy goals, such as privacy and disability access, that are unrelated to marketplace 
competition).
234 Qwest Petition at 1 n.3.  See generally 47 U.S.C. § 254.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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regulations . . . for[] or in connection with [Qwest’s specified services] are just and reasonable and are not 
unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory” within the meaning of section 10(a)(1) of the Act,235 or is not 
necessary for the protection of consumers within the meaning of section 10(a)(2) of the Act.236 On the 
contrary, we believe that consumers will continue to receive essential protections from the application of 
these requirements in connection with Qwest’s specified services.
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES
73. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to section 10 of the Communications Act of 
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 160, the Petition for Forbearance filed by Qwest Corporation and Qwest 
Communications Corporation IS GRANTED to the extent described herein and otherwise IS DENIED.
74. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to section 10 of the Communications Act of 
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 160, and section 1.103(a) of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. 
§ 1.103(a), this Order SHALL BE EFFECTIVE on July 22, 2008.  Pursuant to section 1.4 and 1.13 of the 
Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.4, 1.13, the time for appeal of the Commission’s actions with regard 
to these carriers shall run from the release date of this Order.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
  
235 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1).
236 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(2).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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APPENDIX
Qwest Petition for Forbearance Filed June 13, 2006
WC Docket No. 06-125
Petition Abbreviation
Qwest Corporation and Qwest Communications Corporation Qwest
COMMENTERS 
WC Docket No. 06-125
Comments Abbreviation
Alpheus Communications, LP, DeltaCom, Inc., Integra Telecom, Inc., 
McLeodUSA Telecommunications Services, Inc., Mpower 
Communications Corp., Norlight Telecommunications, Inc., Pac-West 
Telecomm, Inc., TDS Metrocom, LLC, and Telepacific Corp d/b/a 
Telepacific Communications
Alpheus
ACS Anchorage, Inc. ACS
Broadview Networks, Covad Communications, CTC Communications, 
Inc., Eschelon Telecom, Inc., NuVox Communications, XO 
Communications, Xspedius Management Company
Broadview
Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company LLC Cincinnati Bell
COMPTEL COMPTEL
EarthLink, Inc., New Edge Networks, Inc. EarthLink
Embarq Local Operating Companies Embarq
Iowa Telecommunications Services, Inc. Iowa Telecom
National Telecommunications Cooperative Association NTCA
New Jersey Division of the Rate Counsel New Jersey Rate Counsel
Organization for the Promotion and Advancement of Small 
Telecommunications Companies
OPASTCO
Sprint Nextel Corporation Sprint Nextel
Time Warner Telecom, Inc., Cbeyond Communications, LLC, One 
Communications Corp.
Time Warner Telecom, 
Cbeyond et al.
REPLY COMMENTERS 
WC Docket No. 06-125
Reply Comments Abbreviation
AdHoc Telecommunications Users Committee AdHoc
AT&T Inc. AT&T
BellSouth Corporation Legacy BellSouth
Broadview Networks, Covad Communications, CTC Communications, 
Inc., Eschelon Telecom, Inc., NuVox Communications, XO 
Communications, Xspedius Management Company
Broadview
COMPTEL COMPTEL
Embarq Local Operating Companies Embarq
General Communications, Inc. GCI
Hawaiian Telcom, Inc. Hawaiian Telcom
Mobile Satellite Ventures Subsidiary LLC Mobile Satellite Venture
MontanaSky.Net MontanaSky.Net
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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National Telecommunications Cooperative Association NTCA
Qwest Corporation, Qwest Communications Corporation Qwest
Sprint Nextel Corporation Sprint Nextel
T-Mobile USA, Inc. T-Mobile
The Verizon Companies Verizon
Qwest Petition for Forbearance Filed September 12, 2007
WC Docket No. 06-125
Petition Abbreviation
Qwest Corporation and Qwest Communications Corporation Qwest
COMMENTERS 
WC Docket No. 06-125
Comments Abbreviation
AdHoc Telecommunications Users Committee AdHoc
Alpheus Communications, LP, Cavalier Telephone, LLC, DeltaCom, 
Inc., Integra Telecom, Inc., McLeodUSA Telecommunications Services, 
Inc., Mpower Communications Corp., Pactec Communications, Inc., 
TDS Metrocom, LLC, and Telepacific Corp d/b/a Telepacific 
Communications
Alpheus, Cavalier et al.
COMPTEL COMPTEL
Covad Communications Group, NuVox Communications and XO 
Communications, LLC
Covad et al.
