Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables 
and Enhanced Submarine Cable Outage Data
)
)
)
)
GN Docket No. 15-206
REPORT AND ORDER
Adopted:  June 24, 2016   Released:  July 12, 2016
By the Commission: Chairman Wheeler and Commissioners Clyburn and Rosenworcel issuing separate 
statements;  Commissioners Pai and O’Rielly dissenting and issuing separate statements. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Heading Paragraph #
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................. 1
II. THE NEED FOR RULES ...................................................................................................................... 3
III. REPORTING OBLIGATIONS............................................................................................................ 15
A. Establishing Outage Definitions and Metrics ................................................................................ 15
1. Defining a Reportable Outage ................................................................................................. 15
2. Reportable Outage Metrics...................................................................................................... 21
B. Covered Entities............................................................................................................................. 31
C. Filing Obligations .......................................................................................................................... 40
1. Notification Requirements ...................................................................................................... 40
2. Interim Report ......................................................................................................................... 51
3. Final Report............................................................................................................................. 56
D. Good Faith and Confidentiality ..................................................................................................... 66
1. Good Faith Requirements in Section 4.11............................................................................... 66
2. Confidentiality of Submarine Outage Reports and Data ......................................................... 69
IV. OTHER ISSUES .................................................................................................................................. 76
A. Implementation .............................................................................................................................. 76
B. Interagency Coordination............................................................................................................... 78
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis .................................................................................................................... 81
1. Potential Costs of Compliance ................................................................................................ 81
2. Public Interest Benefits ........................................................................................................... 89
D. Legal Authority.............................................................................................................................. 93
V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS................................................................................................................ 97
A. Regulatory Flexibility Act ............................................................................................................. 97
B. Paperwork Reduction Act .............................................................................................................. 98
C. Congressional Review Act........................................................................................................... 100
VI. ORDERING CLAUSES..................................................................................................................... 101
APPENDIX A- List of Parties Filing Comments or Ex Parte Notices
APPENDIX B- Final Rules
APPENDIX C- Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
2
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This Report and Order serves the public interest and promotes the national and economic 
security of the nation by requiring submarine cable licensees to report to the Federal Communications 
Commission (“Commission” or “FCC”) when submarine (or “undersea”) cable outages
1
occur and 
communications over those facilities are disrupted.  By moving – as we do today – from an ad hoc outage 
reporting system to one that will ensure the Commission has a dependable, holistic view of the operating 
status of submarine cables, we will be in a better position to examine the resiliency posture of submarine 
cable infrastructure and to ensure the reliability of the critical national security and economic 
communications that transit it.  
2. The actions we take today build upon the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
2
in this docket, 
with modifications as warranted by the record, recognizing that submarine cable infrastructure is unique 
from the other forms of communications infrastructure for which the Commission currently requires 
outage reporting. In this Report and Order, we:
? Require submarine cable licensees to report to the Commission service outages, defined as “a 
failure or significant degradation in the performance of a licensee’s cable service regardless of 
whether the traffic can be re-routed to an alternate path.” 
? Specify that an outage requires reporting when there is:
o An outage, including those caused by planned maintenance, of a portion of a submarine 
cable system between submarine line terminal equipment (SLTE) at one end of the 
system and SLTE at another end of the system for more than 30 minutes; or 
o The failure or significant degradation of any fiber pair, including losses due to terminal
equipment issues, on a cable segment for four hours or more, regardless of the number of 
fiber pairs that comprise the total capacity of the cable segment.  
? Define the reporting requirements to include a Notification within eight hours (to become four 
hours after three years) of the time of determining that a reportable outage has occurred; an 
Interim Report within 24 hours of receiving a Plan of Work (relating to repairs); and a Final 
Report within seven days of completing repair.  
? Clarify the content required in the reports to allow for the fact that not all requested information 
may be known when the reports are due. 
? Treat the information provided through this reporting system as confidential, consistent with 
section 4.2 of our rules for existing outage reporting.
? Provide that these requirements will become effective six months after OMB approval of these 
rules to provide ample time for implementation.  
II. THE NEED FOR RULES 
3. Background.  Submarine cables provide the conduit for the vast majority of voice, data 
and Internet connectivity between the mainland United States and consumers in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam 
American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as the 
connectivity between the United States and the rest of the world.
3
  In the Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 
the Commission estimated that submarine cables “carry over 95 percent of all U.S.-international voice 
                                                     
1
Throughout this Report and Order, “submarine cable” and “undersea cable” are used interchangeably.
2
Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables and Enhancing Submarine Cable Outage Data, GN Docket 
15-206, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 FCC Rcd 10492 (2015) (Submarine Cable Outage Notice or Notice).
3
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10492-93, para. 1.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
3
and data traffic.”
4
  Other sources estimate that submarine cables carry 99 percent of such traffic.
5
  
Accordingly, the operation and maintenance of the approximately 60 undersea cables licensed in the 
United States
6
are essential to the nation’s economic stability, national security and other vital public 
interests.
7
4. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, charges the Commission with promoting 
“the safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communication.”
8
  This foundational 
mission underlies our efforts to promote resilient, reliable, and secure communications across the 
mainland United States and its territories, and informs how we interpret our duties under the Cable 
Landing License Act
9
and Executive Order 10530,
10
which provide the Commission with authority to 
grant, withhold, condition and revoke submarine cable landing licenses and, in particular, for such grants 
to occur “upon such terms as shall be necessary to assure just and reasonable . . . service in the operation 
and use of cables so licensed.”
11
   
5. Presently, submarine cable licensees are not required to report on their cables’ 
operational status.  Rather, licensees provide such operational information to the Commission on a 
voluntary, ad hoc basis through the Commission’s Undersea Cable Information System (UCIS).
12
  This ad 
hoc approach contrasts significantly with the Commission’s part 4 outage reporting requirements for other 
communication services.
13
  Furthermore, the Network Outage Reporting System (NORS) established for 
part 4 data reporting has not previously provided the Commission with the necessary information to 
analyze undersea cable disruptions, as the system was designed for different types of infrastructure outage 
reporting, not submarine cable reporting.
14
  
                                                     
4
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10494, para. 8.
5
See, e.g., Greg Miller, Undersea Internet Cables are Surprisingly Vulnerable, Wired (Oct. 29, 2015) 
http://www.wired.com/2015/10/undersea-cable-maps/. 
6
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10493, para. 1 & n.3. As of March 31, 2015, there are 62 FCC 
licensed submarine cables operating or planned to enter service. See FCC, Submarine Cable Landing Licenses, 
https://transition.fcc.gov/ib/pd/pf/scll.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
7
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10493, para. 1 & n.2. APEC Policy Support Unit, Economic 
Impact of Submarine Cable Disruptions at 9 (Dec. 2012), http://publications.apec.org/publication-
detail.php?pub_id=1382 (citing a U.S. Federal Reserve representative’s seminar presentation) (“APEC Report”). 
The United States is a member of APEC. See APEC, Member Economies, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-
APEC/Member-Economies.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2015). Noting the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) estimated that submarine cables carry traffic associated with over $10 trillion in transactional value globally
per day.
8
47 U.S.C. § 151.
9
Cable Landing License Act of 1921, 47 U.S.C. §§ 34-39 (Cable Landing License Act).
10
Exec. Order No. 10,530, 19 Fed. Reg. 2709 (May 10, 1954).
11
Cable Landing License Act 47 U.S.C. §§ 34-35; Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10509-10510, 
para. 48.  In acting upon applications for such licenses, the Commission seeks the approval of the U.S. Department 
of State.  Executive Order 10530, § 5(a).  Pursuant to its authority, the Commission has adopted rules governing 
submarine cable service at Sections 1.767 and 1.768 of the Commission’s rules. 47 CFR §§ 1.767, 1.768. 
12
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10494, para. 5.
13
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10494, para. 5; See 47 CFR pt. 4. Part 4 outage reporting 
requires more targeted information on the causes and effects of communications outages, establishes specific 
reporting triggers and thresholds, and provides specific deadlines for those reports to be made.
14
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10499, para. 19.  Because NORS was not designed for 
submarine cable reporting, it lacks many of the data fields that are needed to report on submarine cable 
infrastructure.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
4
6. The July 8, 2015 Northern Mariana Island outage provides a critical example of the 
limitations of the present system and the need for the changes in outage reporting.  The damage from a 
typhoon to a submarine cable between the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and 
Guam severed off-island wireless and wireline voice and data services for thousands of CNMI residents 
and businesses for nearly three weeks.  Services affected during the outage included phone, Internet, 
banking, credit-card transactions, ATM withdrawals and health care.
15
  The Commission was hampered in 
its ability to assess or monitor the CNMI outage impact, restoration developments, and other critical 
issues under the available reporting systems.
16
7. The concerns of the Commission go beyond that of disruptions caused by natural events. 
Some news accounts since we adopted the Notice, for example, highlight the critical role of this 
infrastructure to national security.
17
  Given the high volume and nature of the traffic carried over 
submarine cables (including traffic relating to U.S. Government civilian and military operations and 
functions), submarine cable operational status is of the utmost importance to the nation’s communications 
security, and useful outage information concerning undersea cables will assist the Commission in 
effectuating its role in ensuring the reliability of that infrastructure.
18
8. Given that undersea cables are estimated to support nearly $10 trillion in transactions 
each day, their economic significance cannot be overstated.
19
  Nevertheless, industry representatives note 
that, globally, there are few enforceable laws governing the use or protection of submarine cables, 
presenting a significant assurance gap for this infrastructure.
20
  Currently, parts 1 and 43 of the 
Commission’s rules require undersea cable applicants and licensees to report their cable capacity 
information to the Commission,
21
but, in contrast with the Commission’s part 4 rules for other wireline, 
wireless and satellite providers, they are not required to report on a cable’s operational status.
22
  Instead, 
                                                     
15
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10499, para. 20 & n.43.
16
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10500, para. 22.
17
See David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort, The New 
York Times (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presence-near-undersea-
cables-concerns-us.html?_r=0.
18
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10495, paras. 9-10 n.19. See National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), Cybersecurity Collaboration Report: Strengthening 
Government and Private Sector Collaboration Through a Cyber Incident Detection, Prevention, Mitigation, and 
Response Capability at 20 (2009), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NSTAC%20CCTF%20Report.pdf) (“[U]ndersea cable 
infrastructure carries approximately 95% of the international traffic, including Internet traffic, and . . . restoration of 
that infrastructure requires international cooperation. The NSTAC believes that the Federal Government should 
review these recommendations and consider its appropriate role in the protection and security of that 
infrastructure.”).
19
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10496, para. 11.
20
See International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) Press Release, “ICPC comments on submarine cable 
security around the world,” Feb. 16, 2016, available at https://www.iscpc.org/documents/?id=2039 (ICPC Press 
Release).  ICPC is an international association of undersea cable operators, and 23 of its members are U.S. entities.  
See ICPC Member List, available at https://www.iscpc.org/about-the-icpc/member-list/.  
21
Under Section 1.767, applicants for a cable landing license must include a description of the “type and number of 
channels and the capacity” of the proposed cable in the application.  47 CFR § 1.767(a)(4).  Section 43.62 requires 
licensees of international cables to report annually the capacity of the cable as of December 31 of the preceding year 
and the planned capacity two years out.  47 CFR § 43.62(a)(2)(i).
22
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10494, para. 8.  NORS, outlined in part 4 and used for legacy 
domestic communications outages, is currently ill-suited for submarine cable operators in the absence of mandatory 
reporting requirements because a voluntary, ad hoc data supply cannot present a comprehensive, reliable picture of 
undersea cable operational health and status sufficient to support sound analysis.  See id. at 10499, para. 19
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
5
licensees submit information on operational status to the Commission on a voluntary basis to UCIS, an 
online portal with terrestrial route maps, information on post-incident restoration, and system messages 
with respect to outages involving undersea cables landing in the United States.
23
  
9. The record highlighted several problems with the current approach.  First, UCIS, as a 
voluntary program, only reflects information on approximately 25 percent of undersea cables in use 
today, and accordingly, the Commission lacks visibility into the vast majority of undersea cable 
infrastructure and related outages or disruptions.
24
  Second, the information submitted through UCIS is 
not uniform and there are no standardized triggers to require reporting, so the information that is provided 
to the Commission is inconsistent and not necessarily reliable or probative about the root cause of the 
outage.
25
  Third, UCIS was designed as a “file depository,” meaning that there is no systematic data 
collection effort or a database to house the information.
26
  This makes the limited reports the Commission 
does receive difficult to analyze, and not useful for identifying network reliability trends.
27
  Fourth, 
although some licensees report certain cable faults through NORS, or to the National Coordinating Center 
for Communications (NCC) within the Department of Homeland Security, most licensees have opted not 
to report in UCIS in a consistently reliable fashion.
28
  These deficiencies make it difficult for the 
Commission to learn about outages and related trends, thereby interfering with the Commission’s 
obligation
29
to confirm that critical communication facilities that it licenses, and over which it has 
jurisdiction, are reasonably available and operational. 
10. Even in light of the CNMI incident, some commenters challenge the idea that a 
mandatory outage data collection effort is necessary.  For example, NASCA submits that there is no 
“hidden undersea cable outage problem,”
30
and that voluntary participation in UCIS is low simply 
because there are few reportable events.
31
  Quintillion argues that the application for each landing license 
already contains many of the details that would be required with the proposed outage reporting regime, 
and when coupled with other annual reporting requirements, these details are sufficient to provide the 
Commission with visibility into the operational status of submarine cables and protect “data traveling 
across those cables from unintended use by competitors or other interests.”
32
  Verizon urges the 
                                                     
23
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10494, para. 5.  See also FCC, Notice of Public Information 
Collection(s) Being Submitted for Review to the Office of Management and Budget, 73 Fed. Reg. 23460-61 (April 
30, 2008) (OMB Public Information Collection). Notice of Office of Management and Budget Action, “Request for 
a new OMB Control Number” (for Submarine Cable Reporting) (rel. Apr. 16, 2008), “Supporting Statement” at 1 
(OMB Control Number 3060-1116 and Supporting Statement).  Since UCIS’s inception in 2008, the Commission 
has received in UCIS terrestrial route maps for 37 cables, a location spreadsheet for 35 cables, and a description of 
restoration capabilities for 18 cables; thus participation in the “static” aspects of UCIS has ranged from 29-60 
percent of cables.
24
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10494, para. 6, and 10497 para. 13.  
25
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10494, para. 6, 10497 para. 13, and 10498-9 para. 17.
26
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10498, para. 16.
27
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10498, para. 16.
28
North American Submarine Cable Association Comments at 6 (NASCA). 
29
See infra section IV.D (discussing the Commission’s legal authority and mandate).
30
NASCA Comments at i.  See also AT&T Appendix A at 3 (citing only two undersea faults within 200 nautical 
miles of the U.S. coastline since 1990).
31
NASCA Comments at 6.  NASCA states that many members have had no or only one outage that could have been 
reported to UCIS.  Id.  NASCA also faults the Commission for low participation rates that it says result from failing 
to adequately publicize the existence of UCIS.  Id. 
32
Quintillion Comments at 1.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
6
Commission to first pursue non-regulatory efforts to improve information gathering and oversight of 
submarine cable systems, such as improving the voluntary UCIS system.
33
  
11. On the other hand, the record also includes support for a mandatory reporting regime for 
submarine cable outages.  CNMI notes that “efforts to mitigate the damages caused by the July cable 
break were hampered by IT&E’s reluctance to disclose data . . .”
34
  Docomo Pacific, Inc., (Docomo) 
argues that “[g]iven the breadth of the Commission’s existing network outage reporting rules . . . no 
public policy reason exists to exempt submarine cable operators from a mandatory obligation to report 
network outages, and commenters offer none.”
35
  Docomo also adds that the proposed rules will be 
beneficial not only to the Commission but to the entities served by submarine cables because they “will 
create additional incentives and opportunities for submarine cable operators to implement measures to 
protect against outages and to remedy any outages promptly.”
36
  AT&T does not oppose submarine cable 
disruption reporting obligations, so long as the actual costs of implementing such requirements are 
recognized and adequate time is provided to transition to a new regime.
37
12. Discussion.  We find that a mandatory outage reporting regime is necessary to provide 
the Commission with greater visibility into the availability and health of these networks to allow it to 
better track and analyze submarine cable resiliency, and suggest or take appropriate actions when the data 
so indicate, i.e., before there is a significant problem.  Although as NASCA notes, there may be no 
glaring evidence of a present “hidden undersea cable outage problem” for U.S. cable landing parties,
38
one industry estimate suggests there are approximately 200 submarine cable faults each year globally,
39
and we have previously estimated that there would be approximately 40 hours spent per licensee on 
annual restoration or trouble reports that would warrant a filing in UCIS.
40
  This is the quintessential 
communications infrastructure assurance aim served by NORS reporting, to collect information on 
“service disruptions that could affect homeland security, public health or safety, and the economic well-
being of our Nation.”
41
  The need for such reporting is only heightened when, as is the case with 
submarine cable infrastructure, the facilities are few,
42
are vital to U.S. economic activity and national 
security,
43
have unique vulnerabilities in their environment,
44
and are exceptionally challenging to repair.
45
  
                                                     
33
Verizon Reply Comments at 1, 7. 
34
Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands Comments at 2.
35
Docomo Reply Comments at 3.
36
Docomo Reply Comments at 3.  See also Letter from Bennett L. Ross, Counsel, Docomo Pacific, Inc. to Marlene 
H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 15-206, at 1-2 (filed Oct. 14, 2015) (Docomo Ex Parte) (“Even if such 
information is considered confidential for purposes of the Commission’s outage reporting rules, operators would be 
more readily able to keep system users informed of the extent of the outage and associated repair efforts –
comprehensive information that [Docomo] had difficulty obtaining from IT&E during its recent outage.”). 
37
AT&T Comments at 1-2; see also infra paras. 35, 58, 62, 58, 71, 90.  
38
NASCA Comments at 4.
39
ICPC Press Release at 1. 
40
OMB Control Number 3060-1116, ICR Reference No. 201409-3060-017, FCC Supporting Statement at 8 (2014).
41
2004 Part 4 Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 16832, para.  1.
42
See supra para. 3, noting there are approximately 60 licensed submarine cables affecting the United States.
43
See supra paras. 6-8. 
44
Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) IV, Final Report – Protection of 
Submarine Cables Through Spatial Separation at 2 (2014), 
https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/advisory/csric4/CSRIC_IV_WG8_Report1_3Dec2014.pdf (CSRIC IV Report) (noting 
the multitude of threats to submarine cables, including commercial fishing, dredging, energy projects, and other 
cable activity, as well as natural threats such as earthquakes or landslides). 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
7
13. Further, it is clear that UCIS has failed to become the comprehensive source of 
information about undersea cable outages it was intended to be: few reports are filed; those that are filed 
are inconsistent from entity to entity; and the design of UCIS lacks the analytical capabilities necessary 
for the Commission to perform meaningful analysis.  In the intervening time since the Notice’s release, 
the Commission is aware of two events that presumably fit within UCIS’ filing scope, yet were not 
reported.  In one instance, a Florida lightning strike hampered communications with the Cayman 
Islands.
46
  In another instance, submarine cable connectivity between Guam, a U.S. territory, and 
Australia was severed; not only was this incident not reported in UCIS but, the cable at issue has not even 
been registered in UCIS.
47
  These omissions reveal UCIS’ shortcomings as an assessment tool for such 
critical communications infrastructure, and especially given the evolving and intensifying nature of the 
national security issues the United States faces, we decline to defer action in this proceeding while 
waiting for voluntary participation in UCIS to reach appropriate levels to provide the information 
needed.
48
   
