Federal Communications Commission FCC 15-129
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Pandora Radio LLC
Petition for Declaratory Ruling Under Section 
310(b)(4) of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
Amended
Application of Connoisseur Media Licenses, LLC 
for Consent to Assign Station KXMZ(FM), Box 
Elder, South Dakota, to Pandora Radio LLC
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MB Docket No. 14-109
KXMZ(FM), Box Elder, SD
FCC File No. BALH-20130620ABJ
Facility ID No. 164109
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION
Adopted:  September 16, 2015 Released:  September 17, 2015
By the Commission:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this Order on Reconsideration, we deny the petition for reconsideration (“Declaratory 
Ruling Petition”) filed by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) on 
June 3, 2015, seeking reconsideration of the Commission’s declaratory ruling (“Declaratory Ruling”) in 
the above-captioned docket, released on May 4, 2015.
1
  In the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission held 
that it would serve the public interest to permit a widely dispersed group of shareholders to hold 
aggregate foreign ownership in Pandora Media, Inc. (“Pandora Media”) in excess of the 25 percent 
benchmark set out in Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (“Act”), subject 
to certain specified conditions.
2
  We also deny the petition for reconsideration (“Assignment Petition”) 
filed by ASCAP on July 2, 2015, of the Media Bureau’s (“Bureau”) June 2, 2015, letter decision (“Letter 
Decision”) granting the above-captioned application (“Assignment Application”) to assign the license of 
Station KXMZ(FM), Box Elder, South Dakota (“Station”), from Connoisseur Media Licenses, LLC 
(“Connoisseur”) to Pandora Radio LLC (“Pandora Radio”).
3
  The Assignment Petition was referred to the 
                                                     
1
Pandora Radio LLC Petition for a Declaratory Ruling Under Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act of 
1934, as Amended, Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd 5094 (2015).   On June 8, 2015, Pandora filed an opposition to 
the Petition and on June 23, 2015, ASCAP filed a reply.
2
  47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4). 
3
Melodie Virtue, Esq., Letter, Ref. No. 1800B3-CEG, DA 15-654 (MB Jun. 2, 2015) (“Letter Decision”).  Pandora 
filed an opposition to the Assignment Petition on July 14, 2015.  Pandora Radio is a wholly owned, direct subsidiary 
of Pandora Media. The Assignment Application initially designated Pandora Media as the assignee, but was 
amended on November 25, 2013, to substitute Pandora Radio.  On June 17, 2015, post-consummation, the name of 
the licensee of the Station was changed from Pandora Radio LLC to Pandora FM LLC.  For convenience, we may
refer herein to Pandora Media and the Station licensee collectively as “Pandora.”  As stipulated by both parties, 
Pandora and ASCAP are involved in a dispute, including litigation, over music licensing fees.  Declaratory Ruling, 
30 FCC Rcd at 5094.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 15-129
2
Commission by the Bureau pursuant to Section 1.106(a)(1) of the Rules, for consolidated treatment with 
the Declaratory Ruling Petition.
4
2. On June 20, 2013, Connoisseur and Pandora filed the Assignment Application, which 
was opposed by ASCAP.  As detailed in the Declaratory Ruling, Pandora is a publicly traded U.S. 
company that was unable to determine the citizenship of its shareholders sufficiently to demonstrate that 
its foreign ownership does not exceed the 25 percent foreign ownership benchmark of Section 310(b)(4).
5
  
