Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Improving the Resiliency of Mobile Wireless 
Communications Networks 
Reliability and Continuity of Communications 
Networks, Including Broadband Technologies      
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PS Docket No. 13-239
PS Docket No. 11-60
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
Adopted:  September 26, 2013 Released:  September 27, 2013
Comment Date:  (60 days after date of publication in Federal Register)
Reply Comment Date:  (90 days after date of publication in Federal Register)
By the Commission:  Acting Chairwoman Clyburn and Commissioner Rosenworcel issuing separate 
statements; Commissioner Pai dissenting and issuing a statement.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the Federal Communications 
Commission (Commission) considers measures to promote transparency to consumers as to how mobile 
wireless service providers
1
compare in keeping their networks operational in emergencies, which could in 
turn encourage competition to improve the resiliency of mobile wireless communications networks during 
emergencies. Specifically, we seek comment on a proposal to require facilities-based Commercial Mobile 
Radio Service (CMRS) providers to submit to the Commission for public disclosure, on a daily basis 
during and immediately after major disasters, the percentage of cell sites
2
within their networks that are 
providing CMRS.
3
  These disclosures would be made with respect to each county in the designated 
disaster area.  We seek comment on whether public disclosure of this information, which can be derived 
from information many providers already report to the Commission voluntarily,
4
could provide consumers 
with a reasonable “yardstick” for measuring how well mobile wireless networks maintain service during 
disasters. We also seek comment on whether other measures of service outages may be appropriate, and 
on certain other approaches to resiliency.
                                                     
1
The requirements proposed in this NPRM would apply to such providers only insofar as they provide Commercial 
Mobile Radio Service (CMRS), as that term is defined in Section 20.3 of the Commission’s rules.  See 47 C.F.R. 
§ 20.3.  We seek comment on this proposed scope in Section III.D.1. below.
2
As used herein, the term “cell site” applies not only to sites deployed in cellular-based network configurations, but 
to any land station used to deploy CMRS. 
3
The proposed rule is set forth in Appendix A. 
4
Mobile wireless providers, among other providers, report such information in the Commission’s Disaster 
Information Reporting System (DIRS). See The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Launches 
Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS), Public Notice, DA 07-3871 (PSHSB rel. Sept. 11, 2007) (DIRS 
Public Notice).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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2. In particular, we seek comment on the following issues: 
? Whether the proposed reporting and disclosures would provide consumers with useful 
information for making comparisons about mobile wireless products and services;
? Whether such disclosures, by holding providers publicly accountable, could incentivize 
improvements to network resiliency while allowing providers flexibility in implementing 
such improvements; 
? Whether such information would be useful to policymakers at state and local levels; 
? Whether the proposed disclosures comport with “smart disclosure” principles
5
;
? Whether  the proposed disclosure would lead to adverse unintended consequences for 
consumers and mobile wireless providers;   
? Whether the Commission should consider other measures, including alternative 
informational disclosures, performance standards or voluntary measures, or refer issues 
of what information would be helpful to consumers to an advisory committee before 
acting.
II. BACKGROUND
3. In recent years, a number of major storms, including Superstorm Sandy in 2012, have 
impaired mobile wireless service in affected regions.  Hurricane Isaac hit the Gulf Coast, resulting in 
more than twenty percent of area cell sites out of service in the aggregate in the designated reporting 
area.
6
  Superstorm Sandy disabled at its peak more than twenty-five percent of cell sites in 158 counties in 
all or part of ten states and the District of Columbia.
7
  The most extensive wireless service impairments 
from Superstorm Sandy were heavily concentrated in New Jersey and in the New York City metropolitan 
area, where millions of residents found themselves without reliable and continuous access to mobile 
wireless communications throughout the storm and its aftermath.
8
  Several counties had outages more 
than double the twenty-five-percent figure for the larger area—some much more—and for the State of 
New Jersey, all of which was included in the reporting area, aggregated cell site outages were on the order 
of forty percent.  Of course, some service disruption may be unavoidable during major disasters, and 
surges in demand present added challenges. However, data that mobile wireless service providers 
submitted to the Commission via the Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS)
9
and in follow-up 
meetings with Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau staff revealed that, as during previous storms 
such as Hurricane Isaac and others before that, service impacts during Superstorm Sandy and in its 
aftermath were not evenly distributed among mobile wireless service providers.  Moreover, the 
operational choices and practices of different mobile wireless service providers may account for much of 
this variation.  For example, practices regarding the provision of back-up power supplies at otherwise 
                                                     
5
See infra Section III.C.
6
See The FCC’s Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau Announces the Activation of the Disaster Information 
Reporting System in Response to Hurricane Sandy, Public Notice, DA 12-1733 (PSHSB 2012) (listing the counties 
subject to DIRS activation during Superstorm Sandy).  
7
See Statement of FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski, Superstorm Sandy Field Hearing, New York, NY, and 
Hoboken, NJ (Feb. 5, 2013), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db0205/DOC-318754A1.pdf. 
8
See, e.g., Kevin McCoy, et al., Wireless Service Improves in Sandy-affected Areas, USA Today (Nov. 1, 2012), 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2012/11/01/sandy-cellphones-service-charging/1675189/
(“Wireless coverage is gradually recovering in the areas affected by Hurricane Sandy, but millions of 
Northeasterners are still grappling with spotty or no cellular connections.”).
9
See infra para. 7 (providing an overview of DIRS and the Network Outage Reporting System (NORS)).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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similar cell sites appear to vary among mobile wireless service providers, which may contribute to the 
ability of some mobile wireless service providers to provide more continuous and reliable service during 
the storm than others. 
4. To address these types of questions, the Commission launched a Notice of Inquiry
(Reliability NOI) in 2011 to “initiate a comprehensive examination of issues regarding the reliability, 
resiliency and redundancy of communications networks, including broadband technologies.”
10
  The 
Commission asked a broad range of questions in the Reliability NOI on how to ensure continuity of 
communications services during major emergencies such as large scale natural and man-made disasters.  
For example, it sought comment on the need for reinstatement of emergency back-up power requirements 
of some form on communications providers “to ensure adequate levels of service continuity during major 
emergencies.”
11
  It also asked questions about the impact of inadequate backhaul redundancy on network 
operations during major emergencies.
12
5. More recently, in the months following Superstorm Sandy, the Commission held field 
hearings in New York and New Jersey to further explore the communications impacts of Superstorm 
Sandy and consider lessons learned.  It then held a follow-up field hearing in California to look, in part, at 
emerging technological solutions for improving communications during such emergencies.
13
  Among the 
concerns raised at these hearings was the lack of information made publicly available during Superstorm 
Sandy about the operational status of communications networks and the progress being made to rectify 
service outages.
14
6. In a May 13, 2013 letter to the Commission, Consumers Union urged the Commission to 
conduct a rulemaking proceeding to “establish appropriate metrics for measuring a wireless carrier’s 
network performance,” such as “the number of a wireless carrier’s non-functioning cell towers in each 
county” within a disaster area, “and the percentage of the carrier’s cell towers in that county that the 
number represents.”
15
  Further, it urged the Commission to disclose such information to the public and to 
use it “to set a schedule for phasing in improved performance standards [for wireless networks] as rapidly 
as practicable, with appropriate incentives for achieving them and appropriate penalties for unexcused 
failure to achieve them.”
16
  In ex parte presentations filed July 17 and July 19, 2013, respectively, CTIA-
                                                     
10
See Reliability and Continuity of Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies, et al., Notice of 
Inquiry, PS Docket No. 11-60, et al., 26 FCC Rcd 5614, 5615 ¶ 2 (2011) (Reliability NOI).
11
See id. at 5621-22 ¶¶ 23-25. 
12
Id. at 5622-5623 ¶ 26.
13
See FCC Announces Details Regarding the First Post-Superstorm Sandy Field Hearing, Scheduled for February 5, 
2013, Public Notice, DA 13-140 (PSHSB rel. Feb. 1, 2013); FCC Announces Date and Location of the Second 
National Hearing on Network Resilience and Reliability, Public Notice, DA 13-245 (PSHSB rel. Feb. 20, 2013). 
Archived video recordings of both field hearings are available on the FCC website, http://www.fcc.gov/events/past.
14
At the New York hearing, City of New York representative Rahul Merchant recommended that 
telecommunications providers, like electrical utility companies, provide information “on when the infrastructure is 
down” and “when the telecommunications systems are going to be up.”  Transcript, Superstorm Sandy Field 
Hearing in New York City, at 42, PS Docket 11-60 (posted Feb. 28, 2013).   At the New Jersey hearing, Chuck Bell 
of Consumers Union commented that “going forward more public reporting of key metrics regarding service levels 
could be helpful” by promoting “transparency in holding telecom providers accountable” for the performance of 
their networks during emergencies. Transcript, Superstorm Sandy Field Hearing in Hoboken, New Jersey, at 62, PS 
Docket 11-60 (posted Feb. 28, 2013).
15
See Letter from George P. Slover, Consumers Union, to Chairman Julius Genachowski, et al., Federal 
Communications Commission at 2 (May 13, 2013) (Consumers Union Letter) (filed by the Public Safety and 
Homeland Security Bureau in PS Docket 11-60 on July 5, 2013).
16
See id. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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The Wireless Association (CTIA) and the Competitive Carriers Association (CCA) argued that the 
Commission should gather more information before proceeding to a rulemaking on such matters.
17
PCIA-
The Wireless Infrastructure Association (PCIA) filed an ex parte presentation on August 5, 2013, raising 
similar concerns.
18
7. More generally, the Commission relies on periodic reporting from communications 
providers to gauge network reliability.
19
  Part 4 of the Commission’s rules, established in 2004, requires, 
inter alia, mobile wireless service providers to apprise the Commission of network outages that exceed 
certain quantitative thresholds, dependent on the type of services provided.
20
  The Commission collects 
this information in its Network Outage Reporting System (NORS), and then uses the information to 
identify larger trends and vulnerabilities in the nation’s communications infrastructure.  In addition, the 
Commission operates DIRS, created in 2007, which is activated during emergencies to collect near “real-
time” status information from mobile wireless and other providers to improve the situational awareness of 
federal agencies, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and streamline 
emergency response.
21
  Reporting in DIRS is voluntary; however, the Commission generally suspends the 
otherwise mandatory NORS reporting obligations of DIRS participants throughout periods when the latter 
system is fully activated.   Information reported to the Commission in either of these reporting systems is 
afforded a presumption of confidential treatment, a policy the Commission adopted to protect filing 
parties from competitive harm and prevent terrorist targeting of vulnerable communications assets.
22
8. To complement these efforts, the Commission has tasked federal advisory committees, 
chiefly the Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council (CSRIC), with developing 
and recommending industry best practices to advance, among other objectives, the “security, reliability, 
and interoperability of communications systems.”
23
  CSRIC has developed and recommended to the 
Commission specific actions to facilitate industry-wide improvements in these areas.  The Commission 
generally encourages mobile wireless service providers, a significant cross-section of which participate in 
CSRIC, to implement these recommended best practices within their networks to the extent technically 
and economically feasible.  The Commission relies primarily on NORS and DIRS reporting to assess 
whether network reliability best practices are being effectively implemented or are in need of 
                                                     
17
See CTIA-The Wireless Association, Ex Parte Filing, PS Docket 11-60 (filed July 17, 2013) (arguing that the 
Commission should gather more information on “consumers’ information needs during and after disasters, the type 
of information metrics that may be useful to consumers in those circumstances, and effective means of conveying 
that information to them” before proceeding to a rulemaking such as Consumers Union recommends); see also
Competitive Carriers Association, Ex Parte Filing, PS Docket 11-60 (filed July 19, 2013). 
18
See PCIA-The Wireless Industry Association, Ex Parte Filing, PS Docket 11-60 (filed Aug. 5, 2013). 
19
See Amendment of Part 63 of the Commission’s Rules to Provide for Notification by Common Carriers of Service 
Disruptions, CC Docket No. 91-273, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 2010 (1992) (adopting service disruption 
notification requirements for wireline common carriers);  New Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding 
Disruptions to Communications, EB Docket No. 04-35, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 16830 (2004) (Part 4 Report and Order) (extending notification requirements to wireless 
and satellite providers and establishing Part 4 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations to house the 
Commission’s outage notification requirements).
20
See Part 4 Report and Order.
21
See DIRS Public Notice.
22
See 47 C.F.R. § 4.2; Part 4 Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 16855 ¶ 45; DIRS Public Notice at 2.  See also infra 
para. 59-60.
23
See CSRIC IV Charter, available at http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/communications-security-reliability-and-
interoperability-council-iv.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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refinement.
24
  The Technological Advisory Council, which is chartered to advise the Commission more 
broadly on technical matters, is also exploring approaches for improving broadband network resiliency.
25
III. DISCUSSION
9. Promoting the “safety of life and property” through the use of radio communications is 
part of the Commission’s foundational mission.
26
  Whether, and how quickly, emergency calls get 
through and a first responder arrives might make the difference between life and death,
27
so it is 
imperative that the public be able to reliably access 911, including with wireless phones. The proceeding 
we initiate today to improve the resiliency of mobile wireless networks builds upon information gathered 
through extensive prior efforts to address the resiliency of mobile wireless networks.  As noted, these 
efforts began with the Hurricane Katrina panel in 2006, have included the adoption and subsequent 
withdrawal of mandatory back-up power requirements, followed by our 2011 Reliability NOI that sought 
broad and detailed comment on back-up power and other elements of network resiliency.  We have 
gathered further information in our inquiry into the June 2012 “derecho,” and in our Superstorm Sandy 
field hearings held earlier this year.  While we proceed to consideration of the proposals contained in this 
NPRM, we note that CTIA, CCA and PCIA have raised concerns about some of the proposals.  We seek 
comment on these concerns in the discussion that follows. Ultimately, our objective is to ensure that any 
disclosure rules adopted in this area are tailored to the needs of consumers, do not impose undue burdens 
on service providers, and provide incentives that are most likely to lead to improvements in network 
reliability during emergencies.
28
A. Costs and Benefits of the Proposal
10. We seek to determine the benefits to consumers and other communications users that 
would result from each proposal and any associated burden on mobile wireless service providers. We 
therefore request comment on a range of questions that will help us to weigh the costs and benefits of the 
reporting obligations we propose, as well as the alternative measures we put forward for 
consideration. For each cost or benefit addressed, we ask that commenters provide specific data and 
information such as actual or estimated dollar figures, including a description of how the data or 
                                                     