14. We recognize that redundancies (i.e., traffic re-route engineering) are already in place for 
many cables that prevent or at least mitigate service outages, but this argument misses the broader goal of 
the proposed mandatory reporting regime, which is that both the cables and the services provided over 
them must be protected.  For the Commission to ensure the stability of submarine cable infrastructure, it 
must have greater visibility than what is currently provided through UCIS into the connectivity and 
capacity of all undersea cables landing in the United States.  And, even though we recognize that the low 
number of reports filed in UCIS might be due to a low number of reportable outages, the record suggests 
otherwise.  As mere examples, the outages discussed above are important evidence of how it is not only 
the number of outages, but rather, also the potential impact of the outages, as well as the deficit in the 
Commission’s situational awareness of a major outage, that convince us that reporting needs to be 
mandatory and of the scope described herein.  Accordingly, we adopt the mandatory reporting regime for 
undersea cable operators described below.  This regime will replace UCIS in its entirety and we direct the 
Bureau to retire UCIS upon the effective date of these rules.  
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
45
See CSRIC IV Report at 26-30 (describing the unique difficulties in repairing submarine cable infrastructure). 
46
See Charles Duncan, Lightning Knocks Out Internet, Cayman Compass (Feb. 17, 2016) 
https://www.caymancompass.com/2016/02/17/lightning-knocks-out-internet/; (“A lightning strike along one of the 
submarine cables that connects Cayman’s Internet to the rest of the world knocked out Internet service for many on 
Grand Cayman Tuesday evening.  The lightning hit a landing station at the U.S. end of the Maya-1 cable system 
between Cancun, Mexico and Hollywood, Florida, on Tuesday afternoon, affecting Internet access and some phone 
service in Cayman, according to local telecom companies and regulators.”).  
47
Rohan Pierce, Repair Work Underway on TPG’s PPC-1 Cable, Computerworld (Mar. 9, 2016) 
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/595555/repair-work-begins-tpg-ppc-1-cable/  (“PPC-1 is a submarine 
cable that stretches from Sydney [to] Guam and is operated by the TPG’s subsidiary Pipe.  PPC-1 suffered a major 
fault on 5 February, taking down the entire cable system.  TPG has been routing traffic via Southern Cross and the 
Australian Japan Cable system since the outage.”).
48
The lack of participation in UCIS contrasts with the Commission’s analogous voluntary Disaster Information 
Reporting System (DIRS), which service providers have largely embraced and has been provided the Commission 
with critical situational awareness of service outages during disaster situations. DIRS is similarly a voluntary, web-
based portal through which communications companies – e.g., wireless, wireline, broadcast, and cable providers--
can report communications infrastructure status and situational awareness information during a crisis.  That the 
utilization rate of the voluntary UCIS program has never approached that of the voluntary DIRS program, though 
they were set up within a year of each other, strengthens our view that submarine cable outage reporting will not 
increase absent Commission action to require it. See FCC, Disaster Information Reporting System, 
https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/services/cip/dirs/dirs.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
8
III. REPORTING OBLIGATIONS
A. Establishing Outage Definitions and Metrics
1. Defining a Reportable Outage 
15. Background.  In the Submarine Cable Outage Notice, we proposed to construct rules for 
submarine cable outage reporting based on our part 4 outage reporting rules,
49
using a tailored definition 
of outage for submarine cables as a “failure or significant degradation in the performance of a submarine 
cable, regardless of whether the traffic traversing that cable can be re-routed to an alternate cable.”
50
  In 
the Notice, we explained that this approach was analogous to our part 4 reporting approach for simplex 
outage events and that such reporting is necessary, given that one or multiple, related or unrelated events 
may cause damage to multiple cables, and that generally few undersea cables are available for re-
routing.
51
  
16. Commenters’ support for our proposal to define a reportable outage ranges from support 
of the reporting requirement regardless of re-routing availability,
52
to favoring a definition that is limited 
to a complete failure in service and excludes cases where licensees have re-routed traffic.
53
  Docomo 
acknowledges that including re-routed traffic in the outage definition would align the submarine cable 
outage reporting with the current part 4 outage reporting rules.
54
  Others object to including an obligation 
to report events when traffic is re-routed, in part, because they state there is no service disruption or 
potential impact on customers in these configurations.
55
  Verizon suggests that we focus on events for 
which “re-routing of traffic is not available and when service is adversely affected.”
56
  
17. Other commenters support a definition based on disruptions to communications,
57
or 
suggest that we limit reporting to catastrophic and unforeseen events.
58
  NASCA states that submarine 
cable operators do not have retail customers, and instead offer “wholesale capacity to third parties,” or 
provide capacity as “an input to affiliates that may offer their own retail telecommunications or 
information services.”
59
  Therefore, NASCA instead proposes a definition with a “reference to the 
                                                     
49
47 C.F.R. § 4.5(a).
50
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10502-03, para. 30.
51
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10502-03, para. 30.
52
Docomo Reply Comments at 4, referencing AT&T Comments at 10 (acknowledging that the proposed reporting 
requirements are “somewhat analogous to the current FCC reporting of simplex outages, where there is also no 
adverse impact on services to customers”).
53
NASCA Comments 12-15; Submarine Cable Coalition Reply at 2-3; Letter from Arturo Pellerano Guerra, 
Treasurer, Latam Telecommunications, LLC, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 15-206, at 1-2 
(filed Feb. 1, 2016) (Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte) (favoring a definition that excludes incidents that do not 
degrade or negatively affect communications services transiting the cable, including events where re-routing traffic 
is available); Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 4-6 (supporting a definition limited to unforeseen and 
catastrophic events that result in a significant degradation where traffic cannot be rerouted).
54
Docomo Reply Comments at 4.
55
NASCA Comments at iv, 34 (referencing “potential impact on customers, exclude events that do not disrupt 
communications), Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 1-2 (supporting the exclusion of events that “do not 
degrade or negatively affect communications services transiting the cable”).
56
Verizon Reply at 2; Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 2 (supporting Verizon’s proposal and adding an 
exclusion to disregard events occurring on “terrestrial pathways beyond the cable’s terminal stations”).
57
NASCA Comments at 34; Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 1-2.
58
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 4-6.
59
NASCA Comments at 16.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
9
potential impact on customers,” excluding events that do not disrupt communications, noting that this is 
consistent with the approach in other countries.
60
  The Submarine Cable Coalition would limit the 
definition to unforeseen and catastrophic events that result in significant degradation where traffic cannot 
be re-routed, and proposes instead, (1) a periodic report summarizing events that meet our proposed 
outage definition, and (2) to limit outage reporting obligations to events that “affect fifty percent or more 
of the fiber pairs on a cable and where traffic is not rerouted.”
61
  In arguing for a less stringent reporting 
requirement, the Submarine Cable Coalition notes that the reporting obligation for interconnected Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service is for events resulting in a complete loss of service and that some 
other services, such as simplex, have extended reporting timelines.
62
  
18. Discussion.  To effectively achieve undersea cable infrastructure assurance, consistent 
with part 4 traditionally, we will define reportable outages without regard to a licensee’s or provider’s re-
routing of the traffic carried over a given cable, or some other measure requiring a complete loss of 
service.  Accordingly, we define “outage” as “a failure or significant degradation in the performance of a 
licensee’s cable service regardless of whether the traffic can be re-routed to an alternate path.”  
19. Though there are redundant configurations in some,
63
but not all submarine cable 
infrastructure,
64
we adopt our proposal to require a reporting obligation regardless of whether traffic is re-
routed, and we use the broader term “path” to avoid analysis of whether the traffic was specifically re-
routed to another cable.  For the purpose of promoting and advancing the national security and public 
safety interests served by our U.S.-based landings and connections as a whole, we need to assess outages 
across the total undersea cable environment serving the United States.  For example, in some situations 
the redundant paths could be over-utilized due to an emerging problem, such as an expansive coastline 
area disruption affecting several independent submarine cables.  Using such an approach would help us 
understand operability of submarine cables holistically to better safeguard reliability of this important part 
of the nation’s communications system.  
20. We also modify our proposed definition to limit reportable events to failures or 
“significant” degradation in the performance of a communications provider’s cable.  As explained in the 
section below on outage reporting triggers,
65
we are adjusting our metrics to require the reporting of only 
                                                     
60
NASCA Comments at 34.
61
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 6 (favoring reporting only for events that “affect fifty percent or more 
the fiber pairs on a cable and where the traffic is not rerouted”).
62
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 5.
63
The record reflects that some operators today use several methods to ensure service reliability.  See AT&T 
Comments at 5-6, Attachment A at 3 (describing “mesh” network restoration that uses connection between multiple 
cables to automatically and instantaneously reroute traffic to the next best path when a failure occurs; and “ring” 
systems that automatically switch traffic to the other side of the ring in event of a failure); Verizon Reply at 1 (“most 
U.S. undersea cable systems offer built-in redundancy and extensive traffic re-routing capabilities”); Docomo Ex 
Parte at 2; Docomo Reply Comments at 6 (discussing plans to add a redundant path between Guam and the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands); NASCA Comments at ii, iv, 14-16 (stating “almost all submarine 
cable systems landing in the United States have same-system, intra-company, or third-party submarine cable 
redundancy or satellite backup on routes with limited submarine cable connectivity,” or “hold capacity on an 
indefeasible right of use or lease basis on competing systems,” and “operators on routes with limited or no 
submarine cable capacity” rely on satellite capacity); Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 6; Verizon Reply at 
1.
64
See Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands Comments at 1 (stating that the “Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa are unique among U.S. jurisdictions in that they each lie 
precariously on the ends of a single submarine cable. If those cables break, the entire jurisdiction's capacity to 
transmit and receive information is limited to backup microwave systems, which are inadequate to handle modern 
telecommunications traffic.).
65
See supra paras. 21-30.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
10
significantly degraded service and not all incidents of degraded service, which will better align our outage 
reporting rules for submarine cables with our current part 4 outage reporting requirements.  Further, our 
adjustment to include “significant” degradation is consistent with our long established outage reporting 
requirement that an outage includes events where even “some traffic might be getting through during a 
period of massive disruption.”
66
  However, we decline to adjust our proposal to require an impact to end 
users, or “customers” as NASCA has suggested.
67
  Submarine cables are unique in that they do not 
generally have retail customers, and that they offer “wholesale capacity.”
68
  We agree with Latam 
Telecommunications (Latam) that submarine cables are used for numerous types of voice and data 
communications by different types of users, and therefore a “customer-based definition is unworkable.”
69
  
Moreover, were we only to receive periodic reporting of events meeting our proposed definition as the 
Submarine Cable Coalition suggests, this would hinder our ability to act in the interests of public safety 
and national security through timely receipt of communication from and sharing of information with 
relevant parties such as DHS.
70
  We have, however, taken into account the unique aspects of submarine 
cable infrastructure as the Submarine Cable Coalition requests in other metrics such as the report contents 
and timing as discussed below.
71
2. Reportable Outage Metrics 
21. Background.  To capture significant events in our submarine cable outage reporting, we 
proposed in the Notice to require reporting when, “regardless of whether the traffic is re-routed,” an event 
occurred in which “connectivity in either the transmit mode or the receive mode is lost for at least 30 
minutes,” or in which “50 percent or more of a cable’s capacity in either the transmit mode or receive 
mode is lost for at least 30 minutes.”
72
  We distinguished connectivity from capacity, explaining that 
connectivity is the “fundamental ability to transmit a signal,” and capacity is the “bandwidth or 
throughput” that the cable is “capable of transmitting at any one time.”
73
  We proposed to capture 
significant degradation events by measuring the cable’s capacity, establishing a minimum threshold 
capacity at a loss of 50 percent or more, for at least 30 minutes.
74
  In addition, for this purpose, we asked 
whether other capacities or measurements should be considered, including the capacity definitions used in 
the part 43 cable capacity reporting.
75
  Further, we proposed to include planned maintenance within the 
scope of our submarine cable outage reporting rules.
76
                                                     
66
47 C.F.R. § 4.5(a); Amendment of Part 63 of the Commission's Rules to Provide for Notification by Common 
Carriers of Service Disruptions, CC Docket No. 91-273, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 2010, 2012, para. 11 (1992); 
New Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications, ET Docket No. 04-35, Report 
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 16830, 16860, 16862, 16920, para. 55, nn.168, 
182, Appendix B (2004).
67
NASCA Comments at 16. 
68
NASCA Comments at 34, Docomo Reply Comments at 5.
69
Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 5.
70
See infra Section III.D.2.
71
See infra Section III.C.
72
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10503, para. 31.
73
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10503, para. 31.
74
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10503-04, paras. 32-33.
75
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10503-04, para. 33.
76
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10505-06, paras. 37, 39.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
11
22. The record suggests that we should modify our proposed reporting triggers to better 
account for the unique nature of submarine cable infrastructure.  Some commenters opposed our proposed 
metrics and offered alternative proposals,
77
while others opposed a reporting obligation altogether.
78
23. Connectivity.  In response to our proposal to require reports when connectivity in either 
the transmit mode or the receive mode is lost for at least thirty minutes, some commenters supported the 
concept while suggesting an adjusted metric,
79
while others opposed the proposal.
80
  AT&T does not 
oppose a connectivity metric, but advocates that it be adjusted to include only events “caused by failures 
or breaks in the optical fiber of the cable . . . or power failures.”
81
  AT&T argues that reporting for other 
causes, such as card failures or other problems affecting cable station terminal equipment is unwarranted 
because they usually involve traffic degradations under fifty percent of the cable capacity, are more 
readily repaired, and do not involve the use of a repair ship.
82
  Further, AT&T argues that a definition 
including all losses in connectivity would require outage reporting of large numbers of potential terminal 
equipment issues, and that a requirement to report indications of potential problems or potential traffic-
impacting conditions is vague and ambiguous.
83
  NASCA similarly states our proposal would capture 
mundane events or routine occurrences, such as power feed equipment failures, shunt faults, and 
scheduled or routine maintenance.
84
  NASCA argues that in the case of a power outage, an “interruption 
may be brief,” or in the case of a shunt fault, “the system can be rebalanced, leaving traffic either 
unaffected or quickly restored.”
85
  The Submarine Cable Coalition opposes reporting obligations, and 
adds that “disruptions can be caused by minor changes in a single customer’s equipment while the system 
as a whole would not be affected,” and proposes an alternative definition of when “there is an event 
related to damages or replacements of a portion of a submarine cable system between the submarine line 
terminal equipment (SLTE) at one end of the system and the SLTE at another end of the system, that 
disrupts traffic provisioned on fifty percent or more of the fiber pairs in the system for more than three 
hours” or based on traffic provisioned disruptions on fifty percent or more of the fiber pairs.
86
  Others 
oppose including events that occur on terrestrial pathways beyond a cable’s terminal stations.
87
24. Capacity.  The record reflects a mixed reaction to our original capacity metric proposal, 
i.e., the loss for at least 30 minutes of fifty percent or more of the capacity of the submarine cable, in 
either the transmit or receive mode.
88
  Commenters argue that a capacity-based metric is difficult to 
measure, in light of the dynamic nature of capacity use, capacity owners’ continual capacity activation 
                                                     
77
AT&T Comments at 14; Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 3; NASCA Comments at 31-35.
78
Quintillion Comments at 1.
79
AT&T Comments at 3, 13, 15, Appendix A at 9.
80
NASCA Comments at 10.
81
AT&T Comments at 15-16, Appendix A at 9; Submarine Cable Coalition Reply at 5-6; Verizon Reply at 3 
(stating this would exclude from reporting routine maintenance and minor non-service-affecting incidents, such as 
“card failures or other problems . . . affecting terminal equipment at cable stations”).
82
AT&T Comments, Appendix A at 9.
83
AT&T Comments at 15.
84
NASCA Comments at 10.
85
NASCA Comments at 10.
86
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 3.
87
Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 2.
88
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10503, para. 31.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
12
and deactivation according to their business needs,
89
or capacity application in multi-segmented and ring-
configuration systems.
90
  However, several commenters support an alternative proposal replacing a 
capacity measure and instead basing a reporting requirement on the loss of any fiber pair on the cable.
91
  
25. Planned Maintenance.  Some commenters supported our proposal to include planned 
maintenance events within the scope of our outage reporting rules,
92
while others argued against including 
events resulting from planned maintenance.
93
  The Submarine Cable Coalition argues that planned 
outages are conducted to complete routine maintenance or upgrades; and “customers are provided with 
advance notice of such outages and they are accounted for in service level agreements.”
94
  Docomo argues 
that our part 4 requirements were recently reaffirmed to include events resulting from planned 
maintenance because their exemption would detract from the purpose of part 4.
95
26. Discussion.  We adopt a modified outage reporting metric to capture significant 
degradations and to simplify reporting in general.  Under the originally proposed metric, events causing 
performance failures would not be reportable until all connectivity was lost.
96
  We therefore modify both 
proposed metrics, addressing the connectivity and capacity metrics to account for performance failures 
and events resulting from planned maintenance.
27. Connectivity is an important metric but we are persuaded to modify it to exclude 
reporting that could be burdensome and of limited value.  Accordingly, we adopt a modified version of 
the connectivity metric proposed by the Submarine Cable Coalition and require reporting when there is an 
outage, including those caused by planned maintenance, of a portion of a submarine cable system 
between SLTE at one end of the system and SLTE at another end of the system for more than 30 minutes.  
We are persuaded to make this modification in order to limit the burdens caused by reporting routine 
terminal equipment issues that can be corrected rapidly.  While the Submarine Cable Coalition does not 
specifically define the term “SLTE” in its comments, it is commonly understood to be part of the “dry 
plant”
97
comprised of “signal processing equipment and optical multiplexing equipment that allows 
transmission over the submarine cable.”
98
  Thus, we focus on issues resulting in outages that fall between 
the SLTE due to problems with the “wet plant,” including the submarine cable, repeaters, optical 
                                                     
89
AT&T Comments at 14, Attachment at 7-8 (stating it would be “difficult to identify in the wide variety of 
capacity and facility arrangements that apply to these cables, or where cooperation between different landing parties 
or testing work by a landing party was required to obtain necessary information,” and the “task may even require 
canvassing other owners of capacity on a cable to determine the total amount of lost capacity.”).
90
NASCA Comments at iv, 11-13 (discussing that “[a]n impairment of active capacity does not necessarily mean an 
impairment of used capacity, i.e., traffic loss”; and the various types of capacities: lit capacity, purchased capacity, 
used capacity, or design capacity, compared to the capacity related definitions to comply with filing requirements in 
47 C.F.R. § 43.62); Verizon Reply at 3 (stating that the capacity based definition would be difficult to apply across 
different cable systems and events).
91
AT&T Comments at 13-14, Appendix A at 8-9; Docomo Reply Comments at 4; Submarine Cable Coalition 
Comments at 3.
92
Docomo Reply Comments at 4.
93
NASCA Comments at 10; Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 4, 6.
94
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 6.
95
Docomo Reply Comments at 4.
96
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10503, paras. 31-32.
97
See Submarine Cable Networks, http://www.submarinenetworks.com/stations/blog (last visited Apr. 19, 2016) 
(“The Dry Plant of a submarine cable system is a segment between the beach manhole and the cable landing station,
comprised of land cable, power feeding equipment (PFE) and submarine line terminal equipment (SLTE), etc.”). 
98
EASSy Network, Submarine Technology, http://www.eassy.org/network_subtech_2.html.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
13
equalizer, and branching unit.
99
  We believe 30 minutes, not three hours, is an appropriate timeframe to 
trigger a reporting obligation for such failures because damage or repair to facilities between the SLTE 
likely indicates a long-term problem that will not be cleared quickly, so there is no benefit to further 
delaying reporting.  
28. Further, to simplify our original capacity metric (i.e., reporting required when fifty 
percent or more of the capacity of the submarine cable, in either the transmit or receive mode, is lost for at 
least 30 minutes), we adopt a modification of our original proposal.
100
  In doing so, we also seek to create 
a reporting backstop that is broader than the connectivity metric described above and designed to capture 
events that affect even a single fiber pair, yet provide a longer window before the event becomes 
reportable.  We adopt a metric requiring a report for the failure or significant degradation of any fiber 
pair, including losses due to terminal equipment issues, on a cable segment for four hours or more, 
regardless of the number of fiber pairs that comprise the total capacity of the cable segment.  We are 
persuaded by commenters’ arguments that a capacity-based metric presents various problems and may be 
difficult to implement and execute.
101
  AT&T’s alternative proposal presents a simplified method that 
removes the complications involving measuring various types of capacities by limiting the measurement 
to the loss of any fiber pair.
102
  Because issues may arise at the landing station that will affect submarine 
cable system operation, we include outages that are due to SLTE failures.  To avoid commenters’ 
concerns of reporting large numbers of potential terminal equipment issues,
103
or brief interruptions in 
which service or function is rapidly restored, we limit the reporting scope to events lasting for at least four 
hours or more, as NASCA suggests; however we encourage reporting entities that know earlier than four 
hours that an event will last more than four hours to report that event more expeditiously.
104
  We believe 
the four-hour event threshold is consistent with the unique nature of submarine cable operations compared 
to that of our legacy outage reporting, giving submarine cable operators more flexibility.
105
  This is also 
consistent with our goals of having a holistic view of submarine cable infrastructure while minimizing 
burdens on licensees.  
29. We adopt our proposal to require reporting on planned maintenance to the extent that the 
maintenance-related outage reaches the thresholds described above.  While we have modified our 
proposals to account for the unique nature of submarine cable infrastructure, we agree with Docomo that 
there is no unique, compelling reason that would cause the Commission to depart from its past part 4 
practice of requiring reports on planned maintenance events that meet the reporting triggers.  We reiterate 
that one of the goals of the actions we take today is to improve situational awareness of the operating 
status of submarine cable infrastructure.  Thus, the Commission should be advised of planned 
maintenance for many of the same reasons that cable operators like those in the Submarine Cable 
Coalition make their customers aware of it:  planned maintenance has an effect on the overall ecosystem 
(i.e., available capacity, vulnerability of the total plant in service, etc.) of submarine cable infrastructure.  
                                                     
