Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C.  20554
In the Matter of 
AT&T Corp.,
Complainant,
v.
All American Telephone Co.,
e-Pinnacle Communications, Inc., and
ChaseCom,
Defendants.
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File No. EB-09-MD-010
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION
Adopted:  June 10, 2014 Released:  June 10, 2014
By the Commission:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. On April 30, 2010, AT&T Corp. (AT&T) filed a formal complaint against All American 
Telephone Co. (All American), e-Pinnacle Communications, Inc. (e-Pinnacle), and ChaseCom 
(ChaseCom) (collectively, Defendants) under Section 208 of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended (Act).
1
  On March 22, 2013, the Commission ruled in favor of AT&T on Counts I and II of the 
Complaint.
2
  Thereafter, the Defendants filed a Petition for Reconsideration and Clarification
3
under
Section 1.106 of the Commission’s rules.
4
For the reasons explained below, we dismiss the Petition on 
procedural grounds and, as an independent and alternative basis for this decision, deny it on the merits.
2. Beehive Telephone Co., Inc. and Beehive Telephone Co., Inc. Nevada (collectively, 
Beehive), which are neither parties to this litigation nor to the district court case from which this litigation 
                                                     
1
See Amended Formal Complaint of AT&T Corp., File No. EB-09-MD-010 (filed Apr. 30, 2010) (Complaint); 47 
U.S.C. § 208.  The litigation arises from two primary jurisdiction referrals from the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York (District Court).  
2
AT&T Corp. v. All Am. Tel. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 28 FCC Rcd 3477 (2013) (Order).  AT&T 
elected to bifurcate the claims in Count III of its Complaint into a supplemental complaint for damages in 
accordance with 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.722(d)–(e).  Id. at 3477, n.4; 3497, para. 45.
3
Petition for Reconsideration and Clarification of All American Telephone Co., Inc., e-Pinnacle Communications, 
Inc., and ChaseCom, File No. EB-09-MD-010 (filed Apr. 24, 2013) (Petition); see also Opposition of AT&T Corp. 
to Defendants’ Petition for Reconsideration, File No. EB-09-MD-010 (filed May 6, 2013); Reply of All American 
Telephone Co., Inc., e-Pinnacle Communications, Inc., and ChaseCom in Support of Their Petition for 
Reconsideration and Clarification, File No. EB-09-MD-010 (filed May 13, 2013) (Reply).
4
47 C.F.R. § 1.106.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
2
arose, also filed a Petition for Reconsideration.
5
  As discussed below, we dismiss the Beehive Petition 
because Beehive has not satisfied the requirements for non-parties to seek reconsideration of a 
Commission order in an adjudicatory proceeding.  
II. BACKGROUND
6
3. At all relevant times, the Defendants purported to provide terminating interstate switched
access services to AT&T, an interexchange carrier, pursuant to federal tariffs that the Defendants filed 
with the Commission.  The Defendants charged AT&T for terminating interstate switched access 
services, but AT&T refused to pay, asserting that the Defendants were not providing such services in 
accordance with their federal tariffs and were sham entities.
4. The Defendants sued AT&T in federal district court to collect the access charges billed, 
alleging, inter alia, that AT&T’s refusal to pay violated the Defendants’ federal tariffs, Section 201(b) of 
the Act, and Section 203(c) of the Act.
7
  AT&T filed an answer and counterclaims, asserting federal law 
claims that Defendants violated Sections 201(b) and 203 of the Act.
8
  AT&T also claimed that, regardless
of whether Defendants provided access services pursuant to tariff, they committed unreasonable practices 
through “sham” arrangements designed for the purpose of inflating access charges.
9
  The District Court 
issued two primary jurisdiction referrals.  The First Court Referral Order, issued on March 16, 2009, 
referred AT&T’s “sham entity” counterclaim to the Commission.
10
  AT&T effectuated this referral by 
filing an informal complaint with the Commission on April 15, 2009, which it converted into a formal 
complaint on November 16, 2009.
11
  
5. Thereafter, Defendants requested that the District Court refer additional issues to the 
Commission, which the District Court did on February 5, 2010.
12
  At Commission staff’s direction, 
AT&T filed an Amended Complaint to effectuate certain issues in the Second Court Referral Order.
13
  
                                                     
5
Petition for Reconsideration, File No. EB-09-MD-010 (filed Apr. 24, 2013) (Beehive Petition); see also Opposition 
of AT&T Corp. to Beehive Telephone Co., Inc.’s Petition for Reconsideration, File No. EB-09-MD-010 (filed 
May 6, 2013); Reply to Opposition to Petition for Reconsideration, File No. EB-09-MD-010 (filed May 13, 2013) 
(Beehive Reply).
6
This is an abridged description of the factual and legal background.  The Order contains a more complete 
discussion of the background, which is incorporated herein by reference.  See Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3478–87, paras. 
2–23.
7
Id. at 3486–87, para. 22. 
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
All Am. Tel. Co., Inc. v. AT&T, Inc., Memorandum & Order, 07-Civ 861, 2009 WL 691325 (WHP) (Mar. 16, 
2009) (First Court Referral Order).
11
Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3487, para. 23.  See Formal Complaint of AT&T, File No. EB-09-MD-010 (filed Nov. 16, 
2009).  
12
All Am. Tel. Co., Inc., et al. v. AT&T, Inc., Order Referring Issues to the Federal Communications Commission, 
07-Civ 861, (WHP) (Feb. 5, 2010) (Second Court Referral Order).  See also All Am. Tel. Co., Inc., et al. v. AT&T, 
Inc., Memorandum & Order, 07-Civ 861, 2010 WL 7526933 (Jan. 19, 2010) (Second Court Referral Memorandum 
Opinion).  
13
Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3486–87, para. 23.  See Letter Ruling from Lisa B. Griffin, Deputy Division Chief, EB, 
MDRD, to James F. Bendernagel, Jr., Counsel for AT&T, and Jonathan Canis, Counsel for Defendants, File No. 
EB-09-MD-010 (filed Apr. 2, 2010).  At the same time, the Defendants filed their own formal complaint to 
effectuate the remaining issues in the Second Court Referral Order, which the Commission has already resolved.  
See All Am. Tel. Co. v. AT&T Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 723 (2011) (All American v. 
AT&T), recon. denied, 28 FCC Rcd 3469 (2013) (All American v. AT&T Recon. Order).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
3
After the pleading cycle closed, the Commission ruled in favor of AT&T on Counts I and II of its 
Complaint.
14
The Commission found, based on the totality of the record, that Defendants were “sham” 
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs) created to “capture access revenues that could not 
otherwise be obtained by lawful tariffs,” and that billing AT&T for access charges in furtherance of this 
scheme constitutes an unjust and unreasonable practice in violation of Section 201(b) of the Act.
15
  The 
Commission also found that Defendants violated Sections 201(b) and 203 of the Act by billing for 
services that they did not provide pursuant to valid and applicable tariffs.
16
III. DISCUSSION
A. We Dismiss Defendants’ Petition on Procedural Grounds.
6. The Defendants’ Petition and Reply repeat many arguments that the Commission has 
already fully considered and rejected.  These include the Defendants’ assertions that (1) the Commission 
ignored a statutory deadline;
17
(2) the Commission ignored the contentions made in Defendants’ March 
15
th
Request for Declaratory Ruling;
18
(3) the Order was based upon a collateral attack on the rates and 
practices of a non-party that were never subject to investigation;
19
(4) Defendants’ rates are “conclusively 
deemed reasonable” because Beehive’s rates are “deemed lawful” and are the only rates that could 
apply;
20
(5) Defendants’ discovery rights were unreasonably restricted;
21
(6) the formal complaint process 
was inherently prejudicial to the Defendants and failed to answer critical questions referred by the District 
Court;
22
(7) the complaint proceeding took a fragmented view of the service provided in order to prevent 
the Defendants from defending themselves;
23
(8) the Order failed to address AT&T v. Jefferson 
Telephone;
24
(9) the Order made findings that are inconsistent with established Commission precedent;
25
and (10) the formal complaint process was designed to reach a predetermined conclusion and 
                                                     