Therefore, on June 27, 2014, Pandora filed a petition for declaratory ruling to exceed that benchmark 
(“Petition for Declaratory Ruling”), pursuant to the guidance set out in the Commission’s 2013 
Clarification Order.
6
  On July 29, 2014, the Bureau initiated a docket seeking comment on the Petition 
for Declaratory Ruling.
7
  ASCAP filed comments opposing the Petition for Declaratory Ruling.  
Following the procedure outlined in the Clarification Order, various Executive Branch agencies were also 
notified of the proceedings.
8
  No Executive Branch agency filed a comment or objection.  On May 1, 
2015, the Commission adopted the Declaratory Ruling, granting Pandora’s Petition for Declaratory 
Ruling with conditions and denying ASCAP’s opposition (released May 4, 2015). 
3. On June 2, 2015, the Bureau issued the Letter Decision, granting the Assignment 
Application and approving the Revised Compliance Plan submitted by Pandora on May 15, 2015 
(“Revised Compliance Plan”).
9
  In the Letter Decision, the Bureau found that ASCAP lacked standing to 
file a petition to deny the Assignment Application.
10
  The Bureau concluded that ASCAP did not fall 
within one of the established broadcast categories of parties with standing,
11
and that ASCAP also did not 
satisfy what ASCAP referred to as the “higher bar” for Article III judicial standing.
12
  The Bureau found 
that ASCAP’s claimed harm—that Pandora would be able, as a broadcast licensee, to successfully litigate 
lower licensing fees—was speculative: “Even if [a weakened litigation position] were a cognizable, 
legally-protected interest, ASCAP fails to establish any likelihood that the KXMZ(FM) acquisition would 
result in a court victory for Pandora.”
13
  Because ASCAP’s predictions depend on the independent actions 
of third parties, the Bureau concluded that ASCAP had not established either causation or redressability, 
two requirements for judicial standing.
14
  However, the Bureau decided to treat ASCAP’s petition to deny 
as an informal objection under Section 73.3587 of the Rules and therefore took ASCAP’s arguments into 
                                                     
4
47 C.F.R. § 1.106(a)(1).
5
Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 5095; 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4).  
6
Commission Policies and Procedures Under Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act, Foreign Investment in 
Broadcast Licensees, Declaratory Ruling, 28 FCC Rcd 16244, 16251 (2013) (“Clarification Order”) (stating that the 
Commission would exercise its statutory discretion to consider, on a case-by-case basis, applications and 
transactions that propose foreign broadcast ownership exceeding the 25 percent benchmark of Section 310(b)(4)).
7
Pandora Radio LLC Seeks Foreign Ownership Ruling Pursuant to Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act of 
1934, as Amended, Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd 9094 (MB 2014). The National Association of Broadcasters and 
Multicultural Media and Telecom and Internet Council filed comments urging general reform of the broadcast 
standard for demonstrating compliance with the Section 310(b)(4) benchmarks, but did not take a position on the 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling. Charles Pickney also filed a brief informal comment in support of the Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling.
8
Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 5096.
9
Id. at 5102-3.
10
Letter Decision at 7.
11
Id. at 5-6 (citing Chet-5 Broadcasting, L.P., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 13041, 13042 
(1999)).
12
Letter Decision at 6.
13
Id. at 6.
14
Id. at 6-7.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 15-129
3
account when considering the Assignment Application.
15
  
II. DISCUSSION
4. Assignment Petition.  In the Assignment Petition, ASCAP contests the Letter Decision’s 
findings on: (1) standing,
16
(2) the timing of shareholder approval under the Revised Compliance Plan; (3) 
the timing of biennial ownership reports under the Revised Compliance Plan; and (4) Pandora’s 
motivation in acquiring the Station.
17
  
5. With respect to standing, we affirm the Letter Decision.  ASCAP relies on the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s (“D.C. Circuit”) June 12, 2015, decision in NAB v. FCC
to support its claim that the Bureau “set[] the standing bar too high.  For ASCAP to satisfy Article III 
standing based on a future harm, it argues that it need only show a ‘substantial probability of injury or a 
substantial risk that the harm will occur.’”
18
  ASCAP reiterates that it has standing because if Pandora 
uses its newfound status as a broadcaster to successfully litigate lower licensing fees, large music 
publishers “may well follow through on their threat to withdraw [from ASCAP].”
19
  
