1672 Federal Communwations Commission Reports Agreement, Licensee And Public Interest Groups Reimbursement Agreement Petitions filed by citizens groups for approval of the reimburse ment provisions in six Iicensee-citizens group settlement agree ments, granted. Reimbursement provisions will be approved only if the expenses claimed were incurred in the representation of the citizens groups before the Commission and are documented. FCC 78--875 BEFORE THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMlSSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554 In re Petitions for Special Relief of Citizens Communications Center Requesting Express Commission Approval of Reimbursement Pro visions Contained in Licensee-Citizens Group Agreements in Certain Cases. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (Adopted: December 21, 1978; Released: January 2, 1979 By THE CoMMISSION: COMMISSIONERS LEE A,'lD WASHBURN CONCURRING IN TIlE RESULT; COMMISSIONER QUELLO CONCURRING AND ISSUING A STATEMENT; CoMMISSIONER BRO\VN ISSUING A SEPARATE STATEMENT. 1. On April 12, 1978, and June 15, 1978, Citizens Communications Center (Citizens), a public interest law firm, filed petitions for special relief requesting the Commission to expressly approve the reimburse ment provisions contained in the licensee-citizens group agreements in the following cases: Starr WQIV, Inc., 59 FCC 2d 257 (1976) (hereafter WNCN): Wa.shington Star Communications, Inc., 61 FCC 2d 223 (1976) (hereafter WMAL); New South Radio, Inc., DN 20463 (1977) (hereaf ter, WACT); WGAL Television, Inc., DN 21034, (1977) (hereafter WGAL); F70wer City Television Corp., FN BTC-S341, (1977) (hereaf ter WOKR); Newhouse Brion Reparts all prevailed upon a station for special agreements, (with the added inducement of reimbursement for litigation), the resulting chaos could threaten the quality and stability of broadcast service. Public interest law firms enjoy tax exempt status under Section 501(c)(3). The IRS has ruled that "...public interest law firms are charities only so long as they provide representation in cases of important public interest that are not economically feasible for private firms." Revenue Rule 75-76 notes that"...the likelihood or certainty of an award of fees is a factor affecting the appropriateness of the particular ·litigation for a public interest law firm...As legal precedent is developed indicating the strong possibility of the recovery of fees, certain issues may become economically feasible for private litigants and thus inappropriate for public interest law firm participa tion." I would, again, like to make the point that "public interest law firms" is often a misnomer. These firms represent private groups who often seek special treatment and consideration for their own view points at the overall public's expense. It is questionable whether tax exemption is valid for some "public interest" groups that promote their own narrow,private version of public interests. I will be watching with interest as further requests are made for express "approval" of reimbursement agreements. Ifsuch requests are granted in the future they will serve to further develop the precedent spoken of in Revenue Rule 75-76. Once it becomes obvious that a "likelihood or certainty of an award of fees" does, in fact, exist, then I would expect that the IRS will review the charitable status of the petitioners. Therefore, I reluctantly concur in this result. SEPARATE STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER TYRONE BROWN RE: PETITIONS FOR SPECIAL RELIEF OF CITIZENS COMMUNICATIONS CENTER REQUESTING EXPRESS COMMISSION APPROVAL OF REIMBURSEMENT PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN LICENSEE-CITIZENS GROUP AGREEMENTS IN CERTAIN CASES The Commission's decision today to approve the reimbursement provisions contained in these licensee-eitizens group agreements is long overdue. There is no compelling reason in law or policy to deny explicit approval to these agreements. It should be emphasized that no substantive Commission policy is affected by today's action. The substance of licensee-citizen group agreements will still be a matter for the parties to negotiate and the Commission will continue to review such agreements to assure that they do not delegate nondelegable licensee responsibilities nor otherwise contravene applicable statutes, rules or policies. In the past, we have "accepted" or "not accepted" these agreements. As Commissioner Hooks said in a case wherein the Commission 70 F.e.C. 2d Licen.see-Citizen Group Agreements 1677 det:rn:ine~that it would not "object" to a withdrawal agreement after reVlewmg Its terms: "Although the Commission may be chary of putting its express imprimatur on this agreement and emits a flutter of disinterested ambiguities, its actions speak: louder than its words. . . . The agreement herein is de facto and de jure approved. Anyone doubting that result is wearing blinkers," Star WQIV, Inc., 59 FCC 2d 257, 261 (1976) (dissenting). The failure to explicitly approve reimbursement provisions has adversely affected only two public interest communications law firms which are exempt from taxation under Section 50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Through the semantic adjustment we make today, with respect to these cases, these firms will be permitted to be reimbursed for their expenses under these particular agreements without jeopard izing their tax-exempt status. The refusal to expressly "approve" the reimbursement agreements in these cases could only have been motivated by two factors. The first is disapproval of the activities of these public interest firms in representing views and groups which traditionally have gone unrepre sented in Commission deliberations. The Commission has never claimed this as the basis for indirectly inhibiting participation by public interest law firms, and I doubt that a majority of Commissioners, at least in recent years, would have been willing to go on record as subscribing to that view. The second-and more generolis-reason for not technically "ap proving" these agreements in appropriate circumstances is that requiring the Commission to examine and approve reimbursement provisions will place a substantial burden on the Commission's processes. The short anSwer to this contention is that such agreements are not numerous enough to cause concern about burdening our processes and, moreover, failure to grant approval may prolong challenges which themselves place burdens on our staff. And, of course, we already have a mechanism for approval of similar reimbursement provisions in cases where an applicant for a construc tion permit drops out of a comparative proceeding for a new facility and is permitted to be reimbursed for its "expenses" by the remaining applicant. Those decisions, though mandated by statute, 47 U.S.C. § 3U(c), require the Commission to get even further involved in reviewing the judgments of the parties since the agreements are often accompanied by lucrative "consultancy" agreements for the applicant which bows out of the competition. We analyze such provisions to make certain that they are not disguised "pay offs" for .dismissing a competing application. This procedure certainly can be modified to deal with the simpler issues raised by reimbursement agreements in the petition-to-deny context. Thus, a desire to limit the burdens on our processes does not stand in the way of approving these agreements. There are substantial public policy arguments in favor of our approving these agreements. While I 70 F.e.c. 2d 1678 Federal Communications Commission &ports applaud the belated action we take today in these particular cases, I hope that we may soon revisit the general question of "approving" such agreements in name as well as in fact. 70 F.C.C. 2d