Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-173
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Improving the Resiliency of Mobile Wireless 
Communications Networks
Reliability and Continuity of Communications 
Networks, Including Broadband Technologies 
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PS Docket No. 13-239
[terminated]
PS Docket No. 11-60
ORDER
Adopted:   December 14, 2016 Released:  December 20, 2016
By the Commission:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Heading Paragraph #
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................. 1
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................ 5
III. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................................................... 16
A. Adopting a Voluntary Approach.................................................................................................... 17
B. Community Preparedness .............................................................................................................. 22
1. Municipal Preparedness .......................................................................................................... 22
2. Consumer Preparedness and Restoration Information ............................................................ 28
C. Roaming under Disasters and Mutual Aid Agreements................................................................. 33
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES....................................................................................................................... 41
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1. In this Order, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) addresses 
proposals raised in its earlier Notice, released in the wake of Superstorm Sandy, designed to address the 
resiliency of the mobile wireless industry’s communications infrastructure.
1
   In light of the substantial 
concerns identified in the record with respect to proposed metrics and possible consequences of the 
disclosure proposal initially advanced in our Notice, in this Order we find that the “Wireless Network 
Resiliency Cooperative Framework”
2
(Framework) as submitted by AT&T, CTIA – The Wireless 
                                                     
1
Improving the Resiliency of Mobile Wireless Communications Networks; Reliability and Continuity of 
Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies, PS Docket Nos. 13-239 and 11-60, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 28 FCC Rcd 14373, 14374 ¶ 3 (2013) (Notice).
2
Letter from Joan Marsh, AT&T; Charles McKee, Sprint; Grant Spellmeyer, U.S. Cellular; Scott Bergmann, CTIA; 
Steve Sharkey, T-Mobile; and William H. Johnson, Verizon, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications 
Commission (dated Apr. 27, 2016), PS Docket Nos. 11-60 and 13-239, http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/fcc-
filings/160427-final-network-resiliency-commitment-letter.pdf (Framework) (“[A] voluntary initiative that will 
enhance coordination and communication to advance wireless service continuity and information sharing during and 
after emergencies and disasters.”).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-173
2
Association (CTIA), Sprint, T-Mobile, U.S. Cellular, and Verizon presents a more appropriate path 
forward to improving wireless resiliency and provider transparency, and we refrain from adopting further 
regulations at this time.  We find the voluntary framework to be a reasonable approach to achieving the 
Commission’s stated goals in PS Docket No. 13-239, including promoting availability of wireless mobile 
services in the event of natural disasters and other emergencies and increasing provider transparency 
around wireless resiliency.  We also believe it will bolster situational awareness for the Commission, 
consumers, and public officials, and provide a mechanism by which consumers will be able to hold 
providers accountable for service continuity during disaster-related events.  
2. We commend the wireless industry for coming together on this issue and proposing a 
collective way to improve resiliency.  We are particularly encouraged by the signatory parties’ 
cooperation and fulfillment of certain Framework commitments during the catastrophic flooding in 
Louisiana in August 2016, even though a triggering condition of the Framework was absent.
3
  We 
encourage providers to utilize the Framework where it applies.  We believe that, at this time, the 
commitments made in the Framework for improving wireless resiliency sufficiently address the concerns 
raised in the Notice to warrant terminating PS Docket No. 13-239.  
3. In the Notice, the Commission sought comment on whether to require wireless 
providers to disclose the percentages of cell sites kept in operation during major emergencies, as a metric 
for gauging the comparative reliability of mobile wireless networks and as a tool to create incentives to 
harden networks to better withstand disaster conditions.
4
  The Commission proposed that mobile wireless 
service providers file daily reports during major emergencies, which the Commission surmised could 
form the basis of comparisons among providers as to the resiliency of their networks, which consumers 
could then factor into their purchasing decisions.
5
  The Commission also posited that the disclosures 
would create incentives for providers to increase investment in hardening their networks to better survive 
disaster conditions.
6
  