6. The Bureau applied the same standard that the D.C. Circuit used in NAB v. FCC—
namely, the three-prong test set out by the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.
20
  The 
difference lies in the facts.  In NAB v. FCC, the petitioner demonstrated a “substantial risk” that at least 
some of its television stations would miss the “go-dark deadline” after being reassigned new channels as a 
result of the incentive auction, which had already been mandated by Congress and whose implementation 
had been initiated by the Commission through the adoption of new rules.
21
  No additional actions by other 
parties were identified as necessary parts of the relevant chain of causation.  By contrast, ASCAP’s 
claimed injury is based on the assumption that at least three separate third parties will act in the way 
ASCAP predicts, specifically, that: (1) Pandora will decide to “use KXMZ to claim entitlement” to the 
licensing rate applicable to broadcasters; (2) a court will hold in Pandora’s favor; and (3) ASCAP’s 
members will decide to withdraw from ASCAP as a result of Pandora’s receiving the favorable broadcast 
royalty rate.
22
  This situation fails the test set forth in Lujan that “the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] 
                                                     
15
47 C.F.R. § 73.3587.
16
ASCAP does not pursue on reconsideration its alternative claim of listener standing.
17
ASCAP also argues that dismissal of its public interest arguments was unfounded, because it disagrees with the 
Bureau’s conclusion that ASCAP’s alleged harms to its members are contingent on the independent actions of third 
parties.  Assignment Petition at 3.  We address this argument below, in connection with both the standing issue, and 
the substantive analysis of the scope of Section 310(d).
18
Assignment Petition at 2 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9866 (D.C. Cir. 
June 12, 2015) (“NAB v. FCC”), at 26).
19
Assignment Petition at 2 (emphasis added).
20
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (“Lujan”); Letter Decision at 6 (“To satisfy the stricter Article 
III standing standard, ASCAP must prove three elements: (1) it has suffered or will suffer injury-in-fact; (2) there is 
a causal link between the proposed assignment and the injury-in-fact; and (3) redressability, meaning that not 
granting the assignment would remedy the injury-in-fact.”); NAB v. FCC at 26 (“To establish its standing, [the 
petitioner] must show: (1) “an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) [that] the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) 
[that] it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”) (citing 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 560-61)).
21
NAB v. FCC at 27. 
22
Pandora states that these licensing matters are also being “squarely addressed” by Congress and other government 
agencies, as well as being the subject of ongoing contractual negotiations.  Pandora Comments filed Sept. 29, 2014, 
in MB Docket No. 14-109, at 12.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 15-129
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to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third 
party not before the court.”
23
    
7. We note that not only is ASCAP’s standing claim impermissibly dependent on the 
actions of multiple third parties, it is problematic in other ways as well.  Whereas the petitioner in FCC v. 
NAB provided “reasoned predictions” about how repacking was likely to affect it,
24
ASCAP’s brief 
description of the relevant chain of causation is vague and omits potentially significant information.  For 
example, ASCAP predicts that Pandora will “claim entitlement” to the licensing rate negotiated by 
ASCAP and the Radio Music License Committee (“RMLC”) (an organization representing radio 
broadcasters).  It does not, however, discuss how Pandora’s prospects of success would be affected by the 
2014 decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (“District Court”) in 
Pandora v. ASCAP, upheld by the Second Circuit —in which the District Court unequivocally held that 
Pandora is not entitled to the RMLC rate.
25
   Similarly, the Assignment Petition does not include the 
District Court’s 2013 decision that ASCAP members (some of whom had already attempted to withdraw 
from ASCAP to the degree necessary to negotiate independently with Pandora) could not withdraw from 
ASCAP only with respect to internet streaming services but had to be “all in” or “all out.”
26
  In the 
Declaratory Ruling docket, ASCAP mentioned this holding, concluding merely that “music publishers 
are now closely watching developments and weighing their options.”
27
  This statement hardly describes a 
“substantial risk” of withdrawal.  Therefore, ASCAP has not established that the alleged injury—
withdrawal—is likely to occur at all, much less that it would be directly traceable to the grant of the 
Assignment Application.  For these reasons as well, we uphold the Bureau’s standing determination. 
8. In any event, none of ASCAP’s arguments on the merits warrants reconsideration or 
review of the Bureau’s order.  We address each of these arguments in turn.
9. Shareholder Approval.  The Declaratory Ruling imposed as a condition certain specific 
changes to Pandora’s certificate of incorporation.  It established no date for doing so.  The Bureau’s 
Letter Decision expected Pandora to present this matter for a vote at its 2016 annual shareholder meeting, 
and if necessary at its 2017 annual shareholder meeting—after which the station would be subject to 
divestiture.
28
  Contrary to ASCAP’s assertion, this deadline was not a modification of the Declaratory 
Ruling, which set no deadline.  Nor was it unreasonable for the Bureau not to put Pandora to the 
substantial expense of calling a special meeting of shareholders solely for this purpose.  It was sufficient 
to provide Pandora with a reasonable opportunity to satisfy the condition.  
10. Biennial Ownership Reports.  Nor was it inconsistent with the Declaratory Ruling or 
                                                     