99
EASSy Network, Submarine Technology, http://www.eassy.org/network_subtech_2.html.  See also Submarine 
Cable Networks, http://www.submarinenetworks.com/stations/blog (last visited Apr. 19, 2016) (“The Wet Plant of 
a submarine cable system lies between the beach manholes, consists of submarine cable, repeater/gain equalizer, 
branching unit.”).
100
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10503-04, para. 31-33.
101
AT&T Comments at 14, Appendix A at 7-8; NASCA Comments at iv, 11-13; Verizon Reply at 3.
102
AT&T Comments at 14, Appendix A at 8-9.
103
AT&T Comments at 15, Appendix A at 9.
104
NASCA Comments at 10 (suggesting “[t]o avoid capturing such events, the Commission would need either to 
increase the time period in this criterion—to four hours—or expressly to exclude routine occurrences such as power 
feed equipment failures, shunt faults, and scheduled or routine maintenance).
105
Submarine Cable Coalition Reply at 2.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
14
30. We are not persuaded by Submarine Cable Coalition’s proposal for system-wide 
reporting
106
because the metric scope is too broad and does not equip the Commission with the necessary 
detailed information to meet either our reliability or our national security and public safety obligations.  
B. Covered Entities
31. Background. In the Notice, we proposed to impose an outage reporting obligation on all 
submarine cable licensees, asked whether non-licensees should be included, and sought comment on 
whether reporting obligations should be a licensing condition.
107
  Pursuant to the Cable Landing License 
Act and Executive Order 10530,
108
the Commission has promulgated cable licensing rules,
109
and the 
following entities are required to hold a cable license: (1) any entity that owns or controls a cable landing 
station in the United States; and (2) all other entities owning or controlling a five percent or greater 
interest in the cable system and using the United States points of the cable system.
110
  
32. For arrangements where submarine cables are owned and operated by multiple licensees, 
such as in a consortium, to allow these licensees to designate, for compliance purposes, a licensee 
(Responsible Licensee) to the Commission, and require the Responsible Licensee to file on behalf of the 
consortium.
111
  In the Notice, we also proposed to hold every submarine cable licensee liable for 
compliance with outage reporting requirements, and asked questions concerning appropriate scope of 
enforcement in situations in which a designated “Responsible Licensee” fails to timely or adequately file 
information on a reportable outage.
112
  We further asked if, where multiple licensees own and operate a 
cable or operate in a consortium, the Commission should hold all jointly and severally liable for any 
forfeiture.
113
33. In response to our covered entity proposal, some commenters favor requiring current 
covered licensees to report,
114
while others favor more flexibility in arrangements involving multiple 
licensees or a consortium.
115
  Docomo states that “no public policy reason exists to exempt submarine 
cable operators from a mandatory obligation to report network outages.”
116
  NASCA however, argues that 
our proposal will apply differently for those licensed prior to 2002 and reporting obligations will burden 
the pre-2002 licensees.  Accordingly it states that our new requirements should provide flexibility for 
each cable system to decide how to allocate responsibilities associated with their undersea cables, 
                                                     
106
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 3.
107
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10501, para. 26.
108
Cable Landing License Act; Executive Order 10530.
109
47 CFR §§ 1.767, 1.768.  Cable landing licensing rules that require a person or entity to obtain a cable landing 
license to connect: (1) the contiguous United States with any foreign country; (2) Alaska, Hawaii, or United States 
territories or possessions with a foreign country, the contiguous United States, or with each other; and (3) points 
within the contiguous United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or a territory or possession in which the cable is laid within 
international waters (e.g., Washington State to Alaska).  Id.
110
47 CFR § 1.767(h).  Although an entity with less than 5% ownership in a submarine cable is not required to be a 
licensee under the current rules, it may be a licensee, particularly on cables licensed prior to the rule change in 2002. 
See Review of Commission Consideration of Applications under the Cable Landing License Act, IB Docket No. 00-
106, Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 22167, 22194-98, paras. 53-59 (2001).
111
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10501-02, paras. 27-28.
112
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10502, paras. 29.
113
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10502, paras. 29.
114
Docomo Reply at 3.
115
NASCA Comments at 35.
116
Docomo Reply at 3.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
15
including outage reporting obligations.
117
  Quintillion raises several concerns, including increased costs 
and competitive disadvantages as reasons it opposes our proposal to add reporting requirements as a 
condition to submarine cable licensees.
118
34. Several commenters raised concerns about our proposal’s application to consortiums due 
in part to the nature of the arrangements among operators and also due to the complexity of identifying 
licensee-specific information in a given reportable event.
119
  NASCA argues that many cables are 
operated by consortiums, and at times the segments lie outside U.S. territory where monitoring 
responsibility may rest on foreign consortium members; it calls for limiting the scope of U.S.-based co-
licensees (on whom U.S. reporting obligations presumably will be assigned within a consortium) by 
excluding cable events occurring on segments outside their responsibility and control realm but that 
otherwise may result in reportable outages.
120
  Further, NASCA explains that an event on a cable may not 
have the same effects on each cable owner; cable owners sometimes control specific segments and 
landing stations, or a particular fiber pair on a cable with several fiber pairs.  Damage to a cable, such as a 
crush but not a complete cut, could affect some but not all fiber pairs on a single cable.
121
35. Several commenters support our Responsible Licensee proposal,
122
and others advocate 
for additional flexibility.
123
  AT&T supports our proposal and adds that “all licensees should have a 
continued duty to ensure proper reporting,” in order to provide an incentive to work together in the 
consortium, to establish and implement procedures and systems as necessary.
124
  Further, AT&T explains 
that a designation requirement allows the consortium cable licensees to “identify a mutually agreed 
responsible licensee based on the relevant facts specific to each cable.”
125
  NASCA explains that electing 
a Responsible Licensee and proposing joint and several liability could require a consortium to amend 
several documents, specifically in arrangements where owners are not joint cable landing licensees, such 
as those systems licensed prior to 2002.
126
  The Submarine Cable Coalition opposes our proposal and 
                                                     
117
NASCA Comments at v, 18-19.  NASCA states that until 2002 foreign owned submarine cables largely were not 
required to be licensees, only those operators with U.S. endpoints of the cable were required to be licensees.
Accordingly, because of the shift in license rules, the compliance obligation will “fall solely on the narrow set of 
required licensees of pre-2002 systems,” without any guarantee that these will be able to obtain information needed 
from submarine cable partners that were not required to be licensees. 
118
Quintillion Comments at 1 (arguing that based on our proposal, principle concerns include increased 
administrative cost, increased barrier to market entry, potential use of data by competitors, and the exposure of a 
network’s potential vulnerability).
119
NASCA Comments at v, 17; Submarine Cable Coalition Reply at 4.
120
NASCA Comments at v, 17-18 (stating that our proposal “expands the 5-percent threshold for ‘licensee’ status on 
a system . . . into a proxy for direct management and oversight of system operations”).
121
NASCA Comments at 18; Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 9.
122
AT&T Comments at 2-3, 8 (supporting a “required designation” obligation).  See also Verizon Reply Comments 
at 6 (“[T]he overall record supports giving licensees the option of mutually designating a single party with exclusive 
responsibility and liability for filing outage reports on behalf of the system.”).  
123
NASCA Comments at 35; Submarine Cable Coalition Reply at 4.
124
AT&T Comments at 2-3, 8.
125
AT&T Comments at 8-9 (stating, for example, which licensee is better placed to make reports, such as a U.S. 
landing party or an operator of a Network Operations Center).
126
NASCA Comments at 26-27 (arguing that it would be an added coordination cost for reporting compliance in 
situations where the Responsible Licensee may have to rely on foreign consortium members for cable segments 
located outside the U.S. territory, which may create problems due to language barriers and multiple time zones).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
16
argues that efficiencies gained from a single report per outage are offset by the resources expended by 
licensees needing to police the Responsible Licensee to ensure reporting compliance.
127
36. On the subject of joint and several liability associated with consortia or other 
arrangements among licensees, commenters’ reactions were mixed.
128
  AT&T supports holding 
consortium members to a shared duty to ensure proper reporting and to a “joint liability in the event of an 
enforcement action” in order to promote cooperation.
129
  NASCA argues that imposing joint and several 
liability on all licenses for a cable system could add an additional layer of review, such as a legal 
compliance review for each report prior to submission.
130
  Although it opposes our responsible licensee 
proposal, the Submarine Cable Coalition argues that if adopted, enforcement should be limited to 
licensees that “actually experience capacity or connectivity losses sufficient to trigger a reporting 
requirement,” and those that do not should not be held joint and severally liable for forfeitures.
131
37. Discussion.  We adopt a requirement that all licensees, regardless of when the license was 
obtained, must comply with license conditions, including the outage reporting rules we now adopt. We 
agree with Docomo that there is no public policy reason to exempt submarine cable licensees from the 
obligation to report.  All licensees are integral components in the provision of submarine cable 
infrastructure, and the Commission could not meet its goal of acquiring a comprehensive viewpoint of the 
operational status of all submarine cables if certain licensees were exempted.  We believe with the 
flexibilities discussed below, pre-2002 licensees would be unlikely to have increased burden compared to 
post-2002 licensees.  Most pre-2002 cables operate as a consortium.  Consortium cables generally use 
construction and maintenance agreements (C&MA),
132
which can be amended to incorporate new 
regulatory requirements as necessary.  To the extent that extra flexibility or time is required to revise the 
C&MAs to ensure compliance with the outage reporting requirements adopted herein, we address that 
below. 
38. In light of concerns raised regarding the operations of consortiums or that of a cable with 
multiple licensees,
133
we choose to permit, but not require, a Responsible Licensee designation.  We have 
made this decision to add flexibility to the Responsible Licensee system due to the concerns expressed 
about how our rules could be complicated given the nature of consortiums, including their size, 
domestic/foreign composition, potential language barriers, and time zone challenges,
134
as well as how 
compliance review will add to costs for reporting.
135
  Consortium members are in the best position to 
determine which member is best placed to comply and meet the reporting obligation for the consortium, 
                                                     
127
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 10; Submarine Cable Coalition Reply at 4.
128
AT&T Comments at 9; Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 9.
129
AT&T Comments at 9-10, 11-12 (explaining that in addition to the shared duties and liabilities, consortium 
agreements will require parties to take necessary actions to ensure the “continuation of required licenses and the 
cost-sharing principles that underpin these agreements,” however designating an operator may be time consuming 
and may require a transition period).
130
NASCA Comments at 27.
131
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 10; Submarine Cable Coalition Reply at 4.
132
The Commission formerly required consortium cables to file their C&MAs.  See, e.g., Joint Application for a 
License to Land and Operate a Submarine Cable Network Between the United States and Japan, Cable Landing 
License, 14 FCC Rcd 13066 (1999). While the Commission no longer requires consortium cables to file C&MAs we 
retain our ability to request them on a case-by-case basis. 47 CFR § 1.767(a)(10).
133
NASCA Comments at v, 17; Submarine Cable Coalition Reply at 4; Verizon Reply at 5-6.
134
NASCA Comments at 18-19, 20, 27; PC Landing Corp. Comments at 3.
135
NASCA Comments at 27.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
17
such as a U.S. landing operator or a Network Operations Center (NOC) operator.
136
  We agree with 
Verizon that under this approach, licensees and non-licensees, including those operating with pre-2002 
licensees, are free to negotiate and allocate the underlying risk and financial responsibility.
137
  
Nonetheless, should a Responsible Licensee be designated, it must register with and keep the 
Commission updated as to its Responsible Licensee status pursuant to our rules.
138
  We will hold the 
Responsible Licensee responsible for reporting compliance once designated and registered with the 
Commission.  As Verizon states, this approach combined with a Responsible Licensee option, gives the 
Commission a single entity to hold accountable while providing for systems flexibility to apportion roles 
to meet accountability thresholds.
139
39. If no Responsible Licensee is designated with the Commission or in effect at the time of 
an outage, each party experiencing a reportable outage can be held responsible for reporting and liable 
should the Commission need to pursue enforcement action.  This is a departure from our proposal to hold 
all consortium members jointly and severally liable when a cable experiences an outage, in order to 
provide additional flexibility to covered providers.
140
  In this way we limit enforcement liability to those 
licensees experiencing an outage.
C. Filing Obligations
1. Notification Requirements
40. Background.  In the Notice, we proposed to require licensees to file a notification in 
NORS within 120 minutes of discovering the outage.
141
  We proposed that notifications filed in NORS 
would include the name of the reporting entity; the name of the cable and a list of all licensees for that 
cable; a brief description of the event, including root cause; whether the event is planned or unplanned; 
the date and time of the onset of the outage (or estimate start time/date of the repair for planned events); 
nearest cable landing station; approximate location of the event, in nautical miles or in latitude/longitude, 
as measured from the nearest cable landing station; best estimate of the duration of the event; and contact 
information to provide to the Commission.
142
  We sought comment on whether all of this information 
would be readily available to licensees in the near term after an outage, as well as whether additional 
information on other technical elements should be required.
143
a. Content of Notification
41. Commenters argue that several of the proposed elements of a notification would likely be 
unknown at the time a submarine cable operator would be required to file a notification.  First, multiple 
commenters agree that submarine cable operators rarely know the root cause of an outage in its immediate 
                                                     
136
NASCA Comments at 18-19; Verizon Reply at 7.
137
Verizon Reply at 5-6.
138
See Appendix B infra, section 4.15(b)(1) (“Licensees opting to designate a Responsible Licensee must jointly 
notify the Chief of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau’s Cybersecurity and Communications 
Reliability Division of this decision in writing.  Such notification shall include the name of the submarine cable at 
issue; and contact information for all licensees on the submarine cable at issue, including the Responsible 
Licensee.”).
139
Verizon Reply at 7.
140
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10502, paras. 29.
141
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10505 para. 37.
142
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10505 para. 37.
143
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10505 para. 37.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
18
aftermath.
144
  For example, AT&T states that root cause information “is not generally known until the 
completion of the repair, sometimes requires further analysis and laboratory testing after that time, and in 
some circumstances is never determined.”
145
  Second, AT&T and NASCA oppose a requirement for the 
approximate location of an outage, noting that it can take a significant amount of time to identify the 
location of an outage given the length of trans-oceanic cables.
146
AT&T suggests that cable operators 
should only be required to provide its best estimate of the location of the outage, as such an estimate can 
be provided in a timely manner.
147
  Third, NASCA submits that cable operators would be hard pressed to 
provide an estimate on how long an outage might last.
148
  More generally, NASCA contends that “[t]he 
NPRM’s assumption that this data is readily available already is … incorrect,”
149
and that “[t]he 
Commission should also recognize the trade-off between a quick report and an informed report.”
150
42. Discussion.  We require licensees to provide a preliminary notification in NORS
151
once 
it has been determined that an undersea cable outage has occurred.
152
  We find that having awareness of 
an outage, even without certain information about that outage, helps achieve our goal of improving 
situational awareness as to the operational status of undersea cable networks.  Reporting via widely 
available electronic means is affordably feasible and quite often a normal part of operations.  As proposed 
in the Notice, notifications must contain the name of the reporting entity; the name of the cable and a list 
of all licensees for that cable; whether the event is planned or unplanned; and contact information for the 
Commission.  We recognize, however, that access to information about the root cause, approximate 
location, and estimated duration of an outage will often be unavailable in the period immediately 
following an operator’s determination that there has been an undersea cable outage.  Accordingly, we 
modify our original proposal from the Notice and require such information only if known at the time of 
the notification.  
43. We acknowledge that the root cause of an outage many times cannot be determined until 
after repair work is done, and only seldom is it known at the time of an outage.  Accordingly, in their 
notifications licensees must provide a brief description of the event and need only include information on 
the root cause if known at the time.  If the root cause is unknown, licensees should specify as such and 
provide further information where available in Interim or Final Reports.
153
  
                                                     
144
See, e.g., NASCA Comments at 19-20 (“When a submarine cable operator first becomes aware of a fault, it rarely 
has any data other than identification of the affected segment and almost certainly will not have any information on 
the root cause of the problem...”); AT&T Comments at 16 (“Some information proposed to be included in the 
notification is unlikely to be available at the early stages of identifying and addressing cable outages, or will 
unnecessarily delay these reports unless provided as a best estimate.”).  See also NASCA Comments at v-vi; PC 
Landing Corp. Comments at 2; AT&T Comments at 16-17, citing AT&T Declaration at 9-10; Verizon Reply 
Comments at 4. 
145
AT&T Comments at 16-17, Appendix A at 9-10. 
146
NASCA Comments at 33; AT&T Comments at 17-18, Appendix A at 9-10.
147
AT&T Comments at 17, Appendix A at 10. 
148
NASCA Comments at 20.
149
NASCA Comments at 20.
150
NASCA Comments at 20.
151
All reports described herein are to be filed in NORS in a system designed specifically for submarine cable outage 
reporting.  We direct the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau to make any necessary modifications to 
NORS for this purpose in addition to retiring UCIS upon the effective date of these rules.  See supra para. 14.  
152
The timing for this notification is discussed below at paras. 46-50. 
153
See also paras. 52-53, 58-59.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
19
44. With respect to the location of an outage, licensees must provide the name of the nearest 
cable landing station if known, as well as its best estimate of the location of the event, expressed in either, 
nautical miles and the direction from the nearest cable landing station, or in approximate latitude and 
longitude coordinates.  We have added “the direction from” the nearest cable landing station (e.g., 15 
nautical miles west of [the cable landing station]” to improve clarity in reporting, if known.  We 
acknowledge that undersea cables traverse vast distances, and it can be a complicated and time-
consuming task to determine the location of an undersea cable outage.  Though we only proposed that 
licensees report the “approximate location” of an outage, we clarify that we do not seek to divert time and 
attention away from service restoration efforts by requiring licensees to provide this information.  As with 
root cause information, licensees must provide this information if known at the time of the notification, 
and if unknown, licensees should provide further detail where possible in subsequent reports.  
45. With respect to the duration of the event, licensees must provide their best estimate in the 
notification, but supplement with further information as it becomes available in their Interim or Final 
Reports.  As with root cause and location information, our aim in including this information in the 
notification is to provide preliminary situational awareness in the immediate wake of an outage, which 
can be supplemented or corrected through later reports. 
b. Timeframe for Notification
46. Background.  Commenters state that a 120-minute timeframe for filing a notification as 
proposed in the Notice (i.e., requiring that the notification include root cause information, approximate 
location, and estimated duration of the outage) would be unreasonable to impose on submarine cable 
operators.
154
  As noted above, submarine cable operators usually know little about the root cause of an 
outage in the time immediately following its occurrence, as submarine cable outage identification can be a 
complex and time-consuming task, and in many cases requires coordination with foreign landing 
parties.
155
  Moreover, multiple commenters express concern that requiring operators to file notifications
within such a short timeframe would result in operators having to divert attention away from immediate 
restoration of service.
156
  NASCA argues that this time window would essentially require cable operators 
to have staff available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week to be ready to report outages, which would 
increase costs and which is inconsistent with the fact that NORS lacks a similar requirement for round-
the-clock staff.
157
  AT&T states that the average timeframe for outage notifications it has received from 
foreign consortium parties in recent years has been approximately eight (8) hours, noting that “few 
foreign landing parties operate cable stations on a seven-day, 24-hour basis, and that their personnel may 
initially focus on service rerouting or restoration rather than notifying consortium partners.”  Despite the 
                                                     
154
NASCA Comments at 20; Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 2-3; PC Landing Corp. Comments at 4; 
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 8.  
155
See e.g., Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 7 (“[T]he … 120 minute requirement for the Notification is an 
unreasonable expectation given the logistics involved in communicating with a remote [NOC] and ensuring the 
information is relayed to the responsible licensee. Specifically, once NOC is alerted of a problem, it takes critical 
personal and diagnostics to determine whether a disruption is reportable, especially if the responsible licensee is in a 
foreign jurisdiction.”); PC Landing Corp. Comments at 3-4 (“The highly accelerated submission requirement 
proposed by the FCC fails to recognize that submarine cables constitute international infrastructure and that the 
individuals with the most information about an outage may be located outside the U.S., in different time zones and 
potentially speaking different languages.”); NASCA Comments at 20 (“Incident data may not reach Commission 
licensees for a particular submarine cable system as quickly as the NPRM assumes they will, due to time zone and 
language issues.”).  See also Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 2-3; AT&T Comments at 12-13; Verizon Reply 
at 4.
156
NASCA Comments at 20; Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 2; PC Landing Corp. Comments at 4; AT&T 
Declaration at 5. 
157
NASCA Comments at 20.  For a more detailed discussion on costs, see sect. IV.C. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
20
average cited by AT&T, nearly all commenters agree that operators should have a minimum of 48 hours 
to notify the Commission in the event of a submarine cable outage.
158
  
