Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, DC 20554
In the Matter of
Lyca Tel, LLC
)
)
)
)
)
File No.:  EB-TCD-12-00000403
NAL/Acct. No.:  201132170026
FRN:  0014210983
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Adopted:  October 27, 2016 Released:  October 28, 2016
By the Commission: Chairman Wheeler issuing a statement; Commissioners Pai and O’Rielly dissenting 
and issuing separate statements.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. We dismiss in part and deny in part the Petition for Reconsideration filed by Lyca Tel, 
LLC (Lyca Tel) seeking reconsideration of a Forfeiture Order issued by the Commission.  In the 
Forfeiture Order, the Commission imposed a forfeiture of $5,000,000 against Lyca Tel for deceptively 
marketing its prepaid telephone calling cards through misleading, confusing, and inadequate disclosures 
of its rates and charges that made it impossible for consumers to calculate the actual cost of a call.  
2. Upon review of the Petition for Reconsideration
1
and the entire record,
2
we find no basis 
for reconsideration.  A petition for reconsideration may be dismissed if, for example, it relies on facts or 
arguments that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within the same proceeding, 
or facts or arguments previously known but not timely raised.
3
  Lyca Tel’s Petition fails to present new 
facts, arguments, or changed circumstances that were previously unknown to it that would warrant 
reconsideration, and we do not find that reconsideration is otherwise required in the public interest.  Thus, 
as explained below, we dismiss Lyca Tel’s arguments to the extent they were previously raised and 
rejected by the Commission in the Forfeiture Order or untimely raised in its Petition, and deny Lyca Tel’s 
other arguments on their merits for failing to demonstrate a material error or omission.  Accordingly, we 
dismiss in part and deny in part Lyca Tel’s Petition. 
                                                     
1
Lyca Tel, LLC, Petition for Reconsideration (Nov. 20, 2015) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00000403) (Petition).
2
The Forfeiture Order and Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture include more complete discussions of the 
facts and history of this case and are incorporated herein by reference.  Lyca Tel, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 
11792 (2015) (Forfeiture Order); Lyca Tel, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 26 FCC Rcd 12827 
(2011) (Lyca NAL).
3
47 CFR § 1.106(p) (providing that petitions for reconsideration of a Commission action that “[r]ely on arguments 
that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within the same proceeding” may be dismissed 
because they “plainly do not warrant consideration by the Commission”); see also 47 CFR § 1.106(c); EZ 
Sacramento, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 18257, 18257, para. 2 (EB 2000).  A Petition for 
Reconsideration may be granted when the Commission determines that consideration of the facts or arguments 
raised by the petitioner is in the public interest.  47 CFR § 1.106(c)(2).  However, unless a petitioner either 
demonstrates a material error or omission in the underlying order or raises additional facts not known or not existing 
until after the petitioner’s last opportunity to present such matters, a petition for reconsideration may be dismissed.  
See 47 CFR § 1.106(c).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
2
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Forfeiture Order Satisfied Due Process Requirements
3. In its Petition, Lyca Tel reprises arguments it previously raised with the Commission in 
response to the Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (Lyca NAL)
4
that the Commission did not 
provide fair notice regarding what disclosures are required from prepaid calling card providers in their 
marketing materials.
5
  Specifically, Lyca Tel claims that the standard established by the Commission in 
the NOS NAL (and applied to it in the Lyca NAL) – that advertising denoting applicable rates associated 
with telecommunications services violates Section 201(b) where it does not include clear and conspicuous 
disclosures that allow consumers to calculate the cost of a call – did not provide notice to Lyca Tel of 
what marketing activities were prohibited.
6
  Lyca Tel contends that because Commission NALs “can be 
settled or modified,” they “are not final law” and lack any precedential value.
7
  In addition, Lyca Tel 
argues that the Lyca NAL and Forfeiture Order represent “discriminatory enforcement” of the deceptive 
marketing rules because other prepaid calling card providers used similar marketing disclosures without 
being penalized by the Commission.
8
1. Precedential Value of the NOS NAL  
4. Nearly all of these arguments (excepting the claim of discriminatory enforcement) were 
already made by Lyca Tel in response to the Lyca NAL,
9
and then considered by the Commission and 
                                                     
4
See Initial Response of Lyca Tel, L.L.C. to Notice of Apparent Liability and Request for Consent Decree 
Negotiations, at 5-8 (Sept. 28, 2011) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00000403) (NAL Response); Supplemental Response 
of Lyca Tel, L.L.C. to Notice of Apparent Liability Under Request for Consent Decree Negotiations, at 2-7 (July 3, 
2012) (on file in EB-TCD-12-00000403) (Supplemental NAL Response).
5
Petition at i, 4-10.
6
Id. at 8-10 (citing NOS Commc’ns Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 16 FCC Rcd 8133 (NOS 
NAL)).  Lyca Tel repeatedly references the lack of consumer complaints about its advertising practices to support its 
claim that it lacked fair notice that its marketing practices violated the law.  Petition at 2-4.  However, the Act 
empowers the Commission to “investigate and impose forfeitures on common carriers even in the complete absence 
of consumer complaints.”  Preferred Long Distance, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 13711, 13717, para. 14 
(2015).  See 47 U.S.C. § 403 (“The Commission shall have full authority and power at any time to institute an 
inquiry, on its own motion, . . . relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act.”) (emphasis added).  