14
Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3497, para. 44.  Count I of AT&T’s Complaint effectuates Issues 1a to 1e of the Second 
Court Referral Order, and Count II effectuates the issues in the First Court Referral Order.  Count III, which AT&T 
bifurcated into a supplemental complaint for damages, effectuates issues 2, 3, 5a, 5c, 5d, and 5e of the Second Court 
Referral Order.  See id. at 3487, nn.98–99.
15
Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3487–92, paras. 24–33.  The Commission did not base its conclusions, as Defendants 
contend, on a “single finding-that the rates that the [Defendants] billed and sought to collect are excessive.” See
Petition at 9, 12–13.  
16
Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3492–95, paras. 34–41.
17
Compare Petition at 4–9, with Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3497, para. 43, n.190.    
18
Compare Petition at 8-9, with Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3496, para. 42, n.183.  See Request for Declaratory Ruling In 
Response to Recent Order by Southern District of New York re Primary Jurisdiction Referral In File No. EB-09-
MD-010 (filed Mar. 15, 2012) (March 15
th
Request for Declaratory Ruling). 
19
Compare Petition at 9–13, 18; Reply at 1–2, with Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3492, para. 33, nn.143–45.  
20
Compare Petition at 11–12, with Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3491–92, para. 31, nn.137–39.  
21
Compare Petition at 12-13, with Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3496–97, paras. 42–43, n.186–90 (endorsing Bureau 
analysis).  See Letter from Lisa B. Griffin, Deputy Division Chief, EB/MDRD to Jonathan Canis, Counsel for All 
American, and James F. Bendernagel, Jr., Counsel for AT&T, File No. EB-09-MD-010 (filed Sept. 2, 2010).
22
Compare Petition at 13–16, with Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3496–97, paras. 42–43, nn.182–83, 189 (endorsing 
Bureau analysis).  See Letter from Lisa B. Griffin, Deputy Division Chief, EB/MDRD to Jonathan Canis, Counsel 
for All American, and James F. Bendernagel, Jr., Counsel for AT&T, File No. EB-09-MD-010 (filed Apr. 27, 2010) 
(concluding that “relevant factors of law, policy, and practicality” supported the procedural rulings).  
23
Id.  
24
Compare Petition at 12, n.19, with Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3491–92, para. 32, nn.140–42.  
25
Compare Petition at 2–4, 20–23; Reply at 3–4, with Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3490–93, paras. 30–32, nn.124–42.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
4
demonstrated bias.
26
  Defendants’ repetition of the same arguments here does not provide grounds for 
reconsideration.
27
7. The balance of the Defendants’ arguments could—and thus should—have been made 
before the Commission released the Order.  These include Defendants’ assertions that (1) the 
Commission’s procedural decisions in the complaint proceeding and action in a related tariff proceeding 
demonstrated bias;
28
and (2) Defendants’ tariffs allowed service to be provided by contract.
29
  
Accordingly, we dismiss the Petition on procedural grounds.
30
B. We Otherwise Deny the Petition on the Merits.   
8. As an independent and alternative basis for this decision, we deny the Petition on the 
merits.
31
  As detailed below, the Petition offers no basis that warrants altering the Commission’s findings.  
1. The Defendants’ Attacks on Procedural Rulings Are Unfounded.
9. Defendants’ challenges to the Commission’s procedural rulings are baseless.  First, the 
Defendants incorrectly assert that the Commission failed to address the merits of their March 15
th
Petition 
for Declaratory Ruling.
32
  That Petition was a request that the Commission reconsider its earlier 
procedural orders regarding implementation of the District Court referrals.  The Commission already had 
                                                     