47. Discussion.  Again, we recognize that the determination of root cause, approximate 
location, and duration of an outage typically takes much longer than 120 minutes after the determination 
that an outage has occurred.  Moreover, we agree with commenters that licensees’ primary objective in 
the wake of an outage should be to restore service, and that reporting obligations should be subordinate to 
that objective.  As discussed above, we modify our original notification proposal to require licensees to 
provide root cause information, approximate location, and estimated duration of an outage only when 
available.  The notification process is intended to be preliminary in nature and simply provide notice of, 
not necessarily detail about, an undersea cable outage, for purposes of situational awareness.  
48. We also emphasize that the timeframe for reporting starts upon “the time of determining 
that an event is reportable” and not necessarily the moment that an event becomes reportable.  Several 
commenters, in arguing that the Commission’s proposed notification timeframe is infeasible, point to 
difficulties in receiving the initial notification.  For example, AT&T asserts that “most notifications of the 
occurrence of outages on consortium cables that AT&T receives from foreign consortium parties are not 
provided within two hours of the cable failure.”
159
  Even if the foregoing complications arose preventing a 
licensee from knowing of an outage when it became reportable, the licensee would only be “on the clock” 
to report the event when it determines (i.e., has knowledge that) the event is reportable.  This distinction 
should alleviate many of the concerns that licensees will need to implement new network monitoring 
processes.  
49. We continue to believe that licensees can report within the proposed two-hour timeframe 
from determining that an event is reportable, particularly as they need not provide substantive detail on 
the root cause, location, or duration of the outage if unavailable at that time; we believe that quick 
notification is an essential element in achieving the Commission’s goal of developing comprehensive 
situational awareness of submarine cable infrastructure.  We additionally note our view that many of the 
submarine cable operators have the technical capabilities to near-instantly detect outages and are standard 
within the industry.
160
   
50. That said, given the support on the record for a longer notification timeframe and 
AT&T’s statements that it will need time to implement these requirements with its consortium partners,
161
we will initially, for a three year period from the effective date of these rules, require licensees to notify 
the Commission of an outage within eight hours of determining that an event is reportable.  Three years 
after the effective date of these rules, licensees will be responsible for filing notifications within four
hours of determining that an event is reportable.  After three years, the Commission will open a 
proceeding to revisit.  We find that allowing four hours from the time of determining an event is 
reportable, not when the event necessarily becomes reportable, is feasible, particularly as we have 
allowed for licensees to include approximations and best estimates in their filings.  This phased-in 
approach will give licensees ample time to hone their reporting structure while still achieving the 
aforementioned goal of prompt situational awareness.  A further elongated timeframe does not as 
                                                     
158
NASCA Comments at 20; Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 2-3; PC Landing Corp Comments at 4; 
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 8; Verizon Reply Comments at 4.  See also Submarine Cable Coalition 
Reply at 3 (suggesting that a 72-hour timeframe would be even more appropriate).  
159
AT&T Comments, Appendix A at 4.
160
See, e.g., Akamai, State of the Internet Report Q415 at 51-54 (2016), 
https://www.stateoftheinternet.com/resources-connectivity-2015-Q4-state-of-the-internet-report.html (showing that 
Akamai can very quickly detect changes in Internet traffic levels that result from a submarine cable outage).  We 
believe that licensees, or at least their customers, would have at least the same visibility into network performance 
and should be able to rapidly determine when an outage has occurred.  
161
AT&T Comments, Appendix A at 6-7.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
21
adequately serve the Commission’s goal of acquiring rapid situational awareness of submarine cable 
infrastructure.  
2. Interim Report
51. Background.  In the Notice, we proposed to require licensees to file an Interim Report, if 
applicable (i.e., for an unplanned outage), 120 minutes from when the repair has been scheduled.
162
  We 
further proposed to require Interim Reports to include name of the reporting licensee; the name of the 
cable and a list of all licensees for that cable; the date and time of onset of the outage; a brief description 
of the event, including root cause; nearest cable landing station; approximate location of the event (either 
in nautical miles from the nearest cable landing station or in latitude and longitude); best estimate of the 
duration of the event (total amount of time connectivity is lost or 50 percent or more of the capacity is 
lost); and a contact name, contact email address, and contact telephone number by which the 
Commission’s technical staff may contact the reporting entity.
163
  We explained that the NORS electronic 
interface automatically populates information previously entered for the Notification filing, and asked 
whether additional technical elements should be requested in this report as opposed to in the Notification 
or Final Report filings.
164
a. Content of Interim Report
52. Commenters argue that either our proposal should be modified,
165
or that the Interim 
Report is unnecessary as details may not be available given the timeframe.
166
  AT&T suggests that we 
decline to require the “root cause” explanation, or at least, request this information in the Interim Report, 
if available.
167
  NASCA argues that details of the incident may be unknown until repairs are completed 
and then, this information can be included in the Final Report; the Interim Report may not contain more 
information than the Notification filing.
168
  NASCA further argues that we should reject proposals to
collect additional operational data.
169
  Submarine Cable Coalition raises the possibility that details with 
respect to scheduled time to repair, repair duration, and root cause may change over time as additional 
details become available.
170
53. Discussion.  We adopt modified Interim Report content requirements to address concerns 
that a root cause may not always be known in this adjusted timeframe.  We require licensees to report on 
all of the elements described above in the original proposal, observing that many of these elements (name 
of the reporting licensee; the name of the cable and a list of all licensees for that cable; the date and time 
of onset of the outage; and a contact name, contact email address, and contact telephone number by which 
the Commission’s technical staff may contact the reporting entity) will be auto-filled from the 
Notification and thus will likely require no additional work on the part of the reporting entity barring 
administrative changes.  These fields remain important for basic factual references and we see no reason 
to exclude them from the Interim Report.  We will also continue to require a brief description of the 
                                                     
162
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10505-06, para. 38.
163
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10505-06, 10515, para. 38 and Appendix A.
164
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10505-06, para. 38.
165
AT&T Comments at 20.
166
NASCA Comments at 20-21.
167
AT&T Comments at 19-20, Appendix A at 9-10 (noting that as with the Notification filing, root cause 
information is not available usually until repair work is completed or even until subsequent analysis is undertaken).
168
NASCA Comments at vi, 20-21 (raising the same argument as with the Notification filing, the Commission 
should recognize “the trade-off between a quick report and an informed report”).
169
NASCA Comments at 22.
170
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 8.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
22
event, including root cause; nearest cable landing station; approximate location of the event (either, in 
nautical miles and the direction from the nearest cable landing station or in latitude and longitude); and 
the best estimate of the duration of the event.  These are the fields that will supply the Commission with 
necessary situational awareness about the status of the outage, particularly when the information is 
updated from that which we received in the Notification.  We depart slightly from our original proposal, 
however, and will now only require the root cause description if known at the time.  We are persuaded by 
commenters’ arguments that the root cause may need extended analysis and sometimes may not be known 
until the repair is completed.
171
  We have again added “the direction from” the nearest cable landing 
station (e.g., “15 nautical miles west of [the cable landing station]” to improve clarity in reporting, if 
known.  We emphasize that an approximate location of the event and best estimate of the duration of the 
event are all that is required; licensees will not be penalized for the later-determined accuracy of these 
interim responses if they are submitted in good faith.  We also adopt our proposal that Interim Reports are 
not required for planned outages so long as the planned nature of the event was appropriately signaled in 
the Notification.
172
b. Timeframe for Interim Report
54. Background.  Commenters disfavor our 120 minute proposal and instead offer several 
extended timeframe alternatives due to concerns about the information and operations necessary to 
complete the Interim Report as proposed.
173
Submarine Cable Coalition argues that due to coordination
needed from when a submarine cable owner is able to schedule a repair to the time that information is 
communicated to the Responsible Licensee, hours could pass, an issue which is complicated by differing 
time zones.
174
  AT&T and several others support that an interim report should be required at a set amount 
of time after the receipt of the “Plan of Work” for the cable repair in order to “allow licensees to provide 
the ‘additional useful information’ that the Commission seeks to obtain from this report.”
175
  Verizon adds
that waiting until the distribution of the Plan of Work to other parties on the system would allow the 
Responsible Licensee to provide more useful information to the Commission rather than using our 
proposed reporting timeframe.
176
Verizon further argues that the “operational tasks such as scheduling the 
repair and receiving the Plan of Work may occur several time zones away.”
177
55. Discussion.  We adopt a modified reporting timeframe for the Interim Report. We 
believe that AT&T’s proposal to base the reporting timeframe off of when the licensee receives the Plan 
of Work to be a reasonable accommodation that takes into account the unique nature of submarine cable 
repair and adopt that approach.  We also agree with commenters that further coordination may be 
necessary upon receipt of the Plan of Work.
178
  We do not, however, agree that licensees need elongated 
timeframes, such as 72 hours from receipt of the Plan of Work, in order to file their Interim Reports, 
particularly as we have allowed for licensees to include approximations and best estimates in their filings.  
Such an elongated timeframe does not serve the Commission’s goal of acquiring rapid situational 
                                                     
171
AT&T Comments at 19-20.
172
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10505, para. 36.
173
AT&T Comments at 19-21, Appendix A at 11 (proposing 72 hours after the plan of work is received); Verizon 
Reply at 4 (proposing 72 hours from when the plan of work is distributed); Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 
8 (proposing 48 hours after repairs have been scheduled).
174
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 7.  
175
AT&T Comments at 18-19, and Declaration 10-11; Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 3; Verizon Reply at 
4. 
176
Verizon Reply at 4.
177
Verizon Reply at 4.
178
AT&T Comments at 19-21; Verizon Reply at 4; Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 7.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
23
awareness of submarine cable infrastructure.  Accordingly, we will require licensees to file an Interim 
Report, if required, within 24 hours of receipt of the Plan of Work, which we believe strikes the 
appropriate balance between allowing licensees sufficient time for necessary coordination to amply 
inform the Commission with useful and timely information.  
3. Final Report
56. Background.  In the Notice, we proposed to require licensees to file a Final Report seven 
days after the repair is completed.
179
  We sought comment on this requirement, and whether licensees 
should report additional information that would enable the Commission to perform more thorough and 
systematic outage reporting analysis.
180
  As proposed in the Notice, an undersea cable licensee would be 
required to file a Final Report in NORS within seven days after the repair is completed.
181
We proposed 
that the following elements be required in a Final Report: the name of the reporting entity; the name of 
the cable; whether the outage was planned or unplanned; the date and time of onset of the outage (for 
planned events, this is the start date and time of the repair); a brief description of the event; nearest cable 
landing station; approximate location of the event (either in nautical miles from the nearest cable landing 
station or in latitude and longitude); duration of the event; the restoration method; a contact name, contact 
email address, and contact telephone number by which the Commission's technical staff may contact the 
reporting entity.
182
57. The two components of the Final Report that differ from the Notification and the Interim 
Report are (1) the duration of the event and (2) the restoration method.  The Notice proposed that this type 
of Final Report, with the inclusion of these two additional elements, would enable the Commission to 
work directly with communication providers using a data-driven method on collaborative reliability 
improvement initiatives that will produce measurable results for undersea cables.
183
a. Contents of Final Report
58. The majority of commenters support our proposals for what content should be provided 
in the Final Report.
184
  Verizon supports our proposal that the Final Report information will be available 
seven days after the repair completion.
185
  However, Verizon noted that completion of the root cause 
analysis for certain outages, such as repeater failures, can take several months to complete and flexibility 
for those cases is needed.
186
  AT&T also supports our proposal as to the contents of the Final Report, but 
similarly noted that the information (specifically the root cause of an outage) may not be known at the 
time the Final Report is due and that additional time should be given to supplement the report once the 
root cause is determined.
187
Submarine Cable Coalition supports our Final Reporting content proposal, 
but encourages the Commission to consider a mechanism by which details of the Final Report may be 
amended in good faith given the number of parties involved in a submarine cable repair and the 
complexities of obtaining the technical information and other criteria required for the Final Report.
188
  
                                                     
179
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10506, para 39.
180
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10506, para 39.
181
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10506, para. 39.
182
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10506, para. 39.
183
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10504, para. 35.
184
Verizon Reply Comments at 4; Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 9; AT&T Comments at 21.
185
Verizon Reply Comments at 4.
186
Verizon Reply Comments at 4; AT&T Comments at 20, Appendix A at 11.
187
AT&T Comments at 20, Appendix A at 11; Verizon Reply Comments at 4.
188
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 9.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
24
Latam objected to the Final Report content proposal, in so far as it believes that cable operators will likely 
lack documentation and information needed to complete the report within the seven day timeframe.
189
  
59. Discussion.  As with both the Notification and Interim Reports, we understand the 
commenters’ concerns that particular information may not be known at the time the repairs have been 
completed given the complexities of undersea cable repairs.
190
  We also take into account that submarine 
cable licensees often work together in consortiums, and that although one member may know a certain 
element of the Final Report, the information may not make its way to other consortium members who are 
also experiencing an outage or disruption on the same cable.
191
  For these reasons, we adopt our proposals 
for the content reporting obligations for the Final Report,
192
but with a modification for the “brief 
description of the event.”  Here, in a Final Report, a licensee will need to provide the root cause in its 
brief description of the event only if known at the time of filing.  Both Verizon and AT&T noted that in 
some cases, completion of the root cause analysis may not be known in the proposed timeframe, and in 
some instances, never be determined.
193
  Nonetheless, the Commission expects providers to conduct 
reasonable due diligence to ascertain the root cause of an event. We have also again added “the direction 
from” the nearest cable landing station (e.g., “15 nautical miles west of [the cable landing station]”) to 
improve clarity in reporting, if known.  
60. After the submission of the Final Report, particular details of an event may become 
known or change as research is done and repairs are completed.
194
In order for the Commission to obtain 
the most accurate information, previous Final Reports (and only Final Reports) must be supplemented 
after the Final Report if that information materially alters the previously reported material. Amendments 
to Final Reports should be made in good faith.  
61. The parallels of the Final Report content to our existing Part 4 rules, in conjunction with 
the NORS platform, create an most efficient, streamlined and user-friendly system when implementing 
these new procedures.  Furthermore, we believe that the contents of the Final Report would be easily 
compiled, as NORS interface automatically populates the fields where information required duplicates 
that of the Notification and Interim Report, so the reporting licensee would not have to reenter data unless 
it is to amend or edit a previously-supplied response.
195
We note that the Commission recently adopted a
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which sought comment on applying a two-step reporting process 
to all covered services, which, if adopted, would apply to submarine cable outage reporting.
196
  Interested 
parties may file comments on this issue in the part 4 proceeding.
b. Timeframe for Final Report
62. Background.  The record reflects support for requiring licensees to file a Final Report 
seven days after the repair of a submarine cable is completed.  AT&T agrees that after the repair is 
completed, a seven day deadline for the Final Report generally provides sufficient time for the submission 
                                                     
189
Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 3.
190
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 9, AT&T Comments at 21, Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 3.
191
The Submarine Cable Coalition Initial Comments at 9
192
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10506, para. 39.
193
Verizon Reply Comments at 4; AT&T Comments at 20, Appendix A at 11.
194
See AT&T Comments at 20 (“[R]epair ship contracts for many U.S. landed cables allow the ship operator up to 
30 days to provide a final completion report after finishing the repair.”).  
195
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10506, para. 39.  
196
See Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications et. al., PS 
Docket Nos. 15-80 and 11-82 et.al., Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order on 
Reconsideration, FCC 16-63, 55-56 at para. 127 (May 26, 2016).  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
25
of the required information.
197
  NASCA concurs and proposes that after a repair concludes, “the operator 
would submit a final report within seven days.”
198
  The Submarine Cable Coalition does not object and 
considers seven days after completion of the repair a reasonable amount of time for submission.
199
  And 
Verizon submits that companies should be able to meet the proposed filing deadline of seven days and 
provide most of the proposed information for the Final Report after repair completion.
200
63. Only one commenter argues that the Final Report deadline should extend to 45 days at a 
minimum.
201
  Latam submits that 45 days should be the minimum threshold the Commission should 
undertake, adding that “a deadline of 60 days following repair would give a cable operator the 
opportunity to receive the final report from the repair vessel, as well as any other critical documentation, 
and draft a detailed report for the Commission.”
202
64. Discussion.  We adopt our proposal to require licensees to file a Final Report seven 
calendar days
203
after the repair is completed.  There is substantial record support for requiring submission 
of this critical information within a week following the repair completion.  The Commission has a 
responsibility to ensure the reliability and security of the nation’s communications infrastructure, and 
obtaining timely information on communications service disruptions is essential to that goal. 
65. We are not persuaded by the proposal to extend the deadline to a minimum of 45 days.
204
  
We find that a majority of the information that must be included in a Final Report is readily available 
following the repair of the submarine cable.  As mentioned above, the Commission is aware of the unique 
nature of submarine cable repairs, which is why the Final Report shall be amended, when necessary.  
Therefore, we decline to adopt Latam’s proposal of a 45-day minimum for a Final Report deadline.  The 
seven day requirement we adopt today provides the Commission critical network outage information 
within a reasonable time.
D. Good Faith and Confidentiality
1. Good Faith Requirements in Section 4.11
66. Background.  In the Notice, we proposed to adopt substantially the same wording 
codified in Section 4.11 of our rules for the submarine cable outage reporting requirements to the extent 
that it addresses authorized personnel, the requirement of good faith, the method of attestation that the 
information supplied is complete and accurate, and the manner of filing.
205
We sought comment on 
whether there were any problems with applying this rule to submarine cable reporting.
206
67. Commenters did not oppose our proposal, but they raised concerns regarding the good 
faith requirement and flexibility in amending reports.
207
NASCA asserts that there are circumstances 
where the root cause of an outage resulting from a damaged cable may never be known, adding that 
                                                     
197
AT&T Comments at 20, Appendix A at 11.
198
NASCA Comments at 35.
199
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 9.
200
Verizon Reply Comments at 5
201
Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 3.
202
Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 3.
203
See 47 CFR § 1.4(g) (excluding non-business days only when the filing period is less than 7 days). 
204
Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 3.
205
Submarine Cable Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10506-07, para. 40.
206
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10506-07, para. 40.
207
See, NASCA Comments at 33-34; See also, Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 9.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
26
“[c]able operators should not be penalized if they cannot in all cases provide all of the information that 
the Commission may wish to know but have submitted the information available to them in good 
faith.”
208
Similarly, the Submarine Cable Coalition highlights the complexities involved in assessing and 
repairing a damaged cable, and encourages “the Commission to consider a mechanism by which details of 
the Final Report may be amended in good faith without running afoul of the attestation provision in 
Section 4.11 of the Commission’s rules.”
209
68. Discussion.  We adopt substantially the same wording codified in Section 4.11 of our 
rules for the submarine cable outage reporting system.  We are cognizant of the complexities and 
uncertainties that may arise with outages resulting from a damaged cable.  However, the good faith and 
attestation requirements will not be violated if the authorized personnel submitting a report does in fact 
submit all of the information known to them, in good faith, at the time of reporting.  Also, as made clear 
above, licensees have the duty to amend their Final Reports, in good faith, if the licensee later learns that 
the reported information is inaccurate.  Accordingly, consistent with support from the record, we will 
require a good faith requirement and an attestation consistent with Section 4.11. 
2. Confidentiality of Submarine Outage Reports and Data
69. Background.  The Notice proposes to treat undersea cable reporting information as 
presumptively confidential consistent with Section 4.2 of the Commission’s rules governing outage 
reporting.
210
  Specifically, Section 4.2 of the Commission’s rules governing outage reporting states that 
“[r]eports filed under this part will be presumed to be confidential.”
211
  Under NORS, the Commission 
shares part 4 outage reporting data with DHS.
212
  We sought comment on whether the information the 
Commission receives should be shared with other federal agencies and/or state governments, and if so, 
which agencies.
213
  Additionally, we sought comment on whether sharing should be limited to cases 
where a government entity is directly affected.
214
70. The majority of commenters supported our proposal in part and objected in part.  Many 
agreed that submarine outage reporting data should be treated as presumptively confidential under Section 
4.2.  However, some commenters noted information sharing should be limited to certain agencies,
215
while 
others endorsed a need for greater transparency.
216
71. AT&T agrees with our proposal, submitting that cable outage reports should be 
presumptively confidential and consistent with existing rules governing outage reporting, specifically 
                                                     
208
NASCA Comments at 33-34. 
209
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 9.
210
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10507, para. 41.
211
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10507, para. 41 & n.73. 47 C.F.R. § 4.2.
212
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10507, para. 41 & n.74; Part 4 Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 
at 16856, para. 47 (“We will, therefore, make available to DHS, in encrypted form and immediately upon receipt, all 
electronically submitted outage reports. DHS can then undertake to provide information from those reports to such 
other governmental authorities as it may deem to be appropriate.”).
213
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10507, para. 41; 
214
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10507, para. 41.
215
NASCA Comments at 21 (noting that national security concerns necessitate withholding of such data from public 
inspection and any information sharing with other U.S. government agencies should be limited to the Department of 
Defense and the DHS).
216
Docomo Reply at 5-6; Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands Comments at 1-2; Comments of James 
Brooks at 1.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
27
noting the role confidentiality plays in the context of undersea cable consortiums.
217
  NASCA also agrees 
with our proposal and believes the Commission should treat all outage reporting data as proprietary and 
exempt from public disclosure.
218
  NASCA further submits that national security concerns necessitate 
withholding such data from public inspection and any information sharing with other U.S. Government 
agencies should be limited to the Department of Defense and the DHS.
219
72. Docomo agrees in part and objects in part to our proposal.  Docomo submits that any 
treatment of network outage reports as confidential should be conditioned upon a requirement that the 
cable operator notify affected customers of the outage and keep customers informed of its repair efforts.
220
  