See also infra Section II.B.
7
Petition at 8.
8
Id. at 10-11.  The dissenters raise the same or similar arguments that they raised in response to the Forfeiture 
Order.  Those arguments were addressed in the Forfeiture Order, as supplemented by this item.  In addition, we note 
that there is no merit to the claim that it was “arbitrary” for the Commission to have “settled on 125 cards and 5 
million dollars” in each of the four forfeiture orders addressed, collectively, in the dissent.  Even if the four relevant 
companies were of different sizes and sold different cards in different numbers, the Commission assessed the 
specific record before it in each case, and in each case reasonably inferred that the company committed at least 125 
violations; the Commission then calculated a forfeiture amount equivalent to a base forfeiture applied to 125 
violations.  See, e.g., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11798, para. 18 & n.49.  Far from being arbitrary, this was a 
lawful exercise of the Commission’s discretion that was grounded in the specific record before it in each case.
9
See NAL Response at 5-12; Supplemental NAL Response at 2-6.  We also underscore that Lyca Tel’s reliance on 
Fox and General Electric is misplaced.  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012) (Fox); Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (General Electric).  While both discuss due process, we find 
that the facts of each case are distinguishable.  In General Electric, the conduct at issue was highly technical in 
nature, involving specific guidelines for the disposal of toxic materials – something that required explicit 
instructions.  See General Electric, 53 F.3d at 1326.  Moreover, the applicable standard was changed, causing 
confusion.  See id.  Fox is likewise distinguishable.  In that case, the court found that broadcasters did not have fair 
notice of what was required because of a change of policy and interpretation.  Specifically, under a prior policy and 
precedent, a fleeting expletive or brief shot of nudity was not considered a violation, but under a newer 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
3
rejected in the Forfeiture Order.  As we previously stated, Lyca Tel’s characterization of the NOS NAL “is 
simply wrong.”
10
  In any event, the relevant legal issue here is not the “precedential weight” of the NOS 
NAL, but rather whether it provided fair notice to Lyca Tel. As we explained at length in the Forfeiture 
Order, the Commission clearly set forth the advertising requirements associated with telecommunications 
services in the NOS NAL – including the importance of not misleading consumers about the applicable 
rates for telecommunications services by ensuring that service providers include “clear and conspicuous 
disclosure on how to calculate the total cost of a call.”
11
  Moreover, and also explained in the Forfeiture 
Order, the mere fact that the Commission subsequently resolved the NOS NAL through settlement “does 
not undermine the value of [it] in providing fair notice.”
12
  Due process requires fair notice and the 
Commission previously determined that the finding in the NOS NAL, coupled with the language of 
Section 201(b), “provides a person of ordinary intelligence with fair notice of the conduct that is 
required” from calling card providers.
13
  We therefore find that Lyca Tel’s arguments on this issue (which 
have already been fully addressed and rejected in the Forfeiture Order
14
) do not warrant further 
consideration.
15
2. Claim of Discriminatory Enforcement
5. The only nuance the Petition adds to Lyca Tel’s otherwise repetitive due process claims 
is its argument that the Lyca NAL and Forfeiture Order “ha[ve] and will lead to discriminatory 
enforcement.”
16
  Lyca Tel states that its marketing disclosures that the Commission found violated the law 
“are not unique”
17
and that “other well-known prepaid calling card providers” use “very similar 
qualifications” on their rates and charges.
18
  Lyca Tel suggests that the Forfeiture Order and similar 
penalties issued against five other carriers for deceptive marketing of prepaid calling cards represent a 
“random selection of targets” that is “arbitrary and discriminatory” in violation of its due process rights.
19
  
6. Lyca Tel’s argument is untimely.  Lyca Tel’s discriminatory enforcement claim fails to 
“rais[e] additional facts not known or not existing until after the petitioner’s last opportunity to present 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
interpretation, such content would be considered a violation.  See Fox, 30 FCC Rcd at 2318-19.  In the present case 
there is no complex rubric of technical requirements or a change in policy.  Instead, based on past precedent, the 
Commission determined that Lyca Tel had fair notice that when advertising rates, it was prohibited from misleading 
customers about applicable rates and was required to provide disclosures sufficient to allow consumers to calculate 
the total cost of a call.  See Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11796, para. 15.
10
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11794, para. 9.
11
Id. at 11794, para. 7 (citing NOS NAL, 16 FCC Rcd at 8137-38, para. 9).
12
Id. at 11794-95, para. 9.  See also Preferred Long Distance, 30 FCC Rcd at 13718, para. 16 & n.53 (finding that 
an NAL, with other Commission decisions, “provided the requisite fair notice”).
13
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11796, para. 15 (internal quotations omitted).  We also underscore that NALs, 
Forfeiture Orders, and rulemakings are not the only ways in which the Commission can put regulatees on notice of 
their obligations.  See, e.g., Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 522 F.3d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that an official 
interpretation issued by the Commission’s staff on delegated authority, such as a public notice or letter, has the same 
force and effect as other actions of the Commission).