24
See Part 4 Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 16855 ¶ 46 (stating that “the analytical substance of [NORS reports] 
is essential to the development and validation of best practices”).
25
See Federal Communications Commission, Technological Advisory Council, 
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/technological-advisory-council (identifying “Resiliency in a Broadband Network” 
as one of the TAC’s five current areas of focus). 
26
See 47 U.S.C. § 151. 
27
One study of cardiac emergencies in Pennsylvania found that E911 adoption reduced the risk of mortality within 
six hours by sixty percent and the risk of mortality within forty-eight hours by thirty-five percent.  See Susan Athey 
& Scott Stern, The Impact of Information Technology on Emergency Health Care Outcomes, January 2002, at 32, 
available at http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~athey/itemer.pdf.
28
We note that while the proceeding we initiate today focuses primarily on the reliability of the wireless networks 
that are used in disasters to originate most calls to 911, in a related proceeding, the Commission is considering 
measures to improve the reliability of the wireline facilities that are needed to complete calls to 911 call centers, 
even those that originate on mobile wireless devices.  See Improving 9-1-1 Reliability, et al., PS Docket Nos. 13-75, 
11-60., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 28 FCC Rcd 3414, 3417 ¶ 5 (911 Reliability NPRM) (drawing upon 
findings of the Bureau’s Derecho Report, FCC PUB. SAFETY & HOMELAND SEC. BUREAU, IMPACT OF THE JUNE 2012
DERECHO ON COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AND SERVICES: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (PSHSB, rel. Jan. 10, 
2013), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/derecho-report-and-recommendations (Derecho Report)). The 911
Reliability NPRM seeks comment on a wide range of regulatory approaches, including options under which 
certification or reporting requirements could serve alone or in conjunction with more direct regulation of 911
network practices.  That proceeding also broadly considers how to maintain the reliability of 911 services in the 
migration to Next Generation 911 platforms.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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information was calculated or obtained and any supporting documentation.
29
All comments will be 
considered and given appropriate weight; vague or unsupported assertions regarding costs or benefits 
generally will receive less weight and be less persuasive than the more specific and supported statements.
11. Quantifying specific benefits and costs of implementing the proposed rule and other 
proposals involves challenges. These costs and benefits can have many dimensions, including and 
beyond cost and revenue implications for industry and financial benefits to consumers. We also must 
consider other less tangible benefits, such as the value of more informed consumer choice and the value 
of any lives saved or health outcomes improved due to the completion of calls for help due to 
infrastructure hardening that could result from the increased competitive pressure to deliver reliable 
service during natural disasters and immediately thereafter. To assess the expected burden on providers, 
we seek comment on the nature and magnitude of the costs. In complying with the Paperwork Reduction 
Act, we recently estimated the annual reporting costs to be approximately $190,000 for all providers 
inputting wireless county cell site information in DIRS.
30
  That figure, however, comprised an estimate 
for DIRS reporting for considerably more information than is sought here.  Moreover, because these 
carriers are already reporting needed information, they have already incurred the startup costs associated 
with any reporting system.
12. We estimate that there are fewer than fifty additional providers that are not currently 
reporting DIRS data. Moreover, we believe that the non-reporting providers mostly are very small 
companies that typically serve only one or two counties. Therefore, even if we were to require all 
wireless providers in the disaster areas to file transparency reports-- which is a question on which we are 
seeking comment-- we expect the number of additional reporting providers to be below fifty and the 
counties involved to be relatively few. We estimate the total annual reporting cost for these providers to 
be $78,000, consisting of three elements. First is a $2,000 cost incurred if fifty providers each spend a 
half hour, at $80 per hour, to create and enter a user identification when first logging in to our website 
(i.e., 50 x 0.5 x $80 = $2,000). Second is a $4,000 cost incurred if fifty providers each spend a half hour, 
at $80 per hour, to file the initial reports on two counties (i.e., 50 x 0.5 x $80 x 2 = $4,000). Third is a
$72,000 cost incurred if fifty providers each spend an hour, at $80 per hour, to verify and file daily 
follow-up reports on the two counties for nine additional days of DIRS reporting (i.e., 50 x 1 x $80 x 2 x 
9 = $72,000). We seek comment on these estimates and their underlying assumptions. We are 
particularly interested in receiving carrier data that would improve the accuracy of these estimated costs.
13. To assess the expected benefits, we seek comment on the nature and magnitude of the 
benefits of the proposed rule. If public disclosure increases competitive pressure sufficiently to 
encourage providers to significantly harden their networks, we assume a likely result will be at least one 
life saved every five years.
31
We also assume a life has a statistical value of $9.1 million.
32
We seek 
                                                     
29
To the extent that filers believe that any of this information could be considered confidential, please see 
instructions for filing materials under a claim of confidentiality, infra Section III.F.4.
30
FCC Staff estimated this figure based on: the assumption of two Superstorm Sandy-type of major events per year 
in the nation; the actual number of data reports containing the percentage of cell towers operational per county 
during the DIRS activation for Superstorm Sandy; and the estimated time required for providers to prepare DIRS 
reports (i.e., the same time reported in the Paperwork Reduction Act submission for DIRS). See OMB Control No. 
3060-1003.
31
There is reason to believe, however, that network improvements may save far more than one life every five years
assuming that there are wireless calls that would reach 911 sooner or might not otherwise reach 911 at all. A 2002 
study in Pennsylvania found that, by speeding up the ambulance response time to cardiac emergencies, the adoption 
of E-911 resulted in the saving of 3.6 lives each year in each of the sixty-six Pennsylvania counties.
31
Susan Athey 
& Scott Stern, The Impact of Information Technology on Emergency, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 22, 
No. 3 (Autumn 2002), available at http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~athey/itemer.pdf (last accessed on Aug. 27, 2012) 
(Cardiac Study). The study examined 19,746 ambulance rides resulting in an emergency hospital admission in sixty-
six Pennsylvania counties during 1994 and 1996. It found a -.012 reduction in the forty-eight-hour mortality rate for 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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comment on these two assumptions because, if they are reasonably accurate, they imply public disclosure 
would produce an annual benefit of $1.82 million (i.e., $9.1 million divided by 5) in lives saved.
14. Moreover, the potential benefits of public disclosure may not be limited to the value of 
human lives saved if infrastructure is enhanced.   Medical outcomes also may be improved and 
considerable pain and suffering avoided when emergency service providers are able to respond to E-911
calls.  The total medical benefits from preserving E-911 services may be substantially greater than the 
value of lives saved. Further, another benefit of public disclosure may be to enable consumers to better 
assess the performance of mobile wireless service providers during major emergency events and, thus, 
enable consumers to make informed decisions that conform better to their preferences when selecting 
mobile wireless products and services.
33
15. An alternative way to estimate the potential benefits of public disclosure is to consider 
the value of services lost each year in storms. Superstorm Sandy, for example, caused a substantial loss of 
wireless services.  We believe that had providers done more to improve infrastructure prior to Superstorm 
Sandy, a significant number of cell site outages could have been prevented, allowing a substantial number 
of wireless subscribers in the path of the storm to avoid loss or serious impairment of service.
34
We 
cannot readily determine the value of that lost service, because we cannot know the value of being able to 
call more easily loved ones and friends, among others, during the Superstorm and in the days following 
the destruction. Nor can we know the value of more easily reaching firemen, police, repairmen, and other 
first responders.
16. We can estimate, however, a floor value for lost consumer surplus, a portion of which
could have been saved had outages been avoided. Given the average-revenue-per-subscriber data 
reported by the four major wireless providers for the DIRS reporting counties, we estimate very 
conservatively that cell-site outages connected to Superstorm Sandy caused a loss of service for which 
subscribers had paid $25.8 million.
35
  This $25.8 million could represent what subscribers would normally 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
cardiac patients due to E911. Given the study’s estimate of 304 cardiac incidents each year per, 273,000 people (the 
average population size of a Pennsylvania county), this implies that E911 adoption resulted in 3.648 (i.e., -.012 x 
304) lives saved per 273,000 people.  Because E-911 services respond to a wide variety of life-threatening 
emergencies in addition to cardiac emergencies, the total lives saved in Pennsylvania were almost certainly 
substantially larger than 3.6 lives per county. We note that the Pennsylvania study focused only on the lives saved 
by shortening response times rather than the lives saved by providing wireless service where it may not be available 
at all, which is among the issues we are addressing here.  
32
Earlier this year, the U.S. Department of Transportation completed a review of the technical literature on the 
Value of a Statistical Life (VSL). It concludes, in a February 28, 2013 Department of Transportation Memorandum, 
that the VSL is now $9.1 million. See http:/www.dot.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/guidance-treatment-
economic-value-statistical-life.
33
A CTIA study identifies numerous other benefits from wireless services and estimates the nationwide consumer 
surplus created by such services. See Roger Entner and David Lewin, “The Impact of the US Wireless Telecom 
Industry on the US Economy: A Study for CTIA-The Wireless Association” (Sept. 2005), available online at 
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Report_OVUM_Economy.pdf. CTIA updates many of those estimated benefits in its 2008 
study. See Roger Entner, “The Increasingly Important Impact of Wireless Broadband Technology and Services on 
the U.S. Economy:  A Follow up to the 2005 Ovum Report on the Impact of the US Wireless Telecom Industry on 
the US Economy” (2008), available at http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/10538. See also
Roger Entner, “The Wireless Industry: The Essential Engine of US Economic Growth” (2012) (“2012 CTIA 
Study”).
34
See supra para. 3 (discussing the uneven distribution of service impairments among providers during Superstorm 
Sandy and observing that the operational choices of providers may have accounted for some of these discrepancies). 
35
This estimate conservatively assumes that the subscribers in a county suffered a loss or significant impairment of 
wireless services that is only one-fourth of the cell-site outage percentage for that same county. It also assumes that 
the average daily price of wireless service reasonably reflects the value of using the service—and hence the lost 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
8
pay for the lost services, not what those services were worth to them. The net benefit of a good to 
consumers (i.e., the consumer surplus) can easily exceed what they pay for it. Indeed, a 2012 CTIA study 
estimates that at the end of 2010, consumer surplus was 3.08 times what consumers pay for wireless 
service.
36
Based on these payments estimates and the CTIA study, the value of the lost service during 
Superstorm Sandy alone was at least $77.4 million (i.e., $25.8 million x 3 = $77.4 million). Because this 
loss represents the value of such services during normal weather conditions, it likely substantially
understates the loss of value during (and a few days after) a storm, at which time the value of access to 
emergency services and ability to connect with family and friends may be much greater. We invite 
comment on this analysis and the reasonableness of its underlying assumptions.
B. The Growing Reliance of the American Public on Mobile Wireless Networks 
17. Mobile wireless communications are becoming increasingly central to the day-to-day 
lives of Americans.  In its annual Mobile Competition Reports,
37
the Commission has documented the 
tremendous growth of the U.S. mobile wireless sector, which now supports over 300 million user 
connections.
38
  Mobile data traffic in particular “increased 270 percent from 2010 to 2011” in the United 
States and “has more than doubled each year for the past four years,”
39
during which time mobile wireless 
service providers have continued to upgrade and expand their networks and offer their customers an 
increasing array of “smartphones” and data-centric devices, such as tablets and e-readers.  As mobile 
wireless technologies have continued to proliferate and evolve, consumers of these services have become 
increasingly likely to “cut the cord”—to live without residential wireline telephone service, as thirty-eight 
percent of American households already do.
40
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value when calls are blocked—on each day of the storm. If correct, these assumptions imply that subscribers in the 
reporting counties lost $5.5 million worth of service on October 30, 2012, the first day of the disaster. We find that, 
during the first five days, they lost $19.9 million and, during the entire eleven-day reporting period, they lost $25.8 
million. Most of the loss occurred during the first five days because, after that period, most affected counties 
outside of New York and New Jersey regained service. Our methodology for obtaining these results consists of 
several steps. First, using DIRS data, we determined the percentage of cell sites out of service for each of the 
reporting counties and for each of the eleven days for which this data was reported. Second, we reduced that outage 
percentage by three-fourths to very conservatively estimate the loss or serious impairment of service incurred by 
subscribers. Thus, we assumed for purposes of this calculation that a twenty-percent outage, for example, represents 
only a five-percent loss or serious impairment of wireless services. Third, we multiplied that percentage by the 
number of subscribers in each county, data that was obtained from the Numbering Resource Utilization and Forecast 
reports filed by providers engaged in the provision of wireless telecommunications services. In this way, we 
estimated the number of subscribers without service or with seriously impaired service. Fourth, we determined a
daily average revenue per subscriber (ARPS) by dividing the median monthly average revenue for the four major 
wireless providers by thirty. Fifth, we multiplied that daily ARPS times the number of impaired subscribers to 
estimate the value of service lost in each of the affected counties on each of the eleven days. Finally, we summed 
those figures over all the reporting counties to obtain a loss figure for the entire area affected by Superstorm Sandy.
36
See 2012 CTIA Study at 37.
37
See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Sixteenth Annual Mobile Competition Report, FCC 13-34 
(2013) (2013 Mobile Competition Report), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/16th-mobile-competition-
report; Federal Communications Commission, Fifteenth Annual Mobile Competition Report, FCC 11-103 (2011), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/reports/mobile-wireless-competition-report-15th-annual.
38
See 2013 Mobile Competition Report at 155-56 ¶ 244; see also CTIA-The Wireless Association, Wireless Quick 
Facts, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/aid/ 10323 (last visited June 10, 2013).
39
2013 Mobile Competition Report at 12.
40
See Stephen J. Blumberg and Julian V. Luke, Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from the National 
health Interview Survey, July-December 2012, National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control, 
June 2012, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201306.pdf) (last visited June 21, 
2013).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
9
18. This growing reliance on wireless communications has brought these technologies to the 
forefront of emergency response.  As CTIA noted in its comments on the Reliability NOI, “[d]uring the 
aftermath of major disasters, many individuals rely on wireless as their sole means of communication 
because of its mobile nature and the speed in which carriers restore service to affected areas.”
41
  With an 
increasing percentage of 911 calls—already measured at 75 percent within the State of California
42
—
originating on wireless networks, the need for reliable wireless service during emergencies is a major 
public safety priority. 
19. While consumers value overall network reliability and quality in selecting mobile 
wireless service providers, they may not be able to compare how well different mobile wireless service 
providers’ networks withstand and recover from disaster conditions. As previously noted, the information 
made available to the Commission on a non-public basis following Superstorm Sandy and Hurricane 
Isaac revealed that not all mobile wireless service providers’ networks fared the same during the storms, 
and preparatory efforts and investments to harden networks may account for some of this discrepancy.    
We thus seek comment on whether mobile wireless customers have adequate means of assessing the 
resiliency and reliability of mobile wireless networks in disaster conditions, and whether they have 
reliable basis for evaluating and comparing the network resilience of different mobile wireless service
providers.
C. The Use of Informational Disclosures to Improve Consumer Choice
20. We seek comment in this NPRM on the reporting and disclosure of information to enable 
consumers to compare how well various mobile wireless networks are able to withstand and recover from 
disaster conditions. There is precedent in the telecommunications sector and in other industry contexts for 
using informational disclosures of this sort to enhance consumer welfare and drive product and service 
improvements.
43
  A significant recent initiative along these lines is the Commission’s Measuring 
Broadband America (MBA) Program, under which the Commission tests the actual network speeds 
delivered to consumers by major wireline broadband providers and discloses its findings in a series of 
reports.
44
  Those providers that have tested favorably have touted the reports’ findings in public 
                                                     