23
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).
24
NAB v. FCC at 27.
25
In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F.Supp.3d 317, 320, 369-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Pandora 
Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Pandora v. ASCAP”) 
(setting Pandora’s licensing rate at 1.85 percent of revenues through 2015, slightly higher than the 1.70 percent 
RMLC rate but lower than the higher rates advocated by ASCAP for 2013-15).  Instead, ASCAP bases its prediction 
on a 2013 report filed by Pandora with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Assignment Petition at 2, n.5.  
We also note that on July 29, 2015, the District Court refused to lower the (non-RMLC) licensing rate it had set 
earlier in the year between Pandora and another music licensing group, Broadcast Media, Inc. (“BMI”), rejecting, 
Pandora’s argument that its acquisition of KXMZ qualified it for the RMLC rate.  See BMI v. Pandora Media, Inc., 
No. 13 CIV. 4037 LLS (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2015) (appeal pending).
26
In re Pandora Media, Inc., No. 12 CIV. 8035 DLC, 2013 WL 5211927, at 7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013), aff'd sub 
nom. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015) (“ASCAP 
did not have the right to permit the partial withdrawals of rights at issue and thereby acquiesce to a regime in which 
some music users could not obtain full public performance rights to works in the ASCAP repertory.”).
27
Opposition filed by ASCAP on August 28, 2014, in Docket No. 14-109, at 20. 
28
Letter Decision at 7.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 15-129
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unreasonable to allow Pandora to defer its required foreign ownership certification until after its 2015 
biennial ownership report.  Indeed, the Declaratory Ruling noted that it is only after the changes to the 
certificate of incorporation that Pandora would be expected to have “improved access to shareholder 
information, and thus be able to submit more accurate and complete foreign ownership data.”
29
11. Rationale for Pandora’s Acquisition.  Finally, ASCAP claims that the Bureau’s failure to 
examine “the rationale and motivation” behind Pandora’s transaction is “an extraordinary change of 
policy.”
30
We agree with the Bureau that Pandora’s alleged hope, by acquiring KXMZ(FM), to qualify 
for lower music license royalty rates would not be relevant to our Section 310(d) public interest 
determination.  Whatever the impact of its acquisition on such royalty rates may be, Pandora has 
undertaken to offer programming responsive to the interests of its local listeners, and ASCAP has failed 
to identify any substantial and material question about Pandora’s ability to provide such service in the 
public interest.  
12. In ensuring that broadcast licensees serve the “public interest, convenience, and 
necessity” under Section 310(d), the Commission focuses on the essential goals of diversity, competition, 
and localism.
31
  Here, ASCAP urges us to deny the Assignment Application based on either Pandora’s 
motivation in acquiring the Station or on a “public interest” factor introduced by ASCAP— the injury to 
ASCAP’s members from potential withdrawal of music publishers from ASCAP, which it alleges will 
“then [flow] to broadcasters and the American public.”
32
  ASCAP does not identify in either of these 
arguments any provision of the Communications Act or the Commission’s rules that Pandora’s proposed 
acquisition would violate, or any demonstrated threat that such acquisition poses to our public interest 
goals.  The Bureau carefully considered each of ASCAP’s contentions, concluding that, under our case 
law, Pandora will be considered to serve its community of license—regardless of its motivation in 
acquiring the Station—as long as it: (1) provides principal community signal service to the designated 
community; (2) complies with the main studio location rule; and (3) provides programming that will serve 
the designated community.
33
  The Bureau also determined that, for the same reasons that ASCAP lacked 
standing, the effects of the transaction on the collective music licensing system were too “speculative and 
contingent on the independent actions of third parties” to form a “substantial and material question of fact 
that grant of the [Assignment] Application would be inconsistent with the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity.”
34
  We agree.  Indeed, even if ASCAP had been able to demonstrate any likely connection 
between this transaction and withdrawal of music publishers from ASCAP, it has failed to demonstrate 
how that would adversely affect diversity, competition, or localism in the provision of broadcast service.  
In these circumstances, we believe it is clearly within the Commission’s discretion to leave such matters 
to the courts charged with addressing them.
35
  In fact, as noted above, the courts have now rejected 
                                                     