14
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11794-95, 11796, paras. 9-10, 15.    
15
47 CFR § 1.106(p)(3) (petitions for reconsideration “plainly do not warrant consideration by the Commission” 
where such petitions “[r]ely on arguments that have been fully considered and rejected by the Commission within 
the same proceeding”).  
16
Petition at 10-11.
17
Id. at 10.
18
Id. at 10-11 (citing Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11803 (Commissioner O’Rielly, dissenting)).
19
Id. at 11.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
4
such matters.”
20
  Lyca Tel was aware that the Commission determined that its marketing practices and the 
similar practices of other carriers violated the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act), after the 
Lyca NAL’s release in 2011.  But Lyca Tel presents its “discriminatory enforcement” claim for the first 
time in its Petition – over four years later.  
7. In addition to its untimeliness, Lyca Tel’s discriminatory enforcement claim ignores our 
authority under the Act and relevant Commission precedent.  Section 403 of the Act provides the 
Commission with “full authority and power at any time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, . . . 
relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act.”
21
  The Commission has broad discretion 
to initiate investigations “so long as the matter is within the agency’s jurisdiction.”
22
  The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly recognized that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or 
criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”
23
  Such 
considerable discretion is necessary because “[a]n agency generally cannot act against each technical 
violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.  The agency is far better equipped . . . to deal with the 
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”
24
  The Commission therefore holds 
“prosecutorial discretion in choosing to initiate investigations, and the absence of action against any or 
all potentially liable entities does not preclude it from enforcing against a specific violator.”
25
The 
Commission remains in the best position to “weigh the benefits of pursuing an adjudication against the 
costs to the agency and the likelihood of success” and its decision to pursue enforcement action against an 
egregious violator like Lyca Tel falls fully within its broad prosecutorial discretion.
26
  Consequently, we 
find that the Commission’s investigation of Lyca Tel for deceptive marketing of prepaid calling cards did 
not violate due process requirements.
27
   
B. The Commission Provided Sufficient Specificity as to Lyca Tel’s Violations and 
Support for the Forfeiture Amount
8. Lyca Tel contends that the Lyca NAL and Forfeiture Order lacked the requisite 
specificity under Section 503(b)(4) of the Act regarding the “action and facts” supporting the 
Commission’s violation findings and challenges the Commission’s forfeiture calculation methodology.
28
                                                     
20
Supra para. 2.
21
47 U.S.C. § 403.  
22
Viacom Inc., ESPN Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 797, 804, para. 18 (2015) (Viacom/ESPN).  See Spanish 
Broad. Sys. Holding Co., Inc., Forfeiture Order, 27 FCC Rcd 11956, 11959, para. 8 & n.30 (EB 2012) (Section 403 
provides broad discretion as to the type of misconduct the Commission may investigate and subject to enforcement 
action).
23
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (1869)).
24
Id.
25
Viacom/ESPN, 30 FCC Rcd at 804, para. 17 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Radio One Licenses, LLC, 
Forfeiture Order, 19 FCC Rcd 23922, 23932, para. 24 (2004) (“The Commission is a regulatory agency with broad 
prosecutorial discretion in enforcement proceedings.”) (Radio One).
26
Radio One, 19 FCC Rcd at 23932, para. 24 (citing N.Y. State Dept. of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1213 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993)).
27
47 CFR § 1.106(b), (p) (Petitions for Reconsideration that fail to rely on new facts or changed circumstances may 
be dismissed).
28
Petition at i, 11-15; 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4).  We note that the requirements of Section 503(b)(4) only extend to the 
NAL issued in a proceeding.  See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4) (requiring the “notice” to provide information regarding the 
specific provision(s) of the law violated, what conduct violated the law, and when such violative conduct occurred).  
The Lyca NAL set forth the details of Lyca Tel’s apparent violations in 2011 and the company had the opportunity 
to raise any Section 503(b)(4) claim in its NAL Response, but failed to do so.  Lyca Tel’s Section 503(b)(4) claim 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
5
1. The Commission Provided Sufficient Specificity as to Lyca Tel’s Violations   
9. Regarding specificity under Section 503(b)(4) of the Act, we find that the Commission 
provided sufficient information regarding: (1) the specific provision of the Act that Lyca Tel violated
(Section 201(b)); (2) the nature of Lyca Tel’s conduct that violated the Act (deceptive marketing of 
prepaid calling cards); and (3) the time period during which such conduct occurred (the year preceding 
the Lyca NAL’s release).
29
  Lyca Tel states the Lyca NAL was deficient because it did not identify any 
specific customer affected or deceived by its marketing practices.
30
  But we previously concluded that 
“the Commission need not demonstrate actual harm to consumers to find violations of Section 201(b).”
31
  
Instead, all that is needed to support an enforcement action “is a determination that the Company has 
willfully or repeatedly failed to comply with a provision of the Act or an FCC order.”