41
See Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association, PS Docket 11-60 at 2-3 (July 7, 2011).
42
See Federal Communications Commission, 911 Wireless Services Guide, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/wireless-
911-services.  See also, e.g., State of California, California 9-1-1 Emergency Communications Branch, Summary of 
Wireless Calls by PSAPs (illustrating that between December 2011 and March 2013, 75 percent of 911 calls 
statewide came from wireless phones) (filed in the instant proceeding on the record on July 17, 2013).
43
See Archon Fung, et al., Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency 12-13 (2007) (providing an 
overview of eighteen diverse “targeted transparency” programs); Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge:  Information 
Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 Yale L.J. 574, 577 (2012) (surveying the use of informational disclosures 
across numerous industries).
44
See Office of Engineering and Technology and Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, Federal 
Communications Commission, Measuring Broadband America:  A Report on Consumer Wireline Broadband 
Performance in the U.S. (2013), available at http://www.fcc.gov/measuring-broadband-america/2013/February; 
Office of Engineering and Technology and Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, Federal Communications 
Commission, Measuring Broadband America:  A Report on Consumer Wireline Broadband Performance in the U.S. 
(2012), available at http://www.fcc.gov/measuring-broadband-america/2012/july; Office of Engineering and 
Technology and Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, Measuring 
Broadband America:  A Report on Consumer Wireline Broadband Performance in the U.S. (2011), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/measuring-broadband-america/2011/august.  The Commission recently launched a counterpart 
program focused on measurement of mobile broadband network performance.  See FCC to Launch Mobile 
Broadband Services Testing and Measurement Program, CG Docket 09-158, Public Notice, DA 12-1442 (OET rel. 
Sept. 4, 2012), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/mobile-broadband-measurement.  In Section III.D.2
below, we seek comment on the interplay of that program and any reporting obligations the Commission might 
adopt pursuant to this NPRM.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
10
statements,
45
while at least one provider that performed poorly during the initial round of testing 
dramatically improved its performance in time for the second round.
46
    In this context and others, the 
disclosure of targeted information appears to have driven service improvements, even where the disclosed 
information pertains only to a limited range of the many considerations that influence consumer 
decisionmaking.
47
21. Moreover, the Executive Branch has issued guidance on the use of informational 
disclosures as a regulatory tool.  A recent executive order directed executive branch federal agencies to 
focus on efforts “to identify and consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain 
flexibility and freedom of choice.”
48
  The OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs then issued 
a memorandum providing guidance on the use of “smart disclosure,” a regulatory approach defined as 
“the timely release of complex information and data in standardized, machine-readable formats in ways 
that enable consumers to make informed decisions.”
49
  Such information can be made available directly to 
consumers or be used by third parties to create tools, such as mobile phone applications, that can “greatly 
                                                     
45
See, e.g., David Young, Verizon Public Policy Blog, Verizon FiOS Over-Delivers in FCC’s Latest Broadband 
Speed Report, (Feb. 15, 2013), available at http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/blog/entry/verizon-fios-over-delivers-in-
fccs-latest-broadband-speed-report (last visited June 20, 2013); Cathy Avgiris, Comcast Voices, What Does Sam 
Know? Comcast Delivers Faster Speeds to More People Than Any Other ISP, (Aug. 2, 2011), available at
http://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/what-does-samknow-comcast-delivers-faster-speeds-to-more-people-
than-any-other-isp (last visited June 20, 2013). 
46
See Broadband Speed:  FCC Data is Improving the Market, Joel Gurin, Chief, Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau, FCC, Official FCC Blog, (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/broadband-speed-fcc-data-
improving-market.
47
See, e.g., Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality:  Evidence from 
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q.J. ECON. 409 (2003) (crediting the mandated display of hygiene “report 
cards” in Los Angeles restaurant windows with causing a twenty-percent reduction in hospitalizations for foodborne 
illnesses); Richard Harris, Breathing Easier: How Houston is Working to Clean up Its Air, National Public Radio 
(May 30, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/05/30/185993899/breathing-easier-how-houston-is-working-
to-clean-up-its-air (discussing the role emissions disclosure requirements in improving Houston’s air quality). In the 
commercial aviation sector, the Federal Aviation Administration’s adoption of a requirement that carriers report 
flight delay and cancellation statistics created a market-based incentive for carriers to improve their service and 
scheduling practices, resulting in drastic immediate improvements. See Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Revision of Airline Service Quality Performance Reports and Disclosure Requirements, 14 C.F.R. 
Part 234, [Docket No. RITA 2007-28522], Final Rule, 73 FR 29426, 29426 (May 21, 2008), available at
http://apps.bts.gov/laws_and_regulations/docs/part234_4cy2008.pdf (last visited June 20, 2013); see also Scott 
McCartney, Believe It or Not, Flying is Improving, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 9, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324081704578231553159491828.html (last visited June 20, 2013).  
In addition, there is evidence that disclosures required in the 1968 Truth in Lending Act have improved consumer 
awareness of the terms and conditions of credit services.  See S. Rep. No. 96-368, at 16 (1979), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 252; Elwin Griffith, The Truth and Nothing but the Truth:  Confronting the Challenge in the 
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 345, 417 (2003).  
48
See Executive Order 13563, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-21/pdf/2011-1385.pdf  
(Section 4).
49
See Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum for the 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (2011) (OIRA Memorandum), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/informing-consumers-through-smart-
disclosure.pdf; see also Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, “Disclosure and Simplification as Regulatory 
Tools,” at 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
11
reduce the cost to consumers of seeking out the relevant information from individual companies.”
50
  The 
purpose of “smart disclosure” is to make information “not merely available, but also accessible and 
usable,”
51
and the memorandum suggested that when designing related regulatory initiatives, agencies 
should consider making information as accessible as possible to consumers; making the underlying data 
available in machine-readable formats; standardizing the information; providing the information to the 
consumer in a timely manner; ensuring that disclosures keep pace with market innovation; promoting 
interoperability among data sets; and preventing disclosure of personally identifiable information.
52
    We 
seek comment on whether the proposal we set forth and seek comment on below comports with these 
principles.
22.   If the information disclosed is simple and easy to understand, that could make it more 
relevant and accessible to consumers than more complex and technical information.  We seek comment 
on these matters.  The proposal focuses disclosure on a single percentage figure that may provide a 
snapshot of service capabilities in a particular area at a given time.  This information is collected by the 
Commission from the wireless service providers and considered useful to provide situational awareness to 
federal participants in disaster response, and the metric in the disclosures that we propose also has 
precedent in the information that mobile wireless providers have chosen to highlight in their own public 
statements. During the course of an emergency in which service is lost, mobile wireless providers in the 
United States often report the percentages of operational sites as a means of publicizing their progress in 
restoring service,
53
although such reporting is not standardized.   
D. Proposals to Improve Mobile Wireless Network Transparency and Resiliency
23. In this section, we seek comment on specific elements of a proposal to improve the 
transparency and underlying resiliency of networks that provide mobile wireless services, by requiring 
providers of these services to provide for public disclosure the percentages of sites operational in their 
networks during major emergencies. We also seek comment on possible alternative or complementary 
measures that could improve wireless network resiliency.
                                                     
50
Id. at 3.  See also Joseph Marks, Google Tells Feds How to Get Emergency Info to the Top of Search Results, 
NextGov, June 4, 2013, available at http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2013/06/google-urges-gov-make-
emergency-information-truly-open/64229/ (last visited June 13, 2013) (noting that “a machine-readable format 
means that external websites and mobile apps can automatically digest the information and deliver relevant results
based on search queries, a person’s location or other factors” and discussing how, during Superstorm Sandy and 
other disasters, Google pulled to the top of search results available emergency information when users searched 
relevant terms.)).
51
OIRA Memorandum at 2. 
52
See id. at 5-6.
53
See e.g., Verizon Wireless, Verizon Wireless Supporting Impacted Communities Coping With The Effects Of 
Hurricane Sandy, (Nov. 1, 2012), available at http://news.verizonwireless.com/news/2012/11/pr2012-11-01.html
(last visited June 24, 2013) (“[M]ore than 96 percent of our cell sites [are] now in service and serving our customers 
in the impacted areas”); T-Mobile, Sandy T-Mobile Updates (last updated Nov. 6, 2012), available at
http://newsroom.t-mobile.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=251624&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1804111&highlight (last visited 
June 24, 2013) (noting in a Nov. 3, 2012 update that “[o]n Long Island, more than 75% of T-Mobile’s sites are now 
operational and we are making steady improvements”); AT&T Consumer Blog, Updates on Sandy Relief (Nov. 4, 
2012), available at http://blogs.att.net/consumerblog/story/a7785324 (last visited June 24, 2013) (noting that 
“[m]ore than 90 percent of our cell sites across New York City including Manhattan are back in service, up from 80 
percent [three days ago]”); Sprint, Sprint Makes Significant Progress in Restoring Service Impacted by Hurricane 
Sandy, (Nov. 5, 2012) available at
http://community.sprint.com/baw/community/sprintblogs/announcements/blog/2012/11/05/sprint-makes-significant-
progress-in-restoring-service-impacted-by-hurricane-sandy (last visited June 24,  2013) (Sprint reporting that its 
network “in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut is now 85 percent operational”).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
12
1. Proposed Reporting and Disclosure of Percentages of Mobile Wireless 
Network Sites in Operation During Emergencies
24. The proposed rule in this NPRM would require facilities-based CMRS providers to report 
to the Commission daily on a county-by-county basis the percentage of their cell sites that are operational
for counties in which the Commission has activated DIRS.  Under this proposal, operational site 
percentages submitted by each mobile wireless service provider would be made available by the 
Commission on its website, where consumers could access it directly or where third parties could access 
it for the purpose of incorporating the data into private sector platforms, such as news reports or mobile 
phone applications.  Appendix A contains draft language of a proposed rule.  We seek comment on 
whether this metric provides a reasonable means of comparing how well networks withstand emergency 
conditions. 
25. We first seek comment on the extent to which informational disclosures of this sort 
would enhance consumer choice and facilitate network improvements.  Will consumers value having 
access to this information?  Could the information be meaningful and useful to consumers in making the 
choice among mobile wireless service providers, and if so, how would it affect their decision making?  
Would the reported information be particularly important to consumers who may have heightened 
concerns about maintaining communications during emergencies, such as individuals with serious 
medical conditions and their families?  In the absence of the disclosures discussed below, do consumers 
already have sufficient information about service reliability, as CTIA suggests?
54
26. We also seek comment on whether providing consumers with such information would 
incentivize mobile wireless service providers to improve the capability of their network infrastructures to 
survive and continue operating during and after disasters.  Is that correct?  Would the potential that public 
disclosure would affect consumers’ choice of mobile wireless service provider cause providers to view 
additional investment in networks as being competitively necessary to attract and retain customers?  
Could press coverage and knowledge by policymakers of this information foster improved performance 
by mobile wireless service providers, even if the elasticity of consumer demand for greater network 
reliability during emergencies is difficult to quantify or is perceived to be small?  In other words, would 
providers nevertheless respond by seeking to improve their performance as a matter of risk management, 
e.g., to avoid reputational risk in both the business and consumer markets?
27. On the other hand, would disclosure of network performance, in conjunction with outage 
reporting, lead to unintended negative consequences, such as a reduction of cooperation among providers 
during emergencies or disincentives to build out facilities, particularly in areas subject to severe weather?  
For example, would such disclosures favor large-tower architectures over small-cell and other 
heterogeneous architectures where there may be more towers, each more likely to fail but more resilient 
in the aggregate?  We seek comment on any unintended consequences of adopting such disclosures, with
examples of such consequences.  We ask commenters to explain how likely and widespread those 
consequences would be and describe in detail the anticipated impact on consumers and public safety.
28. Scope.  The proposed disclosures apply only to facilities-based CMRS providers with 
respect to sites used to provide CMRS.  Is this scope reasonable given that the factual basis for the
proposal is an observed variation in performance among mobile wireless networks in particular in their 
ability to withstand disaster conditions?  Moreover, because the same companies provide most of the 
CMRS and mobile data services (i.e., mobile broadband) consumed by the U.S. public, using much of the 
same underlying infrastructure, would the proposed reporting on CMRS infrastructure enable reasonable 
judgments to be made about the operational status of providers’ mobile wireless services more generally? 
29. In proposing a reporting requirement applicable only to mobile wireless providers, we 
observe that the great majority of emergency 911 calls originate on mobile wireless networks, and there 
                                                     