4. The Commission’s Notice also solicited comment on alternative or complementary 
                                                     
3
The Framework requires that Emergency Support Function 2 (ESF-2) be declared for the Framework’s 
commitments to be triggered.  Although Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) designated 20 Louisiana 
parishes as part of the federal disaster area, ESF-2 was not declared during the floods. Several signatory parties told 
Commission staff that mutual aid and roaming under disaster agreements were nevertheless honored in accordance 
with the Framework.    
4
Notice, 28 FCC Rcd at 14373, para. 1.  
5
Notice, 28 FCC Rcd at 14384, para. 24, 26.  Government and consumer-focused commenters generally favored the 
Commission’s proposal to require regular carrier disclosures. See, e.g., Comments of Association of Public-Safety 
Communications Officials (APCO) at 6 (APCO Comments); Consumers Union and the Association of American 
Retired Persons (AARP) argued that disclosures about resiliency preparedness would be ineffective if 
unaccompanied by the adoption of mandatory performance standards.  AARP Comments at 16-17, 23; Consumers 
Union Comments at 12.  See also APCO Comments at 3.  Government and consumer-focused commenters largely 
opposed the use of industry-led voluntary measures for improving resiliency.  Consumers Union Comments 
throughout; California Public Utilities Commission Comments at 2, 7; New York City Comments at 3.
6
Notice, 28 FCC Rcd at 14381-82, para. 20.  Industry commenters generally argued that the proposed disclosures 
would do more harm than good. See, e.g., Comments of CTIA at 1 (CTIA Comments); Comments of Wireless 
Infrastructure Association at 2 (PCIA Comments).  See also, Blooston Rural Carriers Comments at 5; Joint 
Comments of the Competitive Carriers Association and NTCA - The Rural Broadband Association (CCA/NTCA 
Joint Comments) at 16-17.  Commenters also argued that the disclosures would undermine the prevailing spirit of 
cooperation during disasters and thus impede service restoration and recovery.  See, e.g., Comments of the Alliance 
for Telecommunications Industry Solutions at 7 (ATIS Comments).  These commenters argued that the proposed 
cell site outage metric offers a poor measure of network reliability and that the proposed alternative disclosures are 
similarly unnecessary because there is already plenty of data on network reliability available to inform consumer 
choice.  See, e.g., CTIA Comments at 3; Verizon Comments at 4.  They further argued that competition creates 
incentives to make networks as resilient and reliable as possible.  See, e.g., PCIA Comments at 3.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-173
3
measures for improving wireless network reliability, and on their associated costs and benefits.  Among 
these was “voluntary measures taken by industry.”
7
  The Commission specifically sought comment on 
“whether heightened transparency and resiliency of mobile wireless networks could be achieved
adequately” through such measures.
8
  As an example, it cited a 2011 agreement among the Commission, 
Consumers Union, CTIA, and certain wireless carriers addressing “bill shock.”
9
    
5. CTIA Proposed Framework.  On April 27, 2016, in advance of the 2016 hurricane 
season, CTIA, AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, U.S. Cellular, and Verizon filed an ex parte notifying the 
Commission of their adoption of a voluntary initiative designed to enhance coordination and 
communication to advance wireless service continuity and information sharing during and after 
emergencies and disasters.
10
  The filing sets out a five-pronged framework for enhancing coordination 
during an emergency: (1) providing for reasonable roaming under disaster arrangements (RuDs) when 
technically feasible; (2) fostering mutual aid among wireless carriers during emergencies; (3) enhancing 
municipal preparedness and restoration by convening with local government public safety representatives 
to develop best practices, and establishing a provider/PSAP contact database; (4) increasing consumer 
readiness and preparation through development and dissemination with consumer groups of a Consumer 
Readiness Checklist; and (5) improving public awareness and stakeholder communications on service and 
restoration status, through Commission posting of data on cell site outages on an aggregated, county-by-
county basis in the relevant area through its Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS).
11
  CTIA 
asserts that “[t]he Framework is consistent with – and builds upon – CSRIC recommendations.”
12
6. Applicability of the commitments contained in the Framework is limited to when the 
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) or any entity authorized to declare Emergency Support 
Function 2 (ESF-2)
13
activates ESF-2
14
for a given emergency or disaster and the FCC activates DIRS.
15
  