32
  Lyca Tel also 
suggests that the Forfeiture Order was deficient because it did not identify any consumer complaints 
regarding its marketing practices.
33
  However, the Act empowers the Commission to “investigate and 
impose forfeitures on common carriers even in the complete absence of consumer complaints.”
34
  As a 
result, the absence of specified consumer complaints or harms does not render the Forfeiture Order 
deficient under Section 503(b)(4).  
10. The Commission has interpreted Section 503(b)(4) flexibly and we previously noted that 
the statute “does not require exact dates in every context.”
35
  As in the present case, when a carrier 
engages in an unjust or unreasonable “practice” under Section 201(b), we interpret the language of 
Section 503(b)(4)—“the date on which such conduct occurred”—to refer to the time period during which 
the unlawful “practice” giving rise to the violation occurred.
36
  Thus, an NAL satisfies Section 503(b)(4)’s 
date requirement if it specifies the applicable time period within which the carrier engaged in the unlawful 
practice or conduct.
37
  This interpretation provides a practical reading of the statute and also gives effect 
to our interpretation of “practice” as used in Section 201(b),
38
while still providing sufficient information 
to satisfy the violator’s due process rights.  
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
therefore fails to “rais[e] additional facts not known or not existing until after the petitioner’s last opportunity to 
present such matters,” and can be dismissed under Section 1.106 of the Commission’s rules.  Supra para. 2.  
However, as Lyca Tel argues that the Forfeiture Order also contained insufficient information, we deny these claims 
on their merits below.
29
See Lyca NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12833-34, para. 18; Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11797-98, paras. 18-19.
30
Petition at 12.
31
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11805, 11807, para. 6 (2015).
32
STi Telecom Inc. (formerly Epana Networks, Inc.), Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd 11742, 11754, para. 25 (2015) 
(STi).
33
Petition at 12.
34
See supra note 6.
35
STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11749, para. 15 (citing E. Carolina Broad. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 
6154, 6155-56, para. 12 (1991); WROV Broadcasters, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 1421, 
1422, para. 12 (1991)).
36
Id. at 11749-50, para. 15.
37
Id. at 11750, para. 15.
38
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (“Statutory construction must begin with the 
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses 
the legislative purpose.”) (citations omitted).  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
6
11. Both the Lyca NAL and the Forfeiture Order explained that each card Lyca Tel marketed 
using deceptive advertising constituted an independent violation of Section 201(b).
39
  Both the Lyca NAL
and the Forfeiture Order also specified the time period during which Lyca Tel’s deceptive marketing 
practices occurred – the year preceding the Lyca NAL’s release.
40
  It would not only be impractical to list 
the date that each of Lyca Tel’s cards were sold, but also unnecessary because the deceptive marketing 
practice giving rise to the violations (failure to include sufficient countervailing information about its 
rates that would enable consumers to calculate the cost of calls) was identical for every violation.
41
  As 
such, the Commission satisfied the notice requirements of Section 503(b)(4) by identifying the specific 
provision of the Act that Lyca Tel violated, what conduct violated the Act, and when such violative 
conduct occurred.
42
  Accordingly, Lyca Tel’s Section 503(b)(4) claims are without merit and denied.
2. The Commission Provided Sufficient Support for the Forfeiture Amount
12. We also reject Lyca Tel’s argument that the Commission adopted “shifting rationales” for 
the fines by applying “two inconsistent bases for calculating the forfeiture.”
43
  The Commission issued the
forfeiture in this case in accordance with Section 503(b) of the Act,
44
Section 1.80 of the Commission’s 
rules (Rules),
45
and the Commission’s Forfeiture Policy Statement.
46
  When we assess forfeitures, Section 
503(b)(2)(E) requires that we take into account the “nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the 
violation and, with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability 
to pay, and such other matters as justice may require.”
47
  In this case, the Commission considered each of 
these factors and determined that a $5,000,000 forfeiture took into account “the extent and gravity of 
Lyca Tel’s egregious conduct, as well as its culpability.”
48
  The Commission further determined that the 
forfeiture must be significant enough to “protect the interests of consumers and serve as an adequate 
                                                     
39
See Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11797-98, para 18; Lyca NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12833-34, para. 18.  
40
See Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11797-98, para 18; Lyca NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12833-34, para. 18.  
41
Lyca Tel suggests that the Commission’s approach requires it “to defend each and every card sale . . . . [and] 
prove the negative – that no customers were deceived by the calling card they purchased.”  Petition at 13.  This 
completely misses the point.  The standard at play is whether, after advertising certain rates associated with its 
prepaid calling cards, the information provided on each prepaid calling card sold and the associated marketing 
posters contained sufficient information to allow customers to calculate the cost of a call.  See Forfeiture Order, 30 
FCC Rcd at 11794, para. 7; Lyca NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12829, 12832, paras. 6, 14; NOS NAL, 16 FCC Rcd at 8138, 
para. 9.  Far from proving a negative, Lyca Tel needed to show that its prepaid calling card disclosures provided 
enough countervailing information to allow a consumer to calculate the cost of a call, which it failed to do.  See 
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11796, para. 13 (“Lyca Tel’s disclosures are critically incomplete because they 
omit key facts that consumers need in order to understand the rate structure and calculate the cost of a call.”); Lyca 
NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12831, para. 10 (“Lyca Tel's disclosures . . . do not provide the information necessary for a 
consumer to determine what fees apply, the amounts of those fees, and when and how they will affect the number of 
calling minutes offered.”).    