Docomo acknowledges that network outage reports contain proprietary information that should ordinarily 
be sealed from public disclosure.  They noted, however, because the public who rely on submarine cables 
do not "have traditional retail customers" privileges, end users are completely at the mercy of the operator 
to provide timely information about a network outage and its efforts to repair that outage.
221
  Therefore, 
Docomo believes notice to parties affected by an outage should be a precondition of confidential 
treatment of that operator's network outage reports.
222
73. The Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands objects to our confidentiality 
proposal and, instead, recommends that the Commission require “submarine cable operators to report 
outages, and that in jurisdictions that are served by a single cable, operators must also transmit copies of 
outage reports to the jurisdiction’s governor.”
223
  James Brooks also objects to the confidentiality 
proposal, suggesting instead that summaries of the reports should be made available to the public on an 
annual basis.
224
  James Brooks proposes that the summaries “could be scrubbed of commercially 
confidential information while still providing information relevant to the general public that relies on 
submarine cables.”
225
74. Discussion.  We adopt our proposal that undersea cable reporting information is to be 
treated as presumptively confidential consistent with Section 4.2 of the Commission’s rules governing 
outage reporting.  Maintaining the confidentiality of submarine cable outage data is critical to 
safeguarding weaknesses or damage to our national communications infrastructure that could potentially 
                                                     
217
AT&T Comments at 21 (“The assurance of confidential treatment for this information would also be important 
for other consortium parties and could be helpful in obtaining their cooperation in providing the necessary 
information for these reports. A number of consortium agreements require such information to be treated as 
confidential, and also require consortium parties to request confidential treatment for this information when it is 
provided to regulators.”)
218
NASCA Comments at 21 (confidentiality procedures should be consistent with the current NORS practice and 
the Freedom of Information Act).
219
NASCA Comments at 21 (noting that report information should not be shared with other submarine cable 
operators).
220
Docomo Reply at 5 (noting they had difficulty obtaining information from an operator of the submarine system 
serving the CNMI in connection with a recent cable cut. Also noting the same was true for the government of the 
CNMI, which did not receive prompt reports of the cable break, resulting in entire communities left without 
emergency services for a longer period than necessary).
221
Docomo Reply at 5.
222
Docomo Reply at 5-6 (“This approach would ensure that proprietary information is adequately protected from 
public disclosure while not leaving wholesale and enterprise customers in the dark when an outage to a submarine 
cable occurs.”).
223
Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands Comments at 2 (such information would mitigate damages in 
the event of an outage, such as the July, 2015 cable break).
224
Comments of James Brooks at 1.
225
Comments of James Brooks at 1.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
28
facilitate enemies targeting our nation’s key resources.
226
  The Communications Act of 1934 charges the 
Commission with promoting “the safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio 
communication.”
227
  Releasing detailed and sensitive information regarding submarine cable outages and 
disruptions would contradict this core mission of the Commission.  We will, however, share information 
with DHS as is customary with our part 4 outage reports.  This model is consistent with the Commission’s 
past precedent for outage reporting and we do not see a need to depart here from that practice solely for 
submarine cable outage reporting.  
75. We acknowledge, however, the safety and transparency concerns raised by the Attorney 
General of the Northern Mariana Islands and James Brooks.  The July 8, 2015 Northern Mariana Island 
outage proved that there are situational awareness gaps at multiple levels when submarine outages occur.  
We also note that the Commission recently adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking addressing 
many of these same issues and has not yet decided if or how it will change its outage report information 
sharing practices more broadly.
228
  Interested parties may file comments on this issue in the part 4 
proceeding.  We believe that a broader proceeding is a better context for making decisions on how outage 
information should be shared more generally, and allow for submarine cable outage information sharing 
to be considered in that context.  We also observe that initiating this program in a manner that is 
consistent with the confidentiality in other part 4 reporting would allow for reevaluation at a later date of 
a different approach.
229
IV. OTHER ISSUES
A. Implementation
76. Background.  In this Report and Order we adopt rules requiring submarine cable 
licensees to report service outages that meet defined minimum criteria.  We did not specifically seek 
comment on the implementation timing of these rules but numerous commenters requested additional 
time to implement system changes should the Commission decide to act.  All who commented requested a 
transitional period after the Commission issued rules to implement system changes, requesting anywhere 
from 12 to 15 months as a grace period.
230
  
77. Discussion.  These rules will become effective six (6) months after OMB approval of this 
information collection, representing a balance between industry’s needs to adequately prepare for these 
reporting requirements and the Commission’s need to obtain timely situational awareness of the 
operational status of the nation’s submarine cable infrastructure. As the incident in the CNMI has shown, 
the Commission cannot continue to wait for licensees to take advantage of the current voluntary approach.  
Yet, we find that a six month extension is warranted to allow those providers who did not previously 
report such outages to develop processes for doing so.  We also recognize that consortium members may 
need additional time to determine reporting structures.  We do not believe extending the rule 
implementation date beyond six months from OMB approval is warranted because of the significant 
                                                     
226
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10507, para. 41 & n.71; OMB Control Number 3060-1116 and 
Supporting Statement at 6.
227
47 U.S.C. §151.
228
See e.g., Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications et. al., PS 
Docket Nos. 15-80 and 11-82 et.al., Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order on 
Reconsideration, FCC 16-63, 37-38 at paras. 88-89 (May 26, 2016).
229
See e.g., Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications et. al., PS 
Docket Nos. 15-80 and 11-82 et.al., Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order on 
Reconsideration, FCC 16-63, 60-61 at paras. 145-148 (May 26, 2016).
230
See AT&T Comments at 7 (requesting 15 months from the effective date of the final order for implementation); 
NASCA Comments at 35 (requesting one year from OMB approval for implementation); Submarine Cable Coalition 
Reply Comments at 6 (requesting 12-15 months as a transition period).  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
29
adjustments to the proposed rules to add in flexibility and clarify responsibilities.  Additionally, 
commenters have stated that many providers are already providing some level of notifications in the event 
of an outage.
231
  These entities should not need longer than six months from the time of OMB approval to 
adapt their previous reporting system to the one described herein. 
B. Interagency Coordination
78. Background.  We observed in the Notice that the installation of submarine cable systems 
involves authorizations or permits from a number of federal and state agencies.
232
  We sought comment 
on the submarine cable deployment processes generally, and requested any information concerning, for 
example, burdensome regulations or other issues that may impede rapid deployment and maintenance of
undersea cables.
233
  We also took note of CSRIC’s position that “[t]he FCC and submarine cable operators 
should work with other U.S. Government agencies and other stakeholders to consult with and among each 
other at the earliest possible time to address spatial requirements for submarine cables and their 
relationship to other proposed marine activities and infrastructure.”
234
  We also sought comment on 
whether there are any actions we can take or steps we can encourage other agencies to take.
235
79. Commenters generally support efforts by the Commission to serve as a facilitator to 
increase coordination among the various U.S. Government agencies and stakeholders.  Verizon has 
proposed that the Commission should facilitate improved coordination among Federal agencies instead of 
adopting a mandatory reporting requirement.
236
  NASCA emphasizes the need for a centralized system to 
facilitate submarine cable deployment and contact information.
237
  NASCA states that it “welcomes the 
Commission’s proposal to develop and improve interagency coordination processes. . . ”
238
NASCA 
identified the Commission as “best positioned to serve as a single point of contact for various 
governmental agencies with respect to information about installed and planned submarine cable 
systems.”
239
NASCA asserts that this facilitator function will help to streamline permitting and enhance 
submarine cable protection initiatives.
240
80. Discussion.  In the Notice, we directed the International Bureau, in coordination with the 
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, to “reach out to relevant government agencies, under its 
                                                     
231
See NASCA Comments at 6 (“Other NASCA members that do not report in UCIS already report certain 
submarine cable faults in NORS or in the National Coordinating Center for Communications (‘NCC’) of the 
Department of Homeland Security.”).
232
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10509, para 45 (citing CSRIC IV Report at 21-22).
233
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10509, para 46.
234
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10509, para 46 (citing CSRIC IV Report at 57).
235
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10509, para 46.
236
Verizon Reply at 1-2.  See also Docomo Reply at 6. 
237
NASCA Comments at 37.  NASCA states that by undertaking this role, the Commission “would largely 
formalize an informational role that it already plays in many respects.”  NASCA Comments at 41.  NASCA also 
indicates that the Commission could “draw greater attention to existing industry resources, such as NASCA’s online 
mapping tool, which provides extensive location data and contact information for installed submarine cables.”  
NASCA Comments at 41.  
238
NASCA Comments at 37.
239
NASCA Comments at 41.  See also AT&T Comments at 23(stating that “the Commission is well-placed as the 
primary regulator of submarine cables to play a leading role in promoting the need for improved measures and 
processes to protect this critical infrastructure among other federal, state and local government agencies.”).
240
Letter from Kent Bressie, Counsel, NASCA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 15-206, at 3 
(filed Feb. 17, 2016).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
30
existing delegated authority,
241
” to “develop and improve interagency coordination processes and best 
practices vis-à-vis submarine cable deployment activities and related permits and authorizations to 
increase transparency and information sharing among the government agencies, cable licensees, and other 
stakeholders.”
242
  As discussed above, commenters who commented on interagency coordination support 
our proposed approach in the Notice and state that as the primary regulator of submarine cables, the 
Commission should serve as a facilitator and take a leading role in promoting the need for improved 
measures and processes to protect this critical infrastructure among other federal, state and local 
government agencies.
243
  We note that the Bureaus have met with several of the stakeholders since the 
Submarine Cable Outage Notice was adopted and that work on this matter is ongoing.
244
  We agree with 
commenters’ that interagency coordination is very important to protect submarine cable infrastructure.  
To this end, the International Bureau, in coordination with the Public Safety and Homeland Security 
Bureau, will continue to lead interagency coordination efforts to help increase transparency and 
information sharing among the government agencies, cable licensees, and other stakeholders and promote 
improved interagency coordination processes to mitigate threats to undersea cables and facilitate new 
projects to improve geographic diversity.  
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis
1. Potential Costs of Compliance
81. Background.  In the Notice, we estimated that the total annual burden will be $8,000 for 
the entire industry once the licensees have set up adequate reporting processes.
245
  To derive this annual 
burden, we estimated that there will be 50 reportable events, a conservative estimate based upon reports 
estimating 100-200 incidents requiring repair each year globally, the majority of which appear to have 
occurred on cables not directly connected to the United States.
246
  In addition, based on our experience 
with NORS, we estimated that reporting the Notification will require 15 minutes to complete, the Interim 
Report will require 45 minutes to complete, and the final report will require one hour to complete, for a 
total of two hours per reportable event.  At an assumed labor cost of $80/hour, and two hours for each of 
the 50 reporting cycles, the total cost of compliance would be $8,000.
247
  We also recognized that there 
are costs of implementation and sought comment on what those may be, including the extent to which our 
reporting required covered entities to provide information beyond which they were already collecting.
248
Similarly, we sought comment on whether the Notice’s proposed Responsible Licensee system affected 
the costs of compliance, both in the short term (factoring in inter-licensee negotiations) and long-term 
(alleviating the need for many licensees on a consortium cable to establish new reporting systems).
249
  We 
sought comment on all aspects of these proposed analysis and received a number of comments.
82. NASCA states that the Commission failed to account for numerous costs of compliance 
and is therefore inconsistent with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (“PRA”), codified at 44 U.S.C. 
                                                     
241
47 C.F.R. § 0.51(c), (f).
242
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10509, para. 47.
243
See e.g., NASCA Comments at 41. See also AT&T Comments at 23.
244
Letter from Kent Bressie, Counsel, NASCA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 15-206, at 1 
(filed Feb. 17, 2016).
245
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10508, para. 44.
246
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10508, paras. 43-44 & nn.80-81
247
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10508, para. 44.
248
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10508, para. 44.
249
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10508-09, para. 44.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
31
§§ 3501-22.
250
  First, NASCA states that the Commission should account for the costs of reviewing and 
understanding instructions associated with new reporting requirements, estimating that could range from 
$200 to $5,500 per operator based on previous experience.
251
  Second, NASCA advises that the 
Commission did not adequately account for the costs of acquiring, installing, and using technology and 
systems and establishing new policies and procedures.
252
  NASCA details that new software and training 
would be required in even the most basic ownership structure but the unique ownership nature of 
consortium submarine cables would require significant consultation amongst the members of the 
consortium, adding unaccounted expense.
253
  NASCA notes that the Notice’s proposed joint and several 
liability for the Responsible Licensee system makes these consultations all the more necessary and 
detailed.
254
  Third, NASCA argues that the Notice did not adequately account for coordination the data 
necessary for the reports.
255
  Fourth, NASCA states that the Notice’s actual estimates of time necessary to 
complete the reports are inaccurate, failing to account for the significant review in a consortium cable 
setting, particularly where licensees are exposed to joint and several liability.
256
  Fifth, NASCA states that 
the Commission should revise its burden analysis to account for adjusting the existing ways of doing 
business, particularly as a “number of submarine cable operators (including some NASCA members) 
currently report outages on submarine cable facilities using the NORS system, rather than UCIS, and to 
DHS’s NCC.”
257
Finally, NASCA states that the Commission’s assumed $80/hour labor rate 
“significantly underestimates” the actual labor costs required.
258
  NASCA also submits that the proposed 
reporting requirements fail to satisfy OMB criteria for new information collections because the proposals 
are not the least burdensome way to collect information, duplicate other federal rules, and have no 
practical utility.
259
  Other commenters echo these comments and reflect similar concerns.
260
83. Others focus on how the details of the proposed regulations would add costs.  AT&T 
states that “the required expense to implement and operate the necessary procedures and technology to 
make these reports would likely be hundreds of times greater than the estimate set forth in the Notice of 
$8000 per year for the entire industry.”
261
  While the Submarine Cable Coalition states that the rules, as 
proposed, would generate hundreds of reports per system per year, multiples higher than our estimated 50 
reportable events per year.
262
Similarly NASCA states that the proposed rules would capture “mundane” 
events unless modified, which would also presumably drive up the costs of compliance.
263
                                                     
250
NASCA Comments at 23-28.
251
NASCA Comments at 24-25.
252
NASCA Comments at 25.
253
NASCA Comments at 25-26.
254
NASCA Comments at 26.
255
NASCA Comments at 26-27.  NASCA believes in order to monitor for 50 percent or more loss of a cable’s 
capacity, its members would need to implement new tools and methods for data collection.  Id. at 11.
256
NASCA Comments at 27.
257
NASCA Comments at 28.  
258
NASCA Comments at 28 (providing data on the billing rates for law firm partners and associates as data points). 
259
NASCA Comments at 29-30.
260
The Submarine Cable Coalition Reply at 3-4 (arguing that the Commission should revised its cost estimate in line 
with NASCA’s recommendation); Latam Telecommunications Ex Parte at 2; Quintillion Comments at 1.
261
AT&T Appendix A at 7.
262
Submarine Cable Coalition Comments at 3. 
263
NASCA Comments at 10.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
32
84. Discussion.  The record makes clear that there are additional costs, beyond the Notice’s 
initial $8,000 cost estimate (premised upon the costs of filing the three versions of outage reports for 50 
events) that should be factored into our total estimate of the costs of the regulations we enact today.  Our 
finding that this cost figure should be adjusted, however, is not a result of the Notice failing to account for 
costs; instead the Notice affirmatively sought comment on items such as implementation costs, the extent 
to which the information required is not available in the normal course of business, and the costs of inter-
licensee negotiations that are unique to consortium submarine cables.
264
  In some instances commenters 
attempted to provide concrete cost estimates,
265
but in most other instances commenters simply noted that 
the costs would be significant due to the nature of the proposed reporting requirements.
266
  
85. As an initial matter, we note that many of the proposals that commenters claimed would 
inflate the costs have been revised or clarified in an effort to reduce burdens in response to the record.  
For example, we limited the reporting on issues related to terminal-equipment to those events lasting four 
hours, and thus presumably eliminated many of the “mundane” events from the reporting requirement, 
thereby reducing compliance costs.
267
  We extended the proposed reporting timeframes for the 
Notification and the Interim Report while clarifying that reports are due within a set period from when the 
licensee determines that the event is reportable, not from when the event itself becomes reportable.
268
  In 
this way, we alleviate the concerns of those that claim they would have to update their entire network 
monitoring system in order to comply.
269
  We also allowed for best estimate reporting on many of the 
fields that commenters indicated would be costly to identify with precision on a timely basis.
270
  We have 
taken the Responsible Licensee system, which was explicitly designed to mitigate burdens by having only 
one licensee per submarine cable report on behalf of other licensees on that cable, and allowed licensees 
not to use that system if they find it burdensome.
271
86. Thus, while we acknowledge that $8,000 figure may not represent the total cost of 
compliance and that upward adjustments should be made, the record on industry costs does not speak 
with specificity or even generalities to the requirements we have enacted given our record-based 
modifications.  Accordingly, we instead recognize the OMB-approved 2014 UCIS collection of 
$305,000.
272
  We note that the costs associated with UCIS also included costs beyond those which we 
now require.  UCIS asked licensees to provide four categories of information for each submarine cable 
with a cable landing in the United States:  (1) a terrestrial route map; (2) a location spreadsheet; (3) a 
general description of restoration plans in the event of an incident; and (4) system restoration messages.
273
  
As we described in the Notice, “the first three categories are static insofar as the route, the geographic 
coordinates (i.e., location), and restoration plans change infrequently.  Information provided in the fourth 
                                                     
264
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10508-09, para. 44.
265
See NASCA at 24 (estimating $200-$5,500 compliance costs to review and understand new reporting 
instructions.).
266
See supra paras. 83-84.
267
See supra paras. 23, 84.
268
See supra para. 48.
269
See, e.g., AT&T Appendix A at 7.
270
See supra paras. 40-41, 50-51, 53, 55.
271
See supra paras. 38-39.
272
OMB Control Number 3060-1116, ICR Reference No. 201409-3060-017, FCC Supporting Statement at 8 (2014).
273
FCC, Notice of Public Information Collection(s) Being Submitted for Review to the Office of Management and 
Budget, 73 Fed. Reg. 23460-61 (April 30, 2008) (OMB Public Information Collection).  Notice of Office of 
Management and Budget Action, “Request for a new OMB Control Number” (for Submarine Cable Reporting) (rel. 
Apr. 16, 2008), “Supporting Statement” at 1 (OMB Control Number 3060-1116 and Supporting Statement).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
33
category is dynamic, insofar as such messages should be updated after an incident and during the repair 
process.”
274
It is the fourth category of reporting system restoration messages that is directly analogous to 
the outage reporting requirements we enact.  
87. The costs of UCIS associated with the three “static” categories represented $183,000 of 
the $305,000 total, with the system restoration messages accounting for $122,000 in reporting costs 
annually for the industry.
275
If we increased this figure by 25 percent (to account for moving from 40 to 
50 hours reporting per licensee per year),
276
we would arrive at a total of approximately $152,500 for an 
analogous reporting requirement.  We find this to be a credible annual burden estimate based on the 
record and analogous UCIS processes, as confirmed by industry.  Moreover, even if expected costs were 
to include all four elements of the UCIS collection at a total cost of $335,500, we would still, as discussed 
below, consider this a minimal cost in comparison to the potential benefits from our improved ability to 
monitor outages on cables that are so vital to both our economy and national security.
88. Many of NASCA’s concerns are directly related to the Paperwork Reduction Act and 
OMB approval.
277
  As noted below,
278
we seek comment on Paperwork Reduction Act implications 
separately, however NASCA’s comments will inform our burden estimates.  We disagree with NASCA’s 
statement that these requirements “fail[] to satisfy OMB criteria for new information collection” for the 
reasons outlined above.
279
  As described above, we have taken numerous steps to ensure that our 
collection reduces the burdens on licensees over the Notice’s original proposal,
280
and we have established 
that this information collection is “necessary for the proper performance of the agency’s functions.”
281
  
We also disagree with NASCA’s statement that these rules duplicate other recordkeeping obligations and 
have no practical utility.
282
  NASCA itself states that “many submarine cable operators already report” 
outage-type information to DHS’s NCC.
283
  It is apparent from NASCA’s statement that there is no 
common requirement that all submarine cable licensees report on outages in any fashion, let alone in a 
common place and in a uniform manner that allows for systematic analysis and provides a holistic view of 
the operational status of submarine cable infrastructure.  The Commission’s own experience with 
licensees failing to report demonstrates that status quo has proven inadequate to meeting the 
Commission’s needs. 
                                                     
