Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
)
)
)
)
CG Docket No. 02-278
REPORT AND ORDER
Adopted:  August 2, 2016 Released:  August 11, 2016
By the Commission: Chairman Wheeler and Commissioner Clyburn issuing separate statements; 
Commissioner Rosenworcel concurring and issuing a statement; Commissioners Pai and O’Rielly 
dissenting and issuing separate statements.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Heading Paragraph #
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................. 1
II. BACKGROUND.................................................................................................................................... 3
III. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................................................... 10
A. Covered Calls................................................................................................................................. 11
B. Limits on Number and Duration of Federal Debt Collection Calls ............................................... 30
C. Other Implementation Issues ......................................................................................................... 50
D. Severability .................................................................................................................................... 58
E. Effective Date ................................................................................................................................ 59
IV. JURISDICTION................................................................................................................................... 61
V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS................................................................................................................ 67
VI. ORDERING CLAUSES....................................................................................................................... 72
APPENDIX A – Final Rules
APPENDIX B – Comments Filed
APPENDIX C – Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this Report and Order (Order), we take steps to implement Section 301 of the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015,
1
which amends the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
2
by excepting 
from that Act’s consent requirement robocalls “made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the 
United States”
3
and authorizing the Commission to adopt rules to “restrict or limit the number and 
                                                     
1
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584 (Budget Act).
2
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) is codified at section 227 of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended.  See 47 U.S.C. § 227.
3
Budget Act § 301(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)); see also id. § 301(a)(1)(B) (amending 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(1)(B) to read, in part, that artificial- or prerecorded-voice calls cannot be made to a residential telephone 
line without the consent of the called party unless the call is “made solely pursuant to the collection of a debt owed 
to or guaranteed by the United States”).  “Robocalls” include calls made either with an automatic telephone dialing 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
2
duration” of any wireless calls “to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”
4
  The 
Budget Act requires the Commission to “prescribe regulations to implement the amendments made” by 
Section 301 within nine months of enactment.
5
  In implementing these provisions, we recognize and seek 
to balance the importance of collecting debt owed to the United States
6
and the consumer protections 
inherent in the TCPA.
7
2. Based on record evidence that consumers may benefit from calls that can prevent them 
from falling into potentially devastating debt, we make clear that certain debt servicing calls are permitted 
under the exception.  At the same time, and in recognition of the substantial number of comments urging 
clear, strong limits on the number and duration of debt collection calls, we cap the number of permitted 
calls to wireless numbers at no more than three within a thirty-day period;
8
ensure that consumers have 
the right to stop such calls at any time; and adopt other consumer protections.  The measures we adopt 
today implement Congress’s mandate to ensure the TCPA does not thwart important calls that can help 
consumers avoid debt troubles while preserving consumers’ ultimate right to determine what calls they 
wish to receive.
II. BACKGROUND
3. The TCPA and the Current Rules.  In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA and made clear 
that “[i]ndividuals’ privacy rights, public safety interests, and commercial freedoms of speech and trade 
must be balanced in a way that protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate telemarketing 
practices.”
9
  Among other things, the TCPA requires the called party’s consent before certain robocalls 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
system (“autodialer”) or with a prerecorded or artificial voice.  See Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 
7961, 7694, para. 1 n.1 (2015) (2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order).  The Commission has interpreted the 
TCPA to apply both to voice calls and to text messages.  Id. at 8016-17, para. 107.  Throughout this Order we refer 
to robocalls that are subject to the Budget Act’s consent exception as “covered calls.”
“Calls,” for this exception, include any initiated call; this is consistent with the Commission’s previous interpretation 
of “call” for TCPA purposes.  See also para. 28, infra.
4
Budget Act § 301(a)(2) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)). 
5
Budget Act § 301(b).
6
See para. 8, infra.
7
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7964, paras. 1-2 (“we affirm the vital consumer 
protections of the TCPA”).
While one dissent suggests that Congress determined in the Budget Act amendments that the benefits of these calls 
outweigh the privacy concerns, we disagree with this assessment.  Congress’s authorization allowing us to set 
number and duration limits on these calls, as well as the consumer protections inherent in the TCPA itself, indicate 
that Congress intended the Commission to balance the statutory consumer protection purposes against the benefits of 
robocalls for the purpose of collecting debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.
8
As explained at paras. 48-49, infra, we determine that the Budget Act amendments do not alter our current rules 
regarding non-telemarketing autodialed, prerecorded-voice, and artificial-voice calls to residential numbers.
9
TCPA, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(9).  As its name makes clear, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act is a broad 
consumer protection statute that addresses the calling practices of both bad actors attempting to perpetrate frauds 
and legitimate callers who employ calling practices consumers may find objectionable.  The TCPA makes it 
unlawful for any person to make robocalls that do not comply with the provisions of the statute.  While the 
Commission has sought to “reasonably accommodate[] individuals’ rights to privacy as well as the legitimate 
business interests of telemarketers,” Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 
1991, CG Docket No. 92-90, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 8752, 8754, para. 3 (1992) (1992 TCPA Order), 
legitimate callers are not exempt from the statute’s consumer protections.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
3
can be made to residential and wireless phones,
10
restricts unsolicited facsimile advertisements,
11
regulates 
the manner of artificial and prerecorded telephone messages,
12
and grants consumers a private right of 
action against alleged violators separate from regulatory enforcement.
13
4. The TCPA and the Commission’s rules generally require a caller to obtain the prior 
express consent of the called party when: (1) making a non-emergency telemarketing call using an 
artificial or prerecorded voice to residential telephone lines;
14
and (2) making a non-emergency call using 
an automatic telephone dialing system (“autodialer”) or an artificial or prerecorded voice to a wireless
telephone number, among other specified recipients.
15
  Unless exempted by rule or an order of the 
Commission,
16
a caller must ensure that he or she has the consent of the called party
17
prior to each such 
call he or she makes.
18
5. Budget Act Amendments.  As amended by Section 301 of the Budget Act, Sections 
227(b)(1)(A) and (B) of the TCPA now explicitly except from the prior express consent requirement
certain autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice calls either to wireless phones or to residential 
landline phones, if the calls are “made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United 
States.”
19
  The law says that, in implementing the Budget Act amendments, the Commission “may restrict 
or limit the number and duration of calls made to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone 
service to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”
20
  While no legislative history exists 
that lays out the legislative intent, we believe two reasonable interpretations of the statute are to: (1) make 
                                                     
10
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B); 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(1)-(3).
11
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C); 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(4).
12
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(d)(3); 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(7)(i)(B), (b)(3).
13
See id. § 227(b)(3).
14
Id. § 227(b)(1)(B); 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(3).  Consent to telemarketing calls must be in writing and satisfy the 
requirements of 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8).  See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(3).  Telemarketing calls to residential lines that 
are made by or on behalf of a tax-exempt nonprofit organization and telemarketing calls subject to the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) may be made without the consent of the called party.  
Id.
15
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A); 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(1)-(2).  The restriction also applies to such calls directed to 
emergency numbers and other specified locations.  For autodialed or artificial- or prerecorded-voice telemarketing 
calls to wireless numbers, prior express consent must be in writing and satisfy the requirements of 47 CFR § 
64.1200(f)(8).  See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG 
Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 27 FCC Rcd 1830, 1838, para. 20 (2012) (2012 TCPA Order); 47 CFR § 
64.1200(a)(2).  
16
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B), (C).
17
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 8000-06, paras. 73-84.
18
See id. at 8014, para. 100; see also id. at 7993-99, paras. 55-70 (explaining that a consumer may revoke consent 
through any reasonable means).
19
Budget Act § 301(a)(1) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)).  The phrasing is slightly different in the amended § 
227(b)(1)(B): “made solely pursuant to the collection of a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”  Section 
227(b)(1)(A)(iii) is not limited to wireless phone numbers, but states that non-emergency robocalls require consumer 
consent if made “to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized 
mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for 
the call, unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”  47 U.S.C. § 
227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (as amended).  
20
Budget Act § 301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
4
it easier for owners of debts owed to or guaranteed by the United States and their contractors
21
to make 
calls to collect the debts; and (2) make it easier for consumers to obtain useful information about debt 
repayment, which may be conveyed in these calls.
6. On timing, the Budget Act states: “Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the Federal Communications Commission, in consultation with the Department of the Treasury, 
shall prescribe regulations to implement the amendments made by this section.”
22
  Commission staff has 
consulted with Department of Treasury staff, along with other interested agencies, on Budget Act 
implementation questions.  The Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on May 
6, 2016, to begin the process of prescribing regulations to implement the TCPA amendments, as Congress 
directed.
23
  
7. Robocalls Generally.  TCPA complaints as a whole are the largest category of informal 
complaints the Commission receives.
24
  In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received more 
than 900,000 consumer complaints in 2015 relating to debt collection—more than any other industry or 
practice.
25
  In its comments, FTC staff states: “Robocalling increases the number of possible collection 
contacts, and any expansion in their use likely will magnify consumer harms arising from debt collection 
calls.”
26
  The FTC staff also notes that, “[b]ecause the TCPA amendments now allow robocalls to collect 
a debt owed to the U.S. Government, it will be more challenging for consumers to distinguish between 
legitimate debt collection calls and calls placed by scammers impersonating the government.”
27
  
8. Collection of Federal Debt and Debt Collection Generally.  According to the Department 
of Treasury, in Fiscal Year 2015, the federal Government had $1.3 trillion of non-tax receivables (current 
and delinquent), of which $162.1 billion was delinquent.
28
  According to the same report, the top federal 
creditor agencies were the Department of Education, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Export-Import 
                                                     
21
For purposes of this Order and the accompanying rules, we use the term “contractor” to refer to both contractors 
and agents.
22
Budget Act § 301(b).  
23
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 16-57 (May 6, 2016) (NPRM).  Because of this congressionally mandated 
deadline, the Commission declines to entertain the request by ACA International that it “wait to see how the 
[Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] addresses” certain issues before issuing rules.  See ACA Comments at 15. 
24
See Federal Communications Commission Encyclopedia, Quarterly Reports-Consumer Inquiries and Complaints, 
Top Complaint Subjects, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/quarterly-reports-consumer-inquiries-and-complaints
(last visited July 14, 2016).
25
FTC BCP Staff Comments at 2.
26
Id. at 3.
27
Id. at 3.  
28
U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2015 Report to the Congress: U.S. Government Receivables and Debt 
Collection Activities of Federal Agencies (April 2016), 
https://fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/debtColl/pdf/reports/debt15.pdf.  One media source reports that, according 
to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, student debt has “more than doubled since 2007 to $1.3 trillion, and as 
many as one in four borrowers—excluding those still in school—are 90 days behind on payments.”  Brent Kendall 
and Josh Mitchell, Supreme Court Denies Appeal on Student-Loan Erasure, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 11, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-denies-appeal-on-student-loan-erasure-1452527286.  “More than 80% 
of all outstanding student debt in the U.S. is guaranteed by or directly owed to the Education Department.”  Id.  The 
Department of Education reports: “At the end of fiscal year 2016, 41.7 million student loan borrowers owed $1.25 
trillion in federal student loans to the Department, banks, guaranty agencies, and schools.”  Dept. of Education 
Reply Comments at 2.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
5
Bank.
29
  Federal agencies employ a variety of collection tools to recover this debt, including calls.
30
  The 
Debt Collection Improvement Act (DCIA) guides agencies and contractors acting on their behalf in their 
efforts to collect non-tax debts owed to the United States.
31
  In Fiscal Year 2015, private collection 
agencies assisted federal creditor agencies by collecting $465.2 million.
32
  The Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA)
33
governs consumer debt collection practices by eliminating abusive debt 
collection practices, ensuring that debt collectors who refrain from using abusive practices are not 
competitively disadvantaged, and promoting consistent State action to protect consumers against debt 
collection abuses.
34
  
9. The Record in Response to the NPRM.  Consumer response to the NPRM reflects the
public’s general dislike for robocalls and their desire for the Commission to provide them greater 
protection against unwanted calls.  Over 15,700 individuals filed comments directly in the record.  Over 
12,500 of those comments expressed a general dislike for robocalls, while approximately 2,500 included 
more pointed comments regarding debt collection and calls by the federal government.  In addition to the
15,700 individual comments, Consumer’s Union submitted a petition containing 4,800 signatures asking 
the FCC to stop robocalls to cellphones and Americans for Financial Reform submitted a petition 
containing 5,346 comments from members in support of the FCC’s proposed limitations on calls.  
Commenters also report consumers’ fear of scam robocalls, fear for their safety when receiving robocalls 
while driving, and fear that robocalls impact the physical and mental health of senior adults.
35
  One 
commenter states that because the Budget Act amendments could expose an additional 47 to 61 million 
people to robocalls that previously required consent, the Commission must consider these concerns and 
the increase in the magnitude of these concerns.
36
  By contrast, debt servicers and collectors emphasize 
the important need served by such calls, i.e., that they can help educate debtors, often younger 
individuals, about repayment options that can save them from substantial debt from which they may not 
recover.  Consumer groups and our federal partners generally agree on the value of such calls but ask the 
Commission to adopt reasonable limits.
                                                     
29
U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2015 Report to the Congress: U.S. Government Receivables and Debt 
Collection Activities of Federal Agencies, 4 (April 2016), 
https://fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/debtColl/pdf/reports/debt15.pdf.
30
See, e.g., id. at 12.
31
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 
3701(b)(1), (f)).
32
U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2015 Report to the Congress: U.S. Government Receivables and Debt 
Collection Activities of Federal Agencies at 11 (April 2016), 
https://fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/debtColl/pdf/reports/debt15.pdf.
33
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p.
34
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
35
See, e.g., LL Price Comments at 1 (“Scammers will gleefully join the robocall party to target seniors, and to prey 
on the feeble.  Don’t sanction mass-harassment of ordinary citizens.”); Alan Rosenfeld Comments at 1 (“It’s 
especially unsafe to receive these annoying calls when driving.”); Jeanette Burket Comments at 1 (“Seniors are 
being frightened, coerced, and financially exploited by these calls.  Their emotional and even physical health is very 
often compromised on a daily basis by the un-ending personal intrusion, anxiety, and harassment of these callers, 
particularly the debt collectors who are bent on collection of debts not even belonging to the targeted person.  These 
calls are truly a new form of elder abuse.”).  The U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging held a hearing on July 
10, 2015, concerning the effects of robocalls on senior adults entitled “Ringing Off the Hook: Examining the 
Proliferation of Unwanted Calls.”  See http://www.aging.senate.gov/hearings/ringing-off-the-hook_examining-the-
proliferation-of-unwanted-calls.
36
Letter from Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member, United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 2 (Mar. 28, 2016) (on file in CG Docket No. 02-278) (Brown 
Letter); NCLC Comments at 6.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
6
III. DISCUSSION
10. We adopt rules to implement the Budget Act’s amendments to the TCPA, including—
based on substantial record support, and in furtherance of the TCPA’s consumer-protection goals—
restrictions on the number and duration of calls that may be made pursuant to the amendments.  Among 
other things, we determine who may make covered calls, limit the number of federal debt collection 
calls
37
that may be made, and determine who may be called.  We also create rules to, among other things:
? Permit calls made by debt collectors when the loan is in delinquency, and by debt servicers 
following a specific, time-sensitive event affecting the amount or timing of payment due, and in 
the 30 days before such an event.
? Determine that consumers have a right to stop the autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-
voice servicing and collection calls regarding a federal debt to wireless numbers at any point the 
consumer wishes.
? Specify that covered calls may be made by the owner of the debt or its contractor, to: (1) the 
wireless telephone number the debtor provided at the time the debt was incurred; (2) a phone 
number subsequently provided by the debtor to the owner of the debt or its contractor; and (3) a 
wireless telephone number the owner of the debt or its contractor has obtained from an 
independent source, provided that the number actually is the debtor’s telephone number.
A. Covered Calls
11. “Solely to Collect a Debt.”  The Budget Act excepts covered calls from the prior-
express-consent requirement when they are “solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United 
States.”
38
  We begin by interpreting the statutory phrase “solely to collect a debt” so as to determine 
whether calls are covered.
39
  Because the statutory term “solely to collect a debt” is ambiguous, the 
Commission has discretion to reasonably interpret that phrase.  
12. We reject a subjective standard of what a caller may intend when determining whether a 
call is a covered call and instead look to objective characteristics of the call.  We note that an objective 
standard is consistent with our approach to other aspects of the TCPA, such as the meaning of “called 
party” for purposes of reassigned wireless numbers.
40
  Furthermore, a subjective standard would be 
difficult to administer, while an objective standard enables us to look at actual, measurable characteristics 
of a call.
13. In the NPRM, we asked whether covered calls should begin at delinquency or default.  
Several commenters support the proposal that covered calls begin at delinquency, stating that calls during 
delinquency can assist a debtor in determining whether alternative payment plans are an option.
41
  The 
FTC staff’s comments, however, promote default as the starting point for covered calls.  They argue that 
                                                     
37
Throughout this Order we refer to robocalls that are subject to the rules we enact, pursuant to the authority 
granted to us in the Budget Act to “restrict or limit the number and duration of calls made to a telephone number 
assigned to a cellular telephone service to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States,” Budget Act § 
301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)), as “federal debt collection calls.”  “Robocalls” include calls made 
either with an automatic telephone dialing system (“autodialer”) or with a prerecorded or artificial voice.  
38
Budget Act § 301(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).
39
Budget Act § 301(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).  
40
2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8002-03, para. 78.
41
See Letter from Edward J. Markey et al., United States Senator, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 1 (Jun. 
8, 2016) (on file in CG Docket No. 02-278) (Markey Jun. 8, 2016 Letter) (signed by 29 members of Congress); QLI 
Comments at 3; NCLC Comments at 17; see also CAC Comments at 2.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
7
the FDCPA uses default as the “touchstone for coverage,” and that those collecting debts that were not in 
default when their agency obtained them are not considered debt collectors under the act.
42
  Because the 
amended TCPA is not limited to third-party debt collectors, however, this distinction is less important and 
the reasoning for using default rather than delinquency as an initiating event is likewise less persuasive.  
14. We interpret “solely to collect a debt,” and, therefore, calls made pursuant to the 
exception created in the Budget Act, to be limited to debts that are delinquent
43
at the time the call is 
made or to debts that are at imminent risk of delinquency as a result of the terms or operation of the loan 
program itself.  As a practical matter, this means that, at the time the call is made, the debt is delinquent 
or there is an imminent, non-speculative risk of delinquency due to a specific, time-sensitive event that 
affects the amount or timing of payments due, such as a deadline to recertify eligibility for an alternative
repayment plan or the end of a deferment period.  Many federal loan programs offer various alternate and 
income-based repayment options for which a debtor might qualify at various times during the life of the 
debt, and the amount or timing of payments due can vary significantly following expiration of a deferral 
period or an alternate payment plan.  For example, some income-based repayment plans for student loans 
allow a debtor to make a monthly payment of zero dollars without being considered delinquent or in 
default, but higher monthly payments are required automatically if the debtor does not periodically 
recertify that he continues to qualify for the program.  As such, calls regarding changes in the amount or 
timing of payments are directly related to the collection of the underlying debt in that they can ensure 
payments that would likely otherwise would not be made.
15. Some commenters, argue that the Commission may not limit covered calls to those that 
are “delinquent” or in “default” because the Budget Act did not include such limiting language.  For 
example, ACA states: “Congress made absolutely no mention of the [exception] being limited to calls 
made post delinquency or post-default.  As a result it would be inappropriate for the Commission to read 
such a limitation into the amendment.”
44
  We disagree with regard to our discretion to interpret the 
statutory language, but note that we are not limiting covered calls only to those made after default or 
delinquency.  As commenters note, the Supreme Court has confirmed that a person or entity “collects” a 
debt by attempting to obtain payment on it.
45
  Thus, we believe that covered calls must have a reasonable 
nexus to seeking to obtain payment and that the calls permitted under our interpretation of “solely to 
collect” have such a nexus.  In contrast, calls outside the scope of covered calls lack such a nexus because 
the risk of delinquency would be too speculative and too far removed (i.e., not imminent) from an event 
affecting the amount or timing of payments due.  
16. Other commenters argue that covered calls should begin before delinquency because calls 
that occur after delinquency or default are “too late to prevent damage to the consumer’s credit profile 
and fail[] to allow the borrower to receive timely information to choose the repayment plan best suited for 
the borrower’s unique circumstances.”
46
  We agree.  Certain calls to service a debt owed to or guaranteed 
by the government may be so closely tied to an imminent and non-speculative risk of delinquency as to 
                                                     
42
FTC BCP Staff Comments at 5-6.
43
Because we lack a developed record on the point, we do not formally define “delinquent” or “delinquency.”  
Rather, the terms of a contract or other instrument that created the debt defines when a debt is delinquent.  See
NCLC Comments at 17; Navient Mar. 29, 2016 Letter at 2; ECMC Comments at 5; ACA Comments at 9; EFC 
Letter at 2, n.4; Navient Comments at 6; NCHER Comments at 3-4.  For purposes of this order, however, we 
generally use “delinquent” to refer to debts that are not current on payments per the terms of the debt agreement, and 
distinguish that from “default,” which we generally understand to refer to debts that are significantly delinquent.  
See, e.g., Navient Comments at 6; NCHER Comments at 3-4.
44
ACA Comments at 9; see also ConServe Comments at 3; SLSA Comments at 19.
45
See Navient Comments at 31 (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 1491 (1995); Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 
135 S.Ct. 1124, 1130 (2015)); EFC Letter at 4.
46
NCHER Comments at 2.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
8
also be “solely to collect a debt.”  These calls pertain to specific, time-sensitive events that affect the 
amount or timing of payments due.  Once these time-sensitive events are sufficiently imminent, calls 
about these events are no longer just about a debt, but are solely about the collection of a debt.  The time-
sensitive nature of these calls necessitates that they are “solely to collect a debt” for only a limited time—
following the event and in the30 days before such an event.  Any earlier and the calls are too speculative 
and attenuated for the purpose of the call to be “solely to collect a debt.”
17. The record indicates that these debt servicing calls help a debtor avoid delinquency or 
default, which can preserve the debtor’s payment history and credit rating, and help maintain eligibility 
for future loans.
47
  The potential value of these servicing calls to debtors by helping them avoid 
delinquency or default, and the probability that servicing calls will create conditions that allow debts to be 
more readily collected by the United States, lead us to determine that certain servicing calls should be 
included in our interpretation of “solely to collect a debt.”
48
  
18. A caller, therefore, need not wait until a debtor is delinquent to begin making certain debt 
servicing calls.  Rather a caller may make debt servicing calls following a specific, time-sensitive event 
that affects the amount or timing of payments due, such as a recertification deadline or the end of a 
deferment period, and in the 30 days before such an event.
49
  For purposes of the limits on the number of 
covered calls, no debt servicing calls will be permitted except those regarding an approaching deadline or 
a change in status (deferment, forbearance, rehabilitation), calls regarding enrollment or reenrollment in 
income-driven or income-based repayment plans, and calls regarding similar time-sensitive events or 
deadlines affecting the amount or timing of payments due.
50
  While commenters list other pre-
delinquency calls they would like the Commission to include in the list of debt servicing calls for 
purposes of the Budget Act amendments,
51
we decline to do so.  This list of calls we are permitting as 
covered debt servicing calls includes the most-requested debt servicing calls and includes calls both to 
enroll debtors in consumer-friendly programs and to keep them enrolled in those programs.  It also 
includes calls aimed at alerting debtors when significant events will occur that will change their payment 
patterns.  The list does not include calls regarding routine events, such as reminders about scheduled 
upcoming payments.  We would consider a routine event one that occurs by operation of the contract 
alone, as contrasted with the events we describe above, which require affirmative steps by the debtor to 
                                                     
47
See Dept. of Education Reply Comments at 3; Navient Comments at 7-8; EFC Letter at 3; EFC Comments at 3; 
see also Navient Comments at 2.
48
See EFC Comments at 5 (“between October 2013 and November 2014, nearly 60 percent of borrowers enrolled in 
IDR programs did not recertify their incomes as required before their deadlines. The data showed that one-third of 
these borrowers faced financial havoc when they forgot to recertify, and their loans went into hardship related 
forbearance or deferment”); Letter from Mark W. Brennan, Counsel to Navient Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Secretary, FCC at 3-4 (Mar. 29, 2016) (on file in CG Docket No. 02-278) (Navient Mar. 29, 2016 Letter); SLSA 
Comments at 11-12.
49
NCLC argues in its Comments that the Commission should permit these types of debt servicing calls “if the 
consumer is delinquent in responding to a requirement to arrange for a payment plan or forbearance program.”  
NCLC Comments at 3.  In its Reply Comments, NCLC states that it has altered its argument and supports servicing 
calls in “the 30-day period before the debtor will be delinquent in maintaining eligibility for payment plan[s].”  
NCLC Reply Comments at 7.  A commenter notes that, for some programs such as income-driven repayment (IDR) 
plans, “there is a 10-day window between the formal deadline to recertify for IDR and the triggering of adverse 
consequences, such as interest capitalization and resetting the monthly payment to a much higher amount.”  SLSA 
Reply Comments at 8.  See also Letter from James P. Bergeron, President, National Council of Higher Education 
Resources, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 8 (Jun. 22, 2016) (on file in CG Docket No. 02-278) (NCHER 
June 22, 2016 Letter).
50
See Dept. of Education Reply Comments at 3; Navient Comments at 32-33; EFC Comments at 4; Nelnet 
Comments at 7; 
51
See, e.g., SLSA Comments at 11-12; NCHER Comments at 5; EFC Comments at 4.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
9
take advantage of the provisions of the debt contract.  These included calls, which often increase the 
probability that debts will be more readily collected and that a debtor will avoid delinquency, achieve the 
desired result of enabling the caller to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States and 
simultaneously can benefit the debtor.  Our interpretation of covered calls permit no debt servicing calls 
unless the call follows one of these specific, time-sensitive events, and in the 30 days before such an 
event.
19. “Owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”  We turn next to the types of debts that 
are included in the phrase “owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”
52
  We determine that, for TCPA 
purposes, this phrase includes only debts for which the United States
53
is currently the owner or guarantor 
of the debt.
54
  The Budget Act amendments specify that covered calls may be made regarding “debts 
owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”
55
  Because we lack a developed record on the issue, we do 
not seek to define or determine with particularity exactly which debts are included in or excluded from 
this phrase; like commenter SLSA, we are cognizant of the “variety of types of debts covered by the 
provision,” and while we do not “believe that the definitions applicable to each specific federal program 
should be used to [automatically] determine whether debt in that program is considered owed or 
guaranteed by the United States,” we view such definitions—and any agency or judicial interpretations of 
                                                     
52
Budget Act § 301(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii))
53
We note that Section 3 of the Communications Act, as amended, defines “United States” to mean “the several 
States and Territories, the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States, but does not include the 
Canal Zone.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(58).  Based on this statutory language, the context of “debts owed to or guaranteed 
by the United States” as used in the Budget Act amendments, and our consultation with other federal agencies with 
substantive expertise regarding debtor-creditor relationships, we find and apply a definition of “United States” in 
this instance that encompasses a narrower scope that only includes debts owed to or guaranteed by the federal 
government, as opposed to the broader definition of “United States” included in Section 3 of the Communications 
Act, as amended.  We find this narrower definition more closely comports with the scope intended under the Budget 
Act.  We also decline to issue regulations to limit the number and duration of robocalls seeking to collect debts owed
to or guaranteed by state or local government entities as at least one commenter has requested.  See Luster 
Comments at 1-2.
54
One commenter asserts that the exception should include debts “insured, guaranteed, coinsured, or reinsured, in 
whole or in part, by the U.S. government or any agency or instrumentality thereof, directly or indirectly.”  
ABA/CBA Comments at 3.  We disagree.  Congress specified that the debt should be “owed to or guaranteed by the 
United States.”  Budget Act § 301(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).  We, therefore, determine that 
debts insured by the United States are not included in the language of the Budget Act amendments; only debts owed 
to or guaranteed by the United States are included in the language of the Budget Act amendments.  Commenters 
who advocate for including “insured” debts within the language of the Budget Act amendments do not explain how 
the statutory terms “owed to or guaranteed by” encompasses the term “insured,” so we do not included “insured” 
debts within the scope of the terms “owed to or guaranteed by” in our interpretation of the statutory language.
Commenter Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA)—the agency charged with regulating Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac—states in its comments that “the statutory exemption for debts owed to or guaranteed by the United 
States does not appear applicable to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans.”  FHFA Comments at 2.  The Commission 
will not render a decision on this factual issue, particularly because little in the way of facts has been entered into the 
record.
FHFA also asks the Commission to grant an exemption to “entities that service 1-4 unit residential mortgage loans 
from prohibitions against the use of automatic telephone dialing systems or artificial or prerecorded voices when 
calling a delinquent borrower for the purpose of servicing that borrower’s mortgage.”  FHFA Comments at 3.  In its 
request, FHFA cites two different exemption provisions, but fails to provide the factual information necessary for 
the Commission to determine whether the calls at issue would satisfy the threshold requirements for an exemption, 
including whether calls to wireless numbers would be without charge to the called party.  See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) 
(B), (C).  Furthermore, the Commission has no record on which to consider this request for exemption.  As such, it 
would be premature for the Commission to rule on the exemption request. 
55
Budget Act § 301(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
10
them—as highly relevant evidence regarding whether a debt is “owed to or guaranteed by the United 
States.”
56
  
20. We clarify that the debt must be currently owed to or guaranteed by the federal 
government at the time the call is made.  Debts that have been satisfied are not among the covered debts,
57
and debts that have been sold in their entirety by the federal government are, likewise, not covered.
58
  In 
these cases, the debt is no longer “owed to . . . the United States.”  We note that basic contract principles 
dictate that when an owner sells an item, it no longer belongs to the original owner, but to the purchaser.
59
  
Likewise, the purchaser of a debt is owed the repayment obligation, not the prior obligee.
60
  For example, 
a debt is not still “owed to . . . the United States” if the right to repayment is transferred in whole to 
anyone other than the United States, or a collection agency that has acquired ownership of the debt from 
the federal government collects the funds and then remits to the federal government a percentage of the 
amount collected.  In such circumstances, the debt is no longer owed to the United States and our rules 
permit no calls under this exception.
61
21. Who may be called?  We next turn to the question of who may be called using the 
exception created by the Budget Act.  We determine that, because calls made pursuant to the exception 
must be made “solely to collect a debt,” the covered calls may only be made to the debtor or another 
person or entity legally responsible for paying the debt.
62
  Calls are not permitted to other persons listed 
on the debt paperwork, such as references or witnesses, under our rules.  These persons are not liable for 
the debt; consequently, calls to these persons cannot be “solely to collect” the debt.
63
  Senators and 
Members of Congress support our decision to limit covered calls in this way, writing: “The regulations 
should limit the calls to those made just to the debtors” and “[r]estrict the calls and texts to those made 
just to debtors—not their family or friends.”
64
  Another Senator writes separately, urging: “Calls to 
                                                     
56
SLSA Comments at 21.  Likewise, we do not define what constitutes a “debt” for purposes of the Budget Act 
amendments to the TCPA, but will assess on a case-by-case basis whether any individual agency’s interpretation of 
“debt” is reasonable.
57
See MFY Comments at 2; AFR Comments at 2; NCLC Comments at 3; YI Comments at 2
58
See Markey Jun. 8, 2016 Letter at 1; Brown Letter at 2; Letter from Margot Saunders, National Consumer Law 
Center, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 4, 19 (Mar. 29, 2016) (on file in CG Docket No. 02-278) (NCLC 
Letter); ConServe Comments at 3; CAC Comments at 2.
59
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 22 (1981) (“The manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange ordinarily 
takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by the other party or parties.”); id. § 
317(1) (“An assignment of a right is a manifestation of the assignor’s intention to transfer it by virtue of which the 
assignor’s right to performance by the obligor is extinguished in whole or in part and the assignee acquires a right to 
such performance.”).
60
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317, Illustration 1 (1981) (“A has a right to $100 against B. A assigns his 
right to C. A’s right is thereby extinguished, and C acquires a right against B to receive $100.”). 
61
The debt may, however, be guaranteed by the United States after the debt is sold.  In such a case, the debt could 
be subject to covered calls based on the “or guaranteed by” language of the amended TCPA.  See CMC Comments 
at 11-12.
62
This includes co-signors on the debt.  Because co-signors are legally responsible for payment of the debt, calls to 
them may be construed to be for the sole purpose of collecting a debt, absent a showing that the call’s true purpose 
was for marketing or some other purpose specifically disallowed by the TCPA.  The same would be true for 
representatives of a person or entity liable to pay the debt, such as executors, guardians, administrators, and trustees.
63
As stated at para. 12, supra, we reject a subjective- or intent-based approach.  A call is not solely to collect a debt 
unless it reaches the debtor.  Regardless of the caller’s intent, unless the call is placed to one of the three categories 
of numbers we specify in paragraph 23, infra, the call is unlikely to reach the debtor and result in collection; it, 
therefore, falls outside the statutory interpretation we establish herein.
64
Markey Jun. 8, 2016 Letter at 1.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
11
persons who are not the borrower should be eliminated.”
65
  Consumer groups concur, stating “the only 
reasonable way to read the phrase ‘solely to collect a debt’ is to exclude all calls to persons who do not 
owe the debt.”
66
  The FTC staff also supports this limitation, stating “FTC staff recommends that covered 
calls be limited to calls directed at the person or persons obligated to pay the debt.”
67
  
22. Other commenters, however, urge the Commission to permit covered calls to persons 
other than the debtor.  Navient, in particular, comments on the need to call the parents, relatives, and 
references of a borrower in order to locate the borrower.
68
  Navient writes: “[C]alling numbers obtained 
through skip tracing is sometimes the only way to reach a defaulted borrower.”
69
  It also notes that the 
Department of Education requires “lenders to contact every ‘endorser, relative, reference, individual, and 
entity’ identified in a delinquent borrower’s loan file as part of their due diligence efforts.”
70
  Navient fails 
to note, however, that there is no requirement to make these contacts via robocall.
71
  Navient also makes 
clear in its comments that its purpose in calling relatives and references is to locate the debtor, not to 
collect the debt.  Because the language of the Budget Act authorizes the Commission to limit calls “solely 
to collect a debt,” our rules permit covered calls only to persons who are responsible for repaying the 
debt.
72
23. Numbers that May be Called.  Our interpretation of the phrase “solely to collect a debt” 
permits no covered calls unless the call is made to the debtor or person responsible for paying the debt at 
one of three categories of wireless telephone numbers.  First, calls may be made to the wireless telephone 
number the debtor provided at the time the debt was incurred, such as on the loan application.
73
  Second, 
covered calls may be made to a wireless phone number subsequently provided by the debtor to the owner 
of the debt or the owner’s contractor.
74
  Because the debtor has provided the phone numbers in these first 
two categories, the caller risks liability for the call after the first call to the number, if the number has 
been reassigned from the debtor to a third party.
75
  Third, covered calls are permitted to a wireless 
telephone number the owner of the debt or its contractor has obtained from an independent source, 
provided that the number actually is the debtor’s telephone number.  Our decision to permit calls to these 
                                                     
65
Brown Letter at 2.
66
NCLC Comments at 21; see also YI Comments at 1; MFY Comments at 2; AFR Comments at 2; ACA Comment 
at 7.
67
FTC BCP Staff Comments at 6.
68
Navient Mar. 29, 2016 Letter at 4.
69
Id.
70
Navient Comments at 36.
71
See NCLC Comments at 28 (“Industry callers have argued that, because other laws and regulations require 
contacts at several points in the collection process, the limits imposed on calls covered by the TCPA are 
inappropriate and require callers to make a Hobson’s choice about which laws they will follow.  We do not dispute 
that there are a myriad of other laws and regulations that require callers to contact consumers by phone. The key 
here is that these are requirements for contact. They do not require contact by robocall. No one has an inalienable 
right to make robocalls.”).
72
See CAC Comment at 2.
73
The debtor might have incurred the debt through a penalty or fine rather than an application.  In such case, the 
debtor may not have provided a phone number at the time the debt was incurred.  There, the caller may make calls to 
the phone number the debtor provided on the most recent document submitted to the federal government agency 
holding the debt, such as a tax return or discharge papers.
74
The debtor need only provide the phone number to the servicer or owner of the debt; the debtor need not provide 
the phone number in the context of providing consent to receive autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice 
calls.  See ACA Comments at 9.
75
See paras. 25-26, infra, for a discussion of calls to reassigned numbers.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
12
three categories of numbers is consistent with our interpretation of the phrase “solely to collect a debt,” 
and continues to satisfy the TCPA’s consumer protection goals to the extent possible.  As the connection 
between the phone numbers called and the debtor becomes more attenuated, so, too, does the likelihood 
of reaching the debtor.  Beyond these three categories of numbers, persons reached will not likely be the 
debtor, so calls will not likely result in the collection of a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.
24. We note that the rules we are adopting, which permit calls only if they are to these three 
categories of numbers, are broader than the proposal in the NPRM.  We have included calls to numbers 
subsequently provided by the debtor to the owner of the debt or the owner’s contractor, and to numbers 
the owner of the debt or its contractor has obtained from an independent source, provided that any such 
number actually is the debtor’s number.  These additional categories of numbers should prevent 
uninvolved consumers from receiving robocalls about debts they do not owe,
76
while mitigating concerns 
that the phone number provided on the loan application no longer belongs to the debtor when the debt 
enters repayment.
77
25. This limitation we are placing on the number of covered calls, which limits covered calls 
only to these three categories of numbers, is a determination that robocalls to wrong numbers are not 
covered by the exception created in the Budget Act amendments.  Calls to reassigned wireless numbers 
may not be made pursuant to the exception either.
78
  Wrong numbers, as the Commission used the term in 
the 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order, are “numbers that are misdialed or entered incorrectly into a 
dialing system, or that for any other reason result in the caller making a call to a number where the called 
party is different from the party the caller intended to reach or the party who gave consent to be called.”
79
  
We determine that covered calls to reassigned wireless numbers,
80
however, are subject to the one-call 
window the Commission clarified in the 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order.
81
  For purposes of this 
exception, the reassigned wireless number provision would come into play when the caller makes a call to 
the wireless number provided by the debtor but the number was subsequently reassigned.  In this 
circumstance, the caller would be entitled to the one-call window the Commission previously clarified if 
the caller did not know of the reassignment.
26. Numerous parties in the record urge the Commission to apply the same wrong number 
and reassigned number standards set forth in the 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order to these covered 
calls.
82
  Others ask the Commission to abandon or alter the wrong-number and reassigned-number
standard so that covered calls are treated differently from other robocalls, but do not set forth a persuasive 
argument for why a covered call is different from a typical robocall subject to the one-call window.  
                                                     
76
AFR Comments at 2; NCLC Comments at 10-11.
77
Nelnet Comments at 10; ConServe Comments at 6.
78
See para. 12, supra (rejecting a subjective- or intent-based approach).
79
2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7999, para. 72 n. 256.
80
The reassigned number must have been provided by the debtor.
81
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8006-10, paras. 85-92.  As the Commission 
explained, calls to reassigned wireless numbers are different from calls to wrong numbers.  Calls to reassigned 
numbers, where the caller is unaware of the reassignment at the time the call is made, “would have had the valid 
prior express consent of the subscriber or customary user but for the reassignment.”  Id. at 30 FCC Rcd at 8000, 
para. 72 n. 262.  Wrong number calls, however, “are not eligible for the opportunity to make one additional call to 
discover whether the number has been reassigned [because] the caller never had valid prior express consent from the 
subscriber or customary user to make any call to that misdialed or incorrectly-entered phone number.”  Id.
82
See Letter from Edward J. Markey et al., United States Senator, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 1 (Nov. 
18, 2016) (on file in CG Docket No. 02-278) (signed by 41 members of Congress); Brown Letter at 2; NCLC 
Comments at 3; CU Comments at 4; AFR Comments at 2; MFY Comments at 2; YI Comments at 2; CAC 
Comments at 3.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
13
Several commenters argue for a “reasonable belief” or “actual knowledge” standard.
83
  The Commission, 
however, rejected those standards in the 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order.
84
  And while ABA/CBA 
argues that separate regulations “mandate[] that calls be made to distressed borrowers at their last known 
phone number of record,”
85
it does not indicate that the regulations require that those calls be made using 
an autodialer, artificial voice, or prerecorded voice.  Consequently, ABA/CBA could comply with these 
separate regulatory requirements by manually dialing the last known phone number of record.
27. Who May Make the Calls?  We next consider who may make the covered calls at issue.  
We find that a call is made “solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States” only if it 
is made by the owner of such a debt or its contractor.  The record supports this interpretation.  A number 
of commenters urge the Commission to determine that covered calls may be made by “creditors and those 
calling directly on their behalf,”
86
or “creditors and those calling on their behalf, including their agents.”
87
  
Two commenters ask the Commission to broaden the universe of those who may make covered calls, 
asking that “subcontractors [] be permitted to call, even if the subcontractor is not an agent.”
88
  We 
decline to adopt rules that are as broad as “subcontractor,” but limit permitted callers to the owner of the 
debt or its contractor.  As we have noted above, consumers consistently complain to the Commission, the 
FTC, and CFPB about abusive and persistent debt-collection robocalls.
89
  In creating the rules limiting the 
number of covered calls, we seek to balance the goals of increasing the likelihood that debts owed to or 
guaranteed by the United States will be paid by the debtor and of protecting consumers.  Our rules 
properly balance these goals by recognizing the practicality that owners of debts might use the services of 
contractors to make covered calls in a manner that reduces the potential for abuse or causing debtors 
undue hardship.  
28. What constitutes a “call made”?  “Call,” for this exception, is consistent with the 
Commission’s previous interpretation of “call” for TCPA purposes.
90
  A call is any initiated call.
91
  The 
call need not be completed, and need not result in a conversation or voicemail.  While many commenters 
support this interpretation of “call,”
92
others argue that the definition for purposes of the exception created 
                                                     
83
NCHER Comments at 7; ACA Comments at 11-12.
84
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7999-8010, paras. 71-92.  
85
ABA/CBA Comments at 9.
86
NCLC Letter at 3.
87
ACA Comments at 13-14; SLSA Comments at 24.
88
CMC Comments at 16; see also SLSA Comments at 24.
89
See para. 7, supra.
90
The Commission’s implementing rule states that no person or entity may “initiate any telephone call” to the 
specified recipients.  47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1) (emphasis added).  The Commission, in the 2013 DISH Declaratory 
Ruling, noted that neither the statute nor our rules define “initiate,” and determined that “a person or entity ‘initiates’ 
a telephone call when it takes the steps necessary to physically place a telephone call.”  DISH Declaratory Ruling, 
28 FCC Rcd at 6583, para. 26.  While DISH Declaratory Ruling interpreted and applied section 227(b)(1)(B), the 
Commission has stated that the same logic that applies to the “initiation” of calls under section 227(b)(1)(B) applies 
to the “making” of calls under section 227(b)(1)(A).  See DISH Declaratory Ruling, 28 FCC Rcd at 6575, 6583, 
paras. 3, 26; 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).  While some may argue that using call attempts as the basis for determining the 
permissible number of calls is an arbitrary limitation, our interpretation of the term “call” is consistent for the TCPA 
as a whole and does not distinguish between calls regarding debts owed to or guaranteed by the United States and 
calls with other content.  
91
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1).
92
NCLC Letter at 4; EFC Comments at 7-8; OSLA Comments at 2; NCHER Comments at 12; MFY Comments at 
2; AFR Comments at 2; YI Comments at 2; CAC Comments at 2.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
14
by the Budget Act should be “connected calls” or “actual contacts.”
93
  The Commission finds no statutory 
basis to deviate from its existing interpretation of “call” and “made,” and finds persuasive one 
commenter’s argument that “[e]very time the phone rings can cause anxiety.  Whether or not the collector 
leaves a message on voice mail does not assuage this harassment.”
94
  Consistent with the text of the 
TCPA and the Commission’s previous clarifications, covered calls may be an autodialed call, a 
prerecorded- or artificial-voice call, or a text message sent using an autodialer.
95
  
29. Content of the covered calls.  The NPRM asked how to ensure that covered calls do not 
include extraneous material that consumers do not want, such as marketing content.  We agree with the 
many commenters who argue that content that includes marketing, advertising, or selling products or 
services, and other irrelevant content is not solely for the purpose of collecting a debt owed to or 
guaranteed by the United States.
96
  The Commission has previously found that calls solely for the purpose 
of debt collection do not constitute telemarketing.
97
  Content in these calls that is telemarketing, therefore, 
transforms the call from one solely for the purpose of debt collection into a telemarketing call.
98
  
B. Limits on Number and Duration of Federal Debt Collection Calls
30. Need for restrictions.  In considering the need for restrictions on calls to collect debts 
owed to or guaranteed by the United States, we note the volume of consumer complaints, as set forth 
above.
99
  These factors, along with Congress’ explicit grant of authority to the Commission to “restrict or 
limit the number and duration of calls made to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone 
service to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States,”
100
lead us to adopt certain 
restrictions.  
31. Scope.  Section 301(a)(2) of the Budget Act, which enacts a new statutory provision at 47 
U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H), authorizes the Commission to “restrict or limit the number and duration of calls 
made to a cellular telephone number to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”  The 
scope of this authority is broader than the scope of the exception from the prior-express-consent 
requirement, because—unlike the exception—it is not limited to calls made “solely” to collect a covered 
debt.  Thus, the rules we promulgate under this authority apply to any autodialed, prerecorded-voice, and 
artificial-voice calls that reasonably relate to the collection of a covered debt and therefore apply even if 
the calls are not “calls made solely to collect a debt” under 227(b)(1): e.g., as noted above, if the calls also 
contain other content (such as advertising) or precede the specified time period for calls excepted from the 
consent requirement.  Moreover, these number and duration rules apply to calls by the federal government 
(to the extent it is the owner or guarantor of the debt) and its contractors, as explained in the Jurisdiction 
section below.
101
                                                     
93
Navient Mar. 11, 2016 Letter at 2-3; ACA Comments at 16-17; AACC Comments at 2.
94
NCLC Comments at 26.
95
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1); 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8017, para 107.
96
See, e.g., FTC BCP staff Comments at 7-8; ACA Comments at 10-11; NCHER Comments at 5; EFC Comments at 
4; NCLC Comments at 20.
97
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Request of ACA 
International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278, 23 FCC Rcd 559, 565, para. 11 
(2008) (ACA Declaratory Ruling).
98
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, 
Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014, 14097-98, para. 140 (2003).
99
See para. 7, supra.
100
Budget Act § 301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)).
101
This does not limit the applicability of the number and duration rules to only calls made by the federal 
government and its contractors where the debt is owed to or guaranteed by the United States.  Rather, we clarify that 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
15
32. The nature of restrictions, generally.  We determine, based on consumer complaints and 
on support from the record,
102
that restrictions on the number and duration of federal debt collection calls 
are appropriate and necessary.  In reaching this conclusion, we bear in mind one reasonable interpretation 
of Congress’ action in enacting the amendments: to make it easier for owners of debts owed to or 
guaranteed by the United States, as well as their contractors, to make calls to collect the debts.  We also 
bear in mind the TCPA’s overarching goal to protect the privacy interests of consumers and Congress’ 
express grant of authority to the Commission to place certain restrictions on federal debt collection calls.  
In seeking to balance these two interests, we limit the number of federal debt collection calls to three in 
thirty days, with exceptions as noted below; limit the length of calls using an artificial voice or 
prerecorded voice, and autodialed text messages; and limit the times of day when federal debt collection 
calls may be made to wireless numbers.  As explained more fully below, these limits apply in the 
aggregate to all calls from a caller to a debtor, regardless of the number of debts of each type the servicer 
or collector holds for the debtor.
103
  This cap of three calls per thirty days is cumulative for debt servicing 
calls and debt collection calls.
104
  Finally, we limit the number of calls in light of a debtor’s right to stop 
federal debt collection calls and to be notified of this right.
33. Number of calls. In the NPRM, we proposed to limit the number of federal debt 
collection calls to three per month, per delinquency, only after delinquency.  Several commenters support 
this number.
105
  One commenter reminds the Commission, “it is important to keep in mind that the calls 
made pursuant to this regulation are without consent, and are likely to comprise only a portion of the 
many other calls and contacts that debt collectors have with the debtors from whom they are 
collecting.”
106
  Other commenters, however, argue for higher limits, stating that “it takes significantly 
more than three contact attempts to reach the borrower and additional contacts to effectively resolve a 
borrower’s delinquency or default.”
107
  One commenter asserts that it needs 50 calls over several months 
to reach the right person and have a conversation.
108
  Another states that it takes 14.3 attempts to contact a 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
the number and duration rules apply to the federal government and its contractors, notwithstanding our recent 
clarification in the Broadnet Declaratory Ruling, as explained in the “Jurisdiction” section, below. Rules and 
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Broadnet Teleservices LLC Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 16-72 (2016) (Broadnet Declaratory Ruling).  Non-government 
owners of debt and their contractors, where the debt is guaranteed by the United States, must also comply with the 
number and duration rules if they wish to make federal debt collection calls pursuant to the Budget Act amendments.
102
See, e.g., CFPB Comments at 10 (“The Bureau’s examinations of debt collectors have also revealed excessive 
calling and consequent consumer harm. The Bureau therefore believes that a regulatory intervention limiting the 
number of such calls placed to cell phones by auto-dialers would be a beneficial complement to examination and 
enforcement to protect consumers from excessive calls from collectors (as well as from creditors and servicers).”) 
(listed in the Commissions comment filing system as filed on May 8, 2016 rather than June 8, 2016).
103
As explained more fully in para. 45, infra, some debtors have multiple debts with the same owner or servicer.  
See NCLC Reply Comments at 7 (“[S]ome servicers collect debts owed to different agencies of the federal 
government, yet the collection activities devoted to separate agencies are cabined such that it would be difficult for 
the servicers to coordinate among sections.”).  Multiple debts owed by one debtor that are serviced or collected by 
the same entity on behalf of the same loan holder or federal agency shall be considered one debt.  This will prevent 
one debtor with multiple debts of the same type from receiving more than three calls in thirty days, where the debts 
are owned or serviced by the same caller.
104
If a caller is making both servicing and collection calls to a wireless number regarding a particular debt, it may 
make a total of three calls within thirty days; it may not make three servicing calls and three collection calls within a 
thirty-day period.
105
See, e.g., Markey Jun. 8, 2016 Letter at 1; NCLC Letter at 3.
106
NCLC Comments at 27.
107
ECMC Comments at 6.
108
Navient Comments at 10.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
16
consumer.
109
  A third commenter states that it needs approximately 50 follow-up calls, but that those calls 
are consented-to.
110
  Two commenters assert that approximately ten call attempts per month is an 
appropriate rate at which to contact debtors.
111
  A mortgage servicer states: “By making up to five calls in 
the two weeks prior to a client becoming 60 days delinquent, we saw approximately 50% more clients 
become current on the loan when compared to those who weren’t called.”
112
34. As these comments demonstrate, there is no consensus in the record.  The Department of 
Education states that it “does not believe that allowing loan servicers and [private collection agencies] to 
make three [federal debt collection calls] per month would measurably increase the likelihood that they 
would reach a borrower,” but that “a higher limit will reasonably allow” them to do so.
113
  Consumer 
groups generally argue that three calls is the appropriate number for calls pursuant to the Budget Act 
amendments.  As commenter Navient notes, however, these commenters often “fail to explain why three 
calls is an appropriate limit.”
114
  Additionally, callers filing comments cite statistics and call patterns 
documenting their perceived need for more calls—but even callers vary widely when advocating for a 
number on federal debt collection calls.  Congress gave us express authority to limit the number and 
duration of wireless federal debt collection calls, and the record documents the benefits to consumers of 
some number of covered calls.  The Commission, therefore, must engage in an exercise in line drawing as 
we balance the competing interests to determine an appropriate limit on the number of federal debt 
collection calls.
35. We determine, subject to the exception below, that a limit of three federal debt collection 
calls in a thirty-day period is appropriate.  As stated above, a significant number of commenters support 
this numeric restriction.  Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of individual commenters support our 
imposing a low limit on the number of calls allowed pursuant to the Budget Act amendments.
115
  
Commenters asking for a higher limit have failed to offer a compelling justification for any of the various 
limits they support.  At the same time, we agree with consumer groups that have noted that callers may 
make as many calls as they like—they simply need to obtain the consent of the debtor or contact 
consumers without making a robocall.
116
  
36. We, therefore, conclude that the appropriate limit for the number of federal debt 
collection calls is three calls within thirty days while the delinquency remains or following a specific, 
time-sensitive event, with such calls also permitted in the 30 days before such an event (but not before 
delinquency).  We recognize, however, that some federal agencies, based on their expertise administering 
their respective statutes and programs, may desire additional calls.
117
  Balancing these needs with the 
TCPA’s goal of protecting consumers from unwanted calls, we note that federal agencies may request a 
waiver seeking a different limit on the number of autodialed, prerecorded-voice, and artificial-voice calls 
                                                     
109
ECMC Comments at 7.
110
ConServe Comments at 3.
111
Nelnet Comments at 14; SLSA Comments at 26.
112
QLI Comments at 3.
113
Dept. of Education Reply Comments at 4.
114
Navient Reply Comments at 10.
115
See para. 9, supra.
116
See, e.g., NCHER Comments at 12 (proposing that “[n]othing in the rule limits or prohibits calls or texts 
requested or agreed upon by the consumer”).
117
See Dept. of Education Reply Comments at 4.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
17
that may be made without consent of the called party.
118
  We delegate to the Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau the authority to address any such waivers.
119
37. We are not persuaded by callers who argue that more calls are needed or that other 
regulatory or contractual obligations might impose higher limits on the total number of calls.
120
  We are 
not limiting the total number of calls that may be made; instead, we are exercising our statutory authority 
and discretion to establish a limit on the number of autodialed, prerecorded-voice, and artificial-voice 
calls that can be made without the consent of the called party for the limited purpose at issues here.  Thus, 
we set this limit with the knowledge that callers may make additional autodialed, artificial-voice, and 
prerecorded-voice calls if they obtain the prior express consent of the called party
121
or if they dial 
manually.  Robocallers are free, of course, to obtain prior express consent for additional calls and we 
presume that consumers who find the calls beneficial will provide it.
38. Consumer ability to stop federal debt collection calls.  The Commission has determined 
that an ability to stop unwanted calls is critical to the TCPA’s goal of consumer protection.
122
  That right 
is likely more important here, where consumers need not consent to the calls in advance in order for a 
caller to make federal debt collection calls.  As one commenter notes, “[r]equiring calls to stop after the 
consumer so requests constitutes a limit on the number of calls that can be made, and Congress explicitly 
authorized the Commission to limit the number of calls.”
123
  We agree.  We have stated that one 
reasonable interpretation of the statute is that Congress intended to make it easier for consumers to obtain 
useful information about debt repayment, which may be conveyed in these calls.  When a debtor has 
rejected that presumption and declared that he or she no longer wishes to receive these calls, there is no 
longer any reason for the calls to continue.  We determine, per our authority to limit the number of federal 
debt collection calls,
124
that consumers have a right to stop the covered autodialed, artificial-voice, and 
                                                     
118
See 47 CFR § 1.3.
119
Contrary to the claim of one dissent, our decision to adopt a limit of three calls per thirty days does not lack a 
rational basis.  It is well established that a paramount goal of Congress in adopting the TCPA was to recognize the 
intrusive nature of robocalls and to limit the burden they impose on consumers.  See TCPA, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 
2(9).  Nothing in the Budget Act indicates that Congress intended to depart from this goal.  To the contrary, we 
believe Congress granted the Commission rulemaking authority in subparagraph (b)(2)(H) precisely to ensure that 
this law does not inadvertently open the floodgates to unwanted robocalls.  While it is true that some commenters 
urged us to adopt limits much higher than three per thirty days, against the backdrop of Congress’s enduring goal of 
limiting the intrusiveness of robocalls, we believe prudence counsels in favor of adopting limits at the lower end of 
the range of proposals in the record at this time.  To the extent that subsequent experience with the waiver process 
demonstrates that higher limits may we warranted, we can revisit the limits in the future.  One dissent questions the 
adequacy of the waiver process, particularly given some specific concerns raised in the record about federal laws 
and rules under the auspices of other agencies.  Because the Commission lacks expertise with respect to such laws 
and rules (including whether they necessarily require robocalls instead of, say, manual calls), we believe a waiver 
process is the best way to address any such situations; such a process will allow a full record to be developed 
regarding the nature of any relevant statutes and rules.  To the extent that it is demonstrated in a waiver proceeding 
that a genuine conflict exists between our three-per-thirty-days limit and another federal law, we are likely to view 
that factor as probative of the “good cause” needed to justify a waiver, although we also would consider any 
countervailing issues raised in the record.  
120
See, e.g., ConServe Comments at 10; MBA Reply Comments at 9; HOPE NOW Reply Comments at 2-3.
121
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A); 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(1).
122
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7997, para. 66 (“As we have found above, the 
most reasonable interpretation of ‘prior express consent’ in light of the TCPA’s consumer protection goals is to 
permit a right of revocation.”); see also id. at 7993-99, paras. 55-70 (discussing revocation of consent and a 
consumer’s methods of revoking consent).
123
NCLC Comments at 28; but see EFC Comments at 8; NSC Comments at 13.
124
Budget Act § 301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)).  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
18
prerecorded-voice servicing and collection calls to wireless numbers at any point the consumer wishes.
125
  
The debtor may make this request to the caller.  Several commenters support this decision and the 
Commission’s ability to make it.
126
  If Congress intended these amendments to make it easier for 
consumers to obtain useful information about debt repayment,
127
then consumers may request that the 
calls stop if they do not find the calls or the information they contain useful.  Our rules, therefore, require 
that zero federal debt collection calls are permitted once a debtor asks the owner of the debt or its 
contractor to cease federal debt collection calls.  This requirement that callers immediately honor a 
request to stop calls applies even where the caller has previously obtained prior express consent to make 
federal debt collection calls.
39. We also understand that debts may be transferred from one servicer or collector to 
another.  This stop-calling request is specific to the debt and the consumer, and transfers with the debt; 
once the consumer has asked that the number of federal debt collection calls be reduced to zero, only the 
consumer can alter that number restriction.  Consequently, a stop-calling requests applies to a subsequent 
collector or servicer of the same debt.
128
  In reaching this determination, we reject a commenter’s proposal 
that a stop-calling request be limited to a period of time such as a month, but be renewable.
129
  Because 
the stop-calling request for federal debt collection calls applies for the life of the debt, servicers and 
collectors must ensure that information regarding the request conveys with the other relevant information 
regarding the debt when it is sold or transferred between servicers or collectors.
130
  The requirement that 
the stop-call request conveys from one servicer or collector to the next implicates the Paperwork 
Reduction Act, as indicated in our rules, contained in Appendix A, and in the Final Regulatory Flexibility 
Act, contained in Appendix C.
40. Granting consumers a right to request calls stop at any point is only useful if consumers 
know of this right.
131
  We agree with the FTC staff that “[a]n opt-out right [] is only effective if it is well-
known”
132
rather than with the commenters who argue that a consumer should be notified of the right only 
once and in writing,
133
or that notifying consumers of the right within every phone call will “cause a 
consumer to attach undue significance to such a right.”
134
  We, therefore, require callers to inform debtors 
of their right to make such a request.
135
  The disclosure of rights must inform the debtor that he or she has 
                                                     
125
The TCPA does not prohibit callers from manually dialing these calls even if the consumer requests that the 
caller cease making autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice calls.  CFPB Comments at 10; SLSA 
Comments at 30-31; ISL Comments at 2.
126
See, e.g., Markey Nov. 18, 2016 Letter at 1; MFY Comments at 2; NCLC Comments at 3; AFR Comments at 2; 
CAC Comments at 2.
127
See para. 5, supra.
128
ACA Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd at 564-65, paras. 9-10 (discussing calls made “in connection with an 
existing debt”).  While the Commission is not imposing specific record-keeping requirements for stop-calling 
requests, callers bear the burden of proof should there be any dispute about such requests.  Callers, therefore, are 
advised to maintain a record of such requests and to transfer them to subsequent callers along with other information 
about the debt.
129
NCHER Comments at 14.
130
Compare CMC Comments at 16 with NCLC Comments at 29.
131
Brown Letter at 2; Markey Jun. 8, 2016 Letter at 1; CFPB Comments at 11.
132
FTC BCP Staff Comments at 11; see also CAC Comments at 2.
133
ConServe Comments at 11.
134
ACA Comments at 19.
135
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (disclosure requirements are consistent 
with the First Amendment so long as they are “reasonably related to the [government's] interest in preventing 
deception of consumers”).  The disclosure we require here prevents deception because, without the disclosure, 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
19
a right to request that no further autodialed, artificial-voice, or prerecorded-voice calls be made to the 
debtor for the life of the debt, and that such request may be made by any reasonable method.  Disclosures 
must be made in a manner that gives debtors an effective opportunity to stop future calls.  Callers must 
disclose this consumer right within every completed autodialed call with a live caller, whether the caller 
speaks with the debtor or leaves a voicemail message.  Calls using a prerecorded or artificial voice must 
disclose the right within each message.
136
  Covered text messages must disclose the right within each text 
message or in a separate text message that contains only the disclosure and is sent immediately preceding 
the first covered text message.  If the disclosure is in a separate text message, that message does not count 
toward the numeric limits we impose in this Order.  
41. The Commission has previously determined that consumers may opt out of calls for 
which prior consent is required, and that they may do so using any reasonable method, including orally or 
in response to a text message.
137
  Here, where the federal debt collection calls do not require consent, but 
where consumers may request at any time that calls stop, consumers may also make a stop-calling request 
using any reasonable method, including orally or in response to a text message.  We reach this conclusion 
regarding the methods by which a consumer may make a stop-calling request after considering consumer 
confusion, standard calling practices, and recordkeeping procedures.
138
  We anticipate that confusion will 
be minimized and calling practices will be streamlined if stop-calling methods and opt-out procedures are 
consistent.  For similar reasons, we determine that federal debt collection calls made using a prerecorded 
or artificial voice must include an automated, interactive voice- and/or key press-activated opt-out 
mechanism so that debtors who receive these calls may make a stop-calling request during the call by 
pressing a single key.
139
  When a federal debt collection call using an artificial voice or prerecorded voice 
leaves a voicemail message, that message must also provide a toll-free number that the debtor may call at 
a later time to connect directly to the automated, interactive voice and/or key press-activated mechanism 
and automatically record the stop-calling request.  Text message disclosures must include brief 
explanatory instructions for sending a stop-call request by reply text message and provide a toll-free 
number that enables the debtor to call back later to make a stop-call request.  The requirement that the 
artificial- and prerecorded-voice calls, as well as text messages, include opt-out instructions and features 
implicates the Paperwork Reduction Act, as indicated in our rules, contained in Appendix A, and in the 
Final Regulatory Flexibility Act, contained in Appendix C.
42. When may federal debt collection calls be made?  In order for a federal debt collection
call to produce the intended effect of “collect[ing] a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States,”
140
it must occur close in time to a key event in the life of the debt.  As set forth above, calls “solely to collect 
a debt” may be collection calls or servicing calls because both increase the likelihood of a debt being 
collected.  We have interpreted the statutory phrase “solely to collect a debt” to limit debt collection calls 
to a period when a debt is delinquent, and to limit debt servicing calls to following a specific, time-
sensitive event and in the 30 days before such an event.  We here use the authority Congress granted us to 
limit the number and duration of calls “to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”
141
  
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
consumers may be deceived into believing that they must be subject to these federal debt collection calls.  See also
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
136
47 U.S.C. § 227(d)(3).
137
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7996, para. 64.
138
See FTC BCP Staff Comments at 11 (“FTC staff supports expanding the opt-out mechanisms for telemarketing 
robocalls to the covered debt collection calls due to the similar significant impact on consumer privacy.”).
139
Cf. 47 CFR § 64.1200(b)(3); 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(7)(i)(B); see also 16 CFR § 310.4(b)(1)(v)(B)(ii)(A)-(B); FTC 
BCP Staff Comments at 10; NCLC Comments at 30; NCHER Comments at 15.
140
Budget Act § 301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)).
141
Budget Act § 301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
20
The rules we enact today state that zero calls are permitted under the Budget Act amendments unless they 
occur: (1) during the period of delinquency for debt collection calls; and (2) following an enumerated, 
specific, time-sensitive event and in the 30 days before such an event for debt servicing calls.  
43. Content of the calls.  As stated above, our interpretation of the statutory phrase “solely to 
collect a debt” excludes calls that contain marketing, advertising, or selling products or services.  We here 
use the authority Congress granted us to limit the number and duration of calls “to collect a debt owed to 
or guaranteed by the United States.”
142
  The rules we enact today state that zero calls are permitted under 
the Budget Act amendments if the autodialed, prerecorded-voice, or artificial-voice call contains any 
marketing, advertising, or selling of products or services.  Commenters support this determination.
143
  Our 
determination regarding calls that contain marketing, advertising, or sales also supports our interpretation 
of Congress’ intent that the calls provide consumers with useful information about repaying their debt, 
and it is a step in preventing the very real problem that consumers will be subject to fraudulent calls and 
programs.
144
44. Calls only to the debtor.  We also here enact rules stating that zero calls are permitted 
under the Budget Act amendments unless the calls are to the debtor or the person responsible for paying 
the debt, and the call is made to that person at one of the three categories of numbers specified in the
Order above.  Our interpretation of the statutory phrase “solely to collect” explains our reasoning for 
establishing these limits on who may be called and the numbers at which these persons may be called.  
We find that the reasoning applies here as well, where Congress has authorized us to limit the number of 
calls made “to collect a debt.”
145
  Calls to persons other than the debtor or other entities responsible for 
paying the debt are not directly tied to collecting a debt.  In balancing the inconvenience to uninvolved 
persons against the interests of callers, we determine it is not appropriate to extend federal debt collection
calls beyond the debtor and others responsible for paying the debt.  Likewise, calls to numbers other than 
the three categories of telephone numbers we specified above are unlikely to reach the person responsible 
for repaying the debt, and so are unlikely to result in collection of the debt.  We, therefore, limit to zero 
calls made to persons or telephone numbers other than these.
45. Call limits are per caller.  Commenters also ask the Commission to “clarify whether the 
[limited number of federal debt collection calls] is per debtor (e.g., inclusive of all telephone numbers 
used by the debtor)”
146
per delinquency,
147
or per servicer or collector.
148
  One consumer advocate states: 
“[B]ecause many consumers have multiple loans—often eight to ten student loans for each borrower—we 
recommend that the number of calls or texts permitted to be made without consent should be limited to 
three calls per servicer or collector.  Without this limitation, consumers who have eight to ten outstanding 
loans, as many do, could be receiving between twenty-four and thirty robocalls per month to their cell 
phones.”
149
  Because the Commission has set the federal debt collection call limit at three calls per thirty 
days, that number could rise to twenty-four to thirty robocalls per month if we were to determine that the 
call limit applied per loan.  In light of the record, and to prevent an excessive number of calls to 
individual debtors, we determine that the call limit on federal debt collection calls to wireless numbers 
                                                     
142
Budget Act § 301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)).
143
See, e.g., FTC BCP Staff Comments at 7-8; ACA Comments at 10-11; NCHER Comments at 5; EFC Comments 
at 4; NCLC Comments at 20.
144
See FTC BCP Staff Comments at 3; CMC Comments at 17.
145
Budget Act § 301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)).
146
NSC Comments at 8.
147
EFC Comments at 7.
148
CU Comments at 4; MFY Comments at 2; AFR Comments at 2; NCLC Comments at 25; YI Comments at 2.
149
NCLC Comment at 3.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
21
applies for each servicer or collector.
150
  If the servicer or collector has contracts with the United States 
for more than one type of debt—for example to collect or service student loans and Department of 
Agriculture loans—the servicer may utilize a three-call in thirty day limit for each type of loan the 
servicer or collector manages for the debtor.
46. Length of federal debt collection calls.  In the NPRM, we sought comment on the 
maximum duration of a voice call, and whether we should adopt different duration limits for prerecorded-
or artificial-voice calls than for autodialed calls with a live caller.  Commenters generally support the idea 
of a maximum length for artificial-voice and prerecorded-voice calls, but not a maximum length for 
autodialed calls with a live caller because this could impinge on a potentially lengthy conversation 
between a servicer and a debtor.
151
  Commenters who support a maximum length for artificial- and 
prerecorded-voice calls suggest caps of 30 or 60 seconds.
152
  Some commenters suggest that the time limit 
include time for any required disclosures, while others ask that required disclosures be outside of any time 
cap the Commission sets.
153
  In light of the record, we determine that artificial-voice and prerecorded-
voice calls may not exceed 60 seconds, exclusive of any required disclosures.  We do not place any cap 
on the duration of live-caller, autodialed calls made pursuant to the Budget Act exception.
47. We also asked in the NPRM whether we should impose a limit on the length of text 
messages, and what that limit should be.  Commenters note that senders of text messages generally keep 
the messages short because “[a] long text message would get split up into multiple texts and could 
confuse the borrower.”
154
  Other commenters ask that any cap on the length of a text message account for 
required disclosures.
155
  Text messages are generally limited to 160 characters.
156
  As stated above, any 
required disclosures may be included within this 160-character limit for a single text message or may be 
sent as a separate text message that does not count toward the numeric limits we impose herein.
48. Time of day restrictions.  We impose an additional restriction on the number of federal 
debt collection calls or texts allowed, and determine that no federal debt collection calls or texts are 
permitted outside the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. (local time at the called party’s location), which is 
identical to the rule for telemarketing calls.
157
  Congress stated that federal debt collection calls are 
intended “to collect a debt,” and during these times consumers are likely available to answer calls and 
receptive to receiving information from callers.  The record supports our determination that consumers 
                                                     
150
CAC Comments at 2.
151
See, e.g., NCHER Comments at 12-13; CFBP Comments at 11-12; Letter from Timothy M. Fitzgibbon, Senior 
Vice President, National Council of Higher Education Resources, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 3 (Apr. 
05, 2016) (on file in CG Docket No. 02-278) (NCHER Letter); NSC Comments at 10-11; ECF Comments at 8; 
OSLA Comments at 2; NCHER Comments at 13; AFSA Comments at 8; ACA Comments at 20; ConServe 
Comments at 2; CMC Comments at 15; ISL Comments at 2; ABA/CBA Comments at 11-12; SLSA Comments at 
28.
152
ECF Comments at 8; NCHER Comments at 13; NCLC Comments at 26; SLSA Comments at 29.
153
CFPB Comments at 11-12; NCLC Comments at 26; SLSA Comments at 29.  
154
AFSA Comments at 8.
155
CFPB Comments at 12; EF Comments at 8.
156
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_Message_Service.
157
See 47 CFR § 64.1200(c)(1).  One commenter argues that it “cannot determine which time zone the borrower is 
in.”  Nelnet Comments at 15.  Another commenter states that it has adopted operational practices involving ZIP 
codes to better determine a consumer’s likely location rather than relying on area code.  ECMC Comments at 8.  The 
rule we adopt today is the same as our time-of-day restriction on telemarketing calls and as the FTC’s Telemarketing 
Sales Rule.  This restriction has not proved unworkable, and we do not anticipate that it will be unfeasible here.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
22
are generally comfortable with receiving calls during these times.
158
  Furthermore, FTC staff notes that the 
FDCPA and the Telemarketing Sales Rule “similarly limit debt collection and telemarketing calls to this 
same timeframe.”
159
  Adding a new category of calls to this generally accepted timeframe will cause less 
inconvenience and confusion to consumers than if we were to impose a different schedule or no schedule 
for these calls.  Likewise, call centers that contract with businesses to make calls on their behalf are 
familiar with these time-of-day restrictions; this restriction should not impose a burden on callers or their 
contractors making federal debt collection calls.  
49. Multiple sets of regulations.  We acknowledge that other statutes and regulations impact 
debt collection calls, yet we recognize that Congress assigned to the Commission responsibility for 
crafting rules for autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice debt collection calls where the debt is 
owed to or guaranteed by the United States.  Because Congress specifically gave the Commission certain 
authority over these federal debt collection calls, we assume that callers will follow the most restrictive 
rules for the call being made.  Which rules apply will vary based on a number of factors, such as whether 
the caller is a debt collector or a debt servicer, the nature of the debt, and the length of delinquency.  
Where multiple rules apply to the same call and one of the rules is enacted by the Commission to 
implement the TCPA, a caller must comply with the most restrictive requirements regarding factors such 
as frequency, time of day, and so on.  Section 301 affects the TCPA and its implementing regulations but 
does not affect other laws, including specifically those for which the CFPB or the FTC have 
responsibility.
160
C. Other Implementation Issues
50. Covered Calls to Residential Lines.  We note that under our current rules, artificial- or 
prerecorded-voice calls to residential lines that are made for the purpose of collecting a debt are currently 
not subject to the prior express consent requirement.  Although the TCPA allows for broad coverage of 
the prior express consent requirement to all non-emergency artificial- and prerecorded-voice calls to 
residential lines,
161
the Commission has exercised its statutory exemption authority so as to apply the 
consent requirement only to calls that include or introduce an advertisement or constitute telemarketing.
162
The Commission has also found that debt collection calls do not constitute telemarketing.
163
  
51. Congress, in authorizing the Commission to enact rules implementing the Budget Act’s 
amendments, stated that the Commission could “restrict or limit the number and duration of calls made to 
a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service.”
164
  Congress, by omission, did not authorize 
the Commission to enact rules to limit the number and duration of calls made to a telephone number 
assigned to a residential telephone line.  Commenters support this understanding of the Budget Act 
amendment with regard to calls to numbers assigned to residential lines, stating: “Congress did not grant 
the Commission the authority to restrict or limit” these calls.
165
  Consequently, the Commission’s current
rules regarding non-telemarketing autodialed, prerecorded-voice, and artificial-voice calls to residential 
                                                     
158
See, e.g., Markey June 8, 2016 Letter at 1; EFC Comments at 8; NCHER Comments at 12; NCLC Comments at 
3; ACA Comments at 9-20; CAC Comments at 2.  
159
FTC BCP Staff Comments at 9-10.
160
See CFPB Comments at 4; FTC BCP Staff Comments at 1.
161
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (requiring prior express consent for all non-emergency artificial- or prerecorded-voice 
calls to residential lines unless exempted by the Commission).
162
47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(3); 1992 TCPA Order, 7 FCC Rcd at 8755, para. 5
163
ACA Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd at 565, para. 11.
164
Budget Act § 301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)).
165
ABA/CBA Comments at 9; see also Navient Comments at 15-16; NCHER Comments at 15; ConServe 
Comments at 12; ECMC Comments at 11; SLSA Comments at 32.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
23
numbers are not altered by the Budget Act amendments.  The Commission is not imposing restrictions on 
these calls.  Callers may, however, be subject to restrictions under other applicable statutes and 
regulations, such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
52. Restrictions on Calls to Cellular Telephone Service.  Congress authorized the 
Commission to “restrict or limit the number and duration of calls made to a telephone number assigned to 
a cellular telephone service to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”
166
  Yet, the 
amendment to the TCPA, authorizing calls made to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United 
States, is broader, applying to “any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone 
service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which 
the called party is charged for the call.”
167
  Considering the identical language in the prior delegation of 
authority in Section 227(b)(2)(C), we conclude that Congress delegated the Commission authority to limit 
the number and duration of all calls made pursuant to the debt collection exception in section 
227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 
53. Congress, in granting the Commission authority to limit the number and duration of calls, 
used identical language to the language it used in the separate delegation of authority in Section 
227(b)(2)(C).
168
  The identical language in these two delegations of authority indicates that Congress 
intended the two provisions to apply to the same services.
169
  
54. The Commission has interpreted Section 227(b)(2)(C) to apply to all services mentioned 
in Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).  In so doing, it has interpreted “cellular telephone service” by asking whether 
services are functionally equivalent from the consumer perspective rather than on technical or regulatory 
differences, such as which spectrum block is used to provide the service.
170
  This avoids, for example, 
consumers receiving wireless voice service from being treated differently depending on which spectrum 
block their carriers use and callers having to determine which spectrum block is used for a particular 
consumer’s service in order to know which requirements apply.  
55. Applying the canon of statutory construction that Congress knows the law, including 
relevant agency interpretations, at the time it adopts a statute, we presume that Congress knew of the 
Commission’s interpretation of this key language.
171
Congress used the same language in the recent 
delegation of authority without taking any action to alter the Commission’s interpretation of identical 
language elsewhere in the same statute.  We therefore conclude that the authority delegated to us in the 
new Section 227(b)(2)(H) added by the Budget Act applies to all services to which amended Section 
227(b)(1)(A)(iii) applies.  
56. Application of Other TCPA Restrictions to Covered Calls.  We believe the most 
reasonable interpretation of the Budget Act amendments is that they except covered calls from the 
requirement to obtain the consent of the called party, and that calls must in every other respect comply 
                                                     
166
Budget Act § 301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)).
167
Budget Act § 301(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).
168
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C) (authorizing the Commission to exempt certain calls made “to a number assigned to a 
cellular telephone service” from the requirements of Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).  
169
See, e.g., Vonage Holdings Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
170
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7988, para. 43 n.174.  The Commission also has 
taken a similar consumer-oriented approach to wireless services in other contexts.  See also Implementation of 
Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive 
Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, WT Docket No. 13-
135, Seventeenth Report, 29 FCC Rcd 15311, 15314, para. 3 (WTB 2014) (“Similar to previous reports, the analysis 
in this Report is based on a consumer-oriented view of mobile services, with a focus on specific product categories 
regardless of their regulatory classification.”).
171
See, e.g., Washington Legal Foundation v. U.S. Sentencing Commission, 17 F.3d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
24
with the TCPA unless compliance with a requirement of the TCPA is prohibited by a separate regulation 
pertaining to debt collection calls generally.  The Budget Act amendments apply to the consent 
requirement of Section (b)(1), but other sections of the TCPA are left unaffected.  For example, the 
identification requirements of section 64.1200(b)(1)-(2) apply to both excepted calls and other calls made 
using an autodialer, a prerecorded voice, and an artificial voice.  The exception Congress created in the 
Budget Act amendments is not an exception to compliance with the TCPA as a whole, but only with the 
requirement to obtain the consent of the called party to make the call.  The Commission will resolve 
conflicts on a case-by-case basis.
57. Other Issues.  Commenters in the record raise other arguments for the Commission’s 
consideration in enacting rules for the Budget Act amendments.  For example, one commenter asks the 
Commission to state that “no debt collection calls [may be made to] people receiving Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) benefits on the basis of old age or disability, and that Treasury not pass along 
information on debts owed by SSI recipients to debt collectors.”
172
  Another commenter asks the 
Commission to develop “a separate set of rules to assist federal student loan borrowers.”
173
  A separate 
commenter asks the Commission to create a certification system that authorizes callers to use autodialers 
for purposes of making covered calls and only renews the certification if the caller’s yearly performance 
meets standards established by the Commission and the Department of Education.
174
  The Commission 
declines to address these and other ancillary issues and arguments raised in the record as they are outside 
the scope of this proceeding.  Moreover, these issues are not fully developed in the record and we would 
need more facts to meaningfully and cogently address these issues.
D. Severability
58. All of the rules that are adopted in this Order are designed to ensure a caller’s ability to 
make calls pursuant to the Budget Act amendments and a debtor’s ability to control the calls he or she 
receives.  Each of the determinations we undertake in this Order serve a particular function toward this 
goal.  Therefore, it is our intent that each of the rules and regulations adopted herein shall be severable.  
We believe that debtors will benefit from the information they may receive from callers and will also 
benefit from the ability to ask that calls be stopped.  If any of the rules or regulations, or portions thereof, 
are declared invalid or unenforceable for any reason, it is our intent that the remaining rules shall be in 
full force and effect.  
E. Effective Date
59. As noted in the discussion above, two portions of our rules implicate the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA).  These portions involve the rules for the recording of a debtor’s request to stop 
receiving autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice calls to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed 
by the United States, and rules for the conveyance of that stop-call request from one servicer or collector 
to another.  Because these portions of our rules implicate the PRA, they will not become effective until 60
days after the Commission publishes a Notice in the Federal Register indicating approval of the 
information collection by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
60. The remaining rules will not become effective until the rules requiring OMB approval 
become effective.  While these remaining rules do not require OMB approval and could become effective 
immediately upon release of this Order, we determine that the consumer-protection rules regarding stop-
call requests and conveyance of those requests are so integral to this regulatory scheme that the remaining 
rules should not become effective until the consumer-protection rules are in place.  The rules that could 
become effective immediately permit a caller to make calls—they specify how many calls may be made, 
who may make the calls, when the calls can be made, and to which numbers the calls may be made, 
                                                     
172
NCLC Comments at 16.
173
AACC Comments at 2.
174
UNCF Comments at 2.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
25
among other things.  These rules give effect to one of the reasonable interpretations we have identified for 
Congress’ passage of the Budget amendments: to make it easier for owners of debts owed to or 
guaranteed by the United States and their contractors to make calls to collect debts.  But the second 
reasonable interpretation—to make it easier for consumers to obtain useful information about debt 
repayment—carries with it a consumer’s prerogative to determine that the debtor does not want the 
information conveyed in the calls and to ask that the calls stop.  The rules that give effect to this 
interpretation of Congress’ intent are delayed by PRA requirements and OMB approval.  We determine 
that the regulatory scheme we implement today must include both the ability for callers to make calls and 
the right of debtors to ask that calls stop—and that both portions of the regulatory scheme become 
effective simultaneously.  To do otherwise would be to allow callers to make calls but to leave debtors 
with no consumer protections until OMB approval is complete.  We determine that both portions of the 
rules must become effective for the regulatory scheme to be effective.
IV. JURISDICTION
61. In section 301 of the Budget Act, Congress amended section 227 of the Communications 
Act by, inter alia, adding subparagraph (b)(2)(H), which grants the Commission authority to “restrict or 
limit the number and duration of calls made to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone 
service to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”
175
  Section 301 also directed the 
Commission to “prescribe regulations to implement the amendments made by this section.”
176
  With this 
Order, we exercise these grants of authority by adopting regulations that limit both the number and 
duration of calls covered by subparagraph (b)(2)(H).  These limitations apply irrespective of the identity 
of the caller and thus encompass wireless debt-collection calls placed by the owner of the debt or its 
contractors.  We find that this approach—which focuses on the type of “calls made” to a cellular number 
and not the identity of the caller—is consistent both with the Budget Act and with the Broadnet 
Declaratory Ruling in which we recently found that the federal government and its agents are not 
“persons” covered by section 227(b)(1).  
62. By its express terms, new subparagraph (b)(2)(H) authorizes the Commission to regulate 
the frequency and duration of government-debt-collection “calls made” to cellular numbers, even though 
those calls are excepted from the TCPA’s separate prior-express-consent requirement by virtue of the 
Budget Act’s amendment of section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
177
  Given that the same section of the Budget Act 
both excepts these calls from the prior-express-consent requirement and authorizes the FCC to regulate 
their frequency and duration, it seems clear that Congress’s goal in adding section 227(b)(2)(H) was to 
protect consumers by ensuring that calls that are excepted from the consent requirement are nonetheless 
regulated in other respects.
178
  Moreover, whereas the prior-express-consent requirement applies only to 
“persons”—which the Commission has interpreted to exclude the federal government and its agents
179
—
section 227(b)(2)(H) contains no such limitation on the Commission’s authority to regulate the frequency 
and duration of government-debt-collection “calls.”  Thus, although we have ruled that calls by the 
federal government and its agents are excepted from the prior-express-consent requirement of section 
                                                     
175
Budget Act § 301(a)(2)(C) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H)). 
176
Budget Act § 301(b).
177
Budget Act § 301(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).
178
We find no support for the claim in one dissent that “[t]he Budget Act exemption was designed to protect federal 
agencies and their contractors from liability when they make calls without consent of the called party,” or that the 
“intent of the law . . . was to enable lenders to use modern dialing equipment as part of their efforts to collect debt.”  
No legislative history is cited for these assertions, nor does any appear to exist.  Further, had Congress wanted 
callers to be wholly exempt from liability, or never to manually place calls, it would not have granted the 
Commission express authority to adopt rules limiting the number and duration of debt-collection robocalls.   
179
Broadnet Declaratory Ruling, FCC 16-72 at para. 10.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
26
227(b)(1),
180
we conclude that calls by the federal government and its contractors are subject to the 
regulations we promulgate in this order pursuant to our authority to regulate the frequency and duration of 
calls under section 227(b)(2)(H).
181
63. This conclusion is further supported by the timing of the Budget Act.  In particular, when 
Congress passed that legislation, the Commission had not yet resolved whether the federal government or 
its contractors are “person[s]” subject to the prior-express-consent requirement of section 
227(b)(1)(A)(iii).  Against this backdrop (of which Congress presumptively was aware
182
), Congress 
wrote subsection (b)(2)(H) in language that does not limit the Commission’s regulatory authority under 
this new subparagraph to “persons.”  This decision indicates that Congress intended the regulations 
adopted under this new subsection to apply to all callers, not just those who qualify as “person[s]” under 
the statute, and thus to apply to the federal government and government contractors even if the 
Commission were to find (as it later did) that those entities do not qualify as “persons” under subsection 
(b)(1)(A)(iii).
183
  (This inference is also consistent with the view, articulated in the previous paragraph, 
that Congress intended to protect consumers by authorizing frequency and duration limits as a substitute 
for the prior-express-consent requirement for calls that are no longer covered by the latter requirement.)  
If, on the other hand, Congress had wanted to exclude the federal government or government contractors 
from the frequency and duration limits, it naturally could have done so by adding language to that effect.  
For instance, Congress easily could have added a proviso at the end of subparagraph (b)(2)(H) along the 
following lines: “[The Commission] may restrict or limit the number and duration of calls made to a 
telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the 
United States, except that the Commission may not so restrict or limit any call made by the federal 
government or its contractors.”  That Congress opted not to include such a proviso supports our 
conclusion that Congress’s intent in adopting section 301 was to authorize the Commission to limit the 
frequency and duration of any debt collection call that meets the parameters of section 227(b)(2)(H), 
without regard to the identity of the caller.
64. We reject arguments in both dissents that the prefatory reference to “person” in section 
227(b)(1) necessarily means that any rules adopted under subparagraph (b)(2)(H) must extend only to 
“persons.”  In addition to the reasons cited above, we believe a broader interpretation of (b)(2)(H) is at 
least rendered permissible by the literal language of section 227(b)(2).  That paragraph directs the 
Commission to prescribe regulations to implement the requirements “of this subsection.”  The term “this 
subsection” refers to the entirety of subsection (b).  While one of the requirements in subsection (b) is set 
forth in paragraph (b)(1), which hinges on whether the caller is a “person,” another requirement in 
subsection (b) appears in new subparagraph (b)(2)(H).  There, no mention whatsoever is made of 
“persons”; rather, the clear focus is on the nature of the call—namely, whether it is “made” to a cellular 
                                                     
180
See id.
181
In reaching this conclusion, we note that the Budget Act amendments to the TCPA were enacted some 25 years 
after the statute first became law.  
182
See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527-233 (1994), citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 
(1978) (Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute); Goodyear 
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184 (1988) (Congress is presumed to know the existing law pertinent to the 
legislation it enacts); Hernstadt v. FCC, 677 F.2d 893, n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Congress is presumed to be cognizant 
of, and legislate against the background of, existing interpretations of law.”); Letter from Robert E. Latta, United 
States Congress, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 1 (July 8, 2015) (on file in CG Docket No. 02-278) 
(writing in support of petitions filed by Broadnet Teleservices, LLC, and RTI International, Inc., seeking 
clarification that the “Commission’s TCPA rules do not apply to calls made by or on behalf of local, state and 
federal governments”). 
183
To be clear, in the Broadnet Declaratory Ruling the Commission found that the federal government and its 
agents are not persons under section 227(b)(1).  See Broadnet Declaratory Ruling, FCC 16-72 at para. 10.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
27
number “to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”
184
  Thus, under a literal reading of 
the statute, the Commission has clear authority to adopt number-and-duration limits that apply to all 
government debt collection calls, irrespective of whether they were made by a “person.”  In addition, we 
do not think that our authority under section 227(b)(2)(H) is necessarily limited by section 227(b)(1), 
given that section 227(b)(2)(H) grants us authority to regulate a class of calls (those to collect certain 
government-backed debts) that, by definition, are not subject to section 227(b)(1).
65. For similar reasons, we reject the argument of one dissenter that our interpretation of 
subparagraph (b)(2)(H) is impermissible because federal law does not apply to the sovereign absent 
“some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary.”
185
  Here, Congress has provided the 
requisite affirmative showing by carefully structuring
186
subsection (b) such that paragraph (b)(2) 
empowers the FCC to prescribe regulations to implement any requirement in the entire “subsection,” 
whether located in (b)(1) or (b)(2).  We see no reason to effectively rewrite this directive by restricting 
our rulemaking authority solely to requirements set forth in (b)(1).  Finally, the “settled propositio[n]” 
that waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity “cannot be implied” is simply not relevant here.  
This item simply does not address sovereign immunity, which is an issue for the courts to decide, as one 
dissenter has previously emphasized.
187
  This item simply interprets what we understand the TCPA itself 
to require, and if a defendant facing claims for violating the TCPA wants to raise a sovereign immunity 
defense, it remains free to do so, and the court can then address whether these TCPA requirements 
constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.
66. Finally, there is no merit to the claim of one dissenter that the Commission failed to 
provide adequate notice “to non-persons such as the federal government.”  In the NPRM, the Commission 
expressly raised the issue of the government’s personhood, noting that “petitions pending before the 
Commission seek clarification regarding the meaning of ‘persons’ and whether the federal government or 
its agents are persons for purposes of the TCPA, among other things.”
188
  Against that backdrop of 
uncertainty regarding the government’s personhood, the Commission sought comment on “what types of 
number and duration restrictions we should adopt for the covered calls” and “how we should restrict or 
limit the number and duration of covered calls,” and then proceeded to “propose that the limit on the 
number of [covered] calls should be for any initiated calls,” provided those calls were “autodialed, 
prerecorded, or artificial voice calls to wireless numbers.”
189
  The expansive nature of this proposal, which 
would cover “any” initiated call, should have made clear the Commission was at least contemplating 
applying number-and-duration limits to all debt-collection calls to wireless numbers, regardless of the 
identity of the caller.  At a minimum, therefore, this outcome qualifies as a logical outgrowth of the 
NPRM.
190
  
                                                     
184
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(H).
185
See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Unites States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781 (2000).
186
In this regard, we agree with the statement in one dissent that “[t]he structure is key” when interpreting paragraph 
(b)(2).  We see no relevance, however, to the fact that the FCC has not previously found relevant the omission of the 
word “person” in subparagraphs other than (b)(2)(H).  The agency’s prior silence is this regard has no bearing on the 
issues now before us, and should not be read as some kind of implicit endorsement of a view contrary to the one we 
now adopt.
187
See Statement of Commissioner Pai to Broadnet Declaratory Ruling (stating that “[t]he federal common law of 
immunity is a general body of law that covers numerous agencies,” and the FCC “cannot opine . . . on its scope or 
meaning”).  
188
NPRM at para. 16.  
189
NPRM at para. 18 (emphasis added).  
190
See, e.g., United States Telecom. Ass’n v. FCC, 2016 WL 3251234, *10 (2016) (“An NPRM satisfies 
the logical outgrowth test if it “expressly ask[s] for comments on a particular issue or otherwise ma[kes] clear that 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
28
V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
1. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
67. Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended,
191
the Commission’s 
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis in this Order is attached as Appendix C. 
2. Paperwork Reduction Act
68. The Order contains either new or modified information collection requirements subject to 
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA).
192
  It will be submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for review under Section 3507(d) of the PRA.  OMB, the general public, and other federal 
agencies are invited to comment on the new or modified information collection requirements contained in 
this proceeding.  
3. Congressional Review Act
69. The Commission will send a copy of this Report and Order to Congress and the 
Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. §
801(a)(1)(A).
4. Late-Filed Comments
70. We note that there were comments filed late in this proceeding.  In the interest of having 
as complete and accurate a records as possible, and because we would be free to consider the substance of 
those filings as part of the record in this proceeding in any event,
193
we will accept the late-filed 
comments and waive the requirements of 47 CFR § 1.46(b), and have considered them in this I Order.
5. Materials in Accessible Formats
71. To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, 
electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental 
Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (tty).  This Report and Order can also be 
downloaded in Text and ASCII formats at: https://www.fcc.gov/general/telemarketing-and-robocalls.
VI. ORDERING CLAUSES
72. IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to the authority contained in sections 1-4, 227, and 303(r) of 
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-154, 227, 303(r); and the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act as amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Public Law 114-74, 129 
Stat. 584, that this Report and Order IS ADOPTED and that Part 64 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 
64.1200, is amended as set forth in Appendix A.  The requirements of this Report and Order shall 
become effective 60 days after the Commission’s publication of a notice in the Federal Register, which 
will announce approval of portions of the rules requiring approval by OMB under the PRA. 
73. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission’s Consumer & Governmental 
Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, SHALL SEND a copy of this Report and Order to 
Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 
U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
the agency [is] contemplating a particular change.” (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Surface Transportation 
Board, 584 F.3d 1076, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
191
See 5 U.S.C. § 603.
192
Pub. L. No. 104-13.
193
See 47 CFR § 1.1206 (discussing ex parte filings in permit-but-disclose proceedings).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
29
74. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission’s Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, SHALL SEND a copy of this Report and Order, 
including the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
30
APPENDIX A
Final Rules
The Federal Communications Commission amends part 64 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) as follows
PART 64 – MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS
1. The authority citation for part 64 is amended to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. § 154, 254(k); 403(b)(2)(B), (c), Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.  Interp. or apply 47 
U.S.C. 201, 218, 222, 225, 226, 227, 228, 254(k), 616, 620, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation 
Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-96, and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584 unless 
otherwise noted.
2. Amend section 64.1200 by revising paragraphs (a)(1)(iii) and (a)(3)(iv), (v), and (vi); by adding 
paragraphs (f)(17), (i), and (j) to read as follows:
§ 64.1200 Delivery restrictions.
(a) * * * 
(1) * * * 
(iii) To any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile 
radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged 
for the call, unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the federal 
government of the United States.
* * * 
(3) * * *
(iv) Is made by or on behalf of a tax-exempt nonprofit organization;
(v) Delivers a “health care” message made by, or on behalf of, a “covered entity” or its “business 
associate,” as those terms are defined in the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 15 CFR 160.103; or 
(vi) Is made solely pursuant to the collection of a debt owed to or guaranteed by the federal government 
of the United States.
* * * 
(f) * * *
(17) The term debtor for paragraphs (i) and (j) of this section means the debtor; a co-signor or other 
person or entity legally obligated to pay the debt; and an executor, guardian, administrator, receiver, 
trustee, or similar legal representative of the debtor or of another person or entity legally obligated to pay 
the debt.
***
(i) A telephone call is made “solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States” for 
purposes of paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this section only if:
(1) the telephone call has as its exclusive subject a debt that, at the time of the call, is owed to or 
guaranteed by the federal government of the United States and contains no marketing, advertising, or 
sales information;
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
31
(2) the telephone call is made by the owner of the debt, or its contractor, to the debtor and the entire 
content of the call is directly and reasonably related either to:
(A) collecting payment of a delinquent amount in order to cure such delinquency or resolve the debt 
either by obtaining payment of such delinquent amount or by entering into an alternative payment 
arrangement that will cure such delinquency or resolve the debt, during a time period when a delinquency 
exists, or
(B) collecting payment of the debt by providing information about changes to the amount or timing of 
payments following the end of, or in the 30 days before: a grace, deferment, or forbearance period; 
expiration of an alternative payment arrangement; or occurrence of a similar time-sensitive event or 
deadline affecting the amount or timing of payments due; and
(3) the telephone call is made to the debtor at:
(A) the wireless telephone number the debtor provided at the time the debt was incurred, 
(B) a wireless telephone number subsequently provided by the debtor to the owner of the debt or the 
owner’s contractor, or
(C) a wireless telephone number the owner of the debt or its contractor has obtained from an independent 
source, provided that the number actually is the debtor’s telephone number.
(j) A telephone call made using an autodialer or a prerecorded or artificial voice “to collect a debt owed to 
or guaranteed by the United States” must comply with the following limits on the number and duration of 
such calls:
(1) The maximum number of telephone calls that may be made to a debtor is:
(A) three telephone calls within a thirty-day period, and
(B) zero telephone calls following a request by the debtor for no further telephone calls.
These limits apply in the aggregate as follows:  Where the owner of the debt makes the telephone calls 
itself, this limit applies to all telephone calls made by the owner of the debt to the debtor.  Where a 
contractor of the owner(s) makes telephone calls, multiple debts owed by one debtor shall be considered 
one debt if the agent or contractor is servicing or collecting those debts on behalf of the same owner under 
the same contractual or agency relationship.  The limit in (j)(1)(B) applies for the life of the debt; the limit 
in (j)(1)(A) applies during each time period in which telephone calls may be made pursuant to paragraph 
(i)(2) of this section.
(2) Artificial-voice and prerecorded-voice telephone calls may not exceed 60 seconds in length, excluding 
any required disclosures and stop-calling instructions.  Text messages are limited to 160 characters in 
length.
(3) Telephone calls must include a disclosure that the debtor has a right to request that no further 
autodialed, artificial-voice, or prerecorded-voice telephone calls be made to the debtor for the life of the 
debt and that such requests can be made by any reasonable method.  Disclosures must be made in a 
manner that gives debtors an effective opportunity to stop future calls.  For voice telephone calls, the 
disclosure must be made within each telephone call.  For text messages, the disclosure must be within 
each text message or in a separate text message that contains only the disclosure and that is sent 
immediately preceding the first text message permitted in paragraph (j)(2).  When the disclosure is made 
in a separate text message, the text message containing the disclosure does not count toward the limits in 
paragraph (j)(2).
(4) A debtor may request to the owner of the debt or its contractor that no further telephone calls be made 
to the debtor for the life of the debt by any reasonable method, including orally and by reply text message.  
No autodialed, prerecorded-voice, or artificial-voice federal debt collection calls are permitted after the 
stop-call request.  Telephone calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice must include an automated, 
interactive voice- and/or key press-activated opt-out mechanism that enables the debtor to make a stop-
calling request prior to terminating the call, including brief explanatory instructions on how to use such 
mechanism. When a debtor elects to make a stop-calling request using such mechanism, the mechanism 
must automatically record the request and immediately terminate the call. When a telephone call using an 
artificial or prerecorded voice leaves a message on an answering machine or a voice mail service, such 
message must also provide a toll free number that enables the debtor to call back at a later time and 
connect directly to the automated, interactive voice- and/or key press-activated opt-out mechanism and 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
32
automatically record the stop-calling request.  Text messages containing the disclosure required in 
paragraph (j)(3) of this section must include brief explanatory instructions for sending a stop-calling 
request by reply text message and provide a toll free number that enables the debtor to call back later to 
make a stop-calling request.
(5) No telephone calls shall be made before 8:00 a.m. or after 9:00 p.m. local time at the debtor’s location.
(6) No calls are permitted if the call contains marketing, advertising, or sales information.
(7) No calls are permitted except to the debtor at: 
(A) the wireless telephone number the debtor provided at the time the debt was incurred, 
(B) a wireless telephone number subsequently provided by the debtor to the owner of the debt or the 
owner’s contractor, or
(C) a wireless telephone number the owner of the debt or its contractor has obtained from an independent 
source, provided that the number actually is the debtor’s telephone number.
(8) No calls are permitted except:
(A) during a time period when a delinquency exists, or
(B) following, or in the 30 days before: the end of a grace, deferment, or forbearance period; expiration of 
an alternative payment arrangement; or occurrence of a similar time-sensitive event or deadline affecting 
the amount or timing of payments due.
(9) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the number and duration rules in this paragraph apply to all 
autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice calls made to a wireless number to collect a debt owed 
to or guaranteed by the United States, including, for example, calls by any governmental entity or its 
agent.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
33
APPENDIX B
Comments Filed
Commenter Abbreviation
ACA International ACA
American Association of Community Colleges AACC
American Bankers Association and Consumer Bankers Association ABA/CBA
American Financial Services Association AFSA
Americans for Financial Reform AFR
Association of Community College Trustees ACCT
California and Nevada Credit Union Leagues CNCUL
College Foundation, Inc. CFI
Connecticut Legal Services, Inc. CLSI
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau CFPB
Consumer Mortgage Coalition* CMC
Consumers Union CU
Continental Service Group ConServe
Credit Union Association of the Dakotas CUAD
Credit Union Nation Association CUNA
Department of Education Dept. of Education
Edfinancial Services, LLC Edfinancial
Education Finance Council EFC
Educational Credit Management Corporation ECMC
Educational Funding of the South, Inc. EFS
FCC Consumer Advisory Committee CAC
Federal Housing Finance Agency FHFA
Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection Staff FTC BCP Staff
Finance Authority of Maine FAME
Frederick Luster Luster
GuidEd Solutions GuidEd
HOPE NOW Alliance HOPE
Iowa Student Loan ISL
MFY Legal Services, Inc. MFY
Mortgage Bankers Association MBA
National Association of College and University Business Officers NACUBO
National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators NASFAA
National Consumer Law Center* NCLC
National Council of Higher Education Resources* NCHER
National Student Loan Program NSLP
Navient Corporation* Navient
Nelnet, Inc.* Nelnet
NHHEAF Network Organizations NHHEAF
Noble Systems Corporation NSC
Oklahoma Student Loan Authority OSLA
Pinnacle Recovery, Inc. Pinnacle
Progressive Financial Services, Inc. Progressive
Quicken Loans Inc. QLI
Robert Biggerstaff Biggerstaff
Senator Edward J. Markey et al.* Markey
Senator Sherrod Brown Brown
Student Loan Servicing Alliance* SLSA
The Institute for College Access & Success TICAS
Transworld Systems Inc. Transworld
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
34
United Negro College Fund UNCF
Utah Higher Education Assistance Authority Utah
Vermont Student Assistance Corporation Vermont
Vincent Lucas* Lucas
Young Invincibles YI
Over 15,700 individuals filed comments directly in the record.  Over 12,500 of those comments expressed 
a general dislike for robocalls, while approximately 2,500 included more pointed comments regarding 
debt collection and calls by the federal government.  In addition to the 15,700 individual comments, 
Consumer’s Union submitted a petition containing 4,800 signatures asking the FCC to stop robocalls to 
cellphones and Americans for Financial Reform submitted a petition containing 5,346 comments from 
members in support of the FCC’s proposed limitations on calls.
* filing both comments and reply comment (bold - reply comments only).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
35
APPENDIX C
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA),
1
as amended, an Initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Analyses (IRFA) was incorporated into the Notice of Proposed Rule Making 
(NRPM).
2
  The Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in the NRPM, including 
comment on the IRFA.  The comments received are discussed below.  This Final Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the RFA.
3
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Order
2. This Report and Order (Order) promulgates rules to implement Section 301 of the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015,
4
which amends the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
5
by excepting 
from that Act’s consent requirement robocalls to wireless numbers “made solely to collect a debt owed to 
or guaranteed by the United States”
6
and authorizing the Commission to adopt rules to “restrict or limit 
the number and duration” of any calls to wireless numbers “to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the 
United States.”
7
  The Budget Act requires the Commission, in consultation with the Department of the 
Treasury, to “prescribe regulations to implement the amendments made” by Section 301 within nine 
months of enactment.
8
  In implementing these provisions, we recognize and seek to balance the 
importance of collecting debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States and the consumer protections 
inherent in the TCPA.  In adopting these rules today, the Commission fulfills the statutory requirement to 
prescribe rules to implement the amendments to the TCPA.
3. Covered Calls.  In paragraphs 11 through 18 of the Order, we interpret “solely to collect 
a debt” and, therefore, calls made pursuant to the exception created by Section 301 of the Budget Act, to 
be limited to 1) debts that are delinquent at the time the calls are made, and 2) debts for which there is an 
imminent, non-speculative risk of delinquency due to a specific, time-sensitive event that affects the 
amount or timing of payments due, such as a deadline to recertify eligibility for an alternative payment 
                                                     
1
5 U.S.C. § 603.  The RFA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 has been amended by the Contract With America Advancement 
Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) (CWAAA).  Title II of the CWAAA is the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA).
2
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 16-57 (May 6, 2016) (NPRM).
3
See 5 U.S.C. § 604.
4
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584 (Budget Act).
5
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) is codified at section 227 of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended.  See 47 U.S.C. § 227.
6
Budget Act § 301(a)(1)(A) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)); see also id. § 301(a)(1)(B) (amending 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(1)(B) to read, in part, that artificial- or prerecorded-voice calls cannot be made to a residential telephone 
line without the consent of the called party unless the call is “made solely pursuant to the collection of a debt owed 
to or guaranteed by the United States”).  “Robocalls” include calls made either with an automatic telephone dialing 
system (“autodialer”) or with a prerecorded or artificial voice.  See Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 
7961, 7694, para. 1 n.1 (2015) (2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order).  The Commission has interpreted the 
TCPA to apply both to voice calls and to text messages.  Id. at 8016-17, para. 107.  Throughout this Order we refer 
to robocalls that are subject to the Budget Act’s consent exception as “covered calls.”
“Calls,” for this exception, include any initiated call; this is consistent with the Commission’s previous interpretation 
of “call” for TCPA purposes.
7
Budget Act § 301(a)(2) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)). 
8
Budget Act § 301(b).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
36
plan or the end of a deferment period.  In paragraphs 19 through 20 of the Order, we interpret “owed to or 
guaranteed by the United States” to include only debts that are owed to or guaranteed by the federal 
government at the time the call is made.
4. In paragraphs 21 through 22 of the Order, we determine that, because calls made 
pursuant to the exception must be made “solely to collect a debt,” the covered calls may only be made to 
the debtor or another person or entity legally responsible for paying the debt.  We further determine that 
covered calls may only be made to the wireless telephone number the debtor provided at the time the debt 
was incurred, such as on the loan application; to a wireless phone number subsequently provided by the 
debtor; or to a wireless number that the owner of the debt or its contractor has obtained from an 
independent source, provided that the number actually is the debtor’s telephone number.
5. In paragraphs 25 through 26 of the Order, we determine that robocalls to wrong numbers 
are not covered by the exception created in the Budget Act amendments.  Calls to reassigned wireless 
numbers may not be made pursuant to the amendment either, but they are subject to the 1-call window the 
Commission clarified in the 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order.
9
6. In paragraph 27 of the Order, we limit eligible callers to the owner of the debt or its 
contractor.  In paragraph 28 of the Order, we determine that a “call,” for this exception, includes any 
initiated call, including a text message.  In paragraph 29 of the Order, we determine that the excepted 
calls are limited in content to debt collection and servicing; they may not include any marketing, 
advertising, or selling products or services, or other irrelevant content.
7. Limits on Number and Duration of Federal Debt Collection Calls. In paragraphs 33 
through 37 of the Order, we limit the number of federal debt collection calls to three calls within a thirty-
day period while the delinquency remains or following a specific, time-sensitive event, and in the 30 days 
before such an event.  In paragraphs 38 through 41 of the Order, we determine that consumers have a 
right to stop autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice servicing and collection calls to wireless 
numbers at any point the consumer wishes.  Callers must inform debtors of their right to make such a 
request.  In paragraph 42 of the Order, we limit federal debt collection calls so that zero calls are 
permitted unless they occur: (1) during the period of delinquency for debt collection calls; and (2) 
following an enumerated, specific, time-sensitive event for debt servicing calls, and in the 30 days before 
such an event.  
8. In paragraphs 46 through 47 of the Order, we determine that artificial-voice and 
prerecorded-voice calls may not exceed 60 seconds, excluding any required disclosures.  We do not place 
any cap on the duration of live-caller, autodialed calls.  We limit text messages to 160 characters.  Any 
required disclosures may be included within these 160 characters or may be sent as a separate text 
message that does not count toward the numeric limits we impose.  In paragraph 48 of the Order, we 
determine that no federal debt collection calls or texts are permitted outside the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 
p.m. (local time at the called party’s location).  In paragraph 49 of the Order, we determine that if
multiple rules apply to the same call and one of the rules is enacted by the Commission to implement the 
TCPA, a caller must comply with the most restrictive requirements regarding factors such as frequency, 
time of day, and so on.
9. Other Implementation Issues. In paragraphs 50 through 55 of the Order, we interpret
Section 227(b)(2)(C) to apply to all services mentioned in Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), which excludes 
residential lines.
                                                     
9
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8006-10, paras. 85-92. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
37
B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response to the IRFA
10. In the NPRM, we solicited comments on how to minimize the economic impact of our 
proposals on small businesses.  We received three comments directly addressing the IRFA.
10
  Two of the 
comments addressed the area of duplicate, overlapping, or conflicting rules, and one addressed 
coordination with the ongoing Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) rulemaking.  In addition, 
we received six consumer comments that were against robocalls, where the filer mentioned being the 
owner of a small business.
11
  None of the comments pointed out any areas where small businesses would 
incur a particular hardship in complying with the rules.
11. Duplicate, Overlapping, or Conflicting Rules.  Both CMC and NSC claim that the 
Commission failed to identify rules that “duplicate, overlap or conflict with the proposed rule” as required 
by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
12
  In paragraph 49 of the Order, we acknowledge that other statutes and 
regulations impact debt collection calls.  The TCPA regulates autodialed, prerecorded-voice, and 
artificial-voice calls.  The rules we adopt today are concerned only with regulating that subset of 
autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice calls that are made to wireless numbers and to collect a 
debt that is owed to or guaranteed by the United States.  The TCPA amendments and these implementing 
rules change only the specific conditions under which a caller can use an autodialer, prerecorded voice, 
and artificial voice to make calls to a wireless number without the prior express consent of the called 
party and the limitations that apply to autodialed, prerecorded-voice, or artificial-voice calls to a wireless 
number made to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.
12. CMC suggests that the rules conflict with “longstanding federal and state foreclosure 
prevention efforts and policies”; “several federal requirements to call mortgage borrowers by telephone to 
try to prevent foreclosures”; “any new FCC rule permitting consumers to block calls”; “[t]he FDCPA 
prohibit[ion of] unfair practices by debt collectors in attempting to collect a debt”; and “[t]he Dodd-Frank 
Act prohibit[ion of] unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices by covered persons or service 
providers, including consumer mortgage servicers.”
13
  However, none of the rules cited by CMC require 
that calls to wireless numbers be autodialed, artificial-voice, or prerecorded-voice calls.  The TCPA, with 
or without the amendments, does not regulate whether or when a debt collector can make a debt collection 
call, nor does it in any way prohibit a mortgage servicer from making a call in compliance with 
foreclosure requirements.  Debt collectors and mortgage servicers continue to be free to make calls in 
compliance with non-TCPA law.  The rules we adopt today apply only to autodialed, prerecorded-voice, 
and artificial-voice calls.  Therefore the rules cited by CMC do not “duplicate, overlap or conflict with” 
the proposed rule.
13. Coordination with the CFPB.  ACA notes that the CFPB “will convene one or more 
panels under the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act to assess the potential impact of its 
debt collection proposals under consideration on affected small business, including by obtaining feedback 
from small entity representatives.”
14
  ACA suggests that we wait for the results of the CFPB’s analysis, 
particularly since “the substantial majority of collection agencies are ‘small’ under the Small Business 
Administration’s size standard.”
15
  We decline to do so for two reasons.  First, the deadline of August 2nd 
                                                     
10
ACA International Comments at 21-22 (ACA Comments); Consumer Mortgage Coalition Comments at 17 (CMC 
Comments); Noble Systems Corporation Comments at 6 (NSC Comments).
11
Robert Minor Comments at 1; Dan O’Brien Comments at 1, Deborah Hamilton Comments at 1, Jan Reyes 
Comments at 1; John Nowosielski Comments at 1; Wayne Paquette Comments at 1.
12
CMC Comments at 17; NSC Comments at 6.
13
CMC Comments at 17.
14
ACA Comments at 21-22.
15
ACA Comments at 21.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
38
imposed by Congress prohibits us from delaying this rulemaking.
16
  Second, the CFPB is analyzing 
overall debt collection rules and policies, a much wider scope than the narrow area covered by these rules, 
which are limited to regulating autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice calls to wireless 
numbers to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.  It is unlikely that the CFPB panels 
will provide more information than we have already received through the notice and comment process 
that began with the NPRM.
14. Cost Analysis.  CMC recommends that we “consider the costs of mortgage delinquencies 
and foreclosures and mortgage ‘rescue’ scams that telephone calls could have prevented or mitigated” as 
part of the cost analysis.
17
  We have considered comments asserting the potential benefits to debtors of 
receiving the autodialed, pre-recorded voice, and artificial-voice calls at issue in developing the rules we 
adopt today, including in balancing the importance of collecting debt owed to or guaranteed by the United 
States and the consumer protections inherent in the TCPA.  Such costs as CMC mentions would not be 
incurred by regulated entities and, in this context, would be both hypothetical and highly speculative. As a 
result, we do not attempt to quantify the costs raised by CMC in the Description of Projected Reporting, 
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements for Small Entities section below.
C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration
15. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended the RFA, the 
Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration (SBA), and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the 
proposed rules as a result of those comments.
18
  The Chief Counsel did not file any comments in response 
to the proposed rules in this proceeding.
D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which Rules Will 
Apply
16. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where feasible, an estimate of 
the number of small entities that may be affected by the rules adopted herein.
19
  The RFA generally 
defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” “small 
organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.”
20
  In addition, the term “small business” has the 
same meaning as the term “small-business concern” under the Small Business Act.
21
  A “small-business 
concern” is one which:  (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of 
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
22
17. The Commission’s rules restricting autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice 
calls to wireless numbers apply to all entities that make such calls or texts to wireless telephone numbers 
to collect debts owed to or guaranteed by the United States.  Thus, the rules set forth in this proceeding 
are likely to have an impact on a substantial number of small entities in several categories.
                                                     
16
Budget Act § 301(b).
17
CMC Comments at 17.
18
5 U.S.C. sec 604 (a)(3).
19
See 5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(3).
20
See 5 U.S.C. § 601(6).
21
See 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of “small-business concern” in the Small 
Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632).  Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies 
“unless an agency, after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after 
opportunity for public comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the 
activities of the agency and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.”
22
See 15 U.S.C. § 632.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
39
18. Collection Agencies.  This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in 
collecting payments for claims and remitting payments collected to their clients.
23
  The SBA has 
determined that Collection Agencies with $15 million or less in annual receipts qualify as small 
businesses.
24
  Census data for 2012 indicate that 3,361 firms in this category operated throughout that 
year. Of those, 3,166 firms operated with annual receipts of less than $10 million.
25
  We conclude that a 
substantial majority of businesses in this category are small under the SBA standard.
19. Telemarketing Bureaus and Other Contact Centers.  This U.S. industry comprises 
establishments primarily engaged in operating call centers that initiate or receive communications for 
others—via telephone, facsimile, email, or other communication modes—for purposes such as (1) 
promoting clients products or services, (2) taking orders for clients, (3) soliciting contributions for a 
client, and (4) providing information or assistance regarding a client's products or services.  These 
establishments do not own the product or provide the services they are representing on behalf of clients.
26
  
The SBA has determined that Telemarketing Bureaus and other Contact Centers with $15 million or less 
in annual receipts qualify as small businesses.
27
  U.S. Census data for 2012 indicate that 2,251 firms in 
this category operated throughout that year. Of those, 2,014 operated with annual receipts of less than 
$10 million.
28
  We conclude that a substantial majority of businesses in this category are small under the 
SBA standard.
20. Commercial Banks and Savings Institutions.  Commercial banks are establishments 
primarily engaged in accepting demand and other deposits and making commercial, industrial, and 
consumer loans. Commercial banks and branches of foreign banks are included in this industry.
29
  
Savings institutions are establishments primarily engaged in accepting time deposits, making mortgage 
and real estate loans, and investing in high-grade securities.  Savings and loan associations and savings 
banks are included in this industry.
30
  The SBA has determined that Commercial Banks and Savings 
Institutions with $500 million or less in assets qualify as small businesses.
31
  December 2013 Call Report 
data compiled by SNL Financial indicate that 6,877 firms in this category operated throughout that year.
32
  
                                                     
23
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 561440 Collection Agencies, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
24
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 561440.
25
2012 U.S. Economic Census, NAICs Code 516440, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_56SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
26
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 561422 Telemarketing Bureaus and Other Contact Centers,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
27
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 561422.
28
2007 U.S. Economic Census, NAICs Code 561422, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_56SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
29
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522110 Commercial Banks, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
30
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522120 Savings Institutions, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
31
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 522110 and 2012 NAICS code 522120.  A financial institution's assets are 
determined by averaging the assets reported on its four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year.  
"Assets" means the assets defined according to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 041 call 
report form for NAICS Codes 522110, 522120, 522190, and 522210 and the National Credit Union Administration 
5300 call report form for NAICS code 522130.
32
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 
66128, 66301 (Oct. 28, 2015) (CFPD Rule) (citing December 2013 Call Report data as compiled by SNL Financial).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
40
Of those, 5,533 qualify as small entities.
33
  Based on this data, we conclude that a substantial number of 
businesses in this category are small under the SBA standard.
34
21. Credit Unions.  This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in accepting 
members' share deposits in cooperatives that are organized to offer consumer loans to their members.
35
  
The SBA has determined that Credit Unions with $550 million or less in assets qualify as small 
businesses.
36
  The December 2013 National Credit Union Administration Call Report data indicate that 
6,687 firms in this category operated throughout that year.
37
  Of those, 6,252 qualify as small entities.
38
  
Based on this data, we conclude that a substantial number of businesses in this category are small under 
the SBA standard.
39
22. Other Depository Credit Intermediation.  This industry comprises establishments 
primarily engaged in accepting deposits and lending funds (except commercial banking, savings 
institutions, and credit unions).  Establishments known as industrial banks or Morris Plans and primarily 
engaged in accepting deposits, and private banks (i.e., unincorporated banks) are included in this 
industry.
40
  The SBA has determined that Other Depository Credit Intermediation entities with $550 
million or less in assets qualify as small businesses.
41
  Census data for 2012 indicate that 6 firms in this 
category operated throughout that year.
42
  Due to the nature of this category, we conclude that a 
substantial number of businesses in this category are small under the SBA standard.
23. Sales Financing. This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in sales 
financing or sales financing in combination with leasing. Sales financing establishments are primarily 
engaged in lending money for the purpose of providing collateralized goods through a contractual 
installment sales agreement, either directly from or through arrangements with dealers.
43
  The SBA has 
determined that Sales Financing entities with $38.5 million or less in annual receipts qualify as small 
                                                     
33
Id.
34
Note that the 2012 U.S. Census Economic Data does not include information on assets.
35
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522130 Credit Unions, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?code=522130&search=2012%20NAICS%20Search (last visited July 6, 2016).
36
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 522130.  A financial institution's assets are determined by averaging the 
assets reported on its four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year.  "Assets" means the assets defined 
according to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 041 call report form for NAICS Codes 522110, 
522120, 522190, and 522210 and the National Credit Union Administration 5300 call report form for NAICS code 
522130.
37
CFPD Rule at 66301 (citing National Credit Union Administration 5300 call report form).
38
Id.
39
Note that the 2012 U.S. Census Economic Data does not include information on assets.
40
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522190 Other Depository Credit Intermediation,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
41
13 CFR § 121.201; 2007 NAICS code 522190.  A financial institution's assets are determined by averaging the 
assets reported on its four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year.  "Assets" means the assets defined 
according to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 041 call report form for NAICS Codes 522110, 
522120, 522190, and 522210 and the National Credit Union Administration 5300 call report form for NAICS code 
522130.
42
2012 U.S. Economic Census, NAICs Code 522190, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_52SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
43
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522220 Sales Financing, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
41
businesses.
44
  Census data for 2012 indicate that 2,093 firms in this category operated throughout that 
year.  Of those, 1,950 operated with annual receipts of less than $25 million.
45
  We conclude that a 
substantial majority of businesses in this category are small under the SBA standard.
24. Consumer Lending. This U.S. industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in 
making unsecured cash loans to consumers.
46
  The SBA has determined that Consumer Lending entities 
with $38.5 million or less in annual receipts qualify as small businesses.
47
  Census data for 2012 indicate 
that 2,768 firms in this category operated throughout that year.  Of those, 2,702 operated with annual 
receipts of less than $25 million.
48
  We conclude that a substantial majority of businesses in this category 
are small under the SBA standard.
25. Real Estate Credit. This U.S. industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in 
lending funds with real estate as collateral.
49
  The SBA has determined that Real Estate Credit entities 
with $38.5 million or less in annual receipts qualify as small businesses.
50
  Census data for 2012 indicate 
that 2,535 firms in this category operated throughout that year.  Of those, 2,223 operated with annual 
receipts of less than $25 million.
51
  We conclude that a substantial majority of businesses in this category 
are small under the SBA standard.
26. International Trade Financing. This U.S. industry comprises establishments primarily 
engaged in providing one or more of the following: (1) working capital funds to U.S. exporters; (2) 
lending funds to foreign buyers of U.S. goods; and/or (3) lending funds to domestic buyers of imported 
goods.
52
  The SBA has determined that International Trade Financing entities with $38.5 million or less in 
annual receipts qualify as small businesses.
53
  Census data for 2012 indicate that 126 firms in this 
category operated throughout that year.  Of those, 120 operated with annual receipts of less than $25 
million.
54
  We conclude that a substantial majority of businesses in this category are small under the SBA 
standard.
                                                     
44
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 522220.
45
2012 U.S. Economic Census, NAICs Code 522220, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_52SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
46
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522291 Consumer Lending, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
47
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 522291.
48
2012 U.S. Economic Census, NAICs Code 522291, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_52SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
49
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522292 Real Estate Credit, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
50
13 CFR § 121.201; 2007 NAICS code 522292.
51
2012 U.S. Economic Census, NAICs Code 522292, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_52SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
52
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522293 International Trade Financing, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
53
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 522293.
54
U.S. Economic Census, 2012 NAICs Code 522293, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_52SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
42
27. Secondary Market Financing. This U.S. industry comprises establishments primarily 
engaged in buying, pooling, and repackaging loans for sale to others on the secondary market.
55
  The SBA 
has determined that Secondary Market Financing entities with $38.5 million or less in annual receipts 
qualify as small businesses.
56
  Census data for 2012 indicate that 89 firms in this category operated 
throughout that year. Of those, 78 operated with annual receipts of less than $25 million.
57
  We conclude 
that a substantial majority of businesses in this category are small under the SBA standard.
28. All Other Nondepository Credit Intermediation.  This U.S. industry comprises 
establishments primarily engaged in providing nondepository credit (except credit card issuing, sales 
financing, consumer lending, real estate credit, international trade financing, and secondary market 
financing).
58
  Examples of types of lending in this industry are: short-term inventory credit, agricultural 
lending (except real estate and sales financing), and consumer cash lending secured by personal 
property.
59
  The SBA has determined that All Other Nondepository Credit Intermediation entities with 
$38.5 million or less in annual receipts qualify as small businesses.
60
  Census data for 2012 indicate that 
4,960 firms in this category operated throughout that year.  Of those, 4,872 operated with annual receipts 
of less than $25 million.
61
  We conclude that a substantial majority of businesses in this category are small 
under the SBA standard.
29. Mortgage and Nonmortgage Loan Brokers. This industry comprises establishments 
primarily engaged in arranging loans by bringing borrowers and lenders together on a commission or fee 
basis.
62
  The SBA has determined that Mortgage and Nonmortgage Loan Brokers with $7.5 million or less 
in annual receipts qualify as small businesses.
63
  Census data for 2012 indicate that 6,157 firms in this 
category operated throughout that year.  Of those, 5,939 operated with annual receipts of less than $5 
million.
64
  We conclude that a substantial majority of businesses in this category are small under the SBA 
standard.
30. Other Activities Related to Credit Intermediation. This industry comprises
establishments primarily engaged in facilitating credit intermediation (except mortgage and loan 
                                                     
55
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522294 Secondary Market Financing, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
56
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 522294.
57
2012 U.S. Economic Census, NAICs Code 522294, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_52SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
58
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522298 All Other Nondepository Credit Intermediation,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
59
Id.
60
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 522298.
61
2012 U.S. Economic Census, NAICs Code 522298, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_52SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
62
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522310 Mortgage and Nonmortgage Loan Brokers,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch (last visited July 6, 2016).
63
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 522310.
64
2012 U.S. Economic Census, NAICs Code 522310, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_52SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
43
brokerage; and financial transactions processing, reserve, and clearinghouse activities).
65
  The SBA has 
determined that Other Activities Related to Credit Intermediation entities with $20.5 million or less in 
annual receipts qualify as small businesses.
66
  Census data for 2012 indicate that 3,989 firms in this 
category operated throughout that year.  Of those, 3,860 operated with annual receipts of less than $20.5 
million.
67
  We conclude that a substantial majority of businesses in this category are small under the SBA 
standard.
E. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements for Small Entities
31. This Order amends the Commission’s rules implementing the TCPA to align them with 
the amended statutory language of the TCPA enacted by Congress in the 2015 Budget Act, creating an 
exception that allows the use of an autodialer, prerecorded-voice, and artificial-voice when making calls 
to wireless telephone numbers without the prior express consent of the called party when such calls are
made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States, and imposing limitations on 
autodialed, prerecorded-voice, and artificial-voice calls  to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the 
United States.  The Order will likely impose a one-time cost on some entities to set up new recordkeeping 
and other compliance requirements.  These changes affect small and large companies equally, and apply 
equally to all of the classes of regulated entities identified above.
32. To comply with the right of the consumer to stop autodialed, artificial-voice, and
prerecorded-voice federal debt collection calls to wireless numbers without consent, regulated entities 
must keep a record of any request made by a consumer for the cessation of the calls, and must pass that 
information to any subsequent collector or servicer of the debt if the debt is transferred.  This rule 
obligates callers to retain records of consumers opting out of receiving these autodialed or prerecorded 
federal debt collection messages.  Because autodialed, artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice federal debt 
collection calls to wireless numbers required consent prior to these amendments, we assume calling 
entities have systems and procedures already in place to record consent and that the current way of doing 
business will be sufficient for tracking revocation of consent and will not impose new costs.  However, 
the requirement to inform subsequent collectors or servicers of the revocation of consent might be new for 
some calling entities, and could impose a small initial cost to modify systems or procedures.  This 
provision does not impose a significant economic impact on small businesses.  We did not receive any 
comments stating that this rule would cause a significant economic impact on small businesses.  The 
Commission does not require a particular form or format to be used in conveying the revocation of 
consent to subsequent collectors or servicers when a debt is transferred.
33. Federal debt collection calls made using a prerecorded or artificial voice must include an 
automated, interactive voice- and/or key press-activated opt-out mechanism so that debtors who receive 
these calls may make a stop-calling request during the call by pressing a single key.  When a federal debt 
collection call using an artificial voice or prerecorded voice leaves a voicemail message, that message 
must also provide a toll-free number that the debtor may call at a later time to connect directly to the 
automated, interactive voice and/or key press-activated mechanism and automatically record the stop-
calling request.  Text message disclosures must include brief explanatory instructions for sending a stop-
call request by reply text message and provide a toll-free number that enables the debtor to call back later 
to make a stop-call request.  This rule obligates callers to modify their systems to produce the message, 
maintain toll-free numbers, and record any stop-call requests.  Such records should demonstrate the 
                                                     
65
2012 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, 522390 Other Activities Related to Credit Intermediation,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch.
66
13 CFR § 121.201; 2012 NAICS code 522390.
67
2007 U.S. Economic Census, NAICs Code 522390, at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_52SSSZ4&prodT
ype=table.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
44
caller’s compliance with the provision and utilization of the automated, interactive opt-out feature.  The 
Commission allows the calling entities the flexibility to determine how to implement the mechanism.  
The Commission does not require a particular form or format evidencing this mechanism or its 
implementation.  This provision does not impose a significant economic impact on small businesses.  We 
did not receive any comments stating that this rule would cause a significant economic impact on small 
businesses.
F. Steps Taken to Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities, and 
Significant Alternatives Considered
34. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant alternatives that it has considered 
in reaching its approach, which may include the following four alternatives, among others: (1) the 
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into account the 
resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance or 
reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; (3) the use of performance, rather than design, 
standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small entities.
68
35. The amendments to the rules change the specific conditions under which a caller can use 
an autodialer, prerecorded voice, and artificial voice to make calls to a wireless number without the prior 
express consent of the called party and the limitations that apply to autodialed, prerecorded-voice, and 
artificial-voice calls to a wireless number made to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United 
States. The limitations balance the importance of collecting debt owed to the United States and the 
consumer protections inherent in the TCPA.  In paragraph 27 of the Order, the Commission interprets the 
amendments as allowing such calls to be made by the federal government, owners of debt guaranteed by 
the federal government, and by their respective contractors. The amendments therefore benefit the federal 
government, owners of debt guaranteed by the federal government, and their respective contractors.  
Although the federal government is not a small business, many of the owners of debt guaranteed by the 
federal government and the contractors who make these calls are small businesses.  Thus, the 
Commission considered the needs of small businesses in reaching its approach.
36. Automated dialers and artificial-voice, and prerecorded-voice calling systems can be used 
to make thousands of calls without requiring commensurate staffing.  By automating the process of 
making calls and texts, small businesses can make as many calls as large businesses.  The volume of calls 
is not limited by the size of the business.  Therefore limitations designed to protect consumer interests 
must apply to both large and small calling entities to be effective.  The Commission believes that any 
economic burden these proposed rules may have on callers is outweighed by the benefits to consumers.
37. Feedback.  The Commission considered feedback from the NPRM in crafting the final 
order.  Although none of the comments offered suggestions of ways to make the rules more friendly to 
small businesses, there were many comments from regulated callers with suggestions to make compliance 
easier for all, large and small.  We evaluated the comments in light of balancing the need to collect the 
debt with the need to protect consumer interests, and modified the proposed rules in several ways.  For 
example, in paragraphs 11 through 18 of the Order, the Commission expanded the definition of the types 
of calls permitted to include debt servicing calls made following a specific, time-sensitive events such as 
a recertification deadline or the end of a deferment period, and in the 30 days before such an event, rather 
than limiting the exception to calls made when the debt is delinquent or in default.  Similarly, in 
paragraphs 23 through 26 of the Order, we expanded the reach of the exception by allowing covered calls 
to be made to a phone number subsequently provided by the debtor to the servicer or owner of the debt, or 
a number obtained from an independent source, rather than limiting calls to the number provided on the 
loan application.  These changes benefit regulated entities of all sizes.
38. Timetables.  The Commission does not see a need to establish a special timetable for 
                                                     
68
5 U.S.C. § 603.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
45
small entities to reach compliance with the modification to the rules.  No small business has asked for a 
delay in implementing the rules.
39. Reporting requirements; performance standards.  Since the rule does not impose 
reporting requirements, there is no need to establish less burdensome reporting requirements for small 
businesses.  Similarly, there are no design standards or performance standards to consider in this 
rulemaking.
40. Exemption.  The Commission does not see a need to consider an exemption for small 
businesses from the modified rules.  No small business has asked for such an exception.
G. Report to Congress
41. The Commission will send a copy of the Order, including this FRFA, in a report to be 
sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act.
69
  
In addition, the Commission will send a copy of the Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.  A copy of the Order (or summaries thereof) will also be 
published in the Federal Register.
70
                                                     
69
5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
70
See id. § 604(b).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
46
STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER
Re:  Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG 
Docket No. 02-278
Unwanted calls continue to be the top consumer complaint we receive at the Commission.  It is vital 
that we continue to use all the tools at our disposal to help protect consumers against unwanted calls.  
Consumers want and deserve control over the calls and text messages they receive.  To that end, we 
continue to push carriers and other providers to offer consumers robocall filtering tools.  Last year, in our 
Omnibus ruling, we reinforced and further clarified our robocall restrictions, including placing limits on 
calls to reassigned numbers.
Today’s action complies with a specific directive from Congress while taking steps to protect 
consumers.  
In its passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Congress directed that robocalls to help collect 
federally-backed debt, such as some mortgages and student loans, must be allowed without prior consent.  
At the same time, Congress empowered the Commission to set limits on such calls.  That is what we are 
doing in the order released today.
With this Report and Order, the Commission is establishing strong, pro-consumer limits on robocalls 
to collect federal debt.  Wherever possible, the Commission has sought to limit the number of unwanted 
robocalls and ensure consumers have the tools to stop them.  This is true in this order as it was in last 
year’s Omnibus ruling.
Today’s rules limit the number of robocalls, including text messages, to three per month. The new 
rules also only allow robocalls concerning debts that are delinquent or at imminent risk of delinquency, 
unless there is prior express consent otherwise.
The new rules require that, absent consent, callers only call the individual who owes the debt, not his 
or her family or friends.  This includes limiting the number of robocalls allowed to reassigned numbers, 
consistent with last year’s Omnibus robocall ruling. 
The new rules reiterate that consumers have the right to stop calls they do not want at any point they 
wish, and require callers to inform consumers of that right.
The new rules place limits on the duration of calls (excluding required disclosures).  Specifically, pre-
recorded or artificial voice calls cannot exceed 60 seconds and text messages cannot exceed 160 
characters.
The new rules apply to each caller, rather than each debt.  Otherwise, consumers who have multiple 
loans with a single owner of the debt, as many do, could be receiving an excessive number of robocalls 
per month to their cell phones.  This limitation prevents that from occurring.  
In addition, the Commission’s rules limit the time of day when robocalls can take place, requiring that 
no robocalls can may be made before 8 a.m. and after 9 p.m. local time at the called party’s location.  
These protections are particularly important following a January Supreme Court ruling that federal 
government entities conducting official business are not subject to robocall limits unless Congress says 
otherwise. Our decision implements Congress’s directive and responds to thousands of comments from 
consumers expressing frustration with robocalls and urging clear, strong limits on debt collection calls.  
It is important to note that our decision will not open a door for telemarking calls.  Congress specified 
that excepted calls must be “solely” to collect a federal debt, and we have ensured they do not go beyond 
that.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
47
Congress gave us a quick deadline to implement these new rules.  I am proud that we have met that 
deadline and thank my fellow Commissioners and other Federal agencies for their helpful input into the 
decision.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
48
STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER MIGNON L. CLYBURN
Re:  Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG 
Docket No. 02-278
We have heard loud and clear that consumers hate receiving robocalls. During the first six 
months of 2016, Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) related issues accounted for nearly half of 
the more than 175,000 tickets filed with the Commission’s consumer help center.  In our ‘Federal Debt 
Collection Proceeding,’ nearly 16,000 individuals filed comments, with approximately 80 percent 
expressing a general dislike for robocalls. 
As a result, we must strike a delicate balance in this Order between the Commission’s mandate to 
protect consumers and specific instructions given to us by Congress in last year’s Budget Act regarding 
robocalls “made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”  While I recognize 
the importance of delivering timely information to an individual who is delinquent on their debt, and am 
in agreement that direct communication could actually prevent a borrower from experiencing long-term 
financial consequences, clear limits must be in place to prevent robocalls and texts from becoming 
harassment.  By setting a limit of three robocalls per month, with explicit flexibility given to federal 
agencies to request a waiver seeking higher volume limits if needed, we have appropriately tailored a 
framework which both protects consumers and ensures access to critical information on debt repayment.  
Despite the limitations laid out in this Order, debt servicers will continue to have many means of 
communicating with borrowers: calls made with prior express consent; calls manually dialed; as well as 
email and traditional postal mail.  
The TCPA was enacted in part to protect consumers from being inundated with unwanted calls, 
such as those from debt collectors, and our decision here, consistent with the most recent direction of 
Congress, furthers that goal by placing clear restrictions on what is permissible when collecting federal 
debt.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
49
CONCURRING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER JESSICA ROSENWORCEL
Re:  Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG 
Docket No. 02-278
Consumers are fed up with robocalls.  They are irritated when their phones buzz with services 
that sound like scams and they are troubled by the difficulty they have distinguishing them from calls 
about debts honestly owed and services actually rendered.  
Twenty-five years ago Congress passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act to help 
consumers get the calls they need and avoid the ones they do not.  But this law is showing its age.  The
years since its passage have brought a mix of technological advances and legal developments, creating 
new complications for both callers and those who receive calls.  It’s no wonder that robocalls represent 
the single largest category of complaints the Commission receives.  
As a result, last year, in the Bipartisan Budget Act, Congress updated the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act.  Specifically, Congress authorized the Commission to develop policies for calls made to 
wireless phones for the collection of government debt.
Today’s order responds to this charge by adopting reasonable limits on government debt 
collection calls, making clear that consumers have a right to stop robocalls, and clarifying who may be 
called to seek repayment of an outstanding debt obligation.  This is a fair effort to respond to our 
legislative charge under the law.  
Nonetheless, I concur because this result—however warranted by the Bipartisan Budget Act—
creates a legal landscape that is undeniably messy.  It is difficult to reconcile the result here with the 
Commission’s recent Broadnet Declaratory Ruling which finds that the federal government and its agents 
are not “persons” under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and hence fall outside of the Act’s 
reach.  It may be harder still to harmonize both decisions with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Campbell-
Ewald v. Gomez, which holds that no derivative immunity exists under the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act when a contractor of the federal government acts outside of the scope of its 
authority.  Simply put, the legal calisthenics required to navigate this series of decisions are 
exhausting.  Moreover, the result for consumers is uneven.  It may unfortunately yield more, rather than 
fewer robocalls—and if it does, consumers will be justifiably angry.     
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
50
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER AJIT PAI
Re:  Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG 
Docket No. 02-278
Last month in the Broadnet/RTI Declaratory Ruling, my colleagues voted to find that federal 
contractors, including federal debt collectors, are not “persons” under the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act (TCPA) and thus get a free pass to robocall the American people.
1
  I did not support that decision.  In 
my view, federal law makes clear that federal contractors are “persons” and thus are subject to the 
TCPA’s consumer protections.
2
The FCC should reverse this mistake.  As the National Consumer Law Center, the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, the NAACP, and 48 other organizations have told us, “[i]f the Commission 
does not reconsider and change its ruling in [the Broadnet/RTI] proceeding, tens of millions of Americans 
will find their cell phones flooded with unwanted robocalls from federal contractors with no means of 
stopping these calls and no remedies to enforce their requests to stop these calls.”
3
The FCC takes the same path here as it did in the Broadnet/RTI Declaratory Ruling by again 
failing to follow the law.
Some background:  Section 227(b)(1) of the TCPA prohibits “any person” from using certain 
automated telephone equipment without the called party’s prior express consent.
4
  Section 227(b)(2) 
authorizes the FCC to “prescribe regulations to implement the requirements of this subsection.”
5
Last year’s budget deal snuck a special exemption for federal debt collectors into the TCPA.
6
  