42
47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4).  See, e.g., Travelcomm Indus., Inc., Forfeiture Order, 26 FCC Rcd 6476, 6481, para. 12 
(2011) (rejecting Section 503(b)(4) notice claim where NAL “described in detail the evidence upon which the 
proposed forfeiture was based”).
43
Petition at i, 14-15.
44
47 U.S.C. § 503(b).
45
47 CFR § 1.80.
46
The Commission’s Forfeiture Policy Statement and Amendment of Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate the 
Forfeiture Guidelines, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 17087 (1997) (Forfeiture Policy Statement), recons. denied, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 303 (1999). 
47
47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(E).
48
Lyca NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12833, para. 18.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
7
deterrent,” while recognizing “Lyca Tel’s failure to adequately provide material information about its 
rates to thousands of consumers who purchased the Company’s prepaid cards.”
49
  Also pursuant to such 
considerations, the Commission exercised its discretion in setting the forfeiture amount at the equivalent 
of only 125 violations, rather than applying the base forfeiture amount to every one of the hundreds of 
Lyca Tel cards sold each day.
50
  Having considered such factors in both the NAL and Forfeiture Order, 
we find the forfeiture assessment proper and see no reason to reconsider it here.   
13. Lyca Tel also argues that if Section 503(b)(4) can be satisfied by identifying a time 
period rather than each specific date its calling cards were sold, then the Commission cannot then 
calculate the forfeiture on a “per-card-sold basis.”
51
  However, Lyca Tel offers no legal support for this 
proposition and we find nothing to suggest that identifying the relevant time period during which 
violations took place in accordance with Section 503(b)(4) precludes us from assessing a forfeiture for 
each calling card sold.  Lyca Tel claims that the “Commission . . . argues that practices are not discrete 
events . . . .”
52
This is incorrect.  As we previously stated:
[T]he very nature of an unlawful ‘practice’ under Section 201(b) is that it may include 
activities that are repeated over time and is not merely a discrete event on a single day.  
The violations charged in this case included the unlawful practices of making deceptive 
misrepresentations and failing to disclose material information about rates, charges, and 
practices at the point of sale for each calling card sold.
53
  
Likewise, in the present case, the violations involved inadequate advertising disclosures in connection 
with transactions that occurred with multiple consumers in multiple locations on multiple days; the 
violations were not a discrete event.  Accordingly, the Commission made clear that each card sold 
involved the same deceptive marketing practice (misleading cost disclosures that presented insufficient 
information to calculate the cost of a call) that violated the Act.
54
  Thus, the Commission found that Lyca 
Tel’s deceptive marketing of each prepaid calling card to consumers constituted a separate violation of 
Section 201(b) and properly calculated the forfeiture while accounting for the violations’ egregiousness, 
Lyca Tel’s culpability, and the need to ensure that deceptive marketing forfeitures “are not considered 
merely an affordable cost of doing business.”
55
  Lyca Tel advances no argument or new fact that warrants 
reconsideration of these findings.  
III. CONCLUSION
14. Based on the record before us and in light of the applicable statutory factors, we affirm 
our conclusion that Lyca Tel willfully and repeatedly violated Section 201(b) of the Act by deceptively 
marketing its prepaid telephone calling cards, making it impossible for consumers to calculate the cost of 
a call.
56
  We further affirm our decision not to cancel or reduce the $5,000,000 forfeiture.
                                                     
49
Id. at 12833-34, para. 18.
50
Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11798, para. 18 & n.49; NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12833, para. 18 & n.42.
51
Petition at 14-15.
52
Id. at 14.
53
STi, 30 FCC Rcd at 11748-49, para. 14 (citations omitted) (emphasis original).
54
See Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 11797-98, para. 18 (citing NOS NAL, 16 FCC Rcd at 8141, para. 19).   
55
Lyca NAL, 26 FCC Rcd at 12833-34, para. 18.
56
47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
8
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES
15. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 405 of the Act and Section 
1.106 of the Rules, the Petition for Reconsideration filed by Lyca Tel, LLC, is hereby DISMISSED IN 
PART AND, in remaining part, DENIED.
57
16. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Section 503(b) of the Act and Section
1.80 of the Rules, Lyca Tel, LLC IS LIABLE FOR A MONETARY FORFEITURE of five million 
dollars ($5,000,000) for willfully and repeatedly violating Section 201(b) of the Act.
58
17. Payment of the forfeiture shall be made in the manner provided for in Section 1.80 of the 
Rules within thirty (30) calendar days after the release date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
59
18. Payment of the forfeiture must be made by check or similar instrument, wire transfer, or 
credit card, and must include the NAL/Account Number and FRN referenced above.  Lyca Tel, LLC shall 
send electronic notification of payment to Lisa Williford at Lisa.Williford@fcc.gov on the date said 
payment is made.  Regardless of the form of payment, a completed FCC Form 159 (Remittance Advice) 
must be submitted.