The Framework further limits applicability of its RuD proposal to “where: (i) a requesting carrier’s 
network has become inoperable and the requesting carrier has taken all appropriate steps to attempt to 
                                                     
7
Notice, 28 FCC Rcd at 14395, para. 63.
8
Id.
9
Id.  
10
Framework at 1 (“[A] voluntary initiative that will enhance coordination and communication to advance wireless 
service continuity and information sharing during and after emergencies and disasters.”).
11
Framework at 2-3.  The Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS) is a voluntary, web-based system that 
communications companies, including wireless, wireline, broadcast, and cable providers, can use to report 
communications infrastructure status and situational awareness information during times of crisis.  The Commission 
activates DIRS at its discretion, although usually with consultation from FEMA, and it announces to participating 
providers via public notice or email the area that will be covered by the activation and specifics about requested 
DIRS submissions.  See Federal Communications Commission, Disaster Information Reporting System, 
https://www.fcc.gov/general/disaster-information-reporting-system-dirs-0 (last visited July 28, 2016). 
12
Framework at 2. 
13
The NRCC is a multiagency center that coordinates Federal support for major incidents and emergencies.  In 
addition to the NRCC, ESF-2 may be declared at the regional FEMA offices level and the state level.  See Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Fact Sheet: National Response Coordination Center (July 2015), 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1440617086835-
f6489d2de59dddeba8bebc9b4d419009/NRCC_July_2015.pdf.  See also Letter from Brian M. Josef, Assistant Vice 
President – Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, PS Docket Nos. 11-60 and 13-239 
(filed Dec. 13, 2016). 
14
Emergency Support Function 2 (ESF-2) supports the restoration of communications infrastructure, coordinates 
communications support to response efforts, facilitates the delivery of information to emergency management 
decision makers, and assists in the stabilization and reestablishment of systems and applications from cyber attacks 
during incidents.  See Federal Emergency Management Agency, Communications Annex: Emergency Support 
Function 2 (Jan. 2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-02.pdf (ESF-2 Fact Sheet).
15
Framework at 2. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-173
4
restore its own network, and (ii) the home carrier has determined that roaming is technically feasible and 
will not adversely affect service to the home carrier’s own subscribers,” adding that “[s]uch arrangements 
will be limited in duration and contingent on the requesting carrier taking all possible steps to restore 
service on its own network as quickly as possible.”
16
7. On April 28, 2016, the Bureau released a Public Notice seeking comment on the 
CTIA proposed framework.
17
  APCO, CCA, and Wireless Infrastructure Association support the CTIA 
voluntary framework,
18
whereas the City of New York and New America generally oppose the 
framework as proposed.
19
  Rural Wireless Association (RWA) and NTCA support the idea of a voluntary
approach to resolving concerns raised in the Notice, but disagree with the Framework’s position on RuD 
agreements.
20
  Although not a signatory member to the Framework, in its comments, CCA committed to 
many of the same principles.
21
II. DISCUSSION
A. Adopting a Voluntary Approach
8. In response to the Notice, numerous commenters opposed the disclosure approach.  
Specifically, several commenters argued the metrics underlying the disclosures proposed in the Notice do 
not take into account the kinds of technology providers are deploying today, such as small cells, picocells, 
and femtocells, and therefore would produce misleading results.
22
  Some argued that the disclosure 
approach actually creates disincentives for wireless providers to deploy small cell technology, or to 
cooperate with its competitors to restore service.
23
  Specifically, CTIA argues that the disclosures would 
require wireless providers to prioritize their reporting of cell sites that are out to the FCC over restoration 
of service,
24
and that by incentivizing carriers to increase their operational metrics rather than restore 
service, the benefits proposed in the Notice will not be realized.
25
  Sprint also argued that the public nature 
of the proposed disclosures would undermine the long-standing presumption of confidentiality within 
                                                     