26
Compare Petition at 1–20; Reply at 1–3, 10, with Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3496–97, paras. 42–43, nn.181–90.   
27
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.106(p)(3) (providing that petitions for reconsideration of a Commission action that “[r]ely on 
arguments that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within the same proceeding” are among 
those that “plainly do not warrant consideration by the Commission” and may therefore be dismissed by a bureau).
28
Petition at 18–19.
29
Petition at 21, n.38.  In any event, the contract provisions in Defendants’ tariffs concern their relationships with 
interexchange carriers, such as AT&T, not their conferencing service provider customers with which they contend 
they had agreements.  Compare All American Tariff No. 4, Definition of Individual Case Basis (“An arrangement 
. . . based on the specific and unique circumstances of the Customer’s situation.”), with Definition of Customer 
(“The term ‘Customer’ refers to an Interexchange Carrier.”).  See, e.g., Qwest Commc’ns Co.v. Sancom, Inc., 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 28 FCC Rcd 1982, 1992–93, paras. 24–25 (Enf. Bur. 2013).
30
See Qwest Commc’ns Co.v. N. Valley Commc’ns, LLC, Order on Reconsideration, 26 FCC Rcd 14520, 14522–23, 
paras. 5–6 (2011) (“It is ‘settled Commission policy that petitions for reconsideration are not to be used for the mere 
reargument of points previously advanced and rejected.’”) (citing S&L Teen Hosp. Shuttle, Order on 
Reconsideration, 17 FCC Rcd 7899, 7900, para. 3 (2002) (citations omitted); All American v. AT&T Recon. Order, 
28 FCC Rcd at 3471–72, para. 6 (same).  See also 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.106(c)(1), (p)(1)–(2).  
31
We also deny All American’s Emergency Motion to Address Jurisdictional and Due Process Issues, File No. EB-
09-MD-010 and EB-13-MD-003 (filed Dec. 19, 2013) (Emergency Motion).  To begin, All American has not 
demonstrated that there is an “emergency” warranting separate Commission action.  In any event, we address in this 
Order all of the issues raised in the Emergency Motion relating to All American.  Moreover, we will address any 
issues relating to Beehive in EB-13-MD-003 (the complaint proceeding to which Beehive is a party).  See infra note 
84.  Finally, we note that All American filed its Emergency Motion under Section 1.41 of the Commission’s rules, 
which does not apply here.  See 47 C.F.R. § 1.41 (“Except where formal procedures are required under the 
provisions of this chapter, requests for action may be submitted informally.”).  This is a formal complaint 
proceeding governed by the Commission’s formal complaint rules, and any “request to the Commission for an 
order” should have been made in accordance with rule 1.727.  47 C.F.R. § 1.727(a).  We will not countenance 
attempts by parties to make end runs around the Commission’s formal complaint rules by filing motions under rule 
1.41.  See In the Matter of Warren C. Havens, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 28 FCC Rcd 16261, 16267-68 
(2013) at para. 18 (“The Commission regularly declines to consider ‘informal’ requests for Commission action 
under Section 1.41 when there are formal procedures available to the requesting parties . . . Section 1.41 is not an 
invitation to . . . gamesmanship in presenting arguments to the Commission.”).    
32
Petition at 8–9.  See March 15
th
Request for Declaratory Ruling.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
5
twice rejected the Defendants’ suggested approach to effectuate the District Court referrals, and we deny 
their attempt here as repetitive.
33
10. Second, Defendants argue that they were improperly denied opportunities for discovery.
34
  
The Defendants’ argument mischaracterizes their discovery requests and the Commission staff’s 
discovery-related rulings. Section 1.729(a) of the Commission’s rules provides that “[r]equests for 
interrogatories . . . may be used to seek discovery of any non-privileged matter that is relevant to the 
material facts in dispute in the pending proceeding,”
35
and the staff’s discovery rulings were consistent 
with that rule.
36
  Specifically, the staff granted all of Defendants’ discovery requests relating to Beehive,
37
and four requests relating to bifurcated damages issues were denied without prejudice.
38
  Neither of the 
two remaining discovery requests denied by staff pertained to Beehive and, consequently, would not have 
been useful to rebut the testimony challenged by the Defendants.
39
11. Third, the Defendants claim that the Commission failed to provide the District Court with 
guidance it purportedly sought when the Defendants asked the District Court to allow them to pursue 
additional discovery in the court proceedings.
40
  The District Court never sought guidance on that 
discovery request and, in fact, expressly denied the Defendants’ request.  The District Court has never 
suggested that the Commission should modify its processes.
41
  On the contrary, the District Court 
expressly declined Defendants’ invitation to “micromanage the agency’s interlocutory determinations.”
42
                                                     
33
See Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3496–97, paras. 42–43, nn.183, 189.
34
See Petition at 12–13 (citing Letter Requesting Reconsideration of July 28, 2010 Letter Rulings, File Nos. EB-09-
MD-010, EB-10-MD-003 at 6, 8, and 9 (filed Aug. 20, 2010)); Reply at 10.
35
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.729(a).  
36
Defendants wrongly contend that adverse discovery rulings prevented them from obtaining evidence from 
Beehive witnesses, which they could use to refute testimony from an AT&T witness regarding where All 
American’s traffic terminated.  Petition at 12–13.  In finding that the entirety of All American’s traffic “terminated 
at its affiliate Joy’s equipment located in Beehive’s facilities in Utah and not in Nevada,” the Commission relied 
upon the deposition testimony of the only Beehive employee with direct knowledge of the facts, and All American 
participated in the deposition. Order, 26 FCC Rcd. at 3484, para. 17.  All American relied upon other Beehive 
witnesses to counter this finding, but those witnesses did not have direct knowledge of the facts.  See id. at 3484, 
para. 17, nn.62, 64.
37
See All American, e-Pinnacle and ChaseCom’s First Request for Interrogatories to Complainant AT&T Corp.’s 
Amended Complaint, File No. EB-09-MD-010, Request Numbers 1 and 9 (filed June 14, 2010) (Defendants’ First 
Request for Interrogatories); see also Letter from Lisa B. Griffin, Deputy Division Chief, EB, MDRD, to James F. 
Bendernagel, Jr., Counsel for AT&T, and Jonathan Canis, Counsel for Defendants, File No. EB-09-MD-010 at 4 
(filed July 28, 2010) (July 28, 2010 Letter Ruling).
38
See Defendants’ First Request for Interrogatories, Request Numbers 2, 7, 8, 10; July 28, 2010 Letter Ruling at 4.  
Defendants are free to raise these requests in any damages proceeding.
39
See Defendants’ First Request for Interrogatories, Request Number 5 (regarding AT&T’s Conferencing Service 
Global Option), and Request Number 6 (regarding AT&T’s provision of conferencing services).  Defendants’ 
Petition references other discovery rulings made in a different case, which the Commission previously resolved and 
affirmed on reconsideration.  See All American v. AT&T, 26 FCC Rcd at 726, para. 8.  That case involved one legal 
issue–i.e., whether AT&T violated Sections 201(b), 203(c), or any other provision of the Act by failing to pay billed 
charges for the calls at issue.  The Commission determined from the parties’ pleadings that no material facts were in 
dispute, and accordingly determined that the discovery the CLECs sought, as well as any briefing, was unnecessary.  
See id.
40
See Petition at 8–9 (citing March 15
th
Request for Declaratory Ruling).
41
See All Am. Tel. Co., Inc., et al. v. AT&T, Inc., Order, No. 07-Civ 861, (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2011) (noting that the 
Commission has “prioritized the questions, facilitated the completion of discovery and briefing, and issued two 
(continued . . .)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
6
12. Nor did the Commission act in an arbitrary and capricious manner by not answering all of 
the referred questions in one proceeding.
43
  AT&T elected to bifurcate its liability and damages claims, as 
it was entitled to do under Commission rules.
44
  Commission staff ruled that the issues raised in Count III 
of AT&T’s Complaint (alleging that the Defendants are not entitled to collect any compensation for 
access services under a quantum meruit, quasi-contract, constructive contract, or any other state law 
theory) would be addressed in AT&T’s supplemental complaint for damages, if any.
45
  Thus, the damages 
proceeding will encompass the remaining issues referred by the District Court, including the issues on 
which Defendants request clarification.
46
     