60
  When completing the FCC Form 159, enter the Account Number in block number 
23A (call sign/other ID) and enter the letters “FORF” in block number 24A (payment type code).  Below 
are additional instructions that should be followed based on the form of payment selected:  
? Payment by check or money order must be made payable to the order of the Federal 
Communications Commission. Such payments (along with the completed Form 159) must be 
mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-
9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank – Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-
GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63101.
? Payment by wire transfer must be made to ABA Number 021030004, receiving bank 
TREAS/NYC, and Account Number 27000001. To complete the wire transfer and ensure 
appropriate crediting of the wired funds, a completed Form 159 must be faxed to U.S. Bank 
at (314) 418-4232 on the same business day the wire transfer is initiated.
? Payment by credit card must be made by providing the required credit card information on 
FCC Form 159 and signing and dating the Form 159 to authorize the credit card payment.  
The completed Form 159 must then be mailed to Federal Communications Commission, P.O. 
Box 979088, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000, or sent via overnight mail to U.S. Bank –
Government Lockbox #979088, SL-MO-C2-GL, 1005 Convention Plaza, St. Louis, MO 
63101.
19. Any request for making full payment over time under an installment plan should be sent 
to: Chief Financial Officer—Financial Operations, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th 
Street, SW, Room 1-A625, Washington, DC 20554.
61
  Questions regarding payment procedures should be 
directed to the Financial Operations Group Help Desk by phone, 1-877-480-3201, or by e-mail, 
ARINQUIRIES@fcc.gov.
                                                     
57
47 U.S.C. § 405; 47 CFR § 1.106.
58
47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 503(b); 47 CFR § 1.80.
59
47 CFR § 1.80.  The Department of Justice (DOJ) has filed a Complaint for Recovery of the forfeiture against 
Lyca Tel in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  The court has granted a joint motion to 
stay the case and administratively terminated the case until such time as the Commission addresses Lyca Tel’s 
Petition.  
60
An FCC Form 159 and detailed instructions for completing the form may be obtained at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Forms/Form159/159.pdf.
61
See 47 CFR § 1.1914.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
9
20. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall 
be sent by first class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested, to Lyca Tel, LLC, Attention: 
Somasuntharam Thayaparan, Chief Executive Officer; Nithiyananthasothy Vallipuram, Chairman/Senior 
Officer; and Roberta Kraus, President/Senior Officer, 24 Commerce Street, Suite 100, Newark, NJ, 
07102; and to Corporate Creations Network, DC Agent for Service of Process, 1629 K Street NW, #300, 
Washington, DC, 20006; and to Steven A. Augustino, Esq., and Dawn R. Damschen, Esq., Kelley Drye & 
Warren LLP, 3050 K Street NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC, 20007.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
10
STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER
Re:   Lyca Tel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000403
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000409
NobelTel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000452
The FCC has a statutory mandate to protect consumers who rely our nation’s networks, and 
meeting this responsibility is one of the Commission’s top priorities.  A key component of our consumer 
protection strategy has been smarter, tougher enforcement of our rules.  In recent years, our Enforcement 
Bureau has ramped up its efforts to ensure companies follow the rules and consumers get what they pay 
for.  We’ve taken actions and levied fines to crack down on a series of anti-consumer practices, from 
cramming to Wi-Fi blocking to failure to protect consumer data. 
Today, the Commission votes on a series of petitions to hold companies accountable for 
deceptively marketing prepaid calling cards.  
In October 2015, the Commission fined six companies that falsely advertised that their low-cost 
prepaid calling cards could allow consumers far more calling minutes than were in fact being sold.  In 
each case, the company marketed its cards in a way that promised hundreds or thousands of minutes of 
calling time for only a few dollars.  However, unless used in a single call, various fees and surcharges 
would diminish the minutes available and consumers would only receive a fraction of the promised 
minutes.  The marketing materials for the prepaid cards deceived consumers by failing to clearly or 
conspicuously disclose or explain the fees and surcharges that applied to the calling cards.  Many of the 
disclosures were also vague, offering only potential charges and ranges of fees. Some disclosures even 
said that the charges, fees, or minutes could be changed without notice.
The 2015 Forfeiture Orders all underscored the common sense notion that a company must 
provide sufficient information to consumers so that they can reasonably determine the actual cost of a 
call.
Today, the Commission considers four petitions for reconsideration.  They largely rely on 
arguments that have already been considered and rejected by the Commission.  To the extent that the 
companies raised new arguments at this late stage, they were without merit.
Since the Commission issued the forfeiture orders, the companies have failed to pay them as 
ordered, and the FCC has referred these matters to the U.S. Department of Justice, which has begun to file 
the appropriate proceedings in federal court.  Resolution of these petitions today will aid the expeditious 
prosecution of these cases by the Justice Department and facilitate collection efforts in federal court, 
promoting judicial efficiency.  