16
Framework at 2. 
17
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Seeks Comment on Wireless Carriers’ Proposal to Increase 
Resiliency and Enhance Information Sharing During Disasters, Public Notice, PS Docket Nos. 11-60 and 13-239, 
DA 16-463 (PSHSB Apr. 28, 2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-16-463A1.pdf.  
18
APCO Comments at 3; CCA Comments at 1; Wireless Infrastructure Association Comments at 1-2.  See also 
Cohen, Dippell, and Everist, PC Comments at 1. 
19
New York City Comments at 1-2, 5-6; New America Comments at 1-2. 
20
RWA/NTCA Comments at 3.
21
CCA Comments at 1. CCA pledged its support for the Framework and promised to provide relevant contact 
information for appropriate carrier and Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) databases only within a reasonable 
period of time when an emergency situation is announced, subject to promises of confidentiality.  CCA Comments 
at 3.  
22
See, e.g., Sprint Comments at 6-7 (describing shift away from homogeneous large macrocell architecture to 
provide network coverage, and that, even if a cell site is inoperable, consumers may still be able to make a call, and 
therefore, this approach mischaracterizes reliability).  See also CTIA Comments at 9-11; AT&T Comments at 11; 
Sprint Comments at 2-3; ATIS Comments at 3.  See also New York City Comments at 4-5 (suggesting that a 
county-level metric would be a particularly bad methodology for densely populated areas like New York City).
23
CTIA Comments at 14-15 (stating that it creates a perverse incentive for providers to refrain from deploying small 
cells, as a given situation may reflect poorly on a wireless provider even if customers could still make calls using 
small cells to connect to the network); ATIS Comments at 6 (arguing that wireless resiliency wireless providers may 
be disincentivized from deploying small cells because of overall costs of compliance with metric that focuses on 
macrocells); CCA/NTCA Comments at 12 (contending that the disclosures would prioritize reporting over 
restoration of service and thereby disincentivize carriers from cooperating to restore service during an emergency).
24
CTIA Comments at 13-14.
25
CTIA Comments at 16-17.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-173
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DIRS.
26
  Others argued that the disclosures would be more valuable to public safety if they contained 
more information.
27
  The Vermont Public Service Board, however, submitted that the metric would 
nevertheless be “more valuable than having no information at all.”
28
   
9. APCO, CCA, Wireless Infrastructure Association, and RWA/NTCA support the idea of a 
voluntary approach to improving wireless resiliency.
29
  New York City and New America, however, 
express concern that a voluntary solution would fail to provide meaningful solutions for improving 
wireless resiliency.
30
  For example, New York City is highly skeptical of the wireless industry’s 
commitments, and “remains unconvinced of the existence of factors sufficient to motivate competitive 
wireless companies to comply with their own programs for self-regulation.”
31
  New America, on the other 
hand, contends that voluntary commitments made by the industry should not obviate the need for 
regulatory action, particularly with respect to data-sharing standards.  New America also argues that “[a] 
cooperative agreement forged solely among industry representatives leaves out leadership by those most 
informed about local needs and experiences: local groups on the front lines in flood zones, as well as 
emergency response personnel and government officials.”
32
  
10. Discussion.  In light of the concerns identified by commenters with the disclosure metrics 
identified in the Notice, the difficulties in otherwise readily and accurately depicting the ongoing status of
a licensee’s mobile wireless service during such emergencies, and the benefits of mutual aid and sharing 
of facilities through the commitments now made in the Framework, we believe that a more cost effective 
way of promoting our goals is to rely on the voluntary framework as set forth by CTIA and the major 
wireless carriers.  The Commission has long encouraged the incorporation of voluntary industry 
approaches in lieu of regulation, and we were encouraged by and commend the wireless industry’s 
submission of the Framework.    
11. For the reasons set forth in the following sections, we find that the Framework presents a 
reasonable initial path forward to improving wireless resiliency.  We find that the Framework provides a 
rational basis for promoting an alternative path toward improved wireless resiliency without the need for 
relying on regulatory approaches that have the foregoing limitations.  
B. Community Preparedness
1. Municipal Preparedness
12. The Framework committed the signatory parties to convene with a select number of local 
government representatives’ public safety subject matter experts, by June 1, 2016 (the first day of 
hurricane season), to develop best practices to facilitate coordination before, during, and after 
emergencies and disasters in order to maintain and restore wireless service continuity.
33
  The Commission 
                                                     