13. Fourth, Defendants contend that, “under established precedent,” the Commission lacks 
jurisdiction in any further proceedings to determine what rate, if any, AT&T must pay for the services 
Defendants provided.
47
  As this issue was not decided in the Order, but will be adjudicated during a later 
damages phase, it is not ripe for reconsideration.
48
  Moreover, All American v. AT&T does not support 
their assertion.
49
  All American v. AT&T addressed whether a collection action for a customer-carrier’s 
failure to pay another carrier’s tariffed charges gives rise to a claim under Section 208 for breach of the 
Act itself.  The Commission found that it did not.
50
  That order says nothing at all about a customer’s 
(AT&T’s) claims against carriers (Defendants) concerning the carriers’ unjust and unreasonable conduct.  
In addition, in both of its referrals, the District Court found that the Commission has the expertise and “is 
in the best position” to determine the appropriate rate for the Defendants’ services,
51
and that any decision 
by the District Court to set an appropriate rate might discriminate against other customers of the CLECs.
52
  
(Continued from previous page . . .)                                                      
rulings”); Order, No. 07-Civ 861 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28. 2012) (“the FCC continues to make progress, so the prospect of 
a de facto indefinite stay is remote”).  
42
All Am. Tel. Co., Inc., et al. v. AT&T, Inc., Order, No. 07-Civ 861 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28. 2012).
43
Petition at 13–16.
44
See Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3477, n.4; 3497, para. 45.
45
See id.
46
See supra note 15; Petition at 23–25; Reply at 6–9.  Thus, we decline Defendants’ request to “clarify [the] legal 
and jurisdictional consequences” of the Order.  Petition at 23–25; Reply at 6–9.
47
Petition at 16–17; Reply at 8-9.  
48
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.106(p)(5).
49
See Petition at 16–17 (citing All American v. AT&T Recon. Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3470–71, para. 5, 3472; para. 
7).    
50
See All American v. AT&T, 26 FCC Rcd at 726, para. 9.  Similarly unavailing is Defendants’ reliance on Qwest 
Commc’ns Corp. v. Farmers and Merchs. Mut. Tel. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 17973, 
17984-85 (2007) (Qwest v. Farmers) (stating that “any complaint instituted by [a carrier] to recover fees allegedly 
owed by [another carrier] would constitute a ‘collection action,’ which the Commission repeatedly has declined to 
entertain”).  See Petition at 16 n.29.
51
See First Court Referral Order, 2009 WL 691325 at *4.  Indeed, Defendants also requested the second referral 
over AT&T’s objection, and they framed the “rate” questions for the District Court that they now claim the 
Commission lacks jurisdiction to address.  See Second Court Referral Memorandum Opinion, 2010 WL 7526933 at 
*2; see also Second Court Referral Order at 2–4.
52
See First Court Referral Order, 2009 WL 691325 at *4.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
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2. Defendants Have Adduced No Evidence that the Commission Is Biased.
14. The Defendants’ claim that the Commission is biased has no merit whatsoever.
53
  
Administrative officials are presumed to be honest, objective, and capable of judging particular 
controversies fairly and on the basis of their own circumstances.
54
  To prevail on their claim that 
Commission bias has denied them due process, Defendants must show “an unacceptable probability of 
actual bias on the part of those who have actual decisionmaking power.”
55
  The Defendants have not 
produced any meaningful evidence to meet that burden.  Instead, they merely cite their objections to the 
Commission’s handling of the District Court’s primary jurisdiction referrals as purported evidence of 
bias.  The Defendants offer no reason to revisit the Commission’s rejection of those objections.
56
  Adverse 
rulings in proceedings are not by themselves sufficient to show actual bias, and bias cannot be inferred 
from a pattern of rulings on motions.
57
   
15. Characterizing AT&T’s claims as falling within the scope of Section 208(b)(1) of the 
Act, Defendants claim that the Order is untimely under that provision’s requirement that the Commission 
issue an order within five months of the date the underlying complaint was filed.
58
  Defendants contend 
that the Commission’s alleged failure to meet the deadline further evidences bias against them.
59
  The 
Commission has made it clear, however, that Section 208(b)(1)’s deadline applies only to formal 
complaints that involve “investigation[s] into the lawfulness of a charge, classification, regulation or 
practice” contained in tariffs filed with the Commission.
60
  AT&T does not challenge the lawfulness of a 
charge, classification, regulation or practice contained in a tariff that would fall within the parameters of 
Section 208(b)(1).  Instead, AT&T asserts that the Defendants misapplied their tariff and that they—
wholly apart from their tariffs—engaged in conduct that violates Section 201(b).
61
  Thus, the Defendants 
have not demonstrated that the Commission violated a statutory directive.
62
  