Today’s actions send two key messages to two key audiences. To consumers, rest assured that 
the FCC has got your back.  To companies who would defraud consumers, please know that the FCC will 
hold you accountable and that if we levy fines, we will see that they are collected. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
11
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER AJIT PAI
Re:   Lyca Tel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000403
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000409
NobelTel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000452
I agree with the Commission that the four companies at issue here used blatantly misleading and 
deceptive marketing materials to sell prepaid calling cards.  This behavior should not be tolerated, 
especially when it involves preying upon vulnerable populations, such as immigrants.
Unfortunately, the Commission’s ability to lawfully impose forfeitures upon these companies has 
been fatally compromised by its inadequate and incomplete investigation into their conduct.  That’s why I 
dissented from the Forfeiture Orders imposed upon these companies last year, and that’s why I must 
dissent from these Orders denying their petitions for reconsideration.
Section 503(b)(4) of the Communications Act requires Notices of Apparent Liability to set forth, 
among other things, “the nature of the act or omission charged against such person and the facts upon 
which such charge is based” as well as “the date on which such conduct occurred.”
1
  In each of the cases 
here, the Commission has found that “a separate violation of section 201(b) occurred each time a 
consumer purchased” a misleading and deceptive prepaid calling card.
That raises a number of questions pertaining to each purported violation (i.e., each purchase of a 
prepaid calling card).  On which dates did the purchases of prepaid calling cards take place?  Who 
purchased them?  Where did these sales take place?  And which type of card was purchased?
The four underlying Notices of Apparent Liability did not answer any of these questions with 
respect to even a single purchase of a prepaid calling card.  The four Forfeiture Orders did not answer any
of these questions.  And the four Orders we are voting on today still do not answer any of these questions.  
Why is this information missing?  Because the Enforcement Bureau didn’t bother to ask for it.  To say the 
least, this is a problem.
To use an analogy, it’s as if a prosecutor decided to charge a suspect with robbing a whole bunch 
of people, and then at trial, failed to identify any of the victims, when they were robbed, where they were 
robbed, or what was stolen.  Regardless of the defendant’s guilt, there is no way that anyone could be 
convicted of robbery with such a lack of specific evidence.
As a result of the obvious deficiencies in the investigation, I do not believe that the Commission 
has complied with section 503(b)(4) of the Act or fundamental aspects of due process.
To be sure, the Commission has claimed that it was not required to include any of this specific 
information, including particular dates, in the Notices of Apparent Liability.  Instead, it contends that the 
companies were engaging in an unlawful “practice” that included activities repeated over time.  
Therefore, for example, the Commission argues that it was sufficient that the Notices of Apparent 
Liability “refer[red] to the time period during which the unlawful practice giving rise to the violation 
occurred.”
2
Had the Commission found that these four companies had each committed a single continuing 
violation of section 201(b) in the form of an unlawful practice, then I could perhaps understand the 
argument that the facts set forth in the Notices of Apparent Liability were sufficiently specific.  However, 
the Commission makes no such finding—probably because each company’s liability then would have 
                                                     
1
See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4).
2
Locus Telecommunications, Inc. Order at para. 9 (emphasis in original).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
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been capped at $1.575 million.
3
  Instead, the Commission has concluded that each company committed a 
separate violation of section 201(b) each time that a consumer purchased a misleading and deceptive 
prepaid calling card.  At the same time, it’s failed to specify the basic facts underlying even a single sale.  
This is not legally permissible.
When it comes to enforcement, I have many times expressed the concern that the Commission is 
more interested in seeking headlines than respecting the rule of law.  These four Orders represent just the 
latest examples of this problem.  Here, the Commission appropriately identified four companies engaging 
in deeply problematic conduct.  But because its investigation of these companies was deeply flawed, I do 
not believe that it has lawfully imposed forfeitures on them.  These Orders will certainly generate some 
good press for the Commission, but I’m skeptical that a court will ever require these companies to pay 
these penalties.
                                                     
3
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(b)(2).  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
13
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O'RIELLY
Re:   Lyca Tel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000403
Touch-Tel USA, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000409
NobelTel, LLC, File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000412
Locus Telecommunications, Inc., File No.: EB-TCD-12-00000452
Since the Commission has done absolutely nothing to bolster the Forfeiture Orders, nothing in 
these latest orders on reconsideration persuades me that these companies should be subjected to 
unjustifiably large fines for conduct that is not covered by the Act, was not deceptive in any event, and 
did not actually harm a single consumer.  I dissent on each.
Fundamentally, I continue to object to the notion that the Commission has authority under section 
201(b) to regulate “deceptive marketing”.  In the underlying Forfeiture Orders, the Commission claimed
that deceptive marketing is an unjust and unreasonable practice.  However, as a former Commissioner 
noted, “if ‘practices’ includes advertising, then it is hard to imagine what it does not include.”
1
  Under this 
formulation, the Commission’s interpretation of section 201 is so boundless that such roving authority, if 
further embraced, will become the provision that swallows the rest of the Act.  And, in the hands of an 
Enforcement Bureau eager to expand the Commission’s reach, it’s beyond dangerous.