26
Sprint Comments at 9.
27
AARP Comments at 14-15; APCO Comments at 2.
28
Vermont Public Service Board Comments at 2.
29
APCO Comments at 3; CCA Comments at 1; Wireless Infrastructure Association Comments at 1-2; Cohen, 
Dippell, and Everist, P.C. Comments at 2; RWA/NTCA Comments at 8-9 (expressing support for voluntary 
approach, although objecting to the terms as written in the Framework with respect to roaming agreements). 
30
See, e.g., New America Comments at 1 (“We have passed the point where access to communications in a disaster 
situation is optional. “Safety of life and property" is now tantamount to ubiquitous communications, and those 
saving lives on the front lines must have access to vital information about network health to target aid and develop 
contingency plans.”). 
31
New York City Comments at 5, 6.  
32
New America Comments at 1.  
33
Framework at 3.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-173
6
has met with wireless providers to ensure that such dialogues are indeed occurring between the wireless 
providers and state and local public safety.  
13. Comments.  Commenters addressing this issue agree that active engagement with local 
public safety entities is of paramount importance during a disaster.
34
  For example, APCO argues that 
providing PSAPs with timely information about service status enables them to more effectively deploy 
resources, and that “[w]ith up-to-date situational awareness, PSAPs would be able to stage law 
enforcement, fire/rescue and EMS resources, identify impacted areas in GIS-based CAD systems where 
available, and provide real time updates to mobile data systems used by responders.”
35
   New America 
advocates for a standard set forth by New York City in its comments earlier in this proceeding: “Give 
local authorities as near as possible to real-time access to specific wireless outages that have occurred in 
their areas during disasters and up to date status on their restoration efforts, to focus searches on areas 
where outages preclude residents and others from otherwise contacting first responders.”
36
  New York 
City stresses the importance of real-time or near real-time information sharing with local public safety 
officials.
37
14. Discussion.  We commend the signatory parties’ commitment to meet with state and local 
officials in anticipation of hurricane season and note that state and local zoning, building codes, and tower 
policies can create hurdles to positive resiliency objectives. We believe that such meetings can be used to 
accomplish a great deal of advance preparedness work, and encourage public safety and the wireless 
industry to be open-minded in their consideration of how wireless resiliency can be improved.  Such 
advance preparations can also be expected to promote quicker restoration of service during such disasters 
and other emergencies, saving time and money.  Improved preparedness mechanisms should reduce the 
costs borne by both wireless providers and public safety entities in responding to and recovering from a 
disaster.
38
  Furthermore, we believe that such meetings should include all relevant local wireless providers 
as a way to foster cooperation among providers and better prepare all stakeholders for times of crisis.    
2. Consumer Preparedness and Restoration Information
15. The Framework states that the signatory parties will conduct consumer education efforts 
to ensure consumers are properly prepared for emergencies and disasters, and in particular, will develop 
a “Consumer Readiness Checklist.”
39
  The signatories also commit to community outreach in the form of 
“public service announcements, informational pamphlets, and social media ranging from YouTube 
videos to Tweets and other effective ways to improve consumer preparedness for disasters and other 
emergencies.”
40
  Moreover, the Framework agrees that, when both ESF-2 and DIRS are activated, the 
signatory parties will “support the FCC making DIRS data regarding the total number of cell sites out of 
service (calculated consistent with established DIRS practices) publicly available on its website on an 
industry-aggregated, county-by-county basis for any geographic area defined in a DIRS activation 
notice.”
41
  Finally, the Framework suggests that, in order to ensure that the public has the most up-to-
date information and will enhance coordination between the wireless industry and relevant 
                                                     