                                                     
53
Petition at 9–20; Reply at 1–4, 10.  Relying on arguments in Beehive’s Petition, the Defendants request recusal of 
Enforcement Bureau staff.  See Reply at 10.  As discussed below in connection with the Beehive Petition, there is no 
basis for granting this request.  See infra note 84.
54
See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); Morris v. City 
of Danville, Va., 744 F.2d 1041, 1044 (4th Cir. 1984).
55
U.S. v. State of Or., 44 F.3d 758, 772 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 943 (1995).  
56
Defendants also argue that bias can be inferred from the Commission’s rejection of All American’s Tariff No. 4.  
Petition at 18–19.  Not only is this argument factually incorrect (the Wireline Competition Bureau rejected All 
American’s Tariff No. 3—not Tariff No. 4—because it did not “clearly establish a rate,” see Petition Attachment 7 
(All American Telephone Co., Inc., Tariff F.C.C. No. 3, Order, 25 FCC Rcd 5661 (WCB/PPD May 21, 10)) at 2-3, it 
affords no basis for granting reconsideration because the Defendants make this argument for the first time in the 
Petition.  See 47 C.F.R. § 1.106(p)(2).
57
See McLaughlin v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 869 F.2d 1039, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989); Orange v. Island Creek Coal Co., 
786 F.2d 724, 728 (6
th
Cir. 1986).
58
Petition at 4–9; Reply at 4–6.
59
Id.
60
See Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Amendment of Rules Governing Procedures to Be 
Followed when Formal Complaints Are Filed Against Common Carriers, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 22497, 
24512–16, paras. 34–37 (1997); Order on Reconsideration, 16 FCC Rcd 5681, 5684, para. 6 (2001).
61
See Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3487, para. 23.
62
Teamsters Local Union, which addressed the consequences of an agency’s failure to abide by a 45-day deadline 
that applied to a disciplinary proceeding, thus is irrelevant.  See Petition at 9, n.15 (citing Teamsters Local Union 
1714 v. Pub. Emp. Relations Bd., 579 A.2d 706, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).  Cf. Farmers & Merchs. Mut. Tel. Co. v. 
FCC, 668 F.3d 714, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (even if the Commission failed to meet Section 208(b)(1)’s deadline in a 
(continued . . .)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
8
3. The Order Is Consistent with the Prospective USF/ICC Transformation 
Order.  
16. Defendants incorrectly assert that the Commission’s findings contravene the USF/ICC 
Transformation Order.
63
  As the Defendants acknowledge, the USF/ICC Transformation Order is 
prospective and has no binding effect on complaints that were pending at the Commission at the time of 
its adoption and release.
64
  Nevertheless, relying upon snippets from and mischaracterizations of the
USF/ICC Transformation Order, Defendants argue that carriers who act unjustly and unreasonably in 
violation of the Act and Commission rules may do so with impunity as long as they benchmark their 
access rates to the competing incumbent local exchange carrier.
65
  Nothing in the USF/ICC 
Transformation Order supports this contention.  Indeed, the Commission’s prior decisions demonstrate 
the exact opposite to be the case.
66
  
17. The USF/ICC Transformation Order is completely consistent with the outcome of this 
case.  The USF/ICC Transformation Order took immediate steps to curtail “wasteful arbitrage schemes” 
that resulted in consumer costs exceeding hundreds of millions of dollars annually, and specifically 
identified access stimulation as one of the “most prevalent arbitrage activities.”
67
  The record in this 
proceeding overwhelmingly demonstrates that the Defendants were created to exploit exactly the type of 
loopholes that the USF/ICC Transformation Order attempts to close.
68
  The USF/ICC Transformation 
(Continued from previous page . . .)                                                      
matter—unlike this case—where the deadline applies, it would not lose jurisdiction “because Congress established 
no consequence for failing to meet th[e] deadline.”). 
63
Petition at 20–23; Reply at 3–4.  Connect America Fund et al., WC Docket No. 10-90 et al., Report and Order and 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd 176634 (2011) (USF/ICC Transformation Order), pets. for 
review pending, Direct Commc’ns Cedar Valley, LLC v. FCC, No. 11-9581 (10th Cir. filed Dec. 18, 2011) (and 
consolidated cases).  Although Defendants argue that the Order’s findings also contravene other relevant 
Commission precedent, they cite nothing other than the USF/ICC Transformation Order.  See Petition at 20–23; 
Reply at 3–4.
64
See Reply at 4.  See also USF/ICC Transformation Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 17889, n.1182.  The USF/ICC 
Transformation Order thus complements prior decisions and did not overturn or supersede them.  See id.; see also
USF/ICC Transformation Order, Order, 27 FCC Rcd 605, 613, para. 25 (WCB 2012).
65
Petition at 21–22.      
66
See Access Charge Reform, Reform of Access Charges Imposed by Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, 
Seventh Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd 9923 (2001) (2001 CLEC 
Access Charge Order) (permitting CLECs to tariff qualifying rates and limiting complaint challenges regarding the 
reasonableness of such qualifying rates); Qwest Commc’ns Co. v. N. Valley Commc’ns, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 8332 (2011) (finding CLEC’s tariff violated section 201(b) of the Act); AT&T Corp. v. YMax 
Commc’ns Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 5742 (2011) (finding that CLEC violated Sections 
201(b) and 203 of the Act by billing for services not covered by the terms of its tariff); Qwest Commc’ns Co., LLC v. 
Sancom, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 28 FCC Rcd. 1982 (Enf. Bur. 2013) (same).  See also Qwest 
Commc’ns Corp. v. Farmers & Merchs. Mut. Tel. Co., Second Order on Reconsideration, 24 FCC Rcd. 14801 
(2009), recon. denied, 25 FCC Rcd. 3422 (2010), aff’d, 668 F.3d 714 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same with respect to 
incumbent local exchange carrier).  Cf. USF/ICC Transformation Order, 26 FCC Rcd 17663 (finding that revised 
rules will facilitate the Commission’s complaint enforcement processes).  
67
See USF/ICC Transformation Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 17676, para. 33; 17873, para. 649; 17875, paras. 662–63.
68
Defendants argue that a number of the Order’s findings “are in violation of the Commission’s rules governing 
access stimulation.”  See Petition at 20–21.  Yet the Defendants fail to identify any particular rules in support of 
their assertion, beyond those promulgated by the prospective USF/ICC Transformation Order.  Moreover, in many 
instances, Defendants’ arguments are not supported by the authority they cite.  Compare Petition at 21, with Order, 
26 FCC Rcd at 3483–84, para. 17; 3488–89, paras. 25, 27.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
9
Order does not, as Defendants contend, “expressly legitimize” access stimulation in every instance.
69
  Nor 
does it insulate the Defendants from the consequences of a finding that their conduct was unjust, 
unreasonable, and unlawful, in violation of the Act and the Commission’s rules.
70
    
C. We Dismiss Beehive’s Petition for Reconsideration.
18. In order to seek reconsideration of a Commission order in an adjudicatory proceeding to 
which it was not a party, a petitioner must (1) demonstrate with particularity that the petitioner’s 
“interests are adversely affected” by the order, and (2) show that the petitioner has “good reason why it 
was not possible for [the petitioner] to participate in the earlier stages of the proceeding.”
71
  Beehive fails 
to satisfy either requirement.
19. Beehive maintains that its interests are adversely affected by the Order because other 
interexchange carriers could use the Commission’s “sham entity” finding as precedent in an action 
seeking damages from Beehive.
72
  Beehive has not identified any actual damages or economic injury it 
has sustained as a result of the Order; rather, it focuses exclusively on potential future or hypothetical 
damages.  The Commission has made clear, however, that a party is neither adversely affected nor 
aggrieved by “the mere precedential value of an adjudicatory order in a section 208 complaint 
proceeding.”
73
  
20. Beehive next asserts that the Order deprives it of its constitutional due process right to a 
fair hearing in connection with the “sham arrangement” issue that the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah referred to the Commission in separate litigation involving Beehive, Sprint 
Communications Company L.P. (Sprint), and All American.
74
  In Beehive’s view, the Order prejudged 
the “sham arrangement” issue referred in the Utah Referral Order, and the Commission purportedly did 
not afford Beehive “proper notice and . . . an opportunity to present a defense” before issuing the Order.
75
  
But the Order contained no findings that Beehive violated Section 201(b), which is what Beehive 
contends triggered notice and due process obligations.
76
  The Commission’s complaint proceedings are a 
matter of public record, and the Commission was under no obligation to notify Beehive—which was not a 
party to this proceeding—of the allegations relating to it.  Regardless, it is undisputed that Beehive was 
                                                     
69
Neither Defendants’ argument regarding the USF/ICC Transformation Order’s definition of “revenue sharing 
agreements,” Petition at 21–22, nor their argument concerning other carriers’ tariffs that were amended to include 
“chat” and conference operators in their definitions of “end user,” Petition at 22–23 (citing Reply Brief at 5), has any 
bearing on our determinations in this order concerning whether Defendants complied with their tariffs.
70
See Reply at 4.
71
47 C.F.R. § 1.106(b)(1).
72
Beehive Petition at 10; Beehive Reply at 3.  
73
All Am. Tel. Co. v. AT&T Corp., Order, 26 FCC Rcd 15016, 15017–18, para. 6 (Enf. Bur. 2011).  See also AT&T 
Corp. v. Bus. Telecom, Inc., Order on Reconsideration, 16 FCC Rcd 21750, 21752–54, paras. 6–7 (2001) 
(“Petitioners have not directed us to any Commission or court case law suggesting that the precedential value of an 
adjudicatory order in a section 208 complaint proceeding can ‘adversely affect’ a non-party to the adjudication 
within the meaning of section 405(a) of the Act and section 1.106 of the Commission’s rules.”).
74
Beehive Petition at 10; Beehive Reply at 3–4.  See Beehive Tel. Co., Inc., Beehive Tel. Co. of Nevada, Inc. v. 
Sprint Commc’ns, Co., L.P. v. All Am. Tel. Co., Inc., Order of Referral to the Federal Communications Commission, 
No. 2:08-cv-00380 (C.D. Utah Dec. 7, 2012) (Utah Referral Order).  
75
Beehive Petition at 11, 15–17; Beehive Reply at 3–4, 9–10.
76
Beehive Petition at 10.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
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fully aware of the allegations in AT&T’s complaint that resulted in the Order, and that Beehive chose not 
to intervene in the proceeding.
77
      
21. Nor has the Order deprived Beehive of the opportunity to have the issues raised in the 
Utah Referral Order heard by a neutral decision-maker.
78
  The Utah Referral Order requests the 
Commission’s guidance regarding the application of Beehive’s tariff when considered in the context of 
undisputed facts.
79
  Beehive’s tariff was not at issue in the Order, and the Commission made no
determinations regarding Beehive’s tariff or whether Beehive’s conduct violated Section 201(b) of the 
Act.
80
  Beehive has no basis for claiming that it has been denied due process before it even has had the 
opportunity to present its defenses to Sprint’s claims.
81
  Nor is Beehive correct in assuming that the 
Commission will not give Beehive a full and fair opportunity to defend itself.  Beehive will have ample 
opportunity, consistent with the terms of the Utah Referral Order,
82
to present its legal arguments and 
defenses regarding the issues identified in the Utah Referral Order during the course of the Sprint 
complaint proceedings,
83
and those issues will be decided based on the record in that case.
84
  