274
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10497, para. 12.
275
OMB Control Number 3060-1116, ICR Reference No. 201409-3060-017, FCC Supporting Statement at 8 (2014). 
The Supporting Statement estimates that this figure represents the annual recurring burden; it does not recognize 
one-time costs.  
276
OMB Control Number 3060-1116, ICR Reference No. 201409-3060-017, FCC Supporting Statement at 8 (2014). 
This $122,000 annual cost estimate was derived from use of two conservative assumptions. First, that a single set of 
outage reports would involve as many as 40 hours, rather than only the two hours that we estimate above. Second, 
that all 61 cables licensed in 2014 would experience an outage every year. (We used the number of licensed cables,
rather than the number of cable licensees, because it is common for multiple licensees to operate on a single cable, 
and past experience indicates that consortia (or multiple licensees operating on a single cable) generally designate 
only one licensee to prepare and file the report.) We then used an estimated labor rate of $50 rather than $80 per 
hour, to be consistent with the 2014 OMB Supporting Statement’s UCIS cost estimate. Thus, 40 x 61 x $50 = 
$122,000.
277
See infra at para. 82, NASCA Comments at 23-28.
278
See infra para. 98.  
279
See supra at para. 82, NASCA Comments at 29-30.  
280
See supra para. 85.
281
See supra section II. 
282
NASCA Comments at 30. 
283
NASCA Comments at 30 (emphasis added). 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
34
2. Public Interest Benefits
89. Background.  The Notice tentatively concluded that “the benefits to be gained from this 
new reporting regime will substantially outweigh any costs to providers.”
284
  We sought comment on this 
conclusion.
90. The Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands, having experienced the effects of 
a submarine cable outage and the resultant 911 outage, “strongly recommend[s] that the FCC require 
submarine cable operators to report outages . . . .”
285
  AT&T supports our objectives of remaining advised 
of submarine cable outages and receiving the “information necessary to understand the nature of the 
damage and potential impacts on critical U.S. economic sectors, national security and other vital 
interests.”
286
  Docomo summarizes the record by noting that “[w]ith few exceptions, most commenters do 
not object to a requirement that submarine cable operators report network outages, although they take 
issue with some aspects of the Commission's proposed rules.”
287
  Docomo further states that our rules will 
“create additional incentives and opportunities for submarine cable operators to implement measures to 
protect against outages and to remedy any outages promptly,”
288
and moreover a reporting requirement 
would “help the industry develop best practices in addressing outages,” and “ensure that operators of 
undersea cable systems collect and report information about system outages and planned repairs.”
289
Those that do object generally do so on the basis that “the reporting requirements require modification in 
order to be consistent with the technical and operational realities of the submarine cable industry.”
290
  
Still, some commenters claim that the proposal “while well-intentioned, would be needlessly burdensome 
without corresponding policy benefits and unworkable as a practical matter.”
291
91. Discussion.  We find that, on balance, the record reflects support for our conclusion. We 
continue to find that the relative concentration of submarine cables serving as conduits for traffic to and 
from the United States render the Commission’s situational awareness and ability to facilitate 
communications alternatives not only beneficial, but vital to the public interest.  These submarine cables 
are the primary conduit for connectivity between the contiguous United States and Alaska, Hawaii, 
American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  They also 
carry 95 percent of U.S. international communications, with the potential for significant impacts on 
national security and the economy.
292
  In some circumstances, the public welfare cost of outage of such 
communications could be extremely high, as lives and tremendous financial interests are at stake.  It is 
precisely because there is a very substantial public interest in the submarine cables that the Commission 
has authority to license the use of submarine cables and to condition the use of those lines.  Simply put, 
there is too much riding on these cables for the Commission to be less than fully aware about the status of 
these crucial lines of communication.
                                                     
284
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10507, para. 42.
285
Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands Comments at 2.
286
AT&T Comments at 1. 
287
Docomo Reply at 1. 
288
Docomo Reply at 3.
289
Docomo Ex parte at 1-2 (stating that “even if such information is considered confidential for purposes of the 
Commission’s outage reporting rules, operators would be more readily able to keep system users informed of the 
extent of the outage and associated repair efforts”).
290
Submarine Cable Coalition Reply at 1.
291
NASCA Comments at 1.  
292
See supra at paras. 1, 3, 8, 12-13, 19, 30, 88, 90 (discussing importance of submarine cables to the nation’s 
national security and economy).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
35
92. We find that the anticipated benefits of the rules that we adopt today clearly outweigh the 
costs to providers, even with the adjustments made above.
293
  When the Commission adopted its original 
part 4 rules, it observed that previous outage reports required of wireline carriers enabled it to initiate 
investigations and, when appropriate, take corrective action with respect to certain carriers.
294
  The 
Commission explained that, “[e]nsuring that the United States has reliable communications requires us to 
obtain information about communications disruptions and their causes to prevent future disruptions that 
could otherwise occur from similar causes, as well as to facilitate the use of alternative communications 
facilities while the disrupted facilities are being restored.”
295
  This situation was borne out when the 
Commission was hampered in its ability to respond to the CNMI outage due to delayed situational 
awareness.
296
  Based on the record, we conclude that it is entirely appropriate and in the public interest for 
this agency to systematize, coordinate, review and analyze outage reports from various sources across the 
industry because this will help ensure that best practices will be identified and shared and recurring 
problems can be eliminated or mitigated.  The Commission’s improved situational awareness will help 
ensure that licensees are consistently and appropriately acting to ensure the availability of submarine 
cable service, which has direct benefits to public safety and the national defense.
D. Legal Authority
93. Background.  We observed in the Notice, that the Cable Landing License Act
297
and 
Executive Order 10530
298
provide the Commission with authority to grant, withhold, condition and revoke
submarine cable landing licenses.
299
  In concert, the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 
provide that the Commission may place conditions on the grant of a submarine cable landing license in 
order to “assure just and reasonable rates and service in the operation and use of cables so licensed.”
300
  
We stated in the Notice that “‘just and reasonable service’ entails assurance that the cable infrastructure 
will be reasonably available.”
301
  We also observed that “availability of service is essential given that 
submarine cables carry 95 percent of international communications traffic in and out of the United States 
and are the primary means of connectivity for numerous U.S. states and territories.”
302
  We also expressed 
our view in the Notice that submarine cable connectivity plays a vital role in the nation’s security and 
                                                     
293
See supra at paras. 84-88. 
294
2004 Part 4 Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 16837, para. 12.
295
2004 Part 4 Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 16837, para. 12.
296
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10500, para. 22.
297
Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 34-39.
298
Executive Order 10530.
299
See Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10509-10510, para. 48.  In acting upon applications for such 
licenses, the Commission seeks the approval of the U.S. Department of State.  Executive Order 10530, § 5(a).  
Pursuant to its authority, the Commission has adopted rules governing submarine cable service at Sections 1.767 and 
1.768 of the Commission’s rules. 47 CFR §§ 1.767, 1.768. The Cable Landing License Act does not apply to cables 
that lie wholly within the continental United States.  See 47 U.S.C. § 34.
300
See Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10509-10510, para. 48.  See also 47 U.S.C. § 35.  The 
Commission most recently used its authority under the Cable Landing License Act as the basis for adopting 
international circuit data reporting requirements for submarine cable landing licensees.  Part 43 Second Report and 
Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 606, para. 104.
301
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10510, para. 48.  
302
See Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10492-10493, paras. 1-2. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
36
economy,
303
and that the Act and Executive Order authorize the Commission to withhold or revoke a 
cable landing license when doing so would promote the security of the United States.
304
  
94. We recognize that one commenter questioned the Commission’s legal authority to 
implement the new reporting requirements.  NASCA asserts that the Commission did not adequately 
explain how the proposed reporting requirements would effectuate its statutory obligations of promoting 
the public interest and our nation’s economic and national security.
305
  In addition, NASCA argues that 
the two general purposes of the Communications Act that the Commission cited in the Notice – namely, 
to enable “national defense” and “promot[e] safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio 
communication” – do not authorize the Commission to regulate service restoration and repair of undersea 
cables.
306
  NASCA further asserts that neither the Act nor the Executive Order authorize the Commission 
to take a role in restoration and repair of undersea cables.
307
95. Discussion.  We disagree with NASCA and find that the Commission in fact possesses 
ample authority to regulate reporting as to the restoration and repair of undersea cables and effects on the 
related facilities licensed by the Commission.  NASCA appears to misunderstand our recitation and 
reliance on legal authority.  The Commission is instituting a uniform and tailored system of accountability 
designed to ensure that the licenses granted to submarine cable licensees are used to supply “just and 
reasonable . . . service in the operation and use of cables so licensed[,]” and we have explained why our 
role is critical here where the communications facilities at issue bear on national security and the 
economy and why the existing voluntary regime fails to adequately inform that role.
308
  In other words, 
the reporting requirements are designed to inform our understanding of whether the facilities that the 
Commission has licensed are working.  Although our intent is to defer to licensees to institute the 
necessary repairs to their facilities and consider them to have adequate incentive to do so such that our 
direct involvement seems unwarranted at this time, it could be that enhancing our situational awareness 
will have the added benefit of improving licensees’ broader understanding of outage events.  The main 
goal of our requirements, however, is to help ensure that submarine cable service will be reasonably 
available. 
96. As explained above, availability of service is essential given that submarine cables carry 
at least 95 percent of international communications traffic in and out of the United States and are the 
primary means of connectivity for numerous U.S. states and territories.
309
  As a result, submarine cable 
connectivity plays a vital role in the nation’s security and economy.  Accordingly, we conclude that that 
the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order provide the Commission with ample authority to 
adopt the outage reporting requirements and compliance obligations as proposed in the Notice and as 
adopted today, and it is critical that we exercise it.
310
                                                     
303
See Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10509-10510, para. 48.  
304
Submarine Cable Outage Notice, 30 FCC Rcd at 10510, para. 48 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 35).  
305
NASCA Comments at 6-7.
306
NASCA Comments at 9.
307
NASCA Comments at 9.
308
See 47 U.S.C. § 35; supra at paras. 1, 3, 8, 12-13, 19, 30, 88, 90.
309
See discussion supra Sec. IV.D. 
310
47 U.S.C. § 35; 47 C.F.R. § 1.767(g)(1)(i).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
37
V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
97. Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended,
311
the Commission’s 
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) relating to this Report and Order is attached as Appendix 
C.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
98. This document contains new information collection requirements subject to the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. It will be submitted to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for review under Section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, the general public, 
and other Federal agencies are invited to comment on the new or modified information collection 
requirements contained in this proceeding. 
99. In addition, we note that pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 
Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we previously sought specific comment on how the 
Commission might further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with 
fewer than 25 employees.  In this present document, we have assessed the effects of the new rules adopted 
herein, which require submarine cable licensees to report when they experience outages of certain 
durations and causes, on small business concerns and find that the rules adopted here minimize the 
information collection burden on such entities.  
C. Congressional Review Act
100. The Commission will send a copy of this Report & Order to Congress and the 
Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
VI. ORDERING CLAUSES
101. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i)-(j) & (o), and pursuant to the Cable 
Landing License Act of 1921, 47 U.S.C. §§ 34-39 and 3 U.S.C. § 301 that this Report and Order in GN 
Docket No. 15-206 IS ADOPTED.
102. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that parts 1 and 4 of the Commission’s rules ARE 
AMENDED as set forth in Appendix B. 
103. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Report and Order SHALL BE effective six months 
after approval of the Office of Management and Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act. 
104. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission’s Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, SHALL SEND a copy of this Report and Order, including 
the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
                                                     
311
See 5 U.S.C. § 604.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
38
APPENDIX A
List of filers in GN Docket 15-206
AT&T Services Inc.
Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands
Docomo Pacific, Inc.
James Brooks
Latam Telecommunications, LLC
North American Submarine Cable Coalition (NASCA)
PC Landing Corp.
Quintillion
Submarine Cable Coalition
Telstra 
The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC)
Verizon
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
39
APPENDIX B
Final Rules
Parts 1 and 4 of the Commission’s Rules, 47 C.F.R. parts 1 and 4, are amended as follows:  
PART 1 – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
1. The authority for Part 1 is revised to read as follows:
Authority:  47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 155, 157, 225, 303(r), 309, 1403, 1404, 1451, and 1452.  
2. Section 1.767 is amended by adding new paragraph (g)(15), revising paragraph (n) and adding 
new paragraph (o) to read as follows:
§ 1.767 Cable landing licenses.
* * * * *
(g) * * * 
(15) Licensees shall file submarine cable outage reports as required in part 4 of this Title.  
* * * * *
(n)(1)  With the exception of submarine cable outage reports, and subject to the availability of electronic 
forms, all applications and notifications described in this section must be filed electronically through the 
International Bureau Filing System (IBFS). A list of forms that are available for electronic filing can be 
found on the IBFS homepage. For information on electronic filing requirements, see Part 1, subpart Y, 
and the IBFS homepage at http://www.fcc.gov/ibfs. See also §§ 63.20 and 63.53 of this chapter.
(2) Submarine cable outage reports must be filed as set forth in part 4 of this Title.  
(o) Outage Reporting.  Licensees of a cable landing license granted prior to March 15, 2002 shall file 
submarine cable outage reports as required in part 4 of this Title. 
PART 4 – DISRUPTIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS 
3. The authority for part 4 is revised to read as follows:
Authority:  47 U.S.C. 34-39, 151, 154, 155, 157, 201, 251, 307, 316, 615a-1, 1302(a), and 1302(b); 5 
U.S.C. 301, and Executive Order no. 10530.  
4. Section 4.1 is amended by designating the current Section 4.1 as paragraph (a), and adding 
paragraphs (b) and (c) to read as follows:
§ 4.1 Scope, basis, and purpose. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
40
(a) * * * 
(b) The definitions, criteria, and reporting requirements set forth in Sections 4.2 through 4.13 of this part 
are applicable to the communications providers defined in Section 4.3 of this part. 
(c) The definitions, criteria, and reporting requirements set forth in Section 4.15 of this part are applicable 
to submarine cable providers who have been licensed pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 34-39.  
5. Revise part 4 by adding Section 4.15, to read as follows:
§ 4.15 Submarine Cable Outage Reporting
(a) Definitions
(1)  For purposes of this section, “outage” is defined as a failure or significant degradation in the 
performance of a licensee’s cable service regardless of whether the traffic can be re-routed to an 
alternate path. 
(2) An “outage” requires reporting under this section when there is:
(i) An outage, including those caused by planned maintenance, of a portion of submarine 
cable system between submarine line terminal equipment (SLTE) at one end of the 
system and SLTE at another end of the system for more than 30 minutes; or  
(ii) The loss of any fiber pair, including losses due to terminal equipment, on a cable 
segment for four hours or more, regardless of the number of fiber pairs that comprise the 
total capacity of the cable segment.  
(b) Outage Reporting
(1)  For each outage that requires reporting under this section, the licensee (or Responsible 
Licensee as designated by a Consortium) shall provide the Commission with a Notification, 
Interim Report (subject to the limitations on planned outages in Section 4.15(b)(2)(iii)), and a 
Final Outage Report.
(i)  For a submarine cable that is jointly owned and operated by multiple licensees, the 
licensees of that cable may designate a Responsible Licensee that files outage reports 
under this rule on behalf of all licensees on the affected cable.
(ii) Licensees opting to designate a Responsible Licensee must jointly notify the Chief of 
the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau’s Cybersecurity and Communications 
Reliability Division of this decision in writing. Such notification shall include the name 
of the submarine cable at issue; and contact information for all licensees on the 
submarine cable at issue, including the Responsible Licensee. 
(2)  Notification, Interim, and Final Outage Reports shall be submitted by a person authorized by 
the licensee to submit such reports to the Commission. 
(i) The person submitting the Final Outage Report to the Commission shall also be 
authorized by the licensee to legally bind the provider to the truth, completeness, and
accuracy of the information contained in the report. Each Final report shall be attested by 
the person submitting the report that he/she has read the report prior to submitting it and 
on oath deposes and states that the information contained therein is true, correct, and 
accurate to the best of his/her knowledge and belief and that the licensee on oath deposes 
and states that this information is true, complete, and accurate. 
(ii) The Notification is due within 480 minutes (8 hours) of the time of determining that 
an event is reportable for the first three years from the effective date of these rules.  After 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
41
three years from the effective date of the rules, Notifications shall be due within 240 
minutes (4 hours).  The Notification shall be submitted in good faith.  Licensees shall 
provide: the name of the reporting entity; the name of the cable and a list of all licensees 
for that cable; the date and time of onset of the outage, if known (for planned events, this 
is the estimated start time/date of the repair); a brief description of the event, including 
root cause if known; nearest cable landing station; best estimate of approximate location 
of the event, if known (expressed in either nautical miles and the direction from the 
nearest cable landing station or in latitude and longitude coordinates); best estimate of the 
duration of the event, if known; whether the event is planned or unplanned; and a contact 
name, contact email address, and contact telephone number by which the Commission’s 
technical staff may contact the reporting entity. 
(iii)  The Interim Report is due within 24 hours of receiving the Plan of Work.  The 
Interim Report shall be submitted in good faith.  Licensees shall provide: the name of the 
reporting entity; the name of the cable; a brief description of the event, including root 
cause, if known; the date and time of onset of the outage; nearest cable landing station; 
approximate location of the event (expressed in either nautical miles and the direction 
from the nearest cable landing station or in latitude and longitude); best estimate of when 
the cable is scheduled to be repaired, including approximate arrival time and date of the 
repair ship, if applicable; a contact name, contact email address, and contact telephone 
number by which the Commission’s technical staff may contact the reporting entity. The 
Interim report is not required where the licensee has reported in the Notification that the 
outage at issue is a planned outage.
(iv)  The Final Outage Report is due seven (7) days after the repair is completed.  The 
Final Outage Report shall be submitted in food faith.  Licensees shall provide: the name 
of the reporting entity; the name of the cable; whether the outage was planned or 
unplanned; the date and time of onset of the outage (for planned events, this is the start 
date and time of the repair); a brief description of the event, including the root cause if 
known; nearest cable landing station; approximate location of the event (expressed either 
expressed in either nautical miles and the direction from the nearest cable landing station 
or in latitude and longitude coordinates); duration of the event, as defined in paragraph 
4.15(a)(2) of this section; the restoration method; and a contact name, contact email 
address, and contact telephone number by which the Commission’s technical staff may 
contact the reporting entity. If any required information is unknown at the time of 
submission of the Final Report but later becomes known, licensees should amend their 
report to reflect this knowledge. The Final Report must also contain an attestation as 
described in paragraph 4.15(b)(2)(i) of this section.
(v) The Notification, Interim Report, and Final Outage Reports are to be submitted 
electronically to the Commission. “Submitted electronically” refers to submission of the 
information using Commission-approved Web-based outage report templates. If there 
are technical impediments to using the Web-based system during the Notification stage, 
then a written Notification to the Commission by e-mail to the Chief, Public Safety and 
Homeland Security Bureau is permitted; such Notification shall contain the information 
required. Electronic filing shall be effectuated in accordance with procedures that are 
specified by the Commission by public notice.
(c) Confidentiality. Reports filed under this part will be presumed to be confidential. Public access to 
reports filed under this part may be sought only pursuant to the procedures set forth in 47 C.F.R. §0.461. 
Notice of any requests for inspection of outage reports will be provided pursuant to 47 C.F.R. 0.461(d)(3).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
42
APPENDIX C
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA),
1
the 
Commission has prepared this Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) of the possible significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities by the requirements adopted in Report and 
Order.  Written public comments are requested on this FRFA.  Comments must be identified as responses 
to the FRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments set forth in the Federal Register upon 
publication of the Report and Order.  The Commission will send a copy of this Report and Order, 
including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA).
2
  
In addition, the Report and Order and FRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal 
Register.
3
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
2. We adopt measures to improve the utility and effectiveness of the current scheme for 
receiving information on submarine cable outages, with the ultimate goal of enhancing both our overall 
understanding of submarine cable system status and our knowledge regarding specific outages disruptions 
and restoration efforts.  At present, the Commission receives information regarding the operational status 
of submarine cables on an ad hoc and voluntary basis.  We adopt the rules herein with the goal of 
improving the efficiency and utility of the reporting process for outages and repairs of the submarine 
cable network, which is a vital feature of the national and international communications infrastructure.  
3. The operational status of submarine cables carries commercial, economic, social, 
financial, and national security implications.  It is vital that the United States maintain a robust and secure 
communications network that can continue to provide service in spite of significant equipment or system 
failure, and submarine cables are an integral part of that network.  
B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response to the IRFA
4. There were no comments regarding the IRFA. 
C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration.
5. The SBA Chief Counsel did not file comments on the IRFA. 
D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Proposed 
Rules Will Apply
6. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, where feasible, an estimate of 
the number of small entities that may be affected by the proposals, if adopted.
4
  The RFA generally 
defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” “small 
organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.”
5
  In addition, the term “small business” has the 
                                                     