Because the Commission does not have rules on deceptive marketing and refuses to adopt any to 
everyone’s detriment, in my opinion, it continues to point to the 2001 NOS Communications Notice of 
Apparent Liability (NOS NAL).  I remain opposed to using adjudications to adopt new policy positions 
because there is no notice and no opportunity for all potentially impacted companies to provide comment.  
An NAL is not even a final decision of the Commission.  Indeed, when I first joined the Commission I 
was urged to support NALs even if I had concerns about the preliminary positions advanced in them, 
because I was told that parties would have a full and fair opportunity to rebut them in their responses, and 
the Commission would render a final decision on the merits at the forfeiture stage.  Now the Commission 
is trying to have it both ways.  If NALs do not represent the Commission’s final determinations, then they 
cannot and do not provide notice of how the Commission might act in a future case.  That is particularly 
true where the Commission never issues a forfeiture order, but instead settles with the party, as was the 
case with NOS.
Even if one believes that an NAL does provide some degree of notice, which I don’t concede, the 
facts underlying the NOS NAL are so dissimilar that it could not have provided notice to these prepaid 
calling card providers that their markedly different advertisements would be considered problematic.  In 
the NOS NAL, the companies used a pricing methodology that “appear[ed] to be unique to these 
companies” and was so “complicated” and “confusing” that, even though the companies provided verbal 
and written instructions on how to calculate the rates, almost 900 consumers filed complaints.
2
  In 
contrast, these providers, who used standard advertisements and disclosures, would have had no basis to 
suspect that their marketing materials would be treated like those in the NOS NAL.
To start, the disclosures at issue here are neither “complicated” nor “confusing”.  They alert 
buyers to the fact that a specific set of fees could or would apply.  In some cases, the cards indicated that 
there would be a fee of “up to” a certain amount or that a “maximum” specified fee would apply.  In other 
instances, the cards noted that rates could be higher, for example, when calling wireless numbers.  I fail to 
see how a card could be considered deceptive when all categories of charges are spelled out with enough 
detail to enable a consumer to decide whether the card, overall, is a good deal.  A reasonable amount of 
                                                     
1
Business Discount Plan, Forfeiture Order, 15 FCC Rcd 14461, 14475 (2000) (dissenting statement of 
Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth)
2
NOS Communications, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability, 16 FCC Rcd 8133, 8134, 8136, 8137 (2001).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-145
14
imprecision should be considered acceptable when the companies do not control and cannot foresee 
exactly how consumers will choose to use the cards.  That’s not deceptive – it’s necessary for reasonable 
and flexible consumer usage.  And it is certainly distinctive from the NOS NAL where the companies 
provided customers with a specific formula that they falsely claimed would enable customers to easily 
calculate the exact charges.
Moreover, these practices are far from being “unique” compared to those of other calling card 
providers, as advertisements and disclosures at issue here appear to be commonplace elsewhere.  A quick 
search of other well-known prepaid calling card providers turned up disclosures with very similar 
qualifications.  In fact, the qualification that rates and/or terms and conditions are subject to change is 
commonly used in both the voice and broadband context by wireline, cable, wireless and other providers.  
In addition, posters with disclosures in smaller print on the bottom seem to be the norm.  If the NOS NAL
articulated a clear standard that provided companies with fair notice of the conduct required, as the 
Commission continues to allege, then why doesn’t anybody seem to know it?  As I said before, selective 
application of penalties when nobody appeared to be on notice is abusive.
Finally, not a single consumer filed a complaint.  If the advertisements were so unclear, you 
wouldn’t know it from the deafening silence of the public.  In fact, these cases demonstrate the complete 
absence of consumer harm.  The Commission responds that it is empowered by the Act to initiate 
enforcement on its own motion.  However, in an area as completely subjective as deceptive advertising, a 
vital factor must be whether anyone in the real world was actually deceived.  Seeing a null set should be 
telling to my colleagues and the general public.
Even though I would not have pursued enforcement actions against these companies in these 
instances, I would be remiss if I did not comment on the arbitrary approach the Commission used to 
calculate their fines, and which it refuses to reconsider. Because there were no instances of actual 
consumer complaints, the Commission had to find a way to approximate the supposed harm to 
consumers.  It did so by guessing how many cards might have been sold during the relevant timeframe 
and then assumed that all of those supposed sales involved deceptive marketing.  Using its discretion, 
however, the Commission has limited the fine in each item to 125 cards or 5 million dollars.  I'm 
supposed to believe that the Commission took into account the unique facts, circumstances, and 
egregiousness of each case but miraculously settled on 125 cards and 5 million dollars in each item? It is 
simply not credible that four companies of different sizes that sold different cards in different numbers 
would end up with the exact same fines.  Once again, the fines seem to be calculated to achieve a 
preordained result and headline, with no basis in fact or law.
As I said at the Forfeiture Order stage, some might dismiss these actions as an effort to clean up 
the backlog of items concerning an industry that is fading away.  However, providers of all types should 
be troubled by the Commission’s expansive reading of the statute, coupled with assertions that companies 
that were trying to follow the rules, followed standard industry practices, and never had any complaints 
lodged against them can nonetheless be fined millions of dollars.