                                                     
77
See infra para. 22.
78
Beehive Petition at 10, 15–17; Beehive Reply at 8–10.
79
See Utah Referral Order at 2, para. 5 (referring to the Commission, among other issues, the question of “whether 
Beehive . . . provided switched access service or any other service to Sprint under the applicable tariffs” and 
“whether the relationship between Beehive and [All American] and/or Joy Enterprises, Inc. was a so-called sham 
arrangement within the meaning of any particular FCC doctrine and, if so, what is the effect of that determination in 
the application of the tariffs at issue in this case”).  The Utah Referral Order stated that Beehive may not dispute the 
facts identified as “undisputed” in the Utah Referral Order in “proceedings before the FCC or in further proceedings 
in [the] court.”  Utah Referral Order at 5, para. 8.    
80
The “general rule” is that a party is “not bound by a judgment in personam in litigation in which he is not 
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 
880, 893 (2008); see also TSR Wireless v. US West Commc’ns, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 
11166, 11173–74, para. 15 (2000) (under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a “judgment in a prior suit precludes 
relitigation by the same parties of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action”) 
(emphasis added).
81
Beehive Petition at 11.
82
Although Beehive disputes the Enforcement Bureau’s decision to comply with Utah Referral Order’s directive 
concerning undisputed facts, see Beehive Petition at 13, 17, its objection is properly directed to the District Court, 
not the Commission.
83
Sprint filed its complaint against Beehive—which effectuates the Utah court’s referral, on July 30, 2013.  See 
Formal Complaint of Sprint Communications Company L.P., File No. EB-13-MD-013 (filed July 30, 2013) (Sprint 
Complaint).
84
Beehive argues that this proceeding should be consolidated with the Sprint v. Beehive complaint proceeding, and 
that the Enforcement Bureau’s Market Disputes Resolution Division should be recused from further participation in 
the consolidated proceeding.  Beehive Petition at 8-9, 12, 16-17.  Beehive advanced similar arguments in a Motion 
to Consolidate and Reassign (which it filed in this case and in Sprint v. Beehive), and the Bureau considered and 
rejected them.  See AT&T Corp. v. All Am. Tel. Co., File No. EB-09-MD-010 and Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. 
Beehive Tel. Co., Inc., File No. EB-13-MD-003, Order, 28 FCC Rcd 15772 (Enf. Bur. 2013) (Motion to Consolidate 
and Reassign Order).  Beehive sought review of the Motion to Consolidate and Reassign Order in an application for 
review (again, filed in both proceedings).  See Application for Review, File Nos. EB-09-MD-010, EB-13-MD-003 
(filed Dec. 5, 2013) (Application for Review).  We find the Bureau’s analysis to be thorough and well-reasoned, and 
we see no reason to disturb its conclusions.  Because Beehive is not a party to this proceeding, and it has failed to 
satisfy the requirements for seeking reconsideration of the Commission’s Order in this proceeding, its Application 
for Review should be considered in the Sprint v. Beehive case only.  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), (j).  Consequently, we 
will address the Application for Review in that proceeding.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
11
22. Beehive offers no credible justification for failing to seek to intervene earlier in this 
proceeding.  To begin, Beehive’s reliance upon the notice requirement in Section 1.223(a) of the 
Commission’s rules, which concerns proceedings designated for hearing in cases involving applications 
for construction permits and station licenses, is misplaced.
85
This rule is inapplicable here because this 
case has not been designated for hearing and does not involve applications for construction permits and 
station licenses.  Although in Section 208 complaint cases the Commission has looked to rule 1.223(b)’s 
standards for intervention (i.e., whether the party has an interest in the proceeding and how participation 
will assist the Commission),
86
it has not adopted that rule’s notice requirement outside of the cases which 
the rule governs. Moreover, notice to Beehive would have been completely unnecessary.  As Beehive 
readily admits, for more than two years prior to release of the Order, it knew of the claims implicating its 
conduct and could have sought leave to participate in the case.
87
  Beehive chose not to.
88
  AT&T v. 
BellSouth,
89
which Beehive cites,
90
articulates the standard the Commission uses when evaluating 
petitions for reconsideration by non-parties in complaint proceedings, and it supports denial of the 
Beehive Petition because Beehive could have attempted to intervene in this case if it were concerned 
about protecting its rights.
91
  The public record in this case gave Beehive “every reason to understand that 
                                                     