1
See 5 U.S.C. § 603.  The RFA, 5 U.S.C. § 601-12., has been amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121. tit. II, 110 Stat. 857.
2
See id. § 603(a).
3
See id.
4
Id. § 603(b)(3).
5
Id. § 601(6).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
43
same meaning as the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act.
6
  A small business 
concern is one that:  (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; 
and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business Administration (SBA).
7
7. The rules adopted in the Report and Order apply only to entities licensed to construct and 
operate submarine cables under the Cable Landing License Act.  The Report and Order requires only 
submarine cable licensees affected by a service outage to file outage reports with the Commission 
describing the outage and restoration.  The entities that the Report and Order requires to file reports are a 
mixture of both large and small entities.  The Commission has not developed a small business size 
standard directed specifically toward these entities.  However, as described below, these entities fit into 
larger categories for which the SBA has developed size standards that provide these facilities or services.  
8. Facilities-based Carriers.  Facilities-based providers of international telecommunications 
services would fall into the larger category of interexchange carriers.  Neither the Commission nor the 
SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for providers of interexchange services.  
The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers.
9. Wired Telecommunications Carriers.  This industry comprises establishments primarily 
engaged in operating and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure that they own 
and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video using wired telecommunications 
networks.  Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of technologies.  
Establishments in this industry use the wired telecommunications network facilities that they operate to
provide a variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP services; wired (cable) 
audio and video programming distribution; and wired broadband Internet services.  By exception, 
establishments providing satellite television distribution services using facilities and infrastructure that 
they operate are included in this industry.”
8
  In this category, the SBA deems a wired telecommunications 
carrier to be small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.
9
  Census data for 2007 shows 3,188 firms in this 
category.
10
Of these, 3,144 had fewer than 1,000 employees.  On this basis, the Commission estimates that 
a substantial majority of the providers of wired telecommunications carriers are small.
11
10. In the 2009 annual traffic and revenue report, 38 facilities-based and facilities-resale 
carriers reported approximately $5.8 billion in revenues from international message telephone service 
(IMTS).  Of these, three reported IMTS revenues of more than $1 billion, eight reported IMTS revenues 
of more than $100 million, 10 reported IMTS revenues of more than $50 million, 20 reported IMTS 
revenues of more than $10 million, 25 reported IMTS revenues of more than $5 million, and 30 reported 
                                                     
6
Id. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of “small-business concern” in the Small Business Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 632).  Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies “unless an agency, 
after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity for public 
comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of the agency and 
publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.”  
7
15 U.S.C. § 632.
8
U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 NAICS Definitions, 517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch= (last visited Jun. 2, 2016).
9
13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS Code 517110.
10
U.S. Census Bureau, American Fact Finder (2007), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_51SSSZ5&prodT
ype=table.
11
Id. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
44
IMTS revenues of more than $1 million.  Based solely on their IMTS revenues the majority of these 
carriers would be considered non-small entities under the SBA definition.
12
  
11. The 2009 traffic and revenue report also shows that 45 facilities-based and facilities-
resale carriers (including 14 who also reported IMTS revenues) reported $683 million for international 
private line services; of which four reported private line revenues of more than $50 million, 12 reported 
private line revenues of  more than $10 million, 30 reported revenues of more than $1 million, 34 reported 
private line revenues of more than $500,000; 41 reported revenues of more than $100,000, while 2 
reported revenues of less than $10,000. 
12. The 2009 traffic and revenue report also shows that seven carriers (including one that 
reported both IMTS and private line revenues, one that reported IMTS revenues and three that reported 
private line revenues) reported $50 million for international miscellaneous services, of which two 
reported miscellaneous services revenues of more than $1 million, one reported revenues of more than 
$500,000, two reported revenues of more than $200,000, one reported revenues of more than $50,000, 
while one reported revenues of less than $20,000.  Based on its miscellaneous services revenue, this one 
carrier with revenues of less than $20,000 would be considered a small business under the SBA 
definition.  Based on their private line revenues, most of these entities would be considered non-small 
entities under the SBA definition.  
13. Providers of International Telecommunications Transmission Facilities.  According to 
the 2012 Circuit-Status Report, 61 U.S. international facility-based carriers filed information pursuant to 
section 43.82.
13
  Some of these providers would fall within the category of Inter-exchange Carriers, some 
would fall within the category of Wired Telecommunications Carriers, while others may fall into the 
category of All Other Telecommunications. 
14. All Other Telecommunications. This industry comprises establishments primarily 
engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications 
telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes establishments primarily engaged in 
providing satellite terminal stations and associated facilities connected with one or more terrestrial 
systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving telecommunications from, 
satellite systems. Establishments providing Internet services or voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) 
services via client-supplied telecommunications connections are also included in this industry.
14
  The 
SBA has developed a small business size standard for All Other Telecommunications, which consists of 
all such firms with annual receipts of $ 32.5 million or less.
15
  For this category, Census Bureau data for 
2007 show that there were 2,383 firms that operated for the entire year, and of those firms, a total of 2,346 
had annual receipts less than $25 million.
16
  Consequently, we conclude that the majority of All Other 
Telecommunications firms can be considered small.
                                                     
12
See 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS Code at Subsector 517 – Telecommunications.
13
See International Bureau Releases 2013 Circuit Status Report for U.S. Facilities-Based International Carriers, (rel. 
July 16, 2015).  The report is available on the FCC website at http://www.fcc.gov/ib/pd/pf/csmanual.html.
14
U.S. Census Bureau, North American Industry Classification System: 2012 NAISC Definition 517919 All Other 
Telecommunications, http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited Jun. 16, 2016).
15
See 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517919.
16
U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 Economic Census of the United States, Table EC0751SSSZ4, Information: Subject 
Series - Establishment and Firm Size: Receipts Size of Firms for the United States: 2007 NAICS Code 517919, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_51SSSZ1&prodT
ype=table (last visited Jun. 16, 2016). 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
45
15. The Commission has not developed a small business size standard specifically for 
providers of interexchange services.  The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category 
Wired Telecommunications Carriers.  
16. Wired Telecommunications Carriers.  This industry comprises establishments primarily 
engaged in operating and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure that they own 
and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video using wired telecommunications 
networks.  Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of technologies.  
Establishments in this industry use the wired telecommunications network facilities that they operate to 
provide a variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP services; wired (cable) 
audio and video programming distribution; and wired broadband Internet services.  By exception, 
establishments providing satellite television distribution services using facilities and infrastructure that 
they operate are included in this industry.”
17
  In this category, the SBA deems a wired 
telecommunications carrier to be small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.
18
  Census data for 2007 shows 
3,188 firms in this category.
19
Of these, 3,144 had fewer than 1,000 employees.  On this basis, the 
Commission estimates that a substantial majority of the providers of wired telecommunications carriers 
are small.
20
17. Operators of Undersea Cable Systems.  The Report and Order adopts reporting 
requirements for submarine cable facilities in the event of an outage.  Neither the Commission nor the 
SBA has developed a size standard specifically for operators of undersea cables. Such entities would fall 
within the large category of Wired Telecommunications Carriers.  
18. Wired Telecommunications Carriers.  This industry comprises establishments primarily 
engaged in operating and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure that they own 
and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video using wired telecommunications 
networks.  Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of technologies.  
Establishments in this industry use the wired telecommunications network facilities that they operate to 
provide a variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP services; wired (cable) 
audio and video programming distribution; and wired broadband Internet services.  By exception, 
establishments providing satellite television distribution services using facilities and infrastructure that 
they operate are included in this industry.”
21
  In this category, the SBA deems a wired 
telecommunications carrier to be small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.
22
  Census data for 2007 shows 
3,188 firms in this category.
23
Of these, 3,144 had fewer than 1,000 employees.  On this basis, the 
                                                     
17
U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 NAICS Definitions, 517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch= (last visited Jun. 2, 2016).
18
13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS Code 517110.
19
U.S. Census Bureau, American Fact Finder (2007), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_51SSSZ5&prodT
ype=table.
20
Id. 
21
U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 NAICS Definitions, 517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch= (last visited Jun. 2, 2016).
22
13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS Code 517110.
23
U.S. Census Bureau, American Fact Finder (2007), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_51SSSZ5&prodT
ype=table.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
46
Commission estimates that a substantial majority of the providers of wired telecommunications carriers 
are small.
24
19. Operators of Non-Common Carrier International Transmission Facilities. Carriers that 
provide common carrier international transmission facilities over submarine cables are not required to 
report on outages, though the Report and Order seeks comment on whether such carriers should be 
required to provide outage reports.  Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business 
size standard specifically for providers of non-common carrier terrestrial facilities.  The operators of such 
terrestrial facilities would fall within the larger category of Wired Telecommunications Carriers.  
20. Wired Telecommunications Carriers.  This industry comprises establishments primarily 
engaged in operating and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure that they own 
and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video using wired telecommunications 
networks.  Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of technologies.  
Establishments in this industry use the wired telecommunications network facilities that they operate to 
provide a variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP services; wired (cable) 
audio and video programming distribution; and wired broadband Internet services.  By exception, 
establishments providing satellite television distribution services using facilities and infrastructure that 
they operate are included in this industry.”
25
  In this category, the SBA deems a wired 
telecommunications carrier to be small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.
26
  Census data for 2007 shows 
3,188 firms in this category.
27
Of these, 3,144 had fewer than 1,000 employees.  On this basis, the 
Commission estimates that a substantial majority of the providers of wired telecommunications carriers 
are small.
28
21. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers.  Because some of the international terrestrial 
facilities that are used to provide international telecommunications services may be owned by incumbent 
local exchange carriers, we have included small incumbent local exchange carriers in this present RFA 
analysis, to the extent that such local exchange carriers may operate such international facilities.  (Local 
exchange carriers along the U.S.-border with Mexico or Canada may have local facilities that cross the 
border.)  Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically 
for incumbent local exchange carriers.  The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category 
Wired Telecommunications Carriers.  
22. Wired Telecommunications Carriers.  This industry comprises establishments primarily 
engaged in operating and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure that they own 
and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video using wired telecommunications 
networks.  Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of technologies.  
Establishments in this industry use the wired telecommunications network facilities that they operate to 
provide a variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP services; wired (cable) 
audio and video programming distribution; and wired broadband Internet services.  By exception, 
establishments providing satellite television distribution services using facilities and infrastructure that 
                                                     
24
Id. 
25
U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 NAICS Definitions, 517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch= (last visited Jun. 2, 2016). 
26
13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS Code 517110.
27
U.S. Census Bureau, American Fact Finder (2007), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_51SSSZ5&prodT
ype=table.
28
Id. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
47
they operate are included in this industry.”
29
  In this category, the SBA deems a wired 
telecommunications carrier to be small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.
30
  Census data for 2007 shows 
3,188 firms in this category.
31
Of these, 3,144 had fewer than 1,000 employees.  On this basis, the 
Commission estimates that a substantial majority of the providers of wired telecommunications carriers 
are small.
32
23. As noted above, a “small business” under the RFA is one that, inter alia, meets the 
pertinent small business size standard (e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer 
employees), and “is not dominant in its field of operation.”
33
  The SBA’s Office of Advocacy contends 
that, for RFA purposes, small incumbent local exchange carriers are not dominant in their field of 
operation because any such dominance is not “national” in scope.
34
  Consequently, the Commission 
estimates that most providers of local exchange service are small entities that may be affected by the rules 
and policies adopted in the Report and Order.  We have therefore included small incumbent local 
exchange carriers in this RFA analysis, although we emphasize that this RFA action has no effect on 
Commission analysis and determinations in other, non-RFA contexts.  Thus under this category and the 
associated small business size standard, the majority of these incumbent local exchange service providers 
can be considered small providers.
35
E. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements
24. The Report and Order adopts outage reporting requirements for all submarine cable 
licensees.  An outage occurs when a licensee experiences an event in which (1) An outage related to 
damages or replacements of a portion of submarine cable system between the submarine line terminal 
equipment (SLTE) at one end of the system and the SLTE at another end of the system for more than 30 
minutes; or (2) there is a loss of any fiber pair, including losses due to terminal equipment, on a cable 
segment for four hours or more, regardless of the number of fiber pairs that comprise the total capacity of 
the cable segment.  After a triggering event, the reporting requirement consists of three filings, the 
Notification, an Interim Report for unplanned outages, and the Final Report, which provide the 
Commission important data to improve the Commission’s situational awareness on the operational status 
of submarine cables.  The production and transmission of these reports to the Commission may require 
the use of professionals such as attorneys, engineers, or accountants.  However, we conclude that such 
                                                     
29
U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 NAICS Definitions, 517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch= (last visited Jun. 2, 2016).
30
13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS Code 517110.
31
U.S. Census Bureau, American Fact Finder (2007), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_51SSSZ5&prodT
ype=table.
32
Id. 
33
15 U.S.C. § 632.
34
Letter from Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, SBA, to William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC (May 27, 
1999).  The Small Business Act contains a definition of “small-business concern,” which the RFA incorporates into 
its own definition of “small business.”  See 15 U.S.C. § 632(a) (Small Business Act); 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (RFA).  
SBA regulations interpret “small business concern” to include the concept of dominance on a national basis.  13 
C.F.R. § 121.102(b).  
35
U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, 2007 Economic Census, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_51SSSZ2&prodT
ype=table.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
48
reports will be based on information already within the reporting entity’s possession, and therefore these 
should be considered routine reports.
F. Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities, and 
Significant Alternatives Considered
25. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant, specifically small business, 
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach, which may include the following 
four alternatives (among others):  “(1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting 
requirements or timetables that take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the 
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for 
small entities; (3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an exemption from 
coverage or the rule, or any part thereof, for small entities.”
36
G. Federal Rules that May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict with the Proposed Rules
26. None.
                                                     
36
5 U.S.C. § 603 (c)(1)-(c)(4). 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
49
STATEMENT OF 
CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER
Re: Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables and Enhanced Submarine Cable Outage 
Data, GN Docket No. 15-206, Report and Order.
Our ability to serve the public and fulfill our responsibilities begins with being informed. To do 
our job right, we need the facts. While it’s our responsibility to promote the resiliency and reliability of 
our communications networks, when it comes to a key piece of those networks – submarine cables -- we 
have unacceptable gaps in understanding of outages and disruptions. With today’s order, we fix that.
Let’s start with a few baseline facts.
First, submarine cables are a vital part of our communications infrastructure – carrying virtually 
all voice and data traffic between the United States and the rest of the world. As a result, these cables are 
essential to America’s economic stability and national security.
Second, outage reporting systems are a proven tool for promoting network reliability. Other 
communications providers have long reported outages to the FCC through our mandatory Network 
Outage Reporting System (NORS). The data have enabled us to detect adverse outage trends and work 
with industry on solutions, monitor and assist restoration efforts, and coordinate with public safety 
officials and other affected third parties during crises.
Third, the information we receive regarding undersea cable disruptions is too limited and 
inconsistent to be useful. The record in this proceeding identified a series flaws with the current reporting 
system. For starters, it’s voluntary, which means we only receive inform on about 25 percent of undersea 
cables. It’s also ad hoc with no standardized guidelines, which means the information we receive is 
inconsistent and not necessarily revelatory about the root causes of problems.
To understand the problem, look at one recent example of how things currently work – or more 
appropriately – don’t work. 
In July 2015, a damaged submarine cable severed communications for thousands of residents and 
businesses on the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for three weeks. The outage affected 
phone, Internet, banking, credit card transactions, ATM withdrawals, and health care. The Commission 
did not receive information about the outage through the current voluntary reporting system, and the 
information we received through NORS was inadequate. The reports from terrestrial providers did not 
convey the very significant impact that “total communications isolation” had on consumers or the 
impacted communities, subsequent terrestrial reports did not convey accurate status of the submarine 
cable outage nor projected restoral and repair times.  It took open press news reports to allow staff to 
piece together what was happening, spurring FCC initiated calls to parties to gather information on what 
had occurred and organize mitigation options. Lack of timely situational awareness certainly hampered 
Commission efforts to monitor the outage, support restoration and development of interim options to 
mitigate consumer suffering. 
In the few months since we launched this proceeding, through media reports we learned of a 
Florida lightning strike hitting the U.S. terminus of a submarine cable disrupting communications 
between Florida and multiple locations in the Caribbean and an incident where cable connectivity 
between the U.S. territory of Guam and Australia was severed. These outages were not reported to the 
FCC through the existing voluntary system.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
50
Submarine cables are a key piece of our broader communications infrastructure. It simply 
doesn’t make sense that other providers must report network outages, while submarine cable operators do 
not. Today, we bring some common sense and regulatory parity to our outage reporting rules. 
The new rules will require submarine cable licensees to report major communications outages to 
the FCC, which other communications providers have done for more than a decade. Licensees will report 
service failures or the significant degradation of service, regardless whether the traffic can be re-routed.
In situations where traffic is rerouted over another cable or fiber pair, that doesn’t mean that the outage 
didn’t occur. It should be reported. If disruptions prevent a category of service like voice, that too is an 
outage to voice customers even if internet traffic is still up. Collecting information regarding the mode of 
failure is valuable, and maintaining an understanding of decrements to overall submarine cable capacity is 
an important National Security function which the FCC is uniquely suited to fulfill.
The Commission staff has made significant progress in improving interagency coordination 
processes to facilitate rapid maintenance and deployment of cables, identify non-cable seabed activity that 
may place submarine cables at risk. By promoting a diversity of submarine cable routes and providers, 
we can add resiliency and reliability to our communications systems. 
The rules we are adopting today will close reporting gaps, enable the Commission to keep 
apprised of the operating status of submarine cables, and help ensure that this vital communications 
infrastructure remains reliable. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
51
STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MIGNON L. CLYBURN
Re: Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables and Enhanced Submarine Cable Outage 
Data, GN Docket No. 15-206, Report and Order.
Few people realize just how vital submarine cables are when it comes to our nation’s 
communications infrastructure.  There are approximately 60 licensed undersea cables that connect the 
U.S. mainland to rest of the world, and today, these cables carry over 95% of all U.S.-international voice 
and data traffic.  Assuring the reliability and resiliency of this critical piece of our communications 
infrastructure is crucial to our nation’s security and economic well-being.  
Paramount to that task is putting in place rules that will improve the Commission’s situational 
awareness of the operating status of submarine cables by requiring licensees to report service outages.  
The reporting structure codified by today’s Order will enable the Commission to quickly identify 
troubling system trends and facilitate awareness of possible harmful activity early.  
But the rules adopted in the Order differ in important respects from those proposed in the 
underlying NPRM.  The Commission, in crafting the final rules, was mindful of the unique attributes of 
the submarine cable industry, as reflected in the record, and endeavored to provide more flexibility to 
licensees and reduce reporting burdens. 
One important refinement that I thank the Chairman for accepting is an extension of the 
notification timeline.  This Order requires the filing of a notification of an outage eight hours from the 
time a licensee determines that an outage is reportable, as opposed to the two hours proposed in the 
NPRM, and after a three year period, notifications will be required within four hours of that 
determination.
These refinements address industry concerns that staffing, time zone considerations, and language 
barriers would have made the originally proposed timeframe difficult to meet.  Nevertheless, it is 
imperative that the Commission receive notice about outages as soon as practicable, so to the extent 
licensees are able to provide notifications sooner than eight hours, I encourage them to do so.
Ensuring the reliability and resiliency of submarine cables is fundamental to the Commission’s 
statutory obligation to protect the nation’s communications networks, and we all appreciate the important 
role that the staff of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and International Bureau play in 
fulfilling that mission. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
52
STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER JESSICA ROSENWORCEL
Re: Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables and Enhanced Submarine Cable Outage 
Data, GN Docket No. 15-206, Report and Order.
There are roughly 300 submarine cables buried in the coldest and darkest depths of our oceans.  
We may not see them but we rely on them daily.  
Submarine cables are an essential part of the global economy.  They are responsible for $10 
trillion worth of transactional value every day.  That is more than triple what the United States spends on 
healthcare annually.  It’s greater than the Gross Domestic Product of Japan, Germany, and Australia—
combined.  It’s a big deal.  
Submarine cables are also critical for our national security.  They support military communication 
both at home and abroad.  Our troops depend on them and they help keep us safe.
But these cables are vulnerable to damage and attack—from natural disasters, aquatic vessels, sea 
life, and those who want to do us harm.  So we need to know when communications over these 
indispensable facilities are compromised.  
In the past, the Commission monitored submarine cable outages through voluntary reporting.  But 
this was an ad hoc system.  It had serious limitations.  The information we received was not standardized, 
not uniform, and not particularly useful.  Outages and disruptions went unreported—leaving us unable to 
identify how to prevent them.  
Today, we replace the makeshift practices of the past with a process to ensure that the 
Commission receives timely and consistent outage information.  I support this effort.  I believe it is 
consistent with the Cable Landing License Act.  I also believe we need to be open to recalibrating these 
policies over time—so we develop the information we need to protect these facilities—because modern 
life depends on them.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
53
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER AJIT PAI
Re: Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables and Enhanced Submarine Cable Outage 
Data, GN Docket No. 15-206, Report and Order.
On July 8, 2015, the undersea cable that served the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands failed.  It was damaged when a typhoon blew past the U.S. territory.  The outage left tens of 
thousands of residents in a communications blackout.  It prevented them from accessing the Internet, 
making credit card purchases, withdrawing money from ATMs, or even placing phone calls, including 
calls to 911.
Consumers suffered because the cable licensee had no backup plan.  It did not have a redundant 
pathway.  It did not automatically re-route the traffic.  And it did not even notify the FCC that it suffered 
a complete loss of communications.
Cable failures like this may be rare, but they are precisely the types of outages that the FCC 
should target in this proceeding.  We should focus on outages that impact consumers.  We should 
incentivize providers to set up and maintain redundant pathways.  And we should cut through the 
regulatory red tape that only makes it harder for providers to deploy, maintain, and repair undersea cables.  
These measures would help people stay connected and promote our economic and national security 
interests.
Unfortunately, today the FCC does none of this.  It simply stumbles down the same misguided 
trail it blazed last month when it revised another portion of our outage reporting rules.  Once again, the 
Commission refuses to focus on outages that actually affect consumers.  Instead, it mandates that 
companies file reports when there is no loss in communications.  Once again, it declines to request 
targeted outage information that would help us identify trends and threats.  Instead, it demands a haystack 
of paperwork that will only make it more difficult for us to find any needles.  Once again, the 
Commission decides not to encourage providers to construct facilities with automatic and built-in 
redundancies.  Instead, it penalizes those investments by requiring providers to file multiple reports every 
time they use a redundant pathway.  And once again, the Commission decides to divert resources away 
from critical repair and restoration efforts and toward needless paperwork.
Meanwhile, there are genuine problems with the undersea cable regime that we can and should 
solve.  Indeed, when we launched this rulemaking, I suggested that the NPRM seek input on how we can 
make it easier to deploy, restore, and maintain undersea cables.  Commenters responded in spades, 
identifying very specific and necessary reforms.  They identified the need for coordination among the 
many agencies that play a role in this space—including the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management, the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration.  Commenters explained that the government’s left hand often works at cross-purposes 
with its right:  For instance, one agency might authorize a dredging or hydrokinetic project without 
recognizing that an undersea cable lies right under it.  Commenters urged the FCC to operate as a point of 
contact—a clearinghouse for these efforts—and to enact other simple reforms plainly within our power.  
Indeed, the Commission’s advisory committee on communications security and reliability—CSRIC—
outlined these and a host of other steps the FCC should take to improve our undersea cable regime.
1
  But 
having been confronted with actual problems and real solutions, the Order simply says . . . we will keep 
thinking deep thoughts about all this.  But this promise is shallow.
                                                     