34
See, e.g., APCO Comments at 2-3; New York City Comments at 3, 4; New America Comments at 2. 
35
APCO Comments at 5. 
36
New America Comments at 2-3, citing New York City Comments (2014) (omitting emphasis in original).   
37
New York City Comments at 5-6.  
38
For example, if procedures are already in place to guide wireless carriers and a public safety entities during an 
emergency, then those entities can immediately execute those procedures to commence restoration efforts, saving 
time and money by being prepared and not having to devise those procedures in a moment of crisis.  Without a plan 
in place, coordination between providers and public safety during an emergency would consume significantly more 
time and resources.  
39
Framework at 3. 
40
Framework at 3.  
41
Framework at 3.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-173
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stakeholders,” for each county-level entry, the Commission should identify “the time the most recent 
data was submitted, and promptly revise the data it publishes whenever it receives updated information 
from a carrier.”
42
16. Comments.  Commenters generally support the Framework’s commitment to improving 
consumer readiness.
43
  New America points out that a community outreach effort “creates an opportunity 
for mutual learning, as industry representatives may not be familiar with the grassroots and ‘whole 
community’ preparedness efforts already underway in many neighborhoods,” and encourages the 
signatory parties to “learn from local groups about effective ways to support community-led response, 
rather than replicating or creating redundancies with existing ‘preparedness checklists,’ etc.”
44
  New 
York City submits that it “would welcome the opportunity to provide emergency preparedness 
information to wireless customers as part of consumer bills, inserts in purchased products, and other 
collaborations.”
45
Commenters also generally support the Framework’s proposed initiatives for 
informing the public about service status and restoration.
46
  New York City urges the Commission to 
require providers “to make outage-related information available to consumers at two points: during 
telecommunications disruptions due to disasters, and when consumers are selecting telecommunications 
services for purchase.”
47
  
17. Discussion.  The commitments of the Framework present an actionable plan for 
consumer engagement and education, including efforts to increase awareness of factors that may affect 
service reliability, and to promote better consumer understanding of the implications of relying solely on 
wireless networks.  We also believe that information regarding a provider’s disaster preparations and 
response can be used by public officials, including first responders, to enable more effective and efficient 
responses in an emergency.  As such, we generally support the commitments set forth in the Framework 
with respect to improving consumer preparedness and awareness of service restoration efforts.
18. We invite the signatory parties of the Framework to submit to the Commission their 
intent to share information about the total number of cell sites out of service on an aggregated, county-by-
county basis, as well as any other information that consumers might find helpful.  We invite any other 
wireless providers interested in sharing in this commitment to ensuring wireless resiliency through 
cooperation and transparency to do the same, and file their intent in PS Docket No. 11-60.  The 
Commission will publish the names of the wireless providers that have joined the commitments embodied 
in the Framework on its website each year, before hurricane season. 
C. Roaming under Disasters and Mutual Aid Agreements
19. The Framework commits the signatory parties to “[work] with other wireless carriers to 
implement reasonable roaming arrangements for the duration of an event if existing roaming 
arrangements and call processing methods do not already achieve it,”
48
but it limits the applicability of 
this promise only to scenarios in which ESF-2 is declared for a given disaster and the FCC activates the 
DIRS, where: (i) a requesting carrier’s network has become inoperable and the requesting carrier has 
taken all appropriate steps to attempt to restore its own network, and (ii) the home carrier has determined 
that roaming is technically feasible and will not adversely affect service to the home carrier’s own 
                                                     
42
Framework at 3. 
43
See, e.g., APCO Comments at 3; New York City Comments at 3; New America Comments at 3; Wireless 
Infrastructure Association Comments at 2.  
44
New America Comments at 3.
45
New York City Comments at 3.
46
See, e.g., Wireless Infrastructure Association Comments at 2; CCA Comments at 3; New York City Comments at 
3; New America Comments at 3. 
47
New York City Comments at 4. 
48
Framework at 2. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-173
8
subscribers.
49
  The Framework also states that “[s]uch arrangements will be limited in duration and 
contingent on the requesting carrier taking all possible steps to restore service on its own network as 
quickly as possible.”
50
  The Framework places similar conditions on its commitment to honor mutual aid 
agreements during disasters.
51
20. Comments.  While most commenters generally support the roaming proposal, others 
express concern about whether this commitment embodies a meaningful solution to the problem.  For 
example, New York City argues that the conditions under which an RuD would be triggered are too 
stringent, and states that “[t]he threshold should be lowered to reflect local and state emergency 
declarations or requests and should extend to state and local emergencies and disasters in situations where 
DIRS may or may not also be activated.”
52
  In addition, RWA and NTCA jointly filed comments 
expressing strong opposition to this aspect of the framework, asserting that it fails to recognize 
marketplace realities with respect to roaming agreements.
53
  RWA and NTCA contend that nationwide 
carriers often restrict customers from accessing rural carriers’ networks even in areas where the carrier 
provides no coverage, and that this scenario puts customers at risk of not having wireless service during a 
disaster.
54
   We encourage further efforts by rural and national providers to address these hurdles.
21. With respect to mutual aid agreements, New York City expresses concern that, generally 
speaking, the Framework’s commitment on mutual aid would not extend to state and local emergencies in 
light of the condition requiring both ESF-2 and DIRS to be activated.
55
  New York City also submits that 
“state or local governments must not be precluded from entering into local mutual aid agreements with 
wireless carriers or from requesting further resiliency requirements (e.g., carrier assistance to local 
communities in the pre-staging of telecommunications support assets) so as to meet essential 
preparedness and resiliency standards.”
56
   On the other hand, CCA agrees with the Framework condition 
that “mutual aid should be contingent upon a carrier managing its own network prior to extending aid 
where reasonably practicable.”
57
  