85
47 C.F.R. § 1.223(a).  See Beehive Reply at 4–6.  See also Tex. Cable and Telecommunications Ass’n v. GTE Sw., 
Inc., Order, 17 FCC Rcd 6261, 6264, para. 9 (2002) (“Section 1.223 is not directly applicable in [pole attachment 
complaint proceedings] because it applies to cases designated for hearing.”).  
86
See Teleconnect Co. v. The Bell Co. of Pa., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 5202, 5206, para. 19, 
n.52 (Com. Car. Bur. 1991), aff’d on review, 10 FCC Rcd 1626 (1995) (“Although [Section 1.223(b)] addresses 
intervention in an evidentiary hearing, we believe it to be a useful standard when considering the petition before 
us.”).  See also All Am. Tel. Co., et al. v. AT&T Corp., Order, 26 FCC Rcd 15016, 15018, para. 9 (Enf. Bur. 2011) 
(citing rule 1.223’s requirements that a party seeking intervention show the “interest of petitioner in the 
proceedings” and “how such petitioner’s participation will assist the Commission in the determination of the issues 
in question”).  
87
Indeed, in November 2009, AT&T took the deposition of Beehive’s CEO.  Defendants Exhibit No. 4, Deposition 
of James Charles McCown.  See Beehive Petition at 11–12 (“Beehive could have attempted to intervene in this 
proceeding”); Beehive’s Motion to Refer Issues to the FCC Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, Civil No. 
2:08-cv-00380 at 14-15 (C.D. Utah July 26, 2010) (“Moreover, allegations that Beehive and [All American] were 
involved in a traffic pumping ‘scheme’ are before the FCC, as is the precise question of whether [All American]
operated as a sham entity in violation of [Section] 201(b) . . . . Today, the issues are pending in an AT&T case 
against [All American], e-Pinnacle and ChaseCom in which AT&T names Beehive among the ‘relevant non-
parties.’”).  
88
That the Commission disfavors intervention in complaint proceedings and does not have a specific rule regarding 
intervening in complaint proceedings does not excuse Beehive’s failure to request intervention in this case.  See 
Beehive Petition at 10–11.  Indeed, Teleconnect v. Bell Telephone, which Beehive relies upon (Petition at 11) 
demonstrates that the Commission will consider properly-supported petitions to intervene.  See Teleconnect v. Bell 
Telephone, 6 FCC Rcd at 5206, para. 19 (“At the very least, a petitioner for intervention must demonstrate an 
interest in the proceedings, show how the petitioner’s participation will assist the Commission in determining the 
issues in question, and set forth any additional proposed issues.”).  
89
AT&T Corp. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., Order on Reconsideration, 20 FCC Rcd 8578 (2005) (AT&T 
v. BellSouth).  
90
See Beehive Petition at 10–11; Beehive Reply at 4.
91
See AT&T v. BellSouth, 20 FCC Rcd at 8580, para. 6 (“. . . Sprint had every right and opportunity to petition to 
file an amicus brief or seek to intervene”).  See generally, AT&T Corp. v. Business Telecom, Inc., Order on 
Reconsideration, 16 FCC Rcd at 21754, n.21 (2001) (stating that, in a formal complaint proceeding, “[w]e will . . . 
consider on a case-by-case basis motions by non-parties wishing to submit amicus-type filings addressing the legal 
issues raised in this proceeding”) (quoting Pleading Cycle Established for AT&T Corp. v. Ameritech Corp., Public 
Notice, 13 FCC Rcd 12057, 12058 (Com. Car. Bur. 1998)).  See, e.g., Heritage Cablevision Assocs. v. Tex. Utilities
Elec. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 4192, 4192, paras. 6–7 (1992) (dismissing a non-party’s 
(continued . . .)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
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one option available to the Commission” was to find that Beehive was instrumental to the sham,
92
and 
Beehive can hardly claim “surprise” by the Commission’s findings to that effect.
93
23. Similarly unavailing is the contention that Commission staff thwarted Beehive’s “last-
ditch effort to participate in this proceeding” by failing to hold the Order in abeyance pending the filing 
of Sprint’s complaint effectuating the Utah Court Referral, which purportedly would have allowed 
Beehive to seek consolidation of the two cases.
94
  This argument misses the point because it wrongly 
assumes that Beehive could not have participated at the Commission until Sprint filed its complaint.  
Beehive could have filed a motion to intervene years earlier when it learned that its conduct figured 
prominently in AT&T’s claims against the Defendants.
95
  In all events, consolidating the two proceedings 
when the draft Order was on the verge of circulation would have made no sense.
96
  The parties in this 
case generated a vast record.
97
  Consolidation would have meant injecting new parties (Sprint and 
Beehive), as well as different tariffs, tariff periods, and defenses, into the proceeding after the record had 
closed.  Moreover, the Commission would have had to devise a way to reconcile the Utah Referral 
(Continued from previous page . . .)                                                      
Petition for Reconsideration of an order in an adjudicatory proceeding, where the non-party “failed to attempt to 
participate either as an intervenor or amicus,” though it “could have moved the Commission for leave to participate, 
either as amicus or intervenor, [even] after the pleading cycle closed.”).
92
See AT&T v. BellSouth, 20 FCC Rcd at 8580–81, para. 6.  See, e.g., Amended Formal Complaint of AT&T Corp., 
File No. EB-09-MD-010 at 14, paras. 26, 29–34, paras. 54–60, 38–41, paras. 68–71 (filed Apr. 30, 2010); Initial 
Brief of AT&T Corp. in Support of Amended Complaint, File No. EB-09-MD-010 at 19–20 (filed Dec. 20, 2010); 
Reply Brief of AT&T Corp. in Support of Amended Formal Complaint, File No. EB-09-MD-010 at 3 (filed Jan. 14, 
2011) (“AT&T’s Complaint clearly alleged that Beehive was an active participant with the CLECs in the sham 
arrangements at issue.”).
93
See AT&T v. BellSouth, 20 FCC Rcd at 8580–81, para. 6.  Nor can Beehive blame Sprint for Beehive’s failure to 
intervene.  See Beehive Petition at 11–13.  Whatever Sprint’s litigation strategy might have been, Beehive, of 
course, is responsible for protecting its own legal interests.  Similarly, Beehive gets no traction from its complaint 
that it chose not to pursue intervention prior to the Utah Court Referral because it would have been faced with the 
burden of simultaneously litigating the sham-entity issue in court and at the Commission, risking conflicting 
decisions.  Beehive Petition at 12.  That risk existed whether Beehive intervened or not, because Beehive was 
actively defending and pursuing in multiple fora claims that implicated the sham-entity issue.  See Beehive’s 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, WC Docket No. 10-36 (filed Feb. 2, 2010); Consideration of the Rescission, 
Alteration, or Amendment of the Certificate of Authority of All American to Operate as a Competitive Local 
Exchange Carrier Within the State of Utah, Public Service Commission of Utah, Docket No. 08-2469-01, Report 
and Order at 9–12 (Apr. 26, 2010) (reflecting Beehive’s participation in proceedings directed at rescinding All 
American’s Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity).  Beehive also initiated discussions with Commission 
staff in November 2010 regarding the prospect of filing a formal complaint against Sprint.  See Letter Ruling dated 
June 21, 2013 from Christopher Killion, Associate Chief, Enforcement Bureau, to Russell D. Lukas, Counsel for 
Beehive, Gary R. Guelker, Counsel for All American, Marc A. Goldman and William Lawson, Counsel for Sprint at 
7, n.37.  
94
Beehive Petition at 12–13.    
95
See supra para. 22, note 88.
96
In December 2012, Beehive asked the Commission to “consider whether Sprint’s complaint should be 
consolidated for disposition with the AT&T complaint pursuant to § 1.735(a) of the rules.”  Letter from Russell D. 
Lukas, counsel for Beehive, to Anthony J. DeLaurentis, MDRD (dated Dec. 12, 2012) (on file in File No. EB-13-
MD-003).
97
Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 3487–88, para. 24, n.104 (noting that the record “exceeds 7,000 pages, including pleadings, 
discovery responses, deposition transcripts, court exhibits, Utah PSC exhibits, and other miscellaneous documents”).  
The record also includes deposition testimony of several Beehive officers and employees and Beehive’s discovery 
responses.  See, e.g., id. at 3480–84, paras. 12–14, 16–17 nn. 34, 36, 40, 43, 51–52, 54, 60, 62–65; 3488–89, paras. 
26–28, nn. 112, 115, 118, 120–22.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 14-84
13
Order’s directive regarding the parties (including Beehive) not disputing the undisputed facts detailed in 
the Utah Referral Order with the absence of any such limitation in the First Court Referral Order or the 
Second Court Referral Order giving rise to the instant litigation.  Staff appropriately exercised its 
discretion not to consolidate the cases.
98
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES
24. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 4(j), 201, 203, 208, 
and 405 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), 201, 203, 208, 
405, and Section 1.106 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. § 1.106, that the Petition of All American 
Telephone Co., Inc., e-Pinnacle Communications, Inc., and ChaseCom for Reconsideration and 
Clarification is DISMISSED on procedural grounds and, as an independent and alternative basis for this 
decision, DENIED for the reasons stated herein.
25. Accordingly, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 4(j), and 208 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), 208, and Sections 1.41 and 1.727
of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.41, 1.727, that All American’s Emergency Motion to Address 
Jurisdictional and Due Process Issues is DENIED.
26. Accordingly, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 4(j), 201, 203, 208, 
and 405 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), 201, 203, 208, 
405, and Section 1.106 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. § 1.106, that Beehive’s Petition for 
Reconsideration is DISMISSED.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
                                                     
98
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.735(a).  See also Motion to Consolidate and Reassign Order at 2.