1
Report of the Submarine Cable Resiliency Working Group of CSRIC V (June 2016), http://go.usa.gov/xqdF5.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
54
Another major problem is the agency’s refusal to grapple in a serious way with the costs its 
regulatory wish list will impose.
What are those costs, which will ultimately be borne by consumers?  The section of the Order
titled “Cost-Benefit Analysis” makes it clear that the agency itself has no idea.  Indeed, even in an era 
when the FCC regularly offers the textual equivalent of an eye-roll
2
to cost-benefit analysis, the 
discussion here is embarrassingly deficient.
The Order asserts that its new regulatory regime will cost the industry $152,500 per year.
3
  But as 
the record and a rudimentary fact check show, the FCC gets both the math and the analysis wrong.  The 
actual costs are going to be orders of magnitude higher.
First, the FCC uses the wrong number of licensees when calculating its industry-wide cost 
estimate.  Its analysis assumes that there are 61 undersea cable licensees.
4
  So the Order multiplies $2,500 
(which it asserts is the annual burden per licensee) by 61 to arrive at the $152,500 estimate.
5
  The problem 
is that there are up to 161 undersea cable licensees—not 61.
6
  So the FCC’s estimate lowballs the actual 
cost by a significant margin.
7
Second, even if the FCC corrected for this error, its analysis would fare no better because it uses 
an arbitrary number for the annual burden per licensee.  The Order asserts that the new reporting 
                                                     
2
Cf. Lucille Bluth, Arrested Development, http://gph.is/28Vvaq8 (last visited June 24, 2016).
3
See Order at paras. 81–88.
4
See Order at para. 87.  The Order pulls the 61 licensee number from a 2014 supporting statement the FCC 
provided to the Office of Management and Budget for the purpose of renewing the information collection associated 
with a mostly voluntary cable reporting regime the FCC first implemented in 2008.  See OMB Control Number 
3060-1116, ICR Ref. No. 201409-3060-017 (2014) (2014 Supporting Statement), available at 
http://go.usa.gov/x3qsT.
5
Order at para. 87.
6
See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, FY 2015 Regulatory Fees Submarine Cable 
Systems (2015), available at http://go.usa.gov/x3kKj.  The fact that the 2014 Supporting Statement indicates that 
there are 61 licensees makes no difference; the FCC’s own data and the record in this proceeding show that 61 is 
neither the current nor correct number.  
7
The Order does not claim that it uses the correct number of licensees.  Instead, in a footnote, the Order says that it 
is multiplying its per-licensee figure by 61 because the FCC’s 2014 Supporting Statement says that there were “61 
cables licensed in 2014.”  Order at note 276.  But this claim only underscores the arbitrary nature of the Order’s 
analysis.  First, the FCC’s 2014 Supporting Statement says no such thing:  It uses a different figure for the number 
of cable systems.  The number “61” is found in that document, but it is used in one place to refer to the number of 
“licensees” and in another place to the number of “respondents.”  Second, even if you assume that the 2014 
document said that there were 61 cable systems, and if you further assume that this figure is the correct one today, 
the Order’s analysis would still miss the mark.  This is because the Order does not adopt a per-cable-system regime.  
It adopts rules that apply on a per-licensee basis.  See, e.g., Order at para. 37 (“We adopt a requirement that all
licensees . . . must comply with license conditions, including the outage reporting rules we now adopt.”).  Indeed, 
that is why the Order is multiplying 61 by what it says is a “per licensee per year” figure, rather than a per cable 
system per year figure.  To be sure, the Order allows multiple licensees on a single cable system to designate one 
entity that will file outage reports with the Commission.  But this does not aid the Commission’s analysis because 
the Order makes no showing that 100% of cable systems have or will have consortium agreements.  Moreover, the 
Order does not analyze the costs of entering into such agreements or otherwise show that having a consortium 
agreement will mean that only a single entity will be expending hours compiling the information necessary for the 
FCC’s required reports.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
55
requirements will impose a 50-hour burden per licensee per year.
8
  But the FCC offers no rational basis 
for selecting this figure.  It simply takes the 40 hour figure associated with the distinct reporting regime 
implemented by the FCC in 2008 and adds a 25% premium, yielding 50 hours.
9
  
There are two independent problems with this.  The first is that the 2008 regime is so drastically 
different from the one the Order adopts that any reliance on the former cost estimate as a baseline is 
bound to be arbitrary.  This is so for a number of reasons.  For one, the 2008 rules stated that licensees 
“would not be required to generate new information in order to comply.”
10
  The exact opposite is true 
here.  Today’s Order expressly requires providers to generate new information that they would not 
otherwise produce in the normal course of business.  For another, the 2008 regime did not require that 
even a single “formal report be produced.”
11
  Here, the Order mandates that licensees produce not one, 
but three separate and formal reports for every single event.  For yet another, the Order adopts a far more 
expansive definition of “outage” than the FCC used in 2008.
12
  This alone will significantly increase the 
number of reportable events.  
The other problem is that the Order offers no basis for adding 25% (or, more accurately, only 
25%) to the burden hours associated with that regime.  It’s a wholly arbitrary adjustment that “suggest[s] 
the agency is either uncertain about why it made its decision, or else is simply making it up as it goes 
along.”
13
Third, the FCC drives down the cost estimate by waving a magic wand and making some costs 
                                                     
8
Order at para. 87.
9
See Order at para. 87 (arriving at the 50 hour figure by adding 25% to the 40 hour estimate contained in the 2014 
Supporting Statement, which sought to extend the information collection authorization for the 2008 reporting 
regime).
10
2014 Supporting Statement at 1.
11
Id. at 2.
12
As discussed below, the Order requires licensees to report incidents that do not involve any loss of 
communications.  
13
Resolute Forest Products, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, Civil Action No. 14-2103 (JEB)
at 38 (D.D.C. May 17, 2016).  Indeed, the most that the Order says on this score is that the cost estimate associated 
with the earlier reporting regime—the one to which the FCC adds 25% today—contained “two conservative 
assumptions.”  Order at note 276.  But the Order only reaches this conclusion by misreading the agency’s earlier 
analysis.  According to the Order, the 2014 cost estimate associated with that prior regime was “conservative” 
because it assumed “that a single set of outage reports would involve as many as 40 hours, rather than only the two 
hours that we estimate above.”  Order at note 276.  But the FCC’s 2014 cost estimate says no such thing.  Indeed, it 
does not contain any estimate of the number of hours that it will take to prepare a report or set of reports.  The “40 
hours” figure contained therein is the estimate of the annual burden hours per licensee; it does not correlate that 
figure in any way to a number of reports or set of reports.  See, e.g., 2014 Supporting Statement at 8.  Additionally, 
the Order asserts that the agency’s earlier cost estimate was “conservative” because it assumed that “all 61 cables 
licensed in 2014 would experience an outage every year.”  Order at note 276.  Once again, the FCC misreads the 
2014 document.  As previously noted, it does not say that “61” is the number of cable systems, nor does the 
document contain any estimate about the number of outages per system per year.  But perhaps most fundamentally, 
whatever the assumptions—conservative or otherwise—that serve as the foundation of the FCC’s 2014 cost 
estimate, those assumptions simply are not relevant to determining whether the FCC acted reasonably in adding 25% 
to that estimate when purporting to determine the costs associated with this very different and far more onerous 
reporting regime.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
56
arbitrarily shrink or disappear altogether.  For instance, the Order assumes a labor cost of $80 per hour.
14
  
Now, many commenters told us that this figure is far too low given the personnel who will be responsible 
for complying with the FCC’s new rules.  But putting that to the side, one would at least expect the FCC 
to use its own $80 figure when it turns to crunch the numbers.  It doesn’t.  Without providing any 
justification or notice, the FCC uses a substantially lower, $50 per hour figure.
15
  
Likewise, the Order determines that there will be a whole host of one-time “implementation 
costs” associated with this new regulatory regime—those are the up-front costs providers must bear that 
are in addition to all of the recurring, annual expenses.
16
  But when it comes time to put pen to paper, the 
Order assigns a value of exactly $0 to those actual and recognized costs.  It doesn’t even make a passing 
effort to justify this glaring omission.
Similarly, the Order recognizes that there may be a whole range of additional costs that it simply 
does not analyze.
17
  It dismisses those by saying that the FCC will consider them when it seeks approval 
from the Office of Management and Budget for this information collection.  But kicking this can down 
the road makes no sense.  If there are additional costs associated with the rules we are adopting today, 
shouldn’t we figure those out before we adopt the rule?  Carts shouldn’t pull horses.
The errors simply compound from there.  For instance, the FCC estimated that there will be 50 
reportable events a year.
18
  But the Order’s analysis (or lack thereof) makes it clear that the agency has no 
idea how many events will qualify as “reportable events” under its new regime, and thus what the 
compliance costs will be.  The Order says that the 50-reportable-events figure was a “conservative 
estimate based upon” documents that indicate that there were between 100 and 200 cable faults per year.
19
But there’s a fundamental problem with this: The 100-to-200 estimate is one of actual “faults,” and the 
Order’s new rules don’t limit themselves in the least in this regard.  Indeed, the Order treats as reportable 
incidents all sorts of ordinary network events that are not and have never been treated as “faults.”  So if 
the Order were to estimate the number of reportable events, it should be starting with a figure that is 
significantly higher than the number of actual faults, not a fraction of it. 
There are other mistakes—both large and small—but you get the point.
The bottom line is this:  The FCC simply does not care about cost-benefit analysis, let alone 
getting it right.  That is how you end up with a section blithely asserting that compliance costs for the 
entire undersea cable industry and its 161 licensees will be no more than the price of a tiny studio 
apartment in Arlington, Virginia.
This is not the way it should be.  Whether you view it as a requirement of reasoned decision-
                                                     
14
See, e.g., Order at para 81; see also Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables and Enhancing 
Submarine Cable Outage Data, GN Docket No. 15-206, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 FCC Rcd 10492, 
10508, para. 44 (2015) (NPRM).
15
Compare Order at paras. 81-82 (discussing an “assumed $80/hour labor rate”), and NPRM, 30 FCC Rcd at 10508, 
para, 44 (using “an assumed labor cost of $80/hour”), with Order at para. 87 (calculating the $152,500 cost estimate 
based on the $50 per hour labor rate the FCC used when it estimated the costs for the 2008 regime).  
16
Order at para. 86.
17
Order at para. 88.
18
See Order at para. 81 (citing NPRM, 30 FCC Rcd at 10508, para. 43 & nn.80-81).  
19
See Id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
57
making under the Administrative Procedure Act, as the courts do,
20
or simply as a matter of good 
government, as we all should, a federal agency has an obligation to ensure in advance that its decisions 
will be beneficial on net to the American public.  The benefits of a regulation may well outweigh its costs, 
but with the mailed-in analysis that this agency routinely conducts, we will never know.
For all of these reasons, I dissent.
                                                     
20
See, e.g., National Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen an agency 
decides to rely on a cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking, a serious flaw undermining that analysis can 
render the rule unreasonable.”); see also City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that 
“we will [not] tolerate rules based on arbitrary and capricious cost-benefit analyses”).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
58
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O’RIELLY
Re: Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables and Enhanced Submarine Cable Outage 
Data, GN Docket No. 15-206, Report and Order.
This item is basically a sequel to last month’s meeting, so many of the concerns I raised then 
about the Commission’s reporting requirements are equally applicable – if not more so – here.  I was able 
to concur to the order portion of May’s item because it provided some relief and clarity for the entities 
subject to the reporting regime and because edits were made to the final draft to reduce implementation 
burdens.
1
  The same is not true today.  Additionally, as I said when we considered the notice, if we were 
to move forward and implement rules, I would expect to see far more data demonstrating the need for 
regulation.
2
  However, today’s item provides little justification for these new burdens.
The primary incident generating this proceeding was an outage caused by a typhoon in the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).  The CNMI situation is unique because there 
was only one submarine cable servicing this area.  In fact, one article referred to Saipan as “one of the 
least connected places on Earth.”
3
  I thought it would be helpful to provide an update on the CNMI 
situation.  As a result of this very outage, there are press reports that a cable operator, who saw a need and 
business opportunity, has agreed to lay a new undersea cable to connect the three islands of the CNMI to 
Guam.
4
  In fact, when deploying the cable, redundancy will be a focus and the entity will ensure diverse 
landing points, equipment and routes.
5
  In sum, the free market has resolved a problem by promoting 
redundancy and re-routing – which should be the ultimate goal – all without any Commission action. 
Today’s item, however, requires reporting in cases of outages or degradations in service even if 
the traffic is re-routed.  I suggested an edit that would make reporting required only in those cases where 
there was an outage and re-routing was not available for the traffic.  This common sense approach, which 
would draw industry’s attention to where redundancy was a problem, was rejected.  Limiting the 
reporting requirement in such a way would still have addressed the root issue while greatly minimizing 
burdens on affected industry.
Let’s face reality: reporting requirements are a first step to imposing rules, such as reliability and 
resiliency requirements, on operators and inserting the Commission into industry network management 
and operations.  In fact, at last month’s meeting, a couple of my colleagues went so far as to state that “we 
                                                     
1
Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications; New Part 4 of the 
Commission’s Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications; The Proposed Extension of Part 4 of the 
Commission’s Rules Regarding Outage Reporting  to Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol Service Providers 
and Broadband Internet Service Providers, PS Docket No. 15-80, ET Docket No. 04-35, PS Docket No. 11-82, Report 
and Order, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and Order on Reconsideration, FCC 16-63, at 131-132 (rel. May 
26, 2016).
2
Improving Outage Reporting for Submarine Cables and Enhancing Submarine Cable Outage Data, GN Docket No. 
15-206, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 FCC Rcd 10492, 10526 (2015).
3
Gaynor Dumat-ol Daleno, DOCOMO will Lay Cable, PACIFIC DAILY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2015, 
http://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2015/09/03/docomo-lay-cable/71621434/; Docomo Plans Next Steps for 
Possible Undersea Fiber Build, SAIPANTRIBUNE.COM, Sept. 3, 2015, 
http://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/docomo-plans-next-steps-for-possible-undersea-fiber-build/.
4
Dumat-ol Daleno, supra note 2.
5
Frauleine S. Villanueva-Dizon, Docomo to Lay Down New Undersea Fiber Optic Cable, SAIPANTRIBUNE.COM, 
Mar. 11, 2016, http://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/docomo-lay-new-undersea-fiber-optic-cable/.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
59
cannot manage problems that we do not measure.”  But, it is not the Commission’s role to manage, fix, 
restore, operate, maintain or suggest improvements or repairs to any submarine cable network.  
Thankfully, this item does not attempt to do so, and I will vehemently oppose any efforts going forward 
to meddle in industry’s network decisions.  But it raises the question, if the only purpose is to know about 
a problem, what good does that do?  
I also have serious concerns about the timeframes provided for triggering the reporting 
requirements and submitting the various required reports.  In many instances, the Commission disregards 
industry comments in their entirety and chooses its own timeframe with little analysis for why it is more 
appropriate than what is in the record.
6
  Similarly, the Commission arbitrarily decides that this reporting 
requirement should be implemented in six months, when every commenter suggests 12 to 15 months.
I also would have preferred for submarine cable to have a two-phase reporting requirement instead of 
three, because additional information is highly unlikely to be available when the interim report is filed.  I 
recognize, however, that the Commission sought comment on reducing the number of outage reports from 
three to two in last month’s Part 4 further notice.  I want to ensure that submarine cable licensees are 
aware that a decision in the general Part 4 docket will apply to submarine cables and that all interested 
parties should participate in that proceeding.  
Further, the discussion about streamlining the processes to lay submarine cables is more than 
disappointing.  Here is one place the Commission actually could be helpful.  Interestingly enough, press 
articles report that the new cable between Guam and the CNMI will not be operational until May 2017.  
Why?  The reason for the delay is that, while it only takes two to three weeks to lay the cable, the 
permitting process takes a long time.
7
  The Commission should address this need, but instead the item 
directs staff to use its “existing delegated authority” to improve the permitting and coordination process 
with little discussion of what was suggested in the record and no guidance from the Commission, even 
though it appears that discussions are underway.  Good luck with that.  
Finally, the cost-benefit analysis in this order is awful.  Once again, the Commission 
underestimates the burden of filing these reports and ignores the input of commenters.  Instead of 
breaking down the various costs and doing a true analysis, the calculation is based on a portion of the cost 
analysis, provided to OMB as part of a Paperwork Reduction Act filing, for the old submarine cable 
voluntary reporting system. Why a voluntary system that did not have to take into account such things as 
the cost of coordination between consortia members, the possible appointment of responsible parties, 
potential liability issues, and multiple rounds of legal review is a good starting point for the cost-benefit 
analysis is beyond me.  Moreover, starting off such an analysis by suggesting that, at least, the burdens 
are not as bad as those proposed in notice is insulting.  The fact that it could have been worse does not 
excuse the Commission from doing a thoughtful review of the costs.
Additionally, the item states that the costs raised in the record may inform the Paperwork 
Reduction Act filing, but as I have said before, complete information about the costs should be provided 
in the item when Commissioners vote.  Further, a thorough analysis should be done regarding what 
information is reported to the Department of Homeland Security’s National Coordinating Center for 
                                                     
6
For example, the item finds that the reporting requirement is triggered for any outage exceeding 30 minutes, 
whereas commenters requested three hours.  Further, the timeframe for filing the initial notification is four hours 
from determining that an event is reportable even though the majority of commenters state that should have 48 
hours.  What is even more perplexing though is that for the first three years, entities will have eight hours to report.
7
Villanueva-Dizon, supra note 5 (quoting the Docomo Pacific President and CEO who stated that: “’Permitting is 
the part of the process that takes the absolute longest,” . . . adding that it takes about 12 months to do the permitting 
because they would have to coordinate with the CNMI, Guam, and federal governments. . . .  He added that the 
actual laying of the cable will only take less than three weeks.”)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-81
60
Communications. Industry should not bear the burden of filing duplicative information.
Even worse, there is no quantitative analysis of the benefits.  The item just summarily concludes 
that that the potential benefits from improved monitoring outweigh the costs.  There is no proof, however, 
that a reporting requirement or the Commission knowing of an outage leads to any benefit.  There isn’t 
even evidence of a systemic problem of submarine cable outages that needs to be fixed.  Instead, once 
again, the Order returns to the CNMI outage, stating that the Commission was hampered in its ability to 
respond because of the delayed situational awareness.  Operators in an outage situation should be 
spending their time trying to fix the problem, not focusing on a report requirement, and I am sure they are 
not seeking help, advice or any response from the Commission.   
For these reasons, I am unable to support the reporting requirement detailed in today’s item and, 
therefore, I must dissent.