First, it amended section 227(b)(1) to exempt calls “made solely to collect a debt owed to . . . the United 
States.”
7
  Next, it amended section 227(b)(2) to give the FCC authority to “restrict or limit the number 
and duration of calls made . . . to collect a debt owed to . . . the United States.”
8
  It also instructed the FCC 
to adopt final rules implementing these changes by August 2, 2016.
9
As I said when we started this proceeding to implement this exemption, I do not believe the 
federal government should be bestowing regulatory largesse upon favored industries such as federal debt 
collectors.
10
  I hope Congress will soon reverse course and eliminate this special exemption.
                                                     
1
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991; Broadnet Teleservices LLC 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling; National Employment Network Association Petition for Expedited Declaratory 
Ruling; RTI International Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278, Declaratory Ruling, 
FCC 16-72 (July 5, 2016) (Broadnet/RTI Declaratory Ruling).
2
Id. (Statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai, Approving in Part and Dissenting in Part) (“But I part ways with the 
Commission’s conclusion that federal contractors are not persons under the TCPA.”).
3
National Consumer Law Center et al. Petition for Reconsideration of Declaratory Ruling and Request for Stay 
Pending Reconsideration, CG Docket No. 02-278, at 2 (July 26, 2016).
4
Communications Act § 227(b)(1).
5
Communications Act § 227(b)(2).
6
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 301(a), 129 Stat. 584 (Budget Act).
7
See Communications Act § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B).
8
See Communications Act § 227(b)(2)(H).
9
Budget Act § 301(b).
10
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 31 FCC Rcd 5134, 5154–55 (2016) (Notice) (Dissenting Statement of 
Commissioner Ajit Pai).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
51
Anyway, enough background.  In this case, the FCC tries to solve the problem it created in the 
Broadnet/RTI Declaratory Ruling by arguing that even if the TCPA’s consumer protections in section 
227(b)(1) do not apply to federal contractors, the Commission is free to regulate non-persons—including 
“the federal government and its contractors”—under section 227(b)(2).
11
The Commission’s approach is unlawful and makes a dog’s breakfast of the TCPA.
First, the plain text of the TCPA limits the scope of the FCC’s rulemaking authority under section 
227(b)(2).  The Commission does not have unlimited power to “restrict or limit the number and duration 
of [federal debt collection] calls” but only that necessary to (as the preface of that paragraph puts it) 
“implement[] the requirements of this subsection.”
12
  Those requirements are outlined in section 227(b)(1) 
and apply only to “any person.”
13
  Thus, our authority under section 227(b)(2)(H) can only extend to “any 
person” otherwise subject to the requirements of section 227(b)(1)—and not to the federal government 
itself, a non-person as all agree.
Second, the canons of construction confirm that section 227(b)(2) does not extend to the federal 
government.  Federal law does not apply to the sovereign absent “some affirmative showing of statutory 
intent to the contrary.”
14
  That principle drove the FCC’s decision to exclude the federal government from 
the scope of the TCPA in the Broadnet/RTI Declaratory Ruling.  There, we rightly held that Congress’s 
decision to apply the TCPA to “any person” was insufficient to conclude that it intended to extend the 
TCPA to the federal government.
15
  A clearer statement of Congressional intent was needed.  And that 
holding mortally wounds this one:  Congress’s decision to indirectly indicate to whom section 227(b)(2) 
applies (through its reference to the “requirements” of section 227(b)(1)) cannot possibly be a more 
“affirmative showing” than Congress’s decision to directly indicate that section 227(b)(1) applies to “any 
person.”
16
                                                     
11
Order at para. 62.  Although I focus on the application of section 227(b)(2) to the federal government here, these 
arguments carry equal force with respect to federal contractors, at least so long as the FCC continues to believe it an 
“untenable result” to apply the TCPA to federal contractors when those contractors make calls the TCPA allows the 
government itself to make.  See Broadnet/RTI Declaratory Ruling, FCC 16-72, at para. 16.
12
See Communications Act § 227(b)(2)(H) (“The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement the 
requirements of this subsection. In implementing the requirements of this subsection, the Commission— . . . may 
restrict or limit the number and duration of calls made to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service 
to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.”).
13
See Communications Act § 227(b)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . .”); Broadnet/RTI Declaratory 
Ruling, FCC 16-72, at para. 10.  The Order responds that “another requirement in subsection (b) appears in new 
subparagraph (b)(2)(H).”  Order at para. 64.  Not true.  For one, new subparagraph (b)(2)(H) is not a “requirement.”  
It mandates no action.  It prohibits no conduct.  It does not even require the FCC to adopt rules.  All it says is that 
the Commission “may” adopt certain limits.  And any such limits would be “requirements” of the FCC’s regulations, 
not requirements of subsection (b).  Cf. Communications Act § 227(b)(3) (distinguishing between violations of “this 
subsection” and violation of “the regulations prescribed under this subsection”).  For another, the Order’s reading 
renders the prefatory language hopelessly circular.  After all, if the prefatory language refers to the provisions of 
paragraph (b)(2) (such as new subparagraph (b)(2)(H)), then the Commission would automatically be 
“implementing the requirements of this subsection” whenever it adopted rules under paragraph (b)(2).  In other 
words, the prefatory language does no work at all and is mere surplusage.  We must interpret this language in a way 
that gives meaning to every clause.  See Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 446 (1894) (the presence of statutory 
language “cannot be regarded as mere surplusage; it means something”).
14
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781 (2000).
15
See Broadnet/RTI Declaratory Ruling, FCC 16-72, at para. 12.
16
The Order responds that the existence of rulemaking authority under section 227(b)(2) is the “requisite 
affirmative showing.”  Order at para. 65.  But that misses the point.  No one doubts that Congress intended the FCC 
to issue some rules.  The question is whether there’s an affirmative showing that Congress intended to encompass 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
52
Perhaps even more fatal is the “settled propositio[n]” that the United States’ waiver of sovereign 
immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”
17
  Notably, the necessary 
consequence of applying section 227(b)(2) to the federal government is a waiver of federal sovereign 
immunity.  That’s because section 227(b)(3) expressly empowers private parties to bring an action for 
money damages against anyone who violates “the regulations prescribed under this subsection,” i.e., the 
regulations enacted under section 227(b)(2).
18
  But the United States obviously has not delegated 
authority to the FCC to waive federal sovereign immunity.  And section 227(b)(2) contains no 
unequivocal expression, no implication, not even a wink suggesting that Congress intended to waive the 
government’s sovereign immunity.
19
Third, the structure of the TCPA does not support an expansive reading of section 227(b)(2)’s 
scope.  After all, section 227(b)(2)(H) is not unique in omitting the word “person.”  In fact, not one of the 
regulatory authorities contained in subsection 227(b)(2) uses that word.  Not one FCC precedent (until 
today) has found that omission meaningful.  And not once has the FCC suggested that these other 
regulatory authorities could apply to the federal government.  The structure is key
20
:  Whereas section 
227(b)(1) contains mandatory prohibitions (e.g., barring robocalls to consumers’ cellphones), section 
227(b)(2) only contains discretionary prohibitions (e.g., asking the FCC to consider banning robocalls to 
businesses).  And every FCC to date has apparently recognized that it makes no sense to say that 
Congress intended a narrower scope (only “any person”) for the mandatory prohibitions and a broader 
scope (“any person” plus the federal government) for the discretionary prohibitions.
Fourth, the FCC never proposed to extend its new rules to non-persons such as the federal 
government.  Notice to the public is the critical first step in any rulemaking under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.
21
  But the Commission never proposed in the Notice to extend its rules beyond “any 
person” already covered by the TCPA.  Indeed, the Notice apparently recognized that the TCPA did not 
extend beyond persons and instead asked the converse question, “whether the Budget Act amendments
imply that the federal government is a person for TCPA purposes.”
22
  And the proposed rules never 
suggested they’d apply to the federal government.
23
  So it’s no surprise that the Order does not identify a 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
the federal government in those rules.  And though the Order repeatedly points to places where Congress could have 
inserted such a showing, the lack of a showing just doesn’t suffice.
17
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) 
(quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
18
Communications Act § 227(b)(3).
19
I agree with the Order that the FCC should not be deciding questions of sovereign immunity.  See Order at para. 
65.  Nonetheless, we must grapple with the natural consequences of our construction of the statute.  The Order’s 
reading naturally raises the question of whether the United States has waived its sovereign immunity.  I do not 
believe that it has.
20
See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483–84 (2016) (noting the “‘fundamental canon of statutory 
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme’” (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014)).
21
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
22
Notice, 31 FCC Rcd at 5140, para. 16.
23
Id. at 5146 (Appendix A).  Notably, the Order appears to agree and suggests that commenters should have 
somehow guessed that divergent strands from different sections of the Notice could be stitched together to apply 
these section 227(b)(2) regulations to non-persons.  See Order at para. 66 (quoting section III.A of the Notice
(discussing calls exempted from section 227(b)(1)) and section III.B of the Notice (discussing rules under section 
227(b)(2)).  But the Administrative Procedure Act does not require a post-hoc explanation.  It requires advance 
notice.  Furthermore, even the Order’s attempt to stitch together notice fails.  As the Order recognizes, the Notice
only proposed applying limits to “covered calls,” Notice, 31 FCC Rcd at 5140, paras. 17–18, i.e., those calls 
exempted by the Budget Act amendments and thus only calls by “persons” subject to the TCPA, id. at 5139, para. 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
53
single stakeholder that’s even commented on the issue, let alone supported the Order’s interpretation.  
And that includes the Treasury Department, which oversees federal debt collection efforts and with which 
we are legally required to “consult[].”
24
In the end, we can’t mitigate by misinterpreting.  The FCC got the Broadnet/RTI Declaratory 
Ruling wrong.  Adding a second wrong to the first does not make a right.
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
15.  And the Order omits the relevant context when it says the FCC proposed applying rules to “any call.”  The 
Notice used that phrase to cover calls “even if unanswered by a person.”  Id. at 5140, para. 18.  At no point did the 
Notice suggest it would cover calls made by anyone.
24
Budget Act § 301(b).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
54
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O’RIELLY
Re:  Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG 
Docket No. 02-278
When Congress enacted the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (Budget Act), which included certain 
relief from the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), the intent seemed clear.  Faced with the 
alarming prospect that the FCC’s misguided interpretations of the TCPA, culminating in the order last 
June, might prevent the United States from collecting its debts, Congress stepped in to exempt calls 
regarding such debts from the TCPA’s prior express consent requirements.  In other words, out of all of 
the legitimate entities that have valid reasons to autodial consumers, the federal government, along with 
companies servicing loans or collecting debts on behalf of the federal government, were moved to the 
front of the line and granted significant relief from the FCC’s wrongheaded rules.  After all, the federal 
government has a significant interest both in helping borrowers avoid the potentially devastating financial 
consequences of defaulting on loans, as well as ensuring taxpayers recoup the $139.3 billion of delinquent 
debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.
1
The U.S. Department of the Treasury rightfully has pressed for relief for nearly a decade.  In 
2007, its Financial Management Service (FMS) wrote that “[a] ruling by the FCC that would apply the 
restrictions on the use of autodialers to the efforts of private collection agencies collecting debts on behalf 
of the United States, or leaving the issue unresolved, could hinder FMS’ successful partnership with 
private debt collection agencies and negatively impact collections government-wide.”
2
  Again in 2010, 
FMS wrote to the FCC to reiterate that “autodialer restrictions should not apply to debt collectors.”
3
  At a 
minimum, the “use of autodialers should be permitted when collecting debts owed to the U.S., because 
additional protections are in place and the prohibition would decrease collections revenue.”
4
  Specifically, 
FMS noted:
? “[D]ebt collection is inherently different than telemarketing, as it is based on the collection of 
legitimate debts owed by individuals and other entities with a preexisting obligation to pay. Debt 
collectors are not using autodialers to cold call potential customers, but are instead using 
autodialers to contact individuals who have an existing relationship or indebtedness.  
? [D]ebt collectors are already subject to numerous federal and state consumer protection laws, 
such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA), that prevent abusive use of all debt collection practices, including potential misuse of 
autodialers.
? [B]y reducing the potential for human error, autodialers assist with collectors’ compliance with 
consumer protection laws and sound debt collection practices.”
5
                                                     
1
See Comments of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association, CC Docket No. 02-
278, at 2 (filed June 6, 2016) (ABA/CBA Comments).
2
Letter from Rita Bratcher, Financial Management Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, to Kevin Martin, 
FCC, CC Docket No. 02-278, at 2 (filed Jan. 26, 2007).
3
Letter from Scott Johnson, Financial Management Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, to Marlene Dortch, 
FCC, CC Docket No. 02-278, at 2 (filed May 20, 2010).
4
Id.
5
Id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
55
These concerns became even more imperative in the wake of the 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order, which 
placed even more restrictions on legitimate callers.
6
  
Against this backdrop, and without knowing how the FCC would ultimately decide pending 
petitions about whether federal agencies and their contractors were subject to the TCPA, Congress 
enacted the Budget Act exemption to ensure that, at a minimum, federal agencies and their contractors are 
protected when calling to collect debts owed to or guaranteed by the U.S. government.
7
  Just two months 
ago, however, a near unanimous Commission provided further clarification, determining that all federal 
agencies and their contractors performing any legitimate, government authorized functions are exempt 
from the TCPA.  That’s because the Commission determined, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, 
that the federal government and its agents are not “persons” under the TCPA.  
Having issued that broad and appropriate determination, this narrower item, required only to 
comply with the Budget Act, should have been simple and straightforward.  It should have confirmed that 
federal agencies and their contractors are not subject to TCPA restrictions, regardless of whether they are 
calling to locate a debtor, service a debt, collect a debt, or for any other legitimate purpose, because they 
are not “persons” under the TCPA. 
Therefore, it is beyond disappointing that the order decides that the federal government and its 
contractors will face more restrictions when making calls to collect debts than for any other type of call 
they make.  That’s the exact opposite of what the Budget Act exemption was designed to accomplish.
8
  
Clearly, no good law goes unabused in this Commission.
                                                     
6
See ABA/CBA Comments at 2 (“The Commission’s recent interpretations of the TCPA . . . fail to reflect 
technological change and consumer communication preferences, preventing consumers from receiving important 
communications from businesses and government entities on their mobile phones, communications that provide 
important information that consumers want and need to receive.  This untenable situation prompted the 
Administration, beginning in 2013, to include in its budget proposals a request to exempt from the TCPA’s prior 
express consent requirement calls to mobile phones to collect on debts owed to or guaranteed by the United States. 
In 2015, Congress enacted a statutory provision codifying the exemption.  Clearly, both the Administration and the 
Congress recognize that borrowers trying to manage their finances responsibly are best served if they communicate 
with their lender.”).   
7
See Comments of ACA International, CC Docket No. 02-278, at 6 (filed June 6, 2016) (“Congress enacted the 
Budget Act exemption so that one category of debt collectors – those who collect debt owed to or guaranteed by the 
United States – would have a clear pathway to use modern calling technology to contact consumers on their mobile 
telephones in order to increase the recovery of government debt. Given this, the Commission must ensure that any 
final rules adopted reflect Congress’s clear intent to exempt government debt collectors from the TCPA’s prior 
express consent requirement.”).
8
See Comments of Navient Corporation, CC Docket No. 02-278, at viii (filed June 6, 2016) (Navient Comments) 
(“The FCC’s proposal effectively eliminates the exemption enacted by Congress and is contrary to Congress’ clear 
directive in passing the Bipartisan Budget Act (and contrary to the Administration’s longstanding efforts to include 
an exemption as part of the budget).”); see also id. at 18 (“Through its amendment, Congress unequivocally 
prioritized the collection of federal debt above other competing interests underlying the TCPA when it removed 
calls made solely to collect federal debts from the purview of the TCPA’s consent restrictions”); see also Reply 
Comments of the Mortgage Bankers Association, CC Docket No. 02-278, at 2 (filed June 16, 2016) (MBA Reply 
Comments) (observing that, in creating the exemption, “Congress highlighted the importance of collecting these 
debts owed to or guaranteed by the United States Government.”); see also Comments of Nelnet, Inc., CC Docket 
No. 02-278, at 2 (filed June 6, 2016) (Nelnet Comments) (Noting that the proposal “fails to effectuate the 
unequivocal policy objectives of the Budget Act amendments, which the White House has explained include 
“ensur[ing] that all debt owed to the United States is collected as quickly and efficiently as possible”) (citing 
Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2016, at 128, available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/spec.pdf).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
56
To reach this illogical outcome, the order pretends that section 227(b)(2)(H), which permits, but 
does not require, the FCC to adopt certain limits on debt collection calls, applies to non-persons.  That’s 
absurd.  Section 227(b)(2) directs the Commission “to prescribe regulations to implement the 
requirements of this subsection.”  This subsection, of course, is section 227(b), and its requirements set 
forth in section 227(b)(1) make it “unlawful for any person within the United States” or “any person
outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States” to make a call or send an unsolicited 
fax, subject to certain exceptions.  It could not be clearer, therefore, that the subsection is confined to 
persons.  Therefore, any rules adopted to implement the subsection, are also limited to regulating persons.  
If an entity is not a person, it is not subject to section 227(b), and it is certainly not subject to rules 
enacted to implement section 227(b).
Sensing the weakness of its argument, the Commission attempts the legal equivalent of a Hail 
Mary pass:  hoping that a reviewing court will find its argument “at least rendered permissible”.  It is not.  
Contrary to the revised order, section 227(b)(2)(H) is not another “requirement” of section 227(b).  It 
states that the Commission “may restrict or limit the number and duration of calls . . . .”  Not shall.  Not 
must.  May.  That means it is not a requirement.  Nor could it be.  The “requirements” of section 227(b) 
are set forth in 227(b)(1).  Section 227(b)(2), on the other hand, simply guides the Commission’s adoption 
of administrative rules implementing section 227(b)(1).  Administrative rules, of course, are not statutory 
requirements.
Even if the Commission were able to overcome this significant threshold problem regarding the 
scope of its authority, which is impossible, the rules themselves are contrary to the law.  The Budget Act 
exemption was designed to protect federal agencies and their contractors from liability when they make 
calls without consent of the called party.  The revised order counters that there is “no support” for this 
statement as there is no legislative history.  Wow.  If only the Commission would read the text of the law 
itself, it would understand the purpose.  Section 227(b)(1)(A) prohibits persons from using autodialers to  
“make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of 
the called party)”.  To state it another way, only emergency calls or calls made with prior express consent 
may be made using autodialers.  The Budget Act exemption changes that by adding “unless such call is 
made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States”.  Accordingly, federal agencies 
and their contractors are no longer required to have prior express consent when they use autodialers to 
place calls solely to collect a debt.  The fact that the Commission is authorized to place reasonable limits 
on the number and duration of calls does not change the fact that the exemption is from the prior express 
consent requirement.  
After all, if callers already have consent to make calls—either from communicating with the 
borrower, or because the borrower has provided a number and therefore can be contacted for purposes 
related to the reason for which the number was provided—then there is no need for an exemption.
9
  
Rather, the relief was intended to protect these specific callers when they do not have prior express 
consent.
10
  That is, when they misdial a number, when they call a number that, unbeknownst to them, has 
been reassigned, when they make calls in an attempt to track down the borrower’s current number, when 
                                                     
9
See, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Request of ACA 
International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket No. 02-278, Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd 
559, 564, para. 9 (2007) (concluding that the provision of a cell phone number to a creditor, e.g., as a part of a credit 
application, reasonably evidences prior express consent by the cell phone subscriber to be contacted at that number 
regarding the debt).
10
See, e.g., Navient Comments at 3 (“We already have consent to autodial nine out of 10 of the federal student loan 
borrowers whose loans we service today, and they are far more likely to be current. But reaching the remaining 10 
percent of borrowers has been challenging, and they are far more likely to default.”).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
57
the borrower provided the wrong number by mistake, and so forth.  In doing so, Congress determined that 
the well documented benefits of making these calls outweighed any theoretical privacy concerns.
11
  
Indeed, contrary to the revised order, the fact that Congress permitted the FCC to limit the number and 
duration of calls—but did not give the Commission authority to limit which numbers may be dialed—
shows that Congress expected that, in the process of trying to reach the borrower, some number of calls 
would be made to people other than the borrower.
12
  While certain, reasonable limits on the number and 
duration of such calls may be permissible under the law, the order’s outright prohibition on misdialed 
calls and calls to entities other than the borrower, as well as the effective ban on calls to reassigned 
numbers do not “balance” the benefits and concerns as the revised order claims.  They run counter to the 
law.
13
  
The order takes the position that these types of calls are not calls “made solely to collect a debt”.  
I disagree.  To start, that phrase is not ambiguous as the Commission now claims.
14
  Therefore, it also 
should not receive deference for any of the limitations that flow from that decision, including the 
limitations on when calls may be made and who may be called.
15
    
Even if the phrase could somehow be construed by someone as ambiguous, the fact that a caller 
may have simply reached the wrong person—that is, made a mistake—does not change the fact that the 
call was placed with the sole purpose of trying to collect a debt.  Consider this parallel: if I’m driving to a 
specific destination and I make a wrong turn along the way, that doesn’t change the fact that I am driving 
to that destination.  
Including one free pass for reassigned numbers does nothing to remedy the problem.  As many 
commenters and I have explained, one call frequently will be insufficient to determine that a number has 
been reassigned.  In addition, given that over 100,000 numbers are recycled each day, I expect that a 
particularly high percentage of numbers will have changed hands between the time that student loan 
borrowers, for example, take out loans when they start school, when they graduate and actually begin to 
                                                     