Embarq Local Operating Companies Embarq
Frontier Communications Frontier
Sprint Nextel Corporation Sprint Nextel
Time Warner Telecom, Inc. Time Warner Telecom
T-Mobile USA, Inc. T-Mobile
The Verizon Companies Verizon
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN KEVIN J. MARTIN
Re:  Qwest Petition for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules 
with Respect to Broadband Services, WC Docket No. 06-125
Broadband access is essential to an expanding Internet-based information economy. Promoting broadband 
deployment is one of the highest priorities of the FCC.  To accomplish this goal, the Commission seeks to 
establish a policy environment that facilitates and encourages broadband investment, allowing market 
forces to deliver the benefits of broadband to consumers.  Today, we take another step in establishing a 
regulatory environment that encourages such investments and innovation by granting Qwest’s petition for 
regulatory relief of its broadband infrastructure and fiber capabilities.  This relief will enable Qwest to 
have the flexibility to further deploy its broadband services and fiber facilities without overly burdensome 
regulations.
The relief afforded to Qwest is consistent with and similar to the relief provided in Commission decisions 
regarding broadband services, packet switching, and fiber facilities.  In those decisions, the Commission 
determined to relax regulations where competition was significant and where regulations acted as a 
disincentive to deploy new broadband technologies.  Accordingly, based on the specific market facts that 
have been placed before us, we are compelled under the “pro-competitive, deregulatory” framework 
established by Congress, as well as under section 10’s forbearance criteria, to grant Qwest relief from the 
continued application of legacy regulations.
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STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER ROBERT M. McDOWELL
Re:  Qwest Petition for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry 
Rules with Respect to Broadband Services, WC Docket No. 06-125
I am pleased to support this order to streamline regulation of the enterprise broadband market and bring 
parity to those providers of broadband services.
With this grant of Qwest’s petition for forbearance from regulating its existing enterprise service 
offerings, we are bringing Qwest into regulatory parity with other similarly situated price cap carriers.  
This action extends the de-regulatory framework for Qwest’s business broadband services.  It also ensures 
that the consumer protection and competition promotion measures that we adopted for AT&T, Embarq, 
Frontier and Citizens remain in place. 
While the Order grants relief to Qwest, it does not forbear from existing regulation of the TDM-based, 
DS-1 and DS-3 special access services most heavily relied upon by many enterprise users, wireless 
carriers and competitive local exchange carriers.  As competition in the broadband market continues to 
grow, especially through the deployment of new wireless technologies, less regulation should be required.  
I note, however, that the Commission still has inadequate information to determine whether allegations 
that competition is scarce in certain segments of the special access market have merit.  I will continue to 
work to ensure that these questions are fully explored in the Special Access proceeding after a more 
granular record has been established through detailed mapping of business broadband facilities.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 08-168
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DISSENTING JOINT STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL J. COPPS
AND
COMMISSIONER JONATHAN S. ADELSTEIN
Re:  Qwest Petition for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Title II and Computer Inquiry 
Rules with Respect to Broadband Services, WC Docket No. 06-125
The Commission continues down its ill-considered road of granting far-reaching forbearance to 
petitioners seeking relief from Title II and Computer Inquiry obligations associated with certain 
broadband enterprise services. As was the case in last year’s AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry 
Forbearance Order addressing largely the same issues raised by Qwest here, there is insufficient 
evidence to support forbearance in this case.
The concerns we originally raised in our Joint Statement in the AT&T Title II and Computer Inquiry 
Forbearance Order are equally applicable today, so we need only briefly repeat our concerns here. First, 
the Order reaffirms the notion of a special class of “broadband enterprise services” deserving of 
forbearance. Yet, the Commission has previously treated these services as special access services. The 
Commission’s pending rulemaking on this very topic is of course long overdue. Clearly, we should not be 
granting forbearance for rules covering special access services without first completing an industry-wide 
analysis of competition for these services. The Order also lacks any rigorous analysis of the impact on 
small and medium size business customers as well communications providers who use these services to 
provide both residential and enterprise services. Moreover, the Commission again relies on a nationwide 
market analysis. We have repeatedly argued that rampant deregulation and a blind eye towards a 
competitive analysis are no substitutes for a national strategy for deploying broadband services. Today’s 
Order is a missed opportunity for the Commission to critically review whether a national framework for 
the market specific services before us is appropriate.
The Order retains key interconnection, universal service, privacy, disabilities access, and other 
Congressionally-mandated provisions -- forbearance from which would have been devastating for 
consumers and competition. While we appreciate the decision to retain these essential responsibilities, we 
cannot support this Order’s decision to forbear from rules that provide critical pricing protection.
It remains abundantly clear that the Commission is bent on continuing its headlong rush to eliminate large 
swaths of its rules under the guise of forbearance and absent the kind of industry-wide reviews that would 
enable us to assess the marketplace as a whole. We believe this is an egregious mistake. The lack of data 
concerning the specific product and geographic markets at issue and this Order’s lack of analysis cause us 
great concern about both the substance and the process by which the Commission grants forbearance from 
our rules. Moreover, as a result of this approach, the Commission finds itself inundated with company-
specific requests for “me-too” relief that divert attention from the many other critical priorities before us.
For these reasons, we dissent from today’s Order.