Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-72
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Urbanmedia One
Application for a Construction Permit for a New 
Low Power FM Station (WJPC-LP) at Chicago, 
Illinois 
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File No. BNPL-20131114ADR
Facility ID No. 193259
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION
Adopted:  June 9, 2017 Released: June 12, 2017  
By the Commission: 
I. BACKGROUND
1. We have before us a Reconsideration Petition by Sound of Hope Radio NFP (SOH), 
permittee of a new unbuilt low power FM (LPFM) station at Chicago, Illinois.
1
  SOH contends that the 
Commission erred in an Order
2
that dismissed SOH’s Application for Review (AFR)
3
of the Media 
Bureau’s (Bureau) authorization of another Chicago LPFM station. For the reasons stated below, we 
dismiss the Reconsideration Petition.
2. SOH, Urbanmedia One (UM), and Morton College (Morton) filed mutually exclusive 
applications for LPFM construction permits (SOH Application, UM Application, and Morton 
Application, respectively).  Each received equal points under the Commission’s comparative analysis
released on September 5, 2014.
4
  On December 4, 2014, the Bureau dismissed the SOH Application and 
granted the applications of UM and Morton, which had aggregated points pursuant to a timesharing 
agreement.
5
  SOH, on December 8, 2014, sought reinstatement of its application by amending to specify a 
different transmitter site that was not in conflict with the UM and Morton technical proposals (SOH New 
Site Amendment).  On January 7, 2015, while SOH’s reinstatement request was pending, SOH petitioned 
for reconsideration of the UM (but not the Morton) grant.
6
In that First Petition, SOH alleged that UM 
had not negotiated timesharing in good faith and was unqualified because it had engaged in unauthorized 
“pirate” broadcasting.
7
  SOH expressed a desire to withdraw its then-pending site amendment, in favor of 
                                                     
1
SOH Petition for Reconsideration (filed Jan. 17, 2017) (Reconsideration Petition).
2
Urbanmedia One, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 31 FCC Rcd 13759 (2016) (Order).
3
SOH Application for Review (filed Aug. 19, 2016) (AFR).
4
The Commission compared the applications using a point system, tentatively selected SOH, UM, and Morton, and 
afforded them opportunities to file petitions to deny, timesharing agreements, and/or major change amendments to 
resolve their mutual exclusivities.  Commission Identifies Tentative Selectees in 111 Groups of Mutually Exclusive 
Applications Filed in the LPFM Window, Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd 10847 (2014).  SOH did not file a petition to 
deny UM’s tentative selection.
5
See Broadcast Actions, Public Notice, Report No. 48382 (MB Dec. 9, 2014); 47 CFR § 73.872(c).
6
See SOH Petition for Reconsideration and Rescission (filed Jan. 7, 2015) (First Petition).  
7
First Petition at 1-2.  See 47 CFR § 73.854; Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  SOH argued that 
grant of an authorization to an alleged pirate was beyond the Commission’s statutory authority. See AFR at 9-10.  
The Bureau had, however, found that SOH did not adequately support its piracy claims.  James L. Winston, Esq., 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-72
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reverting to its original proposal and negotiating a new timesharing arrangement with Morton.
8
  On 
January 14, 2015, the Bureau reinstated the SOH Application, accepted the SOH New Site Amendment, 
and granted the now “singleton” SOH Application, a grant to which SOH did not object.  Grants of the 
Morton and SOH Applications became final in early 2015.
9
  SOH continued, however, to prosecute its 
petition against UM.
3. The Bureau or Commission has, at each stage of this proceeding, dismissed SOH’s filings 
as procedurally flawed.
10
  The Order, of which SOH now seeks reconsideration, dismissed SOH’s AFR
for lack of standing because SOH had not demonstrated that it was “aggrieved” by grant of the UM 
Application.
11
The Commission observed that the SOH and UM proposals were not in technical conflict, 
and concluded that SOH was not injured by the grant of the UM Application and would not receive any 
redress were the UM grant rescinded.  The Commission stated, for example, that even if it were to rescind 
the UM permit: (1) Morton would not be required to share time with SOH;
12
(2) the Commission’s rules
would provide no opportunity for SOH and Morton, whose applications are no longer pending, to 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
Letter Order (MB Jul. 20, 2016) (Second Staff Decision) at 4.  SOH now repeats and expands upon its piracy claims
by contending that grant of the UM permit was void at inception.  Reconsideration Petition at 3, 6-7, citing FCC v. 
Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Commission must act within scope of its authority).  SOH also equates the 
instant proceeding to a case, not relied upon earlier, in which the Commission dismissed an LPFM application when 
piracy had been established.  Id. at 8-9, citing WKMJ Radio Live The People Station, Inc., Letter, 30 FCC Rcd 
13779 (MB 2015), rev. denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 13779, recon. dismissed, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 31 FCC Rcd 4306 (2016).  The WKMJ case has no bearing here because SOH has 
failed to establish its piracy allegation.  See Second Staff Decision at 4 (finding the piracy allegations “are supported 
by only a single, identical affidavit demonstrating no first-hand knowledge of piracy but only that the affiant viewed 
one of the internet pages on November 16, 2014” and accordingly concluding that “SOH has raised no substantial 
question of ‘pirate’ operations or false certification”).  Furthermore, as the Order explained, any action involving the 
UM Application is irrelevant to the processing and grant of the amended SOH Application.  Order, 31 FCC Rcd at 
13760-61, para. 4.
8
See First Petition at 15, n.10.  SOH later explained that it preferred the original site so it could serve a Chinese-
American audience that is located outside the service area of its permitted facilities.  See Reconsideration Petition at 
4; AFR at 5, n.5.
9
SOH did not seek reconsideration of the grant of the Morton Application or of the SOH Application, as amended.  
Nevertheless, SOH currently argues that “the construction permit grants are not final,” without further explanation.  
See Reconsideration Petition at 12.  
10
See James L. Winston, Esq., Letter Order (MB Mar. 4, 2015) (dismissing First Petition as late-filed because SOH 
had not objected to the UM Application prior to grant); Second Staff Decision (dismissing as repetitious SOH 
Petition for Reconsideration (filed Apr. 2, 2015) (Second Petition) and briefly discussing three issues therein that 
SOH alleged were “critical.”); Order, 31 FCC Rcd at 13761, para. 4 (dismissing the AFR for lack of standing).
11
Order, 31 FCC Rcd at 13760, para. 4, citing 47 U.S.C. § 155(c)(4); 47 CFR § 1.115(a).  To demonstrate standing 
before the Commission, a petitioner must show (1) personal injury, (2) that is traceable to the challenged action, and 
(3) a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress the claimed injury. The injury prong can be shown 
through allegations of: (1) harm of a direct, tangible, or substantial nature; (2) residence in the service area of the 
subject station; or (3) regular listenership which is not the result of transient contacts.  Order, 31 FCC Rcd at 13760,
n.11, citing Tabback Broad. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 11899, 11900 n.3 (2000).  
12
Order, 31 FCC Rcd at 13760, para. 4.  SOH responds that the Commission erred by overlooking evidence that 
Morton was prepared to enter into a timesharing arrangement with SOH.  Reconsideration Petition at 20, citing 
Declaration of Booker Wade (Second Petition, Exh. 11, para. 9).  The alleged “evidence” is a hearsay statement 
from an SOH consultant who states only that Morton told him that Morton believed, in timesharing discussions with 
UM, that UM had also tried to contact SOH.  Id.  Nothing in the record indicates a current desire by Morton to share 
time with SOH, even if that were possible now.  
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-72
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negotiate a time sharing agreement;
13
and (3) SOH’s desired return to its original site would constitute a 
major change that is not permitted outside of a filing window.
14
  
4. The primary arguments in the Reconsideration Petition are that SOH: (1) had no prior 
opportunity to address the issue of standing; (2) did not need to show that it was aggrieved because its 
injury, as a party to the proceeding, is “self-evident” and “presumed;”
15
(3) has an interest which “vested” 
upon the December 4, 2014 dismissal of SOH’s Application, and that this interest cannot be lost 
thereafter;
16
and (4) has standing based on several newly-raised factors.
17
SOH asks the Commission to 
reconsider its procedural dismissal of the AFR and review SOH’s substantive arguments.
II. DISCUSSION
5. Once the Commission has dismissed an Application for Review, it will entertain a 
petition for reconsideration only upon a showing of new facts or changed circumstances.
18
  SOH’s 
contention that standing is a new matter which it could not have addressed previously is meritless and 
forms no basis for reconsideration.
19
  The Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act) places 
                                                     
13
See 47 CFR §§ 73.871(a)(4), 73.872(c).
14
See 47 CFR § 73.870(a), (b) (site relocations greater than 5.6 km are major and allowed only during filing 
windows).  SOH was able to make such a change through its earlier amendment because the Commission had 
opened a 90-day filing window through December 8, 2014 for amendment of certain then-pending LPFM 
applications to eliminate technical conflicts.  See Commission Identifies Tentative Selectees in 111 Groups of 
Mutually Exclusive Applications Filed in the LPFM Window; Announces 30-Day Petition to Deny Period and 90-
Day Period to File Voluntary Time-Share Proposals and Major Change Amendments, Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd 
10847, 10851-52 (2014).  No filing window has subsequently been opened.  Nor has the Commission ever allowed a 
non-conflicting permittee like SOH to amend into a mutually exclusive relationship with a granted permit.  See id. at 
10853-54 (amendments that would cause new application conflicts not permitted). 