11
See also id. at 15 (“Ultimately, Congress prioritized collecting federal debts (and assisting these borrowers in 
avoiding delinquency and default) over other concerns that would otherwise suggest a need to obtain ‘consent’ from 
callers for exempted calls.”).    
12
See id. (“Congress also afforded the FCC minimal discretion to adopt rules implementing this clear directive: the 
enabling legislation only permits the Commission to adopt regulations concerning the number and the duration of 
exempted calls, and only related to exempted calls to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service.”); 
see id. at 35.
13
See id. at v (“If adopted, the proposals would undoubtedly turn the amendment on its head, essentially requiring 
callers to obtain ‘prior express consent’ to place calls that are exempt from the ‘prior express consent’ requirements 
(e.g., by limiting covered calls to only those to telephone numbers provided by the borrower).”).
14
See id. at 15 (“In relatively few words and using clear and concise language, Congress took decisive action to 
override prior Commission decisions that limited calls to collect federally owned or guaranteed debt.”); Comments 
of the National Council of Higher Education Resources (NCHER), CC Docket No. 02-278, at 3 (filed June 6, 2016) 
(NCHER Comments) (“NCHER believes that there is nothing in the Budget Act suggesting a narrow interpretation 
of what calls are covered. In fact, parsing the individual words of the statute ignores its plain reading that provides 
an exception for calls that are made for the purpose of collecting a debt and for no other purpose.”).
15
Separately, the order also refuses to address whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans are “owed to or 
guaranteed by” the federal government.  The order claims that there are not enough facts in the record to decide the 
question.  That ignores detailed filings on the issue.  See, e.g., MBA Reply Comments at 3-8; ABA/CBA Comments at 
3-6.  Similarly, the order is silent as to whether Perkins Loans and HRSA Loans are covered by the exemption, 
despite filings in the record on the issue.  See, e.g., Comments of the Coalition of Higher Education Assistance 
Organizations, CC Docket No. 02-278, at 2-3 (filed June 6, 2016).  Failing to answer these and other questions will 
only create more uncertainty for both callers and borrowers. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
58
repay the loans, and when they finally pay them off.
16
  In addition, as one commenter points out, 
“[m]ortgage servicers are required to place calls to the last known phone number of record, even if the 
borrower is not the current subscriber.”
17
  This item makes compliance with those requirements illegal.
Moreover, nothing in the law limits the relief to calls made to the borrower.
18
  Perhaps that is 
because some agencies require contractors to call people other than the borrower.  As the item itself 
notes, the Department of Education requires lenders to contact every “endorser, relative, reference, 
individual, and entity” identified in the delinquent borrower’s loan file as part of their due diligence 
efforts.
19
  Of course, the order falls back on the tired notion that lenders could manually dial these other 
people.  But that is both unworkable, given the number of calls that must be made, and contrary to the 
intent of the law, which was to enable lenders to use modern dialing equipment as part of their efforts to 
collect debts on behalf of the federal government.
20
  Here again, the revised order finds “no support” for 
this statement and, here again, one need look no further than the statute itself.  Section 227(b)(1)(A) sets 
forth a general prohibition on the use of autodialers, subject to certain exceptions.  The Budget Act adds 
an exemption for calls made solely to collect a debt.  Therefore, it is clear on its face that the exemption 
also enables this class of callers to use autodialers to make debt collection calls.
21
  If Congress intended 
that all of these calls be manually dialed, it would not have provided an exemption because manually 
dialed calls are not subject to the TCPA.
22
  I suppose the Commission’s next argument will be that section 
227(b)(2)(H) gives it authority over manually dialed calls (i.e., non-autodialed calls).  But that is no more 
                                                     
16
Navient Comments at vii (“Borrower relationships can last 10 to 20 years or even longer, increasing the need to 
contact references and other non-borrowers, as well as the potential for the borrower’s number to change or be 
reassigned over time. Congress was aware of these situations and chose not to carve them out of the exemption.”); 
see id. at 42.
17
MBA Reply Comments at 13 (citing HAMP Handbook, 2.2.1 (01/06/16) (requiring a minimum of four telephone 
calls to the last known phone numbers of record, at different times of the day, within 30 day period)).
18
See Navient Comments at 35.
19
See id. at 36 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 682.411(h)).
20
See Nelnet Comments at 3 (“One clear purpose of the Budget Act amendments, then, is to facilitate the repayment 
of student loan and other debts owed to or guaranteed by the United States as a means of protecting federal assets. 
Toward that end, the Budget Act amendments are intended to and should authorize use of the full range of 
communication strategies that the federal government itself would undertake to service and collect its debts, 
including the use of automated and predictive dialing technology and artificial and prerecorded voice messages to 
contact borrowers through the communication channels that borrowers prefer (e.g., contact via cell phone calls and 
text messages).”).
21
Even though it is perfectly clear from the text of the law itself, I also note that the Administration was quite 
explicit that an intent of the Budget Act exemption was to authorize the use of autodialers.  See, e.g., Nelnet 
Comments at 2 (citing Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2016, at 128, 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/spec.pdf) (“The Budget 
proposes to clarify that the use of automatic dialing systems and prerecorded voice messages is allowed when 
contacting wireless phones in the collection of debt owed to or granted by the United States. In this time of fiscal 
constraint, the Administration believes that the Federal Government should ensure that all debt owed to the United 
States is collected as quickly and efficiently as possible and this provision could result in millions of defaulted debt 
being collected.”).  In addition, a section-by-section summary posted by the House of Representatives states that 
“Subsection 301(a) amends the Communications Act of 1934 to authorize the use of automated telephone equipment
to call cellular telephones for the purpose of collecting debts owed to the United States government.”  See Bipartisan 
Budget Act of 2015 Section-by-Section Summary (last visited Aug. 9, 2016) (emphasis added), available at
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/RU/RU00/CPRT-114-RU00-D001.pdf.
22
I continue to oppose the idea, set forth in the TCPA Omnibus Order, that even manually dialed calls may be 
treated as autodialed calls, unless placed from a rotary telephone, because the equipment could be modified into an 
autodialer. 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
59
plausible than asserting authority over non-persons.  If a call or caller is outside the scope of the 
requirements set forth in section 227(b)(1), then the Commission has no authority to regulate them.  
Moreover, the fact that the law permits the Commission to adopt appropriate limits on the number and 
duration does not change the fact that the law authorizes the federal government and its contractors to use 
autodialers in the first instance.
23
  
Nor does the law limit calls made before delinquency is imminent.  Indeed, any call to a borrower 
about the loan should be considered a call made solely to collect the debt.  Yet, the order would bar 
“routine” communications, including calls to remind borrowers about scheduled upcoming payments.  
The Commission states that it will allow certain calls—ones that “often increase the probability that debts 
will be more readily collected and that a debtor will avoid delinquency”—but then it prohibits routine or 
other calls that meet this test.  It also limits calls to only 30 days before a qualifying event.  
The order further restricts the exemption to three call attempts per month.  While the law gives 
the Commission the authority to limit the number of calls, this is far too narrow.  The Commission is 
counting calls that never even go through.  How is that supposed to help borrowers get the relief they 
might need or want?  Multiple commenters noted that it can take dozens of call attempts just to reach a 
borrower, much less help them navigate their loan options.  For example: 
? The Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Fiscal) at the Treasury Department serviced certain 
student loan debt as part of a two-year pilot program, and it found that borrowers 
answered Fiscal’s calls less than 2 percent of the time. After one year, the Bureau had 
obtained live contact with just 33 percent of the borrowers.
24
  
? Another commenter noted that its takes “more than 15 call attempts to reach a right point 
of contact for approximately half of its delinquent federal student loan borrowers, and 
that for 25 percent of its delinquent federal student loan borrowers, it takes [the company]  
40 or more call attempts.”
25
Counting call attempts as calls, therefore, will only hurt the people that the Budget Act exemption is 
trying to help.
26
    
                                                     
23
I also want to make clear that, contrary to prior misguided Commission orders, predictive dialers are not 
autodialers.  They do not meet the statutory definition because they do not “store or produce numbers to be called,
using a random or sequential number generator”.  47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
24
See Letter from Mark Brennan, Counsel to Navient, to Marlene Dortch, FCC, CC Docket No. 02-278, at 1-2 (filed 
July 8, 2016) (Navient July 8, 2016 Ex Parte) (citing BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF THE TREASURY, REPORT ON INITIAL OBSERVATIONS FROM THE FISCAL-FEDERAL STUDENT 
AID PILOT FOR SERVICING DEFAULTED STUDENT LOAN DEBT (2016), at 
https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/student-loan-pilot-report-july-2016.pdf); see also Letter from 
Debra J. Chromy, Education Finance Council, to Marlene Dortch, FCC, CC Docket No. 02-278, at 3 (filed July 18, 
2016) (citing the same pilot program and statistics and also noting that, “[p]rior to contacting borrowers, Fiscal 
attempted to update contact information with a commercially available database.”).  
25
Navient Comments at 42-43.
26
See, e.g., NCHER Comments at 1-2 (“Live communication is key to borrowers understanding their rights, and a 
three call attempt per month restriction will largely nullify meaningful borrower contact.  This arbitrary limit will be 
harmful to millions of federal student loan borrowers who want and need timely and accurate information to better 
manage their debt to avoid delinquency and default and to rehabilitate their defaulted loans.”); see also id. at 12
(“Unfortunately, far too many borrowers fail to have any meaningful contact with their student loan servicer, and the 
Commission’s proposed rule will not facilitate such contact, as was intended by the Congress when it passed the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015.”); see also Nelnet Comments at 14 (“Borrowers are overwhelmingly relieved to 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
60
Moreover, there is absolutely no justification for the number three other than the fact that some 
particular commenters liked it.  These commenters, however, did not provide any explanation or data to 
support a three call limit.  The Commission can’t make policies based on the number of likes it gets or 
emojis.  It is required to have a rational basis for its decisions, and that is utterly lacking here.  
The Commission’s laziness stands in sharp contrast to the comments of parties that could actually 
be impacted by the rules, who provided plenty of reasons and data for choosing a higher number.  Chief 
amongst these is that fact that some are required by federal laws and rules to place more than three calls 
per month.  Commenters summarized these requirements in the filings.
27
  I attach one such example to 
this statement so that it is very clear to the public and any reviewing court that the Commission’s decision 
is arbitrary and capricious.
28
  
Notably, several of these requirements take the form of a minimum number of required calls.  In 
many cases, more calls are needed to actually reach borrowers and help them obtain relief.  Here again, 
commenters stepped up and provided actual data to show how many calls it can take to assist a borrower.   
For example, one commenter noted that “20 percent of [its] federal student loan borrowers require more 
than 50 calls to reach a right point of contact.  These borrowers would take well over a year to reach 
under the FCC’s proposal and, during that time, could easily reach default status without having a 
conversation about their repayment, forbearance, and forgiveness options.”
29
  
In addition, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), who has informally consulted 
with the Commission on the Budget Act exemption, just last week proposed rules for the debt collection 
practices of consumer financial services providers that would be more flexible than the rules that the 
Commission is about to impose on the federal government and its contractors.
30
  The proposal would 
permit up to six total contact attempts per week.
31
  So even though CFPB knew that the Commission is 
about to adopt more stringent rules for federal agencies, it nonetheless proceeded to propose less 
restrictive rules for the private sector.  
Incredibly, the FCC order before us points to all of the data submitted as a reason not to pick a 
different number or set of numbers.  It says there’s no consensus in the record.  Well, perhaps that’s 
because different agencies have different rules on the number of calls that must be placed.  Given the 
work that commenters did to compile the various provisions, it would not take much for the Commission 
to review these filings and set different numbers where appropriate.  Or it could choose the highest 
number required by the various federal laws to ensure that no particular type of caller will be left liable 
for complying with their agency’s rules.  Instead, the order simply falls back on the number three.
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
understand their options and to resolve their account, but these solutions only work when servicers are able to reach 
the borrower.”).
27
See, e.g., MBA Reply Comments at 9-10; Letter from Eric Selk, HOPE NOW Alliance, to Marlene Dortch, FCC, 
CC Docket No. 02-278, at 2-3 (filed June 20, 2016).
28
See Letter from Mark Brennan, Counsel to Navient, to Marlene Dortch, FCC, CC Docket No. 02-278, at 
Appendix A (filed July 12, 2016).
29
Navient Comments at 43.
30
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Small Business Review Panel for Debt Collector and Debt Buyer 
Rulemaking; Outline of Proposals Under Consideration and Alternatives Considered (July 28, 2016), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20160727_cfpb_Outline_of_proposals.pdf.
31
Id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
61
Of course, if there are other laws that are stricter, in terms of the number of calls, time of day, or 
other restrictions, then the Commission is not fazed at all by the lack of uniformity.  In those instances, 
the item requires that the most restrictive limit apply.  
The Commission tries to salvage this mess with a waiver process.  Incredibly, even though the
Commission has a complete record for deciding appropriate limits now, it is putting the burden back on 
federal agencies to demonstrate, to a Bureau, that more relief would be appropriate.  That is a cowardly 
attempt to avoid responsibility for implementing the law.  In short, the FCC will consider providing relief, 
but only if: (1) someone else can provide the Commission with political cover to act; and (2) 
Commissioners are shielded from having to vote on it.     
In post-adoption edits added to the item in a weak attempt to shore up the three-call-attempt limit 
and waiver process, the Commission asserts that section 227(b)(2)(H) was added to avoid “open[ing] the 
floodgates to unwanted robocalls.”  However, the federal agency calling requirements summarized in the 
attached chart, and proposed by the CFPB, hardly constitute a flood.  Even consumer advocacy groups 
have proposed limits that are higher than those adopted in this order.
32
The revised order also claims that given “Congress’s enduring goal of limiting the intrusiveness 
of robocalls, we believe prudence counsels in favor of adopting limits at the lower end of the range”.  
This claim is wrong on many levels.  First, Congress’s primary goal in enacting the TCPA, as evident in 
both the law and supporting documentation, was to restrict telemarketing calls placed by equipment that 
would indiscriminately dial random numbers or blocks of numbers at a time.
33
   Calls by the federal 
government and its contractors to collect debt are nothing of the sort.  The Commission itself has 
recognized that debt collection calls are informational calls.
34
  Moreover, nothing in the record suggests 
that the federal government or its contractors are calling random numbers or blocks of numbers.  Indeed, 
the Treasury Department has said that it not the case,
35
and it would be a nonsensical waste of time and 
resources.  Second, three call attempts is the rock bottom of the range, as the attached chart makes clear.  
Third, setting the limit at three call attempts is far from prudent.   As the U.S. Department of Education 
wrote:  “[T]he FCC’s proposal to limit the number of covered calls to three per month per delinquency     
. . . would not afford borrowers with sufficient opportunity to be presented with options to establish more
reasonable payment amounts and avoid default, especially given that the proposal limits the number of 
initiated calls, even if calls go unanswered.”
36
  The Department of Education further characterized the 
three-call-attempt limit as placing “severe limitations” on calls, with “significant downsides to borrowers 
in terms of the information they need to make sound decisions to manage their debt effectively.”
37
  
                                                     
32
Navient notes that, “in the context of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, NCLC urged the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau to limit calls from debt collectors to three per week.”  Navient Comments at 44 (citing APRIL 
KUEHNHOFF AND MARGOT SAUNDERS, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, DEBT COLLECTION 
COMMUNICATIONS: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 4 (June 2015), available at
http://bit.ly/1LQxpDK.).
33
See also Navient Comments at 15.
34
See, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 
02-278, Report and Order, 27 FCC Rcd 1830, 1841, para. 28 (2012) (declining to require that prior express consent 
for non-telemarketing, informational calls, including debt collection calls, be provided in writing, as is the case for 
telemarketing calls).
35
See supra page 1 and note 3 (“Debt collectors are not using autodialers to cold call potential customers, but are 
instead using autodialers to contact individuals who have an existing relationship or indebtedness.”).
36
Letter from Ted Mitchell, United States Department of Education to Marlene Dortch, FCC, CC Docket No. 02-
278, at 4 (filed July 11, 2016) (Department of Education Ex Parte).
37
Id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
62
The revised order further states that “[n]othing in the Budget Act indicates that Congress intended 
to depart from that goal.”  But that, again, ignores the fact that the Budget Act is proof in and of itself.  If 
the Commission had taken a prudent course in interpreting the TCPA, then there would have been no 
need for a Budget Act exemption to the Commission’s rules.  Instead, the Commission’s interpretations of 
the TCPA were so unworkable that the Administration and Congress took the momentous step of 
overruling the Commission to authorize this specific class of callers to use autodialers without prior 
express consent to collect debt.
38
  By adopting limitations that are the same as those that apply to other 
callers (or even more restrictive as compared to other federal agency or contractor calls or texts), the 
Commission brazenly ignores the rebuke and guts the exemption.  Far from preventing “abuse and 
harassment”,
39
the order would curtail expected and desired communications and chill speech.
40
In addition, the revised order attempts to justify its specious waiver process by acknowledging 
that it lacks expertise regarding other federal laws and rules.  I agree that the FCC is not the expert 
agency, but that is why the law directs the Commission to consult with the Treasury Department.  And it 
is why the Commission should have heeded the comments of the Department of Education, which is the 
expert agency with respect to its loans, stating that covered calls should not be limited to three per month.  
Instead, agencies will be subject to a waiver process, in which evidence presented by an expert agency 
“demonstrat[ing] . . . that a genuine conflict exists” will be merely “probative” of the need for a waiver.  
Moreover, agencies are on notice that the Bureau will also “consider any countervailing issues raised in 
the record” including whether the rules “necessarily require robocalls instead of, say, manual calls.”  
Additionally, the Commission makes no commitment that the Bureau will rule on any such requests in a 
timely fashion.  In short, the waiver process is cold comfort to any agency that thought it would get a fair 
shake from this Commission.  In reality, it is nothing more than a thinly veiled and wholly inadequate 
attempt to fend off additional complaints from the Administration and to survive judicial review.  
Finally, I object to the conclusion that consumers can stop calls altogether.  The order claims that 
“once a borrower has declared that he or she no longer wishes to receive these calls, there is no longer any 
reason for the calls to continue.”  That’s flat out wrong.  The reason the calls must continue is so that the 
federal government can collect its debts.  That is the ultimate purpose of the Budget Act provision.
41
  
While I am glad that the law also enables servicers to contact borrowers to offer relief before a loan ever 
becomes delinquent or enters default, should that occur, the government must be able to protect its 
financial interests, including by contacting debtors until the debt is paid or otherwise resolved to the 
government’s satisfaction. 
                                                     
38
See, e.g., Nelnet Comments at 2 (citing Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal 
Year 2016, at 128, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/spec.pdf) 
(“The Budget proposes to clarify that the use of automatic dialing systems and prerecorded voice messages is 
allowed when contacting wireless phones in the collection of debt owed to or granted by the United States. In this 
time of fiscal constraint, the Administration believes that the Federal Government should ensure that all debt owed 
to the United States is collected as quickly and efficiently as possible and this provision could result in millions of 
defaulted debt being collected. While protections against abuse and harassment are appropriate, changing 
technology should not absolve these citizens from paying back the debt they owe their fellow citizens.”).
39
Id.
40
See Navient Comments at 39-41 (raising First Amendment concerns about certain restrictions).
41
See, e.g., MBA Reply Comments at 13, 14 (“Creating a ‘stop calling’ right to receive covered calls frustrates the 
purpose of the Exemption and threatens to deprive consumers of important, beneficial calls. . . . Congress did not 
create a ‘stop calling’ right within the Exemption nor did it authorize the Commission to create such a right. In fact, 
creating a “stop calling” right would substantively repeal, not implement, the Budget Act Amendment.”).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
63
In the end, the order simply ignores the costs to consumers and the economy when these calls are 
not made, as well as the benefits when they are.  As one Treasury Department official highlighted, 
Delinquencies are reported to the private credit bureaus and can inhibit a borrower’s 
access to future credit for buying a home, starting a business, or completing or furthering 
education. Borrowers may also have a portion of their wages taken directly from their 
paychecks. In other words, they may disengage from personal and professional 
development, and may drop into the ranks of those preyed upon by scams. Additionally, 
the fresh start afforded by bankruptcy is not available for student loan debt, unless 
student loan debtors mount a case that proves undue hardship.  Given the weight of these 
and all the consequences I’ve discussed, as well as the importance of higher education in 
our nation’s prosperity, it is imperative that we structure an effective servicing and 
collection regime focused on helping borrowers avoid default and delinquency.
42
Moreover, as the Department of Education wrote:
The consequences of default on a federal student loan are indeed severe, and effective 
communication to borrowers by their loan servicers before default is critical to helping 
borrowers avoid those consequences.  Defaulted borrowers are subject to offset of federal 
and state payments (including tax refunds and Social Security benefit payments) under 
the Treasury Offset Program, administrative wage garnishment, reporting of the default 
to credit reporting agencies, ineligibility for additional student loans, and potentially a 
civil judgment.  Given these consequences, some of which are only available to collect on 
debts owed to the federal government, it seems appropriate to weigh the cost of a 
potentially unwanted phone call against garnishing the wages of a borrower who could 
have been enrolled in an income-driven repayment plan.  
When callers do reach borrowers, however, borrowers get the information and relief that they need.  As 
one commenter noted:  “More than 90 percent of the time that we have a live conversation with a federal 
loan borrower, we are able to resolve a loan delinquency.”
43
  
Rather than facilitate these critical conversations, the order would chill them.  Countless 
consumers will see their credit ruined for want of a phone call or text.  Companies working for the federal 
government will face predatory lawsuits.  And the federal government still won’t be able to collect its 
debts.  That is contrary to the law and detrimental to all parties involved.  I cannot support it.
                                                     
42
Remarks of Deputy Secretary Raskin on Student Loans at the National Consumer Law Center's Annual Consumer 
Rights Litigation Conference (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/JL2689.aspx.  See also ABA/CBA Comments at 2 (“Communications between a borrower and lender 
may help the borrower prevent missed payments, minimize negative impacts to a borrower’s credit report, take 
advantage of loan modification or other workout programs, and avoid default. Successful loan workouts and other 
foreclosure alternatives also reduce credit risk and financial losses to the United States, helping taxpayers recoup the 
$139.3 billion of delinquent debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States. Using efficient dialing technology to 
communicate with borrowers enables more contacts and important conversations to occur with fewer personnel, 
reducing the cost of servicing and collections. This, in turn, promotes the affordability and availability of consumer 
credit.”); Reply Comments of Nelnet, Inc., CC Docket No. 02-278 (filed June 21, 2016) (summarizing comments 
filed by multiple parties showing the costs to consumers when calls are not made and the benefits when they are).
43
Navient Comments at 6; see also id. at 2 (“If we are able to speak to a borrower in real-time, we can counsel the 
borrower on the more than 16 repayment options—some of which involve monthly payments as low as $0 per 
month—or the 32 deferment, forbearance and forgiveness options available to the borrower.”); see also id. at 7-8 
(“Conversely, 90 percent of borrowers who default on their federal student loans do not have a live telephone 
conversation with us, despite our efforts to reach them.”).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
64
Finally, I do respect that the Commission must issue an order to comply with the Budget Act.  
My vote to dissent is not a vote against complying with the law.  Rather, given that the Chairman has 
secured the necessary votes to approve this item and move it forward, my particular vote line does not 
impact whether the agency is in compliance with the law.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
65
Federal Communications Commission FCC 16-99
66