29
Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 5101-2.
30
Assignment Petition at 6.
31
47 U.S.C. § 310(d); In the Matter of Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 
Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 12903, 12907 (1999) (subsequent history omitted).  To the extent that ASCAP 
suggests that these Section 310(d) public interest factors must form a part of every foreign ownership analysis under 
Section 310(b)(4), we note that such a requirement would be administratively unworkable and duplicative of the 
assignment application process. 
32
Assignment Petition at 3.
33
Letter Decision at 8.  
34
Id.
35
See NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 670 & n.7 (1976); Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 
459 U.S. 498 (1983).  ASCAP’s argument that the Commission reviews how acquisitions will affect competition is 
inapposite.  Under Section 310(d), it is well established that our public interest evaluations of proposed transactions 
encompass “the broad aims of the Communications Act,” which include preserving competition.  See, e.g., 
Applications of Comcast Corp, General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses and 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 15-129
6
Pandora’s argument about its entitlement to RMLC rates that ASCAP has argued would, if successful, 
result in harm to the music licensing system.
36
       
13. Declaratory Ruling Petition.  In the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission held that 
“matters concerning the collective licensing regime are unrelated to potential unacceptable foreign 
influence over U.S. broadcast stations, which is the sole focus of Section 310(b)(4) as it applies to 
broadcast licenses.” 
37
  On reconsideration, ASCAP’s main objection to the Declaratory Ruling is that the 
Commission failed to conduct a “comprehensive” public interest analysis—specifically, that it failed to 
consider ASCAP’s claims that Pandora’s acquisition of the Station would not serve local listeners and 
could lead to the breakdown of the U.S. collective music licensing system.
38
  ASCAP also argues that the 
Commission failed to consider the public interest goals of increased foreign investment, innovation, 
diversity, and localism.
39
  These oversights, according to ASCAP, were inconsistent with the guidance set 
out in the Clarification Order and therefore arbitrary and capricious.
40
14. ASCAP’s argument misunderstands our determination under Section 310(b) and confuses 
that analysis with (and would make it duplicative of) the Bureau’s foregoing determination under Section 
310(d).  In the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission engaged in a detailed, fact-specific analysis of 
Pandora’s request to exceed the statutory foreign ownership benchmarks of Section 310(b)(4), following 
the guidance set out in the Clarification Order.  First, we examined Pandora Media’s ownership structure, 
i.e., that of a U.S.-based publicly traded company with widely dispersed beneficial ownership, in which 
no single foreign individual or entity held an attributable five percent or greater voting interest.
41
  The 
Commission also examined the identity and nationality of those with “the ability to influence or control 
core decisions of the licensee.”
42
  We solicited the input of Executive Branch entities with expertise in 
national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and international trade and received no comments or 
objections.
43
  Finally, the Commission noted that “Pandora is a new and independent entrant to the 
broadcast industry and as such represents an influx of investment capital,
44
quoting the Clarification 
Order, in which the Commission anticipated that “[g]reater capitalization [through foreign investment] 
may in turn yield greater innovation, particularly in programming directed at niche or minority 
audiences.”
45
  These are the relevant public interest factors upon which the Commission properly based its 
exercise of discretion under Section 310(b)(4) to permit Pandora to exceed the foreign ownership 
benchmarks (with conditions).  
15. The Commission considered and rejected ASCAP’s suggestion that we leverage our 
statutory obligations under Section 310(b)(4) in an attempt to preserve the current music licensing system.  
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No. 10-56, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 4238, 4248, ¶ 
23 (2011).  As noted above, ASCAP has failed to demonstrate how its concerns about Pandora’s music copyright 
royalty rates or rationale for this transaction are included within these broad aims.  
36
See paragraph 7 and n.26, supra.
37
Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 5099.  
38
Declaratory Ruling Petition at 1-2, 6.
39
Id. at 5-6.
40
Id. at 1-8.
41
Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 5096.  
42
Id. at 5097-8, 5101 (noting that all eight members of Pandora Media’s Board of Directors are U.S. citizens, as are 
all but two of its ten executive officers) (citations omitted). 
43
Id. at 5097.
44
Id. at 5100. 
45
Clarification Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 16249.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 15-129
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ASCAP provides no support for its view of Section 310(b)(4).  Nor do the Commission’s prior decisions 
analyzing Section 310(b)(4) issues.
46
  In the Clarification Order, we stated that we would address “any 
relevant public interest concerns” and determine “whether the public interest would be served by 
permitting the requested foreign ownership.”
47
In this case, the harm alleged by ASCAP has nothing to 
do with Pandora’s level of foreign ownership.  The alleged harm—potential withdrawal of music 
publishers from ASCAP—would be no less likely to occur even if Pandora had been able to demonstrate 
that it had less than 25 percent foreign ownership and thus never had to obtain a declaratory ruling.
48
  