54
See CTIA July 17 Ex Parte at 1.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
13
has been an upward trend in such calls, making mobile wireless service of pre-eminent importance as the 
preferred method for U.S. consumers to reach out for help when they need it the most.  Furthermore, 
given that most markets across the country are served by multiple mobile wireless service providers, 
could disclosures based on the proposed metric have a competitive impact that will drive improvements in 
communications infrastructure?  Finally, because the metric tracks the performance of portions of the 
network that are within mobile wireless service providers’ direct control during major emergency events, 
as opposed to outages that are due to consumers’ loss of electric power,
55
is this proposed application to 
mobile wireless service providers reasonable?  We seek comment on our proposed adoption of a reporting 
metric applicable only to CMRS providers.  Should we consider changing the scope of our proposed 
reporting and disclosure requirements, or developing a separate program, to cover providers in other 
telecommunications sectors, such as wireline telephone or cable providers?  Are some of those services 
different in important respects, such as whether customer outages are likely to continue due to loss of 
commercial power at the customer’s home, rather than within the service provider’s facilities and 
network?  If so, what would be the rationale for applying outage-based reporting obligations to such 
providers?  Is there a simple and easily understood metric that could be used for such disclosures?  Are 
there better alternatives to foster reliability of these other services?
30. Moreover, as noted above, we use the term “cell site” throughout this NPRM to refer to 
any land station used to provide CMRS, irrespective of the network configuration under which the site is 
deployed.
56
  We seek comment on this usage, which is incorporated into the definitions of “network site” 
and “operational site” in our proposed rule.  Do these terms, as defined therein, leave any ambiguity as to
whether certain facilities would qualify as “sites” for purposes of calculating percentages of sites in 
operation?  We further observe that, as written, the proposal could apply to providers that operate 
networks not deployed under a cellular-based network architecture.  We seek comment on the potential 
applicability of the proposed requirements to such providers.  Are the requirements well-suited to such 
providers, particularly any that rely on only a small number of sites to provide service in a given area?  
Should we consider exempting certain mobile wireless service providers or classes of providers from the 
proposed requirements? If so, how should we determine which providers or classes of providers should 
be exempted? 
31. We also propose that the requirements apply only to facilities-based mobile wireless 
providers, i.e., those that own or control at least part of the network infrastructure they use to provide 
service, as opposed to merely purchasing and reselling service from other providers.
57
  We seek comment 
on this limitation of the scope of the proposed requirement.  Should mobile virtual network operators 
(MVNOs) or other non-facilities-based providers also be required to report outage or other information of 
some kind for public disclosure during emergencies?  Could the disclosure of information about facilities-
based providers but not resellers suggest to consumers that facilities-based providers are less reliable than 
MVNOs (even though MVNOs rely on facilities-based providers for service)?  Would it be feasible for 
non-facilities-based providers to ascertain and report percentages of sites in operation by county for the 
underlying network infrastructure they use to deliver service?  Should such providers instead be required 
simply to disclose with which facilities-based mobile wireless service providers they have contracted to 
provide service in a given area?  Would extending the reporting obligations and associated disclosures to 
non-facilities-based providers result in additional incentives for their underlying facilities-based providers 
to improve the resiliency of their networks?   
                                                     
55
In contrast, when cable or Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service outages occur, it can be more difficult to 
determine whether the root cause of service loss is due to network problems, or due to lack of power at the 
customer’s home. 
56
See supra note 2.
57
See infra note 62 (defining “reseller”). 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
14
32. Reporting Metric.  For consumers to make fair and reasonable comparisons across 
providers and services, the information must be presented in an accessible and usable form that 
consumers can process and interpret easily without formal training or technical expertise and that third 
parties can incorporate into various informational platforms and applications.
58
  Our proposal accordingly 
uses as a standard reporting metric the percentage of a mobile wireless service provider’s sites that are 
operational, i.e., not put out of service as the result of power loss, damage, interruption of transport, or 
other causal factors.
59
  We seek comment on the appropriateness of this standardized reporting metric as 
defined.  Is there a need to clarify with greater precision what it means for a site to be considered 
“operational”?  Are there ambiguous or borderline cases in which a site may or may not be considered 
“operational” or “providing service” as such terms are commonly used?  Should providers report 
percentages rounded to the nearest percentage point?
33. We seek comment on requiring mobile wireless service providers to report for public 
disclosure percentages of operational sites on a per-county basis.  This is how this information is currently 
reported in DIRS.
60
  Reporting by county enables the geographic scope of reporting to expand or contract 
(i.e., by adding or subtracting counties) as a disaster unfolds, while preserving a clear baseline for making 
comparisons among providers.  We seek comment on whether it is more useful to require reporting on a 
more or less granular level than per-county, and if so, what level?  We also seek comment on whether it 
would be sufficient for reporting providers to specify a single percentage of sites operational for a broader 
affected area than county level, such as an aggregate of all of the counties selected for reporting in the 
state?    
34. Should mobile wireless service providers also provide the underlying calculation basis to 
the FCC?  Should that happen on a presumptively confidential basis?  What additional information, if 
any, should providers be required to report for disclosure?  Should there be a minimum number of cell 
sites operated by a mobile wireless service provider in a county for reporting of the information to be 
required?  For example, if a provider has only three sites in a county, would the fact that one of these sites 
is out be probative as a percentage?  Should the required reporting further take into account variations in 
the types of cell sites a provider deploys, i.e., traditional “macro” cells vs. femtocells or other types of 
“small” cells.  If so, how?  Does comparing the overall percentage of each wireless service provider’s 
sites that are operating adequately address this potential concern since each provider could have sites of 
various types?  In seeking comment on these matters, we observe that providers themselves generally 
decline to distinguish among various cell site types when they report publicly during emergencies the 
percentages of their sites in operation in an affected area.
61
35. Should we consider alternative metrics?  If so, what are the relative costs and benefits of 
such alternatives in comparison to the proposed metric, keeping in mind our stated objectives in this 
proceeding?  Should we consider requiring reporting for disclosure along more than one metric, or 
granting mobile wireless service providers more flexibility to tailor the content of their reporting to 
                                                     
58
See supra Section III.C.
59
As a matter of practice, providers often co-locate the sites they use in deploying successive generations (e.g., 
GSM, UMTS, LTE) of mobile wireless technology.  Consistent with DIRS reporting practices, the proposed rules 
would count such co-located sites as a single “site” for purposes of tabulating site outage percentages. We seek 
comment on this aspect of the proposal. How should the rules account for instances in which only some of the 
antennas located at particular site are operational?  In such instances, should a provider be permitted to count the site 
as “operational”?
60
See, e.g., The FCC’s Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau Announces the Activation of the Disaster 
Information Reporting System in Response to Hurricane Sandy, Public Notice (PSHSB Oct. 29, 2012) (specifying 
counties subject to DIRS activation during Hurricane Sandy), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/files/documents/DIRS-Activation-PN-Sandy.pdf. 
61
See supra note 53.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
15
particular circumstances?  Would such flexibility undermine the ability of consumers to compare provider 
performance readily, thereby defeating one of the critical functions of the disclosure requirement?  Could 
the proposed requirements foster behavior from mobile wireless service providers aimed at “scoring well” 
on the reporting metric, even where doing so comes at the expense of allocating resources most 
effectively? How and why might such behavior realistically occur and to what extent? Are there likely to 
be trade-offs in practice between restoration of the greatest possible number of sites and restoration of 
those most critical to serving customers?  If so, if the proposed metric is used, would providers actually 
delay restoration of the sites that are most critical to their customers, notwithstanding that their customers 
will be able to detect whether or not their service is improving?  If so, under what circumstances would 
providers engage in these sorts of behaviors?  Please include specific examples in your comments.
36. Should we allow a mobile wireless service provider to count as a site “within” its 
network any site it actually uses to provide service during an emergency, regardless of whether it owns or 
controls the site?
62
  What effect would counting sites gained through sharing in both the numerator and 
the denominator of the percentage have on providers’ incentives to share?  Would this counting result in 
better or worse service for consumers as providers work to increase their own resiliency?  For example, if 
Provider A has sixty of ninety cell sites operating in a certain county, where Provider B has seventy-five 
of ninety operating, they would respectively report that sixty-seven percent and eighty-three percent of 
their sites are operational in that county.  If each provider granted the other access to its operational sites 
in that county, however, both providers’ reported percentages would increase substantially: Provider A 
would report seventy-seven percent ((60 + 75) divided by (90 + 75) = 135/165) and Provider B would 
report ninety percent ((75 + 60) divided by (90 + 60) = 135/150) of sites operational in the county.  We 
seek comment on whether this is the best method for counting such cell sites that are provided from one 
competitor to another.  Would such a provision appropriately account for sharing arrangements of the sort 
mobile wireless service providers are likely to implement in practice?  To the extent a “borrowed” site 
effectively replaces a site used during normal periods to provide service, should a mobile wireless service 
provider be permitted or required to discount the latter site when calculating its percentages of sites in 
operation?  Should a mobile wireless service provider be afforded only partial credit for its use of a 
borrowed site, given that it must share use of the site with the site’s operator (and perhaps with other 
mobile wireless service providers) and the site may not be optimally positioned to perform as a site within 
its network?  Should such a site be counted as one-half site for purposes of calculating the roaming 
provider’s percentage of sites in service?  
37. Rather than include such sites as part of its percentage calculations, should a mobile 
wireless service provider instead report separately the extent to which it used roaming or similar 
arrangements to augment its provision of service during an emergency?  If so, should providers report 
percentages both with and without adjustments made to reflect such arrangements?  If a facilities-based 
mobile wireless service provider uses roaming on a routine basis to expand its coverage footprint or 
network capacity in the counties designated for reporting during a disaster, should sites operated or 
controlled by its roaming partner within the affected area be counted as part of its network for purposes of 
calculating percentages of sites operational?  Are mobile wireless service providers likely to have 
visibility into the operational status of individual sites they routinely use on a roaming basis to provide 
service to their customers?  
38. Additionally, the proposal would allow providers to count as sites within their network 
any temporary sites, e.g., Cells on Wheels (COWs) and Cells on Light Trucks (COLTs), that they have 
deployed to provide supplementary coverage and capacity during an emergency.
63
  We seek comment on 
                                                     
62
The scope of the proposal, however, excludes those companies that merely purchase or resell service from other 
CMRS providers.  See supra para. 31.  We recognize that the term “reseller” has taken on different meanings in 
different contexts in FCC precedent. Here the term is meant to refer to those who do not own, operate, or maintain 
at least part of the network infrastructure used to provide CMRS. 
63
See PCIA Aug. 5 Ex Parte Filing at 2.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
16
this proposed treatment of temporarily deployed sites.  Rather than be counted as full sites, should such 
sites be counted on a fractional basis, e.g., as one-half of a site, given any attributes of COWs and COLTs 
such as coverage limitations?  If a mobile wireless service provider uses a COW or a COLT to replace a 
disabled site entirely, should it be required to count the disabled site in the percentage?  Given the 
operational complexities involved in deploying these sites, and their provisional and temporary nature, 
would it be more appropriate for mobile wireless service providers to report separately the extent to which 
temporary infrastructure is being used to augment their provision of service during an emergency?
39. We seek comment on the appropriateness of the proposed metric.  First, we seek 
comment on whether consumers are likely to find the metric useful or if a different metric better serve 
consumer needs.  Could the proposed metric unintentionally mislead consumers?  For example, might 
consumers think that the percentage of inoperable sites within a county equals the percentage of lost 
coverage?  Could the presence of overlapping coverage, heterogeneous architectures, and roaming 
arrangements with other carriers and other factors like Wi-Fi offload mean there is no one-to-one 
correlation between inoperable sites and lost coverage or capacity?
64
  If so, could reporting lead 
consumers to think that some carriers perform particularly well or particularly poorly even if both carriers 
end of with effectively the same coverage and capacity as one another throughout a disaster? How likely 
is it that providers reporting widely diverging percentages of sites in operation in a given county would be
providing their customers with comparable levels of service within that county?
40. Second, will consumers find this metric easy to understand, given that all mobile wireless 
service providers would report a single number on a one-hundred-point scale, with higher reported 
numbers representing a higher proportion of sites in service?  Does the metric require only minimal effort 
from consumers to process such information and use it to make comparisons among mobile wireless 
service providers?
41. Third, we seek comment on whether the percentage of cell sites that are operational 
would provide a substantively reasonable metric that consumers can use to compare the resiliency of 
wireless networks and services. Although the percentage of operational cell sites may not correlate 
precisely to the availability of service, as a general matter, the disabling of any site may at least 
marginally impair the ability of a network to deliver service to customers in the area covered by the site, 
and the cumulative impairment of service is likely to increase as the percentage of operational cell sites 
decreases. Thus, are significant differences in percentages between providers likely to reflect real 
differences in the level of service provided to customers?  Moreover, are such differences likely to be 
most apparent during major disasters?  Are such circumstances likely to coincide with increases in 
attempts to communicate over mobile wireless networks, which would amplify the significance of any 
disparities among providers in the percentages of sites they have in operation?  On the other hand, is it 
possible that the proposed metric risks overstating the degree to which cell site outages affect service 
availability?
65
If so, are there potential modifications that could be made to the metric to avoid this 
potential risk?
42. The reporting of percentages rather than absolute numbers of sites in operation seems 
likely to provide a better means for comparing relative performance across mobile wireless service 
providers because it can account for variations in the propagation characteristics of the spectrum bands in 
which they operate and the boundaries of mobile wireless service provider service territories. We seek 
comment on this issue.
                                                     
64
Commenters should consider whether the proposed metric discourage CMRS providers from adopting 
heterogeneous architectures, from deploying small cells and DAS, and from building macrosites with overlapping 
coverage?  
65
See CTIA July 17 Ex Parte at 1. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
17
43. We recognize that the proposed metric potentially has its limitations.  Modern mobile 
wireless networks are complex enterprises, and the technologies that support them continue to evolve at a 
rapid pace.  If we adopt a rule like the proposal, we would expect to review it periodically as technologies 
evolve to assess its continued effectiveness, and to determine if there are complementary or better ways to 
obtain and provide useful information for comparing the resiliency of mobile wireless networks.  The 
proposed metric does not specifically address emerging trends in network design that PCIA identifies, 
such as the proliferation of “small” cells or distributed antenna systems (DAS), that could improve 
network performance.
66
As providers continue to deploy a more diverse mix of cell types in their 
networks, there could be increasing numbers of cell sites that cannot feasibly be equipped with generators 
or dedicated sources of backup power.  That said, is it clear whether such design attributes are being 
developed and implemented widely throughout the industry, or whether there currently are significant 
divergences among providers in how they design and configure their networks that would suggest the 
need for more or more complex metrics that specifically take these potential complications into account
as PCIA suggests?  Along the same lines, providers uniformly cite the need to prioritize restoration of 
their most critical sites when responding to a disaster; would the proposed metric affect this practice.  
Also, as noted, providers themselves continue to provide the percentage of sites operational to the public 
from time to time during disasters, and federal agencies continue to use these figures to provide 
situational awareness.  We seek comment on these issues. Could such disclosures provide a reasonable 
basis for making comparisons among providers even if the metric is not perfectly suited to informing 
consumers exactly how providers would compare in serving them at any specific location?   
44. We seek comment on what metric would provide consumers with the best picture of a 
network’s operational status.  For instance, could the proposed metric provide a better indication of 
overall network health than would a purely coverage-based metric—even if accompanied by detailed 
coverage maps, etc.—given that the mere availability of coverage in an area does not guarantee network 
capacity sufficient to provide reliable service? What about a metric that focuses on the volume or 
percentage of access failures (i.e., “blocked calls”) experienced by a network? Is such a metric feasible, 
given that increases in the volume of traffic in the radio access network can limit the extent to which such 
measurements can be taken reliably?
67
  Does the proposed metric, on the other hand, provide information 
relevant to assessing both network coverage and the probability of completing a call? As the percentage 
of its cell sites in service decreases significantly, is a provider increasingly likely to experience both gaps 
in coverage and diminished capacity?  Are providers suffering extensive site outages likely to avoid 
noticeable deteriorations in service, particularly in relation to competitors that are operating at 
significantly closer to full capacity?  Are there more technically precise or sophisticated informational 
disclosures the Commission should consider that as easily enable consumers to make comparisons in 
disasters, in combination with or instead of the proposed metric?  
45. Timing and Frequency.  Under the proposal, DIRS activation would be the trigger for the 
reporting obligations.  That is, beginning with the activation of DIRS and for the period that DIRS is 
active, mobile wireless service providers operating in counties subject to the DIRS activation would be 
required to report for public disclosure on a daily basis the percentage of their sites within such counties 
that are “operational” as we have defined that term.
68
  In effect, DIRS activation could define both the 
temporal and geographic scope of “emergencies” under which mobile wireless service providers would be 
                                                     
66
See PCIA Aug. 5 Ex Parte at 2.
67
For example, it may be particularly difficult for CDMA and LTE technology to provide a means of measuring 
volumes of offered traffic, numbers of access failures or the percentages of access failures.  Furthermore, all 
wireless technologies may have difficulty providing this information when experiencing extremely high traffic 
loads. 
68
  The proposed rule set forth in Appendix A defines an operational site as one is “providing CMRS, 
notwithstanding commercial power loss, physical damage, backhaul or transport service disruption, or any other 
factor.” See infra Appendix A.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
18
required to report this information.  The proposal would require such information to be submitted during 
any DIRS activation that is announced by means of a public notice, whether considered a full or partial 
activation.
69
  This may be appropriate, given DIRS’s function as a forum for “report[ing] communications 
infrastructure status and situational awareness information during times of crisis.”
70
  Moreover, DIRS is a 
well-established reporting system in which almost all major mobile wireless service providers widely 
participate; those providers that have contact information on file are notified directly of activations, while 
others can be notified by means of public notice.  In addition, the overall extent of communications 
outages and impacts encountered during an event is a primary factor that drives the decision to activate 
DIRS; accordingly, we would expect that tying the proposed reporting to activation of DIRS would focus 
the reporting on circumstances in which it is most likely to generate meaningful information for 
consumers on the comparative resiliency of mobile wireless networks.  As a practical matter, it is not 
atypical for DIRS to be activated only a few times each year;
71
in the latter half of 2012, for instance, 
DIRS was activated in whole or in part only in connection with the “derecho” storm, Hurricane Isaac, and 
Superstorm Sandy.  We seek comment on the proposal to use activation of DIRS as a trigger for the 
reporting we propose in this NPRM.  Given the projected frequency of DIRS activations based on past 
experience, should we consider modifying the obligation so that reporting would be triggered more 
frequently? What would be the advantages, if any, of more frequent reporting? Would such advantages 
outweigh the benefits of tying the reporting to activation of DIRS? If so, how? 
46. If reporting and disclosures are tied to DIRS activation, the proposal would require
providers to report the specified information once every twenty-four hours while the DIRS system 
remains active.  These daily updates would enable consumers to assess the overall trajectory of a mobile 
wireless service provider’s network outages and restoration efforts during an emergency without 
subjecting the mobile wireless service provider to overly burdensome reporting obligations.  We seek 
comment on this frequency of reporting.  Would such reporting fail to capture “critical factors” such as 
those CTIA identifies, including “a provider’s service restoration practices that can make the information 
outdated in a matter of hours and the reliability of the network during the overwhelming majority of time 
that DIRS is not activated?”
72
  Would reporting on a daily basis provide a sufficiently detailed picture for 
the overall recovery progress of a provider in responding to a disaster? Could the reporting provide 
valuable information about network resiliency during major disasters, even if does not address network 
performance during normal periods of operation? On the other hand, would making the proposed 
reporting less frequent than once a day discourage providers from keeping up with the daily cycle 
established for DIRS reporting, leading to reduced situational awareness during disasters?
47. DIRS participants typically provide status updates in DIRS once each day, so adopting a 
similar schedule for the proposed reporting may generate efficiencies for mobile wireless service 
providers that participate already in DIRS.  To further standardize such reporting and align it with DIRS 
reporting practices, all reports of operational site percentages would be submitted at a time of day 
specified by the Commission in the public notice announcing the DIRS activation.  We seek comment on 
these aspects of the proposal.
48. Recognizing that service restoration during an emergency is a complex and dynamic 
process, should we require providers to make “reasonable efforts” to ensure that submitted information is 
current and accurate as of the time of filing.  To what extent would it differ from carriers do now in 
                                                     
69
Sometimes a modified version of DIRS is activated, which calls for only certain fields in the system to be 
completed and only by certain types of communications providers.  The Bureau often initiates this activation by 
contacting affected service providers directly to request information.  Under the proposal, such informal activations 
would trigger disclosure obligations only if accompanied by a public notice announcing the activation.  
70
See DIRS Public Notice at 1.
71
A comprehensive list of DIRS activations since its inception in 2007 is set forth in Appendix C.  
72
CTIA July 17 Ex Parte Filing at 1.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
19
reporting under DIRS?  Should we consider specifying in more detail the “reasonable efforts” required 
from providers in verifying the currency and accuracy of submitted information?  Should we require 
providers to submit unsworn declarations attesting to the accuracy of their submissions?
73
  We seek 
comment on this aspect of the proposal.
49. We seek comment on this proposed frequency and schedule for reporting of percentages 
of sites in operation.  Would a requirement to report operational site percentages during an emergency, 
notwithstanding the voluntary reporting that providers already engage in on the same timetable, 
significantly divert resources away from service restoration or other emergency response activities?  If so, 
how?  Should the Commission consider granting providers additional time to report this information?  If 
so, how long?  Would delay in publication of such information diminish its significance and utility for 
consumers or impact whether its disclosure would likely drive provider improvements in reliability during 
disasters?  Are consumers more likely to consider such information as a basis for comparing and selecting 
among providers if the information is made available to them during or shortly after a disaster? 
50. Finally, the proposal’s reporting and associated disclosures would be programmatically 
separate from DIRS, and their implementation would leave intact the scope, confidentiality presumptions, 
and other operational parameters of DIRS.  The proposal would make public only a subset of information 
that can be derived from information contained in DIRS filings, i.e., percentages of sites in operation by 
county, but they would not make publicly available any DIRS information per se.  Would the proposal’s 
disclosures be consistent with the overarching purposes of DIRS?  Would they threaten the effectiveness 
of this important, voluntary program? If so, how?  The Commission established a presumption of 
confidentiality protection for DIRS information when it created the program in 2007 in recognition of the 
fact that “DIRS filings voluntarily report weaknesses in and damages to the national communications 
infrastructure.”
74
  The public disclosure of such information, we then determined, could “potentially 
facilitate terrorist targeting of critical infrastructure and key resources” or “competitively harm the filers 
by revealing information about the types and deployment of their equipment and the traffic.”
75
  The 
network-level public disclosures of operational site percentages by county, however, would not require 
providers to reveal information about the status of any individual site that could render it more vulnerable 
to attack, and thus it does not appear that the proposed disclosure could be used to facilitate destructive 
acts against a provider’s network.  Similarly, the proposal does not require disclosure of potentially 
competitively sensitive information about specific deployment and operational practices, which have 
typically been accorded confidential treatment.  Rather, the type of disclosures we propose—percentages 
of sites in operation by provider—is consistent with the public disclosures that competitors often make of 
the general performance of their products or services.
76
  We seek comment on these issues.
51. In addition, we seek comment on the extent to which the disclosures proposed in this 
NPRM or similar proposals could have any unintended impact on DIRS reporting.  Could such 
disclosures impair the ability of the Commission to obtain detailed DIRS reports from mobile wireless 
service providers in the future, or otherwise detract from the effectiveness of the DIRS program?
77
  Are 
                                                     
73
See 47 § C.F.R. 1.16. 
74
DIRS Public Notice at 2.
75
Id. 
76
See supra note 53.
77
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (“FOIA Exemption 4”); see also National Parks and Conservation Ass’n. v. Morton, 498 
F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (National Park) (providing that FOIA Exemption 4 applies when public disclosure 
of commercial or financial information submitted to the government “is likely . . . to impair the Government’s 
ability to obtain necessary information in the future”); see also Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 
879 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (clarifying that FOIA Exemption 4 also protects program effectiveness, among other 
government interests). 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
20
there steps the Commission could take to mitigate any such unintended impacts?  Are there effective 
alternative reporting metrics that would not require disclosure of information that may be presumed
confidential?
52. The competitive concerns that partially underlie the confidential treatment afforded to 
DIRS and NORS filings may be inapposite in this proceeding.  In establishing confidentiality protections 
for NORS filings, the Commission acknowledged the concerns of some providers that publicly reported 
outage information “[h]ad been used by competitors to wage marketing campaigns.”
78
  The limited 
informational disclosures may apply competitive pressure to providers to bolster the resiliency of their 
mobile wireless network infrastructure.  Accordingly, would the incorporation of such disclosed 
information into “marketing campaigns” improve public safety rather than detract from the effectiveness 
of these disclosures?  Moreover, the proposal’s disclosure would not likely contain trade secrets or other 
privileged information, such that its disclosure would compromise the operation of the mobile wireless 
marketplace.  In reporting its percentages of sites in operation, a provider would not be required to reveal 
anything about its underlying practices or techniques for achieving network resiliency.  The focus of the 
reporting is on outcomes—how well networks withstand disaster conditions—not on the business 
judgments or other factors that determine these outcomes.  Would such disclosures discourage 
competition or innovation?  Would such disclosures encourage more robust competition among providers 
to improve the resiliency of their networks?  In short, would such disclosures improve consumer welfare?  
We seek comment on these questions.
53. Manner of Disclosure and Associated Recordkeeping.  The proposal would require that 
mobile wireless service providers report their operational site percentages to the Commission in a 
machine-readable format.  The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, with any necessary support 
from other bureaus and offices, would compile the reported information and to post it on the Commission
website in an easily accessed location, in a format that enables comparisons to be made among providers.  
We seek comment on ensuring that reported information is effectively disclosed and made available to 
consumers.  Could the Commission undertake additional efforts to make the information more accessible 
to consumers or to third parties that may seek to incorporate the information into “apps” or other tools for 
consumers?  How likely is it that mobile wireless service providers would also provide additional 
information and analyses by other means, including by posting it on their websites or citing it in press 
releases or advertisements. 
54. We seek comment on whether we should establish rules requiring providers to maintain 
adequate records for some limited period of time of the internal processes and deliberations that support 
the operational site percentages or any other information they are required to report.  If so, what sorts of 
records should we require providers to keep, and in what form?  What time period for retention might be 
sufficient and why?  Do providers already keep records of information that supports their reporting in 
DIRS?  If so, what sorts of records and for how long?  Are there incentives for providers to voluntarily 
keep records, for instance, to provide evidentiary support for their reported percentages in the event of a 
dispute or enforcement action?  What costs and benefits would be associated with the adoption of any 
recordkeeping requirements the Commission might adopt?  Are there ways of minimizing such costs 
while ensuring that adequate records are kept?
55. Applicability to Smaller Mobile Wireless Service Providers.  Finally, we seek comment 
on the applicability of the proposed reporting obligations and associated disclosures to smaller mobile 
wireless service providers.  We observe that many small mobile wireless service providers routinely file 
daily reports in DIRS as do larger providers.  We seek comment on whether it would be particularly 
costly or difficult for smaller mobile wireless service providers to comply with these proposed obligations 
or similar ones.  Should our requirements make special provisions for these mobile wireless service 
providers? Do they need extended periods of time in which to report the information and, if so, why?  
                                                     
78
See Part 4 Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 16854-55 ¶¶ 44-45.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
21
Would relaxed treatment for smaller providers unfairly limit their customers’ ability to compare their 
providers’ performance with that of their competitors? If we decide that smaller mobile wireless service 
providers merit special treatment under our rules, how should we delineate this class of mobile wireless 
service providers?  In seeking comment on these matters, we observe that the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
of 1980, as amended,
79
(RFA) specifically directs us to consider the effects of proposed rules on small 
entities.  Our Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is set forth as Appendix B hereto.
56. Further Study.  Alternatively, should the Commission refer the question of providing 
greater transparency into network recovery efforts of CMRS providers to CSRIC or TAC before adopting 
any reporting or disclosure requirements?  Are there some issues that should be carved off for further 
study while the Commission proceeds with others?  Why? We ask that commenters define with 
specificity any issue on which either advisory body should be charged with developing recommendations, 
the timing anticipated for such work, and the value that such recommendations would be expected to 
provide. Could the efforts of CSRIC and TAC effectively lead to similar benefits for consumers and 
improvements to network resiliency that the proposed reporting in this NPRM is aimed at providing?
2. Other Measures
57. We also seek comment on whether there are alternative or complementary measures for 
improving wireless network reliability that the Commission should consider in this proceeding or  
subsequently.  Commenters identifying such measures should address their associated costs and benefits, 
and whether such measures should be considered as alternatives to or as complements of the reporting and 
disclosures we propose in this NPRM. 
58. Alternative Informational Disclosures.  We first seek comment on whether the 
Commission should consider informational disclosures that differ in kind from the sorts of disclosures we 
have proposed. One possibility is to require mobile wireless providers to make available, as many 
electrical utilities already do,
80
outage maps that document the availability of coverage within their 
service territories on an ongoing basis.
81
  We seek comment on adopting a requirement that mobile 
wireless providers make such maps available, during disasters and perhaps during normal periods of 
operation as well.  How burdensome would it be to provide such maps, and how useful would they be to 
consumers? 
59. Another possibility is that the Commission require mobile wireless service providers to 
report or disclose information about the practices they have implemented to promote the reliability of 
their networks. Under this option, the Commission might require mobile wireless service providers to 
report detailed information about their provisioning of back-up power (e.g., percentages of sites equipped, 
duration of supply, technologies used) as well as available supplementary deployments (e.g., quantities 
of COWs and COLTs, portable generators) they undertake to improve the resiliency of their networks. 
Were we to require disclosures along these lines, would consumers be able to understand and use the 
information to draw reasonable inferences about the comparative resiliency of wireless networks, or 
would such disclosures inundate consumers with more information than they could reasonably be 
                                                     
79
See 5 U.S.C. § 603.  The RFA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12, has been amended by the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, 110 Stat. 857.
80
See, e.g., Public Service of New Hampshire, Outage Map, http://www.psnh.com/outage (last visited July 3, 2013);  
AEP Ohio, Outages & Problems, https://www.aepohio.com/outages/ (last visited July 3, 2013); Pacific Gas and 
Electric, Outages, http://www.pge.com/myhome/customerservice/outages/ (last visited July 3, 2013).
81
In Japan, some mobile wireless service providers have already begun providing such information voluntarily on a 
daily basis during disasters.  In the wake of a destructive 2011 typhoon, Japanese mobile phone operators, including 
NTT DoCoMo, began voluntarily making daily public disclosures during disasters of service information about 
affected areas and the progress of cellular restoration and estimated time of recovery.  See NTT DoCoMo, 
Restoration Area Map (filed in the instant proceeding on July 16, 2013), available at 
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7520928405.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
22
expected to process?  Would consumers understand which of these practices lead to different results, or is 
it preferable to focus on public reporting of a simple measure of comparative results among providers 
rather than on a number of dimensions of preparation?  Would public disclosure of certain details of a 
provider’s plans and resources for handling emergency situations pose a security risk?  Are there other 
types of informational disclosures we have not identified, consistent with sound security policies, that 
would be useful to consumers or would otherwise advance network reliability?  Are there less costly or 
less burdensome alternative measures that would accomplish the same intended objectives as the
proposal? 
60. Relationship with Mobile MBA Program. Next, we seek comment on the interplay 
between the reporting and disclosures proposed herein and the Commission’s Mobile Measuring 
Broadband America (Mobile MBA) program.
82
  Under the Mobile MBA program, mobile wireless 
customers will voluntarily install an “app” that enables their devices to take direct measurements of 
network performance (e.g., throughput, latency, cell site availability) at specified intervals and upload the 
data to a central server.  Such a program could complement or replace the proposed disclosures by 
providing information on day-to-day network performance.  We seek comment on the relationship 
between the two initiatives. Could the robust implementation of the Mobile MBA program eventually
generate sufficient participation and information that would obviate the need for mobile wireless service 
provider reporting and associated disclosures of the sort we envision in this NPRM?  Are there additional 
ways in which the two programs can serve complementary purposes?  If so, how? 
61. Performance Standards.  In its May 13 letter, Consumers Union recommends that the 
Commission use reporting metrics such as those considered herein “to set a schedule for phasing in 
improved performance standards as rapidly as possible.”
83
As an initial matter, we seek comment on 
whether successful implementation of the proposed reporting and disclosure rule could obviate the need 
for adoption of such standards.  Would reporting and disclosure alone be sufficient to facilitate wireless 
network resiliency while enabling wireless providers to maintain the operational flexibility they claim is 
necessary to effectively implement back-up power solutions?
84
  Alternatively, should we consider 
performance standards of the sort Consumers Union proposes?   Would the burden and cost of adopting 
performance standards exceed the benefits, particularly given the frequency or infrequency, or duration, 
of commercial power outages?  Could the Commission take other complementary steps, short of adopting 
specific requirements, to encourage mobile wireless service providers to provide more robust back-up 
power for their cell sites or other critical communications facilities?
85
62. If we should consider performance standards as a possible alternative, we seek comment 
on what form such standards should take.  For example, should we consider emergency back-up power 
requirements similar to the requirements the Commission previously adopted for mobile wireless 
networks but never made effective?
86
  Could we grant mobile wireless service providers greater flexibility 
                                                     
82
See FCC to Launch Mobile Broadband Services Testing and Measurement Program, CC Docket 09-68, Public 
Notice, DA 12-1442 (2012), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/mobile-broadband-measurement. 
83
Consumers Union Letter at 2.
84
See, e.g., Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association, PS Docket 11-60 at 14-17 (July 7, 2011).
85
We note that the 911 Reliability NPRM contains proposals for regulating the provision of back-up power by “9-1-
1 service providers,” but we observe that such requirements would apply only to facilities, such as central offices,
that are critical to the operation of 911 networks and involved in routing 911 calls and location information directly 
to a Public Safety Answering Point.  See 911 Reliability NPRM, 28 FCC Rcd at 3424-25 ¶ 23. As such, the 
requirements proposed in that notice would not typically apply to mobile wireless network facilities or cell sites that 
allow subscribers to originate 911 calls, and the adoption of such requirements would thus have no direct bearing on 
any matters put forward for consideration in this NPRM.
86
The Commission, in 2007, adopted—but never made effective—a requirement that CMRS providers supply each 
of their cell sites with a back-up power supply capable of providing eight hours of service in the event of 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
23
than the previous rule, for example, by applying global back-up power standards to networks as a whole 
rather than to each individual site?  If we were to specify a minimum duration for provision of back-up 
power, what would be a reasonable threshold, taking into consideration the capability of currently 
available back-up power technologies, including batteries?  Since loss of backhaul service (i.e., the 
connectivity between a site and the rest of the network) is also a major cause of cell site unavailability 
during emergencies, should the Commission consider adoption of performance standards to promote more 
redundant backhaul provisioning and what should those standards include? What are the incremental 
benefits of such standards and do they exceed the costs and burdens? Finally, if performance standards 
are appropriate, should we consider phasing in such standards over time? 
63. Voluntary Industry Measures. We also seek comment on whether heightened 
transparency and resiliency of mobile wireless networks could be achieved adequately through voluntary 
measures.  We note one recent example of voluntary measures undertaken by industry to address 
consumer issues by empowering consumers through greater transparency. In light of concerns that 
substantial numbers of wireless consumers had experienced “Bill Shock”—a sudden, unexpected increase 
in their wireless bills—the Commission in October 2010 proposed rules requiring carriers to alert 
consumers as they approach, and again as the reach limits of plan minutes, texts, data, and international 
roaming.
87
  In October 2011, the Commission announced an agreement between it, Consumers Union, 
CTIA, and certain wireless carriers that these carriers would provide free, automatic Bill Shock alerts on a 
voluntary basis, pursuant to CTIA’s Code of Conduct.
88
  The alert requirements were phased in, 
culminating in the April 2013 announcement that all participating carriers now provide the alerts as 
promised.
89
  As a result, CTIA states that approximately 97 percent of consumers are protected against 
Bill Shock for voice, text, data, and international roaming services.
90
  The Commission established a 
website to enable consumers to easily identify participating carriers’ specific Bill Shock alert policies and 
thresholds.
91
64. We seek comment on whether a similar voluntary initiative might feasibly achieve the 
improvements to consumer choice and network resiliency that are the objectives of this proceeding.  If so, 
how might such an initiative work in practice?  Could a voluntary initiative involving wireless industry 
and consumer advocacy groups timely develop additional or improved metrics about service availability 
and network performance during natural disasters that result in extensive service outages that would meet 
the objectives of providing consumers with information that they may find useful, and spurring 
comparisons and competition that result in greater reliability? Would such an initiative be likely to 
produce candid and transparent reporting of information to consumers, even from providers that must 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
commercial power loss.  See Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane 
Katrina on Communications Networks, Order, 22 FCC Rcd. 10541, 10565 (2007) (Katrina Panel Order), on recon., 
22 FCC Rcd 18013 (2007), vacated, CTIA v. FCC, Nos. 07-1475 et al. (Order dated July 31, 2009).  The 
Commission renewed examination of this issue in the 2011 Notice of Inquiry, where it sought comment more 
broadly on the technical and logistical aspects of provisioning back-up power and on whether the Commission 
should consider forms of back-up power regulation that offer service providers greater flexibility than the eight-
hours-per-site requirement the Commission adopted previously.  See Reliability NOI, 26 FCC Rcd at 5621-22 ¶¶ 23-
25.
87
Empowering Consumers to Avoid Bill Shock, Consumer Information and Disclosure, CG Docket Nos. 10-207, 09-
158, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 FCC Rcd 14625 (2010). 
88
See Comments of former Chairman Julius Genachowski at Bill Shock Event, (Apr. 17, 2010) 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-310290A1.pdf.
89
See FCC Marks Milestone in Effort to Eliminate “Bill Shock,” News Release (Apr. 13, 2013).
90
See id.
91
See http://www.fcc.gov/bill-shock-alerts.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
24
report poor performance? Additionally, are there opportunities for public-private initiatives that could 
help achieve the objectives? Could a real-time crowdsourcing approach work?
E. Legal Authority
1. Statutory Considerations
65. We seek comment on whether reporting requirements of the sort proposed in this NPRM
would be within the Commission’s authority under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.  In 
particular, we note that section 201(b) the Act authorizes the Commission to “prescribe rules and 
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions” of the Act.  These 
provisions include the requirement that the practices of common carriers, including CMRS providers, are 
“just and reasonable” and not “unjust or unreasonable.”
92
  The Commission has asserted this authority in 
other contexts as a basis for requiring carriers to make available to the public information that enables 
consumers to make informed decisions about whether to purchase or retain a service.
93
  To the extent they 
promote “just and reasonable” practices relating to the resiliency of mobile wireless networks during 
emergencies, would the reporting and disclosures proposed in this NPRM, or similar proposals, advance 
the foundational purpose of the Commission articulated in section 1 of the Communications Act, namely 
that of “promoting the safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communications”?
94
66. Are there other Title II or Title III provisions that would provide a legal basis for the 
adoption of requirements of the sort we propose insofar as they extend to the provision of CMRS 
services? Could such mandatory reporting of network reliability data for public disclosure be grounded in 
section 214(d)’s requirement that a common carrier “provide itself with adequate facilities for the 
expeditious and efficient performance of its service as a common carrier”
95
and to “undertake 
improvements in facilities” to meet public demand?
96
Would the proposed requirements also fall within 
the Commission’s authority under section 218 to obtain from common carriers “full and complete 
information necessary to enable the Commission to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which 
it was created?”
97
  With respect to CMRS service, would such proposals be within the scope of our 
“broad authority” under Title III?
98
  We seek comment in particular on the applicability of Sections 301 
and 316, and our authority under section 303(b) to “[p]rescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by 
each class of licensed stations and each station within any class.”
99
  Section 301 provides for licensing of 
                                                     
92
See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
93
See, e.g., Anti-Slamming 2d R&O/FNPRM, 14 FCC Rcd 1508, 1581-84 (1998); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1190(d); STI 
Telecom Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 26 FCC Rcd 12808, 12813-34 (2011); NOS 
Communications, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 16 FCC Rcd 8133, 8133 (2001); Computer III 
Further Remand Proceedings, Report and Order in CC Dockets 95-20 and 98-10, 14 FCC Rcd 4289, 4322 (1999).
94
See 47 U.S.C. § 151.
95
47 U.S.C. § 214(d).
96
RCA Communications, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 44 F.C.C.2d 613 ¶ 17 (1956).  Although section 
214(d) requires a “full opportunity for hearing,” that requirement may be satisfied by notice and comment 
rulemaking.  See, e.g., Amendment of Parts 65 and 69, 10 FCC Rcd 6788 ¶¶ 56-57 (1995), citing AT&T v. FCC, 572 
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1978) (identical language in section 205(a)).  See generally United States v. Storer Broadcasting 
Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 617-18 (2d Cir. 1968); California Citizens 
Band Ass’n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (9
th
Cir. 1967) (interpreting other hearing requirements set forth in the 
Act).
97
47 U.S.C. § 218.
98
Cellco Partnership v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  See also id. at 542 (“expansive powers”), 
quoting NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
99
47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303(b), 316.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
25
CMRS providers, and Section 316 authorizes the Commission to modify such licenses “if in the judgment 
of the Commission such action will promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”
100
  Would 
the foregoing sources of authority, when coupled with our authority to “generally encourage the larger 
and more effective use of radio in the public interest,” and to adopt rules “as may be necessary to carry 
out the provisions of th[e] Act,” extend to the proposed disclosure requirements, as less restrictive ways 
of promoting more reliable service by wireless providers?
101
67. Also, we seek comment on the applicability of the Commission’s authority over 911 
service. The Nation’s 911 system is part of its critical communications infrastructure, and the 
Commission plays a key role ensuring that the communications networks, including those of mobile 
wireless service providers, promote public safety, especially on matters involving national security and 
emergency preparedness of the United States.
102
  Indeed, Congress established the Commission in part to 
promote the “safety of life and property.”
103
  Consequently, the Commission also enjoys “broad public 
safety and 9-1-1 authority.”
104
With mobile wireless service subscribers originating an increasing share of 
the nation’s 911 calls—already the great majority and measured at as high as 75 percent in some 
areas
105
—the resiliency of mobile wireless networks is becoming ever more critical to the reliable 
provision of 911 service.  Accordingly, we seek comment on the extent to which the Commission’s 
authority over 911 service could provide additional support for the adoption of requirements proposed in 
this NPRM or similar requirements.
2. First Amendment
68. We seek comment on whether the reporting requirements proposed in this NPRM, like 
the “anti-cramming” rules the Commission adopted in 2012,
106
could withstand scrutiny under the First 
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.  In general, government regulation of commercial speech will be 
found compatible with the First Amendment if it meets the criteria laid out in Central Hudson:  (1) there 
is a substantial government interest; (2) the regulation directly advances the substantial government 
interest; and (3) the proposed regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
107
Under the standard set forth in Zauderer, compelled disclosure of “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
information is permissible if “reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of 
consumers.”
108
  We seek comment on which of these two standards, or any other standard, would apply to 
the proposals set forth in this NPRM, and whether the proposals would satisfy that standard.
                                                     
100
47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 316.
101
47 U.S.C. §§ 303(g), 303(r).  See Cellco Partnership v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
102
See Exec. Order No. 12,472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications 
Functions, 49 Fed. Reg. 13471 (1984), as amended by Exec. Order 13,286, Amendment of Executive Orders, and 
Other Actions, in Connection With the Transfer of Certain Functions to the Secretary of Homeland Security, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 10619 (2003), and Exec. Order 13,407, Public Alert and Warning System, 71 Fed. Reg. 36975 (2006).
103
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 151.
104
See Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302, 311 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
105
See supra note 42.
106
See Empowering Consumers to Prevent and Detect Billing for Unauthorized Charges, et al., CG Docket No. 11-
116, et al., Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 27 FCC Rcd 4436 (2012) (Anti-
Cramming Order).
107
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  Commercial 
speech that is potentially misleading has less First Amendment protection, and misleading commercial speech is not 
protected at all and may be prohibited.  Id. at 563-64.  
108
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco v. FDA, 
696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
26
69. In particular, we seek comment on whether reporting obligations of the sort we propose 
in this NPRM would meet the Central Hudson criteria.  The Commission has  previously observed that 
“the government has a substantial interest in ensuring that consumers are able to make intelligent and 
well-informed commercial decisions in an increasingly competitive marketplace.”
109
  The government 
also has a substantial interest, enshrined in Section 1 of the Communications Act, in protecting the safety 
of the public through the use of radio communications.
110
  We seek comment on whether the reporting 
requirement proposed in this NPRM would directly advance these interests by making available for public 
disclosure information about the operational status of mobile wireless networks during emergencies, 
where designed to create incentives for mobile wireless service providers to improve the resiliency of 
these networks.  What sort of additional factual record, if any, would the Commission need to develop to 
establish that the proposed reporting “directly advances” these substantial government interests? 
70. We note that the proposed requirements would require reporting only of a single, fact-
based metric, one that can be calculated from information that providers already tabulate and routinely 
report in DIRS filings. Such regulation is different in kind from minimum back-up power requirements 
previously adopted by the Commission, or other forms of direct regulation of wireless network facilities 
or practices. Moreover, in other contexts the proposed reporting of information to the government for 
purposes of compilation and disclosure that has been deemed less restrictive than requiring “companies 
themselves to publicly post detailed information in a particular format.”
111
  In addition, we observe that 
the proposed reporting would in no way restrict providers from disclosing information of their own 
choosing directly to the public, as many already do, to provide a fuller context for assessing the 
performance of their networks during an emergency.  We seek comment on the relevance of these 
considerations.
71. Finally, we seek comment on the applicability of the Zauderer standard to reporting 
obligations of the sort proposed in this NPRM.  Would the reported information qualify as “purely factual 
and uncontroversial,” provided that the reporting metric is defined with sufficient clarity and precision?  
Would the prevailing usage of operational site percentages among providers as a means of reporting 
progress in disaster recovery undermine any claim that such information is non-factual or controversial?  
Could the proposed reporting be construed as being “reasonably related to the State’s interest in 
preventing deception of customers?”  What sort of additional factual record, if any, would the 
Commission need to develop to establish such a relationship?  Could such a relationship be established 
even in the absence of evidence of any intent to deceive?  For instance, would the proposed reporting 
“reasonably relate[]” to preventing deception of customers insofar as disclosure of the reported 
information alerts customers to deficiencies in network resiliency of which they were previously unaware 
and which may have affected their prior purchasing decisions had the information been made available to 
them? Are there are other ways of establishing a reasonable relationship between reporting of the sort we 
propose and the prevention of consumer deception?  
F. Procedural Matters  
1. Regulatory Flexibility Act
72. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA),
112
the Commission has 
prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) for this NPRM, of the possible significant 
                                                     
109
See Consumer Information and Disclosure et al., CG Docket 09-158 et al., Notice of Inquiry, 24 FCC Rcd 11380, 
11389-90 ¶ 21 (2009) (citing Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, First Report and Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 98-170, 14 FCC Rcd 7492, 7531 ¶ 61 (1999)).  
110
See 47 U.S.C. § 151.
111
  See American Petroleum Institute v. SEC, Civil Action No. 12-1668, slip op. at 27 (D.D.C. July 2, 2013) (Bates, 
J.) (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988)).
112
See 5 U.S.C. § 603.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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economic impact on small entities of the proposals addressed in this document.  The IRFA is set forth as 
Appendix B.  Written public comments are requested on this IRFA.  Comments must be identified as 
responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments on the NPRM provided on or 
before the dates indicated on the first page of this NPRM.  The Commission’s Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, will send a copy of this NPRM, including 
the IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA).
113
  In 
addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.
114
2. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
73. This document contains proposed new information collection requirements. The 
Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and 
OMB to comment on the information collection requirements contained in this document, as required by 
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13.  In addition, pursuant to the Small Business 
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment 
on how we might further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer 
than 25 employees.
3. Ex Parte Rules
74. The proceeding is a part is a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the 
Commission’s ex parte rules.
115
  Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written 
presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the 
presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies).  Persons making oral 
ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all 
persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made;, 
and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation.  If the presentation 
consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter’s 
written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to 
such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant 
page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them 
in the memorandum.  Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are 
deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b).  In 
proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of 
electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, 
and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that 
proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf).  Participants in 
this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission’s ex parte rules.
4. Comment Filing Procedures
75. Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR §§ 1.415, 1.419, 
interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first 
page of this document.  Comments should be filed in PS Docket No. 13-239.  Comments may be filed 
using the Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS).  See Electronic Filing of Documents 
in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
? Electronic Filers:  Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the 
ECFS:  http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/.  
                                                     
113
See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a).
114
See id.
115
47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200, 1.1202 et seq.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
28
? Paper Filers:  Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each 
filing.  
Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by first-
class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail.  All filings must be addressed to the Commission’s 
Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
? All hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission’s Secretary 
must be delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445 12
th
St., SW, Room TW-A325, 
Washington, DC 20554.  The filing hours are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.   All hand deliveries 
must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners.  Any envelopes and boxes must be 
disposed of before entering the building.  
? Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and Priority 
Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights, MD  20743.
? U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail must be addressed to 445 12
th
Street, SW, Washington DC 20554.
People with Disabilities:  To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, 
large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & 
Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (tty).
Confidential Materials:  Parties wishing to file materials with a claim of confidentiality should follow the 
procedures set forth in section 0.459 of the Commission’s rules. Confidential submissions may not be 
filed via ECFS but rather should be filed with the Secretary’s Office following the procedures set forth in 
47 C.F.R. Section 0.459.  Redacted versions of confidential submissions may be filed via ECFS.
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES
76. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 201(b), 214(d), 
218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i)-(j) & (o), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 
251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c,that 
this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in PS Docket No. 13-239 and PS Docket No. 11-60 IS ADOPTED.
77. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission’s Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, SHALL SEND a copy of this Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of 
the Small Business Administration.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
29
APPENDIX A
Proposed Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications Commission proposes to amend 
47 CFR part 4 as follows:
PART 4 – DISRUPTIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS
1.   The authority citation for part 4 continues to read as follows:
Authority:  Sec. 5, 48 Stat.1068, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 1154, 155, 201, 251, 307, 316, 615a-1, 
1302(a), and 1302(b).
2.   Section 4.15 is added to read as follows:
§ 4.15  Disaster Reporting Requirements for Commercial Mobile Radio Services Providers
(a) Definitions. For purposes of Section 4.15 only, the following definitions apply:
(i) Network site. Any land station controlled or operated by a Commercial Mobile Radio Service 
(CMRS) provider and used by it during periods of normal operation to provide CMRS; any land station 
deployed by such provider on a temporary basis during a period of activation of the Disaster Information 
Reporting System (DIRS) for the purpose of providing CMRS; or any land station not under the operation 
or control of such provider but actually used by it to provide CMRS during a period of DIRS activation, 
under a roaming agreement or other arrangement. Co-located transmitters or antennas used by the same 
provider to provide CMRS using different technologies shall be treated as a single network site. 
(ii) Operational site. A network site that is providing CMRS, notwithstanding commercial power loss, 
physical damage, backhaul or transport service disruption, or any other factor. 
(b) Facilities-based CMRS providers are required to report the information specified in section (c) below 
during periods of activation of the DIRS system, but only when such activation is announced by means of 
a public notice. 
(i) In carrying out the reporting specified in section (c) below, providers shall report only with respect to 
counties subject to the DIRS activation.
(ii) The reporting specified in section (c) shall be made at the time specified in the public notice 
announcing the DIRS activation, or as soon as possible thereafter, each day the DIRS system remains 
activated unless otherwise specified by the Commission. 
(c) Under the circumstances specified in section (b) above, CMRS providers shall report to the 
Commission the percentage of their network sites in each county that are operational sites at the time the 
percentage is reported. Providers shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that all reported information is 
accurate and current as of the time it is reported.
(d) Providers shall carry out the reporting required under subsection (c) by submitting the required 
information to the Federal Communications Commission in a machine-readable format, and in 
accordance with any guidance the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) may issue with 
respect to such submissions. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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(e) The Bureau shall compile the information reported under subsection (c) and publicly disclose the 
information on the Federal Communications Commission website, http://www.fcc.gov, in a prominent 
and easily accessed location and in a manner that enables comparisons to be made among providers. The 
Bureau may also, take additional measures as appropriate to make this information more accessible and 
useful to consumers.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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APPENDIX B
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA),
1
the 
Commission has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities by the recommendations in this Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making (NPRM).  Written public comments are requested on this IRFA.  Comments must 
be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments provided in 
“Comment Period and Procedures” of this NPRM.  The Commission will send a copy of this NPRM, 
including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA).
2
  In 
addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.
3
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
2. The American public relies increasingly on mobile wireless networks to communicate, 
with the great majority of calls to 911 already originating on wireless networks and a large and growing 
number of households having only wireless phones.  Notwithstanding these trends, during Superstorm 
Sandy and other recent storms, mobile wireless networks suffered extensive site outages, seriously 
impairing the ability of millions of customers to summon emergency assistance, receive emergency 
information, and reach their loved ones.  Although some service disruptions may be unavoidable during a 
major emergency, and surges in demand for wireless service at those times present added challenges, the 
current state of affairs is not acceptable and requires action.  We believe that better service and hardening 
of mobile wireless networks is feasible and could dramatically reduce the severity of these problems, 
which are not incurred in equal measure by all mobile wireless providers. 
3. Accordingly, our central proposal in this NPRM is to require facilities-based commercial 
mobile radio service (CMRS) providers to report to the Commission for public disclosure, on a daily basis 
during and following major emergencies, the percentage of cell sites within their networks that are 
providing CMRS.  These disclosures would be made for each county in the designated disaster area.  This 
information is currently included in voluntary reports provided electronically to the Commission by 
mobile wireless service providers in disasters, but on a presumptively confidential basis.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we believe that requiring reporting and public disclosure of the information proposed 
could benefit consumers while also advancing public safety.  First, public disclosure could enable 
consumers to reasonably compare the performance of mobile wireless service providers on a sufficiently 
similar basis during major emergencies to help consumers to make more informed decisions when 
selecting mobile wireless products and services.  Second, empowering consumers with this information 
on an ongoing basis could in turn apply competitive pressure on mobile wireless service providers to 
invest in material improvements to their respective network infrastructures or take other actions to 
improve the reliability and resiliency of their networks. Third, the standardized disclosure of such 
information could provide policymakers with useful information and potentially spark an honest and more 
informed public safety and communications dialogue, perhaps including consideration of possible barriers 
to greater reliability of mobile wireless networks. 
                                                     
1
See 5 U.S.C. § 603.  The RFA, 5 U.S.C. § 601-12., has been amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121. tit. II, 110 Stat. 857.
2
See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a).
3
See id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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4. In addition to seeking comments below on specific transparency proposals, we also explore 
alternative or complementary approaches and seek more general comment on other steps the Commission 
could take if necessary to achieve the goals of greater mobile wireless network transparency and reliability.
B.  Legal Basis
5. The legal basis for the rules and rule changes proposed in this NPRM are contained in 
Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 201(b), 214(d), 218,  251(e)(3),301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 
309(j), 316, 332,403, 615a-1, and 615c of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 
151, 154(i), 154(j), 154(o), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3),301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 307, 
309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c. 
C.  Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which Rules Will Apply
6. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, where feasible, an estimate of, 
the number of small entities that may be affected by the proposed rules adopted herein.
4
  The RFA 
generally defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” 
“small organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.”
5
  In addition, the term “small business” has 
the same meaning as the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act.
6
  A small business 
concern is one which:  (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of 
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA).
7
7. Our action may, over time, affect small entities that are not easily categorized at present.  
We therefore describe here, at the outset, three comprehensive, statutory small entity size standards.
8
  
First, nationwide, there are a total of approximately 27.9 million small businesses, according to the SBA.
9
  
In addition, a “small organization” is generally “any not-for-profit enterprise which is independently 
owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.”
10
  Nationwide, as of 2007, there were approximately 
1,621,315 small organizations.
11
  Finally, the term “small governmental jurisdiction” is defined generally 
as “governments of cities, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special districts, with a 
population of less than fifty thousand.”
12
  Census Bureau data for 2011 indicate that there were 89,476 
local governmental jurisdictions in the United States.
13
  We estimate that, of this total, as many as 88,506 
                                                     
4
5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(3). 
5
5 U.S.C. § 601(6).
6
5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of “small business concern” in the Small Business Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 632).  Pursuant to 5 U.S.C.  § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies “unless an 
agency, after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity for 
public comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of the agency 
and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.”
7
Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632.
8
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601(3)–(6).
9
See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_2012.pdf (reporting numbers from 2010). 
10
5 U.S.C. § 601(4).
11
INDEP. SECTOR, THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC AND DESK REFERENCE (2010).
12
5 U.S.C. § 601(5).
13
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, tbl.427 (data cited therein from 
2007). 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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entities may qualify as “small governmental jurisdictions.”
14
  Thus, we estimate that most governmental 
jurisdictions are small.
8. The disclosure obligations proposed in the NPRM would apply exclusively to facilities-
based CMRS providers, i.e., providers of CMRS that own or operate at least part of the network 
infrastructure that provides the service. The SBA size standard that most clearly applies to this class of 
providers is that established for Wireless Telecommunications Carriers.
15
  Under that standard, a business 
with 1,500 of fewer employees is considered small. Census Bureau data for 2007 show that there were 
1,383 firms in this category that operated for the entire year.  Of this total, 1,368 had employment of 999 
or fewer, and 15 firms had had employment of 1,000 employees or more.  Thus under this category and 
the associated small business size standard, the majority of these Wireless Telecommunications Carriers 
can be considered small.
16
D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements
9. The NPRM proposes requiring mobile wireless providers to submit to the Commission 
for purposes of public disclosure, on a daily basis during designated emergencies, the percentage of their 
cell sites in each affected county that are operational. Providers would need to make “reasonable efforts” 
to ensure that such disclosures are accurate and up-to-date as of the time they are made. A large number 
of CMRS providers, including many smaller providers, already report such information on cell site 
outages in DIRS. In the NPRM, however, we have estimated the costs the proposed requirements would 
impose on providers that do not currently provide such information in DIRS.  We have estimated that a 
$78,000 total nationwide annual expense would be imposed on an assumed fifty additional providers that 
currently are not reporting DIRS data, many of whom would likely qualify as small. Under this estimate, 
an average of only $1,560 in annual costs would be imposed on each provider, of which there would be 
only fifty—out of an estimated 1,368 small providers—and not all of whom would necessarily qualify as 
small. We therefore do not believe that the proposal would have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. We seek comment on this analysis. 
10. In addition, the NPRM seeks comment on whether there is a need to impose requirements 
on providers to keep adequate records of the internal processes and deliberations that support their 
required disclosures. The NPRM seeks comment on ways of minimizing the costs of any such 
recordkeeping, and on whether providers have adequate incentives to keep such records voluntarily (i.e., 
                                                     
14
The 2007 U.S Census data for small governmental organizations are not presented based on the size of the 
population in each such organization. There were 89,476 small governmental organizations in 2007.  If we assume 
that county, municipal, township and school district organizations are more likely than larger governmental 
organizations to have populations of 50,000 or less, the total of these organizations is 52,125.  If we make the same 
assumption about special districts, and also assume that special districts are different from county, municipal, 
township, and school districts, in 2007 there were 37,381 special districts. Therefore, of the 89,476 small 
governmental organizations documented in 2007, as many as 89,506 may be considered small under the applicable 
standard.  This data may overestimate the number of such organizations that has a population of 50,000 or less. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, tbls.426, 427 (data cited therein are from 
2007).
15
This category excludes satellite telecommunications providers.
16
Information: Subject Series – Establishment and Firm Size: Employment Size of Firms for the United States: 2007 
Economic Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_51SSSZ5&prod
Type=table (last visited July 2, 2013).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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to ensure there is adequate evidentiary support for their disclosures in the context of an enforcement 
proceeding). 
E. Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities, and 
Significant Alternatives Considered
11. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant alternatives that it has considered 
in reaching its proposed approach, which may include (among others) the following four alternatives: 
(1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into 
account the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; (3) the use of performance, rather 
than design, standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small 
entities.
17
12. The disclosure obligations we do propose are minimally extensive, and for several 
reasons we do not believe that their implementation would have a significant economic impact on any 
mobile wireless providers, including those that qualify as small. First, the disclosures would be required 
only during serious emergencies, and even then only once a day. The content of the disclosure, a single 
percentage figure for each affected county, is minimal both in terms of size and complexity. Also, the 
information subject to disclosure is already routinely reported on a voluntary basis by mobile wireless 
providers, including many small providers, in the Commission’s Disaster Information Reporting System 
(DIRS). For such providers, compliance with the reporting obligation would require no additional effort. 
We further observe that the disclosure requirement would not prescribe a design standard, as providers 
would be required to report statistics on the resiliency of their networks but retain wide flexibility to 
implement the strategies they deem most effective in achieving sufficient resiliency. 
13. The disclosure requirements proposed in the NPRM are among the least burdensome of 
available options for promoting mobile wireless network resiliency. One alternative option we might have 
proposed is to require providers to supply cell sites or other critical facilities with minimum supplies of 
back-up power to be used in the event of commercial power loss. The Commission previously adopted 
requirements along these lines, although they were ultimately vacated at the Commission’s request in the 
face of legal challenge from the mobile wireless industry. Although we seek general comment in the 
NPRM on back-up power requirements as an alternative to, or possible complement of, the proposed 
disclosure obligations, we do not propose moving forward with adoption of such requirements at this 
time. Another alternative we consider in the NPRM  is to require reporting of information other than 
operational site percentages, such as information about the efforts a provider has undertaken to harden its 
network and prepare for disasters. The relative economic impact of such reporting on small providers in 
comparison to the proposal is difficult to gauge in the absence of specific details, but we do not have 
reason to believe it would be significantly less burdensome than the minimal reporting discussed.  
14. Finally, notwithstanding these observations, we seek comment in the NPRM specifically 
on the potential impact of the proposed obligations on small mobile wireless providers and on steps that 
could be taken to minimize the burden on such entities.  We renew our request for comment on these 
matters in this IRFA.  In doing so, we observe that many small mobile wireless service providers 
routinely file daily reports in DIRS as do larger providers, which suggests that such mobile wireless 
service providers would not find it particularly burdensome to comply with the sorts of reporting 
obligations discussed.  Nevertheless, we seek comment on whether it would be particularly costly or 
difficult for smaller mobile wireless service providers to comply with these proposed obligations or 
similar ones.  Should our requirements make special provisions for these mobile wireless service 
providers? Do they need extended periods of time in which to report the information and, if so, why?  
                                                     
17
5 U.S.C. § 603(c).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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Would relaxed treatment for smaller providers unfairly limit their customers’ ability to compare their 
providers’ performance with that of their competitors?  If we decide that smaller mobile wireless service 
providers merit special treatment under our rules, how should we delineate this class of mobile wireless 
service providers?
F. Federal Rules that May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict with the Proposed Rule
None.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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APPENDIX C
Activations of DIRS Since Its Inception in 2007
Full Activation:
YEAR NAME
2007
FAY
2008 GUSTAV
IKE
2009 KENTUCKY ICE
2010 ALEX (Later downgraded to partial activation)
EARL (Later downgraded to partial activation)
2011 IRENE
2012 ISAAC
SANDY
Partial Activation:
YEAR NAME
2010
ALEX
EARL
NORTH DAKOTA FLOOD
2011 JOPLIN TORNADOES
SNOW STORM
2012 “DERECHO”
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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STATEMENT OF 
ACTING CHAIRWOMAN MIGNON L. CLYBURN
Re: Improving the Resiliency of Mobile Communications Networks; Reliability and Continuity of 
Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies, PS Docket 13-239; PS 
Docket No. 11-60
When disaster strikes, Americans increasingly rely on their mobile phones to call 9-1-1 and to 
check on the well-being of those they care about.  But all too often, wireless network outages in the wake 
of disasters leave many Americans disconnected, at precisely the time they have the greatest need to 
communicate.  At the peak of Super Storm Sandy, for example, approximately 25 percent of cell sites in 
the affected region were disabled – and more than double that figure were disabled in the hardest-hit 
counties in New York and New Jersey.  Without question, communications providers worked tirelessly in 
their storm ravaged areas to restore service.  While some disaster-related disruptions may be inevitable, 
we must and can do more to prepare for future emergencies.  So the question remains:  what can we do to 
prevent such extensive wireless outages, from occurring in the first place? 
Earlier this year, the Commission held field hearings to explore ways we can promote the 
resiliency and reliability of communications networks during disasters.  We learned during Super Storm 
Sandy and other recent disasters that the level of cell site outages varied among wireless providers even 
within the same geographic area.  In addition, we found that choices and practices regarding network 
resiliency vary among wireless service providers. 
Taken together, these differences suggest that some approaches are more effective than others and 
that there are additional actions providers can take to improve the ability of their networks to withstand 
disasters and reduce service disruptions to consumers.  The primary proposal in this Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking does not dictate what methods wireless providers should use to harden their networks.  Those 
decisions are best left to industry.  But what would create greater transparency is information on carrier 
performance that, up to now, has not been publicly available.  This would empower the public to hold 
wireless providers accountable for the results of those decisions.  Specifically, we are proposing that 
wireless providers submit to the Commission, for public disclosure on a daily basis and immediately after 
major disasters, the percentage of cell sites within their networks that are operational.  Providers would 
report this information, on a per-county basis, for the designated disaster area. 
Since this data can be derived from information that providers already submit daily to the 
Commission, on a voluntary and presumptively confidential basis during disasters, our proposal should 
not impose any significant new burden on wireless providers.  But our proposal could have a significant 
impact in other ways:  making cell site outage information public, empowering consumers, and creating 
competitive incentives for wireless providers, to improve network resiliency during emergencies.  We 
seek input from all stakeholders on this proposal, and many related questions. 
This item builds on the Commission’s existing work to improve the reliability and resiliency of 
the wireline communications networks that serve 9-1-1 call centers during disasters.  Today, we focus on 
improving the reliability and resiliency of the wireless networks that are used to call 9-1-1 in the first 
place. 
We cannot prevent disasters from happening.  But we are hopeful that these actions can help keep 
Americans safer when emergencies do occur.  I thank David Turetsky and his talented staff for crafting a 
thorough and well written NPRM.  Again, I thank Michele Ellison and Louis Peraertz for their efforts in 
coordinating with the staff and my colleagues’ offices on this item.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER JESSICA ROSENWORCEL
Re: Improving the Resiliency of Mobile Communications Networks; Reliability and Continuity of 
Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies,  PS Docket 13-239, PS 
Docket No. 11-60
Last year, Hurricane Sandy ripped apart the East Coast.  Our cities saw floods, coastal areas saw 
fires, and some communities were even waylaid by snow.  Power outages were widespread.  Across the 
affected areas, one quarter of our wireless towers failed.  At the moment that so many of us needed to 
reach out, one of our major means of communications did not work.  
Earlier this month, rain pounded on the parched ground in Colorado.  By the time it stopped, 
hundreds of road miles were washed out.  Entire towns resembled lakes.  At one point, 1200 people were 
not accounted for—lost to family and friends.  Local officials cited wireless network outages as a 
significant hurdle as they sought to locate survivors.  
Just last week in New Jersey, a fiber-optic cable cut disrupted wireless service in towns near the 
shore.  Homeowners without traditional landlines found themselves unable to make calls, conduct 
business, and reach out to neighbors.      
In all of these events, we are grateful that carriers sought to fix what failed and get service up and 
running as soon as possible.  But in disasters, days, minutes, and seconds count.  While we can never 
make networks failproof, we should take smart steps to make sure that they are resilient. 
The object lessons from Hurricane Sandy, Colorado, and New Jersey that I just recounted are 
unlikely to be the only episodes where essential communications get cut in crisis.  But I think we have 
had enough examples to know that we need an honest conversation about network resiliency in the digital 
age.  As more consumers migrate from traditional landline services to new wireless and IP services, they 
benefit from the new functionalities they can provide.  But unlike the landline phones plugged into the 
wall, these new services are dependent on commercial power.  This means two things.  First, we must ask 
hard questions about back-up power, and how to make sure our new networks are more dependable when 
we need them most.  Second, we need to make sure that consumers understand not just the benefits, but 
also the limitations, of new technologies when they reach out for assistance.  Preparing for the 
unthinkable with extra batteries and solar-powered chargers when the plugs in the wall do not work is not 
just prudent—it is necessary.   
While today’s rulemaking does not proceed neatly on these lines, I believe it is essential to 
continue the conversation.  Because making sure our networks work in disaster and can withstand mother 
nature’s wrath will make us all stronger—and more safe.     
Federal Communications Commission FCC 13-125
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DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER AJIT PAI
Re: Improving the Resiliency of Mobile Wireless Communications Networks, PS Docket No. 13-
239; Reliability and Continuity of Communications Networks, Including Broadband 
Technologies, PS Docket No. 11-60
Americans want wireless services that work.  And with four or more wireless providers 
competing throughout the country, it’s no wonder that wireless “carriers are rushing to expand and 
upgrade their networks” to meet that demand.
1
  Perhaps that’s why they invested $30.1 billion last year to 
improve their networks.
2
  Perhaps that’s why they’ve deployed 301,779 cell sites throughout the United 
States.
3
  Perhaps that’s why they are exploring heterogenous networks using small cells, distributed 
antenna systems, and macrocells with overlapping coverage (not to mention voluntary roaming 
agreements and Wi-Fi offload).  They’ve done all these things to provide consumers the best network 
experience possible given the limited spectrum available for mobile broadband.  To its credit, the 
Commission seems to appreciate these facts.
But despite acknowledging these realities, the Commission nevertheless insists today on 
proposing reporting requirements that would confuse and mislead consumers.  Most consumers are bound 
to think that if the FCC requires wireless providers to report the percentage of out-of-service cell sites 
within a county during certain natural disasters, that information says something important about a 
network’s reliability or resiliency.  But it may not.
Just as Robert Griffin III’s 63.3% completion rate doesn’t tell you anything about the Washington 
Redskins’ overall performance this year, there’s no particular correlation between the percentage of 
inoperable cell sites and the coverage and capacity maintained by a provider during a disaster.  For 
example, one macrocell going down can impair coverage far more than ten small cells that go out of 
service.  So holding up percentages as a measure of reliability or resiliency is bound to mislead consumers 
into thinking that one provider is better than another even if, in reality, the converse is true.  And not all 
emergencies are natural disasters—in fact, most are not.  Thus, highlighting the performance of providers 
in select counties during only a few disasters each year sheds little light on the day-to-day reliability that 
may be more important for saving lives.
In short, I am disappointed that the Commission was not willing to first figure out what additional 
information about network reliability, if any, consumers really want and need to make informed decisions 
before proposing this mandate.  I also have serious doubts about much of the analysis in the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, especially in those sections addressing the costs and benefits of the proposal and 
the Commission’s legal authority.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
                                                     
1
J.D. Power and Associates, Press Release, 2013 U.S. Wireless Network Quality Performance Study (Mar. 7, 2013), 
available at http://www.jdpower.com/content/press-release/VF9361y/2013-u-s-wireless-network-quality-
performance-study--vol-1.htm.
2
CTIA Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, Semi-Annual Year-End 2012 Top-Line Survey Results (Chart titled 
“Cumulative Capital Investment Passes $365 Billion”), available at
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_YE_2012_Graphics-FINAL.pdf.
3
Id. (Chart titled “Commercially-Operational Cell Sites in the U.S.”).