15
Reconsideration Petition at 3, 12-13.  SOH also contends that the Commission incorrectly relied on Section 
5(c)(4) of the Act (applications for review may be filed by “any person aggrieved”) instead of Section 405(a) of the 
Act (petitions for reconsideration may be filed by “any party thereto, or any other person aggrieved or whose 
interests are adversely affected”).  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 155(c)(4), 405(a).  SOH argues that Section 5(c)(4) is 
inapplicable to broadcast construction actions except to the extent that it is incorporated by reference in Section 
405(a).  Reconsideration Petition at 9.  It further argues that Section 405(a)’s broader language confers standing on 
parties without further demonstration of injury and that standing as a party, once established, continues.  Id. at 10, 
12.  See note 19 infra.     
16
Id. at 11, 17-18, citing Nevada Radio-Television Inc., 40 FCC 2d 444 (1973).
17
Id. at 13-17.  See infra, note 21.  SOH newly argues that: (1) it would receive redress by rescission of the UM 
permit and award of UM’s timeshare periods to SOH; (2) a requirement for SOH to demonstrate standing is
inconsistent with consideration, in the enforcement context, of piracy-based complaints from the general public; and 
(3) the Commission’s failure to address the merits of SOH’s allegations conflicts with an alleged Commission
practice to develop complete records.  Reconsideration Petition at 10-11, citing FCC Enforcement Advisory: 
Unauthorized Radio Broadcasting is Illegal, Public Notice, 31 FCC Rcd 1680 (EB 2016) (how to file a complaint 
about pirate broadcasts).
18
47 CFR §§ 1.106(b)(2), (c); 1.115(g).
19
See Reconsideration Petition at 2.  We also reject SOH’s argument that the Commission should have applied 
standing requirements enunciated in Section 405(a) of the Act rather than those in Section 5(c)(4).  See supra note 
15; 47 U.S.C. §§ 155(c)(4), 405(a).  Each requirement is virtually identical and requires, respectively, that persons 
seeking reconsideration or review be “aggrieved.”  For purposes of the Order, Section 5(c)(4) was the governing 
provision because it enunciates requirements for Applications for Review of actions taken on delegated authority, 
the very type of pleading SOH filed.  SOH’s claim that Section 5(c)(4) does not apply to broadcast actions is 
incorrect and inconsistent with precedent cited in the Order for a related point.  See Chapin Enter., LLC, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 29 FCC Rcd 4250, 4252-53, para. 7 (2014), cited in Order at n.19 (Chapin) 
(pursuant to Section 5(c)(4), informal objector that had not shown how it was “aggrieved” lacked standing to seek 
review of staff action on broadcast modification application).  Moreover, we reject SOH’s suggestion that the 
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-72
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responsibility upon each petitioner to provide “specific allegations of fact sufficient to show” standing as 
a party-in-interest.
20
  SOH had the opportunity—indeed, the obligation—to demonstrate standing earlier 
in this proceeding, but was silent on the issue.
21
  SOH is incorrect when it argues that the Bureau 
affirmatively found SOH to have standing and that the Commission had no basis for a contrary finding.
22
The Bureau did not address SOH’s failure to demonstrate standing.  Rather, the Bureau dismissed SOH’s 
filings on other procedural grounds.  SOH has raised no new facts or changed circumstances that it could 
not have presented earlier concerning its lack of standing and we, thus, dismiss the Reconsideration 
Petition.    
6. In any event, we find no error in the Commission’s prior determination that as a non-
mutually exclusive applicant, SOH lacked standing to challenge the grant of UM’s application. We also 
confirm that standing cannot be established simply by relying on the wholly speculative assumption that 
denying UM’s application somehow would have led to a timesharing agreement between two other 
permittees -- SOH and Morton (whose application has now been granted in its own right).  Moreover, we 
observe that SOH’s new explanation of how it is “aggrieved”mischaracterizes SOH’s filings.  SOH 
claims that it filed and has interests in two separate applications, the window-filed SOH Application 
(which was dismissed in December 2014) and the amended SOH Application (which was granted in 
January 2015).
23
  SOH, however, filed only one application and amended that application to specify a 
different transmitter site that was not in conflict with the UM and Morton technical proposals to receive a 
grant.
24
  SOH now attempts to claim ongoing interests in two different versions of the same application.
25
  
Any interest that SOH had in its original proposal ended when it amended its application, specified a 
different transmitter site, and thereby eliminated the mutual exclusivity between its application and that of 
Morton and UM.  Furthermore, that application was granted, as amended, and became final.  We reject 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
standing language in Section 405(a) is more lenient than that in Section 5(c)(4).  Section 405(a)’s reference to “any 
party” in addition to “any other person aggrieved,” serves simply to exclude informal objectors (non-party 
participants who have not demonstrated how they are “aggrieved”) from seeking reconsideration.  E.g., Chapin, 29 
FCC Rcd at 4252, para. 7.
20
47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1).
21
In a belated attempt to fill this gap, SOH has now raised new claims to have standing as: (1) a competitor (despite 
lack of contour overlap) for listeners and underwriters in the Chicago radio market; (2) a representative of 
approximately 35,000 members of Chicago’s Chinese-American community within the original service area which 
allegedly would lose distinct minority programming from SOH’s site change; (3) an entity with a studio and 
residences of the majority of its directors within the contour of the UM station; and (4) an organization whose 
station manager, Sophie Wang, allegedly listens regularly to UM’s station from the SOH offices.  See 
Reconsideration Petition at 14-17. However, SOH does not claim that these are new facts or changed circumstances
or facts that were unknown to SOH until after its last opportunity to present them.  Rather, these are facts that SOH 
failed to present in its AFR and cannot raise now.  
22
See Reconsideration Petition at 11 (“The Denial Order has improperly recast SOH as no longer a party in interest, 
although the Bureau properly recognized SOH as such”), citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (“post hoc” rationalizations are inadequate).  
23
Reconsideration Petition at 3.
24
SOH’s single application always bore one facility identification number (FID 196767) and one file number 
(BNPL-20131114BNK).  Had SOH been able to file two applications, each would have received a different 
numerical designation.  Also, in such circumstances, the Commission would have dismissed the “second”
application as an inconsistent application.  See 47 CFR § 73.3518; Hispanic Broad. Inst., Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 30 FCC Rcd 10560, 10562, para. 4 (2015).  
25
See generally Town of Sanford v. U.S., 140 F.3d 20, 23 (1
st
Cir. 1998) (rejecting as “[h]aving one’s cake and 
eating it, too” an attempt to claim standing to sue for monies owed while enjoying the benefits of have settled the 
matter). The Commission’s rules specifically prohibit the prosecution of alternate technical proposals. See, e.g., 47 
CFR §§ 73.3518 (inconsistent applications), 73.3520 (multiple applications).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 17-72
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SOH’s argument that its standing “was vested” as of the staff’s dismissal of its original application on 
December 4, 2014, and that its amended application filed on December 8, 2014, is “not determinative” as 
to the issue of standing.
26
  SOH bases its argument on a misreading of Nevada Radio-Television, Inc.,
27
but that decision simply recognized that standing is not conferred on a person that lacks current harm, 
even if such person alleges potential future harm.
28
  Finally, we reject SOH’s assertion that the 
Commission should have addressed the merits of its AFR.
29
The Commission found that SOH was not 
aggrieved by the Bureau’s underlying action and therefore dismissed the AFR for lack of standing.
30
  
Accordingly, having dismissed the application for lack of standing, the Commission was not obligated to 
address SOH’s application for review on the merits.
7. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Reconsideration filed by Sound 
of Hope Radio NFP on January 17, 2017, IS DISMISSED.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
                                                     
26
See generally Beach TV Properties, Inc. v. Solomon, Civ. Act. No. 15-1823, mem. op. at 12 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 
2016) (low power television applicant that assigned its interests to another lost standing to sue); Immaculate 
Conception Apostolic School, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 31 FCC Rcd 13754, 13756-57, para. 8 (2016) 
(where Commission permit grant was based on promise to remain local, permittee was no longer qualified when it 
relocated); Susquehanna Radio Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 29 FCC Rcd 13276, 13277, para. 3 (2014) 
(proposed assignee had no standing after Commission granted licensee’s request to cancel license); Jacksonville 
Educators Broad., Inc., Letter Decision, 6 FCC Rcd 1617, 1617 (1991) (no standing to seek reconsideration of 
denial of assignment and modification of license that has been surrendered, making matter moot).
27
See Reconsideration Petition at 11, 17-18 (citing Nevada Radio-Television Inc., 40 FCC 2d 444 (1973)).
28
Nevada Radio-Television Inc., 40 FCC 2d at 445, para. 2 (stating that Section 405 of the Communications Act 
“confers standing to seek reconsideration upon persons who are aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected 
by a Commission action, not upon those who may be aggrieved or whose interest may be adversely affected upon 
the happening of some contingent event in the future”) .
29
Reconsideration Petition at 18-19.
30
See Order, supra.