22. Discussion.  We believe that the roaming under disasters commitments can promote our 
resiliency goals by enhancing the choices for maintaining coverage available to those wireless providers 
who may be experiencing cell site outages or other equipment difficulties during disasters or other 
emergencies.   While we recognize the concerns of RWA and NTCA, the signatory parties to the 
Framework have committed to make reasonable efforts to work with all wireless carriers to implement 
                                                     
49
Framework at 2. 
50
Framework at 2.
51
Framework at 3 (“Wireless carriers commit to the sharing of physical assets and necessary consultation where 
feasible during and after disasters through establishing mutual aid arrangements with other wireless carriers. As 
noted above, carriers should first manage their own network needs during an emergency, and then provide aid to 
others, if requested. Mutual aid arrangements may be triggered when the NRCC (sic) activates ESF-2 for a given 
emergency or disaster and the FCC activates the electronic DIRS.”).  Although not a signatory party, CCA in its 
comments also pledges to share physical assets, including network infrastructure, with other wireless carriers where 
necessary, reasonable, and available. CCA Comments at 3. 
52
New York City Comments at 2. 
53
RWA/NTCA Comments at 3-4 (“The spirit of the Framework is well-intended, but it makes significant 
assumptions that are simply not true in today’s wireless marketplace.”). 
54
RWA/NTCA Comments at 3-4.  (The “decision by a nationwide carrier not to conduct bilateral testing
renders it impossible for the nationwide carrier’s customers then to roam on the rural carrier’s
network in the event of an emergency or under any exigent circumstance, even if the rural carrier
is ready, willing, and able to provide such access.”).  
55
New York City Comments at 2-3.  
56
New York City Comments at 3. 
57
CCA Comments at 3. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-173
9
reasonable roaming agreements consistent with their overarching commitment to improving wireless 
resiliency.  We also recognize New York City’s concern regarding the threshold at which the 
Framework’s commitments are triggered, i.e., only those situations in which both ESF-2 and DIRS are 
activated.
58
  However, we do not interpret these commitments to serve as a bar to good faith consideration 
of cooperative efforts with municipal governments or as a basis for interfering with any such already 
existing local, regional, or state agreements.
III. CONCLUSION
23. Because the voluntary Framework submitted by the major wireless providers presents 
a more appropriate solution for improving wireless resiliency and enabling provider transparency, we 
decline to adopt the rules proposed in the Notice, and terminate PS Docket No. 13-239.  The Commission, 
however, will continue to engage with wireless providers about the implementation of the voluntary 
framework and regarding wireless resiliency, if necessary.  
IV. ORDERING CLAUSES
24. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 201(b), 214(d), 
218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i)-(j) & (o), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 
251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c, that 
this Order in PS Docket No. 13-239 and PS Docket No. 11-60 IS ADOPTED.
25. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to sections 4(i) and 4(j) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 154(j), that PS Docket No. 13-239 is 
HEREBY TERMINATED.
      FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
      Marlene H. Dortch
      Secretary
                                                     
58
See supra para. 13, notes 41 and 43-44.