Therefore, the Commission correctly concluded in the Declaratory Ruling that the future of the collective 
music licensing system is not a relevant public interest factor in our Section 310(b)(4) analysis of Pandora 
as a prospective licensee and, in any case, is a question that is more appropriately resolved by Congress, 
the courts, and government agencies with expertise in this area.
49
  Similarly, we found that Pandora’s 
motivation in acquiring the Station was not relevant to the purpose of Section 310(b) as the Commission 
has interpreted it, which, again, is a concern with “foreign influence over broadcast stations.”
50
  As noted 
above, however, both Pandora’s alleged rationale for the transaction and the transaction’s alleged impact 
on the collective music licensing system were directly addressed by the Bureau in the Letter Decision, as 
part of its Section 310(d) analysis.  
16. For the reasons set forth above, the Assignment Petition and the Declaratory Ruling 
Petition are denied. 
III. ORDERING CLAUSES
17. IT IS ORDERED THAT, pursuant to Sections 4(i) and 405 of the Communications Act 
of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 405, and Section 1.106 of the Commission’s Rules, 47 C.F.R. 
§ 1.106, the Petitions for Reconsideration filed by the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers on June 3, 2015, and July 2, 2015, ARE DENIED.
                                                     
46
See, e.g., Applications of SOFTBANK CORP., Starburst II, Inc., Sprint Nextel Corporation, and Clearwire 
Corporation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Declaratory Ruling, and Order on Reconsideration, 28 FCC Rcd 
9642, 9693 (2013) (“When analyzing a transfer of control or assignment application in which foreign investment is 
an issue, we also consider public interest issues related to national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, or trade 
policy concerns.”) (emphasis added)); Lockheed Martin Corp (Transfer of Comsat Licenses to Intelsat), Order and 
Authorization, 17 FCC Rcd 27732, 27762-63 (IB 2002); see also Clarification Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 16244 (“The 
Act’s foreign ownership restrictions were originally conceived to address homeland security interests during 
wartime.  They were designed to protect the integrity of ship-to-shore and governmental communications and thwart 
the airing of foreign propaganda on broadcast stations.”).
47
Clarification Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 16252-3 (emphasis added).
48
See Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 5099 (“The alleged harms to the performing rights system arise from 
Pandora’s proposed purchase of a radio station, not from the level of Pandora’s foreign ownership, and would exist 
whether or not Pandora was able to demonstrate compliance with Section 310(b)(4). Thus, ASCAP’s broader public 
interest argument is inapt in the context of this Declaratory Ruling, which exclusively concerns our statutory 
obligations under Section 310(b).”). 
49
Id. at 5099.
50
Id. at 5099 (citing Clarification Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 16253).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 15-129
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18. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MB Docket No. 14-109 IS HEREBY TERMINATED.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary